ML20046B154
| ML20046B154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1993 |
| From: | BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046B151 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308030184 | |
| Download: ML20046B154 (55) | |
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i ATTACHMENT (1) !
i ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT l
l Baltimore Gas and Electric Company ,
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant July 26,1993 I
9308030184 930726 PDR m
P ADOCK 05000317 b? i PDR J ' i
a TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 INTRO D UCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 2.0 ELECDUCAL EQUIPMENT ....... . .. . . ..... . . .. .. .... ... .. . .... .. .. . . . .. .. .. - ~ 2-1 2.1 D ESI G N B AS ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.2 ' ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ..... . .................... ... . . .... . 2-1 2.2.1 EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUr10N S Y 5 TEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 -
2.2.2 MODIFIED ELECTRICAL DISTRIBtTTION S YSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 2.3 AC POWER SYSTEM FOR THE SACM DIESEL GENERATOR ..... ... 24 2.3.1 4.16 KV S Y STEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 2.3.2 ~ 4 80 V S Y STEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 2.3.3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR DIESEL GENERATOR CLASS 1E EQUIPMENr 2-7 2.3.4 PRCHECTIVE RELAYING AND RELAY COORDINATION ........ .. ..... 2-9 2.4 125 V DC POWER S YSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2.4.1 S YSTEM D ESCRIFTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2.4.2 COMPONENr DESC RIPTION .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 ,
2.5 DIESEL GENERATOR AUXILIARY SYFTEMS (ELECTRICAL) ............ 2-13 2.5.I LIGHUNG S YSTEM S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ..... ...... . 2-13 !
2.5.2 COMMUNIC ADON S Y STEM S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14 2.5.3 LIGtTrNING PR OTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 l 2.5.4 OTHER DIESEL G ENERATO R A UXIW ARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 3.0 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS....................................................................... 3-1 3.1 CONFORMANCE WTTH NRC GENERAL DESIGN CRrrERIA ....... .... 3-1 3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ..... 3-3 3.3 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I INSTRUMENTATION AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT .................. . 3-4 3.3.1 S EISMIC QUALIFICATION CRrrERIA . ..... .... ...... .. ... ...... ..... . . .. ... 3-4 3.3.2 PROCEDURES FOR QUALIFYING ELECDUCAL EQUIPMENT AND INFTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 3.4 A C S YSTEM AN ALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 ,
3.4.1 4 .16 KV S Y STEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 3.4.2 4 80 V S Y TTE M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 3.4.3 CABUNG..................................................................... 3-8 3.5 DC S YSTEM AN ALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10 3.6 INDEPENDENCE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS .............................. 3-11 3.6.1 CABLE ROtrrING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11 '
3.6.2 CABLE DERATING AND CABLE TRAY FILL ..................... ........ 3-11 3.7 ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ... ..... .... 3-12 3.8 FIRE PROTECTION FOR ELECDUCAL EQUIPMENT ...................... 3-12 3.9 EXCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .... ....... ...... .. .. ...... 3-13 3.9.1 DHYSICAL IDENTIFICATION . ... .... ........ . .... .... .............. ...... 3-13 >
3.9.2 ISOLADON D EVICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14 3.9.3 PHYSICAL SEPARATION CRrr2RIA ......... ....... ... .... ... ........ 3-14 !
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APPENDICES ,
APPENDIX A CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS t !
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LIST OF TABLES ,
2-1 BATTERY DESIGN PARAMETERS 3-1 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IN THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING LIST OF FIGURES 2-1 EXISTING DIESEL GENERATOR ARRANGEMENT 2-2 NEW DIESEL GENERATOR ARRANGEMENT 2-3 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING 4.16 kV DISTRIBUTION 2-4 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING 480 V DISTRIBUTION 2-5 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING 125 V DC DISTRIBUTION L
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t ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company is adding a safety-related SACM diesel generator at th' e two-unit Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. This diesel generator will support station blackout req 0irements, as required by NUMARC Station Blackout Initiative 1, and provide spare capacity for future plant modifications. The installation of the SACM diesel generator will increase the site total to four safety-related diesel generators and reduce the required coping duration to four hours. In addition, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company is installing an alternate AC power source which will meet the criteria provided in NUMARC 87-00, Appendix B and Regulatory Guide 1.155, Appendix A.
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Currently, Calvert Cliffs has three diesel generators; one dedicated to each unit (Diesel Generator Nos. I1 and 21) and one that swings to the accident unit (Diesel Generator No.12). Unit I will be served by the additional diesel generator. A diesel generator project was initiated to install the new air-cooled 5400 kW (nominal continuous rating) Class IE diesel generator in the 4.16 kV bus system.
A nonsafety-related diesel generator will be installed for use as an alternate AC source (AAC) and other hardware and software modifications are being made to bring Calvert Cliffs into compliance with the Station Blackout Rule.
Numerous systems inside the plant will be affected during the installation of the diesel generators.
He work consists of mechanical, electrical and control system modifications and realignment of the existing diesel generators. Modifications and additions to the Control Room panels will be required to accommodate the additional diesel generator controls.
In order to obtain NRC approval of these modifications to our on-site emergency electrical system, we are preparing a series of design reports for the NRC's review. These design reports will cover appropriate aspects of the diesel generator design, qualification and changes to our electrical distribution system. The design repons have been broken down into several groups to aid in preparation and review by the NRC. These groups are; Civil Engineering, Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems, Instrumentation and Controls, Electrical Engineering and Stanup and Surveillance Testing. In addition to the design reports, other correspondence will be provided to describe any deviations, exceptions or exemptions to the codes and standards we are using to design the modifications. Discussion concerning our alternate AC power source and changes to the Technical Specifications will be provided at a later date in separate submittals.
The diesel generators are the standby, onsite source of power for the safety-related systems necessary to safely shut down the units following a design basis accident and a loss-of-offsite power. This report establishes the functional adequacy of the safety-related SACM diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries.
This design report is not intended to commit 3G&E to compliance with NUREG/CR 0660 or NUREG/CR 5078 concerning the reliability and maintenance of the SACM diesel generator. BG&E ,
is monitoring industry progress with regard to the development of guidance for implementing ;
NUMARC 87-00, Appendix D, and resolving Generic Issue B-56. Present operating procedures and i practices have successfully maintained the three existing diesel generators within Appendix D*s target l l-1 Rev.0 1
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. s ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT .
DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT j l
reliability of .975, and it is anticipated that actions for the SACM diesel generator would provide ,
similar results. I This design report also provides system design information for the Diesel Generator _puilding electrical systems. His information includes an analysis of the Diesel Generator Building AC and DC distribution systems to demonstrate compliance with the NRC's General Design Criteria. His design report also addresses the extent to which Safety Guide 6, Regulatory Guide 1.9, draft Revision 3' and Regulatory Guide 1.32 are followed. Compliance with other Regulatory guides is in accordance with practices previously approved for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. >
Chapter 6.0 of the SACM Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report describes the quality assurance requirements for the fabrication and installation of SSCs associated with the SACM diesel generator. To the maximum extent possible, construction sequencing will be planned to allow
- installation during unit operation, with minimal disruption of plant activities. Critical installation interfaces will be planned to occur during scheduled unit outages. Connection of new electrical systems, such as the 4.16 kV distribution system, to existing systems will be addressed under the 50.59 process.
8 Where Regulatory Guide 1.9, draft Revision 3 is referenced, the design of the diesel generators uses the draft copy dated April 1992.
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I o i ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT ;
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l 2.0 ELECTRICAL EOUTPMENT This chapter of the design report contains information regarding electrical equipment located within the Category I Diesel Generator Building. The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power PlantTelectrical distribution system is described in Chapter 8 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
De following sections briefly describe the electrical system for the existing diesel generators and the modifications which will be required to accommodate the SACM diesel generator.
2.1 DESIGN BASES _
- Portions of electrical power systems which are required for operation of the diesel generator are designed to remain functional during and after a safe shutdown eanhquake.
- The electrical power system is capable of being tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 18. i
- In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 17, the diesel generator and its electrical support systems are designed such that failure of a single component will not prevent operation of plant safety-related equipment essential to safe shutdown. In the event that a single failure occurs which places a diesel generator out of service, each unit has a dedicated diesel generator to supply power to redundant safety-related ,
equipment required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation.
- The failure of the nonsafety-related electrical equipment will not compromise any safety-related systems, structures or components.
- Cables and circuits associated with diesel generator systems are designed to meet the requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
2.2 ELECTRICAL DISTR.IBUTION SYSTEM ne Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant's standby (onsite) electrical power system2 is described in Chapter 8 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The following subsections briefly describe the arrangement of the existing diesel generators and the modifications which will be required to accommodate the SACM diesel generator.
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2 Hereafter referred to as the standby electrical power system. ,
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a ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REIORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 2.2.1 ExisTrNo ELECTRICAL DisTRIBlTT10N SYSTEM The onsite electrical distribution system for each unit consists of six 4.16 kV buses, two, of which :
supply power to the 4.16 kV engineered safety features. The existing engineered safety features electrical system incorporates the two-channel concept wherein independent electrical c~oritrols and power systems supply redundant 4.16 kV engineered safety features.
A simplified diagram of the existing diesel generator arrangement is shown in Figure 2-1. The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant is currently provided with three diesel generators, designated as DG 11, DG 12 and DG 21, all of which are required to be operable when both nuclear units are operating. Two of the three diesel generators may each supply power to a single 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus at each unit (each unit has two engineered safety features buses). The third diesel generator may supply power to any one of the four engineered safety features buses. Any two diesel generators are capable of supplying sufficient power for the operation of engineered safety features during accident conditions on one unit, and shutdown loads of the other unit concurrent with a loss of-offsite power. Another safety function of the diesel generators is to provide independent standby power sources capable of supporting an orderly shutdown of the plant with a loss of offsite power and no loss-of-coolant accident.
The three diesel generators are currently capable of being aligned to the four 4.16 kV engineered safety features buses' as follows:
Diesel Generator DG 11 can be aligned to either the 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11 (Unit 1 Facility ZA) or the 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 21 (Unit 2 Facility ZA). DG 11 is normally aligned to Emergency Bus 11.
Diesel generator DG 21 can be aligned to either the 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 24 (Unit 2 Facility ZB) or to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 14 (Unit 1 Facility ZB). DG 21 is normally aligned to Emergency Bus 24.
