ML20135F474
| ML20135F474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1997 |
| From: | Grooms J, Huber J, Rudigier G BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135F472 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9703120395 | |
| Download: ML20135F474 (41) | |
Text
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ENCLOSURE i
l j
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT REVISION 5 i
l i
i l
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company l
Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318
)
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Docket No. 72-8 9703120395 970306 March 6,1997 PDR ADOCK 05000317 F
i ENCLOSURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TECIINICAL BASIS DOCUMES r REVISION 5 Only the revised pages of the Technical Basis Document are included in this transmittal. New words/information are identified by bold letters and revision bars. Deleted words/information are identified by line out and revision bars. Typographical and reference corrections are identified by revision bars only.
SEECIFlc REVISION ITEMS PAGE ITEM
'iii Tabid of Contents.
Inserted missing page number.
A:2
' Administrative Control of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Technical Basis Updated procedure reference from CCI-154 to RM-1-100.
R 11
- RAl.
Unplanned Radioactive Release Exceeding 200 X Technical Specification Limits -
for At Least 15 Minutes -
Added a question and answer explaining the use of an alarra rather than a value.
R:13 RA l '
Unplanned Radioactive Release Exceeding 200 X Technical Specification Limits -
for At Least 15 Minutes Page overflow.
R:14 RA2 Damage or Uncovery of Single Irradiated Fuel Assembly Outside the Recctor Vessel -
Added a question and answer explaining the use of an alarm rather than a value.
R:16 RA3-Radiation Increases that Impede Safe Plant Operation Revised EAL to refer to " Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown" table.
Removed definition of" required."
B:3 BU2 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Added reference to " cool down."
Corrected EAL to apply to leakage within the capacity of a charging pump. Added reference to cooldown.
B:4 BU3 Fuel Clad Degradation Updated discussion of AOP-6A vis-a-vis Chemistry Action Level.
Added a reference to Improved Technical Specifications.
I
ENCLOSURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TECIINICAL BASIS DOCUMENT REVISION 5 PAGE ITEM B:5 BU3 Fuel Clad Degradation Added a reference to Improved Technical Specifications.
Revised EAL to refer to improved Technical Specifications.
Added a reference to Improved Technical Specifications.
- B:25
_RCB4-Coolant Leakage Page overflow
' B:26 RCB4' Coolant Leakage -
Added a reference to EOP-6.
Added a new EAL for EOP-6 implementation.
Subdivided EAL for EOP-5 and EOP-8 implementation.
Added a reference to EOP-6.
Q:18 QS3 4 Loss of Water Level that Can Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel '
i Corrected units of Reactor Vessel Level Monitor Sytem reading to water level.
E:1 EU1:
Loss of Offsite Po'wer Added a Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) question and answer explaining guidance on cross-tied units.
Corrected AOP-3F Mode reference to shutdown.
Deleted discussion on EOP-2 as an entry condition of the EAL.
Added a reference to credit taken for ability of Calvert Cliffs to cross-tie units.
E:2 EUI Loss of Offsite Power Revised EAL. Combined two EALs into one. Eliminated EOP-2 as an entry condition.
E:4' EU2 Loss of Vital 125 Volt DC Power for Greater Than 15 Minutes Added reference to applicability of l A DG Bus 14 to EAL entry condition.
Added question and answer explaining why reference is included.
E:5 EU2 Loss of Vital 125 Volt DC Power for Greater Than 15 Minutes Administrative change. Changed bold to standard, deleted strike outs.
E:6 EU2 Loss of Vital 125 Volt DC Power for Greater Than 15 Minutes Administrative change. Changed bold to standard, deleted strike outs.
2
1 <
ENCLOSURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT j
EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TECIINICAL BASIS DOCUMENT REVISION 5 PAGE ITEM E:8
'EA2 Only One AC Power Source' Available to Supply 4 kV Emergency Buses :
Added reference explaining acceptability of back up power sources.
E:15
.EGl Prolonged Station Blackout Revised reference to Calvert Cliffs status as a one-hour station blackout coping category plant.
Added reference explaining the basis of station blackout core uncovery time of four hours.
E:16 EGI Prolonged Station Blackout Page overflow.
' T:1 TUI Confirmed Security Event With Potential Degradation'in the Level of Safety of the -
Plant Added a reference to explain that Security defines intrusion and sabotage.
Deleted reference to " hostile manner."
T:2 TAl
. Security Event in the Plant Protected Area'.
Added a reference to explain that Security defines intrusion and sabotage.
Deleted reference to " hostile manner."
T:3-. TSI Security Event in a Plant Vital Area Added a reference to explain that Security defines intrusion and sabotage.
Deleted reference to " hostile manner."
Revised EAL to refer to " Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown."
Rearranged two EALs into one integrated statement.
Deleted EAL to incorporate it into a single integrated statement.
Added a reference to NRC Information Notice 96-71.
I:3 -
IA1 Fire or Explosion Affecting Safe Shutdown Added a new EAL for AOP-9 implementation.
l Renumbered EAL.
i I:4 IA1.
Fire.or Explosion Affecting Safe Shutdown Renumbered EALs.
3
t J
ENCLOSURE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TECIINICAL BASIS DOCUMENT REVISION 5 PAGE ITEM N:4 NA1 Natural Phenomena Affecting Safe Shutdown Revised EAL to refer to " observable damage" and " Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown."
- 0:12
- OUl.
- Site Emergency Coordinator Judgment Typographical errors corrected: flammable.
Renumbered EAL 0:2 OUI' Site Emergency Coordinator Judgment -
Added new EAL for EOP-4 implementation and its basis.
0:5 003
' Destructive Phenomena Revised EAL to refer to " observable damage" rather than security report.
Revised EAL to refer to " observable" rather than " visible," and adds plant protected area.
Corrected EAL to refer to " protected area" rather than " safe shutdown."
Added a reference to " potential damage."
Removed reference to " maintaining safe shutdown."
Added clarification explaining that effect of" safe shutdown" is escalation to Alert.
Removed reference to table of" Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown."
Revised EAL to refer to " observable damage" rather than safe shutdown.".
0:8-OA2 Toxic of Flammable Gases Affecting Safe Shutdown.
Revised EAL to refer to " Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown."
0:10 OA3i Destructive Phenomena Affecting Safe Shutdown Revised EAL to refer to " Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown" and " observable damage."
0:11 OA3 Destructive Phenomena Affecting Safe Shutdown Revised EALs to refer to " Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown" and " observable damage."
4
j CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT l
REVISION 5 DATE:
'2h f 7
Emer cy Planning /- G/. Rudigier REVIEWED:
N 2.!2 B d 7 44M DATE:
P1.
rations - J.' V. Groomi
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DATE:
8 7
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$ ratio Traffilifrg'- J. T. Huber
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DATE:
CfiemistryYrograms GTK.Birley
!/
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Oa(
6 DATE:
Radiation ety - E. H. Roach REVIEWED:
[
DATE:
ED[T7 Design En '
ring-Mecha -
-C. J. Ludlow REVIEWED:
2 DATE:
3 3!f 7 Design nee
-HTectrical -R. B. Sydnor REVIEWED:
/
3/d!97
/
M.
DATE:
le'ar Engine
-S.A.
//
$/s!
7
(
N DATE:
Security - D. M. Dean k
L}censin
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DATE:
rue APPROVED: /
(
5477 DATE:
' ect erge anning Unit - T. E. Forgette REVIEWED:
f }-02
- DATE:
]- T* Vi w
POS Meeting No.
APPRO DATE:
f7 Plant General)(anager
' / '/
Effective Date: with ERPIP 3.0, Revision /I. Change k Calven Cliffs EAL Basis Document Rev.5
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\\
TABLE OF CONTENTS a
TABLES Table G 1: Comparison of NUMARC Guidelines to BGE ICs NUMART' Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological EfYluent Category.
.G:6 Table G-2: Comparison of NUMARC Guidelines to BGE ICs NUMARC Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Category......
...... G:7 Table G-3 Comparison of NUMARC Guidelines to BGE ICs NUMARC System Malfunction Category...............
G:8 Table G-4: Comparison of NUMARC Guidelines to BGE ICs NUMARC Fission Product Barrier Degradation Category......
G:10 Table G:5 Comparison of NUMARC Guidelines to BGE EALs NUMARC Fission Product Barrier Degradation Category..
G:ll Table B-1: SAE Barrier Loss / Potential Loss Combinations for CCNPP Logic..
..B:8 Table B-2: S AE Barrier Loss / Potential Loss Combinations for NUMARC Logic.
B:9 Table E-1: Effects of Lost 125 Volt DC Buses 11,21,12 and 22.
E:5 Calven Cliffs EAL Basis Document iii Rev.5
l ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE EAL TECHNICAL BASIS Administrative revisions shall not change the intent of the Basis AND shall not cause a wording difference with ERPIP 3.0, Attachment 1.
IV.B. I.b.
