ML20070R098

Forwards Addl Info Re Electric Power Sys.Revised PSAR Pages Will Be Incorporated in Future Amend

ML20070R098
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	01/26/1983
From:	Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF, CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT
To:	Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
HQ:S:83:195, NUDOCS 8301270280
Download: ML20070R098 (18)

Text

O Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Docket No. 50-537 i

, HQ:S:83:195 T

Mr. Paul S. Check, Director CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingtoq, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Check:

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM, PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (PSAR)

SECTION 8 Enclosed is additional information on the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant electric power system. The revised PSAR pages will be incorporated into a future amendment.

Sincerely, J n R. Longen ker Acting Director, Office of Breeder Demonstrrtion Projects Office of Nuclear Energy 3 Enclosures cc: Service List O b[

Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution S

j Yo 8301270200 830126 PDR ADOCK 05000537 A PDR

ENCLOSURE ITEM: Separation of associated non-lE equipment and clarification of items other than cables to be separated. .

(See item 12 e) in letter HQ:S:82:119, dated November 2, 1982, for discussion of the NRC concern.)

RESOLUTION: See attached mark-up of Question / Response CS430.10 '

and PSAR Section 8.3.1.4.

l Duestfon CS430.10 (8.3.1)f8.3.2)

• Sect!on 8.3.1.2.14 of the PSAR Indicates that physical separation of circuits and equipment comprising or associated with the Class IE power system, Class IE protection systems and Class 1E equipment, will be in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 8.3.1.4 of the PSAR. Separation critoria described in Sections not meet the guidelines of IEEE Standard 384 and Regulatory For G

example, the PSAR Indicates that non-Class 1E cables in panels will be between dif ferent divisions. separated frca Class 1E cables so that they will no that non-Class 1E cables shall Section 5.6.5 of by be separated IEEEsix Standard inches or384-1974 a barrier.Instates general non-Class no1E criterla *has been described for separation of Class 1E and cables. Other examples includes (1) no criteria for separation between cables trays and condults of another division, (2) confusing criteria for the separation divisions but only two of redundant the third division divisions. (the design Indicates there are three Separation criteria refers to only two redundant divisions in many cases versus the three divisions), (3) conf using definition for associated cables, (4) no criterla for separation between associated cables and non-Class IE cables, and (5) no criteria before and af ter en isolatoin device. Revise your PSAR description of physical separation of circuits to comply with the recommendations of IEEE Standard 384-1974 and guidanca of R.G.1.75 or justify noncompt lance.

Resoense:

g The CRBRP physical separation design criteria is fully consistent with the guidelines set forth in IEEE Standard 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75.$

The IEEE PSAR StandardSection 384-1974 8.3.1.4 has been revised to further ciarify consistency with s and Regulatory Guide 1.75 for the fofIowing items:

1. and etreuits Separation other panels.of Class '4E and non-Class 1E cables 3 within control board and

2. and c. ires 4its Separation of Class 1E and non-Class 1E cableg.

3.

Separation between cable trays and condults of another division.

4 Criteria for the separation of third division. .

5. and circuits and circuits Criteria for separation between associated cables g and non-Class 1E cables 6 z Separation criteria bef oro and af ter an Isolation device.

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Insert'1, .

CRBRP separation criteria includes reqsirements for separating each

- - of Safety-Related Divisions 1, 2 and 3 from each of the remaining Safety-Related Divisions in accordance with IEEE Standard 384-1974

• and Regulatory Guide 1.75. Items being separated on these bases .

include Class IE and associated cabling, circuits, equipment, raceways, and systems. .

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! 8.3.1.2.28 Irrr Standard 387 - 1977 I

' The Standby AC Power Supply conforms to IEEE Standard 387-1977 which includes requirements for capabil Ity rating, independence, redundancy, , testing, analyses, quality assurance, and identificationo 3.3.1.3 confor==nce with Annroorlate DualItv Assurance Standards l

Assurance that equipment and workmanship quality is maintained throughout the construction process Is provided by conformance to IEEE Standard 336 - 1971,

! "I nstal l ation, inspection, and Testing Requirements for instramentation and -

Electric Equipment during the Construction of Nuclear Power Generating .

Stations". The methods used to accompiish cnformance' are described by .

construction procedures and instructions and in Chapter 17.0 of this PSAR. .

