Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Addition of Automatic Load Sequencer
	ML20079B200
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/29/1994
From:	; GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20079B199	List: ML20079B196; ML20079B200;
References
	NUDOCS 9501050314
	Download: ML20079B200 (18)
	v • d • e

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ENCLOSURE 1 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l

RESUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEOUENCER B ASIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGE Proposed Change IS Section 3N.3 Instrumentation This revision will change the applicable action statement in Table 3.3-2, functional unit 6.d.i and ii, for auxiliary feedwater loss of or degraded 4.16 kV engineered safety features (ESP) bus voltage from 23 to 29, the same as functional unit 8.a. and b., loss of voltage and degraded voltage to 4.16 kV ESF bus.

Table 3.3-2, action statement 29, is being revised to add sub-item (b) which requires "With two or more channels inoperable for one bus, satisfy the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement by restoring one or more channels to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ."

The bases for TS section 3/4.3, Instrumentation, is being expanded to elaborate upon the supplemental function the automatic load sequencer provides to the ESFAS system versus it's more substantial role of defming the operability of electrical power sources.

TS Section 3H.8, Electrical Power Systems This revision will explicitly associate the determination of an OPERABLE electrical power source, (either offsite power or an emergency diesel generator), with that of an OPERABLE automatic load sequencer. This revision further distinguishes the different actions required when an electrical power source has been declared inoperable due to an inoperable automatic load sequencer versus the actions required for inoperability due to some other reason.

This revision will also distinguish that the only function of the automatic load sequencer required during shutdown modes of operation is the loss of power and undervoltage protection associated with the applicable bus and electrical power source.

El-1 95010503t4 941229 PDR ADOCK 05000424 P PDR

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ENCLOSURE 1 (CONTINUED)

RESUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION :

ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEOUENCER BASIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGE Electrical power source (s) surveillance requirements applicable during shutdown modes of operation have also been revised to exclude those surveillances which are not required and '

therefore exempted from applicability.

The bases of section 3/4.8, Electrical Power Sources, is being revised to explain the basis of the LCO allowed for an inoperable automatic load sequencer. A description of the only ;

function the automatic load sequencer is required to perform during shutdown modes 5 t and 6 and why certain surveillances are not required to be applicable during that same time l frame is also being added to the bases.

Ilatis The current Technical Specifications do not have a specific specification for the automatic l load sequencer, Surveillances and operability requirements are covered by the specifications for engineered safety features (ESP) instrumentation and electrical power ,

sources. This leaves a question concerning the appropriate actions to take in the event that an automatic load sequencer must be taken out of service or becomes inoperable. l I

Therefore, additional specifications are being proposed that will clearly delineate the appropriate actions and modes of applicability. This will reduce the possibility for a Technical Specification application error.

The proposed specification changes are contained in enclosure 3. These changes are not a result of any plant changes in design or operation. Enclosure 2 provides an evaluation to !

demonstrate that the proposed specifications do not involve any significant hazards considerations. s Y

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4 ENCLOSURE 2 <

RESUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEOUENCER 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION ,

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, Georgia Power Company (GPC) has evaluated the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications and has determined that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve any significant hazards considerations.

Backnround l The automatic load sequencer is used in response to three separate accident and/or design basis events: 1) any transient resulting in a safety injection (SI) signal, 2) loss of offsite power (LOSP), and 3) the combination of an LOSP and an SI signal. The automatic load sequencer starts the emergency diesel generator and connects Class IE loads to the 4.16-kV bus following an SI signal, an LOSP event, or a degraded grid condition.

Although the emergency diesel generator for each train of emergency power is started ,

when an SI signal is sensed, the emergency diesel generator is not connected to the 4.16 kV bus unless an undervoltage condition occurs, i.e., LOSP or degraded grid. Therefore, in response to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or main steam line break (MSLB), the loss of power and undervoltage protection of the automatic load sequencer is not involved.