Administrative revisions shall be approved by the Director-Emergency Planning.
c.
Administrative revisions approved by the Director-Emergency Planung will be distributed in accordance with PR 2-100, Document and Drawing Control.
2.
Technical revision.
a.
Technical revisions shall be reviewed by:
}
(1)
Emergency Planning j
(2)
Nuclear Operations (3)
Operations Training (4)
Chemistry Programs
)
i (5)
Radiation Safety (6)
Nuclear Engineering
)
(7)
Design Engineering (8)
Nuclear Security (9)
Licensing b.
The Emergency Planning reviewer will collect and reconcile review l
comments. Reviews will be documented on the Basis review / approval sheet.
c.
Technical roisions simll be approved by the Directcr-Emergency Planning. The Director will consider review comments and their 1
reconciliation.
d.
Technical revisions shall be submitted to POSRC and the Plant General Manager in accordance with NS-2-101, Conduct of the Plant Operations and Safety Review Committec/ Procedure Review Committec/ Qualified Reviewer.
e.
Technical revisions approved by the Plant General Manager shall be submitted to the NRC for information in accordance with C-C4454 RM 1-100, Preparation of NRC Correspondence. This submittal shall specify that a revision to ERPIP 3.0, Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levels, to implement the Basis document change, will be processed in i
forty-five (45) days.
f.
After action IV.B.2.e. is complete (i.e., the correspondence is mailed) then a revision to ERPIP 3.0,Immediate Actions, Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levels may be initiated in accordance with ERPIP 900, Preparation of Emergency Response Plan and Emergency Response Plan Implementation Procedures. The effective date Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document A:2 Rev.5
1 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE i
RAI Threshold for RI 5421, RI 5422 Release Rate = 3.2 E+7 pCi/sec (see above)
Release Cocmcient (for SG Tube Rupture) = 6.1 E+2 uCi/cm3 rem /h 3
Atmospheric Dump Valve Flow Rate = 1.4 E+6 cm /sec 3
Safety Valve Flow Rate = 2.4 E+6 cm /sec Main Steam Monitor Reading (rem /h) =
Release Rate Release Coemcient x Flow Rate For safety valve rem /h =
3.2 E+7 6.1 E+2 x 2.4 E+6
=.022 tem /h (read as.02)(0.2 mSv/h)
For atmospheric dump valve rem /h =
3.2 E+7 6.1 E+2 x 1.4 E+6
=.038 rem /h (read as.04)(0.4 mSv/h)
The minimum reading for RI-5421/5422 is 10 mrem /h due to the " keep alive" source. Twenty mrem /h would be discult to read accurately. The high alarm setpoint for these monitors is set at 47 mrem /h
- 5 mrem /h. Therefore, for human factors reasons, the existence of the high alarm setpoint is used as the threshold for this EAL.
Thus, EAL 2 uses the lower value and is written as:
l Valid Main Steam Effluent Monitor (RI 5421, RI 5422) High Alarm for GREATER THAN 15 Minutes l
l CCNPP Ouestions and Answers (Radioactivity Release)
]
Why isn't a value given for the EAL 2 at,altor reading?
e It is difIcuk to read this monitor at the response level that is required it is more appropriate to use the alarm set point in consideration ofhumanfactors.
Valid means that the indication is from instrumentation determined to be operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications or has been verified by other k'-7-7-knt methods such as indications displayed on the control panels, repons from plant personnel, or radiological survey results. Based on the March 14, 1993 SG tube rupture event at Palo Verde Unit 2, the main steam effluent monitors (RI 5421, RI 5422 may read N16 immediately following SG tube rupture and prior to reactor trip. However, given the short halflife of N 6, this should clear within the first minute following reactor trip.
i Although Calvert Cliffs does not have a perimeter monitoring system, field monitoring could reliably detect radioactive releases.
Thus EAL 3 is written as:
l Field Survey Dose Rate Reading of 10 mrem /h or greater at Site Boundary l
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document R:11 Rev.5
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. System Descriptions No.15 Radiation Monitoring System
- 2. Off Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
- 3. Radioactivity Release Emergency Action Ievels, J.B. McIlvaine, JSB Associates, Inc., September 1990 4.
Emergency Response Plan Implementation Procedures ERPIP 821, Accidental Radioactivity Release Monitoring and Sampling Methods
+
5.
BG&E Internal Memorandum, J. R. Hill (Nuclear Plant Operations) to R. L. Wenderlich, CE Operations Subcommittee Meeting - Trip Report, April 16,1993 6.
10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Final Rule,56 FR 23360, May 21,1991
- 7. Calvert Clifts Instructions CCI-302, Calvert Cliffs Alarm Manual, Main Steam Effl Rad Monitor 2C24B Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document R:12 Rev.5
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Thus, EAL 1 is written as:
AOP-6E, Loss of Refueling Pool Level, is Implemented AND Valid Containment Radiation Alarm (RI-5316A/B/C/D)
CCNPP Ouestions and Answers (Radioactivity Release)
Why isn't a value given for the EAL 1 monitor reading?
Since the alarm satpoint and the adion level are the same, humanfactor consideration is to reference the alarm to eliminate the need to visuallyfollow a monitor output during a containment event.
]
Thus. EAL 2 is written as:
AOP-6D, Fuel Handling Incident, is Implemented AND ANY of the Following:
{
Valid Containment Radiation Alarm (RI-5316A/B/C/D)
+
Valid Fuel W dling Area Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor (RI 5420) Reading of AT LEAST
+
2E+4 CPM Valid Spent Fuel Senice Platform Monitor (RI-7025) Reading of AT LEAST 100 mrem /h
+
Valid means that the indication is from instrumentation determined to be operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications or has been verified by other independent methods such as indications displayed on the control panels, reports from plant personnel, or radiological sun'ey results.
The containment radiation alarm corresponds to a dose rate of 200 mrem /h.
The value for RI 5420 was determined based on a fuel handling accident damaging one fuel rod in an average (unpeaked) fuel assembly. The results of the calculation, showing RI 5420 response versus age of the assembly (time after shutdown), is shown as Figure RI. The value of 2E4 CPM corresponds to the minimum expected response and is significantly higher than the alarm setpoint of 600 CPM.
One hundred mrem /h is used for the Senice Platform Monitor (RI 7025) because it corresponds to the administrative limit for a high radiation area and is significantly higher than the dose rates expected for fuel handling actisities.
Expected increases in monitor readings due to controlled evolutions (such as lifting the reactor vessel head during refueling) should not result in emergency declaration. Nor should momentary increases due to events such as resin transfers or controlled movement of radioactive sources result in emergency declaration. In-plant radiation level increases that would result in emergency declaration are also unplanned, e.g., outside the limits established by an existing radioactive discharge permit.
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. System Descriptions No.15, Radiation Monitoring System
+
- 2. Abnormal Operating Procedures AOP 6D, Fuel Handling Incident
+
AOP-6E, Loss of Refueling Pool Level
+
- 3. Ogden Calculation #RA-1, 0-RI-5420 Detector Response to Fuel Handling Accident Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document R:14 Rev.5
l, g
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE
{
For areas raluiring infrequent access, the (Site-SpecTc) value(s) should be based on radiation levels which result in i
exposure control measures intended to maintain doses within normal occupational exposure guidelines and limits (i.e.,10 CFR 20), and in doing so, will impede necessary access. For many areas, it may be possible to establish a single < Generic >
EAL that represents a multiple of the normal radiation levels (e.g.,1000 times normal). However, areas that have normally high dose rates may require a lower multipic (e.g.,10 times normal).
4 Plant-Specific Information j
The control room is required to be continuously occupied following design basis accidents. All actions required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown can be accomplished from the control room. Post accident doses have been evaluated and shown to be less than limits based on GDC 19. On a control room high radiation signal, the control room emergency ventilation system automatically switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal absorber banks. EAL 1 is based on the GDC 19 limit recommended by NUMARC.
Thus, EAL 1 is written as:
l Valid Control Room Radiation Monitor (RI 5350) Reading GREATER THAN 15 mrem /h l
This corresponds to a dose rate of 0.15 mSv/h. Valid means that the indication is from instrumentation determined to be operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications or has been verified by other independent methods such as indications displayed on the control panels, reports from plant personnel, or radiological sun'ey results.
EAL 2 addresses event sequences outside the plant design basis. Entry into any area with exposure rates of at least 10 Rem /h (100 m Sv/h) could result in an individual exceeding 10 CFR 20 limits (5 REM /ys) with approximately 30 minutes.
Thus, EAL 2 is written as:
Exposure Rate of 10 rem /h or greater in.^ ::= "=;ud::d :: ^.:h!=: = ":!:'::: Sc': Sh::d:= an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown
":q !. ed=== th: =.j h: the== i: ::: Op:!:: ! : d i: im;;::tiv: h=d 0: =!::in;; =nd!!!:=.
