ML20065T612
| ML20065T612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1982 |
| From: | PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065T576 | List: |
| References | |
| ENVR-821031, NUDOCS 8211020608 | |
| Download: ML20065T612 (533) | |
Text
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 &2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
) REVISION 12 PAGE CHANGES The attached pages', tables, and figures are considered part of
.a controlled copy of the Limerick Generating Station FSAR. This material should be incorporated into the FSAR by following the instructions below.
REMOVE INSERT .
VOLUME 1 Pages 1.2-17 & -18 Pages 1.2-17 & -18 Pages 1.2-23 & -24 Pages 1,2-23 & -24 Figures 1.2-12 thru -15 Figures 1.2-12 thru -15 Figure 1.2-36 Figure 1.2-36 VOLUME 2 Pages 1.8-23 & -24 Pages 1.8-23 & -24 Pages 1.8-33 & -34 Pages 1.8-33 & -34 Pages 1.8-45 & -46 Pages 1.8-45 & -46 Pages 1.13-37 & -38 Pages 1.13-37 thru -38b Pages 2.5-16a & -16b Pages 2.5-16a & -16b Pages 2.5-31 & -32 Pages 2.5-31 & -32 Pages 2.5-39 thru -44 Pages 2.5-39 thru -44b Pages 2.5-49 thru -62 Pages 2.5-49 thru -62 Pages 2.5-93 & -94 Pages 2.5-93 & -94 Table 2.5-3A Table 2.5-3A Table 2.5-4 Table 2.5-4 Figure 2.5-37 (Shts 1-8) Figure 2.5-37 (Shts 1-10)
Table 3.2-1 (pgs 6,8,20,34,38) Table 3.2-1 (pgs 6,8,20,34,38)
VOLUME 4 Pages 3.7-3 & -4 Pages 3.7-3 & -4 Pages 3.7-9 & -10 Pages 3.7-9 & -10 Pages 3.7-17 & -18 Pages 3.7-17 & -18 Pages 3.8-41 thru -44 Pages 3.8- 41 thru -44 Figure 3.8-64 (Shts 4 & 5) Figure 3.8-64 (Shts 4 & 5)
VOLUME 7 Pages 6.2-39 thru -44 Pages 6.2-39 thru -44d Pages 6.2-57 thru -62 Pages 6.2-57 thru -62b Pages 6.2-65 & -66 Pages 6.2-65 & -66 Table 6.2-17 (Shts 1 - thru 14) Table 6.2-17 (Shts 1 thru 14)
O 29 ffR O D C
- u. ..
.. a - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
c:
Limerick Generating Station Units 1.5 2 Final Safety Analysis Report '
Revision 12 Page Changes.
-x/{'}
REMOVE INSERT VOLUME 10 Page'8-v Page 8-v Pages 8.1-1 & -2 Pages 8.1-1 & -2 Pages 8.1-5 thru -8 Pages 8.1-5 thru -8b Pages 8.1-15 & -16 Pages 8.1-15 thru -16b Pages 8.1-27 thru -30 Pages 8.1-27 thru -31 Pages 8.2-1 thru -6 Pages 8.2-1 thru -8 Figures 8.2-1 & -2 Figures 8.2-1 & -2
FiguresS.2-4 thru -6 -
- Pages 8.3-1 thru -36 Pages 8.3-1 thru -49 Figure 8.2-1 Figure 8.3-1 Pages 9-xiii & -xviii Pages 9-xiii & -xviii Pages 9.1-45 & -46 Pages 9.1-45 & -46 Pages 9.1-53 thru -62 Pages 9.1-59 thru -62 Table 9.1-6 Table 9.1-6 Figure 9,1-14 Figure 9.1-14 Figure 9.1-17 Figure 9.1-17 Figure 9.1-24 Figure 9.1-24 Pagea 9.2-47 & -48 Pages 9.2-47 & -48 VOLUME 11 Pages 9-xiii & -xviii Pages 9-xiii & -xviii-Pages 9.3-13 thru -16 Pages 9.3-13 thru -16b Pages 9.4-35 thru -44 Pages 9.4-35 thru -44 Pages 9.5-15 & -16 Pages 9.5-15 & -16 Pages 9.5-21 thru -45 Pages 9.5-21 thru -53 Tables 9.5-5 thru -7 Tables 9.5-5 thru -7 Table 9.5-12 Figure 9.5-8 Figure 9.5-8 <
Figure 9.5-12 VOLUME 12 l
Page 10-v Page 10-v Pages 10.2-1 thru -4 Pages 10.2-1 thru -4b
Figure 10.2-2 Pages 11.2-3 & -4 Pages 11.2-3 & -4 l- Page 11.2-9 Page'11.2-9 .
Pages 11.3-3 thru -10 Pages 11.3-3 thru -10b Page 11.3-17 Page 11.3-17 Pages.11.4-3 thru -6 Pages 11.4-3 thru -6 Pages 11.4-9 & -10 Pages 11.4-9 thru -11 Figure 11.4-3 Figure 11.4-3 Pages 11.5-11 thru -14 Pages 11.5-11 thru -14 Pages 11.5-19 & -20 Pages 11.5-19 thru -21 Figure 11.5-1 (Shts 1 6 .:2) Figure 11.5-1 (Shts 1 thru 4) f ^3
\ ,/
I w ,. .< ..-,,. , ,...,p., . . _..,.,.,,n,,.m.,,,.v.mn,., ., n- . . , ,,__,,..a.e, e, ,,..,y,,,,,._-7,m... , . , ,
w ,+-,v~ -
c.- Core Spray System The core spray (CS) system consists of two independent pump loops that deliver cooling water to spray spargers over the core. The system is actuated by conditions indicating that a breach exists.in the RCPB, but water-is delivered to the core only after reactor vessel pressure is reduced. This system provides the capability to cool the fuel by spraying water on the core. Either loop functioning in conjunction with the ADS or HPCI can provide sufficient fuel cladding cooling following a LOCA.
- d. Low Pressure Coolant Injection LPCI is an operating mode of the RHR system. LPCI uses the pump loops of the RHR system to inject cooling water into the reactor system. LPCI is actuated by conditions indicating a breach in the RCPB, but water is delivered to the core only after reactor. vessel pressure is reduced. LPCI operation provides the capability of core reflooding following a LOCA in time to maintain the fuel cladding below prescribed temperature limits.
1.2.4.2.14 Residual Heat Removal System (Containment Cooling)
The RHR system for containment cooling is placed in operation to limit the temperature of the water in the suppression pool and of the atmospheres-in the drywell and-suppression chamber following a design basis LOCA, to control the pool temperature during normal operation of the relief valves and the RCIC system, and to reduce the pool temperature following an isolation transient. In the containment cooling mode of operation, the RHR system pumps take suction from the suppression pool and deliver the water through the RHR system heat exchangers, where cooling takes place by transferring heat to the RHR service water system. The fluid is then discharged back to the suppression pool, the drywell or suppression chamber spray headers, or to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). .
1.2.4.2.15 Control Room Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System The control room HVAC system provides ventilation, cooling, and control of environmental conditions in the control room areas for the safety and comfort of operating personnel during normal operations and during postulated accident conditions. The system includes air filter units used to remove contaminants that are potentially present in the air following a postulated accident before introducing the air into the control room HVAC system.
O 1.2-17 Rev. 12, 10/82 o
'E 1.2.4.2.16 Reactor Enclosure Recirculation and Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) lh -
The reactor. enclosure recirculation system and the SGTS are both a part of the secondary containment. The recirculation system has the capability of recirculating the reactor enclosure air volume prior to its discharge via the SGTS, following a LOCA.
, The SGTS has the capability of maintaining a negative pressure within the reactor enclosure with respect to the outside i_ atmosphere. The air moving through the SGTS is filtered and discharged through the turbine enclosure exhaust vent.
g 1.2.4.2.17 Standoy ac Power Supply W The standby ac power supply system consists of four diesel-E generator sets per unit. The diesel-generators are s~ized so that 1
any three diesels can supply all the necessary power requirements
- for one unit in the DEA condition. The diesel-generators are designed te start and be able to accept load within 10 seconds.
3 Four independent 4 kV ESF switchgear assemblies are provided for each reactor enit. Each diesel-generator feeds an independent 4
- _ kV bus for eace reactor unit.
Each diesel-generator starts automatically upon loss of offsite power or detection of a LOCA. The necessary safety-related loads are applied in a preset time sequence. Each generator operates independently and without paralleling during a loss of offsite power or LOCA signal.
1.2.4.2.18 De Power Supply -
Each reactor unit is provided with five independent 125 and 125/250 V and one independent 250 V de systems. Each de system
- is supplied from a separate battery bank and battery charger.
The 125 and 125/250 V~dc systems are provided to supply station de control power and de power to four diesel-generators, their associated switchgears and ESF systems. The 250 V de systems are provided to supply power required for the larger loads such as de motor-driven pumps and valves.
The 125 and 125/250 V de systems are designed to supply power adequate to satisfy the safety-related load requirements of the unit with the postulated loss of offsite power and any . concurrent single failure in the de system.
1.2.4.2.19 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System The purpose of the RHRSW system is to provide a reliable supply of cooling water for heat removal from the RHR system during normal shutdown operations and under post-accident conditions.
It can also supply a source of water if post-accident flooding of the primary containment is required.
1.2-18
(, ,) connected directly to the turbine shaft and is equipped with an excitation system coupled directly to the generator shaft.
Power from the generators is stepped up from 22 to 220 kV on Unit 1 from 22 to 500 kV on Unit 2 by the unit main transformers and supplied by overhead lines to the 220 and 500 kV switchyards, respectively.
1.2.4.4.2 Electric Power Distribution Systems The electric power distribution system includes Class IS and non-Class IE ac and de power systems. The Class IE power system supplies all safety-related equipment, while the non-Class IE
- system supplies the balance of plant equipment.
The Class IE ac system for each unit consists of four independent load groups. Two-independent offsite power systems provide the normal electric power to these groups. Each load group includes a 4 kV switchgear, 440 V load centers, motor control centers, and 120 V control and instrument power panels. The vital ac instrumentation and control power supply systems include battery systems and static inverters.
There are four independent diesel-generator sets for each unit.
Each diesel-generator is provided as a standby source of power for one of the four Class IE ac load groups in each unit.
O- Assuming the total loss of offsite power and failure of one diesel-generator, the remaining diesel-generators have sufficient capacity to operate all the equipment necessary to prevent undue risk to public health and safety in the event of a DBA on one unit and an emergency shutdown of the second unit.
The non-Class IE ac system includes 13.2 kV switchgear, 2.3 kV switchgear, 440 V load centers, motor control centers, and 120 V control and instrument power panels.
Two independent Class IE 125 V de batteries and two independent Class IE 125/250 V de batteries and associated battery chargers provide direct current power for the Class IE de loads of each unit. Power for non-Class IE de loads is supplied from a 125/250 and a 250 V non-class IE batteries.
1.2.4.5 Fuel Handling and Storage Systems 1.2.4.5.1 New and Spent Fuel Storage '
The spent fuel storage racks are designed to prevent load buckling and inadvertent criticality under dry and flooded conditions. Sufficient coolant and shielding are maintained to prevent overheating and excessive personnel exposure, p respectively. All new fuel will be stored in the spent fuel
(_,/ pool.
1.2-23 Rev. 12, 10/82 m
LGS FSAR 1.2.4.5.2 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCC) System h The FPCC system is provided to remove decay heat from spent fuel stored in the fuel pool and to maintain specified water temperature, purity, clarity, and level.
1.2.4.5.3 Fuel Handling Equipment The major fuel servicing and handling equipment includes the reactor enclosure cranes, the reactor service platform, refueling service platform, fuel and control rod servicing tools, fuel sipping and inspection devices, and other auxiliary servicing tools.
1.2 4.6 Cooling Water and Auxiliary. Systems 1.2.4.6.1 Service Wster System The service water system supplies cooling water to equipment required for normal plant operation.
The system consists of three 50% capacity pumps with associated piping and valves. The cooling water supply to the pumps is taken from the cooling tower basin, while the water being returned from the system is discharged into the cooling tower.
1.2.4.6.2 Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water (RECW) System The RECW system is a closed-loop cooling water system that provides cooling water for miscellaneous reactor auxiliary plant equipment. The reactor enclosure closed cooling water system consists of two 100% capacity pumps, two 100% capacity heat exchangers, a head tank, chemical addition tank, associated piping, valves, and controls. One reactor enclosure closed cooling water pump is normally in service and the other pump is on automatic stal.dby.
During normal plant operation, heat is transferred from the RECW system to the service water system.
1.2.4.6.3 Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water (TECW) System
- The TECW system is a closed-loop cooling system that provides cooling water to the auxiliary plant equipment associated with the nuclear and power conversion systems in the turbine enclosure. The TECW system consists of two 100% capacity pumps, two 100% capacity heat exchangers, a head tank, chemical addition tank, and associated piping and valves. During normal plant operation, the TECW heat exchanger transfers heat from the TECW system to the service water system. One TECW pump and heat exchanger is normally in service and the other pump is on automatic standby.
1.2-24
.c; ;
W REFERENCE DRAWINGS DWG. FSAR -
NO. FIG. NO. @- .,
m.m u .16 As374_,
- i.m - .
- i w ,%.S ?h. g' 21 --
e! " 9 rb )L _. ;; w v*L ; , _.3-+i W _rn Hs g:. Nq 1
a :, -
-W7 .'qn 2
.. y 5 (
$ $, h., l.m.
ps ;
., .l p rr_,g jev *
@ l45 -
h ;
w J
. =..
.,. n. r, - m
,!' G?I% l N !
t IN}1_ D'*At _8kl-E
{
i M4.sp?[N.- ~
g y_1fk != OI, A- su.,
' big (tK. iWat,
@- _2
- 4,_ . gF-" ,:= -
e-n - - ,.-
us a;e rka=
! .? .h flit ._ _;
t i ~w w t- p&m g l 3
._r_r_ _ &~]3 #
! ,(-tuGB0b ,.,,
4 [e '
h1[ i~ l' T S)'- *=_p,%
A .
. .g _
} r ,,...- -
F Eh 4 _%_ _._N-a?
t 7 A O, - 3
- r. ~a]
r-Iy
-@ /_(1--r _ , C { _ _
4 {.
n- , ,a
$Ull d' M IT Y DGA-wt
[ 9 7.^,"i71 m
jn sp o-e > _
i O 8
___m, . _ . _ _ . . . - _ m _ __.--_. _.._.. ____..-_._ m__. -_ _ . - _ _ _ ___.a-_ __m.-___m_ _ _ . _ _ _ _
n
+
e-I e p n,'
ll1 y i j 3
- .r_
qmw = ='.- *'"'.
p1 l
- 0 -- l j .- ~ j ; -
h2" 'u~
D b
aL
(,, ,,.
~z n - - -
j
- m. . ..
- a. * .
p.,
- ---- ~*: .%. .
jr y q'c. .
x g
/g 7 i f
/ x ! - - "/ ..
- T -
- s g 4 ffi
~
)*
~
l f
T s !
i
/ . '- 7 a -
- a
\ M
- s l w-.. T --
I w s f~-
3 ,. .
a s/w 'S ' ' :l l .
.'.'. p ,__ f 6
e W
k=,m * )ur-r l +
': "s Y1 -
, i
_..,,..y I
&. y [ ,,,,,.
- , - l! **",, [ g3' VR
~~
( [j(gii y? j 7-~~~~~~)~ y V y L \@MQ . 4-g g- h\ /
.-$.w M Maa TEt#'iM[ - , --
mm h5 lllrVq! ; ..\ l G D J b D *". 7 \)m ~/
s_-
\
==
(
%m.y.t
.. - .r a--- - j .L wq] ki f L ,/,
n e m u.n .--
_ . 1
= lf. I h ..
i
. V y_-
am p- a-a+- N i
jll .I . .
../ .
o** = il
_g, n.c __
c-r _
' rr g '_s';ng',
_ ,en c ./
I a, v - .
hbYE-- r---ma.un. / j r hN+
JW M '"-
TUWw y 4.6,,hf
.m . .a.Jd4 [- l 8'._-
L L
- h' k h I a hlhhhE! r- tii.
~' * *- MWP lPM.@_
i L' x
aort:
usE rwis onawins ontv son
'TM---= ' t
~ + ' ' . > =~- 4 :
. -.- .hT. . j\
. tou'a.=<.=,'o oTnE o.cano,a aTio suo'o=.'.as.'o av *
.Fl g[Y-/
c , , _ _
'rfiel
' w -
[ _ i , .. p\ - .ou,t . To oRawiscs wiew oovE==
uj W. _
. lao 9-6 E~ ,
p [2. . c usinwoom Tl y '='_J jW i g . *~\ Q, - ~-
f .. < .
'L ,, g' ,1..p.3 ja6 n<
- LIMERICK GENEHATING STATION I '
UNITS 1 AND 2 w - :1 - --+ .-
-w-p 7 W.ATIAL PLAN AT EL 33f-0 hu ,o swa
& {-'" (ep Q~ n au. ,
GENERAL AdRANGEMENT, REACTOR i
I ENCLOSURE UNIT 1, PLAN AT ELEV. 313 FEET FIGURE 1.2-12 REV.12,10/82 l
- I
i b
i
\ w, 1
0 ,r 0 .r.
I REFERENCE DRAWINGS I DWG. FSAR =
NO. FIG. NO.
i fdfI s /e "_
M 121 12 12 h u ne -
1 - -
h
- 1 .
../
i mis .. . . . <
f *
- e. ,95'#
n1 nq . , ..
_, y i, v. .,_.
e .> .>
L!
m i.... ,. ,l,.
n.... h
. _ .s sesee eva.
'C e
, g ., s se f
- 1. ) - .-
a g
k/ 3, a,-".
5 p EJ,l M. ". .*,
5 l .
Ge 'm
- e ~ '/ !_.
hA .. - Y -
taJ **
{ sana.eam a .
geg ..7m---- - - - - -
s e e. ser# -
2 - -'*' C 3
WC.p' i'M t ! &Rk'
/ __,
,2 %L +
/ /
/ \/
/
.f.
? .a . av <
x *
\E #
\ 1% O em e- \t L e
(h..gg,\ ,' ' 5 . ' * "
- w n
e -
le
- _4, ,-
a: i
., /
n....s. s L.
, . . . . r . .=. 1-N
' TeJ o - ( _ E ._4 , ,-l T 4 w.-
- 4 .) g
- s. ,m, ,y t ""
- .:=,,J JG = ."*
- ;~ o
-- -+-=/**=.
twA" v;
/ mr. b s : :, i[e.;.,.,a i =.
i \ '
b r,"~'
i g . ii . .-
6T x ;y: - --- -
--ni--
,l' i
i; et.e, ,3*S
(
- =.m.m
a . , . e ~ e .< e -. e l
y Q* @
-- y q)
.s , +~~' .~ y-- .
on '
q = x3 ,
.. I gygpg L"""*L IN P
'*ii
('*"'"\ l
~*l _m ,#
4 h1I r M .! %..
f,, '}W .
.M j .,
i 91eue ,JM .'J N M V P-
-~ ,, .. G.
~.
.~? ,
. . qt,:*
I W e.rM' i ; <s..
.a a, [.4 e'e ,,} *,g*
^%
'23 g N *E"
- g" ' a
- g-/ f e6 j
b, g
f l^ .., W E
- b d'St'-- '%
- ,,r..r
q. ; _Q ra66 , j m : ., ss l
}
- '*- ~~
e **d*
n /** f i i h" k w4* ;~,., i
.tM'"'3r 4 1h f NN A
~T :5
. s - /\
} N $:l ? N ?i ~*~ l l Y Y. p-e t s.s -e* g l""
p . ~. _ g
.-+ "
m as a6
>" w
- T'-
r"""
. e wl%** D"" *** * *
.\ c ,
E=
- . E
- .pdWWJ VE ao. gm.e _usri -n' e. W mm
- a. ' ra .s \ a***
h.,m ' '
- %w I ie
.TaHT' rws* rn-W ; '*"**
.hdAfd-J - ***
/ i gj ' @ ~ [9e , j ',
~ 'i x v / Ni
- s L
, s- :
I. x? 1 g,
u_. _ .i m -
o w_ __m _mM ' W Sil _ W ?.'*- t - ~
- 6 swans ,
]
WJ_ I- h
' PL AN AT EL.36-O' ,, ) .-
t r=-= ,
w C FGETV n3
, e yf p' , t t, .. r 1.y , .g.L im y;a t s w on r-
.,d.) .!. ii l s' i oo u i i-r
~
M.g i g3 :g a ghah,i
,j ,,
n,,,,
,,e,l,b,r u
h 1,, ,,e,,,,,l'
, j q*r- <' d ,.
i 1. . : w ' \j
- 1 rgi , ei g14 p. , - +> 6es-++ >
4 - - .
e is b hkk ,r - ,; ;
rh
-n. f .'kh]TM "** b
'.!'/e-
,y
_. g , key? "
- v v-s
_n-a -.-
e a- = .4.;
ygf.* "
. . . $. si . maas tustowe r
/=ay**
' ' - ~ 7
_ i'--#
/ ,,a= USE THtS DR AW'NG ONLY FOR (
_~/"
s E f'j s b ' fL \' ., --
EOulPMENT LOCATION DIMENSIONS. I OTHE R INFORMAf TON SHOWN MAY EM t*
i -
NOT BE CURRENT WITH RESPECT g 7 7 .
.,d*
- -* g-- a' '
=
/
l_/
Q'T TO DR AWINGS WHICM GOVE RN
( 3 . .. : '1 I: =
CONSTRUCTK)N.
- % ** 5..-
'y
],' ] e6 ss.-e k .-h 7f,d="-
m u y _
., a----*T ' LIMERICK GENERATING STATION PARTl41L PL AN AT EL 3 31' - O' @ UNITS 1 AND 2
} FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
~1.] e e e GENERAL ARRANGEMENT, REACTOR ENCLOSURE UNIT 2, PLAN AT ELEV. 313 FEET F1GURE 1.2-13 REV.12.10/82
_. J
~ ^
REFERENCE DRAWINGS DWG. FSAR NO. FIG. NO.
M-123 1.2-16 M-D7 1.2-15 2* v .
g,_
,4pitt,'.'1 [A.J ELU
. hall _,
t --
- w. . __#. g.c- - .
- w. /c]
' t 4*. . 3\ ,
L u m. l
'.d -- -4l' e
N /
- r
,d r
c s
,';;' Ir ;
.~
- j
, . p.hr4v ~ . - - ' .m j .. . s .
W l - y} "
} =f - - = =. - . . _ - - 3 _ . .
i e U 1 I
ql i i L ,
p i :
I
=. E L3 * '? - ; ** ". _. .
j
]
t.
en x i m b. k I VO (g7__.g_. m #=._._. . m/ _ qJ __
'I i g / ...'.'.'%
L g. , -
a w I
i ! - en 6 9 08 * !!
! I ' ~i SEL5T H ds)
E Y - - x+m y W {' ~^_. * }1Il
'.:w em EEf ~ - -- f.
FM73_._
y , fo _ E %
l'1: 4 j, ;. ,
[
3.,.i .. . _ .n _ j _ -._. _ _ -
Oa _ g g-__ _g gr- ----t j ,j_,. j ,,,
~m a ,
.s y I
N [ UM a !
I-
!.t %.t.:,' = - f
= :r H.--
e ua-e
"~.;:' .Y , E
$ """-* 2 l
.....,.1
+__.
teuman
,--"-= i 9.m < -"
[eI:ji g &(?)/ g%pg J. E;
, ?
Is
- JgDT !Vx,-..l '"
s k'4 ==# -}*' * '"' l -'
./
/
o
[m \VW vy m
_;f'.g, v .)
t -< .4 /
f G ~_1 punw. eta e6. Mect a.o uf-e f ff- g' . ej ie a
, a '*j s -
O' cU'l "p Q - * **t' ' ':-c<.gk" L W ,
"AS". *
// /
m.j .
!x*
Yo r,. nd s;tr a ru it Wh f }, .8 . NE[U ff"T TPY+W' f77 _ q .M. .r.L _mt(--
er.- w<, N'aiens k'- *. ,
n.* .j; os 6 y, tQ)/ ' ,
> , i i + n.,- -
x y / '4 d 'l -- y e
, s ,
s, r
...J :m l _,,
x\
' W [j p 3w i%pfp)
,g s p=g.. .[d.._.NjE_ . . ....., _
_J. _ .zs- _.
px A O
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ ._ y a_ - . - - - - .
- -~'.~
v
- 'w,c.i i . . _ . . . . i t=- 'o e
e' ~
{ _~ w O! -
q f
[- y- = s d
g
,J \
m \,
r.
s I g 1}a . .,.- , ., ., ., . -.
. _ _ _ _ -. _ . ._q.
m ,g m -l.s__....-
4 ,,
-/y' (
l
.i.,
z b
a L ...__.. . i. ; \
-J L: \. x 4 '
.=m ._
@)A t . i g y/ j z 4 , ))
L~ / * * * * * * " /_ g" W 'i '- i' i
$ cunw. P(m
.N t / ,. EL wo-l {/
m a
, NQ/ sa j
= 1 _-
- -4 w, . , .. ;: . _% _
'M YrEW( an== WE^\l^^\{YrVCWf~. ,,D, ; 3 . s
/
i l
L, --
I I en e t e, r_ _ _ _
r, . c e r. .- ,,
A ds3 v Do U LD Un LIMERICK GENERATING STATION g A "-'" UNITS 1 AND 2 4 m. FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT W.~.2. :'fll27,.'ll*
G.T .".#.#T. :7t.D EQUIPMENT LOCATION REACTOR ENCLOSURE, UNIT 1, PLAN AT EL. 352' 0" FIGURE 1.2-14 REV.12,,10/82 l
_ _ _ ._. _ _ . __J
T,.
W'Y REFERENCE DRAWINGS DWG. FSAR NO, FIG. NO.
M - 122 12 14 M-13e .
'%t t
.ig_3 __
s i- r.a,--
_n ' OR R R R r' 6 ,f .,
kJ k.a3 kJ kJ kJ k N r--. _
g - , w. _,
.d. i
=:% -
q.~m _
r
- m- y o ..s e
g** ~ ca' z..
w - A; -b . . .
- I
, '9
% - a. -
y.
l .-. ;-- .s h,q := ,,,,, ..
4 CFs 4_.M3.g' E g ., ., .
-l .we .3 fd ,h-f/e aJ t
)
_. 4.h ', f' _ .
.h.
b, 3
(5yhm \
~
l*,
3 a J.J ,1 m.c7 _
Afa k !
o .u.......
l d!
m sJ 3
=,c;escem N j sovela est a s m
j 5 .
E il .
n, *
<a 2 -
\. __. I . 4 k
\ h
';;'41'
<N , ,,
e 6
~,
+
D e e e, 2.r i i a,
_4 2 g to g
mgp_
m "
___p p - m c
- 1 U I t i I
- m. -m, 4-.
y l
y.s. .;
i Av si
- , g ,
h> l ls r '
_ ,b. ;;;= 2
- s. c L N./
s
'l 4 r__ WrM -- T h...___.__ .. L, h',k,
(
)
c.....,
t.a.
w
. y,,, p"**" to.xj p
-_m ! ArATIAL PLAN,.w
,. 4 p w a - g.a
- u.
$[8[,51'% ( N U [i W
1
., ,5!Q < -. sv / i
,u-
,s w m
- 9. w b.,,
^
5
.E / e
~
/s ~~
H--'- .
g/" .
@ g :
O j
pr- ' --
>e
' ~ l i, 2:Kt Nb___. _ _ . .
...... .a. ,
'
- O
. _ . - }- . -. - 2 s - I'IE'__
M,. kj ,
f+w l $ j 's L**J.7 R^N e
We g ~~ -
i - = ;
J =-
'i: a 1 g 8 8
" * " ' ' I l
u- 1w u y g
, i _m . ., __ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
l
. - t iL _nu_ _ _ ._ _ . __ _ a; p' .;
v=t g f .
el p= >
+ - - - ,
i ,.;;,,y g ji j .
. 1 N '
I i
+- i
/Sc r 9 g i ; @ ,P FtAN
., , / (\ x '!
/4 !! '$IJ.)_ \_j Ip d 4;- -
y v.-u r - -
/
/ / ..
.,++.i - :i .
a
' . -[f.N, i ..,em
~ _
e NOTE.
USEPTMENT.THis DR AWING ONLY F OR
~
F*# f' tO #_ _
tv- F 16 6 EQU LOCAT*ON OTHE R IPsFORWATION SHOWN M AY DrwENSIONS.
NOT BE CURRENT WITH RESPECT TO DR AWINGS WHICH GOVE RN CONSTRUCTION LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT. REACTOR ENCLO3URE UNIT 2, PLAN AT ELEV. 352 FEET FIGUHE 1.215 H EV.12,10/82 l
l
I e
m -.e e REFERENCE DRAWINGS DWG. FSAR NO. FIG. NO. @
M-145 1.2-35 gg 2
v/
- y s-i L,i ,
i i i i m.
i
. aa . ' , -hg
,# (
r,( MT ,,,.
- y. *
- .r: , r, u , ' - i &,
!,I i M - ,
- d j
~f/h%m$
y h it 9,
\ . --
jM O! L I A,___\ .,dt '*" -.
t.. ... a. . -
+M11 ! ,
( L-tGB I, ! Id .S
% +j 2 's i ff.b -
EcTioN B-B r ,
Y i 1 -
Q .[m!_f j
&A -
1 y 1 1 1 1, I '
g { , -- > -
qadt w s
~
eW A
0 -
t .-.
w.-
/
u, '
]
s t-[p; 9.F n ~~" **~"
W
{aahf . kes.1, I i. _
f .
' N/
eus ==u.s N
b uooses -
/
k.NNN srcrion A-A
i
% I i
@ ~@ @ '
1 ,
l l
3_
L _. :
I s!
dj~
i l --
- l
= = = =
.c,ri l . .
._ a s
1.- "d."
- W/
eWWg4 _.
-+dh]- -
ktp w + %*7, ,
% +- gL. .: y D*82- l l,_ * 'L. SECTION C-C pti 1'
! i 4
- I k rYmT1
,w ,
. n.-
l 3 t I + i '_ ,u n '
m /. N M ***
m EM# jl 4
s
- Ii, j i
i t.< s.. s,.-
g . M M* .e og *I
. _; 'i u, p, . i .
