ML20077S732
| ML20077S732 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1983 |
| From: | Wetterhahn M CONNER & WETTERHAHN, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077S735 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309220192 | |
| Download: ML20077S732 (33) | |
Text
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00CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 83 SEP 21 Ali:i6 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CFflCE OF SECPGt COCHLTiflG ?, SEW Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 3 G In the Matter of )
)
Philadelphia Electric Company ) Docket Nos. 50-352
) 50-353 (Limerick Generating Station, )
Uni:ts 1 and 2) )
APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO LIMERICK ECOLOGY ACTION AND CITY OF PHILADELPHIA CONTENTIONS RELATED TO SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT Preliminary Statement By letter dated August 31, 1983, Limerick Ecology Action (" LEA") submitted its proposed contentions relating to the Applicant's Severe Accident Risk Assessment (" SARA")
and Environmental Report-Operating License Stage ("EROL")
Section 7 (" LEA Pleading"). The SARA was submitted in April, 1983 and last amended July 15, 1983.1_/ LEA also included a " Joint Report of Limerick Ecology Action, Staff and Applicant" with regard to the discussions among such parties. It noted that both the Staff and Applicant had reserved comment on LEA's positions, as discussed during such conferences, on the consideration of alternatives to 1/ Additional backup information and answers to NRC questions have subsequently been submitted and served on the Licensing Board and parties.
8309220192 830920 PDR ADOCK 05000352 G pon k
b e
reduce or avoid environmental impacts from severe accidents and the_ course of litigation.
Applicant opposes the admission of the proposed LEA contentions for the reasons set forth below. Because of its importance and general applicability to all the submitted contentions, Applicant first discusses the requirements for Commission consideration of the probabilistic risk assess-
, ment as part of its review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. S4321 g seq. and the i guidelines for acceptability of such SARA-related con-tentions. Integrated within this discussion is Applicant's response to LEA Contention SARA-6, which is essentially legal argument. The timeliness of the contentions is then addressed, followed by a discussion of the course of litiga-tion. Finally, the contentions are individually addressed.
A statement of the matters proposed for litigation by the City of Philadelphia (" City") was received by Applicant too late to be integrated into the discussion of LEA's contentions. They are. discussed separately, with references to responses to LEA's contentions, where possible.
Argument 7
I. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Has No Duty To Augment Its Safety Requirements Under The Auspices Of NEPA.
j It- is beyond question that the final environmental
- statement ("FES") which will be published by the NRC Staff pursuant to Section 102 (C) (i) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.
S4332 (C) (i) , relating to the issuance of operating licenses i
k
for the Limerick Generating Station must include a reasoned consideration of the environmental risks attributable to accidents of the facility.SI The Policy Statement issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or " Commission")
requires an analysis and discussion of such risks, with approximately equal attention given releases and to the probability of occurrence of the environmental consequences of such releases.1 The Policy Statement requires that
" events or accident sequences that lead to releases shall include but not be limited to those that can reasonably be expected to occur."O Consideration of "in-plant accident sequences that can lead to a spectrum of releases" is also required, as is a discussion of the " extent to which events arising from causes external to the plant which are con-sidered possible contributors to the risk associated with the particular plant".5_/
-2/ Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Statement of Interim Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 (June 13, 1980)
(hereinafter " Policy Statement"). It is Applicant's understanding that a supplement to the draft environmental statement (" DES") discussing the environmental risks of accidents from the Limerick Generating Station will be issued in October, 1983.
3/ Id. at 40103.
4/ Id.
5/ Id.
. The environmental consequences of releases whose probability of occurrence has been estimated are required to be- discussed in probabilistic terms. The Commission's Policy Statement requires that such consequences be charac-terized in terms of potential radiological exposure to individuals, to. population groups and, where applicable, to biota.E In its Policy Statement, the Commission has explicitly recognized the limitations on probabilistic treatment of the
, environmental risks of accidents:
In promulgating this interim guidance, the Commission is aware that there are and will likely remain for some time to come many uncertainties in the applica-tion of risk assessment methods, and it expects that its Environmental Impact Statements will identify major uncer-tainties in its probabilistic risk estimates. On the other hand the Commission believes that the state of the art is sufficiently advanced that a beginning should now be made in the use of these methodologies in the regulatory process, and that such use will repre-sent a constructive and rational forward step in the discharge' of its responsibilities.7,/
It is clear that the-Commission has recognized the limita-tions that, for the predictable future, are associated with the application of risk assessment methods to the analysis of nuclear power plants. The Commission has recently 6/ Id.