Areas of concern for Safe Shutdown are listed below.
Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown Control Room
. Electrical Penetration Rooms Control Room HVAC Room
+ Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
. Cable Spreading Room a Chargins Pump Rooms
- Cable Chases a Diesel Generator Rooms
+ Switchgear Room
. Diesel Generator Building (0C/l A)
- ECCS Pump Room
- Refueling Water Tank (RWT) 11(21)
- Senice Water Pump Room
+ Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 12
+ Component Cooling Pump Room
- Pretreated Water Storage Tank (PWST) 11(21)
- Main Steam Penetration Room
+ Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) 12 This list of Safe Shutdown areas is displayed on the EAL Tables to assure that all areas related to Safe Shutdown are considered by the SEC.
Expected increases in monitor readings due to controlled evolutions (such as lifting the reactor vessel head during refueling) do not result in emergency declaration. Nor should momentary increases due to events such as resin transfers or controlled movement of radioactive sources result in emergency declaration. In-plant radiation level increases that would result in emergency declaration are also unplanned, e.g., outside the limits established by an existing radioactive discharge permit.
The containment radiation monitor readings should only apply to this IC when personnel are in containment for normal maintenance, inspection, surveillance, testing, or refueling activities.
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. System Descriptions Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document R:16 Rev.5
FISSION PRODUCT CARRIER DEGRADATION Calvert Cliffs Ucits 1 and 2 are Combustion Engineering designed reactors. These reactors use a programmed pressurizer water level that varies as a function of T ** and load. The Chemical Volume Control System includes three fixed flow positive displacement charging pumps and a variable letdown system. Each charging pump has a capacity of 44 GPM. The letdown system valves regulate letdown flow from 28 GPM to 128 GPM. The nominal configuration is one charging pump with ~40 GPM letdown flow. The letdown flow is varied as necessary to maintain programmed pressurizer level.
Additional charging pumps are automatically started when necessary to maintain pressurizer level.
AOP-2A, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage, is implemented if any entry conditions are met; this includes the results of STP-0-271/2, Reactor Coolant Leakage Evaluation.
STP-0-27-1/2 will indicate leakage in excess of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 allowable limits. Control room personnel require approximately 5 to 15 minutes to implement AOP-2A if RCS leakage exceeds the capacity of one charging pump. In general, Calvert Cliffs does not distinguish between identified or unidentified leakage when AOP-2A is implemented. Per AOP-2A, if leakage exceeding the capacity of one charging pump (11 GPM leakage with minimum letdown flow or greater than 39 GPM with letdown isolated) could not be isolated, then the reactor must be shutdown (tripped) and cooled down.
1 If RCS leakage is less than the capacity of one charging pump, STP-0-27-1/2 would be performed to determine the leak rate and the reactor would be maintained at power. It requires approximately 3 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to perform STP-0 27-1/2 to determine the amount of unidentified leakage.
Calvert Cliffs EALs have been written to be coraistent with procedural requirements. These leakage rates are very similar to the NUMARC generic leakage. AOP-2A specifies certain flow paths that can be isolated to terminate RCS leakage. If isolation of the leakage path is successful (e.g., isolating a leaking pressurizer power operated relief valve), reactor operation can continue and this EAL does not apply. However, if RCS leakage could not be isolated, then under these conditions the reactor would have to be shut down in accordance with technical specifications. The EAL language was picked to assure that: (1) leakage is greater than net RCS make-up flow threshold of 11 GPM, and (2) Such leakage could not be isolated in accordance with procedural requirements.
Thus, the Calvert Cliffs EAL is written as:
AOP-2 A, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage, Is implemented For RCS Leakage E==S; within the Capacity of One Charging Pump AND Reactor Shutdown OR Cooldown is Required NUREG 1449 raises concerns regarding events involving leakage through RCS temporary boundaries. RCS leakage EALs apply to all operational modes at Calvert Cliffs. This will assure that leakage is appropriate?y addressed for cold shutdown and refueling modes and address NRC concerns about leakage through temporary RCS boundaries as they apply to EALs.
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. Technical Specifications
- TS 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage 2.
Abnormal Operating Procedures
- AOP 2A, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage 3.
Sun eillance Test Procedure (STP) O-27-1/2, RCS Leakage Evaluation 4.
NUREG 1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States, Draft for Comment, February 1992 Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document B:3 Rev.5
m FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Emeraency Classification Level: UNUSUAL EVENT Anolicable Operational Modes: ALL Calvert Cliffs Initiatino Condition:
BU3 Fuel Clad Degradation i
NUMARC Reconnition Cataanrv: System Malfunction NUMARC Initiatina Condilig:
SU4 Fuel Clad Degradation BaIIjcI: FuelClad NUMARC Generic Basis:
)
This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. < Generic > EAL 1 addresses (Site-Specific) radiation monitor readings such as failed fuel monitors, etc., that provide indication of fuel clad integrity. < Generic > EAL 2 addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the
< Fission Product Barrier Degradation EALs>.
Plant-Soccific Information:
A significant rise in the count rate on the Activity Monitor or valid actuation of the " RADIATION MONITOR LEVEL HI" alarm can be due to either fuel clad failur: or.o crud burst. In accordance with AOP-6A, the response to high RCS activity
)
level is to notify Plant Chemistry to perform a sampic analysis to determine what radionuclides caused the radiation alarm.
This means that the monitor indications are not sufficient alone to determine whether fuct clad damage has occurred at Calvert Cliffs. Thus, < Generic > EAL 1 is not appropriate for use at Calvert Cliffs.
Clad damage is determined from specific activity levels contained in reactor coolant samples. Per AOP-6A, when RCS actidty is less than Chemistry F=l R:!! b!!ity P!:n Action Level 1 values, the operator may return to the appropriate operating procedure. Per CP-204, Chemistry Action Level 1 is for specific activity levels greater than 0.5 Ci/ gram I DEQ or greater than 50/Ebar pCi/ gram of gross radioactivity. ' !: d:f=d = D:n Eq=:!: ' IW-6
-DEQ)+f at-leasHhe Technical Specification Section 3.4.8. Omproved Technical Specifications Section 3.4.15) requires the specific actidty of the reactor coolant to be within l'!::. S= =:
a.
N: T.= S: 1 pCi/ gram 113I DEQ.
- b. Nc:.mx; S: 100/Ebar pCi/ gram of gross radioactivity.
The specific activity of the reactor coolant may be as high as the limits defined by Technical Specification Figure 3.4.8-1 Omproved Technical Specification Section 3.4.15-1) for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The lowest limit for this figure corresponds to 60 l
pCi/ gram 1131 DEQ. Scaling down from the value shown for FCB3, Radiation, corresponding 1500 Ci/ gram 1831 DEQ an RCS sample dose rate at one foot is computed as shown in the equation below.
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document B:4 Rev.5
.. _~. _. _ _ _
s j
FISSION PRCDUCT RARRIER DEGRADATION a
RCS Sampic Reading For 60 pCi/gramII31 DEQ Refer to EAL FCB3, Radiation t
BU3 Value = 60 uCi/aram x 168 mrem /h = 6.7 mrem /h 1500 pCi/ gram Read as 6 mrem /h (.06 mSv/h) j Thus, the EAL 1j written as:
l l Dose Rate at 0:n Foot from RCS Sample of AT LEAST 6 mrem /h l
This corresponds 1:, a dose rate of 0.06 mSv/h.
i Technical Specification 3.4.8 (Improved Technical Specification Section 3.4.15) Reactor Coolant System - Specific Activityis addressed by EAL 2:
Thus EAL 2 is written:
Fuel Clad Degradation Indicated by RCS Sample Activity GREATER THAN Tech Spec 3.4.8 (Improved Technical Specification Secti-;u 3.4.15) Allowable Limits 4
l Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. Technical Specifications TS 3.4.8, Reactor Coolant System - Specific Activity
)
Improved Technical Spec.fication 2
TS 3.4.15, RCS Specific Activity
- 3. BG&E Fuel Degradation EALs Calculation Worksheet, JSB Associates, February 18,1993 d
3 i
i
(
v L
d a
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Da eme.9 B:5 Rev.5 i
n-.
~
I FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION f
Calvert Cliffs Emernency Action Level:
RCB4 CoolantLeakage l
NUMARC Emernency Action Level:
}
Potential Lou - Unisolable Leak Execeding the Capacity of One Charging Pump in the Normal Charging Mode
=
+ - Potential Loss - (Site-Specific) Indication that a SG is Ruptured and Has a Non Isolable Secondary Line Break OR (Site-Specific) Indication that a SG is Ruptured and a Prolonged Release of Mada y Coolant is Occurring From the Affected SG to the Emironment RCS 5 Other(Site-Specific) Indications NUMARC Genene Basis:
i
[
'[RCS 2, RCS 3]
}
< Loss EALs are addressed underICRCB2, Temperature.> <>
The Potential Loss EAL is based on the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolent System j
(RCS) by normal operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header. <This indication, applying to any RCS leakage including primary-to-secondary leakage > assures that any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage or loss (e.g., events leading to reactor scram and ECCS actuation) will result in no lower than an " Alert" emergency classification.