Diesel generator DG 12 is available for alignment and connection to any one of the 4.16 kV Emergency Buses 11,14,21 and 24. Normally closed disconnect switches align DG 12 to supply power to either Emergency Bus 14 or 21. Although DG 12 is aligned to both buses, the diesel generator output breaker must still be closed to supply power to the engineered safety features bus for the affected unit. This is performed automatically by the control logic for the diesel generator or manually (if required).
He three diesel generators in the standby power system are automatically started by either a 4.16 kV Emergency Bus undervoltage signal or a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). For a SIAS, the diesel generator is not connected to a 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus unless an undervoltage condition exists on the engineered safety features bus, as indicated by an undervoltage signal. The 2
The 4.16 kV engineered safety features buses are designated as 4.16 kV Emergency Buses 11, 14,21 and 24.
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4 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENT.RATOR PROJECT undervoltage protection system is described in Section 2.3.4'. With three diesel generators available, the onsite electrical power system design provides independent standby power sources capable of operating systems for safety injection, containment spray and miscellaneous 480 V auxiliary devices for accident mitigation.
In the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant-accident accompanied by a simultaneous loss of offsite power, the diesel generator control logic identifies the 4.16 kV g: .ccred safety features busce for the affected unit, sheds all sequenced loads and assigns two of the three diesel generators aligned to supply power to these buses (providing all three diesel generators are available). During the loss-of-coolant-accident accompanied by simultaneous loss of offsite power, each of the 4.16 kV engineered safety features buses is automatically stripped of all loads except the 480 V Unit Bus feeders. These 4.16 kV engineered safety fer es buses are then reloaded by the loss-of-coolant incident (LOCI) sequencer. Tae LOCI sequenc. mitially blocks the SIAS and/or the containment spray actuation signal to the equipment to be sequenced and then unblocks these signals in programmed steps. The loads on the individual steps are started within the time limits used in the UFSAR Chapter 14 Safety Analysis. The diesel generator loading sequences are described in Table 8-7 of the UFSAR.
i 2.2.2 MODIFIED ELECTRICAL DISTRIBtmON SYYTEM The addition of one safety-related SACM diesel generator to the standby electrical power system will .
enhance the ability to provide reliable electric power during all modes of operation and shutdown conditions of the plant. A simplified diagram of the new diesel generator' arrangement after the addition of a SACM diesel generator is shown in Figure 2-2.
Upon a loss of both the preferred and the alternate (offsite) power source, the SACM diesel generator, designated as DG 1A, is a standby power source that furnishes power to shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition under all design basis event scenarios. It supports the operation of the plant engineered safety features and is designated as a Class IE system.
The existing standby electrical power system has two independent load groups per unit. In the modified standby electrical power system, each load group will have its own standby electrical power supply including a dedicated diesel generator, buses, transformers, loads and associated AC and DC
- control power. Each load group is independently capable of safely shutting down its associated unit.
With the addition of the SACM diesel generator and the re-alignment of the three odginal diesel generators, there is a dedicated diesel generator for each 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus (or ,
two dedicated diesel generators per unit). In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, draft Revision 3, the criteria for sizing the SACM diesel generator is based on the loading sequence described by Table 8-7 in the UFSAR (with the addition of the 480 V loads associated with the Diesel Generator Building
- Unless otherwise stated, specific sections within this report are referred to by section number alone (i.e., Section 2.3.4). Reference to sections from other documents will cite the title of the specific document.
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t ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT auxiliaries). Each of the diesel generators has adequate capacity to meet the power requirements of l its dedicated 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus. The SACM diesel generator will supply power i via its 4.16 kV Unit Bus to the dedicated 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus.
l As with the current diesel generator configuration, each of the dedicated diesel generators in the standby power system is automatically started by either a 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus undervoltage signal or a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). For a SIAS, the diesel generator is not connected to the 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus unless an undervoltage condition exists on the engineered safety features bus, as indicated by an undervoltage signal. With four dedicated diesel generators available, the onsite electrical power system design provides two independent standby power sources per unit capable of supplying power to engineered safety features.
The new SACM diesel generator plus the three original diesel generators will be dedicated to the 4.16 kV engineered safety features buses as follows:
- The S ACM diesel generator, designated DG 1 A, will be connected to the 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11. The existing connection from DG 2A (formerly DG 11) to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11 will be removed.
- DG 21, redesignated as DG 2B, will remain connected to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 24. The existing connection from DG 21 to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 14 will be removed.
- DG 12, redesignated DG IB, will be dedicated to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 14. Existing connections to the other 4.16 kV Emergency Buses will be removed.
2.3 AC POWER SYSTEMS FOR THE SACM DIESEL GENERATOR 2.3.1 4.16 kV SYSTEM A new Class IE 4.16 kV bus, Unit Bus 17, will be provided to supply power from the S ACM diesel generator, DG 1 A, to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11. The new Class IE 4.16 kV Unit Bus will be located in the Seismic Category I Diesel Generator Building. Feeder cables from the unit bus will be connected to safety-related cables run through Seismic Category I structures and ductbanks to the 4.16 kV engineered safety features buses in the plant. The feeder cables consist of one continuous run of cabling from the unit bus in the Diesel Generator Building to the engineered safety features bus in the plant. A 50.59 Evaluation will be performed to evaluate the Category I ductbanks and cable installation. A simplified drawing of the 4.16 kV distribution for the Diesel Generator Building is shown in Figure 2-3.
Inside the Diesel Generator Building, separation is maintained between safety-related and nonsafety-related electrical systems, including associated feeder cables, in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 384-1974 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2. Regulatory 2-4 Rev.O
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'. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT Guide 1.75, Revision 2 provides 16 clarifications or supplements to IEEE 384-1974 regarding physical independence of .-ircuits and electric equipment comprising or associated with Class IE power systems. These supplements are complied with during the design of Class IE systems for the SACM diesel generator. Cable routing to maintain physical separation is described in further detail in Section 3.6.1. ~~
The Class IE 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 is normally supplied power by 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11.
Emergency Bus 11 is equipped with two existing sets of four undervoltage relays.
The first set of relays are set to provide a two-out-of-four undervoltage signal upon a loss of bus voltage. He second set of four relays are set to provide a two-out-of-four undervoltage signal on a sustained bus undervoltage. Upon receipt of a twomut-of-four logic signal from either set of four undervoltage relays, the preferred power supply circuit breakers are opened. The dedicated diesel generator is then automatically staned and connected to its 4.16 kV Unit Bus in order to supply power to the affected 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus.
Upon receipt of a SIAS, the dedicated diesel generator is automatically started. It is only connected to the 4.16 kV Unit Bus to supply power to the 4.16 kV engineered safety features bus when a loss of offsite power is indicated by a two-out-of-four logic signal from either set of four undervoltage relays. He starting circuits for the SACM diesel generator are discussed in the Instrumentation and -
Control Systems Design Report and the Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report.
A 4.16 kV disconnect switch is provided between the diesel generator and the diesel generator breaker in the Class IE 4.16 kV Unit Bus as a maintenance disconnect. i The diesel generator auxiliaries and Diesel Generator Building auxiliary loads are supplied from 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 via a 4.16 kV-480 V unit substation and associated motor control centers ;
(MCCs). j The only time the SACM diesel generator can operate in parallel with offsite power is during testing l of the diesel generator.
The diesel generator output breaker, bus tie feeder breaker to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11 and unit substation service transformer feeder breaker at 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 are controlled locally from switchgear and remotely from the Main Control Board (MCB) Electrical Power System Panels in the Main Control Room. Status indication (indicating lights and meters) is provided at the switchgear and the MCB. Although breaker status indication is always available locally, a local / remote switch is provided for each switchgear circuit breaker to select one of the control and status indication locations and to isolate the control at the other location. His local / remote switch provides for local operation of the switchgear in the event of control room evacuation due to a lack of control room habitability or a fire. Alarms necessary for the operation of the 4.16 kV system and equipment are also provided at the MCB Electrical Power System Panels.
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' ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 2.3.2 480 V SYSTEM L The 480 V system for the Diesel Generator Building provides power to the diesel generator auxiliaries and Diesel Generator Building auxiliary loads. It consists of a 480 V unit substation and two 480 V MCCs. The 4.16 kV-480 V unit substation transformer supplies power from 4.16 kV TJiiit Bus 17 to the 480 V unit substation bus. The unit substation trusformer is a dry-type transformer. Its primary winding is connected in delta and the secondary winding, which is solidly grounded, is connected in wye.
The 480 V unit substation (480 V Unit Bus 17) supplies power from the unit substation transformer
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to the two 480 V MCCs for the Diesel Generator Building. The 480 V _MC_C which supplies the _
Diesel Generator Building safety-related loads is Class IE. A second 480 V MCC for the Diesel Generator Building is non-Class IE to supply the nonsafety-related auxiharles in the Diesel Generator Building. The unit substation circuit breaker for the non-Class IE MCC is designed as a Class IE isolation device. This prevents a failure in the non-Class IE components from affecting the Class IB system in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2. He 480 V unit substation breakers are provided with solid-state overcurrent and ground fault trip devices. A simplified drawing of the 480 V distribution for the Diesel Generator Building is shown in Figure 2-4 The 480 V MCCs supply power through molded-case circuit breakers to various motors and other auxiliary loads in the Diesel Generator Building. Generally, motors rated 50 hp and below and loads that require frequent cycling are supplied power from the 480 V MCCs through combination motor starters. Dese combination motor starters include a magnetic only, molded-case circuit breaker.
Other auxiliary loads are fed by thermal-magnetic molded-case breakers.
Where necessary, various safety-related Diesel Generator Building 208/120 V loads, such as heating and ventilation system (HVAC) controls and status indication for various equipment, will be fed from a Class IE 480 V MCC in that building via a 480-208/120 V dry-type transformer and a 208/120 V Distribution Panel located in the Class IE MCCs.
Essential and emergency lighting that require diesel generator backed power are fed from the Class IE 480 V MCC in the Diesel Generator Building via a 480-208/120 V dry-type transformer and a 208/120 V Essential Lighting Panel. These panels are classified as nonsafety-related. De 480 V feeder breaker (at the MCC) is designed as an isolation device in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2.
The 208/120 V nonsafety-related auxiliary loads for the Diesel Generator Building are supplied from the nonsafety-related 480 V MCC via a 480-208/120 V dry-type transformer and a 208/120 V Distribution Panel located in the non-Class IE MCC.
The 480 V unit bus incoming feeder breaker can be remotely controlled from the MCB Electrical Power System Panels and locally controlled at the 480 V unit substation. Both local and MCB status indication are provided for the incoming feeder breaker and the 480 V unit bus. A local / remote switch is provided in the 480 V unit substation to select breaker control to either the local or remote location. He local / remote switch provides for local operation of the unit substation incoming feeder 2-6 Rev.O
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, i ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT l DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT breaker in the event of control room evacuation due to a lack of control room habitability or a fire.