7/' Id.
i
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reemphasized the fact that many uncertainties exist with regard to the application of probabilistic risk assessments to licensing decisionmaking in the context of its Proposed Policy Statement on Severe Accidents ! and in its Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants (" Safety Goal Policy Statement").9 -
In the context of its Safety Goal Policy Statement, the Commission made the determination that "[t]he basic impedi-ment to adoption of regulations requiring risks to the public to be below certain quantitative limits . . . is that the techniques for developing quantitative risk estimates are complex and, in the cases of interest here, have substantial associated uncertainties."E The Commission also found that the existence of these associated uncertainties " raises a serious question whether,- for a f
specific nuclear power plant, the achievement of a regulatory-imposed quantitative risk goal can be verified with a sufficient degree of confidence."N The Commission
. also expressed uncertainty as to how its " essentially deterministic regulations would be supplemented if the 8/ Proposed Commission Policy Statement on Severe Accidents and Related Views on Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 16014 (April 13, 1983).
- 9/ 48 Fed. Reg. 10773 (March _14, 1983).
10/ Id. at 10775.
11/ Id.
qualitative safety goals and quantitative design objectives
- which are based on considerations of probable risk - were incorporated into the regulatory framework." b All- of these explicit reservations weigh heavily against any attempt to ' use probabilistic risk assessment techniques for . any purpose beyond presenting a full dis-cussion and disclosure of the environmental risk of acci-dents. Applicant submits that it is presently inappropriate and, as a practical matter, impossible to utilize these techniques to impose additional safety requirements for this facility under the auspices of NEPA. If the Commission believes that any environmental analysis demonstrates a need to provide further safety requirements for Limerick, it will i do so by appropriate action under 10 C.F.R. Part 50 as a result of its ongoing - studies into the matter. It will certainly not utilize the " wolf in sheep's clothing" ap-proach suggested by LEA to turn NEPA into a substantive, regulatory statute.
While the Commission's Policy Statement contains a detailed discussion as to the necessary contents of an environmental report and FES, it does not prescribe a discussion of additional inplant features, procedures, or other actions to " mitigate" the environmental impact of extremely low probability accidents. Thus, the Commission's 12/ Id.
4
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Policy Statement mandates disclosure of environmental risks and consequences, but does not establish any basis for requiring mitigating alternative actions based upon such disclosure.13/ Nor is any basis for doing so inherent in NEPA itself. As noted, LEA's position as set forth in Contention SARA-6 attempts to transform NEPA into a substan-tive regulatory mechanism. A similar attempt was summarily rejected by the Supreme Court in Strycker's Bay Neichborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam), where the Supreme Court reiter:ted "that NEPA, while establishing
'significant substantive goals for the Nation,' imposes upon agencies duties that are ' essentially procedural.'"
Earlaar decisions which appear to have interpreted NEPA to invest the statute with substantive authority and obliga-tions cannot be squared with this holding. Moreover, the Court's rationale is fully consistent with the long held understanding that NEPA acts as a full environmental disclo-sure law and ensures that agencies have compiled sufficient 13/ Further, basing mitigating actions on environmental disclosure is inherently unfeasible because of the substantial difficulty in accurately quantifying the risk and consequences of so highly improbable events.
There really can be no one " bottom line" of risk which can be easily manipulated and examined consistently with the other results of the NRC's NEPA analysis. All the results of probabilistic risk assessment studies including uncertainties, sensitivity studies, and qualitative exposition must be considered as a whole in discussing low probability accidents.
14] 444 U.S. at 227.
information necessary for them to make appropriate decisions in light of potentially adverse or beneficial environmental impacts resulting from the proposed action.15/
Furthermore, both court precedents and Commission decisions are clear in stating that alternatives which are remote and speculative need not be considered in fulfilling the requirements for NEPA. Only alternatives which are feasible in the time frame of facility licensing need be considered. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556, 1562 (1983), an agency's " [tl ime and resources are simply too limited" to extend NEPA beyond its clear mandate. The Court stated: "The scope of the agency's inquiries must remain manageable if NEPA's goal of Sensur[ing] a fully informed and well considered decision' .
. . is to be accomplished" M. (citation omitted) .
The discussion of alternatives in an EIS was earlier explained by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978), as follows:
To make an impact statement something more than an exercise in frivolous boilerplate the concept of alternatives
-15/ Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v.
Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981); Atlantic Coalition on Transportation Crisis, Inc. v. Atlanta Regional Comn.is sion , 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979);
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
i
- _-___________ ___ - l
must be bounded by some notion of feasibility.
i Under this ' rationale, "NEPA does not contemplate detailed discussion of remote and speculative alternatives . . . .
