ML20076E908

Proposed Tech Specs 4.3 & 5.3 Re Inservice Surveillance Requirements for Snubbers in Secondary RCS

ML20076E908
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	05/20/1983
From:	PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
To:
Shared Package
ML20076E902	List: ML20076E899 ML20076E904 ML20076E908
References
NUDOCS 8306010345
Download: ML20076E908 (39)

Text

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ATTACHMENT 1

SUMMARY

OF PRODOSED CHANGES 8306010345 830520 PDR ADOCK 05000267 PDR P

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED CHANGES Section Description of Change l 4.3.10.a) Modified section to identify specific snubber types (i.e., mechanical, hydraulic).

4.3.10.b) Modified operability and followup requirements.

4.3.10 Basis (1) Added " subsystems" to list of items required to be protected by snubbers.

(2) Added clarification of permissible. reactor operation at power with defective safety related equipment.

Table 4.3.10-1 Reformatted snubber listings.

5.3.8 (Title) Modified to state shock suppressors in general.

5.3.8 Modified section to identify specific snubber types.

5.3.8.a) Revised section to provide method of entering into the first in-service visual inspection and schedule for subsequent inspections.

5.3.8.b) Revised section to state acceptance criteria for i visual inspections and requirements for functionally testing snubbers which appear inoperable.

5.3.8.c) Revised section to define testing frequency, representative sample of snubbers for functional f

testing, and resampling requirements.

5.3.8.d) Revised section to state the acceptance criteria for functional testing of hydraulic snubbers.

5.3.8.e) Added new section to state the acceptance criteria for functional testing of mechanical snubbers.

5.3.8.f) Added new section relating to record keeping requirements and service life trend analysis.

l 5.3.8 Basis (1) Modified Basis to address mechanical snubbers.

(2) Modified Basis to address formulas that determine representative samples for functional

! testing.

(3) Deleted allowance to not select snubbers in high radiation areas or those especially difficult to remove for functional testing since Fort St.

e a Vrain nas no snubbers in nigh radiation areas and previous operability verification of snubbers dif-ficult to remove entails removal anyway.

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ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED CHANGES 9

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Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-1 4.3 SECONDARY REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION Applicability 4

Applies to the minimum configuration and characteristics of the secondary (steam) reactor coolant system, including the steam generators and turbine plant.

Objective To ensure the capability of this system to cool the core and prevent a safety limit from being exceeded by defining the minimum operable equipment and characteristics of the secondary reactor coolant system.

Generators, Specification LCO 4.3.1 - Steam Limiting Conditions for Operation l The reactor shall not be operated at power unless both the reheater section and the economizer-evaporator-superheater (EES) section of one steam generator and either the reheater section or the EES section of the other steam generator is operable for the removal of decay heat.

The operable EES sections shall be capable of receiving water from either the emergency condensate header or the emergency feedwater header. The operable reheater sections shall be capable of receiving water from the l

emergency condensate header.

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-2 Basis for LCO 4.3.1 The steam generators provide the means for shutdown heat removal from the primary coolant. Either the reheater section or the EES section of one steam generator can be used for this purpose. The reheater section can be supplied water from the emergency condensate header, and the EES section can be supplied water from either the emergency condensate header or the emergency feedwater header.

Specification LC0 4.3.2 - Boiler Feed Pumps, Limiting Conditions for Operation The reactor shall not be operated at power unless at least two of the three boiler feed pumps are operable. If the motor driven feed pump is not operable and cannot be made i

operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the auxiliary boiler shall be put into operation.

Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.2 Any one of the boiler feed pumps can furnish feedwater for helium circulator motive power and steam generator heat removal to provide for shutdown cooling of the plant. One circulator, operating with feedwater motive power, would provide sufficient primary coolant circulation following a 1

postulated depressurization accident. In order to guard against an accident involving rupture of the cold reheat

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-3 line, (i.e., reactor steam cannot be supplied to the turbine-driven feed pumps), either the motor driven feed pump must be operable or the auxiliary boiler must be operated to supply motive steam to the feed pump turbine if required for a plant shutdown (refer to FSAR Section 6.2 and 10.1).

Specification LCO 4.3.3 - Steam / Water Dump Tank Inventory, Limiting Condition for Operation The reactor shall not be operated at power if the steam / water dump tank contains an inventory of condensate corresponding to a level indication exceeding 45 inches.

Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.3 The condensate inventory maintained in the steam / water dump tank serves to cool the fluid dumped from a steam generator in the event of a tube failure. No minimum level is required since the final pressure after a dump into a dry vessel would not lift dump tank safety valves.

A maximum level of 65 inches corresponding to about 2100 gallons, is established to prevent operation of safety valves due to hydrostatically filling the tank during a steam / water dump.

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-4 Specification LC0 4.3.4 - Emergency Condensate and Emergency Feedwater Headers Limiting Conditions for Operation The reactor shall not be operated at power unless the emergency condensate header and the emergency feedwater header are operable.

Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.4 A safe shutdown of the plant can be performed with water supplied to a steam generator via the normal feedwater line, the emergency feedwater line, or the emergency condensate line. In the event of failure of the normal feedwater line (FSAR Section 10.3.6), the availability of either the emergency feedwater or condensate lines provides adequate shutdown capability. In the event of a maximum tornado (FSAR Section 10.3.9) the emergency condensate line and the emergency feedwater line provide redundant flow paths for steam generator supply from the Firewater System.

Specification LCO 4.3.5 - Storage Ponds, Limiting Condition for Operation The reactor shall not be operated at power unless the inventory in the circulating water makeup storage ponds is at least 20 million gallons of water.

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-5 Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.5 The fire water system serves as a backup means of supplying emergency motive capacity to operate a circulator water turbine (s) and supply emergency cooling water to safely cool the reactor in the event of a

" Maximum Tornado" or " Safe Shutdown Earthquake" (FSAR Section 10.3.9). The storage ponds are required to supply a source of water for the fire water system.

Specification LCO 4.3.6 - Instrument Air System - Limiting Condition for Operation The reactor shall not be operated at power unless at least two instrument air compressors, their associated air receivers, and two main air headers to the reactor building and turbine building are operable.

Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.6 The instrument air system is required for air supply to the essential instrumentation required for safe shutdown cooling (as discussed in Section 10.3.9 of the FSAR). The description of this system is presented in FSAR Section 9.9 1

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T Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-6 Specification LCO 4.3.7 - Hydraulic Power System, Limiting Condition for Operation In each of the two hydraulic power systems, at least two hydraulic fluid pumps, one hydraulic valve accumulator servicing each group of valves, and the associated headers shall be operable to facilitate operation of the associated secondary coolant loops during reactor power operation. If two hydraulic fluid pumps or both accumulators servicing a group of valves should become inoperable in one hydraulic power system, the reactor shall be shut down within one hour and the non-affected secondary coolant loop shall be isolated. If all hydraulic pressure is lost in one hydraulic power system, the reactor shall be shut down immediately and the non-affected secondary coolant loop shall be isolated. If a group of valves should become inoperable because of loss of hydraulic oil supply, the affected secondary loop shall be shut down immediately.

Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.7 Each hydraulic power system is designed with three hydraulic fluid pumps, two hydraulic accumulators for each group of hydraulic operated valves, and separate headers to each group of valves. The hydraulic system will 1

normally operate with two hydraulic fluid pumps and both

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, s Fort St. Vrain 01 Technical Specifications s Amendment #

c_ Page 4.3-7 i

hy/raulic' accumulators in service. The second hydraulic s m pump and-accumulator is redundant.

._ loss of two hydraulic fluid pumps or both hydraulic x

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s accumulators servicing a group of valves indicates the

-' p'otentil l_ for complete or partial l'os s of valve s

operability in the affected secondary coola'nt loop. The one hour time interval prior to required reactor shutdown allows for an effort to regain operabili ty of a second hydraulic fluid pump and/or at least one accumulator for

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the affected valve group.

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In the event hydeaulic oil is lost to a group of valves,

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.- some degree of cpntrol will be lost and the affected

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secondary coolantIloop is isolated. '

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In[the event of loss of all hydraulic power in one system, all flow control an'd the ability to isolate the affected sedondary coolant loop is lost, there')re an immediate reactor shutdown is required.

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, Specification LCO 4 3.8 - Secondary Coolant Activity,

' Limiting Conditions for Operation i s The secondary coolant activity level shall be limited to 0.009 pCi/cc of I2'1 and 6.8 pCi/cc of tritium.

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, Fort St. Vrain 01 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-8 Basis for Specification LC0 4.3.8 The limit on the secondary coolant activity has been established to limit the exclusion area boundary dose to less than the suggested limits in the event of the

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accident involving loss of outside power, main turbine X trip, and failure of one diesel generator to start (FSAR 1 Section 10.3.2). In that event, about 52,000 gallons of water would be vented to the atmosphere as steam.

