ML20112C036
| ML20112C036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1996 |
| From: | Doroshuk B, Tilden B, Tucker R BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20112B955 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9605240129 | |
| Download: ML20112C036 (66) | |
Text
I j
Calvert Cliffs NuclearPowerPlant 2
License RenewalProject Aging Management Review Report for the Containment System O
(059)
Revision 1 May, 1996
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M Prepared by:
Date B.M. Tilden P.sviewed bys_
Date R.L. Tucker Approved by:
Dates
- d. W. Doroshuk O
- 8ru8astat888817 P
OV Containment System Aging Management Review Report CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Number TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................
i LIST OF TAB LES............................................................................................... ii LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTION S.......................................................................... i11
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES................................................................................. iv
1.0 INTRODUCTION
................................................................................... 1 - 1 1.1 Containment System Description........................................................ 1-1 1.1.1 Containment System Description............................................. 1 -1 1.1.2 Containment System Boundary................................................ 1 - 1 1.1.3 Containment System Intended Functions.................................... 1 -2 1.2 Evaluation Methods........................................................................ 1 -2 1.3 Containment System Specific Definitions.............................................. 1 -3 1.4 Containment System Specific References.............................................. 1 -3 O
2.0 COMPONENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF LICENSE RENEWAL.................... 2-1 2.1 Component Level Scoping Methodology Over' iew................................. 2-1 v
2.2 Component Level Scoping Results...................................................... 2-1 3.0 COMPONENT PRE-EVALUATION.......................................................... 3 - 1 3.1 Pre-Evaluation M ethodology Overview................................................ 3 -1 3.2 Pre-Evaluation Results.................................................................... 3 -2 4.0 COMPONENT AGING MAN AGEMENT REVIEW...................................... 4-1 4.1 Aging Management Review Methodology Overview............................... 4-1 4.2 Age-Related Degradation Mechanisms................................................. 4-2 4.2.1 Potential ARDMs................................................................. 4-2 4.2.2 Component Grouping............................................................ 4-3 4.2 3 Plausible ARDM s................................................................. 4-3 4.3 Methods To Manage The Effects O f Aging........................................... 4-4 Appendix A Results of Aging Management Review Procedure for the Containment System i
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Revision 1
O Cent inment Srstem Asin. Man semeniRevie-Re, ort CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW REPORT LIST OF TABLES 1-1 Containment System Specific References............................................. 1-4 2-1 Containment System Components within the........................................ 2-2 scope of License Renewal 3-1 Containment System Intended Functions Disposition............................... 3-2 3-2 Summary of Containment System Components Requiring........................ 3-3 Aging Management Review 4-1 Potential Age-Related Degradation Mechamsms Summuy........................ 4-5 4-2 Plausible Age-Related Degradation Mechanisms Summary........................ 4-6 O
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O ii Revision 1
O Containment Sr tem Aging Management Review Report CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AGING MANAGEMENT REVTEW REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS Revision LIST OF TABLES
..........................................................................................1 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES............................................................................... 1 1.0 INTRO D U CTION...................................................................................... 1 2.0 COMPONENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF LICENSE RENEWAL.......................1 3.0 COMPONENT PRE-EVALUATION............................................................. 1 4.0 COMPONENT AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW......................................... 1 Appendix A Aging Management Review Summary..................................................... 1 Description of Programs Which Manage the Effects of Aging........................1 Equipment Type Penetrations Component Grouping Summaries.................................................. 1 O ARDM Matrix.......................................................................... I U M atrix Codes.......................................................................... 1 Potential ARDM List................................................................. 1 Equipment Type Door Component Grouping Summaries................................................. 1 ARDM Matrix......................................................................... 1 Matrix Codes.......................................................................... 1 Potential ARDM List................................................................. 1 Development of Aging Management Alternatives........................................1 h
iii Revision 1
Containment System Aging Management Review Report CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW REPORT
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES REVISION CHANGE DESCRIPTION 0
Initialissue 1
Added more specific evaluation of containment sump recire penetrations which are different from the other mechanical penetrations per the resolution of TPR %-005.
Clarified scope of MN-3-100 and PEG-7 as aging management programs per the resolution of TPR 96-016.
Corrected some terminology inconsistencies in the original revision.
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O iv Revision 1
hl Containment System Aging Management Review Report l
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DESCRIPTION This section describes the scope and boundaries of the Containment System (System 059) as it was evaluated. Section 1.1.1 provides a brief synopsis of the i
system as described in existing plant documentation. The boundaries of the system are described in Section 1.1.2. Section 1.1.3 is a detailed breakdown of the system intended functions and is provided as a basis for component scoping and the identification of component-specific functions.
1.1.1 Containment System Description The containment is a Class I structure, housing the reactor and other NSSS components. The containment consists of a reinforced concrete cylinder and a shallow domed roof which rests on a reinforced concrete foundation slab. The concrete cylinder and dome have a post-tensioned contraction design. Attached to the inside of the containment structure is a carbon O
steei ii er. There re three verso==ei >=a 9 iv -e=1 ecess eve =i=8s i=
the containment: a two-door personnel lock, a large diameter single door equipment hatch, and a two-door personnel escape hatch.
The containment has. numerous penetrations for piping and electrical connections. These penetrations are leak tight, inert assemblies, welded to the containment liner. A fuel transfer tube penetration in the containment is provided to permit fuel movement between the refueling pool in the containment and the spent fuel pool in the auxiliary building.
Two sumps are provided in the containment floor: a normal sump and an emergency sump.
The stmetural components of the Containment System were evaluated using a separate LCM procedure for evaluating structures and the results of this procedure are presented in a separate Aging Management Review l
Report.
1.1.2 Containment System Boundary The Containment System components include containment penetrations, instrumentation associated with penetrations, doors and access hatches and 1-1 Revision 1
C Containment System Aging Management Review Report limit switches associated with doors and hatches. Components within this system boundary include the following major device types:
Includes all containment penetrations for j
mechanical and electrical equipment. Some penetrations are qualified under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
Door (DOOR)
Includes the equipment hatch and the normal and emergency personnel access hatches Pressure Indicator (PI) hxlicate the pressure associated with the penetration seal.
Pressure Switch (PS)
Provide a signal for low pressure associated with the penetrations.
Position Switch (ZS)
Provides a signal to indicate the position of containment doors and hatches.
1.1.3 Containment System Intended Functions
.)
A detailed review of the Containment System intended functions was completed during the screening process using Procedure LCM-11. The following intended functions for the Containment System components were identified in Table 1 of the scoping results.
Provide Closure of Containment Airlock and Access / Egress hatches.
Maintain functionality of Electrical Components as addressed by the EQ program.
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Maintain the pressure boundary of the system.
e Provides rated fire barrier.
e 1.2 EVALUATION METHODS Containment System components within the scope of license renewal were identified through the use of BGE procedure for Component Izvel Scoping of Systems. The results of the scoping process are discussed in Section 2.0 of this report.
O co t t==e=1 srste= co-ge=e=ts s=dJeet to 8 =8 = =>8e-e=t teview for tiee se re e*>>
t were determined using the BGE procedure for Component Pre-Evaluation to identify 1-2 Revision 1
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Centainment Sxstem Aoin Man gemen, Review Report passive, long-lived components that must be evaluated for management of the effects of age-related degradation. The results of the Pre-evaluation process are discussed in Section 3.0 of this report.
All components subject to aging management review are evaluated for the effects of aging in accordance with the BGE procedure for Component Aging Management Review. This procedure is performed to determine plausible aging effects and the appropriate methods to manage those effects. The results of the Aging Management Review (AMR) process are discussed in Section 4.0 of this report.
1.3 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM SPECIFIC DEFIhTTIONS This section provides the definitions for any specific terms unique to the Containment System component level evaluation.
Term Definition None 1.4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM SPECIFIC REFERENCES References utilized in the completion of the Contaimnent System component level evaluation are listed in Table 1-1. Drawings and procedures used as source documents in the evaluation were taken at the revision level of record at the start of this task which was May 1996.
O 1-3 Revision 1
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l Containment System Aging Management Review Report 1
Table 1-1 Containment System Specific References Document ID Document Tnie Reymon No.
Dag UFSAR Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, 18 1996 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Component Level ITLR Screening Results for the 0
1993 Containment System Pre-evaluation Results for the Containment System 1
1996 i
EPRI TR 103835 PWR Containment Ucense RenewalIndustry Report i
7/94 EPRITR 103842 Class l Structures Ucense Renewal Industry Report 1
7/94 EPRI TR-103838 Pressurized Water Reactor, Reactor Pressure Vessel 1
7/94 l
Intemals Ucense RenewalIndustry Report 1
l DG 1009 Draft USNRC Regulatory Culde Standard Format and 12/90 l
Content of Technical information for App!! cations to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Ucenses I
EPRI NP-5461 Components Ufe Estimation: LWR Structural Materials 9/87 Degradation Mechanisms V)
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8/92 Examination of the Unit-1 Containment Structure.
Component Evaluation and Program Evaluation 1
1994 Results for Containment System No. 59 Civ!! and Structural Design Criterla for Calvert Cliffs O
8/91 Nuclear Power Plant Unit No.1 and 2, by Bechtel I
Power Corp.
10/92 IAEA TECDOC 670
- Pilot Studles on Management of Aging of Nuclear Power Plant Components," internat!Onal Atomic l
Energy Agency MN 3-100 Painting and Other Protective Coatings 2
4/96 TRD-A-1000 Coating Application Performance Standard 10 7/95 6750 A 24 Specification for Painting and Special Coatings 12 10/82 6750.C 16 Specification for Furnishing, Fabricating, Delivering 8
5/71 and Erection of the Containment Structure Uner Plate and Accessory Steel 6750 C 16A Specification for Furnishing, Fabricating, and 0
12/68 Delivering the Containment Structure uner Plate and Accessory Steel 6750 017 Specification for Containment Personnel Locks and 3
2/76 Equipment Hatch 1
6750 E-31 Specification for Containment Structure Electrical 6
8/73 Penetration Assemblies f'
6750 M-307 Specification forFurnshing and Delivering Meta!!ic 2
6/72 Expansion Joints l
l-4 Revision I
h' Containment System Aging Management Review Report Table 1-1 Containment System Specinc References Document ID Dcx:mncaTule Reymon No.
Dag 6750-M 343 Specification for Containment Wall Penetration 2
7/71 Coolers SP-387 Specification for Containment Structure Electrical 9
Penetration Assemb!!es BC&E 1963
- Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings," American Institute of SteelConstruction 675GC 28 Specification for Stainless Steel Uner Plate and Spent 6
6/74 FuelPoolBulkhead Cate ASME Section 111,
- Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and 1986 Division 2 Containments," American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boller and Pressure Vessel Code 60420E Sh,.1 Miscellaneous Piping Details 6
7/74 60 731-E Sh,. 3 Safety Irdection and Containment Spray Systems 20 11/95 Operations Drawing 64420 E Sh,.1 Miscellaneous Piping Details 6
7/74 62-152 E Appendix *R* Separation Rr,Qulrements, Aux. Bldg.
7 5/94 and Ctmt. Sruct., Elevatims 45' 0" 62153f Appendix *R* Separation Requirements, Aux. Bldg.