-[T]he discussion of alternatives need not be ' exhaustive' but must contain-sufficient information to permit a ' rule of reason' determination." National Indian Youth Council v.
Watt, 664 - F. 2d 220, 226 (10th Cir. 1981). As the court stated in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981), "NEPA does not require a federal agency to discuss every conceivable alternative to a proposed action . . .. .
With regard to the particular contention at hand by LEA that certain unspecified measures should be taken to rede-sign the Limerick reactors, an important corollary of this rule.is that "there is no need for an EIS to consider an alternative whose effect cannot reasonably be ascertained and whose implementation is deemed remote and speculative."
Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corri-dor v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1071-72 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 707 F.2d
- 1392 (3d - Cir. 1983). See also Monarch Chemical Works, Inc.
- v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639,. 650 (D. Neb. 1979); conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 782
.. (M.D.N.C. 197.7).
These principles were applied by the court in Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, i
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801 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in rejecting the very proposition posited by LEA here. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Atomic Energy Commission was not compelled to explore "every extreme possibility which might be conjectured" as an alternative to reduce potential environmental harm. Instead, the court found that the requirement for consideration of alternatives under NEPA is limited to " alternatives as they exist and are likely to I
exist." Id.
- i. The Commission rejected a very similar contention in the Hope Creek proceeding, where the intervenors claimed that NEPA required the Staff to amend the FES to discuss alternative methods of protecting a facility from liquified natural gas accidents near the site. Finding that the probability ~that such an accident could affect the plant was 4
highly remote, the Appeal Board dismissed the argument as unfounded stating:
The Supreme Court has embraced the doctrine, first enunciated in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972), that environmental impact statements need not discuss the environmental effects of alternatives which are " deemed only remote and speculative possibilities."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551 ( 19 7 8 ) .1_6,/ 6 16/ Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-518, 9 NRC 14, 38 (1979).
_ , - - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . - . - _ _ . _ - - - - _ . ~ . . _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - , _ _ . . _ . . _ .
As the Appeal Board subsequently stated in the Black Fox proceeding, "NEPA does not command exploration of every possibility, however remote or speculative." E Accordingly, this Licensing Board need not examine alternatives, i.e., alleged means to mitigate hypothesized low probability events, when the probability of the occur-rence of such harmful effects is so low. LEA has not in any case made any showing whatsoever that the residual environ-mental risk of the facility - that which exists even after full compliance with all NRC safety regulations -
is other than insignificant. In fact, LEA has failed even to suggest any criteria or threshold for such a determination. In the absence of a clearly defined significant impact, there is nothing to mitigate and thus no need to consider alterna-tives.
The Commission has recognized that the development of probabilistic risk assessment techniques is still in its infancy. Information developed as a result of utilizing
-17/ Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 781 (1979). See also Arizona Public Service Company (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-ll7A, 16 NRC 1964, 1992 (1982) (" farfetched alternatives need not be considered under NEPA"); Carolina Potter & Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 21 , Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and 50-401 OL
(" Memorandum and Order") (September 22, 1982) (slip op.
at 28) ("NEPA does not require discussion of ' remote and speculative' alternatives whose environmental effects 'cannot be readily ascertained'").
these-techniques, when couched in the proper terms, and with the necessary qualifications -on its use, may serve to disclose risks. By its very nature, however, it is not sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for decisionmaking
, with regard to alternative safety considerations. The Commission explicitly recognized this in its Safety Goal Policy Statement in stating that at least two years - of evaluation were ' necessary before the Commission could even consider ' utilizing the probabilistic . risk approach in its 18 /
licensing process. It found that there are " sizable i
! uncertainties still present in the methods" and " gaps in the data- base" in probabilistic . risk assessment techniques.19/
4 These sizable uncertainties and gaps introduce uncertainties j associated with predictions made utilizing the probabilistic risk assessment technique. It is thus not possible to have 20 /
sufficient confidence that any alternative is necessary 1
g/ 48 Fed. Reg. at 10775.
19/ Id. at 10774.
20/
No matter how small the residual risk of an accident
! addressed under the Policy Statement, there are theoretically measures which might be taken to reduce its probability or consequences. However, if that additional step were- taken, there will always be some incremental ~ risk remaining and'another step which could be~taken to reduce that risk, however small. LEA has i'
set forth neither any criteria for nor any limitation on this process in the statement or bases of Contention SARA-6.
or that the selected alternative is preferable.EI In this 1 sense, . mitigative actions would be entirely speculative and l such consideration would not be required.