Assuming a dilution factor of 2.7 x 10, no partition factor of the iodine between the steam released and the water not released, a two hour exposure dose of about 1.5 Rem to the thyroid would be obtained. Using the same assumptions for tritium a two hour exposure dose of about 0.5 Rem to the whole body would be obtained.

Specification LCO 4.3.9 - High Pressure Helium Supply System s

DELETE THIS SPECIFICATION IN ITS ENTIRETY Specification LCO 4.3.10 - Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) -

Limiting Condition for Operation a) The reactor shall not be operated at power unless all l hydraulic and mechanical shock suppressors (snubbers) on Class I piping systems (listed in Table 4.3.10-1) are operacle except as noted in b) through d) of this LCO.

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, Fort St. Vrain 01 j

- 4 Technical Specifications

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Amendment #

Page 4.3-9 -

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[ . b)~ With one or more snubbers . inoperable in a Class I l ' . i' ,

-' system or subsystem, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or l

l restore the inoperable snubber (s) to operable status l .

and perform an engineering evaluation on the supported t c .-

l f component or declare the supported system inoperable

')* , and follow the appropriate action statement for that

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c) If the requirements of a),and b) of this LCO cannot be

, met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the

] [, , reactor .shall be in a low power condition within l ,

36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

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J d) If' -a shock suppressor is determined to be inoperable

> f' while the reactor is in the shutdown or refueling mode, the suppressor shall be made operable or ,

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,e replaced prior to reactor operation at power.

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e) Shock suppressors may be added to Class I systems i

~1 e without prior License Amendment to Table,4.3.10-1, bl provided',a' revision to Table 4.3.10-1 is included with a subsequent License Amendment request.

Basis for Specification LCO 4.3.10

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, Shock suppressors (snubbers) are designed to prevent l

l . unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads,' as might t

- occur during an earthquake, while allowing normal thermal

. motion -du' ring startup and shutdown. The consequence of an P

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, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-10 inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping resulting from the dynamic loads produced by a seismic event. It is therefore necessary that all snubbers required to protect the l Class I systems, subsystems, or components be operable during reactor power operation, Because snubber protection is required only during relatively low probability events, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is i

allowed for repair or replacement. In case a shutdown is required, the allowance of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> to reach a low power x \

condition will permit an orderly power reduction s

consistent with standard operating procedures. Since e

reactor operation at power should not be conducted with u defective safety-related equipment, reactor power

, l operation is prohibited with inoperable snubbers, except l as stated above.

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1 Fort St. Vrain 01 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-11 TABLE 4.3.10-1 CLASS I HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS i

Turbine Water Drain Snubbers TWDS-1 TWDS-6 TWDS-2 TWDS-7

TWDS-3 TWDS-8 TWDS-4 TWDS-9 TWDS-5 TWDS-10 Cold Reheat Snubbers - Circulator

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CRS-Cl-1 CRS-C3-1 CRS-Cl-2 CRS-C3-2 i

CRS-CI-3 CRS-C3-3 CRS-Cl-4 CRS-C3-4 i '

CRS-Cl-5 CRS-C3-5 CRS-Cl-6 CRS-C3-6 CRS-C2-1 CRS-C4-1 CRS-C2-2 CRS-C4-2 CRS-C2-3 CRS-C4-3 CRS-C2-4 CRS-C4-4 CRS-C2-5 CRS-C4-5 CRS-C2-6 CRS-C4-6 Cold Reheat Snubbers CRS-29 CRS-297 CRS-589 CRS-31 CRS-317-1 CRS-591 CRS-72 CRS-317-2 CRS-632 CRS-76 CRS-371 CRS-636 CRS-104 CRS-372 CRS-664 CRS-114 CRS-474 CRS-674 CRS-144 CRS-476 CRS-707 CRS-146 CRS-517 CRS-742 CRS-187 CRS-521 CRS-751 CRS-191 CRS-549 CRS-752 CRS-219 CRS-556-1 CRS-821

CRS-229 CRS-556-2 CRS-822

CRS-262 4

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, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-12 TABLE 4.3.10-1 (Cont'd)