7 S/94 and Ctmt. Sruct., Elevations 69' 0"61-740, Sh.1 Containment uner Plan, Elevation, and Penetrations 19 9/76 61740, Sh. 2 Containment Structure Penetrations 6
9/76 9
61 741 Containment uner Penetration Detalls 17 1/75 61-743 Containment uner Penetration Details 6
3/73 61 749 Containment uner Access Openings 11 4/76 60-353 Sh.1 FuelTransferTube 20 4/95 61409 Sh.1 Electrical East Penetration Assembly Arrangement 14 9/95 Inside U-1 61409 Sh. 2 ElectricalWest Penetration Assembly Arrangement 13 8/91 Inside U-1 12317{l013 incapsulating Flange 0
6/71 128194X)01 Material Preparation Flued Head C
12/72 128194)002 Flued Head With Internal Process Pipe C
1/73 12405A<)001 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 1 1
3/93 12405A 0026 Header Plate Sub-Assembly (external) Type 1 D
3/73 12405B4)001 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 3D E
3/72 1-5 Revision 1
1 Containment System Aging Management Review Report l
Table 1-1 l
Containment System Specific References Document ID Document Title Revician No.
Dag 124058 0 010 Header Plate, Welding Sub-Assembly, 2xt. Type 3D B
10/71 12405C4001 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 2A L
7/94 12405D4001 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 2B J
1/73 12405D4004 Hear Plate anternaD Type 2B D
2/72 12405E0001 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 2C F
202 12405F0001 Sh.1 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 3A H
392 1240500001 Electrical Penetration Canister Type 3B F
2H2 130744011 Penetrations Group M3 3
8/70 130740012 Penetrations Groups M1 and M2 4
200 130744013 Penetrations Groups E1 and E2 2
1/70 130740014 Penetrations 3
100 13074 0019 19' 0" Diameter Equipment Door 7
3/87
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130744020 Sh.1 EQulpment Door Details 5
3/87 13074 0038 General Arrangement 3'W x 6*f Personnel Airlock 3
600 130744039 Lock Structure PersonnelLock 0
200 130744040 Interior Bulkhead Assembly 3'M x 6'r Personnel 2
4/96 Airlock 13074 0041 Exterior Bulkhead Assembly 3'f x 6*f Personnel 1
4/96 Airlock 13074 0 042 3'f x 6'r Personnel Lock Structural Details 1
300 13074 4 043 3'f x6*f PersonnelLockInteriorDoorDetails 0
200 13074 0044 3'W X 6'r Personnel Lock Exterior Door Details 0
2/70 13074 4047 Valve & Latching Limit Switch Locations 0
200 13074 4 048 General Arrangement Escape Lock 5
12/94 130740049 Lock Structural Assembly Escape Lock 0
2/70 13074 4 050 Interior Bulkhead Assembly Escape Lock 1
6/70 13074 0051 Extericr Bulkhead Assembly Escape Lock 1
8/94
- O l-6 Revision 1
O centainment Srstem isin Mana ement Review Revert 2.0 COMPONENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF LICENSE RENEWAL 2.1 COMPONENT LEVEL SCOPING METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW The scoping of the Containment System components was performed in accordance l
with the process described in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Integrated Plant Assessment Methodology as specified in the procedure for the component level scoping of systems. The purpose of component level scoping is to identify l
all system components that support 'he intended system functions identified in Section 1.1.3 for the Containment S,sem. These are the components that are j
within the scope oflicense renewal.
i The stmetural components of the containment were scoped using a different, structural process. The results of this scoping are recorded in a separate section of the Containment Scoping Results. The aging management review of these stmetural components is documented in a separate AMR report.
2.2 COMPONENT LEVEL SCOPING RESULTS A total of three device types h1 the Containment System were designated as within -
2 the scope of license renewal. These device types are listed in Table 2-1. All containment penetrations and doors were determined to contribute to one or more j
intended functions as well as the position switches associated with the doors.
Refer to the results of the Component Level Scoping for the list of components within the scope of license renewal, and other scoping-related details.
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O ce t i - i s ><e- ^=t== =
= - ' n vi -
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r Table 2-1 Containment System Comnonents Within the Scone of I lcenw Renewal Comnonent DEVICE TYPE Containment PersonnelIock DOOR Contaimnent Emergency lock DOOR Containment Equipment Hatch DOOR Containment Penetrations (Electrical EQ)
PEN Containment Penetrations (Electrical Non-EQ)
PEN Containment Penetrations (Mechanical)
PEN Fuel Transfer Tube and PEN Penetration Bellows Containment Sump Recirc Penetrations PEN Containment / Emergency Airlock ZS Limit Switches O
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O 2-2 Revision 1 1
O Containment Srstem 4=in= = n =ement aevie-aeaert 3.0 COMPONENT PRE-EVALUATION 3.1 PRE-EVALUATION METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW The component pre-evaluation procedure is used to determine which components i
are subject to an aging management review. This procedure is used to categorize intended functions as active or passive, determine if the components supporting passive intended functions are long-lived, and identify the set of components j
subject to aging management review.
l The pre-evaluation also determmes whether the components should be included in a commodity group AMR or the system AMR.
3.2 PRE-EVALUATION RESULTS c
Table 3-1 summarizes the disposition of intended functions for the Containment
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System as either active or passive. These functions are derived from the functions identified and documented during the component level scoping process, which are listed in subsection 1.1.3.
Components supporting only active intended functions (i.e., not passive components) and those that are subject to replacement based on qualified life (i.e.,
not long-lived components) do not require an aging management review.
Components that are evaluated as part of commodity evaluations are addressed in
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separate AMRs. The Containment System components dispositioned as part of commodity evaluations include all cables associated with Containment System components in the scope of license renewal.
Table 3-2 summanzes the disposition of the device types identified in Table 2-1 as within the scope of license renewal for the Containment System.
Refer to the results of the Containment System Component Pre-evaluation for the l
list of components subject to AMR and other details.
O 3-1 Revision 1
O ce t i - i s
<e-Aging Management Review Report r
Table 3-1
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Containment System Intended System Function Disposition Function Function Description Passive?
Provide Closure of Containment Airlock and No Access / Egress hatches.
Maintain functionality of electrical components as Yes addressed by the EQ Program.
Maintain the pressure boundary of the system.
Yes Provides rated fire barrier.
Yes O
O 3-2 Revision 1
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Containment System Aging Management Review Report I
d Table 3-2 Summary of Containment System Components Requiring Aging Management Review Components Components Components Components Support Subject to Evaluated in Included in Device Passive Replacement Commodity Containment i
Type Device Description Function (s)?
Program?
Evaluation?
AMR7 DOOR Containment Personnel Yes No No Yes Airlock DOOR Containment Yes No No Yes Emergency Airlock DOOR Containment Equipment Yes No No Yes Hatch PEN Containment Electrical Yes No No Yes EQ Penetrations PEN Containment Electrical Yes No No Yes O
Non-Eo Penetrations PEN Containment Yes o
No Yes Mechanical Penetrations PEN Containment Fuel Yes No No Yes Transfer Tube / Bellows PEN Containment Sump Yes No No Yes Recire Penetrations ZS Containment / Emergency No NA No No Airlock Limit Switches
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3-3 Revision 1
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Containment System Aging Management Review Report 4.0 COMPONENT AGING MANAGEhENT REVIEW 4.1 AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW The aging management review of Containment System components was performed in accordance with the process described in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Integrated Plant Assessment Methodology as specified in the procedure for the component aging management review. This procedure requires the identification of plausible age related degradation mecbanisms (ARDMs) for each component subject to aging management review, unless it can be demonstrated that the effects of aging can be managed without specifying ARDMs.
For one component type in the Containment System, the aging management review was completed without addressing specific ARDMs. Certain electrical penetrations are qualified for a 40 year life under the CCNPP 50.49 Program.
This program has been identified as being a time-limited aging analysis which O
eeas to de aaaressea uaaer a serarate sectioa or the ticease reaew>i rvie.
Therefore, this AMR report does not addresstese penetrations beyond iaentifying which ones are qualified for 40 years under the 50.49 program.
For the remaining component groups, the effects of the ARDMs on the ability of the components to support intended functions are identified and the ability of existing plant programs to adequately manage the effects of these ARDMs is evaluated.
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The review accomplished the following:
Determination of plausible component-ARDMs combinations:
e (1)
Identified potential age-related degradation mechanisms (ARDMs) for Containment System components.
(2)
Grouped Containment System components based on device type and design / operating environment attributes.
(3)
Identified plausible age-related degradation mechanisms ARDMs for each component based on:
Industry and plant information 4-1 Revision I
O containment S stem Asin= = n =e-ent neview ae, ort 7
Material of construction Environmental service factors Intended functions Identified methods to manage aging effects for plausible ARDMs and assessed e
current plant programs to determine whether these aging effects a e adequately managed.
4.2 AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION MECHANISMS Containment System components were evaluated to identify plausible ARDMs for which activities are required to ensure that age related degradation does not affect the component intended function (s). The identification of plausible ARDMs was completed in accordance with the process discussed below.
4.2.1 Potential ARDMs This step of the aging evaluation identifies ARDMs that are potentially O#
. detrimental to Containment System components. These potential ARDMs are detennined on an equipment type basis. An ARDM is considered 'pote'ntial if the evaluation concludes that the ARDM could occur in generic applications of the equipment throughout the plant. The equipment types for which ARDMs were evaluated are listed below.
Penetration Door A list of potential component ARDMs was developed for each of the equipment types. The list was developed through review ofindustry documents. The following are examples of sources of ARDM information:
Draft NRC Regulatory Guide DG-1009 NEI(NUMARC) Industry Reports NRC NPAR Reports EPRI Reports For each ARDM on the list, a determmation was made whether it was applicable (i.e., potential) to the equipment type. The applicability of the ARDM was determined on the basis of a generic component of the equipment type in service O
in any system in the plant.
4-2 Revision 1
i Containment System Aging Management Review Report A summary of the potential ARDMs for each of the Containment System equipment types is provided in Table 4-1. The specific description of each potential ARDM is included on the Attachment 7s in Appendix A.
4.2.2 Component Grouping Similar components are grouped together for evaluation efficiency. The age-I related degradation evaluation results completed for a group are applicable to each of the individual components within the group. Selection of grouping attributes was accomplished through consideration of the component characteristics that would most influence the age-related degradation that could occur. Grouping attributes utilized for the Containment System included material of construction, process environment and applicability of the 50.49 program. Component grouping is shown on Attachment 3s in Appendix A.
4.2.3 Plausible ARDMs The list of potential ARDMs is utilized for a Containment System component-O specific identification of giausidie AnDMs. The viausibiiity determieation is made through consideration of factors that infiuence component susceptibility to the ARDM. The ARDMs are assessed for pfausibility on the basis of:
Material of construction Internal (process) environment External environment Operational conditions / effects Affect on the passive intended function Physical conditions of the component may be used as additional evidence to support a not plausible determination a
The results of the component-specific ARDM plausibility evaluation are included in Attachment 5s and 6s in Appendix A. The results are consistent with both the results obtained in generic evaluations performed in industry reports and with the results previously obtained during the Containment and Auxiliary Building structures evaluations. These results are summarized by component Device Type, in matrix form, in Table 4-2.
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4-3 Revision 1
3(V Containment System Aging Management Review Report 4.3 METHODS TO MANAGE THE EFFECTS OF AGING l
l The methods of managing the effects of plausible age related degradation mechanisms are determined in the final step of the aging management review process. These methods are compared to current plant programs and practices to determine whether aging effects are adequately managed for the period of extended operation, or whether program revisionr. or new programs are required. Additionally, plant modifications may be considered as a method to manage aging effects.
Applicable aging effects management methods are determmed through consideration of the specific plausible ARDM, component configuration (material of construction, geometry, service conditions, etc.), and relative significance of the aging effects for the period of extended operation.
Site programs and processes associated with the Containment system were reviewed to identify those that implemented the aging effects management methods determined to be nececsary for the period of extended operation.