8.3.1.4 Indecencence of Class 1E Systems J

The following criteria is used to preserve the Independence of Class IE sy siem. g (IN$ UtT 13 e and CkCUO3

• A. General Seoaration of Cablestbv Voltaan Class i '

a. -

\

A raceway contains cables of only one class. Classes are based on the nominal utlilzation voltage of the cable and/or vulnerability to spurious signis.

Voltage CIasses are:

15KV Class - 13.8KY AC nominal power SKY Class - 4.16KV AC nominal power ,

000V Class - 480-277 voit AC and 250 voit DC nominal pover .

Control - 120V/208V AC,125V DC,120V AC nominal pow'er and control Low level Instrtsnentation including digital and analog signals When cable trays are arranged in a vertical stack, the preferable arrangement is In order of voltage class, with the highest voltage at the top.

B. Cable Deratino Ampacity rating and group dorating f actors of cables are in accordance with the Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association Publ Ication IPEA-P54-440 and I PCE A-P46-426. Cables are selected to minimize deteriorlation due to temperature, humidity, and radiation during design IIfe of the plant.

Environmental type tests for the expected environments will be performed on l  ;

all cables and terminations. The tests will Include radiation exposure, heat i aging, and electrical measurements to assure that the cable will function In the design environment for the required time. Cable derating as a result of fire stops / seals are included in the design.

8.3-35 Amend. 74

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Insert'l CRBRP separation criteria includes reqsirements for separating each of Safety-Related Divisions 1, 2 and 3 from each of the remaining Safety-Related Divisions in accordance with IEEE Standard 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. Items being separated on these bases .

include Class IE and associated cabling, circuits, equipment.

raceways, and systems. .

! C. Raceway Fill l

Cable tray fill will be limited such that the summation of the cross-sectional areas of cables in a tra g more than 40% of the usable cross y section will in general be not l

sectional srea of that tray section. l I$ondults wIII be sized for a maximum percent fili of the"Inside area

! of the Art. 346. conduit in accordance with NFPA 70 " National Electrical Code a D. SealIna Raceway Blockouts and Wall and Flaar Per.strations '

Fire stops will be Installed for cable trays wherever the cables pass through fire walls and floors other than the Reactor Containment - '

vessel. Cable and cable tray penetrations of fire bearriers are sealed to provide protection at least equivalent to that required of the fire barrier. Penetrations are quallfled to meet the requirements j

of ASTM E-119, and IEEE Std. 634-1978. The actual fire ratings of '

stops and penetrations are determined by fire hazards analysis.

l Fire stops, fire barriers, and air seals v11l be constructed of mastic ,

type materials or elastomer modular construction materials quellfled

' in accordance wifh IEEE Std. 623 and ASTN E-119. Fire stop/ seal

, material will be compatible with Insulation and conductor materials

.and will be shock, vibration, seismic, and radiation resistant in -

i accordance wIth the area (s) penetrated.

E. Phys teal Senaration of Class 1E Cables a ncl C h c.u d S (gnd eipeu;tD 4 5 /

1.

ine separation design description for receways, Class 1E circuitry and associated cablinggiven below incorpora1res the requirements of IEEE Std. 384-1974, Regulatory Guide 1.6 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75.

Load groups, cables and raceways of a safety-related system will be separated fran lood groups, cables, or raceways of other safety-ret ated groups in accordance wIth the separation criteria described heroin. This separation criteria will preclude a single failure within the saf ety-related system fran preventing proper protective action at the system level when required. Raceways and cables will be elassifled by separation groups, namely Class IE Division 1, Ciass 1E Division 2, Class 1E Division 3, and Plant Protection System. For the purpose of physical separatica criteria Class IE Division 1, 2, and 3 are treated as redundant divisions.

(and circuiG) i weies designated in each division will be run in raceways separated

{7 from cables designated in other divisions and from Non-Class IE cabies. Associated cable wIlI be separated as If they were Clas 1 pursuant to the Class 1E rm Ms . .

vision associated with these cablesan 4

Each division of Class IE equipment of Dis Isions 1, 2 and 3 are located in separate rooms which are separated by a minimun of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated ftre barriers.

8.3-36 Amend. 74 Dec. 1982

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1.

P F.

C' senaration Circuits Criteria between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E and Assoelated anel ciwwh 1.

Senaration of Celes Within Safetv-Related Penals A .