..A is really asking that this Board bring into the proceeding via the back door something which the Commission explicitly prohibited it from doing directly. It is beyond question that the Commission has ratified the use of its deterministic safety regulations and, for the present, prohibited the use of probabilistic risk assessment tech-niques in licensing determinations. It has explicitly found that its deterministic regulations as contained in Title 10,
- Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations and the imple-menting guidance therefor is sufficient to protect the public health and safety.E t
21/ If this Board decides that it must consider mitigative alternatives, Applicant submits that the standard to be applied in evaluating such action is whether it is "obviously superior" to the existing design. New England Coalition on Nuclear Power v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 582 F.2d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 1978);
- Roosevelt ' Campobello International Park Commission v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1047- (1st Cir. 1982). While these cases deal specifically with site alternatives, the selection of reactor . design features different from an existing design which meets all regulatory requirements is comparable to selecting a new site over one which meets applicable siting criteria.
- 22/ 48 Fed. Reg. at 10775. See also Separate Views of Commissioner Gilinsky on the Commission's Policy Statement on Safety Goals. M. at 10775-76.
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( Intervenor LEA cannot, in the guise of performing an environmental review, have this Licensing Board impose additional requirements presently covered by the NRC safety regulations even though all Commission safety requirements are being met by the Limerick Generating Station. Applicant submits that the cases cited by LEA for the proposition that the NRC has the authority to impose license conditions to minimize environmental impacts is distinguishable.23/ Those decisions dealt with-environmental impacts of transmission lines, offsite roads, railroad spurs and cooling towers, and did not present a' question of supplementing or conflicting with safety requirements. Those cases therefore do not militate against the Commission's protection of the health and safety of the public via its deterministic regulations and implementing guidelines which have been painstakingly developed by hard experience and carefully considered rulemaking. Moreover, such safety regulations have a relativo degree of certainty in their implementation. Given specific regulations governing the requirements for the construction and operation of a facility, there is no need to interpret NEPA as amending safety requirements. This unauthorized use would, in effect, allow any licensing board to overrule the the Commission's safety regulations, a situation which is clearly prohibited by 10 C.F.R. S2.758, 23/
3 LEA Pleading at 3, 20-21.
using an untested and unapproved methodology. Nothing in NEPA authorizes each licensing board to make a_d hoc decisions redefining and interpreting the effectiveness of the Commission's regulations.
LEA alleges that "[b]y issuing its Interim Policy Statement on Severe Accidents Under NEPA, the Commission has in effect made the threshold determination regarding the significance of the risk of severe accidents."EI LEA offers no support for this proposition. To the contrary, the Commission. expressed its belief that as a result of the analysis required under the Policy Statement the conclusions regarding the environmental risk of accidents, (even includ-ing those special cases that had considered Class 9 acci-dents before the issuance of the Policy Statement) would be "similar to those that would be reached by a continuation of current practices."El LEA states that Applicant is the first to have been required to submit a Severe Accident Risk Assessment.N!
Although true, this fact has no significance. Limerick just happened to be one of the first cases to fall within the
. time frame of the Policy Statement requiring all applicants i
for an operating license after July'1, 1980 to submit this 24/ Id. at 18.
25/ 48 Fed. Reg. 40103.
l 26/ LEA Pleading at 19.
I
information.EI Previously, the NRC had asked for a comparison of the Limerick facility with the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 but, as this Board is well aware, the Staff has abandoned any attempt to compare this reactor's risk with that found by the Reactor Safety Study.28/ Even should the risk of this reactor be greater than that of the refer- '
ence reactor in WASH-1400, LEA has pointed to no signifi-cance of this fact. It would be expected that there are some facilities whose risk would be somewhat higher and some lower. However, nowhere has the NRC established WASH-1400 as a licensing standard.
LEA argues that the risk from Limerick is significant enough to warrant a detailed examination of alternatives.to the present facility.29/ Yet, LEA fails to set any standard for such threshold level of risk. The literature referenced by LEA certainly does not provide the specificity required by the Commission's regulations for application to the Limerick Station. While there is a reference to a paper by the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies which speaks to improved containments, there is absolutely no showing that such improvements are applicable to the Limerick 21 / 48 Fed. Reg. 40103, 28/
While inconsequential, Applicant disputes the fact that the risk is in fact greater.
29_/ LEA Pleading at 19.
facility at this particular phase of its construction.3_0_/
Neither is there any showing that preliminary assessments of core melt accidents at Zion and Indian Point,31/ which are pressurized water reactors, have any relevance to this f' proceeding. LEA has not demonstrated that there is any specific requirement for consideration of alternatives for the addition of additional safety measures which is required by the Commission's regulations. Applicant submits that the Board should not admit Contention SARA-6.