7h> l l n an 8* I'**"
.['
< NOTE:
USE THIS DR AWING ONLY FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATaDN DIMENSONS.
'+- OTHE R INFORMATON 5HOWN M AY MT St CURRENT WITH RESPECT vtw smoot ygt"*
TO DRAWINGS WHICH GOVERN D PTA tt. t N T.W LIMERICK GENER ATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT, DIESEL GENERATOR ENCLOSURE UNITS 1 AND 2, SECTIONS.
FIGURE 1.2 36 REV.12,10/82 i +-
LGS FSAR l REGULATORY GUIDE 1.68.3 Preoperational Testing of Instrument and l Control Air Systems Rev 0, April 1982 l Limerick will be in conformance with this guide. l REGULATORY GUIDE 1.69 Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power Plants Rev 0, December 1973 Limerick did not apply this guide, which endorses / modifies ANSI N101.6-1972. Limerick concrete standards are discussed in Section 3.8.
(Category 1)
O' REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70 Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants Rev 3, November 1978 The Limerick FSAR is in conformance with the format and content requirements of this guide.
(Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.71 Welder Qualification for Areas of Limited Accessibility Rev 0, December 1973 GE does not employ this guide as a design basis for Limerick and in some cases employs alternate approaches that are evaluated as satisfying the intent of the guide. Details are discussed in Section 5.2.3.4. ,
l 0
1.8-23 Rev. 12, 10/82
__, __ .___ __ _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ , . ~ . . . . _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _
LGS FSAR Bechtel employs alternate approaches to portions of this guide as in Section 5.2.3.4.
lh (Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.72 Spray Pond Piping Made from Fiberglass-Reinforced Thermosetting Resin Rev 2, November 1978 The Limerick spray pond does not use this type of pipe and therfore the guide does not apply.
(Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.73 Qualification Tests of Electric Valve Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants Rev 0, January 1974 Limerick non-NSSS valve operators are in conformance with this guide which endorses / modifies IEEE 382-1972 as discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.
There are no safety-related NSSS valve operators inside the primary containment.
(Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.74 Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions Rev 0, January 1974 Quality assurance during construction is discussed in PSAR Appendix D.
Limerick will be in conformance with this guide, which endorses / modifies ANSI N45.2.10 - 1973, during operation as discussed in Sections 17.2A and 17.2B, except for an alternate definition as discussed in Section 17.2A.
(Category 1) 1.8-24
\'") REGULATORY GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants Rev 2, October 1981 l Limerick is in conformance with this guide except for certain alternate approaches discussed in Appendix I of the Emergency Plan.
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.102 Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Rev 1, September, 1976 Limerick is in conformance with this guide as discussed in Section 3.4.
(Category 2)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.103 Post-Tensioned Prestressing Systems for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments Rev 1, October 1976
('~') Limerick does not have a prestressed concrete containment and
\_/ therefore this guide is not applicable.
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.104 Overhead Crane Handling Systems for
. Nuclear Power Plants Rev 0, February 1976 This guide was withdrawn by the NRC on August 16, 1979.
The Limerick reactor enclosure crane was designed and procured prior to the issuance of this guide. For explanatory purposes, a comparison with the guide is given in Section 9.1.5.
(Category 4)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.105 Instrument Setpoints Rev 1, November 1976 Although this guide does not apply to Limerick (being for plants whose construcion permits applications are docketed after Dec.
gs 15, 1976). Limerick will be in conformance during operation as
( ,) discussed in Section 7.1.2.5 and Chapter 16.
1.8-33 Rev. 10, 09/82
LGS FSAR (Category 2) h REGULATORY GUIDE 1.106 Thermal Overlond Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves Rev 1, March 1977 This guide is not applicable to Limerick (being for plants whose construction permits are docketed after issuance of the guide).
The Limerick design is discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.
(Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.107 Qualifications for Cement Grouting for Prestressing Tendons in Containment Structures Rev 1, February 1977 Limerick does not have a prestressed concrete containment and therefore this guide is not applicable.
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator O
Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants Rev 1, August 1977 Although this guide does not apply to Limerick (being for plants whose construction permits are docketed after issuance of the guide), Limerick is in conformance except that an alternate approach is used for paragraph C.1.b(5) regarding surveillance system design in that the surveillance system does not indicate which of the diesel generator protective trips is activated fir'st. However, all diesel generator protective trips which are enforced during loss of offsite power or emergency operation, are annunciated in a group trouble alarm in the main control room and individually in the diesel generator local annunciator panel.
The surveillance feature which would indicate the first diesel generator protective trip, is not necessary for the safe and orderly shutdown and for maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Periodic testing of the diesel generators is described in Section 8.1.6.1.20.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 1.8-34
-(Category 2) ~
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.142 Safety-Related Concrete Structures for Nuclear ~ Power Plants (Other than Reactor Vessels and Containments)
- Rev 0, April 1978 This guide, which endorses / modifies ACI 349-76, is not applicable to Limerick (being for plants whose construction permit applications are docketed after December 15, 1978).
Limerick safety-related concrete structures are discussed in Section 3.8.
(Category 1) !
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143 Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste
, Management Systems Structures and Components Installed in Light-Water-l Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Rev 1, October 1979 ,
i' Limerick is in conformance with the intent of the guide, subject to the exceptions and clarifications listed in Table 3.2-1, Note 18.
T The design codes, standards, and quality assurance for radwaste 4 system piping and components are presented and discussed in l l Table 3.2; design of the radwaste structure is discussed in l
Section 3.8; radwaste management systems are discussed in Chapter 11.
l 1 (Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.144 Auditing of Quality Assurance Programs i for Nuclear Power Plants Rev 0, January 1979 l
This guide endorses / modifies ANSI N45.2.12-1977. The guide and the ANSI standard are not specifically utilized during construction. -Quality assurance during construction is discussed in PSAR Appendix D.
( l l
1.8-45 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Conformance to ANSI N45.2.2.12 during operation is discussed in Chapter 17. Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.144 will be addressed later.
(Category 1)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.145 Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assess-ments at Nuclear Power Plants Rev 0, August 1979 The Limerick analysis was performed prior to issuance of this guide. The September 1977 draft of this guide (Regulatory Guide 1.xxx) was used as discussed in Section 2.3.
O I
O 1.8-46
LGS FSAR O (4) Licensees that rely on purge systems as the primary means for controlling combustible gases following a loss-of-coolant accident should be' aware of the positions taken in SECY-80-399,_" Proposed Interim Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 Related to Hydrogen Control and Certairi Degraded Core Considerations." This proposed rule, published in the Federal Recister on October 2, 1980, would require plants that do not now have recombiners to have the capacity to install external recombiners by January 1, 1982. 1 (Installed internal recombiners are an acceptable alternative to the above.)
(5) Containment atmosphere dilution (CAD) systems are considered to be purge systems for the purpose of implementing.the requirements of this TMI Task Action item.
Response
The containment hydrogen recombiner system, described in Sections 6.2.5 and 9.4.5, is used for postaccident combustible gas control. The recombiners are permanently installed external to the primary containment and are operated remotely from the control room. The design of the containment penetrations associated with the hydrogen recombiner system is single-failure proof for containment isolation purposes during system operation and single-failure proof for operation of the recombiner system.
Limerick complies with each of the points of clarification as described below.
(1) The containment isolation arrangement uses a combined type of design which is single-failure proof as permitted by this clarification item. The hydrogen recombiner supply and return lines connect to the high-volume purge lines outside the primary containment. Each high-volume purge line is provided with redundant, normally closed isolation valves installed in series outboard of the connection point with the hydrogen recombiner lines. This redundancy ensures that isolation of the high-volume purge lines remains single failure-proof during operation of the recombiners. Each supply and return line for the hydrogen recombiners is provided with a single, normally closed containment isolation valve. Because the hydrogen recombiner process loops are closed loops outside containment, the failure of an isolation valve in the open position would not jeopardize containment integrity. The provision of two redundant hydrogen recombiner packages ensures that the recombination function can be performed in the event of a failure of an isolation valve in the closed position.
O 1.13-37 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR (2) The recombiner supply and return lines have been sized such llh that the flow requirements of the recombiners are satisfied for the full range of possible containment pressures that may exist during the time period when the recombiners are required to operate.
(3) As discussed in Section 9.4.5.1.3, the hydrogen recombiner packages, their associated piping, and the containment isolation provisions for the recombiner lines and the containment purge lines are designed as safety-related.
(4) Limerick does not rely on a purge system as the primary means for controlling combustible gases following a LOCA.
(5) Limerick does not use a containment air dilution system for combustion gas control.
- II.E.4.2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DEPENDABILITY Position (1) The design of the containment isolation system complies with the provisions of Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan; i.e., that there is diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation.
(2) Essential and non-essential systems for the purpose of isolation are properly identified.
(3) All non-essential systems are automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal.
(4) The design of control systems for automatic containment isolation valves are such that resetting the isolation signal will not result in the automatic reopening of containment isolation valves. Reopening of containment isolation valves shall require deliberate operator action.
(5) Purge valves that do not meet the requirements set forth in l Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 should have j administrative control that governs " sealed closed" valves l
during operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Furthermore, l these valves are to be verified closed at least once per 31 days.
Clarification (1) The reference to 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan in I position 1 is only to the deversity requirements set forth in that document.
O 1
Rev. 12, 10/82 1.13-38
() (2) For postaccident situations, each nonessential penetration (except instrument lines) is required to have two isolation barriers in series that meet requirements of Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57 of the General Design Criteria, as clarified by Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan. Isolation must be performed automatically (i.e., no credit can be given for operator action). Manual valves must be sealed closed, as defined by Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan to qualify as an isolation barrier. Each automatic isolation valve in a nonessential penetration must receive the diverse isolation signals.
(3) Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.141 will contain guidance on the classification of essential versus nonessential systems and is due to be issued by June 1981. Requirements for operating plants to review their list of essential and nonessential systems will be issued in conjunction with this guide including an appropriate time schedule for completion.
(4) Administrative provision to close all isolation valves manually before resetting the isolation signals is not an acceptable method of meeting position 4.
(5) Ganged reopening of containment isolation valves is not acceptable. Reopening of isolation val *>es must be x performed on a valve-by-valve basis, or on a line-by-line basis, provided that electrical independence and other single-failure criteria continue to be satisfied.
1.13-38a Rev. 12, 10/82 j
-, - - -v ---e-- .-v. mn--,-,-n.,, , , - , - - - - - - , . - - . .c-- .e-. , , ,--n-
l LGS FSAR THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O
O Rev. 12, 10/82 1.13-38b 1
i l
() development of the Newark Basin 140-200 million years ago (Ref 2.5-1). Where faults in~other Triassic basins are overlain by Cretaceous coastal plain sediments, the Cretaceous sediments are
- not offset. The faults near the site, and fracture zones at the site, are considered by the review board to be contemporaneous with the Juro-Triassic deformation. -
Since late Mesozoic time, the area around the site has been a land mass subject to erosion. Continental glaciation that
' occurred during the Pleistocene did not extend to the site area.
Bedrock at the site is overlain by up to 40 feet of residual soil 4 derived from the bedrock by weathering. These. residual soils, which overlie the Sanatoga fault and the Downington Dike without offset, have been dated in studies by Dames and Moore as being of Yarmouthian age, or 500,000 to 850,000 years before present (BP)
(Ref 2. 5-1,1p. 4-17 ) .
2.5.1.2.7 Engineering Geology Evaluation
- Site subsurface exploration is described and discussed in -
2 Section 2.5.4.3. Laboratory tests of foundation materials and in-situ geophysical tests of the foundation materials are i discussed in Sections 2.5.4.2 and 2.5.4.4, respectively.
i Geologic mapping of the foundation excavations is described in Sections 2.5.1.2.5 and 2.5.4.3. It is concluded from these '
, studies and evaluations that the site geologic and foundation 1 conditions are entirely suitable for plant construction and operation.
- 2.5.1.2.7.1 Geologic Conditions Under Category I Structures !
All seismic Category I plant facilities are founded on bedrock,
- except part of the spray pond, portions of the underground
! piping, and electrical ducts, diesel oil tanks, and valve pits, which are founded on weathered rock, natural soil or fills. For more detail, refer to Section 2.5.4.5. The locations of the major Category I facilities are shown on Figure 3.8-58.
The foundation rock at the site consists of reddish-brown siltstone, interbedded and lensing with shale and sandstone.
These rocks are part of the Brunswick and Lockatong lithofacies of Triassic age (see Section 2.5.1.2.3). The bedrock strata dip to the north at angles of from 80 to 200 Several frac.ture zones with minor offsets were encountered during site excavation; these zones and their treatment are described in Sections 2.5.1.2.5 and 2.5.4.12. All the Category I rock foundations were excavated to unweathered bedrock. Geologic maps and sections of the Category I excavations at the main power block are shown in Figures 2.5-10, 2.5-11, and 2.5-13. Engineering properties of the foundation rock are described in Section 2.5.4.
- O 2.5-16a Rev. 12, 10/82 i
,_--__.-c,,,_m _...--__v.,_m,-,,_--,,,,.ww._m.-_,,m.-,
LGS FSAR The natural soils at the site consist of materials derived from the in-situ westhering of siltstone, sandstone, and shale. Soil from 0 to about 40 feet thick was encountered in the borings at the site. In some parts of the area, the bedrock has not completely broken down into soil, and the soil materials are mixed with weathered, decomposed rock fragments. Weathering decreases with depth, and grades gradually to fresh rock. The O
O Rev. 11, 10/82 2.5-16b
\
() 2.5.2.3 Correlation of Earthauake Activity with Geoloaic Structures or Tectonic Provinces i
j As shown in Figure 2.5-14, the trend of epicenters in the site region is generally northeast-southwest, parallel to the trend of ,
geologic structure in the. Appalachian Mountains. As a particular l l
example, within 100' miles of the site there appears to be a pattern
- of seismicity paralleling geologic structure in a relatively narrow l j belt, roughly-along the axis of the Fall Zone. At distances greater than 100 miles northeast of the site, the seismicity i becomes more diffuse and scattered throughout that part of the New !
- - England Appalachians within 200 miles of the site. To the southwest of the site, at distances greater than 100 miles, the seismicity is again more diffuse and, moreover, there are fewer
, events until the Virginia Piedmont is reached just bsyond the
- 200-mile radius. A modest clustering of historic carthquakes occurs here, in the general area of Richmond, Virginia. Finally,
. both to the southeast and northwest of the Fall' Zone, there is scattered earthquake activity within the Coastal Plain and l Appalachian physiographic provinces, respectively. ,
4 i
l The earthquake activity in northeastern Massachusetts, although l well in excess of 200 miles from the site, has been considered.
In November 1755, an intensity VIII earthquake occurred offshore i near Cape Ann, at least 300 miles from the site. This is the '
largest historic earthquake known to have occurred in the New i England region. It has been associated variously with the 4 Southeastern or Avalon Platform tectonic province, a Cape Ann-New
. Hampshire tectonic province (each more than 200 miles from the Limerick site) (Ref 2.5-29), an east-west zone of intense thrust i
and strike-slip faulting (Ref 2.5-31), a northwest-trending seismic and plutonic zone (Ref 2.5-32), and a specific plutonic
- structure (Ref 2.5-33). None of the above alternatives would relate the event to provinces or structures that are closer than
- 200 miles from the Limerick site; therefore, the 1755 Cape Ann event is not significant to the Limerick site.
The lack of recent faulting and the modest size of even the largest historic earthquakes within 200 miles of the site argue against the meaningful association of regional seismicity with specific faults. In addition, the general scatter and infrequency of reported earthquakes indicate that there is no
- - major active faulting in the region.
2.5.2.4 Maximum Earthquake Potential l
No earthquake within the 200-mile radius site region has exceeded intensity VII during the historic record for this area, which
- began in the early 18th century. There have been six intensity VII shocks during this period in the site region. Of these, two 4
occurred near New' York City, in 1737 and 1884, at the edge of the l : Newark Basin, near the junction of the Piedmont, New England, and 1
2.5-31 Rev. 12, 10/82
. - - ,,=.vv-- - , w--- - , - - , ,w.----.w--w--,.+a-e,- --a .m,-.~,ww,,,,,wgr,g,%-,,o+,mye g m -gye +s--ww tr*s'r <ge-t* w = %e w -m eny?-e pe v 'yyy= m- s**==-*w wegygrwTve -vy-1
l I
LGS FSAR I Coastal Plain provinces; one occurred near Wilmington, Delaware in 1871, about 35 miles south of the site, near the Piedmont-Coastal h Plain boundary; one occurred along the New Jersey coast in 1927, about 80 miles northeast of the site in the Coastal Plain; one occurred near Moodus, Connecticut in 1791, about 180 miles northeast of the site in the New England Upland section of the New England Province; and one occurred in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania in 1954 in the Folded Appalachians to the north-northwest of the site and was almost certainly not related to either tectonic strain accumulation or release, as these terms are normally understood.
One additional intensity VII event, which was slightly more than 200 miles from the site, occurred near Richmond, Virginia in 1875, close to the Piedmont-Coastal Plain province boundary. Thus, most of the intensity VII events recorded, and particularly those south of the New England Appalachian-Piedmont Coastal Plain physiographic province junction, have occurred near the Fall Zone. An apparent northeast-southwest trend of smaller earthquakes occurs along the same zone, although intensity VI and smaller events are scattered throughout the site region.
Considering the historic seismicity of the site region alone, a reasonable interpretation of maximum potential earthquake might be either an intensity VII event along the Fall Zone at its closest approach to the site or an intensity VI event very near the site.
Because of the uncertainties involved in associating regional activity with specific structures, however, the maximum potential earthquake is specified as being equivalent to the Io = VII 1871 Wilmington, Delaware earthquake occurring near the site. This is equivalent to translating the largest historical earthquake that has occurred anywhere within 200-miles of the site.
2.5.2.5 Seismic Wave Transmission Characteristic of the Site Detailed descriptive data on the foundation material properties appear in Section 2.5.4. All Category I structures are founded on competent bedrock, except some buried structures including portions of underground piping and electrical ducts, diesel oil tanks, and buried valve pits. Thus, no additional analysis to take account of the site soil column is necessary, i 2.5.2.6 Safe Shutdown Earthquake 1
The safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) is defined in terms of a peak ground acceleration and a design response spectrum. As indicated in Section 2.5.2.4, the site design intensity is VII on the Modified Mercalli Scale. This intensity may be associated with a peak ground acceleration of approximately 0.13 g (Refs 2.5-34 and
-35). For additional conservatism, a peak acceleration of 0.15 g is adopted. This value becomes the high frequency asymptote of the design response spectrum shown in Figure 3.7-2 for critical damping values of 0.0, 0.5, 2.0, 5.0, and 10.0 percent.
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-32
() 2.5.3.5; Correlation of Epicenters with Capable Faults There are no capable faults within five miles of the site. No earthquakes with epicentral locations within 10. miles of the site have occurred in historic time. For regional correlation of epicenters with geologic structures, see Sections 2.5.2.2 and 2.5.2.3.
2.5.3.6 ' Descriptions of Capable Faults There are no capable faults in the region around the site extending to within five miles of the site. For a description of faults within five miles of the site, see Section 2.5.3.2.
2.5.3.7 Zone Requirino Detailed Fault Investication
-l As discussed in Section 2.5.1.2, some shear zones with small t
(, offsets were encountered during foundation excavation at the i
site. Structures of this type are not unusual in the region; however, these zones were mapped in detail and photographed as <
! part of the site geologic record (see Figure 2.5-13). The i detailed geologic. investigation included mapping _of an area l approximately five miles in diameter. A review committee was <
established (see Section 2.5.3.2.1), and the results of all
- investigations were included in a report issued in July 1974
! (Ref 2.5-1). The review committee concluded that the shear zones
! in the foundation excavation at the site and the faults within i
the area mapped are typical of features associated with 150-200 million-year-old events in the area (see subsection 2.5.3.2.1).
l 2.5.3.8 Results of Faultino Investication
! -See Sections 2.5.1.2 and 2.5.3.7; there are no capable faults within five miles of Limerick Generating Station.
! t 2.5.4 STABILITY OF SUBSURFACE MATERIALS AND FOUNDATIONS i
t 2.5.4.1 Geologic Features
. Bedrock at the site consists of well-indurated Triassic i sandstones, siltstones, and shales that extend to a depth of
- several thousand feet. Bedding dips toward the north at 80 to i
200 Site stratigraphy is presented in Section 2.5.1.2.3.
Geologic structure in the site area is presented in Section 2.5.1.2.4. Bedrock is overlain by from 0 to 40 feet of residual soil, developed in-situ by weathering and decomposition of the parent rock. The soil grades into weathered rock, then
- into fresh, unweathered rock; no clearly defined boundary exists
.between soil and rock..
During foundation excavation, some fracture zones with small O displacements were encountered and were treated locally as 2.5-39 Rev. 11, 10/82
LGS FSAR required. Descriptions of the fracture zones are presented in Section 2.5.1.2.5; their locations at final foundation grades are lll shown on Figure 2.5-13. Treatment of these fracture zones is discussed in Section 2.5.4.12. .
Engineering evaluation of the site geology is discussed in Section 2.5.1.2.7. The bedrock at the site contains no unstable minerals or hazardous conditions. The stress regime within the bedrock materials is low and stable. There are no mines in the site area and no significant fluid withdrawal. The bedrock in the construction area is competent and provides satisfactory foundation support for plant structures.
2.5.4.2 Properties of Subsurface Materials The principal plant structures are founded on bedrock. The spray pond is excavated partly in soil and partly in rock. All or portions of other facilities not founded on bedrock are founded on natural soil or manmade fills. The locations of the major plant structures are shown on Figure 2.1-3. Results of laboratory tests for foundation and construction materials are presented in Ref 2.5-39 and 2.5-51, and in FSAR Sections 2.5.1.2, 2.5.4.2, 2.5.4.4, 2.5.4.5, 2.5.4.7 and 2.5.4.10.
2.5.4.2.1 Properties of Foundation Rocks O
The seismic Category 1 reactor and diesel-generator enclosures, as well as the turbine and radwaste enclosures, are founded on hard, competent bedrock. The bedrock consists of siltstone, sandstone, and shale of Brunswick lithofacies of Triassic age.
The Brunswick is described in Section 2.5.1.2. The Lockatong lithofacies, represented by the Sanatoga Members, interfinger with the Brunswick in the northern part of the site area. The Sanatoga Member consists of blue-gray calcareous argillite with two distinct beds of black carbonaceous shale. The spray pond is underlain by both the Lockatong and Brunswick lithofacies.
Bedding and jointing patterns are well developed in the foundation rocks. Bedding plane spacing varies from a few inches to several feet. Bedding planes strike generally east - west and dip to the north at 80 to 200 Two major joint systems are prevalent in the area. Both are vertical or nearly vertical; they strike approximately N 200 to 500 E and N 500 to 600 W.
Three fracture zones and two minor clay seams along bedding were encountered in the main power block foundation excavations; they are described in Section 2.5.1.2.5. Treatment of these zones is described in Section 2.5.4.12.
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-40
/
LGS FSAR Rock quality designation (ROD) values were measured in a total of 81 boreholes, which include the 200 , 300- and M-serien borings completed in 1970, and borings 400 and 401 completed in February 1971 (Figure 2.5-22). In general, RCD values measured on the first core run (5 to 10 ft) in rock were very low, usually zero; with some exceptions, minimum ROD values increased to approximately 50 percent or greater after the first 10 to 30 feet of rock cored. The lower RQD values in the upper 10 to 30 feet of rock reflect poorer rock quality caused by rock weathering; this weathered material was removed during foundation excavation.
The data and analyses discussed below demonstrate that the higher RQD values are associated with the sound, unweathered bedrock that supports the foundations for the principal plant structures.
Because of the gradational nature of the upward transition from s'ound rock to soil, engineering properties in the zone of rock weathering can be expected to vary from soil-like properties near the top of the zone to properties approaching those of sound rock near the base of the zone. Properties of sound, unweathered foundation rock were determined as follows.
Laboratory tests on 16 core samples indicate unconfined compressive strengths ranging from 6370 psi, to 24,540 psi with an average of 15,820 psi. Results of these tests are shown in Table 2.5-3. Laboratory sonic tests on intact cores (Table 2.5-O. 3C) from four borings yield an average compressional velocity of 12,060 fps.
Seismic refraction surveys were performed to determine P- and S-wave velocities for site foundation materials. P-wave velocities in rock range from about 7700 fps to 20,000 fps, with an average of about 12,500 fps; locations of refraction lines are shown in Figure 2.5-21. Shear wave velocities were determined to be about 6100 fps in a line perpendicular to the strike of the bedding (north-south). A line run approximately parallel to the east-west strike of the bedding measured a shear wave velocity of 5800 fps. Poisson's ratio is calculated to be about 0.3. The dynamic modulus of elasticity calculated from the seismic data is 3 x IO* psi. Representative engineering properties of foundation rocks are summarized in Table 2.5-3A. Additional discussion of seismic refraction survey techniques is given in Section 2.5.4.4; plane bearing tests and static moduli are described in Section 2.5.4.10.
The agreement between laboratory and field velocity measurements suggests that the seismic refraction results are representative of sound foundation rock, for otherwise the field measurements would be significantly less than measurements on intact core.
Therefore, the field seismic velocities should provide a reasonable quantitative index of the general character of the in-O situ foundation rock. Weathering reduces rock quality typically in the upper 10 to 30 feet of rock as indicated by reduced ROD 2.5-41 Rev. 12, 10/82
__ ________-----__J
LGS FSAR values in this zone; however, because foundations for the main plant structures including the power block, radwacte, and pumphouse enclosures are carried to unweathered rock, rock weathering is not significant to foundation design for these facilities.
Nevertheless it was recognized that occasional localized features such as fracture zones or clay seams encountered in the foundation rock would require evaluation as they became exposed.
Accordingly, foundation rock was mapped and evaluated for such t features by experienced engineering geologists during the course l of construction. Measures to improve foundation enditions were carried out at certain areas where potential rock weakness was encountered. Detailed discussion of these measures is provided in Section 2.5.4.12.
2.5.4.2.2 Properties of Foundation Soils The in-situ soils are residual in nature, derived from weathering of siltstone, standstone, and shale. The properties of these soils were determined by laboratory testing.
Testing of the in-situ soils at the spray pond was conducted by Geotechnical Engineers, Inc. The complete laboratory test report is given in Ref. 2.5-39. The properties of the soils are given in Sections 2.5.4.2.2.1 through 2.5.4.2.2.3 and are cummarized in Table 2.5-4 (sheet 1).
The properties of the in-situ soils other than spray pond were determined by Dames & Moore. The complete laboratory test results are included in Ref. 2.5-51. The properties of these soils are described in Section 2.5.4.2.2.4 and are summarized in Table 2.5-4 (sheet 2).
2.5.4.2.2.1 Index Properties of Soils at Spray Pond The index properties include the following:
1
- a. Visual and laboratory classification of samples -
ASTM D 2488 l
- b. Mechanical analysis - ASTM D 422
- c. In-situ moisture content and unit weight - ASTM D 2216
- d. Atterberg limits - ASTM D 423 and D 424 i
- e. Specific gravity tests - ASTM D 854 The in-situ soil of the spray pond includes clayey silt, sandy silt, and silty fine sand, with varying amounts of gravel-sized i rock fragments. The predominant soil is clayey silt, classified Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-42
d l
- as ML and CL. The in-situ moisture ranges from 11.9 to 38.7%,
and averages 21.7%. The specific gravity ranges from 2.70 to l 2.80, with an average value of 2.76. !
Sieve and hydrometer analyses were performed to determine grain l The mean size distribution according to ASTM Procedure D 422.
grain eize (D .) was found to be in the range of 0.006 to 4.4 mm, with an average value of 0.32 mm. '
ls The Atterberg Limits were obtained according to ASTM Procedures l D 423 and D 424. The liquid limit ranges from 27 to 51, with an !
average value of 37. The plasticity.index ranges from 2Lto 27, with an average value of 15 (Figure 2.5-17).
} 1,5.4.2.2.2 Static Shear Strength of In-situ Soils at Spray Pond l I
Consolidated undrained triaxial tests were made in which undisturbed specimens were placed in the triarial chamber and ,
saturated by the backpressure method. After saturation the -
samples were consolidated isotropically to a consolidation pressure of 1 ksf. Plots are made of deviator stress vs axial strain, induced pore pressure vs axial strain, and stress paths .
- for each test. These plots are included in Appendix J of the l l PSAR. The failure stresses of samples are shown on !
! Figure 2.5-18. From this drawing, the effective friction angle l' is determined to be 33.50 The undrained shear strength of the material is calculated from the effective stress friction angle and pore pressure parameter A at failure using the,following relationship (from Ref 2.5-40): :
t g = P. sin i _
(2.5-1) !
f 1+(2A - 1) sin p f j
) where:
I g = undrained shear strength f
i = effective stress friction angle 1
- A = pore pressure parameter A at failure !
I f l lF. = initial mean effective principal stress For the samples tested, A varies from -0.04 to -0.38. Using the !
f I
() consertative assumption of A = 0 and i = 33.50, the undrained i
2.5-43 Rev. 12, 10/82 i
LGS FSAR shear strength is calculated to be 1.2 Po.
2.5.4.2.2.3 Dynamic Shear Strength of In-situ Soils at Spray Pond Stress-controlled cyclic triaxial tests were made in which the undisturbed samples were placed in a chamber and saturated using the back pressure method. When saturated, the samples were consolidated isotropically to an effective confining pressure of 2 ksf. After consolidation, the drainage valves were closed, and a symmetrical cyclic deviator stress was applied. The axial deformation, axial load, and pore pressure were measured continuously during the cyclic loading. The cyclic stress ratio plotted against the number of cycles required to cause 5% double amplitude strain is shown on Figure 2.5-19.
The dynamic shear strength of the soil is determined by multiplying the cyclic stress ratio by the effective overburden pressure. The cyclic stress ratio required to cause 5% double amplitude strain in five cycles is determined to be 0.61 (Figure 2.5-19). The selection of 5 cycles simulates the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) of 0.15 g at the site, based on correlations of equivalent uniform stress cycles and time histories by Seed, et al (Ref 2.5-41).
2.5.4.2.2.4 Properties of In-Situ Soils Other Than Spray Pond Area The properties of soils at the Limerick site, other than those O discussed in Gections 2.5.4.2.2.1 through 2.5.4.2.2.3, are discussed in the Dames & Moore report (Ref. 2.5-51). The results of the tests are described below and are summarized in Table 2.5-4 (sheet 2).