J These activities were reviewed with appropriate siite program managers, system engineers, and others to gain concurrence otr.the site programs and processes that will become commitments for plant license renewal. Similarly, modifications to current programs, and requirements for new programs, were identified and reviewed with the site to gain concurrence as these will aisc become commitments for plant license renewal.
l Site programs are related to specific containment system components and plausible ARDMs on Attachments 1,2 and 8 in Appendix A.
. in Appendix A provides a summary of Containment System components (by device type) subject to aging management review, applicable passive intended function (s), plausible ARDMs, and aging effects management programs.
O 44 Revision 1
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Containment System Aging Management Review Report Table 4-1 Potential Age-Related Degradation Mechanisms (ARDMs) Summary 1
l Containment System Equipment Types Potential ARDMs Penetration Door General Corrosion / Oxidation x
x Pitting / Crevice Corrosion x
Irradiation-Assisted Stress x
Corrosion Cracking Stress Corrosion Cracking, x
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking and Intergranular Attack Microbiologically influenced x
Corrosion Saline Water Attack
(
Erosion Erosion / Corrosion Neutron Embrittlement Thermal Aging x
Hydrogen Damage x
Low Cycle Fatigue x
High Cycle Fatigue Wear Creep Electrical Stress Stress Relaxation x
x Elevated Temperature x
x x - indicates that the ARDM is potentially detrimental to the equipment type l
4-5 Revision 1
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Containment System Aging Management Review Report J
1 Table 4-2 Plausible Age-Related Degradation Mechanisms Summary Containment System Component Types Plausible ARDMs Electrical Mechanical Fuel Coat Sump Equip /
Pen Pen (CS)
Transfer Recire Pen Personnel (non-EQ)
Tube /
(SS)
Hatch Bellows General X
X X
Corrosion / Oxidation Pitting / Crevice Corrosion Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking Stress Corrosion Cracking Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking and Intergranular Attack Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion Thermal Aging Hydrogen Damage Low Cycle Fatigue Elevated Temperature x - indicates that the ARDM is plausible for component (s) within the Device Type O
4-6 Revision 1
Containment System Aging Marsgement Review Report O
V Appendix A j
Results of Aging Management Review Procedure for the Containment System (059) i Total Pages, Aging Management Review Summary 1, Description of Programs Which Manage the Effects of Aging 1
Equipment Type: Penetration (PEN), Potential ARDM List 7
Device Type: PEN, Component Grouping Summary Sheet (059-PEN-01) 2, Component Grouping Summary Sheet (059-PEN-02) 2 Attaciunent 3, Component Grouping Summary Sheet (059-PEN-03) 5
., Component Grouping Summary Sheet (059-PEN-04) 1, Component Grouping Summary Sheet (059-PEN-05)
I, ARDM Matrix (PEN) 1, Matrix Code List (PEN) 8
)
I Equipment Type: Door (DOOR), Potential ARDM List 7
Device Type: DOOR, Component Grouping Summary Sheet (059-DOOR-01) 1, ARDM Matrix (DOOR) 1, Matrix Code List (DOOR) 3, Development of Aging Management Altematives 1
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O Revision 1
ng Management Review Summary (Revision 1)
System Name & No.: Containment System (059)
Date: May 1996 Subcomponentel
,L-4 z
g:
Device Type Group i D Pasalveintended Func9 ens Grouping Subgroups Not Pleumble ManagedtryEmiseq Propams Motmeegent Manded JesurPrayam Attributes
. Subledto A0ing Aging Ib ihi E((
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- ,r b Needed
.;as.,
'O u
Contenment 059 PEN 41
- 1) Maintain Containment Long4.lved EQ NA NA NA NA Electrical Pressure Boundary EQ QuesRca90n Numbers Penetragona
Containment 059-PEN 42
- 1) Maintain Containment Same metertels NA General PEG-7 No NA Corrookmf MN-3-100 Eledrical Pressure Boundary Oxidsson OL-2-100 Penetrations Containment 059 PEN 43
- 1) Maintain Containment Same materials NA Gerwei PEG-7 No NA Mechanical Pressure Boundary Corrosionf MN-3-100 Oxidation OL-2-100 and Spere Penetra6ons (NOTE 1)
Fuel Transfer 059 PEN 44
- 1) Maintain Containment Same rnstertels NA None NA NA NA Tube Pressure Boundary Same environment Containment 059-PEN-05
- 1) Maintain Conta6nment Same rnateriets NA None NA NA NA Sump Recire Pressure Boundary Same Penetrations environment ConhHnment 059-oOOR41
- 1) Memtsin Containment Some Meterials NA Genera!
PEG-7 No NA Personnel &
Pressure Boundary Conceionf MN-3-100 Ernergency
- 2) Provide Contamment Oxidaton OL-2-100 Airiocks and Closure
- 3) Provide re ed F're Barriers m
Equipment Natch Note 1: The conteinment normal sump drain header penetrations (1/2 PEN 8) are not included in this group. These penetrations have no Carbon steel sleeve which contributes to maintaining the pressure boundary function. For this penetration, the pressure retaining components are the welds for the containment sump liner (addressed in the Containment Structure Report) and the sump drain pipe itself (addressed in the Containment Isolation Only Systems AMR Report). (LCM-16)
Page 1 of 1 u-__
O O
O : Description of Programs Which Manage the Effects of Aging (Revision 1)
Date: May 1995 System Name and Number: Containnu et System (059) i
?
Program ID 1 Portions ofSystem ~
Aging Mechanisms l Description'ofProp or
- Managed By This Managed by;
~
Program & Passive This Program j
Intended Function
^
4 MN-3-100 - This program provides for discovuj of Mr.ded i
MN-3-100, Protective Scope:
General Corrosion /
coatings in containment and assessment, prioritizaten and Coating Program All carbon steel Containment Oxidation corrective action for any degraded coatings discovered outside penetrations, equipment containment.
QL-2-100, Issue hatches and airlocks.
[
Reporting QL-2-100 - This procedure provides requirements for initiating, j
Passive Intended Functions:
reviewing, and processing ofIssue Reports (irs) and for PEG-7, System
- 1) To Maintain the Pressure resolution ofissues. irs are gen ad to A cat and resolve
[
Walkdowns Boundary of the System hardware and equipment deficiencies and nonconformances.
- 2) To Provide Rated Fire Corrective actions are implemented as required to resolve the
[
Bamers issues.
PEG This guideline provides direction for performance of system walkdowns, the reporting of walkdown results and initiation of corrective acten. Inspection items typically related to aging management include housekeeping (e.g. paint) and
+
stress or abuse (e.g. vibration, cavitation, corrosion, leakage).
Conditions adverse to quality are documented on a IR in accordance with QI 2-100. (LCM-16) g Page1of 1
l Pct:ntiil ARDM List (Rsvi::lon 1 )
1 l
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: PEN Date: May 1996
. POTENTIAL-e
?ARDMl 1(YES/NO)E IDESCRIPTION/JUSTIFICATIONT.. ~...1 SOURCE i
General Yes General Corrosion / Oxidation is the REF.1 Corrosion / Oxidation thinning of metal by chemical attack at i
the surface of the metal by an REF. 2 aggressive environment of moisture i
and oxygen. General REF. 3 1
Corrosion / Oxidation is a potential for low alloy and high alloy ferritic steels.
REF. 4 Austenitic stainless steel and nickel-l base alloys are quite resistant to REF. 5 general corrosion, especially in a properly chemically controlled PWR environment. General Corrosion / Oxidation is a potential ARDM for Containment Penetrations fabricated from carbon steel.
Pitting / Crevice Yes Pitting is a potential ARDM if proper REF.1 Corrosion water chemistry is not maintained.
Pitting occurs in the presence of REF. 2 copper ions and chloride ions. Oxygen p
is required forinitiation of pitting. A REF. 3 v
staignant condition will promote the growth of pitting corrosion. Crevice REF. 4 Corrosion occurs when surfaces of materials are wetted by the corrosion REF. 5 medium and are covered in localized areas with debris; or when a crack or crevice is permitted to exist in a component exposed to such media.
Pitting / Crevice Corrosion is a potential ARDM for containment penetrations exposed to water (i.e. Fuel Transfer Tube).
O e se, or 7 (LCM-16)
Pot::ntirl ARDM List (Revlaien 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: PEN Date: May 1996 POTENTIAL CARDM>>
e (YES/NO)4 iDESCRIPTION/ JUSTIFICATION :
6 SOURCE" Irradiation and Yes Steel degradation due to neutron REF.1 Irradiation-Assisted irradiation results from the Stress Corrosion displacement of atoms from their REF. 2 Cracking (IASCC) normal lattice positions to form both interstitials and vacancies.- The effect REF. 3 of this ARDM is to increase the yield strength, decrease the ultimate tensile REF. 4 ductility, and increase the ductile to brittle transition temperature. IASCC is REF' 5 an ARDM that can occur in stainless steels that are subjected to an environment conducive to corrosion cracking. lASCC can further accelerate the potential corrosion process. Since the containment penetrations are exposed to irradiation, Irradiation and IASCC are potential ARDMs.
Stress Corrosion Yes IGSCC is SCC where the grain REF.1 Cracking boundaries of a susceptible materials (SCC)/intergranular are cracked due to stress and an REF. 2 O
Stress Corrosion aggressive environment. IGA is similar Cracking to IGSCC except_ stress is not required REF.' 3 (IGSCC)/intergranular for IGA. Initiation and propagation of Attack (IGA)
SCC. requires three factors to be REF. 4 present: (1) susceptible material, (2) a corrosive environment and (3) the REF. 5 presence of tensile stresses. The magnitude of the tensile stresses must exceed a threshold value before the ARDM can occur. A generally acceptei value for the threshold stress is the yleid stress of the material of construction. For austenitic stainless steels, SCC is potentialif the PWR operating water chemistry shows the oxygen limit > Sppb, the halogen limit >
150 ppb and the stress levels are at or above the material yield strength.
SCC /lGSCC/lGA are potential ARDMs for stainless steel penet.ations and penetrations with stainless steel components.
i Page 2 of 7 (LCM-16)
Pet:nti:1 ARDM LI:t (Ravician 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: PEN Date: May 1996 POTENTIAL:
ARDM:
(YES/NO)*
- DESCRIPTIONIJUSTIFICATION E SOURCE' Microbiologica!!y Yes MIC occurs in stagnant orlow flow REF. 2 Influenced Corrosion areas in systems that use untreated (MIC) waterin an operating temperature REF. 3 range of 50F to 120'. MIC effects on carbon steel may resultin random REF. 4 pitting, general corrosion, or severe hydraulic effects caused by formation REF.5 of tubercles and massive corrosion product deposits. MIC attack on i
stainless steelis characterized by pitting, most commonly at weldments.
Containment penetrations submerged in water (i.e., during refueling), are potentially susceptible to MIC.
Saline Water Attack No NOT Applicable to Equipmerit Type.
REF. 2 The Containment penetrations are not susceptible to saline water attack.
REF. 3 Saline water attack is only potential for re-inforced concrete structures. Since REF. 4 the containment penetrations are not fabricated from concrete, Saline Water REF.5 O
Attack is not a potential ARDM for containment penetrations.
Erosion No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Erosion is attributed to the removal of protective surface films on a metal by REF.2 mechanical action of a fluid or particulate matter. Erosion occurs REF. 3 under high-velocity conditions, turbulence and impingement. Since REF. 4 the water in the Refueling Canal and the Spent Fuel Poolis not in motion, REF'5 Erosion is not a potential ARDM for the containment penetrations exposed to water (FuelTransfer Tube).