II. Anticipated Course of Litigation Applicant has already presented its views on the scope of the Board's inquiry under the Commission's Policy State-ment in the previous section and it will not respond further to LEA's position in this regard on pages 2 and 3 of its pleading. Applicant generally agrees with the statement regarding the timing of 1-tigation found on page 4 of LEA's pleading. The only proviso is that Applicant, as well as all other parties and the Board, has yet to see any defini-tive position set forth by the Staff on the basis of its l
review of Applicant's submittals in the area of probabilis-tic risk assessment. Therefore, Applicant must reserve the l-i right to review the NRC's conclusions with regard to the
-30/ Id. at 20. Nor does LEA .make any showing that any IiEproved containment is warranted under any basis.
l 31/ Id.
l l
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necessity .for litigating issues which may remain between Applicant and the Staff.
III. Lateness of the Contentions Applicant believes that, as to a number of the con-tentions, LEA.has~ failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing. Included within these are SARA Contentions Nos. 1,
. 2 and 7.- SARA Contentions 1 and 2 are merely repetitions of New PRA Contentions 1 and 2 which were rejected by the Licensing Board in its Second Special Prehearing Conference Order -(July 26, 1983)- (slip op. at 22-24). LEA did not request reconsideration of the Board's ruling with regard to these two contentions as per:aitted by 10 C.F.R. S2.751a(d).
Even at that. juncture, Applicant argued that these con-tentions were late.
These contentions are clearly late without any showing of good cause and should not be admitted.32/ The Appeal Board ruled in Grand Gulf that where there is no good cause
+ Lfor lateness, the petitioner bears a heavy burden with regard'to the other-factors.E! Applicant submits that the other factors are either neutral or weigh against admission of the contentions. In particular, whether the petitioner's 32/ See generally Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear
' Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC _ (June 30, 1983).
3_3_/
Mississippi Power & Light Company (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) , ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982).
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i participation may reasonably be expected to assist in development of a sound record is supported only by a refer-ence to a Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL") report.
BNL is a consultant to the NRC Staff in this matter and there is no demonstration that LEA could independently assist in developing the record. Clearly, petitioner's participation will broaden the issues to be considered by the Licensing Board.
With regard to SARA Contention 7, the manner in which errors of commission could and should have been considered certainly should have been raised at the time PRA con-tentions were submitted. It is inexcusably late and LEA has not specifically addressed the other factors related to the acceptance of late-filed contentions. This portion of Contention 7 should be denied as late.
IV. Response to Specific Contentions A. SARA 1 and SARA 2 As previously discussed, both contentions are essen-tially the same as those submitted and disposed of by the Board in its Second Special Prehearing Conference Order at pages 22-24. The Board's prior ruling is the law of the case. While not an " ironclad rule," the doctrine of the law of the case should be followed unless the tribunal "is convinced that its declared law is wrong and would work an
injustice."EI No reason has been given to overturn the Board's ruling with' regard to the present resubmission.35/
There is no further specificity given and no assignment of error in the Board's previous denial of these contentions.
These contentions should again be denied.36/
SARA 3 In this contention, LEA challenges utilization of what is called a sheltering zone between radii of 10 and 25 miles f rom . the plant in which people are assumed to engage in normal activity and then are rapidly relocated. As is recognized by LEA, NRC emergency planning guidance does contemplate ad hoc responses beyond the plume exposure EPZ.
-34/ Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 260 (1978).
35,/ If the Board reconsiders its previous ruling, Applicant incorporates its previous response to these two contentions contained in Applicant's Answer to the Further Particularization of Intervenors' Conditionally Admitted Contentions at 35-36 (April 27, 1983).
-36/ The effect of smoothing is discussed in BNL, "A Review of the Limerick Generating Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment," NUREG/CR-3028 at pp. 6-31 and 6-32. This discussion is intended to illustrate the effects of smoothing and is not meant to be a recommendation that smoothing should be incorporated. It is not included in the assembly of results and reassessment of risks (Chapter 8 of NUREG/CR-3028).
The use of smoothing was discredited by the Lewis Committee. See " Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," NUREG/CR-0400 at p. 12 (1978), which says that smoothing is
" arbitrary, unnecessary and plain wrong."
Normal activity in the sheltering zone was assumed in SARA to' determine the exposure of such individuals and is merely i
a combination of ' f actors relating to presence outside, in residences, and at work. It is an attempt to model realis-
- tically the exposure to people.