Only local control and status indication is provided for 480 V unit substation MCC feeder breakers.
Alarms necessary for the operation of the 480 V System are also located at the MCB Electrical Power System Panels.
The 480 V motor and other auxiliary loads switched by using combination motor starters are controlled as required by the specific process system of which they are a part. In general, these motor and auxiliary loads have control and status indication provided at the local process control panel that is located in the Diesel Generator Building. In addition, status indication is provided at the MCC. ,
Loads fed by 480 V MCC circuit breakers generally have only manual local control. A shunt trip may be provided if required by a process system. This shunt trip, however, must be manually reset at the 480 V MCC.
2.3.3 COMPONENT DEsCRFTIONs FOR DIESEL GENERATOR class IE EOtnPMENT 4.16 kV Switchcear The function of 4.16 kV switchgear located in the Diesel Generator Building is to provide a means for switching power from the diesel generator to the 4.16 kV emergency bus in the plant. It also provides a feeder via a 4.16 kV-480 V unit substation transformer to the 480 V unit bus that supplies the auxiliary loads in the Diesel Generator Building.
The 4.16 kV switchgear is metal-clad construction. The switchgear has vacuum circuit breakers, three-pole, electrically operated and of the stored energy type with a five-cycle interrupting time. i The circuit breakers are electrical ly and mechanically trip-free and have anti-pumping features.
Provisions are made for manual (non-electrical) closing and tripping of the circuit breakers.
Mechanical and electrical interlocks are provided to prevent the removable circuit breaker element from being inserted into or withdrawn from its operating position while the circuit breaker is closed.
The 4.16 kV maintenance disconnect switch for the diesel generator is included in the metal-clad switchgear assembly.
480 V Unit Substations The function of the 480 V unit substation associated with the Diesel Generator Building is to provide power from the 4.16 kV switchgear to the 480 V MCCs (one Class 1E and one non-Class IE) located in the Diesel Generator Building. The 480 V unit substation is a metal-enclosed switchgear. It consists of an incoming section, a dry-type transformer and a low voltage section. The low voltage section includes a metering and relay cubicle and drawout-type power circuit breakers.
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4 ELECTRICAI ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT i
ne incoming section consists of a transformer enclosure sized to provide adequate space to i accommodate the termination of the field cable and considers the minimum bending radius of the ,
, incoming cable.
The unit substation transformer is a dry-type transformer. The transformer rating is calculated to accommodate the maximum auxiliary power requirements of equipment located within the Diesel Generator Building plus an adequate margin for future loads.
ne metering and relaying cubicle is located adjacent to the incoming low-voltage circuit breaker.
It :ontains the protective relaying and metering devices provided for the 480 V system. ,
~~
480 V Motor Control Centers The function of the 480 V MCCs is to supply power from the 480 V unit substations to the diesel generator auxiliaries and Diesel Generator Building auxiliary loads. A Class IE and a non-Class IE 480 V MCC are provided as discussed in Section 2.3.2.
1 The 480 V MCCs consist of enclosed vertical sectionsjoined together to form a rigid, free standing assembly. He vertical sections have a vertical bus divided into compartments for individual combination motor staners or feeder breakers.
A 208/120 V AC Distribution Panel complete with molded-case circuit breakers for feeder circuits is provided in each 480 V MCC. His distribution panel is fed from the 480 V MCC via a dry type transformer rated 480-208/120 V. The transformer is adequately sized for tiie expected load and to accommodate additional future loads.
l Motors i
ne following paragraphs describe motors used in auxiliary systems for the SACM diesel generator and its Diesel Generator Building. In general, motors are squirrel cage induction type suitable for '
direct across-the-line starting. When available, a motor with a service factor of 1.15 is supplied. ;
Motors less than 1/2 hp are single phase and rated at 115 V,60 Hz for use on a 120 V,60 Hz, single phase, solidly grounded system.
Motors 1/2 hp through 200 hp are three phase and rated at 460 V,60 Hz for use on a 480 V,60 Hz, i three phase, solidly grounded system.
In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, draft Revision 3, safety-related (Class IE) motors for the SACM diesel generator are capable of starting and accelerating their loads to full speed with 80%
of the ratui motor nameplate voltage. They are also sized to provide full load torque during a momentary voltage dip of 75% of rated motor nameplate voltage at the terminals.
2-8 Rev.O
$ ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT i
2.3.4 PROTECTTVE RELAYING AND RELAY COORDINATION Electrical relaying, ground connections, structural safeguards and mechanical systems are provided to assure adequate personnel safety and to prevent or limit equipment damage during system short t circuits or mechanical component failures. Due to the accident mitigation function of1he diesel i generators, most of the protective devices are only permitted to trip the diesel generator during periodic testing when the unit is paralleled to the system. When the diesel generator is started due ;
to a SIAS,4.16 kV bus undervoltage signal or emergency manual switch (break glass) operation, the only protective devices that are permitted to trip the diesel generators are those devices that prevent ;
rapid destruction of the diesel generator:
- Engine overspeed,
- Low lube oil pressure,
- Generator ground current, and
- Generator differential current.
Other protective devices for the SACM diesel generator are described in the Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report.
Protective relays are provided for the Diesel Generator Building electrical power system on the basis of speed, accuracy, selectivity, reliability and sensitivity. Selection and coo'rdination of protection relays are designed to selectively isolate faulted equipment or circuit (s) in order to prevent damage :
to the remaining power system, minimize system disturbances and protect plant personnel.
Overcurrent Protection The feeders to and from the 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 are protected by overcurrent relays.
The low-resistance grounding of the 4.16 kV system limits ground fault currents to 400 A, which is consistent with the existing plant design. Each feeder on 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 (with the exception >
of the diesel generator breaker) is provided with ground fault relays that are coordinated to isolate l ground faults in the affected zone. Window type current transformers are used to eliminate the false tripping due to residual current of a starting imush current.
He 4.16 kV feeder breakers are provided with the following overcurrent protection: !
l
- Re bus tie feeder is protected by inverse-time overcurrent relays. :
1
- The unit substation transformer feeder is protected by instantaneous and inverse-time )
overcurrent relays. 1 2-9 Rev.O i
. s ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT l DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT A voltage-restraint inverse-time overcurrent relay in the diesel generator feeder provides back-up protection to the diesel generator protective relaying.
~
ne 480 V Unit Bus 17 incoming and outgoing feeders are provided with solid-state overcurrent trip '
devices with long-time and short-time delay characteristics. i i
ne 480 V power system employs a wye distribution system with the neutral solidly grounded. The ground fault protection is provided by solid-state trip device which includes a ground fault e:ement.
Backup ground fault protection is provided by a ground fault relay in the unit substation transformer's neutral which trips the 4.16 kV Unit Bus service (unit substation) transformer feeder breaker.
~ ~
, Ground fault' protection is also provided for all 480 V MCC feeders. A window-type current l l transformer and a ground sensor relay in these 480 V MCC feeders provide a shunt trip of the molded-case circuit breaker for feeder only circuits an! ,e-energize the contactor for combination motor starters. The 480 V Unit Bus MCC feeder breaker's ground fault protection (part of the i breaker's solid-state trip device) is provided with a time delay feature which is t: sed for coordination with MCC feedet ground fault protection.
For overcurrer.t prote:ction, a minimum margin of 0.4 second is generally allowed for coordinatian of a primary protection device with the backup protection device. This margin accommodates breaker operating time, relay overtravel and manufacturing and setting tolerances. When a choice is made between two combinations of current tap and time dial settings, either of which will give acceptable operating time on maximum fault currents, the combination of a lower current tap and a higher time dial is chosen to provide better sensitivity at lower fault or overcurrent conditions.
Undervoltace Relayinc he 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 and 480 V Unit Bus 17 are provided with undervoltage relays that provide an alarm at the MCB Electrical Power System Panels.
An existing, dual level undervoltage protection system is provided on 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11 which is separate from the undervoltage protection systems for the three other enginected safety features buses. His dual level undervoltage provides the start and load signal to the SACM diesel generator DG IA.
A described in Section 2.3.1, two sets of dual level undervoltage relays are provided for each of the 4.16 Emergency Buses. One level of the durj level undervoltage relays is set for detection of loss of voltage at 59 percent of rated bus voltage with a time delay of 0.5 second. He second level of the dual level undervoltage relays is set at 90 percent cf rated bus voltage with a time delay of 7.5 seconds. Both levels of the dual level undervoltage relays operate in a two-out-of-four logic to disconnect the offsite power source, load s: sed the associated 4.16 kV Emergency Bus, and stan the dedicated diesel generator whenever the undervoltage setpoint has been exceeded for the required time delay. An additional 0.5 second delay after the diesel generator has been started and is ready to r.ccept load permits the decay of the residual bus voltage prior to closure of the diesel generator breaker.
2-10 Rev.0
, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT i
}
Synchroscope Operation i
The 4.16 kV Unit Bus 17 may be powered from either its offsite power source or its standby power source (diesel generator). Since these power sources may be paralleled during ~ testing, a synchroscope is provided on the MCB Electrical Power System Panels. This synchroscope allows the operator to verify that frequency and phase angle of the two source voltages are synchronized within the required limits before closing the breakers to parallel the two sources.
i 2.4 125 V DC POWER SYSTEM The 125 V DC power for the Diesel Generator Building arid the diesel generator auxiliaries is supplied by a dedicated 125 V DC power system. This system provides a reliable source of continuous power for cont ol and instrumentation in the Diesel Generator Building. In accordance with the recommendations of Safety Guide 6, the 125 V DC power system is independent and :
supports only the electrical load group associated with its diesel generator. The 125 V DC power system consists of a 125 V DC battery, battery charger, a safety-related distribution panel, a i nonsafety-related distribution panel and associated 125 V DC instrumentation. A simplified drawing !
of the 125 V DC power system for the Diesel Generator Building is shown in Figure 2-5. !
Portions of the 125 V DC power system which support the safety function of the diesel generator to I stan and supply power to 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 11 is designated as Class IE. Redundant and diverse Class 1E fuses are used as an isolation device to protect the safety-related 125 V DC !
distribution panel from faults which could occur in the nonsafety-related 125 V DC distribution panel.
l 2.4.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ,
The Diesel Generator Building houses a 125 V DC battery in its own room apart from the battery charger and distribution equipment. The Battery Room is provided with adequate lighting, ventilation and space to perform the battery maintenance and is continuously exhausted to ensure that hydrogen accumulation remains within the limits specified by IEEE 484-1987.