The predominant soils at the site consist of red sandy and clayey silts with numerous rock fragments. They are classified as ML.
The in-situ moisture content ranges from 8.3 to 21.3 percent, and averages 13.4 percent. The average grain size distribution, based on the results of sieve analyses, were found to be 14 percent in gravel size, 27 percent in sand size, and 59 percent silt and clay. The average liquid limit and plasticity index, based on three tests, were found to be 25 and 8, respectively.
A limited number of compression tests were performed to determine the shear strength of the in-situ soil. The total shear strength parameters, based on two unconfined compression and two unconsolidated-undrained triaxial compression tests, were found to be c = 3.0 ksf, and 0 = 180 The effective shear strength, based on four consolidated-drained triaxial compression tests, were found to be c = 0, and 0 a 26.50 No laboratory tests were made to determine the dynamic shear strength of the soil.
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-44
LGS FSAR-(~% .
(,) - 2.5.4.3 Exploration The locations of all field explorations are shown in Figures 2.5-20 and 2.5-21. Summary logs of borings are shown in Figure 2.5-22. Soils are classified in accordance with the Unified Soil Classified System. Rock coring was performed with double-tube, i NX equipment. ,
l i
I Site drilling began in September and October, 1969 and continued in the spring of 1970 (Borings 1 through 301). Geophysical surveys (described in Section 2.5.4.4) were performed in the 1 plant area at this time. In the spring of 1971, additional drilling was performed in the area 6f the Perkiomen Creek pump station. In late 1971 and early 1972, additional drilling was performed in the Schuylkill River pump station area. In 1973 auger holes were drilled in the area of the emergency spray pond, and in 1974 detailed spray pond investigations were completed.
The cooling tower foundation exploration was also completed at 4
this time. Most of the main plant foundation was exposed at this l
time, and some fracture zones were noted (see Sections 2.5.1.2.5 and'2 5.4.12). Between April and July, 1974, an extensive
) geologic study of these zones and the area around the site was completed by Dames and Moore. This study consists of geologic mapping, with some drilling and test trenching near the Sanatoga, Brooke-Evans, and Linfield faults. Site exploration was 4
3 4
O
- 2.5-44a Rev. 12, 10/82
- v. - - . . - , . - _ _ - . . . - . - . . . - - - . . . _ - . - - . - , . - . - _ . . - - - - - . - . -
l l
)
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O
O Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-44b
14S FSAR
() Type I fill was placed in the areas adjacent to the main power block and as backfill over part of the RHR and emergency service water piping. Type II fill was used for finished grading in the outlying areas, including backfill over part of the safety-related duct banks.
Type I fill consisted of broken rocks and fines obtained from the site excavations and was graded from fine to coarse material-with no rock fragments larger than 8 inches in diameter. It was placed in uniform layers of loose lifts with a maximum thickness of 12 inches and was compacted and tested as described below.
Type I fill placed before July 1971 was compacted to 90 percent of the maximum dry density in accordance with AASHO T180-61,
- Method D, and was tested in accordance with AASHO T147-54. Type I fill placed thereafter was compacted to 90 percent of the maximum dry density in accordance with AASHO T180-70, Method D, and was tested in accordance with AASHO T191-61.
Type I fill was compacted by the following approved types of equipment:
- a. Sheep-foot roller with minimum weight of 4000 pound per linear foot of drum, operated at a speed of approximately 3 miles per hour.
- b. Rubber-tire rollers with minimum of 4 pneumatic-tire wheels maintaining tire pressure on the ground of between 80 to 100 psi. The load per wheel may vary from 18,000 to 25,000 pounds.
- c. Vibratory roller with minimum weight of 21,000 pounds, drum diameter approximately 70 inches and length of 78 inches, and minimum centrifugal force of 40,000 pounds,
.and frequency 1000-1400 vibrations per minute.
- d. In confined areas, hand-operated equipment was used with a maximum lift of 8 inches.
Type II fill consisted of broken rocks and fines obtained from the site excavations. It was placed uniformly in unconsolidated lifts not exceeding 24 inches in thickness, producing a reasonably well graded mass with a minimum of stratification of fine or coarse materials. The material was uniformly spread over the entire area by bulldozer prior to compaction. The material was moisture-conditioned to attain satisfactory compaction.
Type II fill was compacted by the equipment described for Type I fill under general supervision without testing requirements.
Granular Type II fill was also compacted by use of a track-type tractor weighing not less than 60,000 pounds and making a minimum O of four. passes overlapping one-fourth the width of the track on each pass.
2.5-49' Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Select granular backill consisted of imported aggregate or screenings. The maximum particle size was 3/4 inch, with no more than 10 percent by weight passing the No. 200 sieve. Select granular backfill was placed in loose lifts with a maximum thickness of 6 inches and was compacted to 95 percent of the maximum dry density in accordance with AASHO T180-70, Method D.
As an alternative to the above material, when cohesionless select backfill was used, it was compacted to 90 percent of the maximum dry density in accordance with ASTM D2049-69 by the use of both dry and wet methods. In place select granular backfill was tested in accordance with AASHO T191-61.
The cementitious backfill consisted of a mixture of portland cement, aggregate, and water. The minimum compressive strength at 28 days was 80' psi. Testing for' compressive strength of cementitious backfill using sand as aggregate was in accordance with ASTM C-109, ASTM C-31, and ASTM C-39. Testing for compressive strength of the backfill using coarse aggregate was in accordance with ASTM C-31 and ASTM C-39.
Slump tests were performed in accordance with ASTM C-143. The cementitious backfill was consolidated by use of mechanical vibrating equipment for proper placement.
The concrete backfill consisted of a mixture of portland cement, aggregates, admixtures, and water. The minimum 28-day ll compressive strength was 2,000 psi. The standards and specifications that governed the concrete backfill are stated in the following sections:
- a. Section 3.8.6.1.2.2 Mix proportioning
- b. Section 3.8.6.1.4.2 Mixing and delivery
- c. Section 3.8.6.1.4.3 Placing
- d. Section 3.8.6.1.4.4 Consolidation
- e. Section 3.8.6.1.5 Construction testing 2.5.4.5.5 Miscellaneous Category I Facilities - Excavation and Backfill Seismic Category I facilities not founded on unweathered bedrock include part of the spray pond, portions of the underground i piping and electrical ducts, oil tanks, and valve pits. The i spray pond is discussed separately in Section 2.5.4.5.3.
Portions of these Category I facilities are founded on weathered rock, natural soil, or fills. The fills are discussed in Section 2.5.4.5.4.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-50
E
l Underground piping was installed in trenches excavated to a minimum of 6 inches below the pipe. Soft spots and unsuitable materia 1'found at the bottom of the trenches were removed and
. replaced with select granular backfill, cementitious backfill, or concrete. Select granular backfill, cementitious backfill, or concrete was placed at least 6-inches below and on each side of the pipe to a minimum of 12 inches above the pipe. The remainder of the trench was backfilled with Type I fill, select granular backfill, cementitious backfill, or concrete. All Category I piping was buried with adequate cover for missile protection.
. The plans, profiles, and sections showing the detailed relationship of the Category I piping to subsurface soil, fill, and rock materials are shown on Figure 2.5-37.
4 The diesel oil tanks and Category I electrical ducts were buried with adequate cover for missile protection. The Category I valve pits were buried, except the roof slabs, which are missile and tornado resistent and are exposed above ground. Soft spots and unsuitable material found at the bottom of the excavations for these structures were removed and replaced with cementitious ,
backfill or concrete. Where over-excavation occurred below these structures, the select granular, cementitious or concrete-backfilling materials were used. Cementitious backfill was placed at least 2 feet below and on each side of the diesel oil i tanks, to a minimum of 12 inches above the tanks. The remaining backfill to finish grade was placed using select granular backfill. The sides of the valve pits were backfilled with cementious backfill or Type I fills. The electrical duct banks .
. were completly encased in concrete with a minimum of 3 inches of
{ concrete cover on all four sides. The remaining trench excavation was backfilled to finish grade with Type I or Type II l fills. Section 3.8.4.1.6 contains additional discussions on these miscellaneous structures. The plans, profiles, and i sections showing the detailed relationship of the Category I electrical duct banks to subsurface soil, fill, and rock j materials are shown on Figure 2.5-37. ,
t 2.5.4.6 Groundwater Conditions f
i A detailed groundwater study of the plant site is presented in !
Section 2.4.13. Groundwater occurs at the plant site in the :
] Brunswick lithofacies which consist of bedded siltstone, sandstone, and shale. Groundwater flows primarily through i joints, fractures, and other secondary openings in the t
- consolidated rock. The water table is 15 to 95 feet below land l l surface at the plant site. A map of the potentiometrio surface, !
- determined from water levels measured in May, 1979, indicate the j
- groundwater levels range from el 250 feet east of the spray pond i ~ to el 120 feet southwest of the radwaste enclosure. Fluctuation j:
2.5-51 Rev. 12, 10/82 !
l
_ ,_ ._ _ _ _ ..- _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .____.__.____J
LGS FSAR of water levels in' observation wells are indicated by the h hydrographs in Figure 2.4-18.
Groundwater studies conducted for the spray pond include installation of. permanent observation wells and the performance of 41 permeability tests. Permeability values obtained from the field tests at the spray pond are given in Table 2.4-18. The average permeabilities for various materials are as follows:
Material Permeability (ft/yr)
Overburden 3.5 Contact Zone 14.0 Rock 214 2.5.4.6.1 Spray Pond Seepage Analysis The spray pond makeup system has sufficient capacity to replace estimated seepage losses during normal operation. Moreover, the total volume of water in the pond itself is sufficient to accommodate estimated seepage during the 30-day transient period throughout which no makeup to the pond is assumed to be available.
Seepage losses from the pond migrate toward the Schuylkill River and to the north, as shown on Figure 2.5-23. As detailed below, estimated seepage losses from an unlined spray pond indicate that seepage from the pond would not adversely affect the safety and performance of the ultimate heat sink, nor significantly effect groundwater levels beneath the plant site. Nevertheless, a liner is provided.
Estimated seepage losses from an unlined pond were calculated by subtracting the natural, preconstruction groundwater underflow from the total underflow expected after the spray pond is constructed. Flows towarr' two discharge areas were analyzed separately because of the difference in differential heads. Two methods were used to calculate total underflow using Darcy's Law:
construction and analysis of a flow net, and computation of underflow through a peripheral cross-section.
In the first analysis, a flow net method was used in which a plan flow net was constructed as shown on Figure 2.5-23. Total flow was calculated using the equation (from Ref 2.5-42):
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-52
(d Q=
n s KDH D
d (2.5-2 ,
where:
0 = quantity of underflow, ft3/yr n = number of stream tubes s
n = number of equipotential drops d
K = permeability, ft/yr H' = differential head, ft D = aquifer thickness, ft The differential head between the spray pond surface and the Schuylkill River is 140 feet. The differential head between the spray pond surface and the northern discharge area at el 200 ft is 50 feet. An effective aquifer thickness of 140 feet is used
() because of the decrease in number and size of fractures at that approximate depth as observed in the core holes. A permeability of 200 feet per year is used as an effective value for the residual soils and bedrock materials (see Section 2.4.13.2.5).
Underflows were determined to be 5.3 x 10* ft3/yr towards the Schuylkill River, and 1.6 x IOS ft3/yr toward the north, giving a total underflow of 6.9 x 10* ft3/yr.
The second method of analysis, a cross-sectional area raethod, uses the following form of Darcy's Law:
0 = KIA (2.5-3) where:
0 = quantity of underflow, ft3/yr K = permeability, ft/yr
= hydraulic gradient (ratio)
A = cross-sectional area of underflow, fta O
2.5-53 Rev. 12, 10/82
1 l
LGS FSAR Using an aquifer thickness of 140 feet, the cross-sectional area through which both natural underflow and seepage from the pond is flowing toward the Schuylkill River is approximately 224,000 fta; the cross-sectional area through which water is flowing toward the north is approximately 168,000 ft2 The hydraulic gradient is approximately 0.1 toward the Schuylkill River and 0.05 toward the north. The permeability is 200 ft/yr. The rates of underflow determined by this method are 4.5x10* ft3/yr toward the Schuylkill River and 1.7x10* ft3/yr toward the north, giving a total underflow of 6.2x106 ft3/yr.
Preconstruction natural underflow was calculated using equation 2.5-3. The hydraulic gradient (I) was determined from equipotential contours of the groundwater table measured on June 24, 1974, shown on Figure 2.5-23. The hydraulic gradient is 0.08 for flow toward the Schuylkill River, and 0.02 for flow toward the northern discharge area. The cross-sectional areas of natural underflow (A) are based on a saturated aquifer thickness of 110 feet. The permeability (K) is 200 ft/yr, as described above. Based on these parameters, natural underflow beneath the pond is estimated to be 2.74x10* ft3/yr toward the Schuylkill River and 0.54x10* ft3/yr toward the north. Total preconstruction (natural) undarflow, then, is estimated to be 3.3x106 ft3/yr, the sum of these flows.
O Therefore, the estimated spray pond seepage loss from an unlined pond is:
(6.9x108) - (3.3x106) = 3.6x106 ft3/yr (Flow net method) or (6.2x106) - (3.3x106) = 2.9x10* ft3/yr (Cross-sectional area method)
These calculated losses would cause a decline of 0.6 to 0.7 feet per month in the water level of an unlined spray pond, t
l In both methods of analysis, the average permeability is assumed to be approximately that of rock (200 feet per year). Because only 60% of the pond bottom is exposed to rock, and the balance is exposed to residual soils of markedly lower permeabilities, these estimates of total seepage loss from an unlined pond are
[
probably high.
l The spray pond includes a soil-bentonite liner on the bottom and on soil slopes, and shotcrete on rock slopes. The soil-bentonite Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-54
~
() liner is to be one foot thick and will have a permeability of less than one ft/yr (Figure 2.5-24 and Section 2.5.5.4). The seepage loss for the lined pond is calculated to be 1.83 x 10*
gal / month or 2.94 x 10* ft3/yr (Section 9.2.6.4). The liner ensures that the actual seepage loss is acceptable by preventing higher rates of seepage through localized fracture zones in the event such conditions were found to exist. A seepage test will i be performed to-ensure that the design basis seepage rate assumptions are not exceeded.
2.5.4.6.2 Dewatering During Construction Groundwater has presented no problem during excavation and construction in the main power block area. The rock'around the power block has low permeability and did not transmit significant quantities of water into the excavation. Small amounts of seepage occurred along the walls of the radwaste enclosure excavation during construction.
2.5.4.6.3 Groundwater Monitoring 1
() The water level in 14 observation wells at the spray pond and power block area is being monitored monthly (Section 2.4.13.4).
These data provide information on any changes in the potentiometric surface or direction of groundwater flow that may occur during the operation of the plant.
i 2.5.4.7 Response of Soil and Rock to Dynamic Loading The responses of soil and rock to dynamic and seismic loading conditions are discussad in Section 2.5.2. Further discussion of
, response characteristics of soil at the spray pond site is contained in Sections 2.5.4.8 and 2.5.5.2. Soil structure
! interaction considerations are discussed in Sections 3.7.1.4 and 3.7.2.4.
1 2.5.4.8 Liquefaction Potential i
! The soil at the seismic Category I spray pond was analyzed for liquefaction potential. The soils at other seismic Category I facilities were not analyzed since these soils are not saturated and the potential for becoming saturated is negligible.
2.5-55 Rev. 12, 10/82 I
LGS FSAR The liquefaction potential of soil in the spray pond site was analyzed for a maximum ground acceleration of 0.15 g. Because of lh the shallow depth of soil, the maximum induced shear stress was calculated assuming that the soil mass behaves as a rigid body, and the average equivalent shear stress was taken as 65% of the maximum induced shear stress (Ref 2.5-43). The dynamic strength of soil was determined from the cyclic triaxial test results included in Appendix J of the PSAR and is shown graphically in Figure 2.5-19. The equivalent number of uniform stress cycles is taken as five.
The soil profile below the pond bottom used in the analysis represents the most critical section. The soil profile includes a 12-inch layer of protective soil cover and a 12-inch layer of soil-bentonite liner on top of 9 feet of in-situ soil. The pond bottom and the bedrock are at el 241 and el 230 feet, respectively.
The average induced shear stress was calculated as follows:
7 = .065 yh a yd (2.5-4) ave g max where:
yave e average induced shear stress y = saturated unit weight of the material. The values used in the analysis were 123.8 pcf, 119.0 pcf, and 126.4 pcf for the soil cover, soil bentonite liner, and the in-situ soil respectively (Table 2.5-5) h = depth where the induced stress is to be computed a
max = 0.15 9
rd = correction factor (0.98 to 0.99 for shallow soil profile)
The shear strength was calculated based on the results of cyclic triaxial shear tests and equals 0.37 af, which was obtained by multiplying the design cyclic stress ratio of 0.61 (Figure 2.5-19), the effective overburden pressure af, and a correction factor of 0.60 (Ref 2.5-43).
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-56
(,j - The factor of safety was obtained by dividing the shear strength 3-
=
by-the average induced shear stress. Since both the shear strength of the soils and the induced shear stresses are ;
dependent on depth below ground surface, determinations of the I factor of safety against liquefaction were made a'c various depths. The results of this analysis are summarized in 3 Figure 2.5-25. The minimum factor of safety was computed to b,e
, 1.9.
2.5.4.9 Earthquake Desian Basis l
! Derivation of the operating basis earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) are discussed in Section 2.5.2. The liquefaction potential and slope stability of the spray pond are analyzed for the SSE event.
2.5.4.10 Static Stability The reactor enclosures, control structure, diesel-generator
- enclosure, spray pond pump house, spray networks, turbine enclosures, and radwaste enclosure are founded on sound, unweathered bedrock. Seismic Category I facilities not founded completely on unweathered bedrock include the spray pond, underground piping, diesel oil tanks, valve pits and electrical ducts. Portions of these facilities not founded on rock are founded on natural soil and/or manmade fills.
The strength of the unweathered bedrock amply accommodates the loads of the plant, providing highly stable foundation conditions. As measured by seismic refraction surveys in the area of the principal plant structures, compressional wave velocities range from 7000 to 20,000 fps, averaging about 12,500 fps; shear wave velocities range between 5800 and 6100 fps. An up-hole survey (see Figure 2.5-21 for the location) measured a compressional wave velocity of 12,600 fps in the siltstone beneath the site. Unconfined compression test results on rock core samples (refer to Table 2.5-3) range from 460 to 1760 tons /fta, with an average of about 1140 tons /ft*. Poisson's 4
ratio is calculated to be about 0.3 (Table 2.5-3A). Static moduli derived from additional compression tests on rock cores range from 1.2 to 8.3 x IO* psi, averaging 4.1 x 108 psi; compressive strengths range from about 580 to 2370 tons /ft*,.
averaging 1230 tons /fta (refer to Table 2.5-3B).
- Plate bearing tests were run by Dames and Moore at the plant site (Ref. 2.5-50); the results are quite variable. Values of the j 2.5-57 Rev. 12, 10/82
-n-. n-,- . . - , , ...-n
-, .----.,y,,,-.- ,n,- --,,,-.--,,--,,-----,-,,c,,.~.,-,,,,--,,-,,ne._
i LGS FSAR Secant Modulus of Deformation at first loading, which includes h plastic and elastic deformation and also reflects the closing of joints and fractures, ranges from 30,000 psi to 200,000 psi, with an average of 85,000 psi. The Secant Modulus of Elasticity at second loading is much higher, with an average value of 356,667 psi.
A bearing capacity of 30 tons /ft2 60 ksf) for static and frequently applied live loads on sound rock is used for design, following recommendations by Dames and Moore (Ref. 2.5-51).
Actual loads induced by the plant structures founded on bedrock are much less than the allowable bearing pressure of the foundation rock, and they are far below the ultimate bearing capacity. The structural loads produce no significant total or differential settlement of the foundations.
2.5.4.10.1 Static Stability of Safety-Related Structures on Rock The following sections contain information regarding static and dynamic lateral earth pressures and groundwater loads on the reactor enclosure, control structure, diesel generator enclosure including pipe tunnel, and spray pond pumphouse, which are all founded on bedrock. Seismic Category I structures not founded on rock are discussed in Section 2.5.4.10.2.
2.5.4.10.1.1 Diesel Generator Enclosure Including Pipe Tunnel The exterior and interior foundation walls of the diesel generator enclosure are founded on bedrock (Figure 3.8-61). The interior walls support the base slab at El. 217 ft. The space between the bedrock and the bottom of the base slab is backfilled with fillcrete. Concrete backfill surrounds all subsurface walls and extends to the rock profile such that there will be no l transmissibility of lateral pressures to the walls.
The pipe tunnel is a concrete box section with the base slab four.ded on bedrock. The north wall lies parallel to the adjacent reactor enclosure wall and is separated by a 1-in, seismic gap.
The west and east tunnel walls are separated by 1-in. seismic gaps from the adjacent radwaste enclosure and auxiliary boiler enclosure. The south tunnel wall was designed as a cantilever to resist the lateral earth pressure due to backfill which has a saturated unit weight of 140 pcf, an at rest earth pressure coefficient of 0.7, and a surcharge of 250 psf due to AASHO-H2O truck loading and seismic loading during construction.
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-58
_~ - - -_ . .
[( ) The box section was also designed for the lateral earth pressure resulting from the Cooper E-72 railroad loading, the live load on the roof, and the seismic load.
Because the high water table elevation is below that of the
-foundation in the power block region, there are no groundwater 4
loads acting on the foundations of the diesel generator 4 enclosure.
2.5.4.10.1.2 Reactor Enclosure and Control Structure i
The reactor enclosure and control structure are bounded to the north and west by two non-seismic Category I structures--the
- turbine enclosure and the radwaste enclosure. The south and east
- sides of the reactor enclosure and control structure are bounded by pipe tunnels. These pipe tunnels are founded on Class A
. concrete backfill or fillcrete, which extends beneath the tunnel to fill subsurface gaps to the adjacent reactor enclosure walls.
In addition, a seismic separation surrounds the reactor enclosure and control structure walls and prevents the transmissibility of
, lateral forces to these foundation walls.
l The walls of the control structure and-reactor enclosure have been designed for a hydrostatic pressure up to elevation 195 i feet, which is the expected maximum water table elevation in this
- region.-
2.5.4.10.1.3 Spray Pond Pumphouse The foundation mat and walls'of the spray pond pumphouse are i founded on bedrock (Figure 3.8-62). A seismic gap separates the subsurface exterior walls from the Class A concrete backfill such that no lateral earth pressure acts on these walls.
I The north wall of the water pit area has been designed to resist hydrostatic pressure (from El. 236 to 267 ft) and lateral seismic loads. The foundation mat has been designed for the same hydrostatic pressure as the north wall in combination with other ,
concurrent loads. !
- O
- 2.5-59 Rev. 12, 10/82
I LGS FSAR 2.5.4.10.2 Static Stability of Safety-Related Structures on Soil ll The following sections discuss seismic Category I facilities not founded completely on unweathered bedrock. There are no groundwater loads acting on the foundations of the spray pond, underground piping, diesel oil tanks, valve pits, or electrical ducts because the high water table elevation is below these foundations.
2.5.4.10.2.1 Spray Pond The sustained load from the spray pond is less than the weight of overburden removed; therefore, there is an adequate factor of safety against overstressing the underlying soil (Figures 3.8-55, 3.8-56, and 3.8-57). Soil rebound during excavation for the spray pond is insignificant. Section 2.5.5 contains a discussion of slope stability under static and seismic conditions, including the design parameters and test results of soil exploration.
2.5.4.10.2.2 Underground Piping The method used for installation of underground piping is discussed in Section 2.5.4.5.5. The placement of backfill is discussed in Section 2.5.4.5.4. All buried pipes satisfy the diameter-to-thickness ratio (less than 300) requirement in accordance with Reference 2.5-52. Therefore, piping deflection due to earth load will not exceed the allowable. In addition, in accordance with table 1 of Reference 2.5-52, deflections due to AASHO HS-20 loading with the minimum required cover of 4 ft are less than the allowable deflections. Process piping located under railroad tracks that are not encased in concrete are approximately 12 ft below grade. Therefore, the deflection due to Cooper E-80 railroad loading will not exceed the allowable.
The more conservative E-80 loading was used in design for required railroad loadings outside of safety related structures.
2.5.4.10.2.3 Diesel Oil Tanks These tanks are located on a base slab founded on bedrock or cementitious backfill bearing on bedrock as shown in Figure .
2.5-37, sheet 8. The associated valve pits located on top of the tanks are founded on cementitious backfill, which also acts as backfill around the tanks. The cementitious backfill has a minimum compressive strength of 80 psi. The remaining portion is Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-60
) backfilled with select granular fill placed and compacted as l discussed in Section 2.5.4.5.4.
Railroad tracks are located on top of select granular fill. The l base slab bearing pressure is 5410 psf, which includes all dead and live loads and the Cooper E-80 railroad Icading. The bearing pressure on the foundation of the valve pits, including dead loads and AASHO H-20 truck loading, is 2830 psf. The allowable bearing capacities of the rock and cementitious backfill are not exceeded by these pressures.
The walls of the valve pits are designed to resist lateral loads due to backfill having a saturated unit weight of 140 pcf and an at rest earth pressure coefficient of 0.7, AASHO H-20 truck surcharge, and dynamic-lateral loading due to a seismic event.
The roofs of the valve pits are adequately designed to resist AASHO H-20 truck loading and tornado depressurization or missile impact. Because the tanks are founded on bedrock or dense natural soil, the amount of settlement is considered to be insignificant.
As an additional protection against flotation, the tanks are adequately tied to the base slab by hold-down straps. For this purpose, the tanks are assumed to be submerged completely in water.
2.5.4.10.2.4 Valve Pits The valve pits for the RHR and ESW piping (Figue 3.8-69, sheets 2 and 3), which are not founded directly on bedrock, fall into the following categories:
- a. Valve pits founded on concrete backfill with a minimum l compressive strength of 2000 psi, which bears on bedrock
- b. Valve pits founded on cementitious backfill with a minimum compressive strength of 80 psi, which bears either on dense natural soil or on rock, have a minimum bearing capacity of 6000 psf.
The valve pits are designed for AASHO H-20 truck loading. The maximum calculated pressure under the base slabs is 2440 psf.
O The walls of the valve pits are designed to resist lateral loads dee to backfill having a saturated unit weight of 140 pcf and an 2.5-61 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR at rest earth pressure coefficient of 0.7, an AASHO H-20 truck surcharge, and are found to be adequate for additional dynamic lh lateral loading due to a seismic event. The roofs of the valve pits are adequately designed to resist AASHO H-20 truck loading, tornado depressurization or missile impact. Because the valve pits are founded on concrete or cementitious backfill, the amount of settlement is considered to be insignificant.
2.5.4.10.2.5 Electrical Ducts Electrical ducts are encased in Class A concrete having a minimum design strength of 2000 psi. The ducts are buried a minimum of 4 ft below finished grade with Type I or II fill placed and compacted as described in Section 2.5.4.5.4. The duct banks are founded on either bedrock, weathered rock, dense natural soil or compacted fill. Where the bottom of the trenches were overexcavated, they were backfilled under the ducts with a minimum of 6 in. of either select granular, cementitious, or concrete backfill.
Select granular, cementitious, and concrete backfill are l described in Section 2.5.4.5.4.
All Class 1 electrical ducts have a minimum 4 ft of backfill on top, which has been found adequate for Cooper E-80 loading without causing significant settlement or loading of ducts or foundation.
2.5.4.11 Design Criteria 2.5.4.11.1 Design Criteria For Safety-Related Structures on Rock The plant structures founded on rock are designed for a maximum acceleration of 0.15 g from an occurrence of the SSE event. From consideration of its engineering properties, it is evident that the foundation rock would not be measurably affected by seismic loadings, and negligible additional foundation settlement would i
accompany these maximum potential dynamic loads. The maximum j contemplated total static and dynamic loads are only a fraction of the bearing capacity of the rock, thus ensuring an ample margin of safety.
2.5.4.11.2 Design Criteria For Safety-Related Structures on Soil The design criteria and methods of design concerning the l liquefaction potential of soil at the spray pond are discussed in l
Section 2.5.4.8. The design criteria and stability analyses of the spray pond slopes are discussed in Section 2.5.5.2.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-62
's 2.5-48 10.S.' Army,' Corps of Engineers, Stability of Earth and Rockfill-Dams, Encineers Manual EM 11110-2-1902 (April 1970).
2.5-49. T.W. Lambe and R.V. Whitman, Soil Mechanics, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York (1969').
2.5-50 Dames and Moore, Report, Plate Bearing Tests, Reactor i Buildina Area, Limerick Generatina Station, Limerick Townshio, Pennsylvania, March 12, 1971.
-2.5-51 Dames and Moore, Report, Foundation Investication, Proposed Limerick Generatino Station, Limerick Township, ,
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Electric Company, October'S t r 1970. !
2.5-52 American Iron and Steel Institute, Welded Steel Pipe, l Steel Plate Engineering Data, Vol. 3, 1977.
2.5-53 Winkler, L., " Catalog of U.S. Earthquakes before the O
1 Year 1850", Bull. Seism. Soc. America. v. 69, n. 2, 569- !
602, 1979. !
2.5-54 Winkler, L., "Datalog of Earthquakes Felt in the Eastern !
U.S. Megalopolis 1850-1930". Division of Health, Siting i and Waste Management, Office of Nuclear Regulatory i Research, U.S.N.R.C., Washington, D.C. NUREG/CR-2532, l NRC FIN B6724, under contract no. NRC-04-81-168, 27p, ;
1982. i 2.5-55 U.S. Geological Survey, 1930-1981, " United States Earthquakes, 1928-1979". Golden, Golorado.
2.5-56 Northeastern U.S. Seismic Network, 1976-1981, Bulletins 1-23 of " Seismicity of the Northeastern United States", ;
October 1, 1975 -' June 30, 1981. Weston Observatory, i Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts.
l 2.5-57 Southeastern U.S. Seismic Network, 1978-1982, Bulletins ;
1-9 of " Seismicity of the Southeastern United States", i July 1, 1977 - December 31, 1981. Seismological ;
O Observatory, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia.
l 2.5-93 Rev. 11, 10/82
. ,,, , - . , -.. -- ,- - . ...., - .-. . .-.. - - . , - ~ - - , , - . _ . _ .