LEA erroneously assumes that the entire population between 10 and 25 miles from the-facility will be relocated after any major accident. There is no basis given by LEA for asserting that such total evacuation would be necessary or was assumed in the model. In fact, the model simply assumed that' the portion of the populace which would be affected by deposition from the plume .would be relocated once the plume had passed. Therefore, only one or, a most,
, a few of the 16 sectors at these distances would require relocation even for the very low probability events which would require any action whatsoever. LEA has not shown that this is an inappropriate assumption or that any other particular assumption would cause significant changes in the 1
results of SARA such as to affect the cost / benefit balance
- for the Limerick Cenerating Station.
SARA 4 LEA alleges that the consequence model is deficient because it fails to employ site-specific emergency response data. It is alleged that SARA employs a generic emergency response model at variance with the available site specific 4
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data.EI While LEA is quick to criticize the available data base upon which the generic estimates for evacuation were based, it points to no better data which was overlooked in determining the best way to model evacuation. In any event, SARA provides some sensitivity models showing the effect of various changes in evacuation modeling on the dose and it fulfills its purpose of informing the decisionmaker about y
~ possible er'or r bands and results of studies.38/ Again, LEA mI s fails to demonstrate that use of any other data would have significantly affected the outcome of the analysis for Limerick.
In any event, Appendix H to the Emergency Plan which is touted by LEA as being appropriate for use is clearly labeled a preliminary evacuation time estimate. It states at page 3-18 that " realistically, it is clear that the N
existing road network will permit evacuation of all the population in the 10 mile zone on a much shorter time frame." To fulfill its purpose under NEPA in making reason-able predictions, SARA utilizes realistic information as opposed to conservative calculations used in datermining compliance with safety regulations. In any event, ex-amination of the preliminary evacuation time estimate reveals that only a few sectors take the maximum time to 37/- LEA Pleading at 13.
38/ See SARA Table G-4.
s evacuate. Thus, it would not be appropriate to assign this value to - all sectors. This document does not take into account the prompt notification system, which is required by the NRC regulations and which will be installed in the Limerick vicinity in order to cut notification time to 15 minutes. Thus, it is impossible to separate preliminary evacuation notification time from preparation time which makes such data difficult to use in SARA.
The use of the three-hour notification time for seis-mically induced accidents is an estimate since, of course, no specific data is available. In any event, the use of a very conservative 1 mph for evacuation speed would compen-sate for any shift in notification time. While LEA postu-lates that a percentage of the population will not evacuate, the NRC has required an educational program to make the public better aware of the steps they should take in case of a severe accident at the Limerick facility. Even if less than all individual s evacuate, LEA does not demonstrate how this raises any litigable issue in terms of the environ-mental analysis for Limerick.
LEA criticizes SARA for not taking adverse weather conditions into account. As discussed on page 10-10 and 10-11 of SARA, adverse weather conditions that would be expected to seriously reduce effective evacuation speeds are relatively infrequent (perhaps 4% of the time or less); so their predicted contribution to public risk is not likely to be large. In any event, the data base usea to determine the
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,; a v generic evacuation speed includes certain adverse weather conditions.EI ' Applicant submits that this contention should be denied.
SARA 5 LEA is incorrect.in stating that the items listed in the " Basis" for this contention have been excluded from SARA.S - Therefore, this contention lacks basis. Many of the consequences . which are alleged to be omitted are, in q
fact, directly or' indirectly included in SARA. LEA's complaint seems to be that instead of or in addition to ,
expressing consequences in terms of dollars, SARA should state effects in terms of other units . of measure, e.g.,
acres of land or job losses. Many of t*nese considerations, however, are factored into the off-site costs discussed in SAPA on pages 12-16 through 12-18. They include: (a) cost of permanent land interdiction (LEA Pleading at 16, SARA Contention 5, Item 2); (b) total land area from which people l are permanently interdicted (M., Item 3); (c) total land area in which crops are interdicted'(Id,., Item 4); (d) total land area in which milk is interdicted (M. , Item 5) ; (e) 39/ SARA contains evacuation sensitivity studies which change -the evacuation parameters so as to give
. variations in public risk. See, e d., Figures 10-23 through 25 and Tables G4 through G8. For example, Table G4 of SARA contains evacuation sensitivity studies which vary the. delay time from 1 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />'for
- the random reactor vessel rupture.
- g/ LEA Pleading at 16-17.
i
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. cost of disposal of contaminated milk and crops (M., Item 6). These quantities are included in CRAC2 runs .S The incremental costs of replacement power (M. at 17, Item 9) are included in SARA (p. 12-17), as are the costs of the !
loss of the power plant due to the accident (SARA at 12-17).
The cost of medical treatment (LEA Pleading at 17, Item 13) I is discussed on pages 12-17 and 12-18 of SARA.