During normal operation the batte y charger is energized from the Class IE 480 V MCC located in the Diesel Generator Building. Tne battery charger maintains a constant voltage to supply (float) the battery with sufficient current to maintain it fully charged while supplying the DC loads. In the event of the loss of AC power, the 125 V DC battery will supply the required DC loads. When the AC power i: restored, the battery charger will be re-energized and resume normal operation. The battery is designed with adequate capacity to supply safety-related and nonsafety-related DC loads for four hours without the battery charger.
As required by Regulatory Guide 1.32, Revision 2, the capacity of the battery charger is based on ;
(a) the largest combined demands of the various steady-state DC loads during normal and post accident conditions and (b) have sufficient charging capacity to restore the battery from the fully discharged state to the required load capacity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2-11 Rev.0 :
i i
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REFORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT A battery fully charged condition is defined as the condition where there is sufficient charge to allow a complete battery discharge cycle upon loss of charger power. The continuous load cycle for the i
battery is the worst case based on normal and post-accident load scenarios for up to four hours.
However, as described in Section 3.5, the battery is not required to meet the requirements 'for station blackout. ~
De battery charger is provided with an equalizing timer to time equalizing charges. A current limiter is provided with the battery charger which can ' oe adjusted over the range of 100 to 125 i percent of rated current. The battery charger output is filtered to limit ripple voltage to a maximum l
of I percent rms with the battery disconnected.
~
The 125 V DC power system is ungrounded. A ground detection system is provided to signal an ~
alarm at the MCB when the system becomes inadvertently grounded. !
The controls and status indication for the 125 V DC power system are provided locally except for !
battery current and DC system voltage which are provided on the MCB DC System Panel. A system trouble alarm is also provided at the MCB DC System Panel.
The fuses used in the 125 V de system are selected based on both their minimum melting temperature !
and their total clearing time. These attributes are coordinated such that the melting temperature of i the upstream fuse will not be exceeded before the total clearing time of the fuse immediately downstream of it.
2.4.2 COMPONENT DESCRWTION f
125 V DC Battery i The 125 V DC battery is a 60-cell lead-calcium storage battery designed for full-float operation with a battery charger.
The load profile used to determine the battery size is established in accordance with IEEE 485-1983. ,
The load profile consists of a combination of transient loads and steady-state loads coincident with
{
a simultaneous loss of offsite power and a failure of the battery charger. Transient loads (including diesel generator start,4.16 kV breaker operation and flashing of the generator field) are added to the ;
i steady state loads (e.g., indication, protection, alarms and inverter loads) during the first and last minute of the profile duration. This loading scenario establishes the worst case DC load for sizing ,
the battery.
The battery is also sized based on the recommendations of IEEE 485-1983 using the temperature j correction factor based on the minimum ambient temperature of 50*F. Aging is compensated for by I adding an additional 25 percent capacity when sizing the battery. This allows for battery replacement i at 80 percent rated capacity. Similarly, additional design margin is also added for other criteria specified by IEEE 485-1983. The controlled portion of the battery duty cycle is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without battery charger support. The battery design parameters are provided in Table 2-1. 1 i
2-12 Rev.O i
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT h
A battery monitor continuously monitors battery voltage with respect to the battery charger to detect the loss of one or more cells. .
Battery Charcer :
The DC distribution system is provided with a 125 V DC battery charger. It has an AC input circuit breaker and a DC output circuit breaker for protection. The battery charger is designed to prevent the 480 V AC supply from becoming a load on the battery.
The battery charger is supplied with the following local instrumentation to monitor the status:
- 1) output voltage, 2) output current, 3) breaker position indication and 4) charger malfunction alarms. i The charger malfunction alarms includes input AC undervoltage, DC undervoltage, DC overvoltage and output circuit breaker open. A common trouble alarm for the DC system is provided in the Main Control Room at the MCB DC System Panel.
DC Distribution Panels ,
A safety-related and a nonsafety-related DC distribution panel is provided in the Diesel Generator i Building. These distribution panels consist of fusible disconnect switches in a panelboard. The nonsafety-related distributien panel is isolated from the safety-related panel by two redundant and diverse Class IE fuses connected in series.
2.5 DIESEL GENERATOR AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ELECTRICALT -
2.5.1 LicFrrmo SYSTEMS Minimum lighting levels for lighting systems in the Diesel Generator Building are provided in accordance with Illuminating Engineers Society standards to allow personnel access and cgress from all building areas.
Normal Lichtine System The normal lighting system for the Diesel Generator Building consists of fluorescent and high intensity discharge fi-tures. i Normal lighting panels are circuited, loaded and balanced to include spare capacity for future growth. l Area circuiting oflighting fixtures is staggered so that the failure of one circuit does not result in the -!
complete loss oflight for any area. The normal lighting panels also supply convenience receptacles that are located throughout the Diesel Generator Building. In addition, the normal ligbting panels ;
feed the general outdoor lighting required for personnel safety in the areas adjacent to the Diesel - .
Generator Building.
The normal lighting transformer and panels are supplied power from the non-Class IE MCC located in the Diesel Generator Building.
2-13 Rev.0 1
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT )
DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT t
Essential Lichtine System He essential lighting system provides the necessary illumination for long-term orderly plant shutdown operations in the event of a loss of the normal lighting system. Essential lighting is provided in the IE Switchgear Room, Diesel Generator Building Control Room, Battery Room, Diesettenerator Room, Dient Generator Trench Area and the corridors and stairwells required to access these areas.
He essential lighting system is not safety-related. However, it is supplied from the 208/120 V Essential Lighting Panel which is fed via the 480-208/120 V dry-type Essential Lighting Transformer from the Class IE 480 V MCC located in the Diesel Generator Building. The Class IE 480 V MCC i feeder breakers are equipped with an appropriate isolation device (as defined by Regulatory Guide 1.75).
Emercency Lichtine System The emergency lighting system provides a minimum amount of lighting for the Diesel Generator Building access / egress and in local control areas required to achieve a hot shutdown condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section J. Emergency lighting is orovided by individual, self-contained, fixed battery power pack units with a minimum 8-hour rating. Lighting units are either the sealed beam or the fluorescent type. ,
Shutdown areas in the Diesel Generator Building include the Diesel Generator Building Control !
Room, IE Switchgear Room, portions of the Diesel Generator Room and the corridors and stairwells required to access these areas.
The 8-hour minimum rated DC battery power pack units receive their normal AC supply from the ,
208/120 V Essential Lighting Panel. In addition to the Appendix R requirements, emergency exit !
signs and emerpacy lighting are provided in the Diesel Generator Building as required by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101 and local fire code requirements. ;
Security Lichtine ,
Existing security lighting will be extended as required for protected area barriers, yard areas and roofs associated with the Diesel Generator Building. When the security perimeter is extended to include the Diesel Generator Building, security lighting will be addressed in a 10 CFR 50.59 Safety ;
Evaluation.
T 2.5.2 CoMut7mcxrioN SYSTEMS j The following conventional plant communication systems are extended to the Diesel Generator Building.
I
- 1. Public Address Systems (both the Gai-Tronics and the Northern Telecom System), l 1
I 2-14 Rev. O j i
l
'. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT
- 2. Commercial Telephones (Northern Telecom System), and
- 3. Sound-Powered Phones (Plant Use). .
For the public address system (Gai-Tronics) and sound-powered phones, the communic ~alion wiring and raceway is standard commercial design in accordance with NFPA 70-1990. For the Northern Telecom System, the wiring and raceway are the same as those used for Diesel Generator Building auxiliaries and non-Class IE instrumentation for diesel generator systems.
Communication systems required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E are not impacted by the addition of a ,
SACM diesel generator.
2.5.3 LictrrNINo PRUTECDON Lightning protection for the Diesel Generator Building is designed in accordance with NFPA 78, Lightning Protection Code and the recommendations of Nuclear Energy Liability Property Insurance ;
Association (NELPIA). Installation is in accordance with the ' Underwriters Laboratory Standard UL 96A.
Since the Diesel Generator Building is primarily a reinforced concrete building, the preferred method of lightning protection is air terminals. These air terminals provide a cone of protection for the Diesel Generator Building. The air terminals are arranged uniformly on the roof of the building and coordinated with the other lightning protection in that area. 'Ihe Diesel Generator Building ai' terminals are interconnected by bare copper wire downcomers and the entire network connected to '
the plant grounding grid.
Any projections from the Diesel Generator Building roof which could be damaged by lightning will be protected by a suitably grounded air terminal in accordance with NFPA 78.
2.5.4 OTHER DIESEL GENERATOR AUXILIARTEs Diesel generator DG 1 A is provided with a starting air system, fuel oil storage and transfer system, l' cooling water systems, lube oil system and combustion air intake and exhaust systems. These :
systems are described in detail in the Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report. .
Electrical drives or loads required to support any of the diesel generator auxiliary systems are l designed as described in Section 2.3.3.
l i
t i
2-15 Rev.0 l
l
'. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT TABLE 2-1 BATTERY DESIGN PARAMETERS Capacity 1070 AH (minimum) i 1
Voltage 125 V DC (Nominal) l Number of Cells - -
l Design Temperature 77 *F 5 'F Battery Float Condition 2.17 to 2.25 V/ cell Equalizing Charge 2.33 V/ cell Minimum Operating Voltage 1.85 V/ cell I
I l
l l
Rev.O I
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l
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FIGURE 2-2 NEW DIESEL GENERATOR ARRANGEMENT
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ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 3.0 15ESIGN OF STRUCTURES. COMPONENTS. EOUIPMENT ann SYSTEMS t
His chapter describes the principal electrical engineering features of the Diesel Generator Building and the equipment located within them.
3.1 CONFORMANCE wrrH NRC GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA Safety-related structures, systems and components (SSCs) for the S ACM diesel generator are designed ~
using all applicable design criteria specified in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Specific general .
design criteria which are applicable to electrical systems include:
Criterion Criterion Number Quality Standards and Records 1 Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena 2 Fire Protection 3 i Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases 4 l Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components 5 Instmmentation and Controls 13 Electric Power Systems 17 l Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems 18 l
l Based on the recommendations given in Section 3.3.1.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3, the :
following paragraphs describe how the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Regulatory Guide l.32, Safety Guide 6, GDC 17, and GDC 18 are complied with during the design of the standby ;
electrical power system modifications. Provisions for surveillances and testing of the diesel generator l Class IE electric power system are described in a separate design report. ;
Criterion 17 !