[RCS 5]
Tius EAL is to cover other (site-specific) indications that may indicate loss or potential loss of the RCS barrier, including indications from containment air monitors or any other (site-specific) instrumentation.
i Plant SoccificInformation:
i The Calvert Cliffs Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) uses three positive displacement horizontal pumps with a capacity of 44 GPM each. The pressurizer level control program regulates letdown purification subsystem flow by adjusting the letdown flow control valve so that the reactor coolant pump (RCP) controlled leak-off plus the letdown flow matches the input from the operating charging pump. Equilibrium pressurizer level conditions may be disturbed due to RCS temperature changes, power changes, or RCS inventory loss due to leakage. A decrease in pressurizer water level below the programmed level will result in a control signal to start one or both standby charging pumps to restore water level. An increase in pressurizer water level above the programmed level will result in a control signal to increase letdown purification flow rate 4
and initiate a backup signal to stop the two standby charging pumps.
A start signal is sent to all three charging pumps on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), aligning the charging pumps suction to the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTS) via the boric acid pumps. All three charging pumps will then 4
inject highly concentrated boric acid into the RCS to ensure that the reactor is shutdown. Potential IAss of the RCS corresponds to conditions where the CVCS can not maintain pressurizer water level within normal limits requiring transition into the EOPs when the reactor is initially critical.
Thus. Potential Loss EAL 1 is written as:
j l RCS Leakage Exceeds Available CVCS Capacity l
L 1
1 Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document B:25 Rev.5 o
1 w
s FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION llowever, review showed that an appropriate site-specific Potential Loss EAL could be developed based on entry into EOP-5, Loss of Coolant Accident, EOP-6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, or EOP-8, Functional Recovery Procedure, for an RCS leak.
j Thus, Potential Loss EAL 2 is,3 and 4 are written as:
EOP 5, Loss of Coolant Accident, O-EOP S, F;nS::' Pac =.j P.ned: :, is Implemented for RCS Leakage 4
l EOP-6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture, is implemented for RCS leakage.
]
l EOP-8, Functional Recovery Procedure, is implemented for RCS leakage-l Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. Abnormal Operating Procedures j
AOP-2A, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
- 2. Emergency Operating Procedures EOP-5, Loss of Coolant Accident
+
EOP-6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture e
i EOP-8, Functional Recovery Procedure
+
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.1, Chemical and Volume Control System
+
i l
l 4
i l
l i
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document B:26 Rev.5
._. 7
_~_
t i
EQUIPMENT FAILURE i
]
Emereency Classification Level: SITE EMERGENCY Aeolicable Onerational Modes: 5,6 Calvert Cliffs initiatine Condition:
QS3 Loss of Water Level That Can Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel NUMARC Initiatina Condition:
4 l
SS$ Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Ret ctor Vessel 4
Barrier: FUEL CLAD l
NUMARC Generic Basis:
2 Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage can occur and reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity may not be assured. <> For PWRs, this IC covers sequences such as prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat i
removal.
Thus, declaration of a Site <E>mergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via < Radioactivity Release IC RGI, Off-Site Dose of AT LEAST 1 REM (EDE+ CEDE) Whole Body or 5 REM (CDE) Thyroid >.
Plant-Soccific Information:
N Sequences that can result in uncovery of fuel in the reactor vessel (indirectly by prolonged boiling) include leakage through SG nozzle dams, pipe breaks in the Shu down Cooling (SDC) System or Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS), or l
loss of the SDC function. These leakage sources are outside the reactor vessel and at most could only result in water level decreases to the bottom of the hot leg elevation. This water level decrease would cause loss of SDC suction. In core i
instrumentation (ICI) penetrations for Calvert Cliffs are through the vessel head. Thus, these do not have to be considered for this IC.
l A review of attachments to AOP 3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions, shows that depending on previous power history and assuming an initial RCS temperature of 140'F, boiling in the core can begin in as little as 7 minutes following loss of SDC during n id-loop operation. AOP-3B also shows that under these conditions, without any operator action, core uncovery can begin w thin about 80 minutes after loss of SDC.
Available methods.o restore RCS inventory and to remove core heat include restoring the SDCS, injecting into the RCS '
1 from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) using the HPSI, LPSI, CS or charging pumps, using the steam generators as a heat 4
sink, using the Refueling Pool as a heat sink, aligning a LPSI pump to take suction from the RWT, or even injecting into the RCS using Safety Injection Tanks (SITS). Given the number ofmethods to restore inventory, and the amount of time available, it is highly unlikely that this JC will be entered.
Thus, the EAL is written as.
AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions, Is Implemented AND ANY of the Following Conditions
]
Exist:
i Alternate Methods for Restoring RCS Inventory Are NOT Effective Valid RVLMS Reading Indicating * '
' water level above core is ten inches or less.
Valid CET Reading Indicating Superheat Conditions t
i I
1 i
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document Q:18 Rev.5
_ -. -. ~. -
4 ELECTRICAL 4
Emernency Classification Level: UNUSUAL EVENT 4
AnoticableOnerationalMW: ALL Calvert Cliffs initiatina Condition:
EUI Loss of Off-Site Power 1
NUMARC Recognition Catemory: System Malfunction NUMARC Initiatina Condition:
SUI Loss of All Off Site Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes e
Barner; Not Applicable NUMARC Generic Basis:
4 E
j Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.
NUMARC Ouestions and Answers. June 30.1993 (System Malfunction) 1.
Does the EAL of SU1 apply to one unit whose essential busses can be energized from another (unaffected) unit at a multi-unit site?
i Sul does apply to this situation. Plants that have the capability to cross-tie powrfrom a companion unit may take creditfor the redunant powr source in the associated EALfor this IC. Inability to efect that cross-tie within 15 minutes is groundsfor declaring the Unusual Event.
l Multi-unit stations with shared safety functions should further consider how this IC may affect more than one unit and how this may be a factor in escalating the emergency class.
Plant Snecific Information:
Procedure EOP-2, Loss of Off Site Power, would be implemented under the conditions of concern. AOP-3F applies to the other operational modes when the plant is ernteel shutdown. Per EOP-2, the following are symptoms of a loss of off-site l
power:
- Momentary loss of Control Room lighting on both Units.
500KV Red Bus and Black Bus power available lights are de-energized.
- Diesel Generators automatically start.
- 13KV Service Buses 12 and 22 pnwer available lights are de-energized.
- No RCPs are running on either Unit.
- Reactor Trip occurs due to RCS low flow.
FO r- ' ' :, nid p:_:f n' x,,_.n.c.:::: : d :: =P.=' p :=t! =c:dy, r; _:: E.^.L: ' r.: i:.. decigd f:: h::
- ' r'f x f--- ""$ 1: ;'- ' if '!y ;p._t; i-M-61 = 2, EOP 2 : 9 h =:x;' :: : !r: ef :E d: p;.::.
Ui ^ -
r ft=, n ';ig OE d: pc.:: b :::;n' ' ': ' '.- 'r: 1:n !! rinx'r 5x:f en p:_:fr:
'- ;h r:-S: n.;nf=, E.^.L ! d=;: ' =:1:;;=2 !? ::::: ".:=b!d. EOP 2 ::y 60 h imph ::::d if:!:;h 7--- --': _' ir!:$: b ::S --f f= RCS in: ;..c.r/d dd rgh :: ! :-' := 13 V Src!= B= k =c;i=d. U r^'
E= : 6-!=2: i not.;;;;;t:: f= db =: Of $ pn.t::. Being a two unit site with the ability to cross-tic power from the other (undected) unit, credit is taken for the redundant power source.
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Documeat E:1 Rev.5
s s
ELECTRICAL 4
1 Thus, the EAL 4 is wTitten as:
EOP-3r Loss of All Off-site 500 kV Power to both 4 kV Safety Related Buses on, ! np!:re.,ied4%-Either Unit for !:= Of 05 2: p=er-Greater than 15 minutes.
i s
EAL 2 dd: - : !;= cf 05 d: p:=: ; bn EOP 2 dce ne ;;;!y.
n=, EAL 2 i-
- =:
l ' - d C" E!:: Sr= fe-GRENER 15 3'::::=
l 1
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. Technical Specifications TS 3.8.1, A.C. Sources
- 2. Emergency Operating Procedures
- EOP-2, Loss of Off-Site Power 3.
Abnormal Operating Procedures
. AOP-3F, Loss of Off-Site Power While in Modes 3,4,5, or 6 1
4 s
i Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document E:2 Rev.5
i ELECTRICAL J
There is one battery charger fed from Unit I and another battery charger fed from Unit 2 connected to each 125 volt de bus.