. - . - - , , , -I
LGS FSAR 2.5-58 Heyers, H. and C.A. von Hake, " Earthquake Data File Summary". National Geophysical and Solar-Terrestrial Data Center, Boulder, Colorado, 1976.
2.5-59 W.J. Hall and V.M. Newmark, Seismic Desian Criteria For Pipelines and Facilities, Journal of The Technical Councils of AISC, November 1978.
O O
Rev. 12, 10/82 2.5-94
.-m l
LGS FSAR O TABLE 2.5-3A REPRESENTATIVE ENGINEERING P OF SOUND FOUNDATION ROC APPROXIMATE AVERAGE PROPERTY VALUE ___
Unconfined compressive strength 15,820 psi 6,370 -
Allowable bearing pressure Normal load 420 psi Normal plus dynamic load 625 psi Density 152 lbs/ft3 140 Compressional wave velocity 12,500 fps 7,000 (ref raction)
Shear wave velocity (ref ract ion) 5,950 fps 5,800 Poisson's ratic (measured) 0.30 Modulus of elasticity (3) 3.0 x 106 psi Shear modulus (a) 1.2 x 106 psi (1) From measurements on unweathered rock in power block ar (2) Dames and Moore, Foundation Report dated October 5, 197 PEco dated August 19, 1971.
(3) Calculated f rom average shear wave velocity and Poissio O
2
=-
Y O _
DPERTIES 313 m
l -
kNGE REFERENCE 24,540 psi Table 2.5-3 -
t2) ^
(2) l _
162 lbs/ft3 Table 2.5-3 _
20,000 fps Sec. 2.5.4.4.1 6,100 fps Sec. 2.5.4.4.2 (2) i
- a. '
, and letter from Dames and Moore to l
's ratio given above.
1
.=
0 -
Rev. 12, 10/82 .--- _ _ . _ ,
-=
+
() TABLE 2.5-4
SUMMARY
OF ENGINEERING PROPERTIES (Page 1 of 2) l OF IN-SITU SOIL AT SPRAY POND PROPERTIES RANGE AVERAGE In-situ moisture content (%) 11.9-38.7 21.7 In-situ total unit weight (1b/fta) 98.6-137.2 122.0 4
Grain size distribution:
Medium grain size, Dso (mm) 0.006-4.4 0.32 Percent by weight passing 15-100 72 ~
no. 200 sieve Atterberg limits:
Liquid limit 27-51 37 Plasticity inder 2-27 15
( Effective consolidated undrained shear strength :
c (psf) -
0 4 (deg) -
33.5 (a)
Undrained shear strength, s (psf) -
1.2 Po Dynamic shear strength -
0.61eo'(2) i' Cyclic stress ratio -
0.61 Standard penetration resistance 7-86 3,6 (blows /ft)
Specific gravity 2.70-2.80 2.76 (1) Po = mean effective principal stress, (7, + 7 )/2 3
(*) s o = effective overburden pressure
.O Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR' O TABLE 2.5-4 (Page 2 of 2)
(,,/ l PROPERTIES RANGE AVERAGE l OTHER THAN AT SPRAY POND SITE l In-situ Moisture Content (%) 8.3 - 21.3 13.4 l In-situ Total Unit Weight (pcf) 126.0 - 140.6 132.8 l Grain Size Distribution Gravel (retain on No. 4 sieve) 4.0 - 25.0 14.0 Sand (passing No. 4 and retain on 12.0 - 54.0 27.0 ,
No. 200)
Silt / Clay (passing No. 200 sieve) 26.0 - 82.0 59.0 Atterberg Limits Liquid Limit 18.0 - 37.0 25.0 Plasticity Inder 3.0 - 17.0 8.0 Standard Penetration Resistance 2 -
98 42 (blows /ft)
Total Shear Strength c = 3.0 ksf, 0 = 180 l Effective Shear Strength c = 0, E = 26.50 i
i O
Rev. 12, 10/82
pea N
/- 91**Pa bt v ee.es
.c a.n, ,i..
,f qI M*
- p _'.
tyyg g essggt .
. __ .5$
h"'O* **" d 1
-' _.r '" " " h %TJb.
~
h l TTPi( A( (Cf @ hTV&if $7%
,1 p itKE CE CdaCSETS .
DecAP% c6 m L ' -
y D4m .9 fuCJS g 4LNN AB.O. AS ,$ p-Aw'IP**$ WAv"T'O*8 ,, @f g.
6 - c~ qe trem utm r eww -ei F
j __ tes _ _ _ . .
I g_'. r K (bwste f . _ - . __
/ /j
_ l..... t .-
~
02 y
1
~
P e. L.
x-a
\ @ \. '
.k a
E e
E n
x E x +i **l M
\ t.-
e
,' N ,.' t!Q l'
' I
/ / l
_ e' '>
iq g .g .l % .
= 1 -*"' 81 - -b ' p t .1;l) , 9i. Jj -
=
, ~ . - ~ 8 r
- . - - / ,M I M
, .[
e N / '
J s -
! / ' M w C ^~ Trm_7 l l ; -
g ~ ~_._p.
pl
_ ,_7 i
- \ m/ W se',
_ -g i\ 1lT
.m ,
c U "
\
l N H "
k
- i J
,i - axmeg; l
i_. ._ _ ._ 4 M I, ~
n . . , , ,
i/i 1
l \ l . _ _
__ _l lma.
g! \ ,
[ M i
, q_ h{ \ 1
. , ~
_L ~
7 j; / '
2
)M l
- -: .. ..a g,
.8, ; i j'
. s,c-ce. care 33 mu.o w
.u n.c 5 h -. l e, g. . _ ...... .mc
- ......w.......... ......x.._. 3 g
. .o Ss, sa ao 44 oo es co*
A k
h E Q -- a e l 7 i e I s
4 sacgagtj=g, = .coiars. . == m i m m s
~
g' 6%r mesQ gg pg
, gg 1 i
,f
- , = - - - son wemw osicwto.aama is sm s s a nts pwq .tomt r.waa>en s wi vm ear. e msectm .:%xm Ffl A _ E p y., c-3 d '"yd W.,..m i b $ 5h**# I E"INmF W Ifl' E"Mp{
7 0& }
- *-Q BWLQ
-m tw m,'
HM46 # 41 w=
" ?c -ygkr ,_m u gyw i ,u wm s eenGZM"* . , . . . .I ii
- 7. .. .. 7 4_-_1- . __ __
p .
-g f_. Q r
\ '
'i cy) '.56 $ b. /t ti ,,,,,
,' f_ m
) - .e._#. ' '
\
/ ?]
h . W , ,-
- b l [ip
/ -
/* t. ,
/ ,- 5 . -
g
/ i
-[E!E' S h 'S 3
s r, / . 2
- 'n
~D
/ - (tjl . ,N x / e n--<
> ~ _ _p , ,-a -
s, x l N
4 as % - a . w. ,
~
- js Li'l' ,. Wf ~~
, g g i 3
usioo I i %
czm ; y ces t g
F i b_exal:ma
-ufi, l i l
num IRE csn
_q en I 1
't i
, l,
(* g srm Er2 N .
I
[ ._ [f m m~geb [J__,_._ .
y _ y !
' @ ~_ ( ";""
g .. LEGEND MG b l Elimsec insitsstoaesearuna
/ I gg J
Ein O. eaw wsway 3 wouis
$*6**,'"*y** y '*'sas
/ \ i
~
_w. m _ ,. m.
s m N - ~ = .
g _
w.. .ac. u.e ej l e f " l I ATDtral b nY.c "*" """8 w or wa ucAmioNNwi
-I' *
' ' . I it , ,, .o ma ua. , ,e ra., u..'
-*rm -g
'N NO** , a LIMERICK GENERATING STATION uo w' s aid V5 .
UNITS 1 AND 2 g _ - FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LIMITS OF EXCAVATION <
a $ ! FOR
=r s ; : POWER BLOCK 4 8 2 SHEET 1 OF 10 l l l FIGURE 2 5.37 REV.12,10/82 1 .
.,-, o
, , ,n ,, m3- s.
~
j#Ig[* , - ;//f /, e'. Y j ,
h,Tfm. _
- (J
'N / ,e f' /.: , ,c '/ L.; ,,jf"~ni-t
/'\ / '
,/ '9 / / g{ ~
i ,,, { g
_. ,f k L, L /' ,
y' a..
, i f ,iijp, -
/
i 6 - 6 :r, p- p ->'
~
a.,
?ff. Y/ \ ,/
~
' ^ * ^ ~
- 5. ,.j ,; ;' lll ,
,, 1 i
Iy
-(',/ - ~, -
j ." *
/
y t
\.t '#. .A
{ {, l- l{[
t t t
, 't
( j s -
- . 4 '
~; ex x y
=c + - q.*
/ ii A :
i v '
. w .g . . _ ____J
'f; 2% ,' ll
. .X.cs >1. .
' ' N ""
+
s-
[ 1="*7dh ,'~~
. I- .3 l,b, Ei { '
Lq A.
g [- -
W ';.
4~
3- .- -
i
~ _h _ ., ,.
m.
3 4 81- di E EIE 3 2is s
em IM i d <r.. /
-/ 3.' %h n e fe M k i%
~ ~ T - ~ ~ ~"n"& --w . xw: '/;- ~l%
~
, ' ' - ~
- N -L ' ' l,
_ _ - ~ _.--n
_______..___ " W f**"" j _ p **c. 7 ;t _,: =,"_, Qj t
E,l e; ti s' .I
' ~'
t.- .
, ' si ) /.
,/
-%. r t . . . . . . . .
q g, ,j . ., - .,
o, ,
- g. %
a.__-_- ., % , fA j
+=., _., _
' -1 '$ , il '
e I &- 2--Q[7 '
_Eij
~
'I a.
-\ ,,- 44i . ,,
%:p y .i t .'..
g_- -
.s,.
.'. M, u. (na am:, g
/~
- 3. . .. ~gs
- '.-- 8- se s
.- m 1 v, \ .1,u , 8 y
~. ,.
,j:
\ \\
fy x ,
~
- emn , ..
,=,
\ -l / 1 ane ' t, c \ '\s i e' '
\ .\
\g\/s
- s. u 4
x
/ . .
s r.- ,
\ (
\ . -
j'# - - -
N
\ -h\,N\ i} $ g rh'.: V -
ik '. . ',
/
tj[; f
,a
\'V.sk,.
s g
,, Y ,- ) y 4 s -
.c f
'k&
x.
1 s Ks >e s
~
\
.a i
,j
\
Q s wy-4a s<h \ r.d
'%Q N' \ ~
I y p.,
s (; Nb'Q,,
x '
g
( -- [
,' s
.awt
,v e l 7 I 5 1 5
. b i,_ I. _ , ' pf \ \ \ ' . .
M
'N X7 h (( a c 3 E [n$4 ..
~
'A anx "*"A 4
t-i A 4
' $( '
--D E F 4
- ll - w . . . - , .__ *i i
-N f
e
\
, p
~
.g
,g : ,a, j _., c g W d>
. ~.
( _
t-q- -
4.
_ , - . _ _ _ . q a
~+y!
, y .
_ y T,",; *_-% k\;%
.. r- s M t --
~Q--+= _ md , % *: ""_
^
y , ., ri 9 \4\T s .
em --- -
Jr lo s g
- )gl -
. } #
'h' wu .,
l
).h i N \KEY .\ PLAN l\
t 't - - -
1 ,,,
, , .',: l f,5;gx :. ' C' . hi
- o
,=r}.- r,9.c Q,n ... o e, y,-
j nl rze Q x ; , -t -- ,. .. _4 .
-\ \- -
%-:-qm- Ai# M --m m i y
. - %c ' % & ,
ise %- . .,
!.1==m-
._m
',),;
- t1.4
', mere w
.aa, I
, . ru_n. . ..A L 3 .:ti.M
,,,,, . . s. e
,da ro se F-m.g-__. . . _ _ . .r - -- -
i i
3
> RMsWL STE A **., 9 t-Emmvrt y;Acrce hya. pus
, , , . , , ,. ,..n -
cre e,s s
~
t!ci.p:O c s
( , e p. ,'
i a.,a_. . l p1A
' l /t
.: <c sn. -u-",
'n =c ia s 'E_, , & I tC-sX:as unce r.= w m }/ l
~ _i.~ .. .;..W. _ ._.qs._ .,
4 n ./ . -
a
! .,..... /, ! **
gp!
,7 1 ,M .i l LIMERICK GENERATING STATION r r, j i ;
UNITS 1 AND 2 l, ; / _n,!Ett fe .
ll FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
,y ,
N 3. ,
y w., .
4
. __ j
- _-- #_ -lj r p,_;, ..____
4' r' A_smen;_-a.-A _- e_ m4 M
. LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY l PIPELINES
.)b N ] h hp~~// / M gr ~ ~
E j j,7 & ELECTRICAL DUGi5 4 l 3 l 2 l
FIGURE 2.5.37 REV.12,10/82
1 1
v: l ll I
a OP
- P b
'/li ! /g i
l l$:71" Np '
4
- 6dll-@
N '~ '
C00t./NG TOWER UNIT /1 t
l.
. ;f; -- - -~1
/4j i
l
- 3,9 t g' -\( { -
7 i
M *
,'," f' \
g ,
f ,
g.g x
$ a
&p; ~- ~~ , ~ i'-(
l A
/ eW .
A*/ n%. ,
p EEGiE* M
, ## ' . N k
.- t,
'2A.._. _ A. _
,s' %!
\
[ED / ' "' O*4
. ' $, h rHR . ,
y N -
i N j 7 V y
e' _ - - . . . _
,1
/
C
- m., s N ) !.
s - - r ,~
\ ,, f',A' b, /
l \ d,' , s 3.- -
\ ETUcarSrN s- . ..
g N, .
s
)
/>
,. _r'd .[# ~
f pi d -,]
', ff' D
/ [, %,, . ,,,",,
l N a
[-
A
[ / g; j [*"
ww
't / rs gw r e l 7 l 6 l 5,
(
N I I I i
-D E F
, ~
O x -
MPI Gj $[' W I A
\ f 7
- m. )j I d- b4t [ -
m.- ;
.L.'_v _1 __ e!
ql .. 2 ~a ' m fl ,,
, M%d
.k
\
\ \ l \
g
} g:
t I*
s '!j Ef
{ g
}
KEY PLAN l
I
'i tN,'s d. @
j' *r g M
a
.j Q{ , .-
te,'
u.
N
- ~,,, #g N
i
/
- n. t esz um.ma m % --M; f*- '
y 7
d N' T - as v,,,g/ ro. e .*
- g4(k , @,, .. ~ (/
'+
\yw',x. ..
=
- g
'p@
%.N
,, N. y N / _ ' ' ' r7#'m ..#v p
..< w-
- 4 # ww% j? g / A4 4 #j *' 'e s '5 v
nm Q . 't i/
f "'EH .'h' % s S ., .,j k .kx '/ [ ~
g, N'N (p
.w < Jy' p,M f ,r .
4%
7 1
,Q) - l , t h ,._ !
' ~*t-Q'
' qg '
i
\
n 'f , ,_,
p a s , x J a w g g;t y _'{s ffr e --
-T EDM WI3 7Kl 7 N
-r, xT1 1 ._ ,, $,' , g_ 7,7,/'
F -Q
$ .,.ft ..'ra r , 7 ,
nw-v,___
. r . .
,~~. a. ,e ,.c_ , .-,; . g,. ; t,l : \ t. 1
, : t .,
\\,,,w L.. . -
7 ..
Q1 g 85$- f_7..__ y'a x. y%.-':
- 7 *--
- } -
ff*ff,7 .r. _,
',* **K ' / ydJ g e3x' ,.-
,,N-Q \ '
/ :
d \s
.\
/
- l.ul"t ..-
"'* * %d ,< i, l =5 l r ; Ql q g sacs J 7 4 (t , 1 t ~ ,, ,~ - -
,//// M////// , LT 'i
' 4343 /t EV V / P / / y. ,s. p:,\",3, w .
T' ~
f' ~
ej !M ',;, '$ #
l '_, m.l ,.,w ::Rc. war!4 ouMD .9ull. OIN$. -
. N % JEle
,,3 'M[M[ m e m : , j'i- .
.. )%D ,< .' .> r ~Y -
p ' ,aerN a ,Y' t , . w ,i f
'v; , / . .
is '
t ..
~
g
- _l, ' /m m
R eN?T?u \ / i /'
K .,' uuma
"'*** I LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
~
/ UNITS 1 AND 2
/,'
I *~
s str FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
/ '<
LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR I
I /h'/ji - "
+ d -._ *~
SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPELINES J {' -W. d~-- & ELECTRICAL DUCTS SHEET 3 OF 10 .
4 3 2 l l l FIGURE 2.5.37 REV.12,10/82
% ===w
. ,3 f ' #Jh,,ae.su ,
){
NM /
~~
,s4 g[*.
{e , _ _ _ . ,
lb '
^
ws - = , -l ~
E t '~ ~~ - -~
N 6 : wy a P ( el ; CM .f [*4-'_ygg -
)'
% . m .
..n*.M te rr W
,$muk. M '
b'N'. I 'k"j'_, ,
_, { ,
..m T. ' g;'I
,' 4'_ ,-'Q m.L m,y
, -y -
y- .
- , _. L
- ew **w s g - .
g,
,,,,c'-
- s- e ug 4
.i
-*g S
L. 3;r
- a. .
)g
....a-... . .
-.e
. m . --.
7ea q
-+a r o is 3
g I ;
ne s,e *. g\ g j , _ mm m m- -, N \gg, ,
h
~
.. r. L. -
3 J. ;
F.. a,does .
t, Q . I ' I E ,,,._ . ;. . ,. '- . -, _.4 s jg 8W' ~~
f- r- - 4i
. ' --~2:1-;... '!**2 C:1p p , 's e.,===
.j P'
// .
4 yz @ h
'f , , ,
~ l
- p. n-.
, , / ,* A. en ~
.u m' p- - . -,,m'*
n e----
,* 4 h
( .: s ==
4 ht: - 3 3- w- ..
u.i L- m'k /
r .__ _
D.s 48' " " ~ ~
Vw
-a g ov W INC 8'M.QQ Q l ON!T E i ~ , . . , . . . . , 2m g 1 8>
, .a i
\ . . . -. .
b . . E.
6:3
,I
! ~ LG W.
--r -
e .
!t/
! l l C w y'$ TDA T!CN t
c n U:LOING
\.
.O MACTCG BUILC/NG C
l j
m r.e as r., n
/ ,
j
[ AllL c__ ~]
A t*y ( 5 $~'
,N511 Ain - l
~ '
5 L OCo< T gis t l
m, o-.-
m.-.
/
/ ,/
,. * /
/
- w. n Y,.Y./ M !//.///){'////
t i LW . >~ . ' " -v% 4,,1 ,' /
A --- 5 - - < - A -- - - - iE --
, M_Mlhd , 1 NYNh- ~7 8
i I 7
ai 6
tt .
5 l l l
i -
unm_ A B C
- amo 7 T m .
--D E F I ' / A V m Sir- /_.
i / r1 f ~~~ [ g m
Q
'..-EN ~ , [/; (
yQ .,,
, Ox 7.'l-
' , M' h +
li,k !!I ! - - - -
( V N ;\ l \ _
g, ggy ptas i .k.. l i ly .t- ! 1 .5
'.j ttx:_ y,:gg C q es .-- i- e . . . -
h'sg y f.
Et"% . _.-i, 3 t,Q i, , , ,//s "
1,l, .:. - = - -
+- -
-.y .
y " ' ' " "
u.',*** e f. .1 l
- .u r ,7 g ~s . - . . _ . . . _ ~ . ,_
a..
N- l
/
- y. :s y ? .,/ ' Q _,a... . . - . . . .
7- '-
~,,.. -
dj 7 j g g.
i
[n. a . ... N _a f.
-:l\g. / l '
7 , t. e k !. 2
/
/% Q.jS t ~" ~ - -
e e, ,
,' _ .- . -==--==., . . - t..
{ .
}/ ..
'~ '
. s soa.
/ il ,,.w....
/ 1,
/ lI; '
/ '
LL I l 3 . .'
' ' ~ .y-;..Jy .
i : y s
- i /. ' ~ ~ s
/ .
ji
/. ,
/-
'. t .f k '
!~ LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
,O lli
// / '*, UNITS 1 AND 2 Y N_- .
// FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
/f hUS '
/- ;4 f /f /' "'" LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR
/ / ff .'
SEISMIC CATEGORY l PIPELINES
.e. /'- :Q{ F"ty%}c :
, 2*r j'
& ELECTRICAL DUCTS SHEET 4 OF 10 __ -
l 4 1 3 [ 2 FIGURE 2.5.37 REV.12,10/B2
M M a . __ p ~
tx ~u......
- MIB ins l / ".
Y !.
h
~
E. "
f r
I !,.
3 V.. I V ga t W i COOL
- - --ern- H, _ _.- - . as .i.
__ . _..g t . - - - -
E I f 'EWi *#
j
- / , ,
=:, .
voc 1.< - -
' \ -4 4 Asdctim ; P *
' \./
4 ** * # g j i' 4 W[ um] 7 4yy 2 . c
- Y' '
a 2 -n .e .-1 e/m.
. .m i
7 F g / ,o4 3 %y %. '
m f'*"'.or, m ,,.A$' ,
m . < .-
/
y 'Aw , W ,a ,
\
, 9,.'
~
,\/ 4 1f,' },
~
~"
W@ jQ@?f[y$' rn,rp. m
'pM R4 ,+
- .,4
. / .uma. tv / -
r, .
,' /
W. 2' a
y ,
d' .
wa*.
I* H I i DN YD'N Y NkDNb f h l
/ i t \ ll
/
/ q 1,Ja y
= ,
/ - . ,
., q
, y ,
.. s . , - , , , l:
Ms 3 k J- p': T x .=s..
, .Y \s\\s '\
g
\ e_ ,
l
'M
\ r i g
A / f \ l Illa A ._ .
m ac n.-
,, wi g l g s, i4 -
__ s l 7 l 6 -1 5
\f --0 E F
_. x -
f \ /
mx a _
wskunumre g 1
?>r--c'lY, R A[ x 'N m. a -- e er - - -
e gy gg g s- .
ggy %
~\ ~.
La 4 eQn
Q gQ, 1% lk ,/
N 4 ,' h5 , us.
l\
M :s /,
w N '
J lj ,A 2D
'f-
A ..
.je(
n ; m i t
!l
- 5
- / 'r ab 12'
, & a ,4 /
h
..hy, '
y e 3 k
[
h g M ~
A{h! .
A
/
,/ N
^
/
/g m..m ,, .
/'., ~ =
/
/. ~
./
.y f
f*
\
g
.4 #p' e
's. f
{
j
_t
.'. - \.
ff ,
f l2,", ,l# '.a kaa se
+
M Jj[7
.f
" A--
I l
v y- p . . ... ._y - ~]
l : k l- .i 3 ,
l
.1. . . _ .l -
1 Iv v [p mes.. , ,,.
9 j J ,_ . --
a, m t
5/
M l
// LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
,/ UNITS 1 AND 2
,/ FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT t
I C f 1 I
L LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPELINES
& ELECTRICAL DUCTS SHEET 5 OF 10
{
- l 8 1 2 l _
FIGURE 2.5.37 REV.12,10/82
N 6
I i
E ,
s
/
y f Te a *.-c am i r s
1',,;, ,i ,, ; >_- , / , ./,,,,,
4 ,
h _}
E Y
, , _ _, __ s , .
_ f g., -y -- , c
.y .
n- y U_. \
y ui
- .)'-- .,
t
,,_ a '
d~~ '
c Y.
i l '
.w.... ...
g ~~
, d:= ==
Q '.
f, ,
,/
$-d;-si A /
o g
y\\
1 m
l L- eLach auct x:wc s'
/
o y , .
c .
y* .
i _c.e b;
A i +
NE
.s n
/ / .
- I 7 l
- l 5 j
i l- . . . . . . .
l u
A lB C
-D h ,G >-- bA; N
\h # k_NN gA4 M
8 ~
$'dMkY\
s- s T %**>I U V\
KEY PLAN i
k, N
, AEWr 3.> l G ^ , ' , ,'+
\
,f~- -. ,, *
~
/ s
's.
s
'N h #Pt h -
N.
\ ',
t N '-
s 4\ .
\' '
IE'1 .
r= ==
\
, y7
, fg LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
\ , .
UNITS 1 AND 2 3L G TCWER UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
\
8\ LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR
~~r
\ I b, \ SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPELINES l $ 2: ELECTRICAL DUCTS SHEET 6 OF 10 FIGURE 2.5.37 REV."123dd2 U
gl I .; ' " _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
g .
t 1 II I' g .
I sum ]
- ' A
&/. ' ) ('/,, ,/f/ :
~f// /,,c g ,,
1 by -._ r v/@m v/ ,/m 4.,nes/ f//,,g mm -%,f
,ac,-
m m . / ,1
. '/ 3, /' \,% ,.
KI / /LLena
/, _n_'
- 6ii,j,,g , , - ,- . l_ j G s ~m.
. ~
j I j
{ ,, ,y ,
YNM
/
~l w- %,mm.,, \
M- ,m =
,/
- F -
% le' y ,./ '
~ -
',=,
/ '~~
/
f~T. - =_ ,,
k'y./
~
, ,. h-] . fI t
/p gy/g-7 -
r
,) /
.0;~D.
/ ,
/
j, s j::l, '
6 r
/ 9
- F
. . k l s l .
g p
/ /
$lIE ma
/
e r' O CO l/NG ' TOWER i
('
A g llll ,',. ~
/i e '.
5- B+
' I 7 I s ;
f
= =' = .. ,, 'x 8 '
/ 7' h
~~
f/ j // // '
/ * -.
O $$%; y fO/ '
!j ,w/ / #f A ? m o Ll ae.s , ,e- m- / n. / \ g y.
I L)9
,/ , .'._ u u m m e Wi-
// f ', / %. sk x9 l/. -ifkW h\f
/ <i
/. ~ \., )
/EW DQ, q L
5 ( \, l
' T' u v\
l
,' E.e". GEE EARTascAs puGT
/
/
/.
s -
_1 _. N ~
g '
<f
',,' /*"*
l l
- a unvou n_esa Y
x "g j' L y y \ {~ $
_I r m___. . w. _.pc{= .
~r_-
)
l ; 4 1 *t2 ) .
.J [A %..
'g 7
~ N. v/ ,
w
\ K . /
,e'
/=
'[ ,/ ,
l N .. Nl ,
fl i
/ ; /
'\
~ 'd -
~
(
/
\h \) ;
\ /- LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
\ / -
UNITS 1 AND 2
/
'\ - FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
"# /.
.d k\ * * *^ar - b -
'l LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY l PIPELINES, g ,
l""*' ELECTRICAL DUCTS &
~
SPRAY POND PUMPHOUSE SHEET 7 OF 10
, g , g , y FIGURE 2.5.5 REV.12,10/82
I enunma, mm.amur 941EL 4tM
, , i 9-- T t-?'
Is l I
_ k i \ p_.j._.msnm_ _ _ . _ _ _ .
(l F-~
\lQt~%; , s i
e . . 'N.
.' /
's o
! j_ .u[l i i
.eisi i i
m /
- /\ ,-
s.co - - e"' 2 - -E f ,' I__ _' / h a,
_.lis'& _ _ .-s U2
%_-4p L :_ ,__ _n f.:_,= x --- - -
"___-___-~ _-~- /, - '/
.--n -, ,- /'/ /
/s _s _ ,. _ .._ _ _cmA _,[ ' r ' ' NJ p/' M/j // /j'/_945 r
./
LGwV 4 .n.-px
= _ _ = - _-____-
- ,o _ ,
/
s% ,
5.0.t _- L. -+-y_ . m .-+_s u-.~._ - - - - s U -a J'_ ..
E w94W daw m n F2%*4% f
/p/
,/
/ //
_, 4__.1
//__.
<_ / u._: u y w,,, m_ 4 f' b I l b /b,,-p
- ///////////n7mn////z,<t .- J
}
1 EuCAVATION FOR DIE *f,L oit STOWaE TAWMS C
m.4 r,r cw > f u a- ,- i r--- i r--- ,
r- r i r--- , --- i r--- i s i l i ii s l iji il I e l i j
- r - -l --l r[
i L_Ta J L _ tar __J L _ t!_ J L_ t _J L _ q., _ J L_u_J t ri., J L4a 'I s _ /h
- s ,,- - - - __ __ _ __ __
_.s_ c a_ _ _ _ __ _. _ _ _ __.4 4 g (ca e ver.ous saww.caomr i 4 -
- -* I sm12,14 1 341
, ,e. as4 SECTION M
\ ./
h 8
1 7 I 5 i
r-m
@: eu t s
n @ O S e gr' xmuwa -
! E e
.$. )4 t
k __ _ _. -_ _
4---- - -
1 f , _
sNQNNKNN'sNNNh <xNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN1 [ N1"<%
'-Q' '
- i EEA '/ gi
. i I
/ 1
,,m N.
ll ti _ _ _ . _
_ __ _ _ __ _. p' _,__ _/dL_ _ i_2 _ ___ '_
- - _- . _ - G ' _ ,%.'.L - _ y L J .c = g'ie_ 4-_ _j. .
- _p g/ b.:p= gh- = - _u"4I.- *
, f
/
//' , g l!!
y/ _/, w ,'.<
f//,,/
zq' 4s
/f.
j/ /-- /
</
- /
W
/,
g.
? * * * * * *
,,,y y ( sauna -.. .. um 7-17 Ei y sm__
) ;m . _ _- wyn Z2--
in
- lw w -
"""'"*2-e.i fie ~s l s'ff 49'-C* T4*
i m a-2lTO.'.*
" " " " K* "' 7 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SE C T/ CA/
LIMITS Or EXCAVATION FOR DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANKS
& DIESEL OIL LINES SHEET 8 OF 10 l 5 4 3 l 2 l l FIGURE 2.5.37 Rev. u, iu/82
an== A N
I I e la l f44se*wascaviem.as ea* = ==>
w a moca -
,_ m i taii eu t setm w nowas\
- _ . ~ l _ )/
ur- 3,,,
--_._.___i_
g 6'**N' M Dx=ww~_- ~_ .._:..._ = . . . _ _..~.____m.<~~=
_ n _ _. ~ = w. . ~
G PAOFILE A-C 280 .
t
"" (se sa*=.catacas : pwni.as on.*w
,visru a se eeu.<are e w o,unoemenow.c
% T
=
- . . - --~~~~~~~s--- ]-) -
un.W5MM25S&i' Q W-& R y g & & k Q G "55cY EEN 1an PROFILE B-B E
2
. o .