The electrical power systems modifications associated with the addition of a safety-related diesel :
generator to the standby power system will further minimize the probability oflosing electric power ,
from any of the remaining supplies as a result of or coincident with the loss of power generated by ;
the nuclear power plant, the loss of power from the transmission network or the loss of power from onsite electric power supplies. j The standby power system, including the new SACM diesel generator, is designed to have sufficient ,
capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions i of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational ;
occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
l l
l 3-1 Rev.0 '
1 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT De standby power supply, including the 125 V DC battery, and the onsite distribution system have sufficient independence, redundancy and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.
The description of the design and capacity of the SACM diesel generator and its addition to the standby power system is provided in the Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report and Chapter 2 of this design report.
Criterion 18 Class IE electric power systems for the SACM diesel genuator are designed in order that the following aspects of the system can be periodically tested:
- The operability and functional performance of the components of the diesel generator Class IE electric power system (e.g., diesel generator, engineered safety features bus and DC system)
- The operability of these electric power systems as a whole and under conditions as close to design as practical, including the full operational sequence that actuates these systems.
Non-Class IE electrical components will be inspected, maintained and tested on a routine basis without affecting the rest of the system. Protective relaying will be periodically tested.
Safety Guide 6 i
He AC and DC safety-related equipment are separated into redundant load groups, each of which is connected to an independent diesel generator. De alternate AC diesel generator will be capable of being connected to any of the four engineered safety features buses through normally open disconnect switches. These disconnect switches will be interlocked to prevent paralleling diesel generators or connecting redundant load groups together. No provisions are made to parallel standby ;
power sources or connect redundant load groups together.
Reculatory Guide 1.9. draft ' Revision 3 His Regulatory Guide describes means acceptable to the NRC staff for monitoring diesel generator reliability and identifying reasonable evidence that the diesel generator reliability has not fallen below the target reliability values selected for compliance with 10 CFR 50.63.
The design of the SACM diesel generator and its electrical systems complies with the design considerations described in Section 1 of the Regulatory Position of Regulatory Guide 1.9, draft Revision 3. Compliance with Sections 2 and 3 will be discussed in the Testing Design Report.
J 3-2 Rev.0 3 1
$ ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT Reculatory Guide 1.32. Revision 2 For the SACM diesel generator, the criteria, requirements and recommendations of IEEE 308-1974/1980 are generally acceptable to the NRC Staff and provide an adequate basis for l complying with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 with respect to the design, operation and testing of electric power systems, subject to the qualifications identified in the guide. The addition of the SACM diesel generator conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.32.
3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS wo COMPONENTS Electrical equipment is classified as safety-related or nonsafety-related in accordance with the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.49, paragraph (b). This definition is consistent with the broader I definition of Nuclear Safety-Related in ANSI /ANS 51.1-1983 which is "SSCs designed to perform l a nuclear safety function." A nuclear safety function is any function that is necessary to ensure:
1
- 'Ite integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary 1
- The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition
- The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of plant conditions that could result in potential offsite exposures that are comparable to the guideline exposures of i 10 CFR Part 100 l
As defined by IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC) Standards such as IEEE 308 and IEEE 323, electrical equipment that meets this criteria is identified as Class IE. ANSI /ANS 51.1 assigns Class IE equipment to Safety Class 3. Nonsafety-related electrical equipment is designated as non-Class IE and is assigned Safety Class NNS for non-nuclear safety. A list of significant safety-related electrical equipment is provided in Table 3-1.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, Revision 3 identifies Class IE electric systems that provide the emergency electric power needed for functioning of plant features and classifies them as Category I. Regulatory Guide 1.29, Revision 3 also extends Category I to include those portions of SSCs whose continued function is not required but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any plant feature described in the regulatory guide to an unacceptable safety level. This extension is also consistent with 10 CFR 50.49, paragraph (b)(2). 10 CFR 50.49 also includes certain post-accident monitoring equipment as safety-related. Safety-related post-accident monitoring equipment is defined by Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 and ANS 4.5-1980.
The plant specific classification criteria based on these requirements is found in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant List of Safety-Related Items Manual also called the 'Q-List'. All new or modified equipment for the Diesel Generator Building will be classified in accordance with the Q-List.
3-3 Rev.0
l ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT Physical identification of electrical circuits is in accordance with the accepted practices for existing equipment. Section 3.9.1 discusses the physical identification requirements in further detail, t
3.3 SEISMIC OUALIFICATION OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I INSTRUMENTATION AND ELECTRICAL EOUIPMENT This section discusses the seismic analysis methods used for electrical systems in the Diesel Generator Building. He geologic and seismologic investigations conducted to support construction of the Diesel Generator Building are described in the Civil Engineering Design Report. The Civil Engineering Design Report also describes the methods and procedures used to develop the seismic input required for the dynamic analysis of the Diesel Generator Building and the auxiliary systems contained within it. He seismic analysis of cable trays and supports is described in Sections 3.7.3 and 3.9 of the Civil Engineering Design Report.
3.3.1 SElsMIC OUALIFICAT10N CRrTERIA Class IE electrical equipment in the Diesel Generator Building is qualified in accordance with either IEEE 344-1975, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 1, or with IEEE 344-1987 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 2. Qualification by experience, addressed in !
Section 9.0 of IEEE 344-1987, is only employed through the use of analysis or test data from previous qualification programs. Qualification by experience is further described in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.2 PROCEDURES FOR OuAttFYING ELECDUCAL EOUTPMENT AND INsTRi> MENTATION The following paragraphs describe analyses and testing methods which are used to qualify electrical system components. De adequacy of the equipment's seismic design is demonstrated by one of the following methods:
- Analysis
- Testing under simulated seismic conditions
- Combination of testing and analysis The selection of a method to establish the qualification of a component is based on the function, type, size, shape and complexity of the component. Regardless of the method selected, the qualification is based on the seismic forces corresponding to the design basis earthquake. The design basis i earthquake for the Diesel Generator Building is defined as five operating basis earthquake (OBE) events and one safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) event. The number of maximum stress cycles for each event is 10. Given the low number of total cycles (60) and the fact that, for an SSE, component stresses would be limited to 90 percent of the applicable materials yield strength, fatigue failure is 1 not a concern for any components qualified by analysis. For components qualified by testing, 1 3-4 Rev. O j
4 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT potential fatigue induced failure is addressed by simulating the effects of five OBEs followed by one SSE. i l
The seismic input corresponding to the mounting location of a componen is defined by the applicable required response spectra (RRS) which accounts for potential amplification of the building motions through intervening supports. The RRS is obtained by increasing the amplitud3 of the floor response spectra (FRS) by ten percent. The methodology used to develop the FRS used for seismic analyses is described in the Civil Engineering Design Report.
Oualification By Analysis Qualification by analysis is performed in accordance with the applicable sections of IEEE 344-1975/1987.
The analyses verify that the Class IE equipment and equipment supports will successfully meet their safety-related performance requirements when subject to the stresses induced by the combination of operating and seismic loads defined below:
- The combined normal operating stresses and the stresses due to the OBE do not exceed the allowable working stress limits that are acceptable as good practice as set forth in the applicable design standards and codes. However, no increase in the allowable working stress resulting from the consideration of seismic loads is allowed, unless permitted by the codes applicable to equipment used for nuclear service.
)
- Re combined normal operating stresses and the stresses due to the SSE do not exceed 90 percent of the minimum guarateed yield stress of the material. .
De loading combinations that produce the maximum stress and deformation are considered.
Where possible, the fundamental frequency of electrical equipment, including supports, is determined by analysis. For equipment having a fundamental frequency equal to or greater than 33 Hz, the equipment is considered to be rigid. Equipment with a fundamental frequency below 33 Hz is .
considered to be flexible. Where electrical equipment is so complex that fundamental frequencies cannot be calculated, it is qualified by testing.
For rigid equipment, the seismic forces are obtained by concentrating its mass at the center of gravity and multiplying it by the maximum floor acceleration. The maximum floor acceleration is obtained from the FRS applicable to the location at which the equipment is mounted. The loads caused by the accelerations in the three orthogonal directions are then combined by the square-root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares (SRSS) method.
Flexible equipment is analyzed using either the static coefficient analysis method (equivalent ctatic load method) described in IEEE 344-1975/1987, or the modal response spectrum analysis technique described below.
3-5 Rev. O
'. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT In the modal response spectrum analysis technique, the accelerations used to analyze flexible equipment are obtained from the appropriately dampened RRS. The appropriate damping values are obtained from Regulatory Guide 1.61, Revision 0. When using the response spectrum analysis technique, frequencies and mode shapes are determined for two onhogonal horizontal directions and the vertical direction. The seismic loads include the effects of directional response and multi-modal response. To obtain the directional response, the resulting loads caused by the accelerations in the .
three onhogonal directions are combined by the square-root-of-the-summf-the-squares method. The I multi-modal response, including the effect of closely spaced modes, is obtained in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.92, Revision 1.
Dynamic models must adequately represent the analyzed system. This representation includes correct j mass pcint selection so as to represent all significant modes. . Electrical equipment is mathematically l
modeled as:
1
- Lumped masses connected by massless elastic structural members, or
- As an assemblage of finite elements, or l
- Any other acceptable mathematical model that adequately describes the mass and stiffness propenies of the equipment The number of masses used is sufficient to define the dynamic behavior of the equipment within the frequency range of interest. He mass and stiffness of equipment appendages, as well as the
) flexibility of the supports, is also considered in the mathematical model of the equipment.
Significant torsional effects resulting from eccentricity between an equipment's center of gravity and its center of mass are represented in the mathematical model. J Oualification By Testine Qualification by testing is performed in accordance with the applicable sections of IEEE 344-1975/1987. A description of both the SSE and OBE, including seismic accelerations and durations, used for the design of SSCs in the Diesel Generator Building is provided in the Civil Engineering Design Repon. The duration of the strong motion portion of each eanhquake is assumed to be at least 15 seconds. This time period is used as the duration of each vibration test run. A vibration test run simulates the strong motion of a single SSE or OBE.
The vibration testing simulates the effects of:
- Nonseismic vibration (e.g., pump vibration, if applicable)
- Five OBEs
- ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT i
DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT Vibration test results are satisfactory if no malfunctions or failures cccur during or after any portion of the vibratory testing. A malfunction or failure is defined as that which would inhibit the required performance of the safety-related function (s) of the equipment. The equipment-specific acceptance criteria is based on the safety-related performance requirements.