The ac power for both battery chargers per bus is obtained from the same load group. The reserve battery is connected to its own charger when it is not connected to a safety related 125 volt de bus.
Each of the four 125 volt de power sources is equipped with the following instrumentation in the control room to enable continual operator assessment of 125 volt de power source condition:
DC bus undervoltage alarm a
Battery current indication 4
Charger current indication Charger malfunction alarm (including input ac undervoltage, output de undervoltage, and output de overvoltage)
+
DC bus voltage indication, and DC ground indication
+
Components affected by the loss of 125 volt de buses 11,12,21, or 22 are listed in table EU2-1.14ss of the new Diesel Generator I A 125 volt DC bus 14 does not constitute an entry condition for this EAL, CCNPP Ouestions and Answers (Electrical)
Why does the 125 voit DC bus 14 need to be addressed in the basis ifit has no impact on the EAL?
e Site Emergency Coordinators askedfbr documentation in the basis, that the new 125 vok DC bus 14 uns considered for the eledricalEAL's. AOP 7JIds the equipment that is lost ofbus 14is lost.
Thus, the EAL is written as:
AOP-7J, Loss of 120 Volt Vital AC or IEolt Vital DC Power, is Implemented AND 125 Volt DC Power Lost for GREATER THAN 15 Minutes Source Documents / References / Calculations:
BG&E Drawing 61-057 E, Block Diagram - Auxiliary System Load Groups - Units 1 & 2 3
1 l
l Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document E:4 Rev.5 l
J
4 ELECTRICAL i
4 4
Table E-1: Effects of Lost 125 Volt DC buses 11,21,12, and 22 less of Loss of Loss of less of 11125 veh & Bus 21125 voh de Bus 12125 veh de Bus 22125 voh de B as Channel ZD ESFAS and Channel ZE ESFAS and AFAS Channel ZF ESFAS and AFAS Channel ZO 13FAS and AFAS AFAS Sensor Cabineta de.
Sensor Cabinets de<nergized Sensor Cabiness de-energized Sensor Cabinets de-energized energized CNTMT Area Rad Morutor CNTMT Area Rad Monitor out CNTMT Area Rad Monitor out CNTMT Area Rad Mosutor out out of service ofservice ofservice ofservia Channel A RPS Calmnet de-Channel B RPS Cabinet de-Channel C RPS Cabind de-Channel D RPS Cabuwt de-i enerszed energized enersized energized imes of 2A EDO field flash less of 2B EDO field flash and Ims of1B EDO field Dash and and cent.ol power, the start control powr, the start solenoids control power,the start solenoids solenoids fail shut (Unit 2 fait shut (Unit 2 only) failshut (Unit I only) only) less of breaker position less of breaker position indication:
indication:
Normal power rupply to the Normal power supply to the
)
!!A/21 A and l2N22A 11B11B and l2B/22B RCPs i
RCPs 13/23 and 14/24 4 KV buses 11/21.12/22,15/25,and 13A/23A,13B/23B,14N24A, 16/26 4 KV buses and 14B'24B 480 Voh Buses lI A/21 A, llB11B, 12A/22A, and 12B'22B 480 Volt Buses 1I and 1213 KV buses (Unit i only)
Loss of Urut 2 Annunciauon All Urut 1 Annunciator lights de-energized (Status Panels remain i
encreized)
)
CC CNTMT SUPPLY fails CC CNTMT RETURN fails shut 4
shut i
1 BYPASS valves fait shut BYPASS valves fail shut less of SRW to the Turbine less of SRW to the Turbme Building Buildmg IA and PA may be lost due IA and PA may be lost due to loss to loss of SRW to the of SRW to the Turbine Building l
Turbine Building j
Channel A ESFAS and Channel B ESFAS and AFAS AFAS Actuation Cabinets Actuation Cabinets de-energized f
de energized 11/21 SRW,1I/2I CC and 12/22 SRW,12/22 CC, and 11/21 ECCS Pump Room 12/22 ECCS Pump Room IIX IIX SW outlet valves fail SW outlet valves fail open open 11/21 Main Steam Effluent 12/22 Main Steam Etlluent Rad Rad Monitor out of senice Monitor out of senice 1 L and 12 SFP Heat i1 and 12 SFP Heat Exchangers Exchangers lose cooling flow lose cooling flow due to SRW due to SRW outlet CVs outlet CVs failing shut (Unit I fsiting shut (Unit 1 only) only)
I1/21 MSIV loses position 12/22 MSIV loses position indication, but can still be indication, but can still be closed closed from 1C03/2003 from 1CO3/2CO3 CNTMT High Range CNTMT High Range Morutor Monitor Channel A out of Channel B out ofsenice senice i
Calvelt ClifrS EAL basis Doct. ment E:5 Rev,5
4 6
4.
ELECTRICAL i
3 i
Table E-1: Effects of Lost 125 Volt DC Buses 11,21,12, and 22 (Continued) less of less of Loss of Loss of II 125 voit de Bus 11 125 veh de Bus 12125 veh de Bus 22123 veh de Bus Loss ofopen signal to the Turbine Bypass Valves and q
loss ofquick open signal to j
the ADVs (Unit 1 only)
Aux Spray Valve fails shut IA downstrearn of the CNTMT IA Control Valve is isolated ("CNTMT IA i
180L ATED 1A-200${V CLOSED
- alarm does NOT actuae) i CNTMT Oaseous Morutor l
nut ofservice Oaseous and Liquid Waste release control valves fail shut (Unit I only) 1IIV21B and 121112B RCPs are untrippable frorn 1C06/2006 Loss ofletdown due to 1/2-CVC.
$164V failing shut AFW Turbme Dnven Tram Flow Control Valves 1150 and 12 SO fail open (Unit 1 only)
PORV-404 moperable in MIT ENABLE (Unit 1 or.ly)
}
TCHs I and 5 tnp TCBs 2,6, and 9 tnp TCBs 3 and 7 tnp TCBs 4 and 8 tnp less ofplant oscillograph (Unit i 1
only) i i
i j
.(
i i
1 t
b i
i 4
s 4
1 Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document E:6 ReV. 5 e
_ 7 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._._
ELECTRICAL i
i Emergency Classification Level: ALERT l
i i
Anolicable Operational Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4 i
..Cajyert Cliffs initiating Condition:
f EA2 Only One AC Power Source Available to Supply 4 kV Emergency Busses 4
NUMARC P-aletaa (%*aarv: System Malfunction NUMARC Initiatina Condition:
SAS AC Power Capability to Essential Busses Reduced to a Single Power Source for Greater Than 15 Minutes Such That Any Additional Single Failure Would Result in Station Blackout Barner. Not Applicable J
l NUMARC Generic Basis:
l~
l This IC and its associated < Generic > EAL are intended to provide an escalation from IC <EUI, Loss of Off-Site Power >.
The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the off site and on site power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of off-site power with a concurrent failure of one diesel generator to supply power to its emergency busses. Another related condition could be the loss of all 2
off-site power and loss of on-site emergency diesels with only one train of emergency busses being backfed from the unit main generator, or the loss of on-site emergency diesels with only one train of emergency busses being backfed from off-site power. The subsequent loss of this singic power source would escalate the event to a Site <E>mergency in accordance with l
IC <ES1, Station Blackout >.
i
< Generic > EAL lb should be expanded to identify the control room indications of the status of Site-specific power sources and distribution busses that, if unavailable, establish single failure vulnerability.
j At multi unit stations, the EALs should allow credit for operation ofinstalled design features, such as cross-ties or swing diesels, provided that abnormal or emergency operating procedures address their use. However, these stations must also 1
j consider the impact of this condition on other shared safety functions in developing the site specific EAL.
i l
Plant Soccific Information:
i l
The EAL addresses conditions while operating in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 under which only one method is available to supply j
the emergency buses and loss of that method will result in a Station Blackout. Acceptable back up power sources with respect to this EAL include the non-safety related OC diesel generator and the 13 kV SMECO tie line. De 13 kV j
SMECO tie line can back up both units. When one or more of these sources are available to back up the Unit esperiencing a loss of offsite power or loss of a safety related diesel generator the entry condition for the EAL is not
,i being met and the EAL does not apply.
}
Thus, the EAL is written as:
Only One Power Source (Off-site or Diesel) is Available to Supply Unit 1 (Unit 2) Safety Related 4 kV i
busses for GREATER THAN 15 Minutes AND the Unit is Not on Shutdown Cooling (this is a condition
{
where any additional single failure will result in Station Blackout).
l Source Documents / References / Calculations:
[
Section 8, Electric Power Systems
+
4 Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document E:8 Rev.5
ELECTRICAL 2
Under conditions where a dieselgenerator is supplying power to one Unit, it should not be considered available as a power supplyfor the other Unit.