<r'
,or ee scanacm t ses 4e ca % w s
, Tvre t Fu eeTTcM m sacAwatio.e w or w
~ '
an
\ n \
D
^* -W. .~. ..m ,2 . = ~~'~~- --
- :-._c
- .L..
iu --c_--
_ - d' ~ = v-- - -- -.-
. _ _ . u
.&i't. -L=Emz&% 'E t s h .=~ w .-- --
==
" -&.QQ"%w.:w==.= i==:.a=& +-'+
-}^%N 5kj_[sQ'._q71535.95El f^2=~2&~fE+'. :^='5-T=^h ~E
= =a=,.- -
<-w.
PROFILE C C emace%
C B
h N g i
, A ha i r.no ame ~m m 8 7 6 l 5 l l
t.
t 9
8 d
f I -
i_ ~
s _ -
i _ _-- _ _ _
gggwCTLR~fE5W3-=Y$W E'555~
1 I
-~~
g___ __ - - _-
e UV g g q=g g f=& g='O~-~~q 4 g QFsCa55% "-
I s
'I
\ - -
l
, _ _ _ _ - - .# -w _ s.u.
o g- @ 73k TOEYM tutb
_:::e.._ .
- c:ih % 9'J.%* *'{$
m mmm..caoui
-=.:
w ~ m. .w:
m m.sm or sacanse v
. u. ..mv s.. .s. . w.
m
~ ' ' -
tr ..
e,.
-. . era s.
ma5 .=
...=.a.=3.
SJue.fE.PR$$$Nj$D M fl .$CT%
$44 S.
- LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 l FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT M
LIMITS OF EXCAVATION FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY l PIPELINES SHEET 9 OF 10 4 l 3 l 2 l FIGURE 2.5.37 REV.12,10/M
A <**"tu H
too
,ae
. M4% M M _
.=aor W 4 lum _ _ -S'**'wl _ _
et..
~
ce r." -
w .ms t q l
~ " ' _ ' i, -
K'--_~~~ : ,-
G u, UW % ssyN,w ;,.ww.(;h-'wy c - -0 w
- .w MM'~.~.%.~. e-tw~G4 w %Qh, s %, % :M-:
y ;99 echsetestet 6 des 08m4Ger 0.--_ 1 n hT9%99 erfte se95EOSO959 6 Awe w sensucft us Ges**One*4 4AmOa h F
I J
M
-. _ -__ ___-----c---
% ~ [
ikAsM%CA4. puCT Gd E
1 N
. .. . I _.-.
. ~ ,
m ~--_~ K ~ ~~ _ _ - m PAW MM M --
~ -- ._ _ __n '
N
$40 % g4
'= -m- % .-1 C
PROFILE OF ELEC a o- . m FBCPs4 ppmusert I e W 8
g i f A ma ce ta 1
elg7 yq e ,
l n
- ij!
'., (il !y-
,N ij l % hi
]
.\
i
{i!' \\
cIf ;
/t i:/ l
- , \
~
l _t i y/
li !l I
A
///l I
l d
.;j q
- i. 1 l, ll Li s- ;
- ;\-
N s.$SC p!
- sn s !!
m Islet sE E58 iE si Rig ae 2
- J
[^'; TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont ' d) b QUALIT)
SOURCE GROUP OF LOCA- CLASSI)
FSAR SUPPLY TION FICATIf SYSTEM / COMPONENT [ 40 ] SECTION [ 1 1* I 2 ]* I31* i P PW D
- 5. Laundry drain filter RW D
- 6. Piping and valves P Pumps, centrifugal P RW D 7.
B. Gaseous Waste Management System 11.3
- 1. Heat exchanger P RW D
- 2. Pressure vessels P RW D
- 3. Atmospheric tanks P RW D
- 4. 0-15 psig tanks P RW D
- 5. Recombiner P CS D
- 6. Preheater P CS D
- 7. Aftercondenser P CS D
- 8. Ref rigeration equipment, piping P RW D
- 9. Refrigeration equipment, other P RW D
- 10. Piping and valves P RW D
- 11. Pumps / compressors P RW D C. Solid Waste Management System 11.4
- 1. Tanks, atmospheric P RW,T D
- 2. Phase separators P RW D
- 3. Waste containers P RW -
- 4. Centrifuges P RW -
- 5. Piping and valves P PW D
- 6. Pumps P RW D i
l V WATER SYSTEMS l A. Service Water System 9.2.1 l
- 1. Heat exchangers P R,T D
- 2. Piping and valves P R,CW,T D
- 3. Pumps P R,CW D l /\ .
k/
s B. Emergency Service Water System 9. 2. 2
- 1. Piping and valves P R,T, C/D 0,S
- 2. Pumps P S C
~
r -- a-- -
l r
! (Page 6 of 33) l l PRINCIPAL F CODES AND SEISMIC Q-
)N STANDARDS CATEGORY LIST
, _ [ 41* [ 51* [ 61* COMMENTS III-3 II N [18]
III-3/ II N [18]
B31.1 III-3 II N [18]
VIII-1 II N [18]
VIII-1 II N [18]
API-650 II N [18]
API-620 II N [18]
III-3 II N [18]
III-3 II N [18]
III-3 II N [18]
B9.1/B31.5 II N [18]
VIII-1/ II N [ 18 ]
TEMA C IIl-3/ II N [18]
B310 1 I MF STD II N [18]
API-650 II N [18]
API-650 II N [18]
MF STD II N [18]
MF STD II N [ 18 ] l l III-3/ II N [18] l l B31.1 l
III-3 II N [18] l VIII-1/ II N TEMA C
! B31.1 II/ IIA N MF STD II N O
III-3/ I/ IIA Y/N B31.1 III-3 I Y Rev. 12, 10/82 ~
~
Nm LGS FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (cont' d)
QUALITY SOURCE GROUP OF LOCA- CLASSI-FSAR SUPPLY TION FICATIOt SYSTEW COMPONENT [40) S ECTION f 11* [ 21* I31*
PP VI DIESEL-GENERATOR SYSTEM 9.5.4,9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7 l
- 1. Day tanks P G -
- 2. Diesel generators P G -
- 3. Tanks, diesel fuel storage P O .- ;
4.- Heat exchangers, jacket water P G C j and lube oil, air cooler coolant
- 5. Filters and strainers, lube cil P G -
and fuel oil systems )
- 6. Lube cil heater P G -
- 7. Air receivers P G -
l
- 8. Compressors P G - ;
- 9. Cooling jacket water heater P G -
- 10. Drain tank, dirty lube oil P G -
l
- 11. Piping and valves, fuel oil system P G,0 -
,O 12. Piping and valves, diesel lube cil system P G -
[
- 13. Piping and valves, diesel starting P G -
air system from receiver !
to diesel skid !
- 14. Piping and valves, other P G -
i
- 15. Transfer pumps, fuel oil system P G,0 - l
- 16. Pump, lube oil P G -
[
- 17. Pump, jacket water cooling P G
- 18. Pump motors, fuel oil system P G,0 -
- 19. Electrical modules, with safety P G,CS - !
functicn !
- 20. Pumps, circulating water, P G -
}
pre-lube, air cooler, and ;
standby circulating lube !
l l 21. Lube oil storage tanks P G -
) 22. Diesel combustion air intake and P G,0 -
exhaust piping j i
VII HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR l CONDITIONING SYSTEMS l i
A. Control Structure l l
- 1. Control Room HVAC System 9.4.1.1
- a. Water chillers (except condenser) P CS D
{
- b. Water chiller condensers P CS C l
^
r (Page 8 of 38)
PRINCIPAL O
CODES AND SEISMIC Q-STANDARDS CATEGORY LIST
[ 41* [ 51* [ 61* COMMENTS HYD. I III-3 I Y IEEE-387 I Y III-3 I Y [22]
III-3/ I Y TEMA C VIII-1/ I Y MF STD MF STD I Y III-3 I Y MF STD I Y MF STD I -
Y MF STD II N B31.1 I Y III-3/ I Y MF STD III-3/ I Y MF STD MF STD II N [19 ]
B31.1 I Y MF STD I Y MF STD I Y IEEE-323, I Y 344 IEEE-323, I Y [11], [12]
344, 279 MF STD I Y III-3 I Y I MF STD I Y [44] l 1
VIII-1/ I Y
/IEEE-323 III-3 I Y Rev. 12, 10/82
LGD FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont' d) s
%,/ QUALITG; SOUFCE GROUP ,
OF LOCA- CLASSI-FSAR SUPPLY TION FICATI@
SECTION f 11* _ f 2 ]* f 318 SYSTEM / COMPONENT [40)
XI AUXILIARY SYSTEMS A. Safeguard Pipino Fill System, 6.3 Including Feedwater Fill System
- 1. Piping and valves, from and including P P A .
isolation valves, to feedwater lines P E B
- 2. Piping and valves, other B !
- 3. Pumps P R B. Suppression Pool Cleanup System Fig. 6.3-9
- 1. Piping and valves, to second P R B isolation valve
- 2. Piping and valves, af ter second P R D isolation valve
- 3. Pumps P R D C. Demineralized Water Makeup System 9.2.5
- 1. Tanks P W -
- 2. Piping and valves P ALL -
- 3. Pumps P W -
D. Drywell Chilled Water System 9.2.10
- 1. Chillers P T D
- 2. Cooling ceils P T -
- 3. Piping and valves, other P T,P D
- 4. valves, isolation to primary containment P R B i S. Pumps P T D l
l 6. Piping associated with isolation valves P C D at primary containment penetratien E. Control Structure Chilled Water System 9.2.10
- 1. Piping P CS D
- 2. Valves P CS D
- 3. Pumps P CS C
- 4. Motors, pump p CS -
l
- 5. Chillers (except condensers)- P CS D
- 6. ' Chiller condensers P CS C I
r- - V -
~%
(Page 20 of 38)
PRINCIPAL CODES AND SEISMIC Q-STANDARDS CATEGORY LIST f 41* f 51* f61* COMMENTS III-1 I Y ,
l III-2 I Y l III-2 I Y l III-2 I Y B31.1 IIA N MF STD IIA N API-650 II N O
B31.1 II N B31.1/ II N I
HYD.I VIII-1 II N ARI II, IIA N B31.1 II, IIA N '
III-2 I Y HYD.I/ II N B31.1 B31.1 I Y B31.1 I Y B31.1 I Y III-3 I Y IEEE-323, I Y l 344 i VIII-1/
IEEE-323 III-3 I Y Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd) (Page 34 of 38)
[17]The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbines do not fall within the applicable design codes. To ensure that the turbine is 1
fabricated to the standards commensurate with their safety
- and performance requirements, General Electric has
< established specific design requirements for this component in their specification.
. [18]Certain major liquid, solid, and gaseous radwaste system components were designed, fabricated, procured, installed, and tested to the requirements of ASME Section III,
! Division 3, prior to May 1978. After May 1978, system design, fabrication, materials, procurement, installation, and testing are, at a minimum, in accordance with quality
~ group D and the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.143, Rev. 1, subject to the following clarifications and exceptions:
- a. Certain atmospheric tanks are welded to API /AWS standards in lieu of ASME Section IX.
I b. Curbs or elevated thresholds are not provided for indoor tanks because of the watertight integrity of the l
surrounding structure.
- c. Hydrotest pressure is held for 10 minutes, in accordance with ASME Section III, rather than 30 minutes.
- d. The radwaste enclosure is designed in accordance with seismic Category I criteria (Section 3.8.4). Limerick does not use Regulatory Guide 1.60, as stated in Section 1.8. Alternate methods are discussed in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.
- e. Limerick's quality program during construction does not require audits of activities associated with radwaste systems, and items of noncomformance and their regulation are not always documented,
- f. Cleaning and welding of piping is conducted in accordance with the specified piping quality group.
[19]See Section 3.2.2 for discussion of conformance to Regulatory
~
Guide 1.26.
[20]These components and associated supporting structures must be
, designed to retain structural integrity during, and after, the SSE, but do not have to retain operability for protection of 'ublic safety. The basic requirement is prevention of structural collapse, and damage to equipment and structures
() required for protection of the public safety and health.
Rev. 12, 10/82 i
LGS FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd) (Page 38 of 38)
)
[37]The final survey and measurement of the as-built emergency spillway are conducted under the applicable portions of the quality assurance program to ensure that the geometry and riprap gradation satisfy design requirements.
[38]A complete description of the codes and standards, seismic category, and Q-list status of piping and instrumentation within the spray pond is shown on Figure 9.2-3.
i
[39] Design codes and standards are under consideration and will be added to this table when finalized. !
[40] Specific components that comprise parts of major components with the same design criteria are generally not listed. For example, transformers are a part of load centers or switchgear, and valve operators are a part of motor operated valves.
[41] Raceway systems include conduit, cable trays, and their supports. Raceway firestops and seals are not 0-listed.
O However, quality control provisions commensurate with Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 are applied to the raceway firestops and seals.
i l [42] Inverters do not supply power to safety related loads. The
! Class 1E battery loads are discussed in Section 8.3.2.1.1.4.
[43] Primary, backup and fault current protection devices are subcomponents of switchgear, load centers, motor control centers and distribution panels, which are Q-listed as shown in items X.A, X.B and X.C.
[44] Cast iron exhaust piping beyond the roof penetration is not
- Q-listed.
i i
I l
Rev. 12, 10/82 l l
I
. _ ___. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _._ _ _ _. . . _. ._ __ I
() Regulatory Guide 1.61 is not used as a design basis as discussed in Section 1.8. However, all the values shown in Table 3.7-2 agree with the Regulatory Guide with the exception of the SSE value for welded steel structures. The damping value of 5 percent (shown in PSAR Table C.2.1) is based on information given in Reference 3.7-6. The 5 percent value has been used, with appropriate design margins, because the stress levels for SSE conditions are allowed to approach the yield point.
3.7.1.4 Supportino Media for Seismic Cateoory I Structures All seismic Category I structures are supported on sound rock or concrete backfill bearing on sound rock, except for some yard facilities such as. valve pits and portions of electrical duct banks and underground piping which are supported on natural soil or fill (Section 2.5.4.10). For the dynamic analysis of the rock-founded structures, soil-structure interaction is considered to be lll '
negligible due to the high stiffness of the rock. The modulus of elasticity, the shear wave velocity, and the density of the supporting medium used in the analysis are 7.3x10* psi, 6000 fps, and 150 lbs/ft3, respectively. However, the floor response spectra developed for the reactor enclosure and the containment for equipment analysis are based on a model that considered the flexibility of the supporting medium.
() 3.7.2 SEISMIC SYSTEM ANALYSIS Seismic Category I structures and systems, and components of the NSSS that fall under the category of a seismic system, are discussed here. Seismic systems are analyzed for both OBE and SSE.
3.7.2.1 Seismic Analysis Method 3.7.2.1.1 Seismic Analysis Methods (NSSS)
Analysis of seismic Category I NSSS systems and components was accomplished, where applicable, using the response spectrum or time-history approach. Either approach utilizes the natural period, mode shapes, and appropriate damping factors of the particular system. Certain pieces of equipment having very high natural frequencies may be analyzed statically. In some cases, dynamic testing of equipment may be used for seismic qualification.
A time history analysis involves the solution of the equations of the dynamic equilibrium (Section 3.7.2.1.1.1) by means of the methods discussed in Section 3.7.2.1.1.2. In this case, the duration of motion is of sufficient length to ensure that the maximum values of response are obtained.
A response spectrum analysis involves the solution of the
, equations of motion (Section 3.7.2.1.1.1) by the method discussed in Section 3.7.2.1.1.3.
3.7-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR 3.7.2.1.1.1 The Equations of Dynamic Equilibrium h Assuming that velocity is proportional to damping, the dynamic equilibrium equations for a lumped mass, distributed stiffness system are expressed in matrix form as:
[M] {u(t)} + [C] {u(t)} + [K] {u(t)} = {P(t)} (3.7-1) where:
u(t) = time-dependent displacement of nonsupport points relative to the supports u(t) = time-dependent velocity of nonsupport points relative to the supports u(t) = time-dependent acceleration of nonsupport points relative to the supports
[M] = diagonal matrix of lumped masses
[C] = damping matrix
[K] = stiffness matrix P(t) = time-dependent inertial forces acting at nonsupport points 3.7.2.1.1.2 Solution of the Equations of Motion by Mode Superposition The first technique used for the solution of the equations of motion is the method of mode superposition.
The set of homogeneous equations represented by the undamped free vibration of the system is se
[H] {u(t)} + [K] [u(t)} = {0} (3.7-2)
Since the free oscillations are assumed to be harmonic the displacements can be written as
{u(t)} = {d} e (3.7-3) i where
{d} = column matrix of the amplitude of displacement {u}
3.7-4
) Two separate analytical procedures were employed to satisfy the above requirements. A time-history analysis was used to develop
, instructure response data, and a modal response spectra analysis was used to develop stress distributions within the various structures. The mathematical idealization of the structural '
- characteristics of the various seismic Category I structures was
. spectra (Section 3.7.1.1), the synthetic tioe history.
~(Section 3.7.1.2), and the soil-structure interaction parameters (Section 3.7.2.4) used for development of floor response spectra i for equipment assessment. Refer to, Figures 3.7-10 through 3.7-19 for either a pictorial representation or an actual sketch of the l mathematical models used. A complete description of the ,
! formulation of the mathematical models and their use is provided l
- in Section 3.7.2.3.2.
3.7.2.2 Natural Frequencies and Response Loads The natural frequencies of the primary containment, the reactor enclosure, and the control structure below 33 cps are shown in l Tables 3.7-5 and 3.7-6 respectively. The significant mode shapes l
- of the containment and the reactor enclosure and control i structure are shown on Figures _3.7-20 through 3.7-30. The mode shapes for the primary containment are for the horizontal and i vertical directions. The reactor enclosure and control structure mode shapes are for each of the three principal directions
- east-west, north-south, and vertical.
Tables 3.7-7 through 3.7-16 show the response (i.e., ,
displacements, accelerations, shear forces, bending moments, and axial forces) of the primary containment and the reactor
! enclosure and control structure for both OBE and SSE. :
Response spectra at critical locations are shown on l Figures 3.7-31 through 3.7-40. The curves are shown for each of .
the principal directions at the damping values shown (see Section l
- 3.7.2.15.1 for further discussion of damping values). !
! Figures 3.7-41 and 3.7-42 represent the response spectra of the t
+
refueling area using soil-structure interaction. !
)
3.7.2.3 Procedures Used for Modelinc !
3.7.2.3.1 Procedures Used for Modeling (NSSS) l i
3.7.2.3.1.1 Modeling Techniques for Seismic Category I i Systems and Components !
O An important step in the seismic analysis of seismic Category I NSSS systems and components is the procedure used for modeling.
i 3.7-9 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR The techniques currently being used are represented by lumped h masses and a set of spring-dashpots idealizing both the inertial and stiffness properties of the system. The details of the mathematical models are determined by the complexity of the actual structures and the information required for'the analysis.
3.7.2.3.1.2 Modeling of Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals The seismic loads on the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and internals are based on a dynamic analysis of an entire RPV-enclosure complex, with the appropriate forcing function supplied at ground level. For this analysis, the models shown in Figure 3.7-19 and the mathematical model of the enclosure are coupled together.
This mathematical model consists of lumped masses connected by elastic (linear) members. The stiffness properties of the model are determined using the elastic properties of the structural components. This includes the effects of both bending and shear.
In order to facilitate hydrodynamic mass calculations, several mass points (fuel, shroud, vessel) are selected at the same elevation. The various lengths of control rod drive (CRD) housings are grouped into the two representative lengths as shown in Figure 3.7-19. These lengths represent the longest and shortest housings in order to adequately represent the full range of frequency response of the housings. The high fundamental natural frequencies of the CRD housings result in very small seismic loads. Furthermore, the small frequency differences between the various housings, due to the length differences, result in negligible differences in dynamic response. Hence, the modeling of intermediate length members becomes unnecessary. Not included in the mathematical model are the stiffnesses of light components such as jet pumps, incore guide tubes and housings, spargers, and their supply headers. This is done to reduce the complexity of the dynamic model. To find seismic responses of l these components, the floor response spectra generated from the i system analysis are used.
l The presence of fluid and other structural components (e.g., fuel within the RPV) introduces a dynamic coupling effect. Dynatic effects of water enclosed by the RPV are acc6unted for by introduction of a hydrodynamic mass matrix, which serves to link the acceleration terms of the equations of motion of points at the same elevation in concentric cylinders with a fluid entrapped in the annulus. The details of the hydrodynamic mass derivation are given in Ref 3.7-5. The seismic model of the RPV and internals has two generalized coordinates in the horizontal . j directions for each mass point considered in the analysis. The <
remaining generalized vertical coordinate is excluded because the l vertical mode frequencies of RPV and internals are well above the significant horizontal mode frequencies. A separate vertical analysis is performed. The two rotational coordinates about each 3.7-10
/
~ ,
() equipment meets the seismic design criteria.
least one of the following:
The data f.nclude at
- a. Recent test data acquired from dynamic tests of equipment
- b. Dynamictestdatafrompreviouslytestedcomparable ,
equipment i H
- c. Performance data from equipment which, during ncrmal operating conditions, have been subjected to. dynamic loads equal to or greater than those defined in Section 3.7.3.1.1.1 ,
Typical test methods used are as follows:
- a. Single frequency sine beat test
- b. Single frequency dwell test
- c. Multifrequency test 3.7.3.1.1.3 Combination of Analysis and Dynamic Testing Certain equipment was qualified by a combination of analysis and '
O dynamic testing. Experimental methods are used.to' aid in the formulation of the mathematical model for the equipment. Mode shapes and frequencies are determined experimentally and incorporated in the mathematical model of the equipment. The ,
model is then subsequently analyzed by the procedure described in Section 3.7.3.1.1.1.
3.7.3.1.2 Piping Systems BP-TOP-1, Rev. 3 (Ref 3.7-4) describes the methods used for seismic analysis of piping systems. Ref 3.7-4 is followed on Limerick with the following exceptions:
In seismic analysis the modal responses are combined by SRSS, and l lower damping values than specified in Ref 3.7-4 are used.
See Section 3.7.3.7.2.
3.7.3.1.3 Class IE Cable Trays The cable trays are seismically qualified by the capacity evaluation method which consists of the following:
- a. Calculation of the fundamental frequency of the cable tray based on the tray properties obtained from static tests 3.7-17 Rev. 12, 10/82
/
i ,
^
b'. Seismic load computation based upon the tray frequency and the design spectra
- c. Calculation of the tray allowable capacity
- d. Evaluation of the tray capacity by interaction formula
' ~
3.7.3.1.4 Supports for seismic Category I HVAC Ducts and Cable Trays The supports for HVAC ducts and cable trays are analyzed by the response spectrum method (see Ref 3.7-2).
3.7.3.2 Determination of Number of Earthquake Cycles 3.7.3.2.1 Determination of Number of Earthquake Cycles (NSSS)
To evaluate the number of cycles which exist within a given earthquake, a typical BWR enclosure-reactor dynamic model was excited by three different recorded time histories: May 18, 1940, El Centro NS component 29.4 sec; 1952, Taft N 690 W component, 30 sec; and March 1957, Golden Gate S 800 E component, 13.2 seconds.
l The modal response is truncated so that the response of three different frequency bandwidths could be studied: 0-10 Hz; 10-20 Hz; and 20-50 Hz. This is done to give a good approximation to the cyclic behavior expected from structures with different frequency content.
Enveloping the results from the three earthquakes and averaging the results from several different points of the dynamic model, i the cyclic behavior as given in Table 3.7-18 was formed.
Independent of earthquake or component frequency, 99.5% of the stress reversals occur below 75% of the maximum stress level, and 95% of the reversals lie below 50% of the maximum stress level.
This relationship is graphically shown in Figure 3.7-43.
In summary, the cyclic behavior number of fatigue cycles of a component during an earthquake was found in the following manner:
- a. The fundamental frequency and peak seismic loads are found by a standard seismic analysis,
- b. The number of cycles which the component experiences are found from Table 3.7-18 according to the frequency range within which the fundamental frequency lies.
- c. For fatigue evaluation, 0.5% (0.005) of these cycles are conservatively assumed to be at the peak load and 4.5%
(0.045) at or above three quarter peak. The remainder of the cycles have negligible contribution to fatigue usage.
3.7-18
l LGS FSAR 3.8.3.6.5- Drywell Platforms a.- Materials Materials used in construction of the drywell platforms conform to the following standard specifications.
Item- Specification Box beams and built-up ASTM A441 and ASTM A588, I wide flange beams Grade A Structural shapes, plate, ASTM A36 and bar !
Connection bolts ASTM A325
- b. Welding Welding is performed in accordance with the Structural Welding Code, American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1
8.15 of AWS D1.1.
- d. Erection Tolerances Erection tolerances for the drywell platforms are in accordance with the AISC Specification.
3.8.3.6.6 Quality Oditrol Quality contrc; . eprcements during construction are discussed in e
Appendix D of t p i . a, j 3.8.3.7 Testino and Inservice Inspection Requirements 3.8.3.7.1 Preoperational Testing ,
3.8.3.7.1.1 Structural Acceptance Test The diaphragm slab is tested to 1.15 cimes the design downward differential pressure. Section 3.8.1.7 contains a description of the structural-acceptance test. Structural acceptance test d
results are available after testing is complete.
O 3.8-41 Rev. 3, 03/82
LGS FSAR 3.8.3.7.1.2 Leak Rate Testing Preoperational leak rate testing is discussed in Section 6.2.6.
3.6.3.7.2 Inservice Leak Rate Testing Inservice leak rate testing is discussed in Section 6.2.6.
3.8.4 OTHER SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES This section gives information on all seismic Category I structures, other than the primary containment and its internal structures. It also describes the turbine enclosure, which is a non-seismic Category I structure. The following structures are included in this section:
Seismic Category I, Safety-Related Structures Secondary containment Control structure Diesel-generator enclosure Spray pond pump structure Spray pond Miscellaneous structures Seismic Category I, Non-Safety-Related Structure Radwaste enclosure (including offgas portion)
Non-Seismic Category I, Non-Safety-Related Structure Turbine enclosure The general arrangement of these structures is shown on Figure 1.2-1.
3.8.4.1 Description of Structures 3.8.4.1.1 Secondary Containment The reactor enclosures enclose the primary containments and, with the refueling floor, provide secondary containment (Figures 1.2-2 through 1.2-16). The secondary containment houses the auxil.iary systems of the nuclear steam supply system, the spent fuel pool, the refueling facility, and equipment essential to the safe shutdown of the reactor. The secondary containment is structurally integral with the control structure described in Section 3.8.4.1.2.
Rev. 12, 10/82 3.8-42
() The secondary containment, up to and including the roof slab, is of reinforced' concrete-construction. Exterior bearing walls are reinforced concrete, and are additionally designed as shear walls to resist lateral loads. The floors and roof are constructed of reinforced concrete, supported by steel beam and column framing systems. The concrete slabs are designed as diaphrages to transmit lateral loads to the shear walls. The structural steel beams and girders are supported by either structural steel columns, or reinforced concrete bearing walls. The steel columns are supported by base plates attached to the foundation. The reinforced concrete walls and floors meet structural, as well as radiation shielding, requirements. At certain locations,
- concrete block masonry walls are used to provide better access for erecting and installing equipment. The block walls also meet the structural and the radiation shielding requirements.
i The refueling facility is located above the reactor enclosures.
It consists of the spent fuel pool, the steam dryer and separator l storage pool, the reactor well, the cask loading pit, the skiamer surge tank vaults, a 48-foot long refueling platform crane, and a
- 129-foot long refueling crane. The facility is supported by end i bearing walls, and by two post-tensioned concrete girders with i
- grouted tendons. The girders run east-west, and span over the i
primary containments without intermediate supports. Each girder spans approximately 162 feet, and is 6 feet wide. The depth is
- 46 feet at the supports, and is reduced to 26 feet at midspan, .
where the girders straddle the containments. The ends of the !
girders are supported by concrete pilasters. A gap between the bottom of the girders and the top of the containments ensures '
that loads from the refueling facility are not transferred to the
- containment. The details of the post-tensioned girders, including the tendon layout, are shown in Figure 3.8-53. The walls and slabs of the spent fuel pool, the cask loading pit, the reactor cavity, and the steam dryer and separator storage pool are lined on the inside with a stainless steel liner plate. The ,
refueling facility meets the radiation shielding requirements. '
The refueling floor area crane consists of a main and an
, auxiliary hoist, with capacities of 125 tons and 15 tons, respectively. The crane is used during maintenance and refueling operations. It spans approximately 129 feet, and is 28 feet above the refueling floor. The crane is mounted on two 175-pound rails, supported by a pair of runway girders. The runway girders are supported by a series of built-up columns spaced at 27 foot
, centers, which in turn are supported by bearing walls. Figure l
3.8-54 shows the details of the runway girders and the supporting columns. The refueling floor area crane is discussed in .
Section 9.1.5.
The reactor enclosure is separated from the primary containment by a gap filled with compressible material. A gap is also 3.8-43 Rev. 12, 10/82 9 , w .-.r-y.-..-,,..y----~ --,,.--y.,. . - , , - - ,-y,_ -,,,mw-c,,,,w-w,-.w. ,.--.,,-,,,,y.-,.-,m-- ____,w,-ww--.,,._m
c i
LGS FGAR provided at the interface of the secondary containment with the diesel generator, radwaste, and turbine enclosures.
3 . 8 . 4 .1. '. Control Structure The control structure, shown in Figures 1.2-17 through 1.2-29, is a reinforced concrete enclosure, structurally integrated with the secondary containment. The bearing walls are of reinforced concrete, and are additionally designed as shear walls to resist lateral loads. The floors and roof are constructed of reinforced concrete supported by steel beams. They are designed as diaphragms to transmit lateral loads to the shear walls. The beams span in the north-south direction and are supported at the ends by the bearing walls. The reinf.orced concrete walls and floors meet structural, as well as radiation shielding requirements. At certain locations, concrete block masonry walls are used to provide better access for erection and installation of equipment. The block walls also meet the structural and radiation shielding requirements.