The instrumentation used to actuate the engineered safety features for an Si signal is identified in Table 3.3-2 of the Technical Specifications. The automatic load sequencer is not specifically listed in this table although its operability may be implied. Currently, if the automatic load sequencer is inoperable, it is necessary to evaluate the appropriate actions based on Table 3.3-2 for inoperable engineered safety features actuation system instmmentation. The revision of action statement 29 of section 3/4.3 Instrumentation, ESF Table 3.3-2 and revisions to the action statement for electrical power source (s)

Specifications 3.8.1.1. and 3.8.1.2, will make it clear which actions are required to be taken when an automatic load sequencer is inoperable.

Currently, action statement 29 applies only to functional unit 8(a) and (b) regarding a loss of power to 4.16 kV ESF bus, which requires that with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: ;

1 E2-1 l

. l ENCLOSURE 2 (CONTINUED)

RE-SUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEOUENCER 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION ACTION 29 a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, an additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

Action statemen* 29 is being revised with this TS amendment to require the following :

ACTION 29 a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channelis placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; an additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

b.With two or more channels inoperable for one bus, satisfy the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement by restoring one or more channels to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

This TS amendment will also revise the action statement applicable to functional unit 6d.(i) and (ii), start of motor and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps on loss of or degraded 4.16 kV ESF bus voltage, from it's current action statement 23 to the new action statement 29. Action statement 23 for functional unit 6d. (i) and (ii) currently states that with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The purposes of the revisions to the Technical Specifications are to identify the appropriate actions to take when an automatic load sequencer is inoperable, to clearly j identify which functions of the automatic load sequencer are required to be operable !

during different modes of plant operation, and to avoid the unnecessary application of Specification 3.0.3.

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ENCLOSURE 2 (CONTINUED)

RESUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEQUENCER -

l 10 CFR 50.92 (EVALUATION) !

Analysis These revisions to the Technical Specifications are not the result of any design changes or changes in operating procedures or requirements. This change will eliminate any confusion that might exist concerning the effects of an inoperable automatic load sequencer on ESFAS instrumentation versus the broader ramifications upon electrical power source operability.

When an automatic load sequencer is inoperable, the safety related loads for the bus served by that sequencer may not load as assumed in the safety analyses, even if the preferred offsite power source or the emergency diesel generator are available. The determinat;on of whether the bus will, or will not be loaded under this scenario depends upon what portion or function of the automatic load sequencer is inoperable and the plant mode of operation. During Modes 1- 4, the automatic load sequencer serves dual, but separate, purposes in ESFAS and emergency safety bus loading for an LOSP or degraded grid condition. The function of the automatic load sequencer for detecting loss of power and degraded bus voltage can be inoperable but the sequencer may still initiate the sequencing ofloads in response to an ESFAS signal from the solid state protection system (SSPS). Therefore, the appropriate action and LCO of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for an inoperable automatic load sequencer was conservatively chosen to be the same as when an offsite power source and emergency diesel generator are inoperable. This assures that the level of j protection provided by the Technical Specifications is not reduced by the addition of this requirement. The proposed LCO of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for an inoperable automatic load sequencer is in agreement with, and the action statements follow the intent of the proposed requirements in NUREG-1431, Revision 0, the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse plants.

Functional units 6.d.i and ii and functional units 8.a. and b. refer to instrumentation that senses loss of, or degraded voltage on the 4.16 kV buses. The same instrumentation is used for both functional units. It senses loss of or degraded voltage and sends a signal to the automatic load sequencer. Therefore, the appropriate action to be taken when this instrumentation, or a portion ofit, is inoperable should be the same for 6.d.i. and ii.; and 8.a. and b. Since the signals from this instrumentation are processed by the automatic load sequencer, an inoperable instrumentation train can not be more severe than for an inoperable automatic load sequencer train. An inoperable automatic load sequencer train does not cause a loss of power to the 4.16 kV bus; however, it may result in the inability of that train to sequence loads as designed. Therefore, the inoperability of an automatic E2-3

ENCLOSURE 2 (CONTINUED)

RE-SUDMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEOUENCER 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION load sequencer is no more severe than the concurrent inoperability of both power sources for that train. The appropriate action for concurrent inoperability of both power sources is already specified in 3.8.1.1. This change to the Technical Specifications clearly establishes actions for an inoperable automatic load sequencer that are consistent with 3.8.1.1.,

regardless of whether or not it is due to inoperable inputs to the automatic load sequencer or other reasons.