The first part of this EAL corresponds to the threshold conditions for IC ESI, Station Blackout for GREATER THAN 15 Minutes. The second part of the EAL addresses the conditions that will escalate the SBO to General Emergency.
l Occurrence of any one of these conditions following SBO is sufficient for escalation to General Emergency. These i
conditions are: (1) SBO coping capability, or (2) indications of inadequate core cooling. Each of these conditions is discussed below:
- 1. SBO Cooine Capability Calvert Cliffs E!!:: "S $c is licensed both for a four hour SBO coping category AND a one hour SBO coping category. The ability of each unit to cope with a four hour SBO duration was based on an assessment of condensate inventory required for decay heat removal, Class IE battery capacity, compressed air availability or manual operation of certain valves, effects of loss of ventilation, containment isolation valve opetability, and reactor coolant inventory loss. A plant-specific analysis indicates that the expected rates of reactor coolant inventory loss under SBO conditions do not result in core uncovery in a SBO of four hours. Therefore, makeup systems in addition to those currently available under SBO conditions are not required to maintain core cooling under natural circulation (including reflux boiling). Thus, conditions in which restoration ofA Cpower within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOTlikely are included in the EAL.
Installation of a SBO diesel also allows Calvert Cliffs to operate as a plant having a one hour coping capability. This allowance is in recognition that sufficient diesel generator back-up reduces the likelihood of station black-out. The analysis for the four hour coping category however, provides the source of an appropriate estimate of the time to core uncovery following a station black out from which the plant can not recover. This time (four hours) is used as the basis for determining when to declare a general emergency subsequent to a prolonged station black out.
2.
Indications of h.adeauate Core Cooling Calvert Cliffs does not use Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Calvert Cliffs uses Safety Function Status Checks developed by the Combustion Engineering Owmers' Group (C-E OG) which are based on logic similar to that used for CSFSTs developed for Westinghcuse PWRs. The applicable acceptance criteria for Core and RCS Heat Removal are shown on the Safety Function Status Checks. They are:
Steam Generators Available for RCS Heat Removal
- 1. Adequate secondary side liquid inventory in at least one steam generator as indicated by level between.170 and +30 inches, and
- 2. Adequate source of feedwater available to assure continued liquid inventory available as indicated by Condensate Storage Tank level greater than 5 feet, and
- 3. Steam Generators acting as effective heat sink as indicated by Cold Leg Temperatures (TCOLD) constant or lowering.
Primary Side Conditions for Core and RCS Heat Removal
- 1. Adequate core heat removal as indicated by Core Exit Thermocouple readings less than superheated, and
- 2. Either cf the following:
Nattral circulation established as indicated by the temperature difference between Hot Leg Temperature (THOT) and TCOLD of between 10 *F and 50 *F, or Forced circulation effective as indicated by THOT-T l
COLD ess than 10 *F.
+
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document E:15 Rev.5
e s
1 ELECTRICAL Per CEN-152, superheated conditions indicate core uncovery and inadequate core cooling.
Thus, the EAL is wTitten as:
EOP-7, Station Blackout, is Implemented AND ANY of the Following:
Restoration of Power to ANY Vital 4kV Bus Is NOT Likely Within 4 Hours Valid CET Readings Indicate Superheat Temperatures Core and RCS Heat Removal Using Steam Generators Can NOT Meet Acceptance Criteria Valid means that the indication is from instrumentation determined to be operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications or has been verified by other indications displayed on the control panels.
Can NOT is used because the ability to meet the final acceptance criteria is the appropriate concern, not whether intermediate acceptance criteria are not being achieved at any given moment.
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
CEN 152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
- 3. Letter, Daniel G. MacDonald (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to G.C. Creel (BG&E), Response to Station Blackout Rule Calven Clifts Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, TAC Numbers 68525 (Unit 1) and 68256 (Unit 2),
October 10,1990 i
Calvert Clifts EAL Basis Document E:16 Rev 5
- 7 l
SECURITY Emernency Classification Level: UNUSUAL EVENT ApplicableOncrationalModes ALL i
Calvert Cliffs Imtiating Condition j
TUI Confirmed Security Event With Potential Degradation in tlw level of Safety of the Plant NUMARC Recoanition Category. Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety NUMARC Initiatina Condiuon i
l HU4 Confirmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant 4
l Barrier: Not Applicable NUMARC Generic Basis:
i i
This EAL is based on (Site-specific) Site Security Plan. Security events which do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. The plant Protected Area Boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the (Site-specific) security plan. Bomb doices discovered within the plant Vital Area would result in o escalation <to a higher emergency classification level via other Security Event ICs>.
Plant-Soccific Information:
The Calvert Cliffs EALs address the generic areas of concern and include the ISFSL Nuclear Security will determine j
whether or not intrusion or sabotage exists in accordance with the Safeguards Contingency Plan. Attempted intrusion means that intruders are not successful in getting past the innermost fence of the double fence that surrounds the plant protected area. Sabotage within the ISFSI includes discovery of a bomb device. Intruders are armed or unarmed personnel that are attempting to or have gained unauthorized access 5 & '"- ------
Sabotage (including discovery of a bomb doice) inside the Plant Protected Area warrants escalation to an Alert level j
cmergency. A Site Emergency is warranted if sabotage occurs in an area of concern for safe shutdown of either reactor.
1 Thus, EAL 1 is written as:
l " Security Emergency" or " Security Alert" Declared for Attempted Intrusion into the Plant Protected Area l
EAL 2 is written as:
" Security Event" Declared for:
- ~
- Sabotage Within or to ISFSI Protected Area
- IntrusionIntoISFSIProtected Area i
Source Documents /Peferences/Calculauons None i
4 4
4 i
Calvert Cliffs EAL Bas 4 De ment T:1 Rev.5
a l
SECURITY Emernency Classification imel: ALERT Anolicable Operational Modes: ALL Calvert Cliffs Initiatina Condition:
TAI Security Event in the Plant Protected Area NUMARC Pam-nietaa Catenorv: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety i
NUMARCInitiating Condition' HA4 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area Bamer. Not Applicable NUMARC Generic Basis:
This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. For the purposes of this IC, a civil disturbance which penetrates the protected area boundary can be considered a hostile force.
Intrusion into a vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site < Emergency >.
l Plant-Soecific Information:
The Calvert Cliffs EALs address the generic areas of concern. Nuclear Security will determine whether or not intrusion or sabotage exists in accordance with the Safeguards Contingency Plan. Sabotage includes discovery of a bomb de5 ice.
Intruders are armed or unarmed personnel that have gained unauthorized access h : h ^!k --
Thus. EAL 1 is written as:
" Security Emergency" or " Security Alert" Declared For.
j Intruzion into the Plant Protected Area Sabotage inside the Plant Protected Area Source Documents / References / Calculations:
None l
l l
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document T:2 Rev.5
SECURITY Emeraency C1.**irmnelaa Level: SITE EMERGENCY Anoticable Onerational M~la*: AIL i
i Calvert Clifh Inleintian Caadi ion:
t 4
.TSI Security Event in a Plant Vital Area NUMARC Reconnition ('='aaary: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety NUMARC Initi=*ian Candition:
HS1 Security Event in Plant Vital Area Bamer: Not Applicable I
NUMARC Generic Basis:
I This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to the Vital Area. < >
l Plant-Soecific Information:
The Calvert Cliffs EALs address the generic areas of concern. Nuclear Security will determine whether or not intrusion i
or sabotage exists in accordance with the Safeguards Contingency Plan. Sabotage includes discovery of a bomb device.
Intruders are armed or unarmed personnel that have gained unauthorized war h : ': S ---.
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Thus, the EAL 4-is written as:
" Security Emergency " or " Security Alert" Declared For:
Intrusion into an Aarea of S ;'r' ^^^ h : r---. fx M: 'rt-d 9'- :-- ^r Concern for Safe Shutdown.
- Sabotage within an Aarea of 6 ;'r: S: k : r:r= fx - ': &" :: d "'- :: rr l
Concern for Safe Shutdown.
i The list of areas of concern for Safe Shutdown are shown below and are prominently displayed on the EAL Table.
Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown
- Control Room
- Electrical Penetration Rooms
- Control Room HVAC Room
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
- Cable Spreading Room
- Charging Pump Rooms
- Cable Chases
- Diesel Generator Rooms
- Switchgear Room
. Diesel Generator Building (OC/lA) d
- ECCS Pump Room
- Refueling Water Tank (RWT) 11(21) a Service Water Pump Room a Condensate StorageTank (CST) 12 i
- Component Cooling Pump Room
- Pretreated Water Storage Tank (PWST) 11(21) j
- Main Steam Penetration Room
- Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) 12 q
This list of Safe Shutdown areas is displayed on the EAL Tables to assure that all areas related to Safe Shutdown are considered by the SEC.
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".^.L 2 h 7tc.ese l Sabotage :id'; :: x d 6 ;'- ' -' E : r----- fr - ': dutm d:id:: :n^^:-
l Source Documents / References / Calculations:
1.