Job losses caused by the accident (LEA Pleading at 17, Item 11) and indirect effects associated with possible reduction in productive capacity industries located outside the area directly affected by the accident (M., Item 10) are discussed on page 12-18 of SARA. As stated on page 12-18, CRAC2 does include unemployment costs and more sophisticated models which include indirect effects do not significantly affect the economic impact.
The total latent health effects due to both initial and chronic radiation exposure are considered (LEA Pleading at 16, Item 1). On page 12-17 of SARA, the total number of thyroid nodule cases is considered, including both initial and chronic radiation exposure. This is the biggest single source of non-fatal cancers.
The LEA contention maintains that SARA does not consid-er loss of important resources such as " livestock, mineral resources, water resourc>a, health care facilities, scenic
-g/ See Table II-4 of CRAC2 reference guide, NUREG/CR-2326.
. . ~ . _ _ . - _~ . _._ _
- and. aesthetic resources" (LEA Pleading at 17, Item 14).
While SARA does not censider these individually, the CRAC2 runs on which these are based do rely on inputs which include the value of developed property, depreciation of that property, and relocation costs. These figures are provided as national averages and implicitly take account of lost busineases and property, which would principally include mineral resources, health care facilities and the tourist industry.
Compensation for health effects induced by radiation exposure (LEA Pleading at 17, Item 8) is discussed in SARA.
The estimate of one million dollars for the cost of an early death (SARA at 12-17) would largely be in the form of compensation to the family of the victim. LEA has indicated no specific deficiency in.these respects nor any significant impact which has been overlooked. It is certainly true that more and more information could be generated, but there is no demonstration that-more is needed or would affect the ,
ultimata outcome of this proceeding.
SARA 7 d
This contention is broad, unfocused and includes only two examples with any specificity whatsoever. While LEA cites a document- apparently prepared to support its contentions, which is provided only in part, there is no showing that the author, Mr. Sholly, has any expert quali-fications in the field of probabilistic risk assessment. If read as a whole, the submitted portion of the document
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prepared by Mr. Sholly states that he considers that a risk analysis could be performed which would include sabotage.S/
He admits that that study would have large uncertainties.S The prediction of the outcome is at best speculative and I
there is no showing that r.his would add substantially to l i
risk.
To the contrary, the Commission has explicitly found that sabotage cannot be reasonably considered in probabilis-tic risk terms. In its Safety Goal Policy Statement, the Commission found that "[t]he possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently includ-ed in the safety goal. "S! As a basis for its action, the Commission had concluded that the performance of a risk assessment on sabotage would not be useful. The Commission specifically found that "(a]t present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low, level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point I
M/ LEA Pleading, following p. 21, excerpt from Sholly, Steven, " Report on Review of Severe Accident Risk Assessment, Limerick Generating Station, USC, August 1983 at p. 7.
43/ Id.
M/ 48 Fed. Reg. at 10773.
1 will continue to be successful."El Applicants submit that this finding by the Commission regarding the inability to quantify the risk of sabotage is binding upon this Licensing Board.
With regard to the other topic, errors of commission, there is no specificity given and no basis presented. This contention should be denied.
V. Matters Raised By The City Of Philadelphia The Applicant and the City of Philadelphia (" City")
have met and had a number of telephone discussions to exchange information and views after the Board issued its Memorandum and Order Denying Motion for Additional Time for City of Philadelphia to submit Contentions (September 2, 1983). These discussions have resulted in the elimination of a few of the matters initially raised by the City.
Applicant and the City plan to continue their exchange of informatior. in the future.
On September 19, 1983, the City identified to Applicant the areas that it wished to pursue as issues in the hearing.
While Applicant will continue to work with the City outside ,
of the hearing framework, Applicant opposes the consideration of these matters before the Licensing Board.
The City's submittal consists of an identification of three
" concerns" with additional breakdown contained in an 45/ Id. (emphasis supplied).
appendix. Applicant's response addresses the matters raised in Appendix A to the Statement of the City of Philadelphia Pursuant to Orderc of July 26, 1983 and September 2, 1983 (September 19, 1983).EI A number of matters raised are similar to contentions advanced by LEA.E! For the convenience of the Board, Applicant's response notes these instances and references its response to the appropriate LEA contentions.
Contention City 1A is essentially the same as Contention SARA-7 as it relates to human errors of commission. Applicant's response to this contention has been provided at pages 19 and 27-28, supra. Contention City 2C.1, which addresses incomplete evacuation of the 10 mile
-plume EPZ, has been addressed in the response to Contention SARA-4 at page 22-23, supra. Further, inasmuch as the City is located over 20 miles from Limerick, its interests, either as a Section 2.714 intervenor or a Section 2.715 participant, do not include total evacuation of the plume EPZ. In NRC proceedings, parties may assert only their own
~
46/ The actual pleading was not received until 1:30 p.m. on September 20, 1983. Applicant wishes to reserve the right to further address the matters contained in the body of the City's pleading.