The control structure is separated from the turbine enclosure by a seismic gap.
3.8.4.1.3 Diesel-Generator Enclosure The diesel-generator enclosures, shown in Figures 1.2-35 and 1.2-36, house the standby diesel-generators, which are essential h for safe shutdown of the plant.
Concrete walls separate each diesel-generator enclosure into four cells, one for each of the four diesel-generators provided per unit. A concrete overhang on the south side of the enclosure serves as an air intake plenum. A concrete exhaust plenum is located on the north side of the enclosure roof.
The diesel-generator enclosure is a reinforced concrete structure on wall foundations. The bearing walls are of reinforced concrete, and are additionally designed as shear walls to resist lateral loads. The floors and roof are constructed of reinforced concrete supported by steel beams. They are designed as diaphragms to transmit lateral loads to the shear walls. The north side of the enclosure bears on the pipe tunnel beneath. At certain locations, concrete block masonry walls are used to provide better access for erection and installation of equipment.
The diesel generators are supported by the floors.
3.8.4.1.4 Spray Pond Pump Structure The spray pond pump structure, shown in Figures 1.2-37 through 1.2-39, contains the emergency service water (ESW) and residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pumps, auxiliary equipment, &
and related piping and valves. W-Rev. 11, 10/82 3.8-44
f~
f per /TN i! N O a musem. -
i
/
y w , ... g ,G T M (SELEC.1ED CatANulM SAcAptLL 1
. . IL.tt3to44su.
Amr _ d w i RL. 906'd*Mid.
jfI . ., ,, , , ._ , *N .' C h,,, : ;. .,*.
. ,r \ \. .: . : ' ? -
a.am man I A It!O* DA. TAsit (TyQE l .re6*.4* , l ._**
~
t_
. "I { W' ni. : . ~ . :- m, ,une,s ,. upp*
q }5;. gp i a=U- 1, 2 extr.T' 2lofff%b'.'f*
emm.o] l co<wa w CDMENTITnOUS SACMPLL
/' ,
cer@ /co' ~
se.o=
- s:o- ~
\--) \ seso*
. \ emwrarm RCUC AMO CorkAETt. $ LAB -
wru arwasa
. 1D* 1L. 09 L%ACMFILL lb9 LQ*
ELEVATION VIEW Sit OtTA!LA p
W ) =as .
O *s: J, as ,
~
6 .
d (/ JP '
$'6*9A 4k.(%S eg s,tfE/ ~i TYF *'
.13 t *' D
- I
' sur-:l .*- m
~ 1 E -
'. ~ * *r !
^N*4h I
. .. C. .;.*,S, - -
'[;
bn.s.
- 1. , -- .; l' meme _j 1
u .l.)w-. e -
.i ei
-= * . - _ , .
. ,,L i l ... IN A
/l
/ m :s.Lre o rum in raww
]
n ooo --
asa ra n u mo
,w roooroam 4 a ,
J'.to',,,' ,, ass 7 S7 8 3 .._
~
DETAlL M ,,r.v,yw 4+,s,r a ,,ns.o D
DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK STRUCTURES LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT O MISCELLANEOUS STRUCTURES FOUNDATION DETAILS SHEET 4 OF 5 FIGURE 3.8-64 REV.12.10/82 L
- _-___a
O I
. ., _'. .g. ig a' o",
\, I* ,
\ '5,'cD.Us#dEfk
' se was. .wa arr reo (9/TA TAastJ l - ,
. Ix rnoif
- 1. c I - ;:.:_ -s,. y t.51 h O- '
% weswo Crf bl 7YP TANK NKJOEAGE 70 SASE SAS DETAll /T\
D DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK STRUCTURES LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT O MISCELLANEOUS STRUCTURES FOUNDATION DETAILS SHEET 5OF5 FIGURE 3.844 REV.12,10/82 I
- 3 LGS FSAR O A design flow functional test of the RHR pumps is performed for each pump during normal plant operation by taking suction from and returning to the suppression pool. The discharge valves to the reactor recirculation system loops remain closed during this test, and reactor operation is undisturbed.
An operational test of the discharge valves is performed by shutting the downstream valve after it has been satisfactorily tested, thereby establishing the reactor coolant pressure
, boundary (RCPB) at the downstream valve, and then operating the upstream valve. The discharge valves to the containment spray headers are checked in a similar manner by operating the upstream and downstream valves individually. All these valves can be actuated from the control room by using remote manual switches.
Control system design provides automatic return from the test to the operating mode if LPCI initiation is required during testing.
The surveillance frequency for testing and inspection is discussed in Chapter 16.
6.2.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements The containment spray and suppression pool cooling modes of the RHR system are manually initiated from the control room. Once initiated, containment cooling performance is monitored by Oa ' suppression pool temperature, flow, and containment pressure instrumentation. Details of the instrumentation are provided in Section 7.3.1.
6.2.3 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FUNCTIONAL DESIGN Each reactor enclosure encloses one reactor and its primary containment. The secondary containment completely encloses the two reactor enclosures and the common refueling area. The secondary containment houses the refueling and reactor servicing equipment, the spent fuel storage facilities, and other reactor auxiliary or service equipment, including the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system, standby liquid control (SLC) system, control rod drive (CRD) system equipment, the ECCS, and electrical equipment
. components. When the primary containment is open, as it is during the refueling period, the secondary containment provides primary. containment.
The secondary containment is separated into three ventilation zones. Zones I and II are the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor enclosures, respectively. Zone III consists of the refueling area.
O 6.2-39 Rev. 12, 10/82
e LGS FSAR 6.2.3.1 Design Bases l
- a. The conditions that could exist following a LOCA require the establishment of a method of controlling the leakage l from the primary into the secondary containment.
- b. The functional capability of the ventilation system to maintain negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the outdoors is discussed in Sections 6.5.1.1 and 9.4.2.
- c. The seismic design, leaktightness, and internal and external design pressures of the secondary containment structure are discussed in Section 6.2.3.2 and Chapter 3.
- d. The capability for periodic inspection and functional testing of the secondary containment structure is discussed in Chapter 16.
6.2.3.2 System Desian 6.2.3.2.1 Secondary Containment Design l Each reactor enclosure and the refueling area are designed and constructed in accordance with the design criteria outlined in h Chapter 3. All of the major structural walls are constructed of reinforced concrete. All of the major structural floor slabs and roof slabs are constructed of reinforced concrete supported by structural steel framing.
Penetrations of the secondary containment zones are designed with leakage characteristics consistent with leakage requirements of the secondary containment. The reactor enclosures and the refueling area are designed to limit the inleakage to 50 percent of the zone free volume per day at a negative interior pressure of 0.25 in, wg, while operating the standby gas treatment system (SGTS). Following a LOCA, all affected volumes of the secondary containment are maintained at this negative pressure by operation of the SGTS. All these volumes are identified in Figures 6.2-27 through 6.2-35.
An analysis of the post-LOCA pressure transient in the secondary containment will be performed to determine the length of time following isolation signal initiation of the SGTS that the pressure in the secondary containment would exceed minus 0.25 in, wg. The guidelines stated in Standard Review Plan 6.2.3 will be used in the drawdown calculations. -
The openings provided for gaining access to the secondary containment are listed in Table 6.2-13, and are shown in Figures 6.2-27 through 6.2-35.
Rev. 11, 10/82 6.2-40
- Personnel Access Doors: At each secondary containment personnel access opening there are_two doors, which are designated the inner door and.the outer door. Each door is equipped with a door position switch to provide monitoring. The monitoring circuitry consists of local indicating lights, local audible alarms, and control room annunciator lights and alarms. The monitoring operation ~is as follows:
A. Both doors closed - the blue indicating-lights located ;
above each door.are de-energized !
B. One door opened (either inner or outer) - the blue indicating light above-the door that is still closed is energized to warn against opening. The blue indicating light above the opened door is still de-energized.
C. Both doors opened - the blue' indicating lights above each door are energized; a time delay relay is energized and after a preset time it energizes an audible local alarm and a control room annunciator to identify that secondary containment access has been breached.
Closure of one of the doors returns the system condition to the same status as in Paragraph B, above.
() Equipment Access Doors: All equipment access doors are kept locked. The door position on each of these doors is constantly ,
monitored and indicated in the control room. Opening of any one of these doors results in an alarm in the control room.
Entrances to the reactor enclosure are provided.with air locks for separation. Access doors between reactor enclosure ;
ventilation zones are provided with airlocks.
The railroad access shaft, located between Unit 1 and Unit 2, is accessible through airlocks to the reactor enclosures and through the refueling floor ventilation ductwork and access hatch to the refueling floor. The railroad access door position is constantly monitored and indicated in the central alarm station and I secondary alarm station (guard stations) as part of the plant security system. Administrative procedures require that the ;
access shaft outside door be closed and locked unless the access i shaft is sealed closed and the ventilation ductwork is flanged off. These procedures ensure that the secondary containment will be maintained.
The boundaries of the secondary containment are shown in Figures 6.2-27 through 6.2-35.
The secondary containment design data are in Table 6.2-14.
6.2-41 Rev. 11, 10/82
l I
LGS FSAR 6.2.3.2.2 Secondary Containment Isolation System Isolation dampers and the plant protection signals that activate the secondary containment isolation system are described in Section 9.4.2.1.3.
6.2.3.2.3 Containment Bypass Leakage Upon receipt of an isolation signal, the reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) and the SGTS are automatically activated and begin to process all air flow streams from the secondary containment ventilation system. Therefore, if a LOCA occurs, radioactivity that exfiltrates the steel-lined primary containment or piping systems containing radioactive fluids is collected and passed through the RERS and SGTS as described in Section 6.5.
The potential paths by which leakage from the primary containment can bypass the areas serviced by the SGTS have been evaluated.
Table 6.2-15 identifies all primary containment penetrations, the termination region of all lines penetrating primary containment, and the bypass leakage barriers in each line. It has been determined that no potential bypass leakage paths exist for the entire spectrum of LOCAs except for a feedwater line break inside containment. A water seal cannot be maintained in the broken feedwater line by the feedwater fill system (Section 6.2.3.2.3.2) for the case of a feedwater line break inside containment. For this case, containment leakage may travel past the broken feedwater line's containment isolation valves into the portion of the feedwater line located in the turbine enclosure. However, a water seal in this portion of the feedwater line would realistically be expected to be maintained by water from the condensate storage tank. Therefore, no bypass leakage is postulated to reach the environment.
When designating the termination region, if either the system line that penetrates primary containment or any branch lines connecting to it penetrate the secondary containment, the termination region is listed in Table 6.2-15 as outside secondary containment (OSC). The types of bypass leakage barriers employed by these lines are:
- 1. Redundant primary containment isolation valves
- 2. Closed seismic Category I piping system inside containment
- 3. A water seal maintained for 30 days following a LOCA
- 4. The line beyond the outboard primary containment isolation valve is vented to secondary containment by ll use of a vent line located upstream of the two block valves.
Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-42
- - - - - ~ - -
l f
() -5.
-6.
A leakage collection system is provided.
The line contains a temporary spool piece that is
- removed during normal operation and replaced by blind flanges so that any leakage through the flange is into secondary containment.
. Type 1. leakage barriers are considered to limit but not eliminate i- bypass leakage. Leakage barriers of types 2 through 6 are considered to effectively eliminate any bypass leakage.
Leakage from those lines terminating in the secondary containment is collected during the LOCA since the secondary containment is maintained at subatmospheric pressure and.all exhaust is 4 processed by the RERS and SGTS during these modes (Section 6.5).
. Therefore, lines terminating within the secondary containment are not considered potential bypass leakage paths.
Lines penetrating primary containment are isolated following a i
LOCA as described in Section 6.2.4. All containment iso 3ation
- valves and penetrations are designed to seismic Category I
- requirements.
t f The primary containment and penetration leakage is monitored I
during periodic tests as discussed in Sectior. 6.2.6. Those
- penetrations for which credit is taken for water seals as a means
- of eliminating bypass leakage (Table 6.2-15) are preoperationally leak-tested with water and Technical Specification leakage rates are given as water leak rates.
6.2.3.2.3.1 Water Seals l In each case where water seals are used to eliminate the potential of secondary containment bypass leakage, a 30-day water seal is assured because either a loop seal is present or the water for the seal is provided from a large reservoir. The water seals for all of these lines will be maintained at a pressure
! greater than the peak containment accident pressure. Each of the water seals listed in Table 6.2-15 is discussed below (some ,
penetrations may be listed more than once due to the. presence of i
- multiple types of water seals). i l a. Penetrations 9A & B and 44. The feedwater fill system (Section 6.2.3.2.3.2) is used to maintain a water seal in the lines downstream of these penetrations.
- b. Penetrations 204A & B, 207A & B, 208B, 210, 212, 215, 216, 217, 226A & B, 235, 236, 238, 239 and 240. The lines associated with these penetrations all penetrate the wetwell 'bove the suppression pool water level and 4 terminate at least 4 feet below the minimum suppression k-- !
- l. 6.2-43 Rev. 12, 10/82
I LGS FSAR pool water level. A 30-day water seal is therefore e assured on the submerged portion of line,
- c. Penetrations 13A & B, 16A & B, 17, 39A & B, 45A-D, 205A
& B, and 225. Piping connected to these penetrations is normally full of water and will be kept full after a LOCA due to operation of the ECCS and/or safeguard piping fill system. The suppression pool is the water source for the ECCS and fill system, and therefore a 30-day water supply ic assured.
- d. Penetrations 203A-D, 206A-D, 209, 214 and 237. The lines associated with these penetrations all penetrate the wetwell at least 11 feet below the minimum water level of the suppression pool, and therefore a 30 day water seal is assured.
- e. Penetrations 231A & B. The line to the containment isolation valves from the drywell floor drain sump is maintained full of water by an elevation difference between the sump and the valves. The line to the containment isolation valves from the drywell equipment drain tank is maintained full of water by an elevation difference between the tank and the valves.
- f. Penetrations 10, 11, 12, 44, 228D and 241. Lines associated with these penetrations that pass through the secondary containment boundary and take credit for water seals are provided with loop seals inside secondary containment, which eliminates the possibility of bypass leakage.
- g. Penetration 14. The minimum piping height inside primary containment of the RWCU supply line that branches off the recirculation loop is at El 267 ft.
The primary containment penetration is at El. 297 ft and the RPV penetration is at El. 280 ft. This elevation difference ensures that a water seal is maintained in the line from the RPV to the containment isolation valves. The RWCU supply branch line that connects to the bottom of the vessel is normally full of water, and the water will be maintained in this line because it connects directly to, and below, the vessel.
- h. Penetrations 37A-D and 28A-D. The CRD insert and withdraw lines are normally full of water. A water seal will be maintained in these lines after a LOCA due to the elevation difference between the containment penetrations (El. 265 ft) and the connections to the control rod drives (El. 215 ft).
O Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-44 {
() 6.2.3.2.3.2 Feedwater Fill System l The feedwater fill system prevents the release of fission l products through the feedwater containment isolation valves after l a LOCA by providing a water seal downstream of the valves. j 1
6.2.3.2.3.2.1 Safety Design Bases l l
The feedwater fill system is designed with sufficient capacity I and capability to prevent leakage through the feedwater lines ,
under the conditions associated with the entire spectrum of LOCAs I except for a feedwater line break inside containment.
The feedwater fill system conforms to seismic Category I requirements. Quality group classifications are shown in Table
- 3.2-1, Item XI.A. The system meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.96, where applicable.
The feedwater fill system is capable of performing its safety l function considering the effects resulting from a LOCA, including missiles that may result from equipment failures, dynamic effects associated with pipe whip and jet forces, and normal operating and accident-caused local environmental conditions consistent with the design basis event. Furthermore, any portion of the feedwater fill system that is quality Group A and is located outside the primary containment structure is protected from n.-
s missiles, pipe whip, and jet force effects originating outside the containment so that containment integrity is maintained.
The feedwater fill system is capable of performing its safety function following a LOCA and an assumed single active failure.
The feedwater fill system is designed so that effects resulting from a single active component failure do not affect the i integrity or operability of the feedwater lines or the feedwater
- containment isolation valves. ,
The feedwater fill system is capable of performing its safety
, function following a loss of all offsite power coincident with a
- postulated design basis LOCA.
l l The feedwater fill system is designed to prevent leakage from the i feedwater lines consistent with maintaining containment integrity l for up to 30 days.
The feedwater fill system is manually actuated and is not required to be actuated sooner than 30 minutes after a LOCA.
The feedwater fill system, including instrumentation and circuits necessary for the functioning of the system, is designed in l accordance with standards applicable to an engineered safety l feature.
6.2-44a Rev. 12, 10/82
r LGS FSAR The plant is designed to permit testing of the operability of the feedwater fill system controls and actuating devices during power lh operation, to the extent practicable, and to permit testing of the complete functioning of the system during plant shutdowns.
6.2.3.2.3.2.2 System Description The feedwater fill system is a subsystem of the safeguard piping fill system. The safeguard piping fill pumps provide suppression pool water as the water seal source for the feedwater lines (Section 6.3.2.2.6 and Figure 6.3-9). The feedwater fill system consists of two fill trains, one from each fill pump. Each train is routed to both feedwater lines (Figure 5.1-3).
Following a LOCA, the feedwater fill system is manually initiated from the control room. A water seal is provided by the fill system in both feedwater lines for all line breaks other than a feedwater line break inside containment. For this case, the feedwater fill system can be isolated from the broken feedwater line so that a water seal can be maintained in the intact feedwater line. A water seal inside the broken feedwater line cannot be maintained by the fill system for the case of a feedwater line break inside containment because the water escapes out the broken pipe into primary containment.
The sealing water to the valves eventually fills the feedwater lines up to the reactor vessel, and the water returns to the suppression pool through the LOCA break. Because the source of sealing water is the suppression pool, a 30-day water supply is assured. Operation of the feedwater fill system will not affect the function of the suppression pool because the seal water is eventually returned to the pool when the drywell is flooded back through the downcomers.
6.2.3.2.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation The feedwater fill system is designed to prevent the release of radioactivity through the feedwater line isolation valves by providing a continuous flow of water through the feedwater lines following a loss of all offsite power coincident with the postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident. The two redundant fill trains are physically separated, except where the lines are interconnected, to minimize the exposure to missiles and to the effects of pipe whip or jet impingement from high energy line breaks.
The feedwater fill system is seismic Category I and is capable of performing its intended function following an active component failure. Each fill train is powered from a different division of the Class 1E power supply. Double series isolation valves are provided to ensure that no single active failure will affect the integrity of the feedwater lines.
Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-44b I
l
LGS FSAR s/ Feedwater line pressure is indicated in the control room so that i the operator can determine if there has been a feedwater line break inside containment. If so, the operator can isolate the system from the broken-line and still provide fil] system water
-to the intact line.
6.2.3.2.3.2.4 Instrumentation and Controls l l The instrumentation necessary for control and status indication of the feedwater fill system is classified as essential and, as such, is designed and qualified in accordance with applicable IEEE standards to function under seismic Category I and LOCA
- environmental loading conditions appropriate to its installation, with the control circuits designed to. satisfy the mechanical and electrical separation criteria. Section 7.6 gives a control and 4
instrumentation description.
6.2.3.2.3.2.5 Inspection and Testing l 4 Preoperational tests for the safeguard piping fill system are l discussed in Chapter 14. During plant operation, valves, piping, instrumentation, electrical circuits, and other components
. outside the steam tunnel can be inspected visually at any time.
I Complete system functional testing or isolation valve testing
! from fully closed-to-open and the return open-to-closed position is performed during reactor shutdown.
i 6.2.3.3 Desion Evaluation The design evaluation of the secondary containment ventilation system is given in Sections 6.5.1 and 9.4.2. The high-energy,
' lines within the secondary containment are identified and pipe
, ruptures analyzed in Section 3.6. The leakoff system on the nitrogen purge lines has two outboard block valves in series 1 downstream of the leakoff vent valves and the secondary containment b.oundary. The liquid nitrogen facility is located outside of
, secondary containment. Therefore, a failure of one of the
[ outboard block valves does not prevent a negative pressure from t being maintained in the secondary containment structure or result !
in leakage from the primary containment across the inboard valve I to the environment.
6.2.3.4 Tests and Inspections
'The program for initial performance testing is described in
- Chapter 14. The program for periodic functional testing of the i secondary containment structures including SGTS drawdown time and
- the secondary containment isolation system and system components is described in Chapter 16. The leak-rate testing program and
, provisions are discussed in Section 6.5.1, as part of the SGTS tests.
(}
6.2-44c Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR 6.2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements The control systems to be employed for the actuation of the reactor enclosure ESF air handling systems are described in Section 7.3.
The control and monitoring instrumentation for the above systems is discussed in Sections 6.5.1 and 9.4.2. Design details and instrumentation logic are discussed in Section 7.3.
6.2.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM The containment isolation system is designed to prevent or limit the release of radioactive materials that may result from postulated accidents. This is accomplished by providing isolation barriers in all fluid lines that penetrate primary containment.
6.2.4.1 Design Bases
- a. The containment isolation system is designed to allow the normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while preserving the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape of radioactive materials that can result from postulated accidents.
- b. The containment isolation system is designed to either automatically isolate fluid penetrations cr provide the capability for remote manual isolation from the control room.
- c. The arrangement of containment isolation valves for fluid systems that penetrate the primary containment conforms to Gensral Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57 to the greatest extent practicable.
- d. Fluid instrument lines that penetrate primary containment conform to the isolation criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.11 to the greatest extent practicable,
- e. Containment isolation provisions are designed to withstand the most severe natural phenomenon or' site-related event (e.g., earthquake, tornado, hurricane, O
Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-44d
LGS FSAR s The containment spray lines are provided with two normally closed, remote manually operated isolation valves outside the l containment. The inner isolation valve is' located directly on the containment. ,
.6. 2. 4. 3.1. 3. 2. 7. Suppression Pool Spray The suppression pool spray lines are provided with normally closed isolation valves outside containment, located directly on the containment. The' valves automatically close upon receipt of an isolation signal. The external pipe, designed to Quality Group B and seismic Category I requirements, provides the second isolation barrier. Because of the desired use of this system after a LOCA, the system reliability is greater with only one isolation valve in the line.
6.2.4.3.1.3.2.8 Drywell Radiation Sampling Lines l The sampling system lines that penetrate the containment and connect to the drywell and suppression chamber air volume are equipped with two normally open solenoid-operated isolation valves in series, located outside and as close to the containment as possible. These valves ensure isolation of these lines if there'should be a break; they also provide long-term leakage control. In addition, the piping is considered an extension of
, the containment boundary and, as such, is designed to seismic Category I standards and to the same temperature and pressure conditions as the containment.
6.2.4.3.1.3.3 Conclusion on Criterion 56 In order to ensure protection against the consequences of accidents involving release of significant amounts of radioactive materials, pipes that penetrate the containment have been demonstrated to provide isolation capabilities on a case-by-case basis in accordance with Criterion 56.
In addition to meeting isolation requirements, the pressure retaining components of these systems are designed to the same l
quality standards as the containment.
i 6.2.4.3.1.4 Evaluation Against Criterion 57 l
Criterion 57 describes criteria for closed system isolation
! valves.
Influent and effluent lines of this group are isolated by automatic or remote manual isolation valves located as close as possible to the containment boundary.
O 6.2-57 Rev. 12, 10/82
r LGS FSAR 6.2.4,3.1.4.1 CRD Lines The CRD system has multiple lines, the insert and withdraw lines, l that penetrate primary containment.
The classification of these lines is Quality Group B, and they are designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2. The
! basis on which the CRD insert and withdraw lines are designed is commensurate with the safety importance of maintaining the pressure integrity of these lines.
It has been accepted practice not to provide automatic isolation valves for the CRD insert and withdraw lines to preclude any possible failure of the scram function. The lines can be isolated by the solenoid valves provided on the hydraulic control units (HCUs) that are located outside the primary containment.
The lines that extend outside the primary containment are small and terminate in systems that are designed to prevent outleakage.
The solenoid valves are normally closed, but open on rod movement and during reactor scram. In addition, a ball check valve located in the CRD flange housing automatically seals the insert line if there is a break. Finally, manual shutoff valves are provided outside the containment.
6.2.4.3.1.4.2 Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water and Drywell Chilled Water Supplies and Returns h
The influent and effluent lines are provided wita normally-open motor-operated gate valves that can be remote manually isolated from the control room.
6.2.4.3.1.4.3 Primary Containment Instrument Gas r
The influent lines are provided with a normally-open air-operated globe valve outside the containment. The effluent lines are provided with normally open air-operated globe valves inside and
- outside the containment. The power-operated valves are automatically closed on receipt of a containment isolation signal.
6.2.4.3.1.5 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.11 l Instrument lines that penetrate the containment from the RCPB conform to Regulatory Guide 1.11 in that they are equipped with a restricting orifice located inside the drywell and an excess flow check valve located outside and as close as practicable to the containment. Should an instrument line that forms part of the reactor pressure boundary develop a leak outside the containment, a flow rate that results in a differential pressure across the valve of 3 to 10 psi causes the excess flow check valve to close automatically. Should an excess flow check valve fail to close i when required, the main flow path through the valve has a Rev. 12, 10/S2 6.2-58
~
.n s- -resistance to flow at least equivalent to a sharp-edged orifice of-0.375 inch diameter. Valve position indication is provided in the reactor enclosure. Those instrument lines that do not connect to the RCPB conform to Regulatory Guide 1.11 in that they-are either equipped with an excess flow check valve or an isolation valve capable of remote operation from the control room, and are sized or orificed to meet the criteria outlined in Regulatory' Guide 1.11. The status of the isolation valves capable of remote operation from the control room is indicated in the control room.
6.2.4.3.1.6 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.141 The containment isolation system conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.141 except as discussed below:
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N271-1976 Section 3.5 Criteria For Closed Systems Inside Containment. If a closed
! system inside containment is used as one of the two containment isolation barriers, it shall meet the criteria that follow...
() (2) Be missile, pipe whip, and jet force protected from a LOCA or from a missile, pipe whip, or jet force that results in a requirement for. containment isolation.
- (3) Meet Safety Class 2 design requirements.
(7) Meet seismic Category I design requirements.
Limerick Desian:
Closed systems such as primary containment instrument gas, reactor enclosure cooling water and drywell chilled water are not designed strictly in accordance with items (2), (3), and (7) of Section 3.5 of ANSI N271. The design criteria used for these systems are listed in Table 3.2-1.
Section 3.6.4 Single Valve and Closed System Both Outside Containment...
.The single valve and piping between the containment and the valve shall be enclosed in a protective leaktight or controlled leakage housing to prevent leakage to the atmosphere.
O 6.2-59 Rev. 12, 10/82
For systems that fall into this category except for the ECCS pump suction lines, the single valve outside primary containment is not enclosed in a protective leaktight or controlled leakage housing. Moderate energy lines that fall into this category do not connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are not postulated to break concurrent with a LOCA. Therefore, neither reactor coolant nor post-LOCA containment atmosphere are released. However, any leakage is contained within the secondary containment and is diluted and filtered prior to release. The ECCS pump suction isolation valves are enclosed in pump rooms adjacent to the containment that have provisions for the environmental control of any fluid leakage.
Section 3.6.5 Two Valves Outside Containment...
The valve nearest the containment wall and piping between the
, containment and that valve shall be enclosed in a protective leak-tight or controlled leakage housing to prevent leakage to the atmosphere.
Limerick Desion:
For systems that fall into this category, the valve nearest containment is welded directly to the containment penetrations whenever possible,.and is not enclosed in a protective leaktight or controlled leakage housing. Moderate energy lines that fall into this category do not connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are not postulated to break concurrent with a LOCA.
Therefore, neither reactor coolant nor post-LOCA containment atmosphere are released. However, any leakage is contained within the secondary containment and is diluted and filtered prior to release.
Section 4.4.2 Method of Valve Actuation...
It should not be possible for remote manual operation to override the automatic isolation signal until the sequence of automatic events following a isolation signal is completed...
Limerick Desion:
This guideline is met for all remote manually operable valves with the exception of valves in systems that must be operated after an accident and that have been provided with a keylocked override switch for this purpose.
O l
Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-60
LGS FSAR O Section 5.3.2 - Leakage Rate Testing Provisions and Methods. Provisions shall be made for leakage rate testing of containment isolation valves...
Limerick Desion:
Individual leakage rate tests are performed for containment j isolation valves as indicated in Table 6.2-25.
Note:
Regulatory Guide Paragraphs C.4 and C.6 refer to N271 Sections 4.4.8 (closed system design) and 4.14 (piping between isolation barriers) and adds the requirements of Section 3.5 to these sections.- As discussed above, there is partial conformance with Section 3.5.
6.2.4.3.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analyses A single failure can be defined as a failure of some component in any safety system that results in a loss or degradation of the system's capability to perform its safety function. Active components are defined as components that must perform a mechanical motion during the course of accomplishing a system i
O safety function. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that electrical systems be designed against passive single failures as well as active single failures. Section 3.1 describes the implementation of these requirements as well as General Design Criteria 17, 21, 35, 41, 44, 54, 55, and 56.
In single failure analysis of electrical systems, no distinction is made between mechanically active or passive components; all fluid system components, such as valves, are considered electrically active whether or not mechanical action is required.
Electrical systems as well as mechanical systems are designed to meet the single failure criterion for both mechanically active i
and passive fluid system components that are required to perform a safety action.
6.2.4.4 Tests and Inspections The containment isolation system undergoes periodic testing during reactor operation. The functional capabilities of power operated isolation valves are remotely tested manually from the main control room. By observing position indicators and changes in the affected system operation, the closing ability of a particular isolation valve is demonstrated.
O 6.2-61 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR A discussion of testing and inspection pertaining to isolation valves is provided in Section 6.2.1.6 and in Chapter 16.
Table 6.2-17 lists all isolation valves.
Instruments are be periodically tested and inspected. Test and/or calibration points are supplied with each instrument.
Excess flow check valves (EFCVs) are periodically tested by opening a test drain valve downstream of the EFCV and verifying proper operation. As these valves are outside the containment and accessible, periodic visual inspection is performed in addition to the operational check.
Leak-rate testing for the containment isolation system is discussed in Section 6.2.6.