NRC Information Notice No. %71: Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief.
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Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document T:3 Rev.5
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FIRE Emernency Classification Level: ALERT Aeolicable Ooerational Modes: ALL Calvert Cliffs Initiating Condition:
IAI Fire or Explosion Affecting Safe Shutdown NUMARC Recoanition r=*=rv: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety NUMARC Initiatinn Condition:
HA2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown Barrier: Not Applicable NUMARC Generic Basis:
(Site-specific) Areas containing functions and systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant should be specified. (Site-Specific) Safe Shutdown Analysis should be consulted for equipment and plant areas required for the applicable mode. This will make it easier to determine if the fire or explosion is potentially affecting one or more trains of safety systems.
Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on < Equipment Failure, Electrical, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Radioactivity Release, or SEC Judgement ICs>. <>
With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, siolent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification. No attempt is made in this < Generic > EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for the declaration. The declaration of an Alert and the activation of the TSC will provide the <SEC) with the resources needed to perform these damage assessments. The <SEC) also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosions,if applicable.
Plant SoccificInformation:
Each Calvert Cliffs unit uses the Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) 9A through 9S to address fires within the plant protected and vital areas that are of particular concern because they contain equipment required for safe shutdown.
Thus, EAL 1 is written as:
l AOP-9 series Implemented for Fire..
l There are two independent clocks for determining the magnitude of a fire based on time. One clock starts when a fire is detected. For practical purposes a fire is detected when the report of the fire is received in the Control Room. Report of a fire may be by Control Room fire alarm or by voice message. A fire alarm refers to IC24B, Fire System Control Panel, for fire detection and fire suppression system actuation. Fire pump running and trouble alarms by themselves do not constitute a report of a fire. This clock includes: the time it takes to confirm or verify the fire report, plus the response team assembly i
time, plus the time it takes the responders to establish a fire fighting strategy, plus the time it takes to actually extinguish the fire.
Thus, EAL 4-2 is written as:
l Fire in an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown that is not extinguished within 30 minutes ofits detection.
l Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document I:3 Rev.5
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FIRE i
5 Visible smoke is sufHcient to conclude that a fire exists. Flames do not have to exist. Odor by itself does not constitute a fire.
j A fire is extinguished when the Fire Brigade Leader determines that active combustion has ceased and there is no
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immediate danger of the fire spreading.
The other clock for determining the magnitude of a fire is the time it takes to extinguish the fire. This clock begins when the first extinguishing agent is applied to the fire.
i Thus, EAL 3 3 is written as:
I Fire in an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown that is not extinguished within 15 minutes of the first extinguishing agent being applied.
This EAL accounts for situations where the time to validate and respond to the fire is short.
j EAL 3 4 is written as:
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l Explosion in an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown.
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j An explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, or a siolent l
electric arc, of sufficient force to potentially damage equipment, structures or components.
Fire and/or explosion in the Control Room HVAC Room may lead to power being lost to the alternate shutdown panels.
Thus, the Control Room HVAC Room (Room 512) has been added to the areas of concern for safe shutdown. The list of l
areas of concern for Safe Shutdown are shown below and are prominently displayed on the EAL Table.
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Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown i
- Control Room
. Electrical Penetration Rooms Control Room HVAC Room
. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room i
+ Cable Spreading Room
. Charging Pump Rooms l
+ Cable Chases
. Diesel Generator Rooms j
Switchgear Room
. Diesel Generator Buildings (0C/l A)
- ECCS Pump Room
+ Refueling Water Tank (RWT) 11(21) 1 Service Water Pump Room
. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 12
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- Component Cooling Pump Room
- Pretreated Water Storage Tank (PWST) 11(21) l
- Main Steam Penetration Room
. Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) 21 This list of Safe Shutdown areas is displayed on the EAL Tables to assure that all areas related to Safe Shutdown are considered by the SEC.
The significance of these EALs is not that safety systems have been degraded. What is significant is that a fire of such magnitude that it can not be extinguished in the times specified exists in an area of concern for safe shutdown. Likewise, j
an explosion is significant because it occurred in an area of concern for safe shutdown, not because it degraded safety systems.
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1 Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document I:4 Rev.5 l
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NATURAL HAZARDS l
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EAL 2 is written as:
Verified Report to Control Room of Vldh Nr;::e *^3 "h $m S;;4:r Observable Damage in
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an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown.
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Verification of damage can be by physical observation, or by indications of degraded equipment performance in the Control Room or at local control stations.
I EAL 3 uses a sustained wind speed of 90 MPH to address high winds striking the Plant Vital Area as recommended by NUMARC. This speed is chosen to assure that the wind speed is within the design capability of the meteorological tower.
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l Thus. EAL 3 is written as:
3 l Sustained Wind Speed GREATER THAN 90 MPH (40 meters /second) for AT LEAST 15 Minutes l
i The duration of 15 minutes is selected to indicate sustained winds and to preclude wind gusts. Wind speeds are also provided here in meters /second for dose assessment input. The conversion equation is as follows:
l 90 miles / hour x 5280 fect/ mile x (I hour /3600 seconds) x 1 meter /3.2808 feet) = 40 meters /second l
j Per UFSAR Section 2.8.3.6, the still water level used for Intake Structure analysis is 17.6 feet MSL. This is above the top of the range of the Tide Level Recorder (0 LR 5195). The top of the Traveling Screen cover housings is about 18 feet MSL.
3 EAL 4 indicates achieving the design water level.
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Thus. EAL 4 is written as:
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l Bay Water Level At Or Above the Top of the Traveling Screen Cover Housing l
Per UFSAR Section 2.8.3.7, the predicted extreme low tide is 3.6 feet MSL and the plant is designed to safely operate at an extreme low water level of-6.0 feet MSL. EAL 5 is based on the lower elevation.
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Thus. EAL 5 is written as:
f l Bay Water Level Is AT LEAST 6 Feet Below Mean Sea Level l
5 Surveillance Test Procedures provide a way to determine Bay level.
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 2. Operating Instruction (01) 46, Seismic Measurement Equipment
- 3. BG&E Drawing 60 220-E (M 31), Equipment Location Service Building, Water Treatment Area & Intake Structure Section"J T'
- 4. BO&E Internal Memorandum, J.E. Thorp to R.E. Denton, Emergency Action Level Review Criteria, June 1,1990 Calvert Clifts EAL Basis Document N:4 Rev.5
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l OTHER HAZARDS 3
l Emernency Classification Level: UNUSUAL EVENT Annlicable Operational Modes: ALL I
Calvert Cliffs initiating Condition:
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OU1 SEC Judgement j
NUMARC Recognition Category: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety NUMARC Initiatina Condition:
HUS Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual
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Event i
Barrier Not Applicable i
NUMARC Generic Basis:
This < Generic > EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the <SEC) to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.
From a broad perspective, one area that may warrant <SEC) judgement is related to likely or actual breakdown of site specific event mitigating actions. Examples to consider include inadequate emergency response procedures, transient response either unexpected or not understood, failure or unavailability of emergency systems during an accident in excess of that assumed in accident analysis, or insufficient availability of equipment and/or support personnel.
1 Specific examples of actual events that may require <SEC) judgement for Unusual Event declaration are listed here for consideration. However, this list is by no means all inclusive and is not intended to limit the discretion of the site to provide further examples.
- Aircraft crash on-site
- Train derailment on-site
- Near site explosion which may adversely affect normal site activities.
- Near site release of toxic or r=;;h flammable gas which may adversely affect normal site activities a
- Uncontrolled RCS cooldown due to Secondary Depressurization It is also intended that the <SEC's> judgement not be limited by any list of events as defined here or as augmented by the site. This list is provided solely as examples for consideration and it is recognized that actual events may not always follow a pre-conceived description.
Plant snecificInformation:
Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) is the title for the emergency director function at Calvert Cliffs.
Thus, the EAL 1 is written as:
Any Condition Which in the SEC's Judgement Indicates Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant In this manner, the EAL addresses conditions that fall under the Notification of Unusual Event emergency classification description contained in NUREG 06$4, Appendix 1 that is retained under the NUMARC methodology.
Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document 0:1 Rev,5
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OTHER HAZARDS Uncontrolled RCS cooldown due to secondary depressurization is given as an example under this initiating condition.
In order to reduce the need for judgment in recognizing this condition, a separate EAL is written for EOP-4 implementation. EOP 4 is implemented for this condition at Calvert Cliffs. Other examples given in the generic basis are addressed as specific EAL's and under OU2 and OU3.