Specific surveillance requirements for the automatic load sequencers are already included in Specification 4.8.1.1.2.h.4, 6, and 12. These surveillances are applicable during all modes cfoperation except Modes 5 and 6, when cenain surveillances (as noted in this revision) of 4.8.1.1 are being exempted because the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is not applicable. During Modes 5 and 6, the only surveillances which should be applicable and directly associated to the automatic load sequencer are those that relate to the sequencer's capability in detecting and functioning in response to a safety bus undervoltage or loss of power. It is not necessary to provide any new or additional surveillance requirements with this amendment, but only to clarify which of the existing surveillance requirements and its mode of plant operation is applicable.

Conclusion Based on the above considerations, GPC has concluded the following concerning 10 CFR 50.92.

1. The proposed change to the Technica! 3pecifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the action to be taken when an automatic load sequencer is inoperable is consistent with that of a more stringent condition already specified, namely, the loss of an entire train of emergency power during Modes 1-4, and for Modes 5 and 6 adding specific actions which previously had never been addressed in TS.

2. The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because it does not involve any change to the design, operation, or performance of the automatic load sequencer. It only serves to clearly identify the appropriate conservative response to an inoperable automatic load sequencer applicable to the plant mode of operation.

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5 ENCLOSURE 2 (CONTINUED)

RE-SUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEQUENCER 10 CFR 50.92 (EVALUATION)

3. The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the proposed actions to take when an automatic load sequencer is inoperable is the same as the action already required by the Technical Specifications when no power is available to the entire emergency bus during Modes 1-4 and by adding requirements during Modes 5 and 6, which had previously never been addressed.

Based upon the preceding information, it has been determined that the proposed Technical Specifications addition does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

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ENCLOSURE 3 l

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RE-SUBMITTAL OF REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADDITION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD SEOUENCER j l

INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATION The proposed change to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications would be incorporated as follows.

- Remove Page Insert Pagg ,

3/4 3-21*,-22 3/4 3 -21*,-22 i 3/4 3 -27a, -28* 3/4 3-27a, -28* -

3/48-1,-2 3/48-1,-2 ;

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B 3/4 8-1, -2* B 3/4 8-1, -2*

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Overleaf page containing no change.

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y TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued) .

M E ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTR (K NTATION C

5 MINiltM CHANNELS APPLICA8L d TOTAL NO. CHANNELS TO TRIP- OPERA 8tE MODES-- ACTI0li

. FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS

~

o- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)

~ -

b. Sim. Gen. Water Level--

Low-Low *

(LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 3 LOOP 4 L10517 LIO527 L10537 L10547 L10518 LIOS28 L10538 LIO548 LIO519 L10529 LIO539 L10549 L10551 LIO552 LIO553 L10554)

) I 2/sta. gen. 3/sta. gen. I, 2, 3 20

[ 1) Start Motor-Driven Pumps 4/sta. gen.

~ in any oper- in each ating sta. gen operating sim. gen.

4/sta. gen. 2/sta. gen. 3/sta. gen. 1, 2, 3 20 l

2) Start Turbine-Driven Pump in any in each 2 operating operating gg ag sim. gen. sim. gen.

1 aa

!! c. Safety injection Start .

"" Motor-Driven Pumps See Functional Unit 1. above for all Safety injection gg initiating functions and requirements.

d. Loss of or Degraded 4.16 kV ESF Bus Voltage 5 3)us has d 2/p:ain 3/t w r 1, 2,'3 gg i Start Motor-Driven Pumps 11 Start Turbine-Driven Pump -

4/

4/.l.sahr bus 2 from

.either $ &

3/imahr b gg 1, 2, 3 X@

[

)u s

See Specift tion 3.3.3.6 - '

kN No, n hood un'sh 8 ,

4 TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) b) With one channel inoperable in each unit, restore each inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days OR within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in the emergency mode #.

c) With two channels inoperable in a unit, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either

1) lock closed the affected and lock open the unaffected OSA intake dampers OR 2) initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in each unit in the emergency mode #.

d) With three channels inoperable, within I hour either 1) lock closed the OSA intake dampers of the unit with two inoper-able channels and lock open the other OSA intake dampers and either restore the remaining affected channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days OR initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in the emergency mode # in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR

2) initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in each unit in the emergency mode #.