Hot Reheat Snubbers HRS-23 HRS-128 HRS-246 HRS-356 HRS-24 HRS-129 HRS-278 HRS-357 HRS-26 HRS-131 HRS-279 HRS-378 HRS-58 HRS-158 HRS-281 HRS-379 HRS-59 HRS-159 HRS-289 HRS-381 HRS-61 HRS-161 HRS-314 HRS-413 HRS-69 HRS-193 HRS-315 HRS-414 HRS-94 HRS-194 HRS-318 HRS-416 HRS-95 HRS-196 HRS-321 HRS-421 HRS-98 HRS-201 HRS-324 HRS-422 HRS-101 HRS-202 HRS-348 HRS-428 HRS-103 HRS-205 HRS-349 HRS-985 HRS-104 HRS-243 HRS-351 HRS-990 HRS-105 HRS-244 Main Steam Snubbers l MSS-9 MSS-117 MSS-201 MSS-314 l MSS-16 MSS-118 MSS-204 MSS-321 l MSS-17 MSS-120-1 MSS-206 MSS-339 l MSS-18 MSS-120-2 MSS-222 MSS-346 l MSS-19 MSS-120-3 MSS-239 MSS-347 l MSS-27 MSS-125 MSS-246 MSS-348 l MSS-29 MSS-126 MSS-247 MSS-356 l MSS-44 MSS-135-1 MSS-248 MSS-369 l MSS-51 MSS-139 MSS-249 MSS-376 l MSS-52 MSS-145-1 MSS-257 MSS-377

] MSS-54 MSS-145-2 MSS-258 MSS-379 l MSS-61 MSS-145-3 MSS-274 MSS-414 l MSS-64 MSS-146 MSS-281 MSS-421 l MSS-74 MSS-147 MSS-284 MSS-422 l MSS-81 MSS-149 MSS-291 MSS-424 l MSS-82 MSS-184 MSS-304 MSS-431 l MSS-84 MSS-191 MSS-311 MSS-433 l MSS-109 MSS-192 MSS-312 MSS-822-1 l MSS-116 MSS-194

Fort St. Urain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

4 Page 4.3-13 TABLE 4.3.10-1 (Cont'd)

Boiler Feed Snubbers Generators BFS-B1-1 BFS-B1-4 BFS-B2-1 BFS 82-4 BFS-B1-2 BFS-B1-5 BFS-B2-2 BFS-B2-5 BFS-B1-3 BFS-B1-6 BFS-B2-3 BFS-B2-6 Boiler Feed Snubbers i l BFS-54 BFS-420 BFS-523 BFS-573 l BFS-138 BFS-421 BFS-526 BFS-577 l BFS-139 BFS-422 BFS-528 BFS-614 l BFS-142 BFS-425 BFS-529 BFS-641 l BFS-149 BFS-434-1 BFS-530 BFS-679 l BFS-152 BFS-434-2 BFS-532 BFS-711 l BFS-153 BFS-434-3 BFS-534 BFS-763 l BFS-166 BFS-435 BFS-536 BFS-764 l BFS-297 BFS-437 BFS-537 BFS-796 l BFS-352 BFS-451 BFS-553-1 BFS-820 l BFS-397 BFS-477 BFS-553-2 BFS-823 l BFS-398 BFS-479 BFS-556 BFS-824

[ BFS-400 BFS-498 BFS-563 BFS-843 l BFS-402 BFS-500 BFS-564 BFS-844 l BFS-412 BFS-501 BFS-566 BFS-870 l BFS-416 BFS-516 BFS-572 BFS-871 Boiler Feed Snubbers - Emergency l BFS-14E BFS-89E BFS-218E BFS-399E l BFS-15E BFS-122E BFS-219E BFS-405E l BFS-16E BFS-141E BFS-228E BFS-414E l BFS-26E BFS-142E BFS-229E BFS-417E l BFS-29E BFS-143E BFS-243E BFS-419E l BFS-30E BFS-154E BFS-244E BFS-421E l BFS-31E BFS-158E BFS-245E BFS-422E l BFS-47E BFS-167E BFS-257E BFS-423E

, l BFS-53E BFS-181E BFS-260E BFS-430E l BFS-56E BFS-197E BFS-263E BFS-431E l BFS-57E BFS-203E BFS-264E BFS-432E l BFS-74E BFS-204E BFS-268E BFS-442E l BFS-76E BFS-210E BFS-269E BFS-444E l BFS-77E BFS-216E BFS-398E 1

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 4.3-14 TABLE 4.3.10-1 (Cont'd)