Thus EAL 2 is written as:
l EOP-4, Excess Steam Demand Event,is Implemented.
l Source Dacumaa'</ References /Caledations:
- 1. EmergencyResponsePlan
- 2. NUREG454/ FEMA REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, October 1980, Appendix 1 I
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Calvert Cliffs EAL. Basis Document O:2 Rev.5 I
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i OTHER HAZARDS i
i EAL 1 is written as:
F"':-- * = dy P--: Of = Explosion Causing Observable Damage to Permanent Equipment or j
Structures Within the Plant Protected Area Or Within the ISFSI Protected Area EAL 2 is written as:
i Veseble Observable Damage t: ":'; Sh $ - E;;!;2=: O: to Permanent Equipment or Structures Within the Plant Protected Area Or Within the ISFSI Protected Area i
EAL 3 is written as:
l Turbine Failure Causing Observable Casing Damage l
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Observable is used to indicate that such damage can be readily seen and does no. require special equipment or techniques to see or measure.
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EAL 4 is written as:
I Vessel or Vehicle Collision Causing Observable Damage to " ': Sh:$2: Permanent Equipment or i
Structures Within the Plant Protected Area.
3 EAL 5 is written as:
l Vessel or Vehicle Collision Causing Observable Damage to Structures Containing Dry Stored Spent Fuel l
J EALs 4 and 5 address airplane, helicopter, barge, boat, train, car, or truck collisions inte that may potentially damage equipment required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown or with the Horizontal Storage Modules and their associated structural supports. These EALs do not include vehicle crashes with each other, damage to office structures, damage to j
equipment =: =;;:=d :: ed!=: = =!:' !: =f: 2:22, that does not affect plant safety, or damage to structures that l
are not required to maintain the integrity of the dry spent fuel stored in the ISFSI. ed ch:2:n== =d ;;!;;=: cf j
een= = 5 :T.:d S!. Actual damage in areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown are escalated to Alert whereas 1
damage in the plant protected area is recognized as only having the potential for affected safe shutdown.
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^ n = cf C = = n. fee S d *5: d: =
- C=:=1 Recr
- E!=tri=! P=rm != R==
- C=:::! R== HV^.C Reem
- A=:liarj Pd=:= P=p Rec =
- Cd'; c :-M:; Recr
- Ch=ging P=; Re:=
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- Cd!; Ch=
- Di=! C==::: R==
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- S:i:d;= Rec =
- Di=! C=:::= E !!d!:; (^C!! A)
- ECCS P=; R==
- Rd:!!:g "'::= T:d (R"T, ! !(21)
- re!="/d P=pR=r
- C=f=x:: *:=g: Ted (CST) M i
- C=p==: C=!! g "=p R==
- P=::r:M "/dr S:=g: Ted ("VSD !!(21) j
- M6 c =r P===:!= R==
- F :! Oi! S::=;; T-d (rOSD 12 P.!: !! Of "d *h :$2m ::= i: di:;!:y-d 0 th EAL Td!= :: - r= th: :!!== :6 M :: "^':
"h: t z,=: = =!d =d b'S CEC.
j EAL 6 is wTitten as:
Flooding Of R== C '-!?:; "d "h:2:7 E;;!;==: Causing Observable Damage to Permanent i
Equipment or Stevetures Within the Plant Protected Ares i
Floodmg indicates that the net water flow into the room results in elevated water levels, may be more than available drain i
capacity, and if continued, can prevent operation of equipment in the room. Thus, minor water level increases that may result in wet floors and do not pose a challenge to equipment operation are not included in this EAL. Areas containing equipment required for Safe Shutdown are listed above. The rooms located below MSL include the ECCS Pump Rooms and the Charging Pump Rooms. The Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers are also located in the ECCS Pump Rooms. Such 4
flooding can result in a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Calvert Cliffs plant and is therefore included in i
this EAL.
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Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document 0:5 Rev.5 i
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OTHER HAZARDS Emergency Classification Level: ALERT Anolicable Ooerational Modes: ALL Calvert Cliffs Initiatina Condition:
OA2 Toxic or Flammable Gases Affecting Safe Shutdown NUMARC Recognition Category Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety NUMARC Initiatinn Condition:
HA3 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Bamer: Not Applicable NUMARC Generic Basis:
This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas (i.e., Service Water Pumphouse).
The intent of tids IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas, it is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on < Electrical, Equipment Failure, Radioactivity Release, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or SEC Judgement ICs> o Plant SoecificInformation:
For the purposes of this IC, Halon (such as is discharged by the fire suppression system) is not toxic Fire suppressant discharge can be lethal if it reduces oxygen to low concentrations that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
Fire suppressant discharge into an area is not basisfor emergency classifcation under this IC unless: (1) Access to the afected area is required, and (2) Fire suppressant concentration results in conditions that make the area inaccessible (i.e.,
JDl2D.
Thus, the EAL is written as:
Toxic or Flammable Gas Making Safe 44mc
^---- '------ *' an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown Inaccessible.
This EAL also addresses releases that could originate from the Cove Point Liquid Natural Gas Plant.
The areas of concern for safe shutdown are identified below.
Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown
- Control Room
. Electrical Penetration Rooms
- Control Room HVAC Room
. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
- Cable Spreading Room
- Charging Pump Rooms
- Cable Chases
- Diesel Generator Rooms
- Switchgear Room
- Diesel Generator Building (OC/l A)
- ECCS Pump Room
- Refueling Water Tank (RWT) 11(21)
- Service Water Pump Room
. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 12
- Component Cooling Pump Room
- Pretreated Water Storage Tank (PWST) 11(21)
- Main Steam Penetration Room
- Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) 12 This list of Safe Shutdown areas is displayed on the EAL Tables to assure that all areas related to Safe Shutdown are considered by the SEC.
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Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document 0:8 Rev.5
GTHER HAZARDS Emergency Classification Level: ALERT Aeolicable Operational Modes: ALL Calvert Cliffs initiating Condition:
OA3 Destructive Phenomena Affecting Safe Shutdown e
I NUMARC Recognition Category. Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety NUMARC Initiatina Condition:
HA1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area Barrier Not Applicable NUMARC Generic Basis:
Generic EALs 1, 2, and 3 are addressed under IC NA ), Natural Phenomena Afecting Safe Shutdown.
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< Generic > EAL 4 should specify the types of instrumentation or indications including judgement which are to be used to assess occurrence.
< Generic > EAL 5 is intended to address such items as plane or helicopter crash, or on some sites, train crash, or barge crash into a plant vital area.
< Generic > EAL 6 is intended to address the threat to safety related equipment imposed by missiles generated by main turbine rotating component failures. This (site specific) list of areas should include all safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if missiles
,l have damaged or penetrated areas containing safety related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
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< Generic > EAL 7 covers other (Site-Specific) phenomena such as flood.
Each of thesc < generic > EALs is intended to address events that may have resulted in a plant sital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems. The initial " report" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in th<csc>
c EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on < Equipment Failure, Electrical, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Radioactivity Release, or SEC> Judgement ICs.
Plant SoccificInformation:
The Calvert Cliffs EALs are based on report to the control room of damage affecting safe shutdown functions.
EAL 1 addresses airplane, helicopter, barge, boat, train, car, or truck collisions. This EAL does not include vehicle crashes with each other, damage to office structures, or damage to structures that are not safety-related.
Thus. EAL 1 is written as:
Vessel or Vehicle Collision.'?:^ ting the ^1i!!G ::
5;; 'h ".^!:2 "d t:- Causing
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Observable Damate in an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown Calvert Cliffs EAL Basis Document 0:10 Rev.$
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OTHER HAZARDS l
EAL 2 is wTitten as:
Missiles.*"rting $:.^bi!!:y ::.^dirc; Or :! ::! Ed Sh:52, Causing Observable Damage in an Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown EAL 3 is written as:
Flooding.^."=:! g 10.^.b!!!:y :: ^dirc: 0: -"' *d Sh:$2m Causing Observable Damage la sa Area of Concern for Safe Shutdown 1
i Determination of whether the collision, missiles, or flooding are afecting ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdovm is determined by physical observation, or by Control Room / local control station indications. Observation of damage to systems should be used to discriminate between major flooding and minor flooding or flooding in areas having a low probability of affecting safe shutdown. Operability determinations are not expected prior to declaration of this event-based EAL.
2 The list of areas of concern for Safe Shutdown are shown below and are prominently displayed on the EAL Table.
Areas of Concern for Safe Shutdown
- Control Room a Electrical Penetration Rooms
- Control Room HVAC Room Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
- Cable Spreading Room
. Charging Pump Rooms
- Cable Chases Diesel Generator Rooms
- Switchgear Room
. Diesel Generator Building (OC/l A)
ECCS Pump Room Refueling Water Tank (RWF) 11(21)
- Service Water Pump Room
. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 12
+ Component Cooling Pump Room
- Pretreated Water Storage Tank (PWST) 11(21)
. Main Steam Penetration Room
+ Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) 12 This list of Safe Shutdown areas is displayed on the EAL Tables to assure that all areas related to Safe Shutdown are considered by the SEC.
Source Documents / References / Calculations:
- 1. Updated Final Safet) Analysis Report i
Calvert Cli4Ts EAL Basis Document 0:11 Rev.5
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