Page 3 of 7 (LCM-16)
Pct:nti:1 ARDM List (R:vicien 1 )
i l
SYSTEM: Containment System 05g O
=au'a==" " v"=: """
o i : u v 'eae POTENTIAL ARDM:
1YES/NO)1 T DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION SOURCE Erosion / Corrosion No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
RE.F.1 Erosion / Corrosion occurs under high-velocity conditions when the fluid REF. 2 flowing over the metal is corrosive to the metal. Erosion is attributed to the REF. 3 removal of protective surface films on a metal by mechanical action of a fluid REF. 4 or particulate matter. Since the water in the Refueling Canal and in the REF* 5 l
Spent Fuel Pool is neither high-velocity I
or corrosive, Erosion / Corrosion is not a potential ARDM for the containment penetrations exposed to water.
Neutron Embrittlement No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Neutron Embrittlement is not a potential ARDM for the containment REF. 2 penetrations since they are located outside the primary shield and are REF. 3 exposed to neutron fluences 2
considerably less than 1E18 n/cm.
REF. 4 O
a=e s Thermal Aging Yes Thermal aging is a potential ARDM for REF.1 steels subjected to elevated temperatures for long periods of time.
REF. 2 Since some containment penetrations are exposed to elevated temperatures REF. 3 for extended periods, Therma! Aging is a potential ARDM.
REF. 4 REF. 5 Hydrogen Damage Yes Hydrogen damage can occur with only REF 2 a few parts per million hydrogen, which can occur from the fabricating process REF. 3 or inservice corrosion reactions. For hydrogen damage to occur, stainless REF. 4 steels must be exposed to many times the levels that could damage carbon REF.5 steels. Hydrogen damage is a potential ARDM for containment penetrations l
exposed to water.
Page 4 of 7 j (LCM-16)
Pct nti:1 ARDM List (Rsvisinn 1 )
i SYSTEM: Containment System 05g EQUIPMENT TYPE: PEN Date: May 1996
)
D (YES/NO)' '
' DESCRIPTIONIJUSTIFICATION" iSOURCE' POTENTIAL 4
'ARDM-i Low Cycle Fatigue Yes Structural deterioration can occur as REF.1 1
the result of repeated stress / strain j
cycles caused by fluctuating loads and REF. 2 temperatures. When cyclic loads are such that significant plastic strain REF. 3 occurs in the highly-stressed regions, the material damage is said to have REF. 4 l
been caused by low cycle fatigue.
Since the containment penetrations REF* 5
{
are subjected to both stress and thermal cycles, Low Cycle Fatigue is a potential ARDM.
i High Cycle Fatigue No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 i
Since the containment penetrations will i
)
not be subjected to either high stress REF. 2 or hi thermal cycles (>10E5 cycles),
H Cycle Fatigue is not a potential REF. 3 A
M.
REF. 4 i
l REF. 5 iO i
Wear No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 i
Since there is no relative motion between the penetrations and the REF. 2 Containment or Auxiliary Building, wear is not a potential ARDM.
REF 3 4
f REF. 4 l
REF. 5 i
Creep No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Creep is not a potential ARDM for containment penetrations. The REF. 2 containment penetrations are not i
exposed to the required temperature REF. 3 range (>1000'F) that would perpetuate this ARDM.
REF. 4
?
REF. 5 Page 5 of 7 (LCM-16)
.~
1 l
Pat:nlict ARDM List (R:vi2 inn 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: PEN Date: May 1996
- POTENTIAL VARDM
- (YES/NO)
- DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION ?
-SOURCE Electrical Stresses No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF. 2 Electrical stresses are induced in the insulating material used in the REF. 3 fabrication of electrical and i
electromechanical parts and REF. 4 components, Since the containment
- enetrations have no electrical parts REF. 5 nvolved with maintaining a pressure l
boundary or rated fire barrier, Electrical stresses are not a potential ARDM.
Stress Relaxation Yes Stress Relaxation is unloading of.
REF.1 preloaded components caused by long term exposure of materials to elevated REF. 2 temperature and/or neutron irradiation.
Stress relaxation is a potential ARDM REF. 3 for components with substantial preload. Since some containment REF. 4 3enetrations (FuelTransfer Tube) lave bolted flange connections, Stress REF. 5 Relaxation is a potential ARDM.
A Elevated Temperature Yes Elevated temperatures can cause a REF.1 T
reduction in yield. strength and a reduction of the modulus of elasticity in steels. Therefore, since some containment penetrations are exposed to elevated temperatures, Elevated Temperature is a potential ARDM.
~
Page 6 of 7 (LCM-16)
1 Pet;ntial ARDM LIIt (Rr,vi::i::n 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: PEN Date: May 1996 POTENTIAL-ARDM X(YES/NO)i
- DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION -
SOURCE:
REF.1: EPRI TR-103835, Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Structures, License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1, 7/94.
REF. 2: DG-1009, USNRC Draft Regulatory Guide - Standard Format and Content of Technical information for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 12/90.
REF. 3: EPRI TR-103842, Class i Structures License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1, 7/94.
REF. 4: Component Life Estimation: LWR Structural Materials Degradation Mechanisms -
EPRI NP-5461, Project Report 2643-5,9/87.
REF. 5: EPRI TR-103838, Pressurized Water Reactor Pressure Vessel Intemals License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
O O
Page 7 of 7 (LCM-16)
C:mponent Aging Minrgem nt RIview LCM-16 Revision 4 O Component Grc uping Summary Sheet (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 SYSTEM: Containment 059 GROUP ID NUMBER: 059-PEN-01 GROUP ATTRIBUTES:
1.
Device Type:
Containment Electrical Penetrations (Long-Lived EQ) 2.
Vendor:
Bunker-Ramo Corp. (Amphenol Space and Missile Systems Division) or Conax Corp.
3.
Model Number:
NA 4.
Material:
ASME SA516 Gr. 70 (Carbon Steel)
ASME SA240,TPYE 304 (Stainless Steel)
ASME SA312, TYPE 304 (Stainless Steel)
Non-Metallic Materials:
O Epoxy Sealants (i.e., Polysulfone)
Adhesives 5.
Intemal Environment: General Containment Environment 6.
Extemal Environment: General Auxilatry Building Environment 7.
Function:
- 1) Maintain Containment Pressure Boundary
- 2) Maintain Electrical Functionality per EQ Program 8.
Name Plate Data:
PARAMETER VALUE LIST OF GROUPED COMPONENTS (EQUIPMENT ID):
See page 2 for listing O
PEN-01 Attschment 3 (Rev.1)
Page 1 of 2
C:mponent Aging M:nagem:nt RLvhw LCM-16 Revision 4 0
~
nu.i sai i
( Faninment IDL Number Equipment ID Number
'1' EN1ZWE9'
^EP'^01'O 1 PEN 1ZEA4 ~
EPh004~
P i
1 PEN 1ZEA5 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZEA4 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZEA7 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZEA7 EPA 004 iPEN1ZEB1 EPA 010 2 PEN 22EB1 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZEB2 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZEB3 EPA 004 I
1 PEN 1ZEB3 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZEC1 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZEC1 L'PA004 2 PEN 2ZEC4 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZEC4 Er'A004 2 PEN 2ZEC6 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZEC6 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZEC9 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZEC9 EPA 004 2 PEN 2 ZED 1 EPA 010 1 PEN 1ZEDi EPA 010 2 PEN 2 ZED 2 EPA 010 1 PEN 1 ZED 2 EPA 010 2 PEN 2 ZED 6 EPA 010 1 PEN 1 ZED 6 EPA 010 2 PEN 2 ZED 7 EPA 010 1 PEN 1 ZED 7 EPA 010 2 PEN 2 ZED 8-EPA 004 iPEN1 ZED 8 EPA 004 2 PEN 2 ZEE 1 EPA 004 1 PEN 1 ZEE 1 EPA 004 2 PEN 2 ZEE 3 EPA 004 1 PEN 1 ZEE 3 EPA 004 2 PEN 2 ZEE 4 EPA 004 1 PEN 1 ZEE 4 EPA 004
.2 PEN 2 ZEE 9 EPA 004 1 PEN 1 ZEE 9 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWA3 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWA3 EPA 010 2 PEN 2ZWA6 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWA6 EPA 010 2 PEN 2ZWB1 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWB2 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWB2 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWC1 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWC1 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWC4 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWC4 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWC6 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWC6 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWD3 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWD3 EPA 004 f
1 PEN 1ZWD4 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWD4 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWD6 EPA 010 2 FEN 2ZWD6 EPA 010 1 PEN 1ZWD8 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWDB EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWE1 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWE1 EPA 004 1 PEN 1ZWE2 EPA 004 2 PEN 2ZWE2 EPA 004 l
1 PEN 1ZWE3 EPA 010 2 PEN 2ZWE3 EPA 010 l
1 PEN 1ZWE4 EPA 010 2 PEN 2ZWE5 EPA 010 iPEN1ZWE6 EPA 010 2 PEN 2ZWE6 EPA 010 2 PEN 22WE9 EPA 010 PEN-01 (Rev.1)
Page 2 of 2
- -.. - -. - _ = _
Component Aging Minagem:nt RIvhw LCM-16 l
Revision 4 l
O
> Component Grouping Summary Sheet (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 l
SYSTEM: Containment 069 GROUP ID NUMBER: 059-PEN-02 GROUP ATTRIBUTES:
l 1.
Device Type:
Containment Electrical Penetrations (Non-EQ) 2.
Vendor:
Bunker-Ramo Cor
[
Systems Division).p. (Amphenol Space and Missile 3.
Model Number:
NA l
4.
Material:
ASME' SA516 Gr. 70 (Carbon Steel)
ASME SA106B (Carbon Steel) l ASME SA240,TPYE 304 (Stainless Steel)
ASME SA312, TYPE 304 (Stainless Steel)
Non-Metallic Materials:
Epq 4
Sealants (i.e., Polysulfone) l AdhesNes 5.
Internal Environment: General Containment Environment 6.
Extemal Environment: General Auxilairy Building Environment 7.
Function:
Maintain Containment Pressure Boundary
~
8.
Name Plate Data:
PARAMETER VALUE l
LIST OF GROUPED COMPONENTS (EQUIPMENT ID):
L See page 2 for listing PEN-02
, (Rev.1)
Page 1 of 2
Component Aging Mtnigem:nt Rtview LCM-16 Revision 4 1
y EquipmentID Equipment ID Equipment ID 1PENiZE f 1PENIZWDi
'2P5N2 ZEE 7 1 PEN 1ZEA2 1 PEN 1ZWD2 2 PEN 2 ZEE 8 1 PEN 1ZEA9 1 PEN 1ZWD5 2 PEN 2ZWA1 1 PEN 1ZEB4 1 PEN 1ZWD7 2 PEN 2ZWA8 1 PEN 1ZEB5 1 PEN 1ZWD9 2 PEN 2ZWA9 1 PEN 1ZEB6 1 PEN 1ZWE5 2 PEN 2ZWB7 1 PEN 1ZEC2 1 PEN 1ZWE7 2 PEN 2ZWB8 1 PEN 1ZEC7 1 PEN 1ZWE8 2 PEN 2ZWC3 1 PEN 1 ZED 3 2 PEN 2ZEA1 2 PEN 2ZWC9 1 PEN 1 ZED 4 2 PEN 2ZEA2 2 PEN 2ZWD1 1 PEN 1 ZED 5 2 PEN 2ZEA5 2 PEN 2ZWD2 1 PEN 1 ZEE 2 2 PEN 2ZEA9 2 PEN 2ZWD3 0
1 PEN 1 ZEE 5
- EN2zEB2 x- - 2eeN2ZWm
~
1 PEN 1 ZEE 6 2 PEN 2ZEB4 2 PEN 22WD5 1 PEN 1 ZEE 7 2 PEN 2ZEB5 2 PEN 2ZWD6 1 PEN 1 ZEE 8 2 PEN 2ZEB6 2 PEN 2ZWD7 1 PEN 1ZWA1 2 PEN 2ZEC2 2 PEN 2ZWD8 1 PEN 1ZWA8 2 PEN 2ZEC7 2 PEN 2ZWD9 1 PEN 1ZWA9 2 PEN 2 ZED 3 2 PEN 2ZWE4 1 PEN 1ZWB1 2 PEN 2 ZED 4 2 PEN 2ZWE5 1 PEN 1ZWB7 2 PEN 2 ZED 5 2 PEN 2ZWE6 1 PEN 1ZWB8 2 PEN 2 ZEE 2 2 PEN 2ZWE7 1 PEN 1ZWC3 2 PEN 2 ZEE 5 2 PEN 2ZWE8 1 PEN 1ZWC9 2 PEN 2 ZEE 6 2 PEN 2ZWE9 PEN-02 (Rev.1)
Page 2 of 2
Component Aging M:nagem:nt R;vhw LCM-16 Revision 4 l
O
' Component Grouping Summary Gheet (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 SYSTEM: Containment 059 GROUP ID NUMBER: 059-PEN-03 GROUP ATTRIBUTES:
1.