Hydraulic 011 Snubbers l HOS-1 HOS-21 HOS-45 HOS-71 l HOS-2 H0S-22 HOS-46 HOS-72 l HOS-3 HOS-23 H05-48 H05-73 l HOS-4-1 HOS-24 HOS-49 HOS-74 l HOS-4-2 HOS-25 HOS-50 HOS-75 l HOS-5 HOS-27 HOS-51 H05-76 l HOS-6 HOS-28 H05-52 HOS-77 l HOS-7 HOS-29 HOS-53 HOS-78 l HOS-8 HOS-30 H05-54 HOS-79 l HOS-9 HOS-31 HOS-55 H05-80 l H05-10 HOS-33 H05-56 H05-81 l HOS-11 HOS-34 HOS-57 HOS-82 l HOS-13 HOS-35 H05-58 HOS-83 l H05-14 HOS-36 H05-59 HOS-84 l HOS-15 HOS-37 HOS-60 HOS-85 l HOS-16 HOS-38 HOS-61 H05-86 l HOS-17 HOS-39 HOS-63 HOS-87 l HOS-18 HOS-40 HOS-64 H05-88 l HOS-19 HOS-41 HOS-65 H05-89 l HOS-20 HOS-42 HOS-66 HOS-90 Emergency Condensate Snubbers ECS-1 ECS-3 ECS-5 ECS-7 ECS-2 ECS-4 ECS-6 Vent Stack Snubbers VSS-101 VSS-107 VSS-113 VSS-119 VSS-102 VSS-108 VSS-114 VSS-120 VSS-104 VSS-110 VSS-116 VSS-122 VSS-105 VSS-111 VSS-117 VSS-123

_. Fort St. Vrain 01 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-1 5 .'3 SECONDAPY COOLANT SYSTEM - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Applicability Applies to the surveillance of the secondary (steam) coolant system, including the steam generators and turbine plant.

Objective To ensure the core cooling capability of the components of the steam plant system.

Specification SR 5.3.1 - Steam / Water Dump System l

Surveillance a) The steam / water dump valves shall be tested individually every three months.

b) The steam / water dump tank level indicators shall be checked daily, and functionally tested every three months.

i j SR 5.3.1.b shall be implemented per ISI Criterion A.

c) The steam / water dump tank level, pressure and temperature instruments (including indicators, alarme, i and interlocks - where applicable) shall be 1

functionally tested and calibrated annually, or at the next scheduled plant shutdown if such surveillance has not been performed during the previous year.

Fort St. Vrain 01 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-2 SR 5.3.1.c shall be implemented per ISI Criterion B.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.1 The steam / water dump system is provided to minimize water in-leakage into the core as a result of a steam generator tube rupture (FSAR, Section 6.3). Satisfactory operation of the dump valves, as is sufficiently demonstrated by testing every three months, will minimize core damage and primary coolant system pressure rise in the event of a steam generator tube rupture.

The dump valve test will be accomplished by closing the (normally locked open) block valve downstream of the dump valve to be tested. After operation of the dump valve, the block valve will again be locked open, returning the dump valve to service.

The specified frequency for instrumentation functional test and calibration is adequate to assure that the water level in the steam / water dump tank does not exceed the limits of LCO 4.3.3, and, in case of dump, to confirm that the proper steam generator has been dumped, and to prevent venting and draining of the tank to the radioactive gaseous end liquid systems before the contents have been adequately cooled.

, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-3 Specification SR 5.3.2 - Main and Hot Reheat Steam Stop Check Valves Surveillance The main steam and hot reheat steam stop check valves shall be full stroke tested in accordance with specification SR 5.3.4 and partial stroke tested once per week.

SR 5.3.2 shall be implemented per ISI Criterion A.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.2 2

The main steam stop check and hot reheat stop check valves will be partially stroked once a week during plant Full stroking tests are impractical because operation.

complete closure of any one valve would automatically shut down one or more circulators. Therefore, the valves will be stroked during power operation by means of special electrical circuitry in the hydraulic control system which

limits closure to 10% without interfering with emergency closure action called for by the plant protective system.

This test will demonstrate that the valves are free to I

close when required, without causing severe pressure, temperature, flow, or power generation transients.