. e) With four channels inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in each unit in the emergency mode #.

ACTION 29 the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Totfa-Number hannels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION ma 6ceed provided the owing conditions are satisfied-a.

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The' inoperable chann place he tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and i

b. The Minimum C s OPERABLE require is met; however, an addit channel may be bypassed for u 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for s ance testing of other channels per Spect ion

a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the ;

3 '

inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; an additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specincation 4.3.2.1.

b. With two or more channels inoperable for one bus, satisfy the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement by testoring one or more channels ta OPERABLE l

\ status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months

(

The initiated CREFS shall be Train B unless Train B is inoperable.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 3-27a Amendment No. 67 (Unit 1) ,

Amenoment No. 46 (Unit 2) < l l

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES g gn ,g/,m[c /as! CeFeMCfy OPERATING A -

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sou ces shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offs ite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Distribution System,Vand

b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1) A day tank containing a minimum volume of 650 gallons of fuel (52% of instrument span) (LI-9018, LI-9019), ,

2) A separate Fuel Storage System containing & minimum volume of 68,000 gallons of fuel (76% of instrument span) (LI-9024, LI-9025),and

3) A separate fue,1 transfer pump, H) Am &w+oma.h c, loaa : e f we nc. c' r APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ,

I due to offer +/w an s nogra ble a d* **dj ')

ACTION: 2 Gt-ea d serve ncer-

a. With one offsite %rcuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources inoperablev demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C.

sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter. Restore the offsite l circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT and in COLD SHUTDOWN within th STANDBY follod ng 30within hours.the da n xtr +.

6 hourgee of An-an ineper$6/r aaroma.9,V Le a d s*t ets t e c t >

~

b. With either diesel generator inoperaniW demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel gener- i ator by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months *#, unless the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator is l

' demonstrated. Restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE l status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next ,

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . I oThis test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

The diesel shall not be rendered inoperable by activities performed to support testing pursuant to the ACTION Statement (e.g., an air roll).

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 75 (Unit 1) .

Amendment No. 54 (Unit 2) I 1

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

'3 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

'" ' " -'./

ACTION (Continued) - foo Ceyu encep

c. Withoneoffsitecircuitandonediesel\generatoroftheaboverequired

- A.C. electrical power sources inoperabl W demonstrate the OPERABILITY ,

of the remaining A.C. offsite source by performing Surveillance Re-quirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter, and, if.the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an ' inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 .,

within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months *, unless the OPERABLE diesel generator is.already operating #, or the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator is demonstrated. Restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at ,

least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN'within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore the other A.C. power source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance with the provisions of 3.8.1.1, ACTION Statement a or b, as appropriate, with ,

the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source. A successful test of diesel generator OPERABILITY per Surveillance ,

I Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under the ACTION Statement for an OPERABLE diesel generator or a restored to OPERABLE I

diesel generator satisfies the diesel generator test requirement of '

ACTION Statement b.

d. With one diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION b. or c.

above, verify that:

i

1. All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices '

that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and

2. When in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE.

If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

e. With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Following restoration of one offsite source, follow ACTION Statement a with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is '

restored to OPERABILITY.

The diesel shall not be rendered inoperable by activities performed to support testing pursuant to the ACTION Statement (e.g., an air roll).

3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 75 (Unit 1)

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 Amendment No. 54 (Unit 2)

ELECTRICAt POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATTON ACTION (Continued) on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite a.c: circuit.

f.

With two of the above required diesel generators inoperab ., demon-strate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.1.a. within I hour and at least

' once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within the restoration Following next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months anddiesel of one in COLD SHUTDOWN within generator following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

unit, follow ACTION Statement b with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable diesel generator. A successful test of diesel OPERABILITY l per Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under this ACTION Statement for a restored to OPERABLE diesel sati the diesel generator test requirements of ACTION Statement b.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite l transmission network and the Onsite Class IE Distribution System shall be: l

a. Detemined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct '

breaker alignments, and indicated power availability.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: l

a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1)

Verifying the fuel level in the day tank (LI-9018, LI-9019),

2)

Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank (LI-9024, LI- !