Device Type:
Containment Mechanical Penetrations and Spare Penetrations 2.
Vendor Chicago Bridge & Iron 3.
Model Number:
NA 4.
Material:
ASME SA516 Gr. 70 (Carbon Steel) i ASME SA1068 (Carbon Steel)
I O
5.
imiemai e#virommeot: Gemerai.comtaimmemiEnviroamemi -
6.
Extemal Environment: General Auxiliary Building Environment l
7.
Function:
Maintain Containment Pressure Boundary 8.
Name Plate Data:
PARAMETER VALUE LIST OF GROUPED COMPONENTS (EQUIPMENT ID):
l f
See pages 2 through 5 for listing
'O PEN-03 V (Rev.1)
Page 1 of 5
t Component Aging M:ntgem:nt RLview LCM-16 Revision 4 O
Equipment ID. Equipment Description
, Equipmard ID w Equipment Descript on 1 PEN 10 CTMT SPRAY WATER 1 PEN 1ZWA4 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 13 PURGE AIR INLET PENETRATION 1 PEN 14 PURGE AIR OUTLET 1 PEN 1ZWAS CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 15 CTMT ATMOSPHERE AND PENETRATION PURGE 1 PEN 1ZWA7 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 16 COMPONENT COOLING PENETRATION WATER 1 PEN 1ZWB3 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 17A STEAM GEN. NO.12 PENETRATION BLOWDOWN 1 PEN 1ZWB4 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 17B STEAM GEN. NO.12 PENETRATION BLOWDOWN 1 PEN 1ZWB5 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 18 COMPONENT COOLING PENETRATION WATER 1 PEN 1ZWB6 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 19A INSTRUMENT AIR PENETRATION 1 PEN 19B PLANT AIR 1 PEN 1ZWB9 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 1 A REACTOR COOLANT &
PENETRATION PRESS SAMPLING 1 PEN 1ZWC2 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 1B RC DRAIN TANK 11 VENT PENETRATION HEAD 1 PEN 1ZWC5 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 1C REACTOR COOLANT PENETRATION PUMP SEAL 1 PEN 1ZWC7 CTMT SPARE iPEN1D POST-ACCIDENT PENETRATION SAMPLING 1 PEN 1ZWC8 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 1ZEA3 CTMT SPARE PENETRATION O
~
N2 SUPPLY TO SAFETY PENETRATION iPEN20A INJECTION 1
PENETRATION 1 PEN 20B NITROGEN SUPPLY TO 1 PEN 1ZEA8 CTMT SPARE RC DRAIN i
PENETRATION 1 PEN 20C N2 SUPPLY TO STEAM 1 PEN 1ZEB7 CTMT SPARE GEN PENETRATION 1 PEN 21 AUX FEEDWATER TO 1 PEN 1ZEB8 CTMT SPARE STEAM GEN PENETRATION 1 PEN 22 AUX FEEDWATER TO 1 PEN 1ZEB9 CTMT SPARE STEAM GEN PENETRATION 1 PEN 23 DRAINS FROM REACTOR l
1 PEN 1ZEC3 CTMT SPARE COOLANT PENETRATION 1 PEN 24 OXYGEN SAMPLE LINE 1 PEN 1ZEC5 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 25 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION PENETRATION PPG 1 PEN 1ZEC8 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 26 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION PENETRATION PPG l
1 PEN 1 ZED 1 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 27 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION PENETRATION PPG 1 PEN 1 ZED 9 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 28 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION PENETRATION PPG 1 PEN 1ZWA2 CTMT SPARE 1 PEN 29 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION PENETRATION PPG 4
l 1 PEN 2A LETDOWN LINE O
PEN-03
[ (Rev.1) l Page 2 of 5 l
Component Aging MInag; mint Rrview LCM-16 Revision 4 O
Equipment ID
.. Equipment Description
- Equipment ID _ Equipment Desenption 1 PEN 2B REACTOR COOLANT 1 PEN 60 STEAM TO REACTOR CHARGING HEAD 1 PEN 3 SAFETY INJECTION 1 PEN 61 REFUELING POOL 1 PEN 30 SERVICE WATER OUTLET PENETRATION PPG 1 PEN 62 CTMT PMNT HEATING 1 PEN 31 SERVICE WATER 1 PEN 63 SPARE PENETRATION PPG 1 PEN 64 CTMT PLANT HEATING 1 PEN 32 SERVICE WATER 1 PEN 70 LINER PLATE GROUND PENETRATION PPG PENETRATION 1 PEN 33 MAIN FEEDWATER 1 PEN 71 LINER PLATE GROUND 1 PEN 34 MAIN FEEDWATER PENETRATION 1 PEN 35 MAIN STEAM 1 PEN 72 CTMT PRESSURE 1 PEN 36 MAIN STEAM MONITOR 1 PEN 37 PMNT SERVICE WATER 1 PEN 73 SPARE 1 PEN 38 DEMINERALIZED WATER 1 PEN 74 SPARE 1 PEN 39 SAFETY INJECTION 1 PEN 75 SPARE 1 PEN 4 SAFETY INJECTION 1 PEN 76 SPARE 1 PEN 40 SPARE 1 PEN 77 CTMT PRESSURE 1 PEN 41 REACTOR COOLANT MONITOR SHUTDOWN 1 PEN 78 CTMT PRESSURE 1 PEN 42 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE MONITOR 1 PEN 43A STEAM GENERATOR 1 PEN 79 SPARE BLOWDOWN 1 PEN 7A ILRT PENETRATION
" ' " ^ " * " " " " ^ ' "
' ' " ' " " " ' ' " ^ ' ' "
C)
BLOWDOWN 1 PEN 80 SPARE 1 PEN 44 FIRE PROTECTION 1 PEN 811 SPARE 1 PEN 45 SPARE 1 PEN 82 SPARE 1 PEN 46 SPARE 1 PEN 83 CTMT PRESSURE 1 PEN 47A HYDROGEN SAMPLING.
MONITOR 1 PEN 47B HYDROGEN SAMPLING 1 PEN 9 CTMT SPRAY WATER 1 PEN 47C HYDROGEN SAMPLING 2 PEN 10 CTMT SPRAY WATER 1 PEN 47D HYDROGEN SAMPLING 2 PEN 13 PURGE AIR INLET 1 PEN 48A CTMT HYDROGEN 2 PEN 14 PURGE AIR OUTLET PURGE 2 PEN 15 CTMT ATMOSHPERE AND 1 PEN 48B CTMT HYDROGEN PURGE PURGE 2 PEN 16 COMPNENT COOLING 1 PEN 49A HYDROGEN SAMPLE WATER 1 PEN 49C HYDROGEN SAMPLE 2 PEN 17A STEAM GEN. NO.12 1 PEN 49D SPARE BLOWDOWN 1 PEN 5 SAFET(INJECTION 2 PEN 17B STEAM GEN. NO.12 1 PEN 50 ILRT PENETRATION BLOWDOWN 1 PEN 51 SPARE 2 PEN 18 COMPONENT COOLING 1 PEN 52 SPARE WATER 1 PEN 57 SPARE 2 PEN 19A INSTRUMENT AIR 1 PEN 58 SPARE 2 PEN 19B PLANT AIR 1 PEN 59 REFUELING POOL 2 PEN 1A REACTOR COOLANT &
RECYCLE PRESS SAMPLING 1 PEN 6 SAFETY INJECTION PEN-03 (Rev.1)
Page 3 of 5
l Component Aging Managem;nt RLview LCM-16 Revision 4 4
- w L Equipment ID.... Equipment Descriphon.
. Equipment ID.
Equipment Description 2 PEN 1B RC DRAIN TANK 11 VENT 2 PEN 2ZEC8 CTMT SPARE HEAD PENETRATION 2 PEN 1C REACTOR COOLANT 2 PEN 2 ZED 1 CTMT SPARE PUMP SEAL PENETRATION 2 PEN 1D POST-ACCIDENT 2 PEN 2 ZED 9 CTMT SPARE SAMPLING PENETRATION 2 PEN 20A N2 SUPPLY TO SAFETY 2 PEN 2ZWA2 CTMT SPARE INJECTION PENETRATION 2 PEN 20B NITROGEN SUPPLY TO 2 PEN 2ZWA4 CTMT SPARE RC DRAIN PENETRATION i
2 PEN 20C N2 SUPPLY TO STEAM 2 PEN 2ZWA5 CTMT SPARE GEN PENETRATION 2 PEN 21 AUX FEEDWATER TO 2 PEN 2ZWA7 CTMT SPARE l
STEAM GEN PENETRATION l
2 PEN 22 AUX FEEDWATER TO 2 PEN 2ZWB3 CTMT SPARE STEAM GEN PENETRATION 2 PEN 23 DRAINS FROM REACTOR 2 PEN 2ZWB4 CTMT SPARE l
COOLANT PENETRATION 2 PEN 24 OXYGEN SAMPLE LINE 2 PEN 2ZWB5 CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 25 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION PENETRATION PPG 2 PEN 2ZWB6 CTMT SPARE l
2 PEN 26 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION l
PENETRATION PPG 2 PEN 2ZWB9 CTMT SPARE l
2 PEN 27 SERVICE WATER PENETRATION l
PENETRATION PPG-2 PEN 2ZWC2 CTMT-SPARE l
2 PEN 28 SERVICE WATER
~
PENETRATION PPG 2 PEN 2ZWC5 CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 29 SERVICE WATER PENETRATICN l
l PENETRATION PPG 2 PEN 2ZWC7 CTMT SPARE l
2 PEN 2A LETDOWN LINE PENETRATION 2 PEN 2B REACTOR COOLANT 2 PEN 2ZWC8 CTMT SPARE CHARGING PENETRATION 2 PEN 2ZEA3 CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 3 SAFETY INJECTION PENETRATION 2 PEN 30 SERVICE WATER 2 PEN 2ZEA6 CTMT SPARE PENETRATION PPG PENETRATION 2 PEN 31 SERVICE WATER 2 PEN 2ZEA8 CTMT SPARE PENETRATION PPG PENETRATION 2 PEN 32 SERVICE WATER 2 PEN 2ZEB7 CTMT SPARE PENETRATION PPG PENETRATION 2 PEN 33 MAIN FEEDWATER 2 PEN 2ZEB8 CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 34 MAIN FEEDWATER PENETRATION 2 PEN 35 MAIN STEAM 2 PEN 2ZEB9 CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 36 MAIN STEAM PENETRATION 2 PEN 37 PLANT SERVICE WATER 2 PEN 2ZECS CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 38 DEMINERAllZED WATER PENETRATION 2 PEN 39 SAFET(INJECTION 2 PEN 2ZEC5 CTMT SPARE 2 PEN 4 SAFETY INJECTION
(
PENETRATION 2 PEN 40 SPARE i
PEN-03
! (Rev.1) l Page 4 of 5
Camponent Aging M:nigemInt R; view LCM-16 Revision 4 O
- Eauinment ID _
. Eauioment Descriotion
- Eauiement ID..