Oualification By Experience Previously qualified equipment of a design that meets the requirements of equipment specifications can be used in the Diesel Generator Building. In this case, the previous seismic qualification '
documentation is used in lieu of requalifying the equipment provided the following conditions are satisfied: -
- The previous seismic qualification must have used a- methodology consistent with the requirements of the equipment specifications
- The existing qualification documentation must have addressed required response spectra which meet or exceed the FRS developed for the equipment's mounting location within the Diesel Generator Building (increased by a ten percent margin) ,
- Re existing qualification documentation must have identified and addressed the possible ,
impact of aging, including nonseismic vibration, on the seismic capability of the equipment l 3.4 AC SYSTEM ANALYSIS The following subsections provide analyses which further describe compliance with the NRC's General Design Criteria and regulatory guides. These analyses supplement the AC power system descriptions provided in Section 2.3. Compliance with GDC 17 and 18, Safety Guide 6, Regulatory Guide 1.9 and Regulatory Guide 1.32 are described in Section 3.1. ,
3.4.1 t.16 kV SYSTEM The rating of the 4.16 kV switchgear is selected from the preferred ratings of IEEE C37.06 to provide a conservative margin of safety based on the required interrupting capability. The 4.16 kV emergency bus switchgear is rated at 250 MVA. The required rating is based on the AC system short circuit calculation performed in accordance with IEEE C37.010 and IEEE 141 (Red Book). The power system, diesel generator, and connected motors are considered in the model for determining the fault currents. All motors connected to the buses are considered to be operating when the short circuit occurs.
3-7 Rev.0 )
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'. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 3.4.2 480 V SY5 TEM The interrupting rating of the 480 V unit substation is determined from the preferred ratings ofIEEE C37.16 to provide a conservative margin of safety. De required interrupting capacity of the 480 V unit substation is determined from the AC system short circuit calculation performed as described in the preceding section. l 480 V MCCs The bus system of the 480 V MCCs has a continuous current rating and short circuit bracing selected from the NEMA standard ratings to withstand short circuit currents determined from the AC system short circuit calculation as described in Section 3.4.1 above, Short circuit protection for combination motor starters is provided by magnetic-only molded-case circuit breakers with adjustable instantaneous magnetic trip elements. He continuous current rating ;
of these adjustable instantaneous magnetic trip molded-case circuit breakers is based on 125 percent t of the fullload current.
Running protection of the motors is provided by the thermal overload relays in the combination motor starters. The heater elements in the overload relays have longtime trip characteristics which .
approximate the heating curves of the motor's loads. The criteria for selection of the thermal j overload relays and heater elements is based on 125 percent of the full load current for motors with '
a service factor of 1.15 and 115 percent of the full load current for motors with a service factor of :
l.0. The thermal overload protection also uses the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.106, Revision 1, '
Regulatory Position C.2. Thermal overload relays must be manually reset at the MCC.
Protection of feeder circuits, other than motor feeder circuits, is provided by thermal-magnetic '
molded-case circuit breakers. He continuous current rating of these thermal-magnetic molded-case circuit breakers is also based on 125 percent of the full load current.
Control transformers provided with each combination motor starter are one size larger than normally i supplied by the manufacturer to accommodate additional controls and auxiliaries that may be required.
3.4.3 CAsuNG All wire and cable installed in scheduled raceway in the Diesel Generator Building are flame !
retardant. In general, all wire and cable installed in the scheduled raceway in the Diesel Generator :
Building are also designed and specified as Class IE regardless of the actual circuit function. !
Materials that are prone to release corrosive off-gases, specifically polyvinyl chloride (PVC), are not !
used as an insulation or jacket for any type of wire and cable. ;
I l
3-8 Rev.0 l l
Y ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT The following voltage classes of cable are installed in the Diesel Generator Building:
- Medium Voltage (5 kV) Power Cable !
- Low Voltage (600 V) Power Cable
- Low Voltage (600 V) Control Cable
- Instrumentation and Specialty Cables a Low Voltage (600 V) Switchboard Wire The medium voltage power cables are rated at 5 kV based on the 100 percent insulation rating. The conductors are stranded tinned-copper in accordance with ASTM B33 with Class B stranding in accordance with ASTM B8. A non-conducting stress control layer is provided over the conductor.
The insulation is a proprietary ethylene-propylene-rubber type material in accordance with ICEA Standard No. S-68-516 designated as Kerite HT. The insulation is rated for a conductor temperature of 90*C. The insulated conductor is not shielded. Each conductor isjacketed with a flame retardant, heat, oil, moisture, and abrasion resistant proprietary rubber-based vulcanized material designated !
as Kerite HTNS. No armor or sheath is required over the jacket or in place of the jacket.
The low voltage power cables are single conductor or multiple conductor, as required. The low voltage control cables are multi-conductor only. They are both rated at 600 V based on the 100/133
$ percent insulation rating. The conductors are stranded tinned-copper in accordance with ASTM B33 with Class B or Class C stranding in accordance with ASTM B8. The insulation is either cross-linked-thermosetting-polyethylene in accordance with ICEA Standard No. S-66-524 or ethylene-propylene-rubber in accordance with ICEA Standard No. S-68-516. Both types of insulation are rated for a conductor temperature of 90*C. Each assembly of insulated conductors is jacketed with a flame retardant, heat, oil, moisture, and abrasion resistant thermosetting polyethylene, chlorinated polyethylene or synthetic rubber. !
Instrumentation cable including thermocouple extension cable is either single conductor or multi-conductor, as required. This cable is rated 600 V. The instrumentation cable conductors are solid or stranded tinned-copper in accordance with ASTM B33 with Class B or C stranding in accordance with ASTM B8. Thermocouple extension cable conductors are in accordance with ANSI MC96.1. ;
i The insulation is one of the flame-retardant, thermosetting materials listed in ICEA standard No. S-82-552. The insulation is rated for a conductor temperature of 90*C.
The insulated conductors are twisted into multi-conductor assemblies in accordance with ICEA i l
standard No. S-82-552, as required by the application. These assemblies are provided with a continuous mylar-backed aluminum or copper tape shield with a minimum # 22 AWG tinned-coated copper drain wire in accordance with ICEA standard No. S-82-552. Single or multiple groups of i these shielded-twisted assemblies are provided with an overall jacket of a flame retardant, heat, oil, moisture, and abrasion resistant thermosetting polyethylene, chlorinated polyethylene or synthetic l
rubber.
3-9 Rev.O l
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ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT The low voltage switchboard wire is single conductor. It is rated at 600 V based on the 100/133 percent insulation rating. The conductors are stranded tinned-copper in accordance with ASTM B33 i with either Class B, C, G or H (extra-flexible) stranding. The insulation is either cross-linked- ,
thermosetting-polyethylene in accordance with ICEA Standard No. S-66-524 or ethylene-propylene- i rubber in accordance with ICEA Standard No. S-68-516. Both types of insulation are rated for a conductor temperature of 90*C. This type of wire is commonly designated as Type " SIS" wire.
1 3.5 pC SYSTEM ANALYSIS ;
This section provides analyses which further describe compliance with the NRC's General Design Criteria and regulatory guides. Dese analyses supplement the DC power system description provided ,
in Section 2.4 Compliance with GDC 17 and 18, Safety Guide 6 Regulatory Guide 1.9 and Regulatory Guide 1.32 are described in Section 3.1. -
ne 125 V DC systems provide a reliable source of continuous power for control and instrumentation !
in the Diesel Generator Building. The 125 V DC system consists of a 125 V DC battery, battery ,
charger, a safety-related distribution panel, a nonsafety-related distribution panel and their associated 125 V DC instrumentation.
The rating of 125 V DC equipment is selected to provide a conservative margin of safety based on the required interrupting capability (DC short circuit current) calculated in accordance with ;
IEEE 946. The short circuit rating of the equipment in the 125 V DC system is selected from the applicable industry and manufacturer standard ratings to meet the required interrupting capabuity.
He 125 V DC power system is designed in accordance with the guidance of IEEE 946-1985. The Battery Room design is in accordance with the installation design requirements ofIEEE 484-1987 and Regulatory Guide 1.128, Revision 1. The battery is separately housed in its own room with adequate lighting, ventilation, and space to perform the battery maintenance. Loads used for sizing the battery 4
are based on the recommendations of IEEE 485-1983 for the following scenarios:
- Load on the DC system exceeds the maximum output of the battery charger ;
- Output of the battery charger is interrupted
- Auxiliary AC power is lost l e
ne battery charger is sized such that it is able to supply the steady state DC system loads and recharge the battery from a fully discharged state to the required load capacity in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The ,
normal and post-accident loads associated with the most severe of these scenarios is used to determine !
the battery size for the Diesel Generator Building. The battery does not supply any loads required ;
to meet station blackout needs (e.g., solenoid valves, motor operated valves or emergency lighting).
Although the battery is not required to remain operable to meet station blackout requirements, it is designed to remain operable to supply loads for starting the SACM diesel generator, including the generator field flashing.
Rev.0 l 3-10
, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT l
l During normal operation the battery charger is energized from the Class IE 480 V MCC located in i the Diesel Generator Building. He Battery Charger maintains a constant voltage to supply (float) the l battery with sufficient current to keep it fully charged and also supply the steady state DC load. in j the event of the loss of AC power, the 125 V DC battery will continue to supply the required DC . ;
loads. When the AC power is restored, the battery charger will be re-energized and resume normal operation.
The 125 V DC power system is ungrounded. It is provided with a ground detection system to !
provide an alarm at the MCB when the system becomes inadvertently grounded. The battery is also !
monitored to detect the loss of battery availability. l The controls and status indication for the 125 V DC power system are provided locally except for battery current and DC system voltage which are provided on the MCB DC System Puel. A system trouble alarm is also provided at the MCB DC System Panel.
3.6 INDEPENDENCE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 CABLE ROURNG ;
3 The equipment and circuits in the Diesel Generator Building are physically separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2. To accomplish this, the diesel generator and its auxiliaries are located in a separate Category I Diesel Generator Building. For circuits located within the Diesel i Generator Building, the following paragraphs describe the separation of redundant Class IE circuits or Class IE and non-Class IE circuits. Separation of redundant equipment and circuits outside the Diesel Generator Building will be addressed by 50.59 Evaluations.