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, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical' Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-4 Specification SR 5.3.3 - Cypass and Pressure Relief Valves Surveillance The main steam and hot reheat steam power operated (electromatic) pressure relief valves, and the six hot reheat steam bypass valves shall be tested once per year, or at the next scheduled plant shutdown if the valves have not been tested during the previous year. The main steam bypass valves shall be tested in 'accordance with specification SR 5.3.4.

SR 5.3.3 shall be implemented per ISI Criterion A.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.3 The specified secondary (steam) coolant system bypass valves and pressure relief valves will be tested during plant shutdown as follows:

a) The main steam and hot reheat steam power operated pressure relief valves will be tested by exercising the valves.

b) The main steam bypass valves will be tested for operability by cycling the valves.

c) The six hot reheat steam bypass valves will be tested by exercising each valve to ensure freedom of movement.

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Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-5 The main steam bypass valves divert up to 77% steam flow (via desuperheaters) to the bypass flash tank on turbine trip or loop isolation, so that the steam is available for driving helium circulators, boiler feedpump turbines, etc.

The main steam power operated relief valves divert the remaining steam flow to atmosphere.

The six hot reheat steam bypass valves and the power operated pressure relief valves ensure a continuous steam flow path from the helium circulators for decay heat removal.

The tests required on the above valves will demonstrate that each valve will function properly. Test frequency is considered adequate for assuring valve operability at all times.

Specification SR 5.3.4 - Safe Shutdown Cooling Valve.

Surveillance '

Those valves that are pneumatically, hydraulically, or electrically operated, that are required for actuation of the Safe Shutdown Cooling mode of operation, shall be tested annually, or at the next scheduled plant shutdown if these valves have not been tested during the previous year.

In addition, the above test shall include the normally closed check valves which are required to open for

, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-6 actuation of the safe shutdown cooling mode of operation, when such testing is practical.

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SR 5.3.4 shall be implemented per ISI Criterion B.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.4 J

The safe shutdown cooling mode of operation utilizes systems or portions of systems that are in use during normal plant operation. In many cases, those valves required to initiate Safe Shutdown Cooling are not called upon to function during normal operation of the plant, i

except to stand fully closed or open.

I Testing of these valves will assure their operation if called upon to initiate the Safe Shutdown Cooling mode of operation.

During reactor operation, the instrumentation required to I

monitor and control the Safe-Shutdown mode of cooling is normally in use and any malfunction would be immediately brought to the attention of the operator. That 1 instrumentation not normally in use is tested at intervals I

specified by other surveillance requirements in this Technical Specification.

Safe Shutdown Cooling, the systems or portions of systems involved, are discussed in Sections 10.3.9 and 10.3.10 of 4 the FSAR and are represented in FSAR, Figure 10.3-4.

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Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-7 Valve testing will include, as applicable, full stroking each valve, or an observation that the valve disc travels from the valve normal operating position to the position required to perform the safety function, an observation ,

that the remote position indicators accurately reflect actual valve position, and a measurement of the full stroke time for the hydraulically actuated automatic 1 valves.

Specification SR 5.3.5 - Hydraulic Power System Surveillance i The pressure indicators and low pressure alarms on the hydraulic oil accumulators pressurizing gas and on the .

hydraulic power supply lines shall be functionally tested once every three months and calibrated once per year.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.5

The hydraulic power system is a normally operating system.

Malfunctions in this system will normally be detected by failure of the hydraulic oil pumps or hydraulic oil accumulators to maintain a supply of hydraulic oil at or above 2500 psig. Functional tests and calibrat ions of the pressure indicators and low pressure alarms on the above basis will assure the actuation of these alarms upon a malfunction of the hydraulic power system which may compromise the capability of operating critical valves.

, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-8 Specifica~ ion SR 5.3.6 - Instrument Air System Surveillance The pressure indicators and low pressure alarms on the instrument air receiver tanks and headers shall be functionally tested monthly and calibrated annually.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.6 The instrument air system is a normally operating system.

Malfunctions in this system will be normally detected by failure of the instrument air compressors to maintain the instrument air receiver tanks at a pressure above the alarm setpoint. Functional tests of the pressure indicators and low pressure alarms on a monthly basis and calibration on an annual basis will assure the actuation of these alarms upon a malfunction of the instrument air j system which may compromise the capability of operating critical valves.

Specification SR 5.3.7 - Secondary Coolant Activity Surveillance The secondary coolant system will be analyzed for 222I, tritium, and gross beta plus gamma concentration once per week during reactor operation.