9025),

3) Verifying the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank, '

l

4) Verifying the diesel starts and accelerates 4160to+ at least 170, 440

-135 RPM volts and 1 with 60 generator 1.2 Hz. voltage and frequency atThe diesel generator shall be I

by using one of the following signals:

All diesel generator starts for the purpose of surveillance testing as required by Specification 4.8.1.1.2 may be preceded by an engine prelube period the as recommended by the manufacturer so that the mechanical stress and wear on d1e w engine is minimized.

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE f due to an inoperable automatic load sequencer restore the inoperable automatic load sequencer to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next b hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Amenoment No. 75 (Unit 1)

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-3 Amenoment No. 54 (Unit 2)

i Id#laj'"1 N,e less of~ power an d u nder voIbege h"'b"

f N ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i A.C. SOURCES anoc/4 fed, ademafi c /**d Wfuracce '

SHUTDOWN f

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C, electrical power sources'shall be i OPERABLE:

.' a. One circuit between the offsi e transmiss'on i network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System yand

b. One diesel generator with:

1) A day tank containing a minimum volume of 650 gallons (52% of instrument span) (LI-9018, LI-9019) of fuel,

2) A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 68,000 .

gallons of fuel (76% of instrument span) (LI-9024, LI-9025), and t

3) A fuel transfer pump.

4) The lors of pwer an/ a n ler vo N a99 4~u n e so n of 4 b e OCC* C'<g APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. a n i, wa h'e. /od e/ ref urn e,e r ACTION: ,

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, .

immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive re- ,

activity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads ,

over the fuel storage pool, and provide relief capability for the Reactor Coolant System in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.3. In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the reauired sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1. ,li e above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated i OPERABL y the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 (except for Specification 4.8.1.1 ), and 4.8.1.1.3.

. . M, ag 4.8.1.2.2 At leam once per 18 mombs dunng shutdown, vanfy the loss of power and undervohage function of the -=M automenc load sequencer OPERABILITY upon LOSP signal by v.a'yizg desnergmanon of the emergency bus, load shedding of the l

OPeranns loads from the emergency bus, and venfying the diesel starts and energizes the with the available auto-connected shutdown loads.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-10

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEN INSTRUMENTATION _ ,

[ ,

- c. .

..n.5 ; .,

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System'and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures: (1) the w'.,- ~

associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter ',

monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the .

specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to pemit. au channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance consistent with main-- @ W W %

an appropriate level of reliabi ity of the Reactor Trip' System and : J~

taining,4d Engingp Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation, and (3) sufficiente s dp&

systeRP f9nctional capability is available from diverse parameters. MW W F..

The OPERASILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reli-W ability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the-facility design-fgM. "

the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The inte -

grated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions !

used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these-systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained com--

parable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests per- .

formed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capabil- l ity. Specified surveillance. intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Sur - l veillance Frequencies and out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection i

. Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report. Surveillance inter- [j,yg.. ; ;

vals and out of service times were determined based upon maintaining an approe g,pj w w -

~

o priate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered: !

I V) Safety Features instrumentation. The NRC Safety Evaluation Reports for WCAP - .

C 10271 and its supplements were provided in letters dated February 21, 1985, .

h from C. O. Thomas (NRC) to J. J. Sheppard (WOG-GP); February 22, 1989, from- Q C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. A. Newton (WOG); and on April 30, 1990,. from C. E.- AC Rossi to G. T. Goering.

L I The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Set-points specified in Table 3.3-3 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Satpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

~

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational :

tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, ~

Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-3. Opera--

tion with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the ,

Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety !

analysis to accommodate this ~ error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERASILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found.

to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumamtation to measure the process variable and the i uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, j Z + R + 5 s TA, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 67 (Unit-1)

Amendment No. 46 (Unit-2)

Insert 1 :

Page B 3/4 3-1 The engineering safety features actuation system does not include an explicit functional unit for the automatic load sequencer. An inoperable load sequencer would affect the ability to detect and respond to a loss of power or undervoltage and thus is included with the instrumentation that must be available to meet the requirements of functional units 6.d. i. and i.i. as well as 8.a and b. Since the hardware is the same for each of these '

functional units, a common action statement is used. The mode of applicability for functional unit 6.d does not include mode 4 since the AFW is not required to be operable ;

in mode 4, therefore, a footnote has been added that refers to functional unit 8.a and b.

which requires the instmmentation to be operable in mode 4.