3 Within safety-related control boards and panels the separation between wiring ut redundant divisions or of non-Cl' ass 1E wiring fran Class 1E and associated (.aass 1E wiring will comply with at ,

least one of the following: .

i I). A minimum separation distance of 6 inches vertical and horizontal paneI materials will beare maintained fIsme retardent. where the. control board or

• II) An analysis will be perf ormed to determine the minimum separation distance. The analysis will be based on tests .

perf ormed to determine the flame retardant characteristics of

• the wiring, wiring materials, equipment and other material Internal to the control board or panel. .

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lii) Barriers will be installed in the event the above separation distances are not maintained.

Within safety-related control boards and panels, non-Class 1E wiring is not harnessed with Class 1E or associated Class 1E

_ wiring. Associated Closs IE' wiring is harnessed with C1 ass 1E wiring of the same divislon.

2.

Senaration of Class 1E and Non-Class 1E Cables and CWcMS .

A 4

All Class 1E and non-Class IE cables will be routed in raceways consisting of cable trays and cot iuits. Each raceway will contain cable For only. (s)the of purpose one Class of cabl 1E anisafety g (f racewayJgpg or a non-clas been divided into six (6) sepa(ation r zones *f the pl. ant areas have 8.3.1.4. as described in Section I

3.

Senaratlon Between Cable Travs and Conduits of Another Division A Class IE conduit will contain circuits of only one toed division. In non-hazard zones exposed Class 1E conduits are separated from trays of another divisica as described in Section 8.3.1.4E. In alI other separation zones the Class 1E conduits are not routed with Trays of another division.

'4 . .Cr.[teria for the Senaration of Third Dtvision The Class 1E electrical distribution system consists of three Class IE divisions (Division 1, 2 and 3). Each of these divisions is designed to have physical and electrical independence from the other two divisions as described elsewhere In this section. Each

( of these divisions. Is provided with an onsite (standby) diesel generator and has the capability to shutdown the plant safely.

However, from the consideration of connected Iceds, Class IE -

8.3-36a

-Amend _. 74

- ~ . - - -. .

Divisions 1 and 2 provide power to redun' dant load groups and as '

such are described as redundant divisions in Sections 8.1.2 and

• 1 8.3.1.1. Class IE Division 3 provides power to heat removal l system of Loop 3 and to important non-Class 1E los,ds through an  !

isolation subsystem. Class 1E Division 3 as stated above has the capability to shutdown the plant safely; however, isince all the loads powered from this division are not similar or Identical to those powered by Division 1 or 2, this division has not been i

identifled as redundant to Division 1 or 2.

i druf Circuit $

5. criteria for sesaration Between Assoelated f%les and Non-Class 1E Cables aJ circuit 5 4 A

(Gdcireu &

.The associated circuits as defined in paragraph 4.5 of IEEE )

Standard 384-1974 wl!I be considered as Class 1E cablesitor The purpose of their routing and Installation. The separation criteria between associated cables and non-Class IE cables is the same as described in item 2 above for the separation between Class 1E and non-Cl ass IE cables. These cables, once identified as -

associsted wIth a safety divIslon, wIlI be routed and InstalIed in a raceway of that division. Each associated cable will be  !

wirquely identified as described in Section 8.3.1.5.

6. Senaration criteria Before and After an Isolation Device and circuits t

The cables,before an Isolation device are Class IE circuits and

_ _ . . _ . . . ; . . :: _ _ _ ^: *- M ^: :M are routed in Class IE raceway system in accordance with criteria described in Iteg aboy,p,for physical separation of Class IE cables. The cable afTer tie isolation device are considered non-C: ass 1E cable (sgnd are rou in non-CIass 1E raceway system.

eo.d eircuits Tho minimum separation maintained between cable f each division varies a,.4 circuifs according to cable location with respect to pot tal hazards. The design l

Intent is to previde separation greater than the minimum listed where conststent wIth a practical plant Iayout. SIx general ciassifIcatter.s of haz'crd zones or areas are defined for ciectrical separation consideration:

1. , Non-Hazard,,, Zones Areas in which the nly potential hazard is a fire of an electrical nature. ,

II. Fire Hazard Zones Areas in whlch a potential f tre hazard could extst as a consequence of the credible accumulation of a significant quantity of fixed or transient combustible materials as defined in PSAR Section 9.13.1.