Eautoment Descriotion',
2 PEN 41 REACTOR COOLANT 2 PEN 60 STEAM TO REACTOR SHUTDOWN HEAD 2 PEN 42 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE 2PENB1 REFUELING POOL 2 PEN 43A STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET BLOWDOWN 2 PEN 62 CTMT Pl. ANT HEATING 2 PEN 43B STEAM GENERATOR 2 PEN 63 SPARE l
BLOWDOWN 2 PEN 64 CTMT PLANT HEATING f
2 PEN 44 FIRE PROTECTION 2 PEN 70 LINER PLATE GROUND l
2 PEN 45 SPARE PENETRATION l
2 PEN 46 SPARE 2 PEN 71 LINER PLATE GROUND l
2 PEN 47A HYDROGEN SAMPLING PENETRATION l
2 PEN 47B HYDROGEN SAMPLING 2 PEN 72 CTMT PRESSURE l
2 PEN 47C HYDROGEN SAMPLING MONITOR I
2 PEN 47D HYDROGEN SAMPLING 2 PEN 73 SPARE 2 PEN 48A CTMT HYDROGEN 2 PEN 74 SPARE PURGE 2 PEN 75 SPARE i
2 PEN 48B CTMT HYDROGEN 2 PEN 76 SPARE PURGE 2 PEN 77 CTMT PRESSURE 2 PEN 49A HYDROGEN SAMPLE MONITOR 2 PEN 49C HYDROGEN SAMPLE 2 PEN 78 CTMT PRESSURE 2 PEN 49D SPARE MONITOR 2 PEN 5 SAFETY INJECTION 2 PEN 79 SPARE l
2 PEN 50 ILRT PENETRATlON 2 PEN 7A ILRT PENETRATION l
2 PEN 51 SPARE 2 PEN 78 ILRT PENETRATION 2 PEN 52 SPARE - -
- - - - 2PE80 SPARE-2 PEN 57 SPARE 2 PEN 81~.
SPARE 2 PEN 58 SPARE 2 PEN 82 SPARE 2 PEN 59 REFUELING POOL 2 PEN 83 CTMT PRESSURE RECYCLE MONITOR 2 PEN 6 SAFETY INJECTION 2 PEN 9 CTMT SPRAY WATER Note: The containment normal sump drain header penetrations (1/2 PEN 8) are not included in this group. These penetrations have no carbon steel sleeve which contributes to maintaining the pressure boundary function. For this penetration, the pressure retaining components are l
the welds for the containment sump liner (addressed in the Containment Structure Report) and the sump drain pipe itself (addressed in the Containment isolation Only Systems AMR Report).
l l
l PEN-03
- (Rev.1)
Page 5 of 5
]
Compon:nt Aging M:n g: mint Rsview LCM-16 Revision 4 O Component Grouping Summary Sheet (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 SYSTEM: Containment 059 GROUP ID NUMBER: 059-PEN-04 GROUP ATTRIBUTES:
1.
Device Type:
FuelTransferTube 2.
Vendor:
KELLOGG 3.
Model Number:
NA 4.
Material:
ASME SA240, TYPE 304 (Stainless Steel)
ASME SA312, TYPE 304 (Stainless Steel) 5.
Intemal Environment: Containment Refueling Pool Environment 6.
Extemal Environment: Auxiliary Building Spent Fuel Pool Environment 7.
Furuzion:
Maintain Containment Pressure Boundary I
O 8.
Name Plate Data:
PARAMETER VALUE LIST OF GROUPED COMPONENTS (EQUIPMENT ID):
FuelTransferTube O
I Page 1 of 1 4
i, 1
j Camponent Aging Minignmtnt Rsview LCM-16 Revision 4 i
l Component Grouping Summary Sheet (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 i
SYSTEM: Containment 059 f
GROUP ID NUMBER: 059-PEN-05 l
GROUP ATTRIBUTES:
4 1.
Device Type:
Containment Sump Recire Penetrations 2.
Vendor:
VELAN 3.
Model Number:
NA 4.
Material:
ASME SA240, TYPE 316 (Stainless Steel) inconel Bellows 5.
Intemal Environment: General Auxiliary Building Environment 6.
Extemal Environment: General Auxiliary Building Environment 7.
Function:
Maintain Containment Pressure Boundary This encapsulation serves to make the sump isolation valve O
inboard of the containment boundary...it would capture any leakage from the isolation valve or piping.
8.
Name Plate Data:
PARAMETER VALUE LIST OF GROUPED COMPONENTS (EQUIPMENT ID):
1 PEN 11 (1XJ15) 1 PEN 12 (1XJ16) 2 PEN 11 (2XJ15) 2 PEN 12 (2XJ16) l Note:
1.
In NUCLEIS the components identified as 1XJ15,1XJ16,2XJ15 and 2XJ16 (expansion joints) are actually part of the containment penetrations identified above. These XJs are included in the Safety injection System in NUCLEIS but are evaluated in this AMR.
Valves 1HVSI-1090,1HVSI-1090A,2HVSI-1090 and 2HV31-1090A, which isolate the drains from these encapsulation devices, are evaluated in the Safety injection System AMR.
O Page 1 of 1
l I
O ARDM Matrix (Revision 1 )
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System EQUIPMENTTYPE: PEN DEVICE T(PE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID : As Noted Date: May 1996 GROUP OR SUB GROUP IDt
)
l ARDMs 059-PEN-02 059-PEN 059-PEN 059-PEN-05 General Corrosion / Oxidation A
A 8
8 1
Pitting / Crevice Corrosion 1
1 1
1 Irradiation and irradiation-2 2
2 2
l Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking (IASCC) l SCC /lGSCC/lGA 3
3 3
3 l
MIC 4
4 4
4 Thermal Aging 5
5 5
5 i
Hydrogen Damage 6
6 6
6 Low Cycle Fatigue 7
7 7
7 Stress Relaxation 9
9
.9 9
l l
Elevated Temperature 10 10 10 10 l
l 1
1 Page 1 of 1
' (LCM-16) l
Mr.trix Codo Lint (Rr,vizion 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System DEVICE TYPE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,03,04,05 Date: May 1996
- DESGrur nON :
180URCEz tCODE.
A General Corrosion / Oxidation is a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for REF.1 Containment Penetrations due to the following:
REF. 2
- 1) The containmerit carbon steel penetrations are exposed to the environment of the containment and auxiliary building and REF. 3 i
corrosion could occur in the presence of moisture and oxygen if their coated surfaces are not maintained by an effective coatin9 REF. 4 management program.
- 2) Some penetrations have fluids passing through at l
temperatures that could cause condensation, which, in the presence of oxygen, could lead to oxidation.
- 3) Someyenetrations could have elevated temperatures, which do not affect the penetration but may cause the coatings to fail, allowing oxidation to occur.
- 4) A walkdown of selected Containment Penetrations, in April 1995, noted that some penetrations in Unit-2 have indications of rust / scale / corrosion inside the containment. Issue Report IR1-005-351 was written to address this situation.
The effects of general corrosion / oxidation would be eventual loss of carbon steel sleeve material and inability of the penetration to form the required pressure boundary. This ARDM can be detected visually well before loss of material occurs to the extent that intended function would be affected. Therefore, General Corrosion / Oxidation can be managed by visual examination of Containment Penetration coated surfaces both in containment and outside containment.
Page 1 of 8 (LCM-16)
J l
Mr.trix Ccds List (R;vi2 ion 1) i SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System t
2 DEVICE TYPE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,03,04,05 Date: May 1996 l
- CODE-
..- DESCRIPTION -
LSOURCE.
}
1 Pitting / Crevice Corrosion is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for REF.1 containment penetrations, due to the following:
REF. 2
- 1) Only the Fuel Transfer Tube penetration is a wetted surface.
j Therefore, Pitting / Crevice Corrosion is not PLAUSIBLE for all REF. 3 j
other containment penetrations.
REF. 4
- 2) The amount of oxygen, chlorides and copper ions in the surrounding fluid (Spent Fuel Pool and Refueling Canal water) is REF.5 not sufficient to perpetuate Pitting / Crevice corrosion in the Fuel i
Transfer Tube.
- 3) Due to strict water control, the Fuel Transfer Tube could not d
I experience localized build up of debris (e.g. crud), which is j
required for this type of corrosion,
- 4) A visual examination of the Refueling Canal Liner, which experiences the same water environment as the Fuel Transfer Canal, was performed in June 1992 and noted that "the stainless steel liner appeared to be in good condition
- 5) A visual examination of the Fuel Transfer Tube from the Refueling Canal in April 1995, verified that there were no j
indications of corrosion.
2 Irradiation and Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking are REF.1 not PLAUSIBLE ARDMs for containment penetrations, due to the following:
- 1) The cumulative radiation exposure experienced by the containment penetrations throughout thg license renewal term is far below the level of 2E17 neutrons /cm (> 1MeV) which could cause a change in mechanical or physical properties Page 2 of 8 (LCM-16)
Matrix Ccda Liat (R vision 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System DEVICE TYPE: Containment Penetrations l
GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,03,04,05 Date: May 1996 L
1 5
CODE.c tDESCRrnON:
, SOURCE <
3 SCC, IGSCC and IGA are not plausibis ARDMs for the Fuel REF.1 transfer Tube, containment sump recirc penetrations and other containment penetrations with stainless steel components REF. 2 (electrical penetrations), due to the following:
REF. 3
- 1) Specification 6750-M-254, Shop Fabricated Nuclear Carbon i
and Austenitic Steel Piping and Pipe Supports, which govems the REF. 4 i
fabrication of the Fuel Transfer Tube, specifically limits the weld interpass temperatures to 350*F to " limit distortion and sensitized REF.5 areas".
- 2) The ccatainment electrical penetrations are not exposed to water or moisture.
- 3) Insignificant tensile stresses occur in the Fuel Transfer Tube and electrical penetration stainless steel materials.
- 4) A lack of an aggressive environment. The normal water in the Refueling Canal and Spent Fuel Pool water is quite benign to stainless steel.
O
- 5) Very little field welding was performed on the-Fuel Transfer Tube. Welders and welding was strictly controlled per ASME Section IX requirements.
- 6) Per Ref. 4, "for temperatures below 200'F, IGSCC is not a great concem for austenitic stainless steels in oxidizing water environments in the absence of chlorides and sulfates. The maximum normal temperature of the Spent Fuel Pool is less than 130 F (UFSAR Section 9.4.1).
- 7) There is no history of excessive leakage of the Fuel Transfer Tubes at CCNPP.
i SCC, IGSCC and IGA are not plausible ARDMs for the carbon steel containment penetrations because they are not wetted surfaces and they are subjected to very low stress levels.
Page 3 of 8 (LCM-16)
1 l
M::.trix Cada List (Revinion 1) l SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System DEVICE TYPE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,03,04,05 Date: May 1996 I
-CODE tDESCme nONr
-SOURCE; j
4 MIC is not a plausible ARDM for the Fuel transfer Tube, due to REF. 2 the following:
REF. 3
- 1) Insignificant tensile stresses occur in the Fuel Transfer Tube stainless steel materials.