An inoperable automatic load sequencer does not impact the operability of the automatic ;

actuation logic and actuation relays (functional unit 1.b). The hardware referred to by this l functional unit is not contained within the automatic load sequencer, but in the solid state :

protection system. The effects of an inoperable automatic load sequencer is that the associated on site or offsite 4.16 kV emergency power sources may not correctly respond to an ESF or loss of power signal. The appropriate action for an inoperable automatic load sequencer is closely related to the action for an inoperable diesel generator and associated ;

offsite source with an energized 4.16 kV bus. The appropriate actions for an inoperable ,

automatic load sequencer are included in specification 3.8.1.1 and is discussed in the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.8.1.. Action statement 29 for inoperable undervoltage ;

t channels is commensurate with that for an inaperable automatic load sequencer, and it's basis is enveloped by the justification given foi Technical Specification 3/4.8.1.

1 of1 ;

1 l

)

l

\

l

. 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES _

3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, and ONSITE~ POWER DISTRIBUTION The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribu-tion system during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply. safety-related equipment required for: (1) the safe shutdown of the fatH i y, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and 0.C.

power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are con-sistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power s sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions 4

\ coincident with an assumed loss-of offsite power and single failure of the

\ other onsite A.C. source. The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service ,

Mines are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93,," Availability of Electrical Power '

S'burces," December 1974 and Appendix A to Generic Letter 84-15, " Proposed Staff-Positdon to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability." When one diesef generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, ,

that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency :

power, are also OPERABLE, and that the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1s OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurancc that a loss-of-offsi;e power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the diesel generators is incpe'rable.

i The term, verify, as used in this context means to administratively check by

( examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are ,

q) out-of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform ~

V) the Surveillance Requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the

, C component.

H The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that:

(1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capa-bility is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

L %

' The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the

ciesel generators are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9 Revision 2 " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Suoplies," December, 1979; 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977: ; and 1.137, " Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators."

Revision 1, October 1979. Accenoix A to Generic Letter 84-15 and Generic Letter 83-26. " Clarification of Surveillance Reouirements for Diesel Fuel Impurity Level Tests."

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 S 3/4 8-1

INSERT 2 Page B 3/4 8-1 The ACTION times specified for an inoperable automatic load sequencer are based on the times allowed when a combination of one diesel generator and one offsite circuit is inoperable. Under this condition the 4.16 kV Class IE bus would remain energized. The ACTION conservatively addresses any consequential effects of an inoperable load sequencer on other engineered safety features.

In Modes 5 and 6 the automatic load sequencer is necessary to automatically strip the loads from the IE bus and start the operable diesel generator in the event of a loss of off site power (LOSP). Since the design basis LOCA is not applicable in Modes 5 and 6 the automatic LOCA load sequencer function of the load sequencer is not required to be demonstrated as operable. Therefore, those surveillances that require sequencing ofloads because of an SI signal are not required in Modes 5 and 6.

The loss of power and undervoltage function are the aspects of sequencer operation that function to trip all closed breakers on the 4.16 kV Class IE bus on a loss of or degraded voltage, start the associated diesel generator, close the breaker to supply power to the 4.16 kV Class IE bus from the associated diesel generator, and close the breakers to supply power from the 4.16 kV Class 1E bus to the LOSP required loads in the appropriate sequence.

During shutdown, the operability of the loss of power and undervoltage function for L

modes 5 and 6 of the automatic load sequencer is not affected by the inability to sequence and load equipment that is not required to be operable in Modes 5 and 6. Surveillances to show operability of the loss of power and undervoltage function of the automatic load sequencer will only include that equipment that is required to be OPERABLE in Modes 5 and 6.

I ofI

ML20079B200

Text

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