In the Diesel Generator Building, the physical separation between redundant Class IE and non-Class lE conduits and open trays is generally in accordance with the figures in IEEE 384-1974 and IEEE 384-1981 that are applicable to enclosed raceway and open cable trays. Exceptions to :
IEEE 384-1974 are discussed in Section 3.9.3.
i Separation within the local control panels and equipment in the Diesel Generator Building is also ir ,
accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2. If no other analysis !
is provided, redimdant Class IE devices and their associated wiring and similarly Class IE and !
non-Class IE devi:es and their associated wiring are physically separated by a distance equal to or ;
greater than 6 inchs. Where physical separation is impracticable, conduit and metal barriers are used for maintenance of independence. Though interlocked armored cables are not considered a raceway, flexible wateright or metallic conduit is considered a raceway / separation barrier when ,
properly installed into or internal to Class IE equipment.
f 3-11 Rev.0 l
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. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 3.6.2 CABLE SIZING. DERATING AND CABLE TRAY Fna The design of the Class IE cable system for installation in the safety-related raceway system in the Diesel Generator Building uses the guidance ofIEEE 690-1984 including its Appendices. In lieu of the criteria for percent fill in random fill tray providal in IEEE 690-1984, the following conservative criteria is used for cable derating in the Diesel Generator Building:
- 40 percent fill for random filled power and control cable tray
- 60 percent fill for random filled instrument cable tray
- Percent fill for conduit is in accordance with NFPA.70 Ampacity rating and group derating factors of cables are in accordance with ICEA P-46-426 for cables in conduit, ducts or maintained-space cable trays. The ampacity rating of cables in randomly filled cable trays is in accordance with ICEA P-54-440. The cable short circuit capacity is in accordance with ICEA P-32-382. ,
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3.7 ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF ELECTRICAL EOUTPMENT l
The Calvert Cliffs Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program is established in accordance with the i requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Requirements for dynamic and seismic qualification of electric
) equipment important to safety; protection of electric equipment important to safety against other natural phenomena and external events; and environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety located in a MILD environment are not included in the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
The Diesel Generator Building is considered a mild environment, which is defined by 10 CFR 50.49 as ". . . an environment that would at no time be significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrences." For the Diesel Generator Building, these operational occurrences include the operation of the diesel generator for periodic testing. This operation for periodic testing produces temperatures in the Diesel Generator Building equivalent to those calculated for post-accident operation of the diesel generator.
The requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 do not apply to the safety-related electric equipment in the Diesel Generator Building. Generally, safety systems equipment used in the design of the Diesel Generator Building are qualified in accordance with the guidance ofIEEE 627-1980. Specifically, the guidance provided in IEEE 323-1983 provides an acceptable method for the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment which are located in a mild environment. Therefore, the safety-related (Class IE) electrical equipment located in the Diesel Generator Building is qualified in accordance with established Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant EQ design procedures to meet the performance requirements for the specific environmental and operating conditions. That is the safety-related functional requirements and the environmental conditions are included in the specification for the equipment. The equipment specification also requires equipment to meet the 3-12 Rev.O
. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT quality assurance standards of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 21.
To allow the Class IE cable to be installed anywhere in the plant, cables are qualified to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. However, SIS wire which is only used in the Diesel Generator Building is qualified for the Diesel Generator Building environment using the guidance of [
IEEE 383-1974 and IEEE 323-1983 for a mild environment.
3.8 FIRE PROTECTION FOR ELECTRICAL EOUIPMENT The fire detection and mitigation systems are described in.the Diesel Generator and Mechanical Systems Design Report. Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 also requires physical separation of electrical systems such that:
- One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s)is free of fire damage and i
- Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. .
The separation of redundant trairu to meet the above requirements is accomplished by using one of .
the following methods:
e A 3-hour fire barrier.
t
- A horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. ,
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are installed in the fire l area. '
A 1-hour fire barrier. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system ,
are installed in the fire area.
As described by Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, the Diesel Generator Building provides fire protection
, separation of cabling and circuits for redundant diesel generators which are used to safely shutdown each unit. He SACM diesel generator and the Unit I redundant diesel generator are not located within the same fire areas. Connection of the new cabling and circuits to existing ones will be addressed in future safety evaluations in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Automatic preadion suppression systems are provided in the Diesel Generator Room, IE Switchgear Room and non-lE Electrical Panet Room so that a fire initiated by electrical equipment can be ;
contained or extinguished before causing additional damage. He preaction suppression systems for the Diesel Generator Building require both the actuation of a detector and the opening of fusible link }
sprinkler heads before any water is discharged. Derefore, the preaction system would spray water on electrical equipment which is in thc vicinity of a fire. A fire within the Diesel Generator Bu" ding ;
3-13 Rev.O ;
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. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT is assumed to disable its diesel generator and render it inoperable. Thus, the electrical switchgear l in the Diesel Generator Building would not be required to remain operable. ,
3.9 EXCEPTIONS i
3.9.1 PHYSICAL IDEbTrIFICATION !
Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2 recommends identification requirements which provide an i adequate method for verifying that the installation conforms to the separation criteria. The regulatory positions of the regulatory guide expand the requirements of IEEE 384-1974 to require that cables be marked every 5 feet to identify the channel / separation group. It further states that the method of identification should be simple and preclude the need to consult any reference material to distinguish between the various channels / separation groups. The preferred method of marking the cables per the regulatory guide is color coding.
The method of identification and verification that circuit and raceway installation in the Diesel Generator Building conforms to the separation criteria is consistent with the methods identified in the current licensing basis for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. This method does not use color coding or marking of the cables every five feet to identify the separation group. It is considered acceptable based on the following:
Plant personnel are already familiar with the use of the current system of facility codes to verify separation of redundant Class IE circuits. This will minimize the potential for personnel error in future maintenance activities.
- The cables within the Diesel Generator Building are the same Class IE channel as the diesel generator or are non-Class IE. Therefore, physical separation of redundant Class IE circuits is not a concern.
Some of the cables are pulled from the Diesel Generator Building into the plant. Color coding these cables in the plant could potentially mislead tne plant personnel working with these circuits.
The facility code is the first portion of the scheme cable number that is tagged on each end of the cable. Similarly, the raceway identification tag number also begins with the facility code. Cable and raceway facility codes will always match for a correctly installed circuit.
3.9.2 ISOLATION DEVICES The design of isolation devices in the Diesel Generator Building are in accordance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2, except as noted below:
3-14 Rev.0
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT I
For the safety-related Class IE 125 V DC system provided in the Diesel Generator Building, there !
are certain nonsafety-related annunciation loads that should be tripped on a SIAS to prevent a l common cause failure fron. affecting the safety function of redundant systems or components (as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2). These nonsafety-related annunciator loads have been designed for a DC source to assure their operation under abnormal conditions. H erefore i I
tripping these loads on a SIAS would negate the purpose of the DC source for this equipment.
To comply with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.75, these nonsafety-related 125 V DC loads are ;
separated from the safety-related 125 V DC system using redundant and diverse Class IE fuses. De !
fuses are selected, qualified and coordinated such that the failure of one fuse to trip on fault current l will not prevent the operation of the second fuse to disconnect the nonsafety-related load. As !
described in Section 2.4.2, siring of the 125 V DC battery considers the situation where the battery ,
is supplying both safety-related and nonsafety-related DC loads. Derefore, the battery is sized such !
that it can supply both safety-related and nonsafety-related loads for the required time period and ',
failure of a nonsafety-related DC load will not affect the operation of safety-related DC loads.
3.9.3 PHYslCAL SEPARATION CRrTERIA i Section 3.6 describes the compliance with the physical separation requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2. However, there are several additional configurations applicable to conduit, as a subset of enclosed raceway, that are not addressed by the figures in IEEE 384. Subsequent to issuing i IEEE 384-1981, the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC) Working Group on !
Independence Criteria, SC-6.5 published a paper entitled " Cable Separation - What Do Industry l Testing Programs Show?". His paper provides additional recommendations that cover these >
configurations as well as remove some conservatism in the physical separation requirements based j on industry sponsored testing. The recommendations applicable to the Diesel Generator Building for the physical separation between redundant Class IE conduits and Class IE open trays are as follows: i
- When a Class IE conduit is horizontal to a redundant Class IE open tray (i.e., the same elevation), the separation must be greater than 6".
- When a Class IE condait is above and parallel to a redundant Class IE open tray or crosses the open tray at an angle less than 45 degrees, the separation must be greater than 12".
at an angle greater than 45 degrees, the separation must be greater than 3". ;
'
- When a Class IE conduit is below the redundant Class 1E open tray, the separation must be ;
greater than 1". j
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- l ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT i DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT l TABLE 3-1 l
SIGNIFICANT SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT LOCATED i IN THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING .
4.16 kV System With the exception of synchronizing signals, all components of the 4.16 kV system are classi6ed as ClassIE. ;
480 V Svstem [
I With the following exceptions, all 480 V components are safety-related:
i 125 V battery Battery charger Battery monitor l
Some DC mstrumentation Safety-relatM DC distribution panel I i
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. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT L
APPENDIX A CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGELATIONS l
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', , ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REIVRT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS UNITED ST ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Safety Guides 6 3D1 Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between their Distribution Systems Division 1 Regulatory Guides 1.9 4/92 Selection, Design and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Draft Revision 3 Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electrical Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants 1.29 9D8 Seismic Nsign Classification 1.32 2n7 Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants
) 1.47 SD3 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems 1.53 6n3 Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems 1.60 12n3 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants 1.61 . 0n3 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants 1.70 1In8 Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition) 1.75 9n8 Physical Independence of Electric Systems 1.76 404 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants 1.8) In5 Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Muhi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants A-1 Rev. O
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, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT l DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT ,
' l.89 6/84 Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment i Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants ,
t 1.92 2n6 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in l Seismic Response Analysis ;
1.93 12n4 Availability of Electric Power Sources 1.97 5/83 Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power ,
Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and F1110 wing an Accident 1.100 8n7 Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipmer..
for Nuclear Power Plants ;
1.100 6/88 Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants 1.106 3n7 Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves 1.108 807 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants 1.120 11/77 Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants 1.128 10n8 Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage ,
Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants l.129 2n8 Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants 1.131 8/77 Qualification Tests of Electric Cables, Field Splices, and ,
Connections for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 1.153 12/85 Criteria for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Portions of Safety Systems 1.155 8/88 Station Blackout 1.156 11/87 Environmental Qualification of Connection Assemblies for Nuclear Power Plants 1.158 2/89 Qualification of Safety-Related Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants i
A-2 Rev.0 i
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. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT NUREG/CR-0660 1979 Enhancement of Onsite Diesel Generator Reliability NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plans .