6.2.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL IN CONTAINMENT Following a postulated LOCA, hydrogen gas may be generated within the primary containment as a result of the following processes:
- a. Metal-waterbeactioninvolvingtheZircaloyfuel cladding and the reactor coolant
- b. Radiolytic decomposition of water in the reactor vessel and the suppression pool (oxygen also evolves in this process) ll i
O Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-62
l l
i LGS FSAR f n k-}/ c. Corrosion of metals and paints in the primary containment To preclude the possibility of a combustible mixture of hydrogen and oxygen accumulating in the primary containment, the containment atmosphere is inerted with nitrogen gas during power
-operation of the reactor. The means provided for inerting the containment is described in Section 9.4.5.1. With the concentration of oxygen being controlled to belcw the lower flammability limit, the level of hydrogen buildup in the primary containment following a postulated LOCA is of no particular concern for combustible gas control.
To ensure that the oxygen concentration in the primary containment is maintained below the lower flammability limit, the following features are provided:
- a. A containment hydrogen recombiner subsystem
- b. A combustible gus analyzer subsystem
- c. The capability to mix the primary containment atmosphere to prevent the local accumulation of oxygen (accomplished by the drywell air cooling system, which is discussed in Section 9.4.5.2)
- d. The capability for a controlled purge of the primary containment following a LOCA (accomplished by the containment atmospheric control system, which is discussed in Section 9.4.5.1)
Both the containment hyddogen recombiner subsystem and the combustible gas analyzer subsystem are part of the containment atmospheric control system, which is shown in Figure 9.4-5.
6.2.5.1 Desion Bases
- a. The containment hydrogen recombiner subsystem is designed to maintain the oxygen concentration in the primary containment below the lower flammability limit of 5% by volume.
! c. Those lines that penetrate the primary containment and l ~ are associated with the containment hydrogen recombiner j subsystem and the combustible gas analyzer subsystem are l (\_}s provided with automatic isolation valves to ensure the l l 6.2-62a Rev. 12, 10/82 i !
- - . . , _ _ _ ~ , _ . . - _ , _ , , - . . . _ _ - ,.,, _ _-_--.--_. _._,~..--. _ .-,_... _ ., _ _.,._ .-...-.... ..
i LGS FSAR a-THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O
O Rev. 12, 10/82 6.2-62b
L
-(described in Section 9.4.5.1), that open to allow air to flow from the suppression chamber back into the drywell.
The recombiner gas inlet and outlet lines are each provided with a normally-closed butterfly valve for containment isolation.
These valves can be operated by hand switches in the control room, and are automatically closed upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. The isolation signals can be overriden by using keylocked bypass switches. Containment isolation is discussed further in Section 6.2.4.
The process stream entering the recombiner skid assembly flows first through a control valve that is used to regulate the flow j rate through the recombiner. Next along the process path is the i blower, that provides sufficient head to overcome the system flow losses and also the 0.5 psid maximum differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber. From the blower, the gas flows through the gas heater pipe that spirals
- around the reaction chamber.
The gas is heated as it flows through the gas heater pipe, due to radiated heat from the electric heater elements and the reaction chamber. Next, the gas flows into the reaction chamber, where the exothermic recombination of hydrogen and oxygen occurs. The
'O flow field in the reaction chamber is highly turbulent, with sufficient mixing to rapidly bring the inlet gas temperatures to i
a level where virtually complete recombination occurs. Reaction chamber temperature is not critical, and considerable deviation from the nominal operating temperature of 13000F may be tolerated without seriously affecting recombiner performance. The geometric configuration and volume of the reaction chamber provide gas flow movement and transport times so that recombination is completed over a varied range of hydrogen-oxygen concentrations. Recombined gas flows from the reaction chamber to the water-spray cooler where it is cooled to less than 2500F.
The hot process gas is mixed with water spray in the throat region of a venturi, and the hot gas is cooled by vaporization of the water and by direct contact with the water droplets. The cooling water is supplied to the recombiners from the RHR system.
Cooled gas flowing from the cooler is passed through a water separator that prevents any remaining water droplets from entering the gas recirculation line. The separated water drains down to the suppression pool through the recombiner gas outlet
, piping. Recirculation (dilution) gas is drawn from the top of the water separator and is routed to the recombiner gas inlet
- l. piping.
t
! Operation of the hydrogen recombiner package is initiated manually from the control cabinet. When gas flow has been 4
O established and the water inlet valve is fully open, the heater elements are energized. Approximately 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> are required for 6.2-65 Rev. 12, 10/82
r-LGS FSAR l the system to reach operating temperature. As the temperature of the heated enclosure increases, the gas being circulated through the recombiner is heated. The recombination reaction begins to occur at the outlet of the gas heater pipe when the temperature at that location reaches approximately 11500F. When the temperature at the gas heater pipe outlet reaches 13000F, power to the heater elements is automatically turned off. When the gas heater pipe cools to the point at which it can no longer sustain the reaction, the reaction moves into the reaction chamber. When the temperature at the gas heater pipe outlet falls below 13000F, an interlock is cleared and power is returned to the heater elements at a lower level than during startup. Temperatures in the gas heater pipe stay below those required for reaction, so the reaction stays in the reaction chamber. A temperature controller located in the control cabinet is used to maintain reaction chamber temperature'at about 13000F.
6.2.5.2.2 Combustible Gas Analyzer Subsystem
- The combustible gas analyzer subsystem is part of the containment atmospheric control system, which is discussed in Section 9.4.5.1 and shown schematically in Figure 9.4-5. The combustible gas analyzer subsystem consists of two analyzer packages, each of which contains a hydrogen analyzer cell and an oxygen analyzer cell. One of the analyzer packages normally samples gases from the suppression chamber and the other normally samples gases from the drywell. However, sufficient sample points are provided so that both analyzer packages can take samples from either the drywell or the suppression chamber.
Each analyzer package consists of a sample cabinet located in the reactor enclosure and a remote control panel located in the control room. Sample points in the primary containment are located as follows:
- a. Drywell
- 1. El 291 feet, azimuth 100; 15' feet from containment centerline
- 2. El 255 feet, azimuth 2150; 25 feet from containment centerline
- 3. El 242 feet, azimuth 2140; 1.5 feet from inside wall of reactor pedestal.
- b. Suppression chamber
- 1. El 222 feet, azimuth 700; at inside of containment wall O
6.2-66
^
..-.:L_
-= --
DOCUMENT ~
E PAGE .
PULLED .
ANO.,emm NO. OF PAGES ,
N .
t REASON <
D PAGE ELEGS2 D NARo core Faro A1. von er owr -
D BETTER COP (REQUESTED ON J >_
%P .
MARDCOP(FRED Al POR l .
OMR_
Q3- O\
kFEMED ON APER 70RE h CARD' Ts b l k w o M N - \ M
- _. - .-- , , , - ------..-,----,-a - - - - , - - - - - - . , , , - - - -
LGS FSAR CHAPTER 8 FIGURES Fiaure No. Title 8.1-1 Station Single Line Diagram 8.2-1 Transmission System and Startup Feeds 8.2-2 Transmission System Single Line 8.2-3 Third Off-Site Source Emergency Backup 8.2-4 Transmission System Relay Single Line Diagram l 8.2-5 Transmission System Arrangement of Cable Trenches l 8.2-6 Transmission System Line Routings l 8.3-1 4 kV Class IE Power System 8.3-2 Class 1E Load Centers O 8.3-3 125/250 V de System l
l O
8-v Rev. 12, 10/82
CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER C.1 INTRODUCTION 8.1.1 GENERAL The electric power systems of the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1.and 2 are designed to generate and transmit electric power into the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) power network.
The two independent offsite electric. power source connections to LGS are designed to provide reliable power sources for plant auxiliary loads and the engineered safeguard loads of both units, so that any single failure can affect only one power supply and cannot propagate to the alternate source. A third independent offsite source, available as a potential source for emergency
, nse, can be connected to supply the engineered safeguard loads of both units in the event of the loss of one of the connected offsite power sources.
The onsite ac electric power system consists of Class 1E and non-Class 1E power systems. The two offsite power systems provide O.' the preferred ac electric power to all Class 1E loads. One source is the 220-13 kV startup transformer in the 220 kV substation. The second source is from a 13 kV tertiary winding of the 220-500 kV bus-tie auto-transformer in the 500 kV substation. In the event of total loss of offsite power sources, eight onsite independent diesel-generators (four diesel-generators per unit) provide the standby power for all engineered safeguard loads.
The non-Class 1E ac loads are normally supplied through the unit auxiliary transformer from the main generator. However, during plant startup, shutdown, and post-shutdown, power is supplied from the offsite power sources through the 220-13 kV startup transformer and the 220-500 kV bus-tie auto-transformer.
Onsite Class 1E and non-Class 1E de systems supply all de power l requirements of the plant.
8.1.2 UTILITY POWER GRID AND OFFSITE POWER SYSTEMS l The Unit 1 and 2 generators are connected by a separate iso-phase
- bus to their respective main step-up transformer banks as shown j in Figure 8.1-1. The Unit 1 main step-up transformer bank, with i three single-phase power transformers, steps up the 22 kV l l generator voltage to 220 kV; the Unit 2 bank, with three single- l phase power transformers, steps up the 22 kV generator voltage to i
(/)
x_ 500 kV. The 220 kV and 500 kV substations each use a breaker and I
8.1-1
{
LGS FSAR one-half scheme arranged in an interior main bus hopover design.
Each substation has three elements initially and is arranged for future expansion to four or more elements. Element refers to each bus-to-bus connection. The substations are approximately 2150 feet apart and are interconnected by a 500-220 kV bus tie transformer and transmission line. The 500 kV substation feeds two substations on the Philadelphia Electric Company system, Whitpain and Peach Bottom, which are part of the Keystone 500 kV grid. Both the 500 kV and 220 kV substations and the associated transmissions are tied into the PJM Interconnection The 33 kV third offsite source to LGS is made available from the Cromby-Moser 33 kV tieline. The Moser substation receives bulk power from the Cromby Generating Station and is tied.to a 33 kV distribution system.
Plant startup power, which is the preferred power for the engineered safeguard systems, is provided from two independent offsite power sources. The power for the engineered safeguard systems can also be provided from the third independent offsit'e source. The three sources are as follows:
- a. 220-13 kV transformer connected to the 220 kV substation
- b. A 13 1V tertiary winding on the 500-220 kV bus tie auto-transformer
- c. 33/13.2-4.16 kV transformer for connections to the 33 kV Cromby-Moser tieline The Perkiomen pumping station receives power from two 33 kV transmission circuits to supply power to the makeup w2ter pumps and their auxiliaries.
The transmission system, including the 220 kV line to the Unit 1 main transformer and the two offsite power lines to the startup sources, is to be operational before Unit 1 fuel load.
Transmission lines to Unit 2 are to be operational before Unit 2 fuel load.
The offsite power systems and their interconnections are described in detail in Section 8.2.
8.1.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS The onsite power system for each unit is divided into two major categories:
O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-2
l LGS FSAR O f. Each unit has four independent de Class 1E power systems corresponding to the four standby ac power system l
divisions and one independent dc non-Class IE power j
,. system for the non-Class 1E de loads. l
Class IE cables that are treated and identified as l Class 1E are routed through one division of Class 1E l i
raceways exclusively. Sharing of raceways in such cases i
is not considered to jeopardize the raceway separation, because the cables in such cases are disconnected from i i the buses upon occurrence of LOCA signal. l
- h. Special identification criteria as discussed in !
Section 8.1.6.14 are applied for Class 1E equipment, ;
cabling, and raceways. l
- i. Separation criteria are established for preserving the i independence of redundant Class 1E systems and providing l isolation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.
- j. The Class 1E electric systems are designed to satisfy ,
the single failure criterion in accordance with O IEEE 379.
l
- k. Class 1E equipment and systems have been designed with !
the capability for periodic testing.
l 8.1.6 REGULATORY GUIDES AND IEEE STANDARDS f The' design of the offsite power system complies with the !
requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix A. General Design Criteria 5, !
17, and 18 as discussed in Section 8.2. ;
i Codes and standards applicable to the onsite power system are listed in Table 3.2-1. The design of the onsite power system complies with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, and 50 as discussed in Sections 8.3.1.2.1 and
. 8.3.2.2.1. ;
Conformance with Reaulatory Guides l 8.1.6.1 ;
i
~
Conformance with applicable Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9, 1.22, i 1.29, 1.30, 1.32, 1.40, 1.41, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.63, 1.73, 1.75, 1.81, 1.89, 1.93, 1.100, 1.106, 1.108, 1.118,.1.128, 1.129, and l 1.131 is discussed below. l I
i 8.1-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
- . - .. _,- - . -__ - . - ..-- - - _ - _ _. -. - __ D
LGS FSAR 8.1.6.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.6, " Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems" (3/71)
The design of the standby power system is in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.6.
The standby power system consists of four independent divisions per unit. All safety-related loads are divided among these four divisions so that loss of any one division does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each division consists of both standby ac and de power systems.
The ac loads of each division have connections to two independent offsite power supplies and to a single onsite diesel-generator.
The power feeder breakers to each division are interlocked so that only one of the power supplies can be connected at any one time, except during the diesel-generator load test where the diesel-generator is synchronized to one of the preferred offsite power sources. Only one diesel-generator is tested at a time.
Each diesel-generator is exclusively connected to the corrasponding division. The diesel-generator of one division cannot be paralleled, either manually or automatically, with the diesel-generator of another division.
The de power system of each unit consists of four division de systems; two 125/250 V, 3-wire systems; and two 125 V, 2-wire systems. Each division is energized by its own batteries and chargers. The battery charger is supplied by its corresponding Class 1E ac power system. The de power system of any one division is independent of any other de power system.
8.1.6.1.2 Regulatory Guide 1.9, " Selection of Diesel-Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies" (3/71).
The standby diesel-generator capacities are in compliance with this edition of Regulatory Guide 1.9. Revisions 1 and 2 of the l guide are not applicable to Limerick as discussed in Section 1.8.
The continuous or the 2000-hour rating of the standby diesel-generators is greater than the sum of conservatively estimated loads needed to be supplied following any design basis event.
Load requirements are listed in Table 8.3-2.
The standby diesel-generators are capable of starting and accelerating all engineered safeguard loads to the rated speed l within the time and in the sequence shown in Table 8.3-1. They I are capable of maintaining, during the steady-state and loading sequence, the frequency and voltage above a level that may degrade the performance of any of the loads below their minimum i requirements. The standby diesel-generators are capable of l
8.1-6
\- recovering from transients caused by step load increases or resulting from the disconnection of a partial or full load.
Specifically, the standby' diesel generators are designed to maintain frequency and voltage to not less than 95 percent and 75 percent of nominal, respectively, following a step load change.
The frequency and voltage are restored to within 2 percent and 10 percent of nominal, respectively, within 60 percent of each load sequence time interval. In addition, during the recovery from transients caused by step load increases or resulting from the disconnection of the largest single load, the speed of the diesel l generator will not exceed 75 percent of the difference between the nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint or 115 percent of nominal, whichever is lower.
The diesel generators have been qualified in accordance with the ;
requirements of NUREG 0588 for Category II equipme.nt and Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. O.
, 8.1.6.1.3 Regulatory Guide 1.22, " Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions" (2/72)
Refer to Section 7.1.2.5 for discussion of this guide.
8.1.6.1.4 Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification" (2/76)
The electrically-related structures, systems, and components of this plant are in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.29, except for Paragraph C.1.m concerning the CRD manual control, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
8.1.6.1.5 Regulatory Guide 1.30, " Quality Assurance Reguirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment" (8/72) 4 The guidelines of ANSI Standard N45.2.4-1972 (IEEE 336-1971), as endorsed by this regulatory guide, have been met by the quality assurance program for the installation of safety-related items, although the standard is not specifically referenced in the constructor'.s quality assurance procedures. (For QA during construction see PSAR Appendix D.)
Conformance to the guide during plant operation is discussed in Sections 17.2A and 17.2B.
8.1.6.1.6 Regulatory Guide 1.32, " Criteria for Safety Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants" (2/77)
All safety-related electric systems are in compliance with
% Regulatory Guide 1.32, except as it refers to Regulatory Guide
("'/
\s- 1.75, which is discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.14. The portions of 8.1-7 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Regulatory Guide 1.32 applying to offsite power and de power are discussed in Sections 8.2 and 8.3.2, respectively.
IEEE 308-1974, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" is generally accepted by Regulatory Guide 1.32.
Class 1E ac power systems are designed to ensure that any design basis event, as listed in Table 1 of IEEE 308, does not cause either loss of electric power to more than one division, surveillance device, or protection system that could jeopardize the safety of the reactor unit; or transients in the power supplies, which could degrade the performance of any system.
Controls and indicators for the Class 1E 4 kV bus supply breakers are provided in the control room and on the switchgear. Controls and indicators for the standby ac power supplies are also provided in the control room and on the local diesel-generator control panels. Control and indication for the standby power system is described in Section 8.3.1.
Class 1E equipment and associated design, operating, and maintenance documents are distinctly identified as described in Section 8.3.1.3.
Class 1E equipment is qualified by analysis, by successful use under required conditions, or by actual testing to demonstrate its ability to perform its function under any applicable design basis events.
The surveillance requirements of IEEE 308 are followed in design, installation, and operation of Class 1E equipment and consist of:
- a. Preoperational equipment tests and inspections are performed in accordance with the requirements described in Chapter 14, with all components installed. These tests and inspections demonstrate:
- 1. All components are correct and are properly mounted.
- 2. All connections are correct, and circuits are continuous.
- 3. All components are operational.
- 4. All metering and protective devices are properly calibrated and adjusted,
- b. Preoperational system tests are performed in accordance with the requirements described in Chapter 14, with all components installed. These tests demonstrate that the equipment operates within design limits and that the Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-8 4
LGS FSAR O system is operational and meets its performance specifications. These tests also demonstrate:
- 1. The Class 1E loads can operate on the preferred power supply.
- 2. The loss of the preferred power supply is detected.
l O
1 1
1 O
8.1-8a Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O
I O
Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-8b l ._ __ ______ __ --
LGS FSAR-O
\# is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to prevent reactor shutdown, removal of decay heat from the core, or isolation of the primary containment if there is an accident. The engineered safeguard system and RPS are separated 1 from each other, and each is further separated into- l four channels / divisions. Separation requirements !
spply to control and instrument power and motive power for all systems concerned. The. degree of separation required varies with the potential hazards in a particular' area.
Arrangement and/or protective barriers ensure that no locally. generated force or missile can destroy redundant portions of the engineered safeguard system and/or RPS.
The arrangement of wiring is designed to eliminate, i
insofar as is practicable, all potential for fire damage to cables and to separate the engineered safeguard or RPS channels / divisions so that fire in one division does not propagate to another division.
i' Equipment and circuits requiring separation are identified on documents and drawings in a distinctive manner.
- 2. Methods of Separation I: The separation of circuits and equipment is achieved by separate safety class structures, distance, or barriers, or combination thereof.
- 3. Compatibility with Mechanical Systems The separation of Class 1E circuits and equipment ensures that the required independence is not i compromised by the failure of mechanical systems served by the Class 1E systems. For example,
~
Class 1E circuits are routed and/or protected so that the failure of related mechanical equipment of one redundant system cannot disable Class 1E circuits or equipment essential to the operation of the other redundant system (s).
- 4. Associated Circuits Associated circuits are not uniquely identified as such. These circuits, with the exception of item ,
(c) below, are treated and identified as Class 1E i O- up to an-isolation device and are isolated on a j 8.1-15
=
E F
LGS FSAR LOCA signal, with the following clarifications and
$ exceptions:
(a) When relays and other devices are used as isolation devices between Class IE and non-y Class 1E circuits, the 6-inch separation
- requirement at the device terminals is not maintained in accordance with IEEE 384-1974 e
Section 4.6.1.
(b) All non-Class 1E 4 kV motor loads that are fed from Class 1E buses are treated and identified as Class 1E even beyond the isolation device.
However, these loads are tripped in the event e of a LOCA and are routed in dedicated Class 1E raceways. They do not become associated with any other Class 1E division.
[ (c) The public address and fire alarm panel that a feeds non-Class 1E loads is fed from a P
Class 1E bus. This panel is not tripped on LOCA, because intentional disconnection of the fire alarm system is a violation of the National Fire Code and is considered p unacceptable for plant safety. The r distribution transformer and panel are r qualified and seismically supported to r Class 1E criteria. All circuits originating F from this panel are run in conduits that contain only PA and fire alarm system wiring.
L -
All circuits criginating from this panel are protected by thermal magnetic circuit breakers s in the panel. In addition, the 440V feed to
= the transformer is protected by a molded case E circuit breaker in the motor control center.
y Each of these circuit breakers is qualified J and purchased as Class 1E; therefore, two c Class 1E isolation devices exist between the
( non-Class 1E public address and fire alarm I ; circuits and the Class 1E 440V bus.
b d 5. Non-Class 1E Circuits l;
f Non-Class 1E circuits are separated from Class 1E l circuits by the separaticn requirements specified in Section 8.1.6.1.14.b, or they become associated t circuits. Nor.-Class 1E 440 volt loads that are fed
, from Class 1E motor control centers use a shunt
[ trip device on the motor control center breaker to R isolate the circuit on a LOCA signal. These E
circuits are treated as non-Class 1E from the motor .
control center to the load and control devices. .
[
E Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-16 2
LGS FSAR O b. Specific Separation Criteria 1.. Cables and Raceways The minimum separation distances specified in Paragraphs 4 and 5 below are based on open ventilated trays. Where these distances are used O
O 8.1-16a Rev. 12, 10/82
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O
I l
O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-16b
l 1
These MOVs can be initiated manually or automatically.
I
- 1. Manual initiation
)
During manual. operation, the thermal' overload is normally in the trip circuit; however, the thermal )
overload can be bypassed by holding the control switch in the appropriate "open" or "close" position. The associated "out of service" annunciator will alarm, along with a white indicating light on the system's vertical board indicating a valve motor overload or loss-of-power condition. By checking the valve indicating lights, the operator can determine whether the alarm is due to loss of voltage or motor overload.
i
- 2. Automatic initiation i The thermal overload is bypassed in automatic operation of the Class 1E HOVs in which the same annunciation sequence occurs as described in item 1
] BDove.
- b. MOVs with maintained contact control switches:
These valves are not required to operate automatically during an accident. The thermal overloads do not interrupt the motor-operated valve power circuit, but they alarm on an overload condition in the control room.
The operator has the option to allow the valve to continue to operate or to interrupt power to the motor-operated valve by placing the control swich in the STOP.
position.
8.1.6.1.20 Regulatory Guide 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants" (8/77) l The periodic testing of the diesel generator units will be in
- conformance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.108 and IEEE 387-1977 as follows
p The preoperational testing will be performed in accordance with l
! the site test outlined in section 6.4 of IEEE 387-1977. i l
A starting test as described in section 6.6.1 of IEEE 387-1977 will be performed on each diesel generator once per month.
O 8.1-27 Rev. 12, 10/82 i
LGS FSAR Periodic testing in accordance with section 6.6.2 of IEEE 387-1977 will be performed at intervals not exceeding 18 months.
8.1.6.1.21 Regulatory Guide 1.118, " Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems" (6/78)
The Limerick design provides the necessary capability for periodic testing of electric power systems in conformance with Section 5 of IEEE 338-1977 as endorsed and amended by the guide.
Periodic testing capability of instrumentation and controls systems is discussed in Section 7.1.2.5.
Periodic testing of the Class 1E systems will be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.118 and IEEE 338-1977.
8.1.6.1.22 Regulatory Guide 1.128, " Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants" (10/78)
This guide does not apply to Limerick per its implementation section. Regulatory Guide 1.128 endorses and amends IEEE 484-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations." The installation design and installation of the Class 1E batteries for LGS are in conformance with IEEE 484-1975. lh 8.1.6.1.23 Regulatory Guide 1.129, " Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants" (2/78)
The maintenance and testing of the Limerick batteries will be performed in accordance with IEEE 450-1980, except that the acceptance test will be performed at the factory prior to shipment. As required by Regulatory Guide 1.129, a service test will be performed on the Class IE batteries upon completion of installation and at intervals not exceeding 18 months.
Performance tests will be made at intervals not exceeding 5 years.
8.1.6.1.24 Regulatory Guide 1.131, " Qualification Tests of Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (8/77)
Regulatory Guide 1.131 endorses and modifies IEEE 383-1974, " Type Test for Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." LGS Class 1E cables, splices, and connections are in full compliance with IEEE 383-1974. For further information refer to Section 3.11.
O 1 Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-28 l
LGS FSAR 8.1.6.2 IEEE 387-1972, " Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" ,
i The design of the standby power supplies is in l compliance with IEEE 387-1972. The following paragraphs l analyze compliance.
- a. Adequate cooling and ventilation equipment is provided to maintain an acceptable service environment within the diesel-generator I compartments during and after any design basis event, even without support from the preferred ;
power supply.
b.- Each diesel-generator is capable of starting, accelerating, and accepting load as described in Section 8.3.1. The diesel-generator automatically energizes its cooling equipment within an acceptable time after starting.
- c. Frequency and voltage limits and the basis of the continuous rating of the diesel-generator are discussed in the compliance statement to Regulatory Guide 1.9 in Section 8.1.6.1.2.
- d. Mechanical and electrical systems are designed so i that a single failure affects the operation of only j a single diesel-generator.
I
- e. Design conditions such as vibration, torsional vibration, and overspeed are considered in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 387-1972.
l f. Each diesel governor can operate in either the isochronous or droop mode and the voltage regulator can operate in either the parallel or non-parallel mode. During testing, the diesel generator is connected to and operated in parallel with the offsite power source. The electric governor is set in the droop mode whenever connected in parallel with a system in which another prime mover is controlling the frequency. Under automatic or emergency start conditions, the electric governing system and the voltage regulator are set automatically for isochronous and non-parallel mode, respectively. .
- g. Each diesel-generator is provided with control systems permitting automatic and manual control.
The automatic start signal is functional except Oi when the diesel-generator is in the maintenance 8.1-29 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR mode. Provision is made for controlling the diesel-generator from the control room and from the diesel-generator room. Section 8.3.1 provides further description of the control systems,
- h. Voltage, current, frequency, and output power metering is provided in the control room to permit assessment of the operating condition of each diesel-generator.
- i. Surveillance instrumentation is provided in accordance with IEEE 387 as follows:
- 1. Starting system - starting air pressure low alarm
- 3. Fuel system - fuel oil level in day tank high and low, fuel oil pressure low, fuel oil strainer differential pressure high, fuel oil filter differential pressure high, fuel oil level in storage tank high, and low alarm I
- 4. Primary cooling system - emergency service -
water low pressure
- 5. Secondary cooling system - jacket water temperature high, jacket water keep-warm failure, jacket water pressure low, and jacket water expansion tank level low alarms
- 8. Generator - generator differential l overcurrent, ground neutral overcurrent, l generator phase overcurrent, and antimotoring
! trip and alarm; generator overvoltage alarm
- 9. Excitation system - generator loss of excitation and overexcitation alarm
- 10. Voltage regulation system - bus overvoltage alarm l Rev. 12, 10/82 8.1-30
LGS FSAR O 11. Governor system - engine overspeed trip
- 12. Auxiliary electric system - 4 kV bus undervoltage relays initiate bus transfer and alarm.
A detailed list of trip and alarm functions and testing of the diesel-generator is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.3.
O O
8.1-31 Rev. 12, 10/82 ]
C-_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM
}
I 8.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
8.2.1.1 Offsite Power Sources !
Offsite power is supplied from two independent, physically j separated sources: .
- a. A 220-13kV transformer no. 10 located at the Limerick !
! 220kV substation !
- b. A 13kV tertiary winding on the No. 4A and 4B 500-220kV !
bus tie auto-transformers through the No. 20 13kV regulating transformer located in the Limerick 500kV substation Physical and schematic representations of offsite and onsite l transmission systems are shown in Figures 8.2-1, 8.2-2, and O
8.2-6. i l
The Limerick 220kV substation supplies offsite power at 13.2kV !
via the No. 10 220-13kV transformer which has a nominal capacity ;
of 61.6 MVA and a 15kV underground cable run of 1000 feet outside !
the station. A transition to cable bus is made inside the i turbine enclosure, where the cable bus continues for 330 feet to :
the station auxiliary bus 10A103. The underground installation !
protects the power supply from variable weather conditions such !
as high-velocity winds, icing, and lightning.
l i
l The line primary protective relaying consists of three j differential relays, which under fault conditions trip and lock j out station auxiliary bus 10A103 breakers and breaker 105 in the
~
220kV substation. Phase overcurrent and ground overcurrent 4
relays provide backup relay protection. Breaker 105 is also tripped by no. 10 transformer protective relays and 220kV bus no. 7 protective relays.
The 220kV substation is supplied from three transmission sources: ]
() a) 220-60 line which has a capacity of 1200 mVA l S.2-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR b) 220-61 line which has a capacity of 1200 MVA c) The No. 4A and 4B bus tie autotransformers which interconnect the 220kV and 500kV substations and have a nominal capacity of 420 MVA each The Limerick 500kV substation supplies offsite power at 13.2kV to station auxiliary bus 20A103 from the tertiary winding of one of the No. 4A or 4B tie autotransformers through the No. 20 13kV-13kV regulating transformer. The tertiary winding has a nominal capacity of 95.7 MVA and the No. 20 transformer has a nominal capacity of 56 MVA. This substation is physically located 2150 feet from the Limerick 220kV substation, effectively minimizing the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating conditions, postulated accidents, and natural disasters. The 13.2kV power is transmitted 2100 feet to the station via an underground cable run and 400 feet of cable installed in a tray beneath the site access railroad bridge that spans Possum Hollow ravine. A transition to cable bus is made inside the turbine enclosure, where the cable bus continues for a distance of 330 feet to station auxiliary bus 20A103. The underground installation avoids exposure to adverse weather conditions.
O Pilot wire relaying is used for line primary protection that, under fault conditions, trips and locks out station auxiliary bus 20A103 breakers and breaker 205 in the 500kV substation. Backup relay protection is provided by phase overcurrent and ground overcurrent relays. Breaker 205 is also tripped by no. 4 transformer protective relays, 500-220kV bus tie protective relays, and No. 40 grounding transformer protective relays.