REF. 4
- 2) A lack of an aggressive environment. The Refueling Canal REF. 5 and Spent Fuel Pool water chemistry is very tightly controlled and is benign to stainless steel.
- 4) The Refueling Canal is only filled with water during outages.
The majority of the time, the Fuel Transfer Tube is dry and MIC would not be possible in the intemals and in the areas located in the Refueling Canal.
- 5) A visual examination of the Refueling Canal Liner, which experiences the same water environment as the Fuel Transfer O
T=b a r' arm d ia a"" 'aa2 e " ate ta t th t '"' -
steel liner appeared to be in good condition
- 6) A visual examination of the Fuel Transfer Tube was performed in April 1995 and noted that "All areas visible looked free from damage / corrosion. Blind flange removed and installed in rack.
No damage / corrosion to blind flange / studs securing flange in rack".
MIC is not a plausible ARDM for the carbon steel containment penetrations, electrical penetrations and stainless steel containment sump recirc penetrations because they are not wetted surfaces and are subject to low stress levels.
5 Thermal Aging is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for containment REF.1 penetrations, due to the following:
- 1) Normal operating temperatures within PWR containment structures are between 120' F and 150' F which are well below the 700' F level at which the structural integrity of steel begins to be significantly affected. Additionally, even if local areas of containment penetrations should experience elevated temperatures, the highest fluid temperature in any process pipe is still well below 700* F.
Page 4 of 8 (LCM-16)
]
l
M:trix Cada List (R:;vi::Isn 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System 4
DEVICE TYPE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02, 03, 04, 05 Date: May 1996 CODE.
. DESCRIPTION
. SOURCE 6
Hydrogen Damage is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for Fuel Transfer REF.1 Tube, due to the following:
REF. 2
- 1) ) Insignificant tensile stresses occur in the Fuel Transfer Tube stainless steel material.
REF. 3
- 2) A lack of an aggressive environment. The normal Refueling REF. 4 Canal water chemistry is very tightly controlled and is quite benign to stainless steels. The amount of hydrogen in the REF. 5 surrounding fluid is not sufficient to perpetuate Hydrogen Damage.
- 4) The Refueling Canal is only filled with water during outages.
The majority of the time, the Fuel Transfer Tube is dry and Hydrogen Damage would not be possible and if any damage did j
begin it enuld not perpetuate.
- 5) A visual examination of the Refueling Canal Liner, which.
experiences the same water environment as the Fuel Transfer Tube, was performed in June 1992 and noted th~at "the stainless steel liner appeared to be in good condition".
- 6) A visual examination of the Fuel Transfer Tube was performed in April 1995 and noted that "All areas visible looked free from damage / corrosion. Blind flange removed and installed in rack.
No damage / corrosion to blind flange / studs securing flange in rack".
Hydrogen Damage is not a plausible ARDM for the carbon steel containment penetrations, electrical penetrations and stainless steel containment sump recire penetrations because they are not wetted surfaces and are subject to low stress levels.
Page 5 of 8 (LCM-16)
MItrix Cods List (R:vini:n 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System DEVICE T(PE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02, 03, 04, 05 Date: May 1996 SOURCE 3 CODE.
- DEScrur ON 7
Low Cycle Fatigue is not a Pl.AUSIBLE ARDM for containment REF.1 penetrations, due to the following:
REF. 5
- 1) Containment penetrations are designed to have good fatigue stren rties (1ES cycles) of below yield load in accordance with SE ction Ill.
- 2) Containment penetrations are not exposed to any cyclic thermal or pressure loading since they are only exposed to normal containment temperature variations and are not pressurized. Potential low-cycle fatigue due to localized elevated temperatures are not anticipated to be significant.
- 3) Containment penett ations with high temperature process piping (i.e. Main Steam and Feedwater) are keep below 120*F by penetration coolers.
- 4) Containment penetrations are designed such that their stresses are well below the plastic range.
O 8
General Corrosion / Oxidation is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for the REF.1 Fuel Transfer Tube and the containment sump recire penetrations because these penetrations are fabricated from stainless steel REF. 2 and Inconel.
REF. 3 REF. 4 REF. 5 i
l Page 6 of 8 (LCM-16)
1 M;trix Coda List (R:vi2Isn 1) l SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System O
oeviceTvee:co#t i"
- 1 e # tr tio#-
l GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,03,04,05 Date: May 1996 CODE:
DESCRIPTION -
SOURCE-l 9
Stress Relaxation is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for containment REF.1 l
penetrations, due to the following:
REF. 2 l
- 1) The Fuel Transfer Tube fienge bolts are not exposed to high temperature or high radiation.
REF. 3
- 2) The Fuel Transfer Tube flange bolts are removed and REF. 4 reinstalled during each outage.
REF.5
- 3) The Fuel Transfer Tube botting flange is crianted such that the water pressure in the Refueling Canal would always put the flange seals in compression. Therefore any slight relaxation of botting pre-load would probably not cause any leakage.
l
- 4) The only external loading on the Fuel Transfer Tube flange bolts is the water head in the Refueling Canal, which is insignificant.
l
- 5) The containment sump recire penetration bolted joints are not exposed to the high temperatures and radiation levels required l q for stress relaxation to occur forstainless.steeland carbon steel.
V t
l Additionally, these joints are not subject to any cyclic thermal or pressure loads and are subject to low stress lev ~els under normal operations because the joints are not pressurized.
l l
- 6) The carbon steel containment penetrations and electrical i
penetrations have no bolted components.
l 10 Elevated Temperature is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for the REF.1 i
ccntainment penetrations, due to the following:
j
- 1) Normal operating temperatures within PWR containment i
structures are between 120' F and 150' F which are well below i
the 700 F level at which the structural integrity of steel begins to be significantly affected. Additionally, even if local areas of containment penetrations should experience elevated temperatures, the highest fluid temperature in any process pipe is still well below 700* F.
Page 7 of 8 (LCM-16) l
L M;trix Ceds List (R; vial:n 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System DEVICE TYPE: Containment Penetrations GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,03,04,05 Date: May 1996 I
l l
.CODEc
- DESCRr nON:;
ySOURCE::
REF.1: EPRI TR-103835, Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Structures, License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1, 7/94.
REF. 2: DG-1009, USNRC Draft Regulatory Guide - Standard Format and Content of Technical Information for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses,12/90 REF. 3; EPRI TR-103842, Class I Structures License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
REF. 4: Component Life Estimation: LWR Structural Materials Degradation Mechanisms - EPRI NP-5461, 9/87 REF. 5: EPRI TR-103838, Pressurized Water Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
O l
I l
l i
Page 8 of 8
, (LCM-16) l -
Pct:ntici ARDM List (Rsvi:icn 1 )
i SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENTTYPE: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996
. POTENTIAL "ARDM (YESINO)J '
1DESCRIPTIONIJUSTIFICAMONi SOURCE l
General Corrosion /
Yes General Corrosion / Oxidation is the REF.1 l
thinning of metal by chemical attack at Oxidation the surface of the metal by an REF. 2 aggressive environment of moisture i
and oxygen. General REF. 3 Corrosion / Oxidation is a potential for l
low alloy and high alloy ferritic steels.
REF. 4 f
General Corrosion / Oxidation is a i
mtential ARDM for the Containment REF. 5 l
3ersonnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock l
and Equipment Hatch, since they are fabricated from carbon steel.
l Pitting / Crevice No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Corrosion Pitting / Crevice Corrosion occurs when l
surfaces of materials are wetted by the REF. 2 corrosive medium and are covered in O
localized areas with debris.~ Since the -- REF. 3 Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment REF. 4 Hatch are not wetted surfaces, Pitting / Crevice Corrosion is not a REF. 5 l
potential ARDM.
Irradiation-Assisted Yes Steel degradation due to neutron REF.1 Stress Corrosion irradiation results from the Cracking (IASCC) displacement of atoms from their REF. 2 normal lattice positions to form both interstitials and vacancies. The effect REF. 3 of this ARDM is to increase the yield l
strength, decrease the ultimate tensile REF. 4 L
ductility, and increase the ductile to brittle transition temperature. IASCC is REF. 5 an ARDM that can occur in stainless steels that are subjected to an environment conducive to corrosion cracking. IASCC can further accelerate the potential corrosion xocess. Since the Containment mersonnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock j
and Equipment Hatch are exposed to radiation, Irradiation and lASCC are potential ARDMs.
I i
Page 1 of 7 (LCM-16)
Pct::ntial ARDM List (R visien 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 4
POTENTIAL
.. ~.. _
?ARDM-J(YES/NO) J
? DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION -
SOURCE Stress Corrosion No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Cracking SCC /lGSCC/lGA are potential ARDMs (SCC)/intergranular for stainless steel components.
REF. 2 Stress Corrosion IGSCC is SCC where the grain Cracking boundaries of a susceptible materials REF. 3 (IGSCC)/Intergranular are cracked due to stress and an Attack (IGA) aggressive environment. IGA is similar REF. 4 l
to IGSCC except stress is not required for IGA. Initiation and propagation of REF. 5 SCC requires three factors to be l
present: (1) susceptible material, (2) a corrosive environment and (3) the presence of tensie stresses. The magnitude of the tensile stresses must exceed a threshold value before the l
ARDM can occur. A generally l
accepted value for the threshold stress l
is the yield stress of the material of l
construction. For austenitic stainless l
steels, SCC is potentialif the PWR operating water chemistry shows the oxygen hmit > Sppb, the halogen limit >
150 ppb and the stress levels are at or O
above the material yield strength.
Since the Containment Personnel 1
Airlock, Emergency Alriock and Equipment Hatch are fabricated from carbon steel and are subjected to low tensile stresses, SSC, IGSCC, and IGA are not potential ARDMs.
Microbiologically No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF. 2 Influenced Corrosion MIC occurs in stagnant or low flow (MIC) areas in systems that use untreated REF. 3 water in an operating temperature range of 50F to 120F. Since the REF. 4 Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment REF. 5 Hatch are not submerged in water, MIC is not a potential ARDM.
Page 2 of 7 (LCM-16) 4 I--
i l
Pctrntiti ARDM List (Ravi2ian 1 )
4 j
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 j
i
- Pu mNTIAle j
.ARDM T(YES/NO) -
- 1 DESCRIPTION /JUSTIFICATIONE
-SOURCE:
Saline Water Attack No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF. 2 i
The Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Ecuipment REF. 3 i
Hatch are not susceptible lo saline water attack. Saline water attack is REF. 4 only potential for re-inforced concrete structures. Since the Containment REF. 5 Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock i
and Equipment Hatch are not l
fabricated from concrete, saline water 1
attack is not a potential ARDM.
j Erosion No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 3
Erosion is not a potential ARDM for the l
i Containment Personnel Airlock, REF. 2 Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch. Erosion is attributed to the REF. 3 removal of protective surface filma on 3
i a metal by mechanical action of a fluid REF. 4 l
or particulate matter. Erosion occurs under high-velocity conditions, REF' 5 turbulence and impingement. Since the Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch are not exposed to water, j
Erosion is not a potential ARDM.
l Erosion / Corrosion No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Erosion / Corrosion is not a potential ARDM for the Containment Personnel REF. 2 Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch. Erosion / Corrosion REF. 3 occurs under high-velocity conditions when the fluid flowing over the metal is REF. 4 corrosive to the metal. Erosion is attributed to the removal of protective REF. 5 surface films on a metal by mechanical action of a fluid or particulate matter.
Since the Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch are not exposed to water, Erosion is not a potential ARDM.