3.10 1981 Seismic Qualification of Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment 3.11 1981 Environmental Design of Mechanical and Electrical ,
Equipment i
8.1 1981 Electrical Power - Introduction ,
8.2 1981 Offsite Power System 8.3.1 1981 AC Power Systems (Onsite) 8.3.2 1981 DC Power Systems (Onsite)
BTP ICSB-8 1981 Use of Diesel Generator Sets for Peaking (PSB)
BTP ICSB-11 1931 Stability of Offsite Power Systems (PSB)
BTP ICSB-18 1981 Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually (PSB) Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves BTP ICSB-21 1981 Guidance for the Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47 (PSB)
BTP PSB-1 1981 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages BTP PSB-2 1981 Criteria for Alarms and Indications Associated with Diesel-Generator Unit Bypassed and Inoperable Status 9.5.1 1981 Fire Protectic Program 9.5.2 1981 Communication Systems 9.5.3 1981 Lighting Systems A-3 Rev.0
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT 1 DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT CODES AND ST. i VDARDS l ANS - American Nuclear Society 3.3 1988 Security for Nuclear Power Plants 4.5 1980 Criteria for Accident Monitoring Functions in Light-Water-Cooled Reactors J 51.1 1983 Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water Reactor Plants ANSI- American National Standards Institute MC96.1 1982 Temperature Measurement Thermocouples N45.2.11 1974 Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Draft 3, Revision 1) 1 NQA-1 1989 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear l Facilities Calvert Cliffs Documentation .
Revision 14 Calvert Ofs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated l Final Safety Analysis Report 29 CFR - Title 29 (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Code of Federal Regulations Part 1910 Occupational Health and Safety Standards ICEA -Insulated Cable Engineers Association P-32-382 1969 Short Circuit Characteristics of Insulated Cable i
P-46-426 1966 Power Cable Ampacities, Volume 1, Copper Conductors and Cumulative Errata Sheets P-54-440 1986 Ampacities, Cables in Open-Top Cable Trays i S-66-524 1982 Cross-Linked-Thermosetting-Polyethylene-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical t Energy ,
A-4 Rev.O i i
J
. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT S-68-516 1976 Ethylene-Propylene-Rubber-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy S-82-552 1986 Instrumentation Cables and Thermocouple Wire T-27-581 1983 Standard Test Method for Extruded Dielectric Power, Control, Instrumentation and Portable Cables IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 1 1986 General Principles for Temperature Limits in the Rating of Electric Equipment and for the Evaluation of Electrical Insulation 32 1972 Requirements, Terminology, and Test Procedure for Neutral Grounding Devices 96 1969 General Principles for Rating Electric Apparatus for Short-Time, Intermittent, or Varying Duty 97 1969 Recommended Practice for Specifying Service Conditions in Electrical Standards 98 1984 Preparation of Test Procedures for the Thermal Evaluation of Solid Electrical Insulating Materials i
99 1980 Recommended Practice for the Preparation of Test Procedures for the 'Ihermal Evaluation of Insulation Systems for Electric Equipment i12 1984 Test Procedure for Polyphase Induction Motors and Generators !
113 1985 Guide on Test Procedures for Direct-Current Machines 141 1986 Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution for Industrial Plants (IEEE Red Book) 142 1991 Recommended Practice for Grounding of Inducial and Commercial Power Systems (IEEE Green Book) 242 1986 Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (IEEE Buff Book)
A-5 Rev.0 y
. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT -
DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 279 1971 Criteria for Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection ' t Systems ,
308 1991 Criteria for Class lE Power Systems for Nuclear Power !
Generating Stations 323 1983 Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 334 1974 Standard for Type Tests of continuous Duty Class IE Motors ,
for Nuclear Power Generating StF;ons 344 1975 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev.1 344 1987 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Statious, as ;
endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2 352 1987 Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems
)
379 1988 Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems 383 1974 Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 384 1981 Criteria for Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits 387 1984 Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby .
Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 420 1982 Design and Qualification of Class IE Control Boards, Panels, and Racks used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 1 450 1987 Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and '
Replacement of Large Led Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations i
l A4 Rev.O
. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT
~
484 1987 Recommended Practice for_ Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations 485 1983 Recommended Practice for Sizing Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations
$35 1986 Qualification of Class IE Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 572 1985 Qualification of Class IE Connection Assemblies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 603 1980 Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 627 1980 Design Qualification of Safety Systems Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Statiors 628 1980 Criteria for the Design, Installation and Qualification of Raceway Systems for Class IE Circuits for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
) 634 1978 Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test.
649 1991 Qualifying Class IE Motor Control Centers for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 650 1990 Qualification of Class IE Static Battery Chargers and Inverters for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 665 1987 Guide for Generating Station Grounding 690 1984 Design and Installation of Cable Systems for Class IE Circuitr in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 692 1986 Criteria for Security Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 741 1990 Criteria for Protection of Class IE Power Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 833 1988 Recommended Practice for the Protection of Electric Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations from Water Hazards A-7 Rev.O
b
. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT 943 1986 Guide for Aging Mechanisms and Diagnostic Procedures in '
Evaluating Electrical Insulation Systems 946 1985 Recommended Practice for the Design of Safety-Related DC Auxiliary Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating '
Stations 1050 1989 Guide for Instrumentation and Control Equipment Grounding in Generating Stations C37.2 1991 Electrical Power System Device Function Numbers .
C37.04 1979 Rating Structure for AC High-Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis C37.06 1987 AC High-Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical l Circuit Basis-Preferred Ratings and Related Required Capabilities C37.09 1979 Test Procedure for AC Hig'a Vo:tage Circuit Breakers Rated -
on a Symmetrical Current Basis C37.010 1979 Application Guide for AC High-Volta;e Circuit Breakers Rated en a Symmetrical Current Basis C37.13 1979 Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures C37.14 1990 Low-Voltage DC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures C37.16 1988 Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers and AC Power Circuit Protectors - Preferred Ratings, Related Requirements and Application Recommendations C37.17 1979 Trip Devices for AC and General Purpose DC Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers C37.18 1979 Enclosed Field Discharge Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures for Rotating Electric Machinery C37.20.1 1987 Metai-Enclosed Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear C37.20.2 1987 Metal-Clad and Station-Type Cubical Switchgear A-8 Rev. O
i ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT C37.20.3 1987 Metal-Enclosed Interrupter Switchgear C37.21 1985 Control Switchboards C37.81 1989 Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Metal-Enclosed Power Switchgear Assemblies C37.82 1987 Qualification of Switchgear Assemblies for Class . IE Applications in Nuclear Power Generating Stations C37.90 1989 Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus C37.91 1985 Protective Relay Application to Power Transformers C37.96 1988 Guide for AC Motor Protection C37.97 1979 Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power System Buses C37.98 1987 Seismic Testing of Relays C37.100 1992 Definitions for Power Switchgear C37.101 1985 Guide for Generator Ground Protection C37.102 1987 Guide for AC Generator Protection C37.103 1990 Guide for Differential and Polarizing Relay Circuit Testing C37.105 1987 Qualifying Class IE Protective Relays and Auxiliaries for Nuclear Power Generating Stations C37.106 1987 Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating Plants C57.12.01 1989 General Requirements for Dry-Type Distribution and Power ,
Transformers in9uding Those with Solid Cast and/or Resin-Encapsulated Windings C57.12.56 1986 Test Procedure for Thermal Evaluation of Insulation Systems ,
for Ventilated Dry-Type Power and Distribution Transformers A-9 Rev.O J
l l
. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT ,
DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT ,
C57.12.59 1989 Guide for Dry-Type Transformer Through-Fault Current Duration C57.12.80 1978 Terminology for Power and Distribution Transformers C57.12.91 1979 Test Code for Dry-Type Distribution and Power Transformers C57.13 1978 Requirements for Instrument Transformers C57.13.1 1981 Guide for Field Testing of Relaying Current Transformers i C57.13.2 1991 Conformance Test Procedures for Instrument Transformers ,
C57.13.3 1983 Guide for Grounding of Instrument Transformer Secondary Circuits and Cases C57.19.101 1989 Trial-Use Guide for Loading Power Apparatus Bushing C5'.94 1982 Recommended Practice for Installation, Application, Operation, and Maintenance of Dry-Type General Purpose ,
Distribution and Power Transformers
} C57.96 1989 Guide for Loading Dry-Type Distribution and Power Transformers C57.98 1986 Guide for Transformer Impulse Tests i C57.105 1978 Guide for Application cf Transformer Connections in Three-Phase Distribution Systems C57.109 1985 Guide for Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration A-10 Rev.O
... O
% ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT NEMA - National Electrical Manufacturers Association AB 1 1986 Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Molded Case Switches ICS1 1988 General Standards for Industrial Control and Systems ICS 2 1988 Industrial Control Devices, Controllers and Assemblies ICS 6 1988 Enclosures for Industrial and Control Systems l
ICS 250 1985 Enclosures for Electrical Equipment (1000 Volts Maximum) .
l KS 1 1990 Enclosed and Miscellaneous Distribution Equipment (600 l Volts Maximum) Switches l LA 1 1986 Surge Arresters MG1 1987 Motors and Generators j MG2 1983 Safety Standard for Construction and Guide for Selection, Installation, and Use of Electric Motors and Generators !
MG 13 1984 Frame Assignments for Alternating Current Integral-
) Horsepower Induction Motors l PB 1 1990 Panelboards ;
PB 2 1989 Deadfront Distribution Switchboards PE 5 1985 Utility Type Battery Chargers 'l l
SG 4 1990 Alternating-Current High-Voltage Circuit Breakers SG 5 1990 Power Switchgear Assemblies SG 6 1990 Power Switching Equipment ST 1 1988 Specialty Transformers ST 20 1986 Dry-Type Transformers for General Applications l
l l
A-Il Rev, 0
.,o t ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DESIGN REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT NFPA - National Fire Protection Association 70 1990 National Electrical Code 78 1989 Lightning Protection Code 101 1991 Code for Safety to Life from Fire in Buildings and Structures UL - Underwriters Laboratory 44 1983 Rubber-Insulated Wires and Cables 67 1988 Panelboards 94 1991 Tests for Flammability of Plastic Materials for Parts in Devices and Appliances 96A 1982 Installation Requirements for Lightning Protection Systems 489 1991 Molded-Case Circuit Breakers and Circuit-Breaker Enclosures 845 1988 Motor Control Centers 891 1984 Dead-Front Switchboards ASTM - American Society for Testing and Materials B8 1990 Standard Specification for Concentric-Lay-Stranded Copper Conductors, Medium-Hard or Soft B 33 1991 Standard Specification for Tinned Soft or Annealed Copper Wire for Electrical Purposes A-12 Rev. 0
,