If the secondary coolant activity level reaches 25% of the limit of LCO 4.3.8, or the secondary coolant activity level increases by a factor of 25% over the previous

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-9 equilibrium value at the same reactor power level, the frequency of sampling and analysis shall be increased to a minimum of once each day until the activity level decreases or reaches a new equilibrium value (defined by four consecutive daily analyses whose results are within

+10',),

4 at which time weekly sampling may be resumed.

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.7 The specification surveillance interval is adequate to monitor the activity of the secondary coolant.

l Specification SR 5.3.8 - Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) l Surveillance The following surveillance requirements apply to all l Class I piping system hydraulic and mechanical snubbers:

l a) Visual Inspections l The first in-service visual inspection of snubbers l shall be performed within six months from issuance of l this Technical Specification (Amendment ). For

] the purpose of entering the schedule described in this l section, it shall be assumed that the facility had l been on a six-month inspection interval.

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Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-10 l The first in-service visual inspection of snubbers l shall include all snubbers listed in Table 4.3.10-1.

l If less than two snubbers are found inoperable during l the first in-service visual inspection, the second in-l service visual inspection shall be performed l 12 months + 25% from the date of the first inspection.

l Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be l performed in accordance with the following schedule:

l Number of Inoperable l Snubbers per Inspection Subsequent Visual l Period Inspection Period

• l 0 18 Months plus or minus 25%

l 1 12 Months plus or minus 25%

l 2 6 Months plus or minus 25%

l 3, 4 124 Days plus or minus 25%

l 5,6,7 62 Days plus or minus 25%

1 8 or more 31 Days plus or minus 25%

l *The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more l than one step at a time.

I b) Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria l Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no l visible indications of damage or impaired operability, I (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting l structure are secure, and (3) in those locations where

[ snubber movement can be manually induced without l disconnecting the snubber, that the snubber has l freedom of movement and is not frozen-up. Snubbers l which appear inoperable as a result of visual l inspections may be determined operable for the purpose L

• Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-11 l of establishing the next visual inspection interval, l providing that (1) the cause of the rejection is l clearly established and remedied for that particular i snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically l susceptible, and (2) the affected snubber is l functionally tested in the as-found condition and l determined operable per Sections 5.3.8.d) and l 5.3.8.e).

l c) Functional Tests l Once each refueling outage, a representative sample l (that number of snubbers which follows the expression l c l 35 [1 + 2], where c = 2) shall be functionally tested i either in place or in a bench test. For the total l number of snubbers above "c" which do not meet the

[ functional test acceptance criteria of Specifications l 5.3.8.d) or 5.3.8.e), an additional sample l selected _according to the expression I c I 2 12 l 35 (1 + 2) l{c + 1}l (a - c) shall be functionally l tested, where "a" is the total number ,0f snubbers l found inoperable during the functional testing of the l representative sample.

l l Functional testing shall continue according to the I c I 2 12 l expression b [35(1 + 2) l{c + 1}l] where "b" is the l number of snubbers found inoperable in the previous l re-sample, until no additional inoperable snubbers are l

I

Fort St. Vrain 01 Technical Specifications Amendment #

page 5.3-12 l found within a sample or until all snubbers in l Table 4.3.10-1 have been functionally tested.

l d) Hydraulic Snubars Functional Test Acceptance Criteria l The hydraulic snubber functional test shall verify I that:

1 l 1) Activation (restraining action) is achieved within

] l the specified range of velocity or acceleration in l both tension and compression.

l 2) Snubber bleed or release rate, where required, is l within the specified range in compression or l l tension. For snubbers specifically required to l not displace under continuous load, the ability of l the snubbe'r to withstand load without displacement I shall be verified.

l e) Mechanical Snubbers Functional Test Acceptance 4

l Criteria i

The mechanical l snubber functional test shall verify l that:

l 1) The force that initiates free movement of the j snubber rod in either tension or compression is l less than the specified maximum drag force.

t

• Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-13 l 2) Activation (restraining action) is achieved within l the specified range of velocity or acceleration in l both tension and compression.

l 3) Snubber release rate, where required, is within l the specified range in compression or tension.