E/ The City has not specifically identified these items in its pleading.
personal rights and interests. $ This contention should be
! denied on that additional basis.
. Contention City 3C and D assert that it is possible to reduce doses in certain circumstances by evacuation of individuals in the range of 25-35 miles. The City has not ,
asserted that the risk to individuals at these distances is substantial' nor cited any precedent for consideration of I' this matter. These contentions lack specificity and basis.
See also discussion of Contention SARA-6, particularly page 12, note 20, supra and discussion of Contentions City 3A and B, pages 31-32, infra.
Contentions City 2B.1, 2C.2 and 2D.1 address the as-I sumptions used to predict exposures to individuals. These 4
matters are addressed in response to the response to SARA-3 at pages 20-21, supra. Additionally, they lack specificity and bases and fail to advance any alternative assumptions which can be considered by the Dcard.
Contention City 2C.3, related to evacuation in " bad 4
i weather," is addressed in response to SARA-4 at pages 23-24, -
supra. City Contentions 2D.2 and 2D.3, relating to breathing rate and the range of latent-cancer fatalities, ,
are lacking in bases and specificity. No attempt is made to demonstrate the 'effect of the alleged deficiencies on l Applicant's -
t 48/ Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 (1978).
a
analysis. The introductory portion of Contention City 2D (as well as the introduction to Contention 2) states that the City is attempting to require the use of " conservative" (emphasis supplied) assumptions in the SARA analysis. This is not appropriate inasmuch as the Commission in its fulfillment of its responsibilities under NEPA is attempting to produce a realistic evaluation of the environmental risk.
Therefore, these contentions should be denied.
Contentions City 3A and B call for the generation of certain dose-distance curves. These curves would presumably seek to isolate the risk to individuals residing in the City utilizing some different and more conservative assumptions than contained in SARA. The City has not pointed to any requirement for the generation of this information nor any use to which it w Ild be put in the licensing process.
4 Applicant submits that it has considered the risk from the operation of the Limerick Generating Station as a whole in SARAN! and is not required to provide an area-by-area breakdown of the risks to individuals. In rejecting an intervenor's call for a " micro-cost-benefit analysis" because not all individuals living in the area of the plant would receive electricity from it, the Licensing Board in Black Fox stated:
-49/ The calculated risk values do reflect the entire population surrounding the facility and thus includa the risk in the direction of the City.
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Basically, the Intervenors do not show in their contention that a mi-cro-cost-benefit analysis is necessary to meet the NEPA requirements in this case. The Board is not persuaded that the state versus state analysis suggest-ed by subsection a of the contention or the local area versus wider area analy-sis called for by subsection b is a prerequisite to a proper NEPA evaluation.5,0,/ 0 In Contentions City 3A and B, the City is seeking to demonstrate that the Commission's emergency planning regulations are inadequate by showing that there is some extremely small probability that EPA Protective Action Guides could be exceeded and arguing that the plume exposure i
e pathway emergency planning zone should be extended to over 20 miles. This is obviously not an environmental matter and, in any event, constitutes a prohibited attack on the NRC regulations.b! While additional information on a number of matters could be generated, it is difficult to see what purpose would be served. The city has not specified the need for the additional information demanded by this g contention.
i f
50_/ Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), (Docket Nos. 50-556, 50-557), Special Prehearing Conference Order (slip op at 10) (August 4, 1976).
- ~ 51/
.10 C.F.R. 550.47 (c) (2) . See South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), Docket No . - 50-395, " Memorandum and Order" (September 14, 1981) (slip op, at 5); Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2),
(Footnote Continued)
I
The City would have the Board consider, in an environmental context, the impact of the consumption of contaminated water provided by the City of Philadelphia.
This matter was excluded from SARA on the basis that multiple drinking water sources existed and that drinking water sources would be isolated until the contamination potential had passed. The City has not demonstrated any inadequacy in this analysis; this contention should be denied as nonspecific and lacking in basis. It should also be denied as an environmental contention since, in reality, it seeks to raise emergency planning considerations.
VI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Applicant objects to the admission of the contentions filed by LEA and the City of Philadelphia.
Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.
I Mark J. Wetterhahn Counsel for Philadelphia Electric Company September 20, 1983 (Footnote Continued)
Docket Nos. 50-458, 50-459, " Memorandum" (August 26, 1983) (slip op. at 19).
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