11!. Ldeircnt Hazard Zone (Pf oe Break Hazard Zone)

Areas in which a potential hazard could exist as a consequence of ]

postulated pipe break events in high energy lines. . ./

Amend. 74 8.3-36b Dec. 1982 l -

ENCLOSURE ITEM: Impact of Rotating Equipment Failure (See item 12 i) in letter HQ:S:82:19 dated Nov5mber 2, 1982, for discussion of the NRC concern.)

RESOLUTION: See attached mark-up of Question /Respnse CS430.14 l and PSAR Section 8.3.1.4.E, Equipment Hazard Zone.

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Ouestion CS430.14

• Separation between redundant raceways as defined in the PSAR takes into consideration the presence of rotating equipment monoralis, and equipment removal paths and the possibility that heavy equ,ipment could be lif ted and dropped and possIbiy cause f allure of two raceway channels. Minimum separation between the two raceway channels is to be such as to preclude f allure of both channels. Current regulstory gutdelInes, however, requires ,

protection of each raceway as well as swparation so that the dropped equipment wIlI not cause f allure of e'rher racawsy. An altornative to protection would .

be a design that provides an additional two Independent systees each capable of shutting down the reactor and separated such that neither will be af fected by the " dropped equipment" or f ailure of rotating equipment. Indicate compilance altornative.

acceptabie with the above guidelines In the PSAR or describe and justify an Resoonse The routing of' the safety-related raceways of CRBRP is such that any " dropped equipnent" will not result in a f ailure of any of these raceways.

The CRBRP raceway design Is in full spilance with IEEE Standard 384-1974 as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.75.

In addition, the safety systems design for CRBRP includes three physically and electrically independent divisions, each capable of shutting down the reactor.

f Equipment of each of these divisions, are located and cables are routed in

' separate plant areas such that f ailure of rotating equipment will not cause failure of more than one safety division g -

he PSAR Section 8.3.1.4 has been revised.

1N$6kY 4

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QCS430.14-1 _ - -----

Insert 2  :

The likelihood of rotating equipment missile damage to Chass IE equipment

• is minimized or eliminated by one or a combination of the following:

1) Qualification of Non-Class IE and Class 1E rotating equip-ment to prevent missiles during the worst case seismic

event (which envelopes normal operating conditions) for that rotating equipment.

ii) Segregate rotating equipment from Class IE equipment.*

iii) Provide missile protection by walls or barriers for the Class IE equipment.*

iv) Provide redundant equipment

• necessary to meet the single failure criterion.

• Equipment is construed here to include equipment, circuits, cabling, raceways, systems, etc.

See PSAR Section 3.5 for additional information on missile protection.

(

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Insert 3 ,

Division 3 cables within the control room and upper cable spreading room areas are routed in raceways embedded in concrete floors and walls up to the point of entry to the Division 3 panels. There am no Division 3 cables or raceways ,in either the upper cable spreading ,

room or the lower cable spreading room. .-

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~ln Non-Hazard Zones, a minime horizontal clear space of three feet is ,

meintained beiween cable trays of dif ferent divisions as shwn in Figure f 8.3-6. If a herirontal clearance of less than three feet Is unavoidable, a N f tre barrier Is prwided between the divisions as shwn in Figure 8.3-6.

Vertical stacking of cable trays of dIf forent divisions Is evolded w'herever possibl e. Where cable trays of dif ferent divisions are stacked vertically, 4 alnista clear space of five feet is prwided between the div.lstons as shown in .

Figure 8.3-6. If a vertical clearance of less than fIve feet is unavoldable, a fire barrier is prwided between the divisions as shown In Figure 8.34.

Fire Hazard 7enes In fire hazard zones, Class IE condults, trays, wireways or raceways of only one saf ety division are routed. This division is suitably protected by fire '

barriers and f tre protections systems to mitigate the of facts of f tre In this zone on the saf ety function of the other safety groups.

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Eeulomant Hazard Zone (Pine Break Hazard Zgigl To the extent practical, Class 1E cables are routed in areas runote f rom high energy piping or areas of potential sodlum fires; If unavoidable, the f olIwIng precautions are taken

a) CfBRP has three (3) Class 1E Divisions with complete physical separation between divisions. Any damage to cnbic irays caused by pipe whip misslos, jet Impingement, or environmental ef fect will be limited to the same safety division to which tha pipe belongs, and the (.

l two other divisions capable of safety shutting down the plant will ' -

remain unaf fected.