Page 3 cf 7 (LCM-16)
Pmantid ARDM List (R: vision 1 )
i SYSTEM: Containment System 05g O
=auia==arrve=: osa-oooa-o' o i :
v 'eae i
i ARDM ^
Pu s te(TIAL
~
. SOURCE-a.
> (YES/NO)?
DESCRIPTIONtJUSTIFICATION-Neutron Embntiiement No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Neutron Embrittlement is not a mtential ARDM for the Containment REF. 2
- ersonnel Alriock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch, since all are REF. 3 i
located ou't,ide the primary shield and are exposed to neutron fluences REF. 4 2
consklerably less than 1E18 n/cm.
REF. 5 Thermal Aging No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Thermal aging occurs in steels with high content of carbon and at REF. 2 l
temperature levels as low as 550*F.
Since the temperature of the REF. 3 Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment REF. 4 Hatch are ambient and well below the temperature threshold for damage, REF. 5 Thermal Aging is not a potential O.
ARDM.
Hydrogen Damage No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF. 2 Since the Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and REF. 3 Equipment Hatch are not exposed to a i
hydrogen environment, Hydrogen REF. 4 Damage is not a potential ARDM.
REF.5 Page 4 of 7 (LCM-16)
I
Pot::nti 1 ARDM Li;t (R;vinien 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment Sp;m 059 O
=auie==artves: oss-oooa-oi oate: Mar ieee POTENTIAL 4
ARDM-(YES/NO)-
DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION :
SOURCE Low Cycle Fatigue No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Structural deterioration can occur as the result of repeated stress / strain REF. 2 cycles caused by fluctuating loads and j
temperatures. When cyclic loads are REF. 3
)
such that significant plastic strain 1
occurs in the highly-stressed regions.
REF. 4 j
the material damage is said to have been caused by low cycle fatigue.
REF*5 Only the periodic Type A, integrated leak rate tests are a major source of i
load changes for the Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch. Since the Containment Personnel Airiock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment i
Hatch are typically not subjected to either stress or thermal cycles and are normally at ambient temperatures below 120 F and are under insignificant stresses (excludin J
- )eriodic Type A testing),
ele
- atigue is not a potential ARD 1
High Cycle Fatigue No NOT Applicable to Equi) ment Type.
REF.1 Since the Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and REF. 2 2
Equipment Hatch will not be subjected to either high stress (exce at for the REF. 3 periodic Type A integratec leak rate tests) or high thermal cycles (>10E5 REF. 4 l
cycles H h C cle Fatigue is not a l
Potent REF.5 l
Wear No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF.1 Since there is no relative motion between the Containment Personnel REF. 2 4
Airlock, Emergency Airiock and Equipment Hatch surfaces and the REF. 3 l
Containment structure itself, wear is not a potential ARDM.
REF. 4 REF. 5 O
Page 5 of 7 (LCM-16) l
Pct:nti:1 ARDM List (R;vi::Ign 1 )
SYSTEM: Containme'nt System 059 EQUIPMENT TYPE: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 POTENTIAL ARDM
- (YES/NO)1 DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION '
SOURCE-Creep No NOT A)plicable te 5 qui) ment Type.
REF.1 Since t1e Containment personnel i
Airlock, Emergency Airlock and REF. 2 Equipment Hatch are not exposed to I
the required temperature range that REF. 3 would perpetuate this ARDM, Creep is not a potential ARDM.
REF. 4 REF. 5 Electrical stresses No NOT Applicable to Equipment Type.
REF. 2 Electrical stresses are induced in the insulating material used in the REF. 3 fabrication of electrical and electromechanical parts and REF. 4 l
components. Since the Containment l
Personnel Alriock, Emergency Airlock REF. 5 and Equipment Hatch have no insulation materialinvolved in any intended functions, Electrical stresses are not a potential ARDM.
O stress Reiaxat'on ves stress reiaxat>en 's a noientiai ^RDM REr.1 l
for components with substantial preload. Since the Containment REF. 2 Equipment Hatch has bolted connections, stress relaxation is a REF. 3 potential ARDM.
REF. 4 REF. 5 Elevated Temperature Yes Elevated temperatures can cause a REF.1 reduction in yield strength and a reduction of the modulus of elasticity in steels. Therefore, Elevated Temperature is a potential ARDM for the Containment Personnel Airlock, l
Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch.
l O-Page 6 of 7 i (LCM-16)
1 Pctanti;l ARDM LI t (R viaien 1 )
SYSTEM: Containment System 059 i
O sou'a==""ves: osa-oooa-o' o te:= v'aae l
POTENTIAL-
- ARDM
-(YESINO):
- DESCRIPTION / JUSTIFICATION SOURCE' REF.1: EPRI TR-103835, Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Structures, License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
REF. 2: DG-1009, USNRC Draft Regulatory Guide - Standard Format and Content of Technical Information for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 12/90.
REF. 3: EPRI TR-103842, Class l Structures License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1, 7/94.
REF. 4: Component Life Estimation: LWR Structural Materials Degradation Mechanisms -
EPRI NP-5461, 9/87.
REF. 5: EPRI TR-103838, Pressurized Water Reactor Pressure Vessel Intemals License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
0 i
i L
i i
f IO Page 7 of 7 (LCM-16) 4
l l
Component Aging M:nigem:nt RLview LCM-16 t
l Revision 4 Component Grouping Summary Sheet (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 SYSTEM: Containment 059 GROUP ID NUMBER: 059-DOOR-01 GROUP ATTRIBUTES:
i 1.
Device Type:
DOOR 2.
Vendor:
Chicago Bridge and Iron 3.
Model Number:
NA 4.
Material:
Carbon Steel Plate SA-516 Forgings SA-350 Castin s SA-216 Boltin SA-320 5.
Intemal Environment: NA 6.
Extemal Environment: NA l
7.
Function:
Maintain Containment Pressure Boundary 8.
Name Plate Data:
PARAMETER VALUE LIST OF GROUPED COMPONENTS (EQUIPMENT ID):
1 DOOR 67 2 DOOR 67 1 DOOR 68 2 DOOR 68 1 DOOR 69 2 DOOR 69 l
l lO
ARDM Matrix (Revision 1 )
SYSTEM. NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Contaiment System EQUIPMENT TYPE: DOOR DEVICETYPE: DOOR GROUP ID 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 GROUP OR SUB. GROUP ID1 ARDMs.
059-DOOR-01 General Corrosion / Oxidation A
trradiation and irradiation-1 Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking (IASCC)
Stress Relaxation 2
Elevated Temperature 3
~
V Page 1 of 1 Atachment 5
M;trix Codo List (R viaien 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System O
osvice >ves: oooa GROUP ID: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 l
CODE:
- DE5Grur nON
- 50URCE; i
A General Corrosion / Oxidation is a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for the REF.1 f
Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch due to the following:
REF. 2
- 1) The Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and REF. 3 Equipment Hatch are exposed to the intamal environment of the containment and corrosion could occur in the presence of REF. 4 moisture and oxygen if their coated surfaces are not maintained by an effective coating management program.
l
- 2) The Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch can be exposed to conditions conducive to forming condensation (warmed air flowing through an open airlock / hatch) which could lead to oxidation.)
The effects of general corrosion / oxidation would be eventual loss of carbon stee' material and inability of the door to form the required pressure boundary. This ARDM can be detected visually well before loss of material occurs to the extent that intended function would be affected. Therefore, General O
corre ioa'oxid tioa c a d a 9 e bv vi o i x mia tioa or Containment equipmen't hatch and personnel airlocks coated surfaces both in containment and outside containment.
1 Irradiation and Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking are REF.1 not PLAUSIBLE ARDMs for the Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch, due to the following:
- 1) The cumulative radiation exposure experienced by the Containment Personnel Airlock. Fmergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch throughout the license renewal term is far below the level of 2E17 neutrons /cm' (> 1MeV) which could cause a change in mechanical or physical properties j
i j
I Page 1 of 3 (LCM-16)
~. -..
Mstrix Cods List (R:;vi:I n 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System DEVICE TYPE: DOOR GROUP ID: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 CODE-
, DESCRIPTION SOURCE 1
2 Stress Relaxation is not a plausible ARDM for the Containment REF.1 Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock, and Equipment Hatch due to the following:
REF. 2
- 1) The Containment Equipment Hatch flange bolts are not REF. 3 exposed to the high temperature or high radiation levels required for stress relaxation to be a plausible ARDM..
REF. 4
- 2) The bolts are typically removed and reinstalled during each REF. 5 outage.
- 3) The Containment Equipment Hatch is oriented such that the LOCA pressure during an accident would always put the hatch seals in compression. Therefore any slight relaxation of botting pre-load would not cause leakage.
- 4) The only extemal loading on the Equipment Hatch bolts is the dead weight of the hatch itself, which is insignificant.
3 Elevated Temperature is not a PLAUSIBLE ARDM for the REF.1 Containment Personnel Airlock, Emergency Airlock and Equipment Hatch, due to the following:
- 1) Normal operating temperatures within PWR containment structures are between 120' F and 150' F which are well below the 700* F level at which the structural integrity of steel begins to be significantly affected.
Page 2 of 3 (LCM-16)
l MLtrix Ceds List (R:vinien 1)
SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System l
l DEVICE TYPE: DOOR GROUP ID: 059-DOOR-01 Date: May 1996 ECODE --
- L DESCRriION.
SOURCE-REF.1. EPRI TR-103842, Class l Structures License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
REF. 2: DG-1009, USNRC Draft Regulatory Guide - Standard Format and Content of Technical Information for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses,12/90 REF. 3: EPRI TR-103835, Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Structures, License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1, 7/94.
REF. 4: Com aonent Life Estimation: LWR Structural Materials Degradation Mechanisms - EPRI NP-5461, 9/87 REF. 5: EPRI TR-103838, Pressurized Water Reactor Pressure Vessel Intemals License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1,7/94.
O 1
i O Pa,e s e s I (LCM-16)
O O
O Development of Aging Management Alternatives (Revision 1)
Date: May 1996 SYSTEM NUMBER: 059 SYSTEM NAME: Containment System COMPONENTID:NA GROUP ID: 059-PEN-02,059-PEN-03,059-DOOR-01
- 1-
'2.
c31 PLAUSIBLE ARDM -
PLANT PROGRAM
- REASON FOR THE FORM OF ' GING MANAGEMENT A
- FROM -
- ALTERNATIVE CHOSENj ATTACHMENT 5 General Corrosion /
Periodically walkdown the Containment The plausibility of the ARDMs is due to possible degradation of Oxidation penetrations, equipment hatch and personnel the extemal protective paint coatings due to ambient conditions.
airlocks to identify and correct areas where MN-3-100 requires the monitoring of all coated surfaces in the
' the external painted surfaces have degraded Containment. For surfaces outside containment, System Engineer to the extent that ARDMs could challenge Walkdowns as directed by PEG-7 provide for an engineer with the pressure boundary function.
" ownership" of the system to closely examine components. 'Ihese walkdowns will identify and document significant coating MN-3-100, Protective Coating Program degradation and/or presence of corrosion. PEG-7 and MN-3-100 QL-2-100, Issue Reporting require initiation of an Issue Report in accordance with QL-2-100 PEG-7, System Walkdowns for conditions adverse to quality, including housekeeping deficiencies (e.g. degraded paint). Issue Reports identify needed corrective action, and require completion of the work prior to closure. Procedure MN-3-100 also identifies when and how to to correct the degraded condition regardless ofits location.
This aging management approach provides reasonable assurance that significant degradation (i.e. degradation, which if not corrected, could eventually challenge system pressure boundary) will be identified and resolved.
Page1of1 (LCM-16)
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