I For snubbers specifically required not to displace l under continuous load, the ability of the snubber j to withstand load without displacement shall be l verified.

l f) Record Keeping l Record keeping shall consist of:

l 1) A historical record for each snubber shall be l maintained.

l 2) Concurrent with the first in-service visual j l inspection and at least once per refueling cycle

! l thereafter, the historical records for each l snubber listed in Table 4.3.10-1 shall be reviewed j l to determine any trends that may adversely affect j l service life.

l l

I Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-14 Basis for Specification SR 5.3.8 l All Class I hydraulic and mechanical snubbers are visually inspected for overall integrity and operability. The inspection will include verification of proper l orientation, adequate hydraulic fluid level, when

l applicable, and proper attachment of snubber to piping and structures.

i The inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection. Thus, the required j inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures. Thi number of inoperable snubbers found during a required inspection determines the time interval for the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspection performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25 percent) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection where results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

Experience at operating facilities has shown that the required surveillance program should assure an acceptable level of snubber performance provided that the seal materials are compatible with the operating environment.

To further increase the assurance of snubber reliability, functional tests should be performed once each refueling cycle. These tests will include stroking of the snubbers L

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-15 l to verify proper piston movement, lock-up, and bleed. The l number of snubbers represented by the formula in j l Section 5.3.8.c) of this specification is an adequate 3

l sample for such tests. Observed failures on these samples should require testing of additional units.

l The required surveillance program will assure a higher 1

i degree of snubber functional reliability.

Specification SR 5.3.9 - Safety Valves Surveillance l The steam generator superheater and reheater safety valves and the steam / water dump tank safety valves shall be i tested at five calendar year intervals to verify their setpoint.

j SR 5.3.9 shall be implemented per ISI Criterion B.

l l

Basis for Specification SR 5.3.9 The safety valves protect the integrity of the steam generators, which are part of the reactor coolant boundary, and of the dump tank, which may contain radioactive fluids. Testing the safety valve setpoints will assure that the pressure within the equipment remains within design limits.

When practical, testing of the safety valves will be i

scheduled during the surveillance interval so that testing of one (or more) safety valve (s) of similar type and

, Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

.Page 5.3-16 operating conditions several times during the interval will provide additional confidence in safety valve reliability and adequate overpressure protection.

Specification SR 5.3.10 - Secondary Coolant System Instrumentation Surveillance The secondary coolant reheat steam instrumentation used a) for control and indication of emergency condensate flow to the reheaters and reheater backpressure, in case of safe shutdown cooling, b) to automatically open the reheater discharge bypass on l

l high pressure, and l

I c) to monitor reheater discharge bypass temperature, and reheater inlet temperature, l

shall be functionally tested and calibrated annually, or l

at the next scheduled plant shutdown if such surveillance was not performed during the previous year.

SR 5.3.10 shall be implemented per ISI Criterion B.

l L

• Fort St. Vrain #1

. Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-17 Basis for Specification SR 5.3.10 1 The frequency specified for surveillance of the above

) instrumentation will assure that they perform their expected automatic actions, and that the operator will be I provided with accurate information which he can use for I safe shutdown cooling or to avoid abnormal equipment operation.

Specification 5.3.11 - Steam Generator B1 metallic Welds Surveillance i The accessible portions of steam generator bimetallic welds shall be volumetrically examined for indications of subsurface defects as follows:

a) The main steam ring header collector to main steam piping weld for one steam generator module in each loop at five calendar year intervals.

b) The main steam ring header collector to collector drain piping weld for one steam generator module in each loop at five calendar year intervals, c) The same two steam generator modules initially selected shall be re-examined at each interval.

d) The bimetallic welds described in a) and b) shall also be inspected for two other steam generator modules in each loop during the initial examination.

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• Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-18 SR 5.3.11 shall be implemented per ISI Criterion C.

Basis for Specification 5.3.11 The steam generator crossover tube bimetallic welds between Incoloy 800 and 2 1/4 Cr-1 Mo materials are not accessible for examination. The bimetallic welds between the steam generator ring header collector, the main steam piping, and the collector drain piping are accessible, involve the same materials and operate at conditions not significantly different from the crossover tube bimetallic welds. The collector drain piping weld is also geometrically similar to the crossover tube weld.

Examination of selected bimetallic welds that are accessible will provide additional assurance concerning the continued integrity of steam generator bimetallic welds. Although no degradation is expected to occur, this specification allows for detection of defects which might result from conditions that can uniquely affect bimetallic I

welds made between these materials. Additional collector welds are inspected at the first examination to establish a baseline which could be used, should defects be found in later inspections and additional examinations subsequently be required.

4 1

E

• Fort St. Vrain (l1 Technical Specifications Amendment #

Page 5.3-19 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 4

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