1 .

l Additional protection will be provided against any single Class 1E

, Division cable tray damage due to high energy pipe whip missiles by l

restraint of high energy pipe lines In the vicinity of Class 1E receways. The design of restraints and/or barriers will be determined by analysis to meet BTP APCSB 3-1.

b) Redundant Class 1E circuits are routed or protected such that a '

postulated event In one system and division cannot preclude the operation of the other redundant system cr division.

c) In all areas of the plant, the separation between redundant Class IE cable raceways takes into consideration the presence of rotating '

equipment, monoralis, equipment removal paths and dropped equipment ssch that f ailure of rotating equipment will not cause f ailure of more than, one safety division and any dropped equipoent w11I not cause f ailure of any safety-related raceways.g INSERT 2 d) In general, Class 1E electrical d!stribution equipment (e.g.,

switchgear, motor control centers, etc.) Is not located In areas where high energy piping or other similar hazards are located.

Amend. 74 3.3-38 Dec. 1982

Insert 2 i The likelihood of rotating equipment missile damage to Class 1E equipment

• is minimized or eliminated by one or a combination of the following:

i) Qualification of Non-Class IE and Class 1E rotating equip-ment to prevent missiles during the worst case seismic event (which envelopes nornal operating conditions) for that rotating equipment.

ii) Segregate rotating equipment from Class 1E equipment.*

iii) Provide missile protection by walls or barriers for the Class 1E equipment.* ,

i s) Provide redundant equipment

• necessary to mett the single failure criterion.

• Equipment is construed here to include equipment, circuits, cabling, raceways, systems, etc.

l See PSAR Section 3.5 for additional information on missile protection.

l

f ENCLOSURE ITEM: Cable Spreading Room / Fire Protection (See item 12 h) in letter HQ:S:82:119, dated N5vember 2, 1982, for discusion of the NRC concern.)

RESOLUTION: See attached mark-up of PSAR Section 8.3.1.4.E, Cable Spreading Rooms.

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i e). In. general, no Class 1E raceways are installed in equipment hazard zones or potential missile areas. Where this is not only one Class 1E division is installed in the area. practical, f) In all areas, Class 1E raceways of adequate construction are j

installed so as to minimize or eliminate the possibility of damage due to potential missiles or pipe whip. The damage potential of the missile or pipe whip is evaluated, and the physical separation i

' between different~ safety division raceways is specified accor-digly or the raceways are relocated. When physical separation is not practical, appropriately designed barriers are installed bet-

! ween redundant raceways. The separation of redundant Class 1E l division circuits and equipment make effective use of inherent i

plant design features such as using different rooms or opposite l sides of rooms or areas. -

Cable Spreading Rooms .

a) Two cable spreading rooms are provided, one above the Control Room

.for Division 1, ide$edesses and Non-Class 1E Division A and one below the Control Room for Division 2, and Non-Class IE Division l B. 4 g dure 47'3 b) Circuits routed in cable trays in the cable spreading rooms are  !

i limited to control and instrument functions. No power cables are -

routed through the cable spre9 ding rooms or the control room.

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c) ,fhe cable spreading rooms are protected against external missiles (there are no internal sources of missiles) such as high-pressure piping or rotating heavy machinery. The only potential source of

' damage to redundant division cables would be from fire generated

.by .the cabling itsel f. A fire detection and suppression system is u installed ensuring that potential for fire damage to cables is minimized in the cable spreading room.

ff A min um c1 r sep atio of onyfoot rizo al a thr fee  !

ver cal i maint ned tweenA rays arryi cab s of ffer t

, di sion . If e mi mum hpfizon 1 or rtic sepa tio oes n t exi ,a re-re stanYbarri r or vere cable rays ithout arri s ar provi d.

d/) There is no cable tray or conduit connection between the upper and lower cable spreading rooms.

Containment Penetration Areas Three separate per.etration arcas are provided for all cables that must pass through the containment wall. Where possible, redundant Clus 1E cables utilize electrical penetrations spaced horizontally rather than i vertically. Cables through penetration of the primary containment; are grouped such that failure of all cables in a single penetration will not l

Amend 63

' ' Dec. 1981 8.3-39

f Insert 3 ,

s Division 3 cables within the control room and upper cable spreading room areas are routed in raceways embedded in concrete floors and walls up to the point of entry to the Division 3 panels. There are no Division 3 cables or raceways ,in either the upper cable spreading ,

room or the lower cable spreadi.ng room. .-

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