The 500kV substation will ultimately be supplied from four transmission sources:
a) 5010 line which has a capacity of 2780 MVA
- b. 5030 line which has a capacity of 2780 MVA c) 5031 line which has a capacity of 2780 MVA 1
l l d) The No. 4A and B bus tie autotransformers O
Rev. 12, 10/82 8.2-2
During unit operation, normal auxiliary power for the station is supplied from two 47 MVA unit auxiliary power transformers (one 4
per unit) ccnnected to the generator leads. Startup and Class 1E bus power is provided from the two independent offsite sources.
Either;offsite source can supply the.13.2kV unit auxiliary buses and the 4kV Class 1E buses for normal plant startup and shutdown.
j and supply all normally connected loads including loads that may i be automatically transferred to them when a LOCA in one unit coincides with a safe shutdown in the remaining unit. Each offsite source supplies an emergency auxiliary (safeguard)
. transformer with a norminal capacity of 14 MVA that steps down
Line 2300, a 33kV source, serves as a potential third offsite !
source for emergency use in the event of loss of one of the normal offsite sources. A spare 14 MVA 13.2/33-4.16kV transformer is located onsite solely as a replacement for either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 13.2-4.16kV safeguard transformer. The spare transformer has the same capacity as the safeguard transformers, which is more than adequate for safe shutdown of the plant. Underground conduit connects each safeguard transformer with the 33kV circuit breaker terminal yard. In the i
O event of failure of either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 safeguard transformer requiring repair time of more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the faulty safeguard transformer will be removed and physically replaced by the spare. The spare safeguard transformer dual 13.2/33kV high-voltage winding can be energized from either the offsite source at the 13.2kV startup bus or from a 33kV aerial tap on line 2300 if the offsite source is unavailable. Cable ;
will be pulled into the existing underground conduit for the 33kV high-voltage winding of the spare transformer as shown in Figure l 8.2-3. All of this work, including installation of a 33kV i primary pole circuit and reconnection of previously installed
. control and protective relay wiring, will be accomplished within a 72-hour period in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93.
Line 2300, the 33kV offsite source, has a ca>acity rating of I 24 MVA which is sufficient to supply all corhected and automatically transferred loads when a LOCA in one unit coincides '
with a safe shutdown in the remaining unit. This line terminates at Cromby Generating Station and Moser Substation. Bulk power to Hoser Substation is delivered by two 66kV lines from Cromby Generating Station, which has a generating capacity of 385 MW.
In addition, Moser Substation is solidly tied into the 33kV distribution system and has three combustion turbines with a combined generating capacity of 54 MW.
8.2-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
8.2.1.2 Switchyards l
! Both the 220kV and 500kV substations use a breaker and one-half l
scheme. This arrangement is shown in Figures 8.2-1 and 8.2-2.
Both substations have three bus elements initially, with provisions for future expansion to four bus elements. Element refers to each bus-to-bus connection. Both substations employ primary and backup relay protection plus breaker failure protection schemes. The substations are interconnected by a 500-220kV bus tie transformer and a 220kV transmission line. The tieline is approximately 100 feet from the Unit 1 generator line at the 220kV substation and is approximately 200 feet from the Unit 2 generator line at the 500kV substation. Both Limerick substations ultimately interconnect with the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection through their respective transmission lines.
Each main generator is connected by an isolated phase btis to its respective stepup transformer bank. The Unit 1 generator output of 1090 MW is fed to the 220kV substation via three 22-220kV, 387 MVA Unit 1 main transformers. The Unit 2 generator output of 1090 MW feeds into the 500kV substation via three 22-500kV, 388 MVA Unit 2 main transformers. A system spare 220-22kV trancformer is installed next to the C phase Unit 1 transformer for immediate use should a fault occur on one of the three operating transformers. A system spare for the Unit 2 500-22kV transformers is stored at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.
The relaying associated with the 220kV and 500kV substations and transmission lines is shown in Figure 8.2-4. Three separate protective relaying schemes are used on the 500kV and 220kV transmission lines. The first two schemes use primary and backup high-speed relays with a power line carrier for directional comparison relaying logic. In the 500kV substation, carrier relaying is on A phase and B phase of the transmission lines.
The 220kV substation transmission line carrier relay protection is on A phase and C phase. The redundant relays operate from separate current transformers and separate secondary windings of the same potential device. Each substation has its own de battery and battery charger. The charger is fed from an essential ac bus which has two alternate feeds with an automatic throwover. Low de voltage is alarmed in the substation control house and the Limerick control room. Because this de system and the substation protective relays are non-Class 1E, redundancy is not required. Direct current control circuits are fused separately for the redundant relay protection channels. Each line relaying initiates operation of separate redundant trip l
coils at the 500kV circuit breakers and one trip coil at the 220kV circuit breakers. The third scheme is breaker failure Rev. 12, 10/82 8.2-4
LGS FSAR O protection for a stuck breaker. This is provided by tripping adjacent breakers and transmitting signals to trip the circuit breaker at the remote line terminal. Separate carrier paths or channels are provided for each line relaying scheme.
The use of three relaying schemes with independently fused direct current feeds and independent 500kV circuit breaker trip coils, along with current shorting switches and potential switches, permits inservice shutdown and test of any one relay and control scheme while maintaining two protective relaying schemes in service. The use of the breaker and one-half m rangement allows for the outage of one breaker without taking a line, transformer, or generator out of service. Testing. equipment is installed for carrier line relaying to allow inservice functional testing of the directional comparison relaying logic. After initial calibration, the equipment is periodically inspected, and readings are recorded.
Each 500kV and 220kV bus element has two protective bus differential relaying schemes, either of which may be shut down for testing while maintaining the other in service for bus protection. All control operations, except actual tripping of the breakers, can be done while maintaining the bus in service.
The breakers in both the 220kV and_500kV substations are controlled from the substation control houses. Except for Unit 1 breakers (535 & 635) and Unit 2 breakers (235 & 335), al breakers are also controlled via a supervisory control system from the Limerick control room. The above-mentioned unit breakers are controlled ~via independent hard-wired circuits from the Limerick control room.
All circuit breakers have sufficient accumulator capacity for at least three open and close operations after loss of power.
Figure 8.2-5 shows the cable trench arrangements in the 220kV and 500kV switchyards. All control power circuits to the switchyard equipment are routed in these trenches. Control circuits for the various pieces of equipment are separated into individual cables.
Primary and backup relay and control circuits are separately fused and are separated into individual cables. All cables are direct-buried in the trenches.
Relay and circuit breaker functional trip tests on all of the O offsite power sources are made periodically, as unit outages permit.
8.2-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
-_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - \
LGS FSAR The substation control batteries are tested periodically as follows:
- a. Weekly - Voltage and specific gravity of the pilot cell are recorded. Overall voltage of the battery is recorded.
- b. Quarterly - Voltage and specific gravity of each cell are recorded. Overall battery voltage is recorded.
- c. Yearly - All connections are ductored and retorqued in addition to the quarterly tests.
8.2.1.3 Conclusion The offsite power system has been designed for maximum reliability. The design and configuration of the offsite power system with provisions for periodic testing are in full conformance with NRC General Design Criteria 5, 17 and 18 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.32 (1977) and with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93 (1974).
8.2.2 ANALYSIS 8.2.2.1 Transient Stability Detailed transient stability studies were made for both Limerick units using the Philadelphia Electric load flow (POWERFLO) and transient stability (TRANSTAB) computer simulation programs.
These computer programs are widely recognized in the electric utility industry and are being used by over 140 domestic and foreign utilities, government agencies, and universities.
The stability evaluation consisted of analysis of prefault and post-fault load flow simulations and of transient stability digital computer calculations. Examination of the 1985 peak and
! light load levels showed the light load level to be most critical l for stability because of the higher impedance and lower system inertia seen by the Limerick units. Thus, all results are based on 1985 light load conditions. For all load flow simulations and associated stability calculations, a detailed representation of the Philadelphia Electric Company system and the other PJM Interconnection systems was modeled including a significant Rev. 12, 10/82 8.2-6
LGS FSAR O representation of the systems in the surrounding Interconnected Power Pools. Altogether 1208 buses, 2158 lines, and 180 individual generators were represented in the model. The Limerick units and other PJM Interconnection generators were represented in the transient stability calculations by appropriate inertias and machine reactances, with generator excitation systems and turbine governors being modeled in great detail to accurately simulate generator transient performance.
The generating units of companies outside the PJM Interconnection were represented by their transient reactances and inertias.
l The results of the studies show that both Limerick units are stable for the most severe type of fault (three-phase) at the most critical locations on the electric network system.
Specifically, the Limerick generating units are stable for the following conditions:
l a. A three-phase fault on any single 500kV or 230kV Limerick circuit that is cleared by primary protective equipment (3-1/2 cycles) l . b. A three-phase fault on any single 500kV or 230kV Limerick circuit, where the most critical Limerick circuit breaker fails to open and the fault is cleared at Limerick by backup protective equipment (8 cycles)
- c. A three-phase fault on the transformer connecting the Limerick 500kV and 230kV buses that is cleared by primary protective equipment (3-1/2 cycles)
- d. A three-phase fault on the transformer connecting the Limerick 500kV and 230kV buses, where the most critical circuit breaker fails to open and the fault is cleared at Limerick by backup protective equipment (8 cycles)
- e. Simultaneous three-phase faults on both Limerick-Whitpain 500kV circuits that are cleared by primary protective equipment (3-1/2 cycles).
Load flow simulations and stability calculations were examined to evaluate the transient and post-transient system conditions after the most serious network faults and after the sudden tripping of either Limerick unit. The analysis of circuit loadings and bus voltages showed no adverse system conditions either during 8.2-7 Rev. 12, 10/82
! periods of steady-state operation or during system oscillations O caused by a fault and its subsequent clearing, i
8.2.2.2 Outages of Transmission Lines in the Vicinity of Limerick Generatina Station To demonstrate the reliability of the transmission lines associated with Limerick, unscheduled outages of existing transmission lines in the area were investige.ted. The lines included in the study are the Peach Bottom-to-Whitpain 500kV line, the three Whitpain-to-Plymouth Meeting 230kV lines, and the Whitpain-to-North Wales 230kV line. These lines were chosen because they presently link the substations associated with the Limerick project.
UNSCHEDULED OUTAGEQ Length Lines (mi.) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Peach Bottom-Whitpain 72.4 0 0 1 0 1 h
Plymouth Meeting-Whitpain 5.1 0 0 0 0 1 1 Plymouth Meeting-Whitpain 5.1 0 0 0 0 1 0 Plymouth Meeting-Whitpain 5.1 0 0 0 0 1 0 North Wales-Whitpain 3.5 0 0 1 0 0 2
- The Peach Bottom-Whitpain 500kV line was interrupted four times on the same day in 1976 because of galloping conductors. Equipment has since been installed to prevent recurrence of the galloping conductors.
Historically, outages in this area have been caused by lightning l strikes, flashovers, galloping conductors, airplanes, and I equipment failures.
l Of the 14 outages listed above, 9 lasted less than one hour, 4 l lasted less than one day, and one lasted 5 days.
l l
l 9
Rev. 12, 10/82 8.2-8
r' 1 1 l
\* ... *,...
., ; 220 KV UNIT 1
\. .
- l S TUP O O
\
- UNDERGROUND
'g ....................)................o o
. 2N KV
$UBSTATION j
\ UNIT UNIT *!
1 2
\ !
\ !
- ^
\, 220 KV TIE g c
\.
\ .
INITIAL 13 KV
\ STARTUP UNDERGROUND
\. CROMBY
\ .
\ .
CROMBY
- 66 KV TO 13 KV -
SUBSTATION 4
. I
\.
\
\ PEACH BOTTOM x.
\.
( 66 KV LINE -
\Qh
~.
% we d
WHITPAl 500 KV UNIT .
13 KV STARTUP "UNDERCROUND
'*(f - M.H.
WHITPAIN
, I *\
18 1 i i f
500 KV SUBSTATION l
] PROPOSED BREAKERS LIMERICX GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND STARTUP FEEDS FIGURE 8.21 REVI1 N 82
&a
- p. Gao TO i CROMBY 22041 NO.10 TR 105 o_ _ _ _ _ _ _
b I i
1 I
g 715 735
- BUS NO.7 -
I
__ l 725 636 l TO -
BUS NO. 5 -
l CROMBY 515 536---H>
220-60 - -
l
. - g 5s I y
I I
! AUTO' I
I I
220 KV NI SUBSTATION e
UNI g GRO) i I
v NO.1 START UP M.CIN STEP-UP FEED 13 KV TRANSFORMER BUS 10A103 UNITl
(, d
\
UNIT 1 l
P I
~. o 1
l l
TO WHITPAIN SUBSTATlON A
/ 5031 5030\
BUS NO.1 135 125 --1' 235 115
_ . _ -- 225 BUS NO. 3 -
TO 1~335 325 - PEACH BOTTOM BUS TIE,
- ~
IRANSFORMER NO. 4 315 3{
=
D 500 KV SUBSTATION ER 205 ND (,
)
NO.20 REGULATING
" TRANSFORMER NO. 2 START-UP '
FEED 13 KV MAIN STEP-UP
- BUS 20A103 TRANSFORMER LUXILIARY lSFIRMER LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
! UNITS 1 AND 2
\ FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UNIT 2 TRANSMISSION SYSTEM l SINGLE LINE l
l FIGURE 8.2 2 REV.12,10/82 l
1 8517 f t Lief Pttuatt l PRIM &#Y Q 8
tatagP IA U ag
$- h E 4:'J::;r 4 CC.,
] El-yCCIT g
g x y 1 ui. C/ , ,
I"'h*
Jr t
fagu,f i k_ l CfuEtaTOR -I r3 _sE tut s
[33 BACRWP $
220tV SUBSTATION q f-M $
( -
l 120sv
,-f!E LIut tactur
- r;, 1 =s- l 5 :
- laue10 f am4 7-% PILOT "'
l "';'; l : e simi.r.rt:(
-]l[-
- F F : :
_3l> Ei[ E[ __.
!, I "!
, e 1.U.t. ".
F : :
R,
- F_,
1 EUI ! _ _ tp _ _ treve tre sur l l*
!'d#, 9 '"
&g.j
- ii; d . '#.C.U
- ,,' <,1 u ,,I u..,
i 1...u....
i-@
x I _
(@ ,,,,,
..C.,
L..........................
r!ous tre Line 7e ~ -
"F .,.,ru...,..
' i
- 1. . ,
, 6.............................
-q
.i......
SACLUP OPR!ust?
g Di L a; BACR UP
{
CCVTb' g,
(, {75] IUPPLT LinE gg
% g PRImaRT LIEF !?O-80 10 Caoust f t $Uttia.
L 4 P OUS ALI. BLPP' t l I LinE PRIMART l g 1 !
AUI.8DPPL1 I E
=
LINE BACEUP 1 01 L_ _ _ _ _ .
I UNDE SCROUNS 5 CABLE =
E' -
- - - '- _m__ _ _ _ _ ____ .
.- - - - . .~ .. ..
h 1
d t.
E!8F 5030 11st Etti it WNjfPalg 70 suf f rats C
ACRUP BACEUP 88 84 CCvih' i PR!ua R T t PRImaat
$66RV CCVfh' '"* nm
_ . I r, _ .~ ca I
'~ bl ~ _ b '~ _ In a0DITISR te PR!uaa? aus sacsup Rftatt SHOWu. ALL fleiv an0 EDORT CIRCuf f ORE AEERI wave ORiaLER f eltuff PROTECTIVE Rftart WWICH TRIP fuE CIRCulf BREasERS a8JaCf ut g yPfluaRY 70 THE Faut? OREasER 15 gf PAILS 18 OPEN a 10-70aE autIS-70mf IN A PRECETERulait flue.
fnaugsgg TR4 esser TRIP falf ggyf{ _
y g--* g--
f!- sou v suesTATION !- t-Esa Eis E3
+
r1
. if f persa,
,~-~
{ Riv '-
k~O*Jh,3 e'u's"R's f- tacaup + m
] Cy] ~~ ~ }
.t I l PRAI3FOsuf R l taCauP TR n RuF A Q
""'="
__ * ,'# #,"' g CC.TF ,,
Q
CC G'C8l,. . . d tatsuP i
1 flot t - Gl. I j. g CNf
'~
D~ ~
$008v TRaus. , CC
$00-f te-13EV tsa03 gaCaup f-TRautFORMERE j- #
TO N TOM CCTT k-
- " TGI.~
j D~
'~
~
auCI4-f 0ut IRgE.
- ";J';"'-
g__k' 13av 18ast. LE ADS g g t a p suppt, I gattur T" L!nE PaZuaET ' 1 h aVI. EUPPtf 15
- f0 FLIRT SACEUP
-6 ) Offaatt et
- 8R0ust $UB3f A.
RE But ef!NE TRastF ORME R EI 8AE'UP L8P IUI le g -- PRIMAR T g f k*, AUI. SUPPtv , 8 to
.t uE PRI RT #f tutaf f u8 E 18ansFORutt
=
=
< 7 l.. . -
'}
REL AY Of f!CE NUM6f R1 IHOWN On TNIt OI ASRAM ARE IN ACCORDANCE e F LOT
. Wif M THE L Aff 57 REVISION OF g A.R.S.I. ST AND ARD C37.2 E
b ya0f REROURO Ca0LE LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANAL.YSIS REPORT TRANSMISSION SYSTEM RELAY SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM FIGURE 8.2-4 REV.12,10/82
N 33KV LINE #550,0 AC SERVICE I I I I i 105 : TIE TO
@ n nm #10 TRANS. l LINE 220h SU 220-81 s to h r - JL -- -< -----
i j RE IIIC t r 1r-- e i
- 88 88 NB g7 [gp;.; _ tI I . crh_n_ # 3 L & P --
.i i se 25 s8 [________._.__r___. 205 tI I3 33 tI (\ I8 3:
gg I ".M~Q I; g
/.
8I I3 3: Ig / II II 33 l II I - ggd5] 6--715
- 735
- 8 u
I - t8 - II 3: I 3a gy p_. JL________ -__J,g 38 a r- -----------
~~--,a 8 gg (gp II ta II II 725 gg II It 8I I I --
as as : B35 II I3 3I II I3 33 Il II II II IB I3 I II 33 I 15 II 33 I I 33 I E il 3g I I j II 3g 3 I LINE 88 "' % - - s' 220-60 i i si
/ ;;
si 515
;35
_ j,8 u i __ai._______ _____Jl ea : 88 aa ae 525 s II It 8I J8 88 88 ll ll ll TOGEN.#1#1TR.
#1 L&P, h !!
II la
, 8I il
, 18 IL__
i i ll lr ,$i I II l 8I 88 llllll lll I 8L-
! '~~~
' CONTROL HOUSE i 500KV TIE I
I A.C. SERVICE 8 33KV LINE #2300 220KV SUBSTATION
33KV 33KV LINE #2300 LINE #5500' L ' CONTROL A.C. NOTES: r-- l l l l l r-HOUSE ( SERVICE ~: 1 1. A.C. POWER IS SUPPLIED
\ i II ' FROW TWO 0FF-SITE SOURCES
$'8 l' s
\
I l AND ONE SUBSTATION SOURCE. AN AUTOWATIC THROWOVER TO #2 TR. i SCHEWE WILL TRANSFER TO L. g ~~ j
.,p. i ~ _~ ~ ~ ~ 's GEN. #2 rEn # 1 L&P 3 l THE EWERGENCY SOURCE ON
- a 5\s ss r---
r--'3 LOSS OF THE NORMAL POWER
.. ss is s
i SUPPLY. i8 "
. J i. . . .J, ,' ,' 235 C l 2. D.C. POWER IS SUPPLIED i #5031 i FROW THE 130 VOLT STATION
, , 88 88 e L....JL.....J 8 8
i BATTERY IN THE CONTROL uw crn HOUSE-
. . .. - . , a' i .
RO 40 8 8 tt I g' 4A 8 8: _7 33 : ' 8: _a se ' 8: 8 3 L&P I I, ,g L___d Eg gg I, ,,
- ll ll ll Ie ll a
II II IL-. J. L
- i. . _ , .. __- . , , . _ _ . _.. .,.3 ,.__
II -- 32s ,I ,I 13s lI II II II II II
^
e; 115 II II 88 __ ! ll i2s
,u __ _.::_ . ,
i
.___j ,_______
j ll l e a: a8LINE LINE ll ll
'j 2 25 ll#5030
#5010 j s
g LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT TRANSMISSION SYSTEM ARRANGEMENT OF CABLE TRENCHES 500KV SUBSTATION FIGURE 8.2-5 REV.12,10/82 )
l [ 230/500KV TIE LCD 12-3-82 f) PROPOSED SOOKV v
' 5031 LINE
" 278O MVA 3 m LCD 1987 5030 LINE 500KV 5010 LINEj 2780 MVA LC D 12-3-82 h 0 MVA LCD 12 82 23OKV 1200 MVA l LCD 10-1-83 l 220-60 LINE l
P30KV 1200 MVA LCD12-1-83 220-61 LINE l I l Y \ l 1 i i l [ CROMBY l l l LIMERICK GENERATING STATION ! UNITS 1 AND 2 l FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ! O TRANSMISSION SYSTEM l LINE ROUTINGS j i FIGURE 8.2-6 REV.12,10/82
LGS FSAR
/%
U 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1.1 Description - The onsite ac power systems are divided into Class 1E and non-Class 1E systems. Figure 8.1-1 shows a single line diagram of both systems.
-The onsite ac power systems consist'of main generators, main step-up transformers, unit auxiliary transformers, safeguard transformers, and diesel-generators, among other distribution system equipment. The onsite ac power distribution system has nominal bus voltages ratings of 13.8kV, 4.16kV, 2.4kV, 480V, and 208/120V. Throughout this discussion and on.all design drawings, the equipment utilization voltages are designated as 13.2kV, 4kV, 2.3kV, 440V, and 208/120V.
i' 8.3.1.1.1 Non-Class 1E ac System The non-Class 1E portion of the onsite power systems provides ac power for non-Class 1E loads. A limited number of non-Class 1E loads are important to the power generating equipment integrity and are fed from the Class 1E distribution system through the isolation devices. The unit auxiliary transformer supplies all the non-Class 1E unit auxiliary loads. The unit auxiliary transformer primary is l connected to the main generator isolated phase bus duct tap,
- while the secondary of the transformer is connected to the two i 13.2 kV unit auxiliary buses through a nonsegregated phase bus.
During plant startup, shutdown, and post-shutdown, power to the 13.2 kV buses is supplied from the offsite power sources, with Unit I supplied through the 220-13 kV startup transformer and Unit 2 supplied through the 13 kV tertiary winding of either the No. 4A or 4B 500-220 kV bus-tie autotransformer; the tertiary of the other autotransformer is available as a back-up source. In addition, during these conditions, manual or automatic fast transfer is provided to transfer the unit auxiliary buses to the startup power source to maintain continuity of power at the unit auxiliary distribution system. The interconnecting breakers are O' interlocked to prevent the connection of the startup power source 8.3-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
r 1 LGS FSAR and the unit auxiliary power source to the unit auxiliary buses at the same time. In addition to the loading conditions mentioned in the above paragraph, the 13.2 kV startup buses also supply the power to the Class 1E loads through their respective 13.2 kV - 4.16 kV safeguard transformers, as discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.2. The 13.2 kV unit auxiliary switchgear provides power to large auxiliary loads, 2.3 kV switchgears, and 440 V load centers. The 13.2 kV switchgear feeds double-ended 440 V load centers. A manual tie breaker is provided for each set of load centers to intertie the two load centers if there is a failure of one load center transformer. To prevent paralleling of the two power supplies to each set of load centers, bus tie breakers are electrically interlocked with corresponding bus breakers such that one bus breaker must be open before the tie breaker may be closed. If the tie breaker is closed, closing of both bus breakers will automatically open the tie breaker. Load centers generally supply power to 440 V loads larger than 100 hp and power for their respective motor control centers. The motor control centers supply 440 V loads smaller than 100 hp, while 440 V, 480/277 V, and 208/120 V panels provide miscellaneous loads such as unit heaters, space, heaters, lighting systems, etc. The 13.2 kV switchgear also feeds a 2.3 kV switchgear which supplies power to general plant services loads. The non-Class 1E equipment capacities are listed below:
- a. Transformers Main transformer 3-16, 387 MVA, FOA 650C (Unit 1) 20.9-230 kV Main transformer 3-16, 388 MVA, FOA 650C (Unit 2) 20.9-505 kV Unit auxiliary transformers 1-36 (both units) 31.5/42.0/52.5 MVA, OA/FA/FOA, 650C 22-13.8 kV Station auxiliar[ (startup) 1-36 transformer 37/49/61.6 MVA, (Unit 1) OA/FOA/FOA, 650C Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-2
LGS FSAR 230-14.18 kV, LTC-automatic, on-line, range t10% Auto-transformers, tertiary 2-36 OA/FOA/FOA winding (startup) H 420 MVA 650C (Unit 2) X 420 MVA 650C Y 95.7 MVA 650C l 515-230-13.8 kV LTC 10% of 515 kV F.C., automatic, on-line C leguard transformers 1-36 (both units) 11.2/14.0 MVA, OA/FA, 650C 13.2-4.16 kV, LTC-automatic, on-line, range 10% Transformers (Perkiomen 1-36 Creek) 5.6/7.0 MVA, OA/FA, 650C (Common to Units 1 and 2) 34.4-4.16 kV I Plant services transformer 1-36 5600/7000 kVA, OA/FA, 650C, 13.2-2.4 GRD Y/1.38 kV Regulating Transformer 1-36
- (startup) 35/46/58 MVA (Unit 2) OA/FA/FA, 650C l
- 13.8-13.8 kV l LTC - automatic, on-line, range t15%
l
- b. Switchgear j 13.2 kV Switchgear 1200/2500 A continuous !
rating, 750 MVA 3d class 37,500 A rms sym interrupting rating l 2.3 kV Switchgear 1200/2000 A continuous rating 250 MVA 3d class 37,500 A rms sym interrupting O rating 8.3-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- c. 440 V Unit load centers Transformers 1000 kVA, 3 6, 60 Hz, 4160/480 V Bus 600 A continuous rating Breakers (metal clad) 22,000 A rms symmetrical, minimum interrupting rating
- d. 440 V Motor control centers Horizontal bus 600 A continuous rating, 42,000 A rms sym bracing Vertical bus 400 A continuous rating, 42,000 A rms sym bracing Breakers (molded case) 22,000 A rms symmetrical, h
minimum interrupting rating
- e. 120 V Instrument ac distribution panels Buses 100/225A continuous rating 10,000 A*rms sym bracing Breakers (molded case) 100 A frame size 5,000 A rms sym interrupting rating I
- f. 120 V ac UPS and computer distribution panels Buses 400 A continuous rating 5,000 A rms sym bracing Fuses 200,000 A rms sym interruptin rating Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-4
LGS FSAR i 8.3.1.1.2 . Class 1E ac Power System The Class 1E ac power system is.the portion of the onsite power system that is shown after the safeguard transformers in Figure 8.3-1. The Class 1E ac system distributes power at 4 kV, 440 V, and 208/120 V. The loads that are fed by this Class 1E ac system are divided into four divisions in each unit and are shown in Table 8.3-2. Each load division has its own distribution system and power supplies. The 4 kV bus of each Class 1E load division is provided with connections to two offsite power sources, designated as preferred and alternate power supplies. In addition, provisions exist for connection to a third offsite power source through a spare transformer if there is a failure of one of the two offsite sources or either of the safeguard transformers. Diesel-o generators are provided as a standby power supply if there is a total loss of the preferred and alternate power supplies. Standby power supply is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.3. O The following material describes the various features of the Class 1E ac power system.
~8.3.1.1.2.1 Power Supply Feeder Each Class 1E 4 kV switchgear is provided with a preferred and an alternate offsite power supply feeder and one standby diesel-generator feeder. Each bus is normally energized by the preferred power supply. If the preferred power source is not available at the 4 kV bus, automatic transfer is made to the alternate power source, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.2.4. If both the preferred and the alternate power sources become unavailable, the loads on each bus are picked up automatically by the standby diesel-generator assigned to that bus, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.3.
8.3.1.1.2.2 Bus Arrangement The Class 1E ac power system is divided into divisions A, B, C, and D. Power supp' lies for each load division are discussed in O Section 8.3.1.1.2.1. All Class 1E ac loads are divided among the four divisions so that any combination of three out of four 8.3-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
r LGS FSAR divisions has the capability to supply the minimum required lh safety loads to safely shut down the unit. The distribution system of each division consists of a 4 kV bus, a 440 V load center, several motor control centers, and several low-voltage distribution panels. The bus arrangements are shown in Figure 8.3-1. 8.3.1.1.2.3 Loads Supplied from Each Bus Table 8.3-3 lists all the loads supplied from each Class 1E bus. 8.3.1.1.2.4 Manual and Automatic Interconnections Between Buses, Buses and Loads, and Buses and Supplies No provisions exist for automatically connecting one Class 1E load division to another redundant Class 1E load division or for automatically transferring loads between load divisions. .The incoming preferred power supply associated with a load division can supply the 4 kV Class 1E bus of the other load division by manual operation of the requisite 4 kV circuit breakers,'when required. For each load division, one 4kV feeder circuit breaker is provided for the normal incoming preferred power source, and another 4kV feeder circuit breaker is provided for the alternate power cource. Safegucrd bus 101 is the preferred power source for channels A and.C for Unit 1 and channels B and D for Unit 2. Safeguard bus 201 is the preferred power source for channels B and D for Unit 1 and channels A and C for Unit 2. The normal preferred power source to each bus is electrically interlocked with the alternate power source such that the bus can be connected to only a single power source at any one time. In the event of loss of preferred power to the load division, undervoltage relays on the source feeder bus initiate an automatic transfer to the alternate power. source, if available, and start the bus diesel generator. In the event of losing both preferred and alternate power supplies, the diesel breaker closes when the generator reaches rated voltage and load division becomes powered from the diesel generator. When the power system is operating from the diesel-generator supply (loss of offsite power), redundant load divisions cannot be manually connected together because the 4 kV circuit breakers controlling the incoming preferred and alternate power supplies Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-6 _ _ . _ __ _ 1
LGS FSAR () 'to the Class 1E buses are locked-open to prevent the paralleling of the diesel-generators. During manually initiated testing, one l diesel-generator may be paralleled with the preferred source. 8.3.1.1.2.5 Interconnections Between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E' Buses, Non-Class 1E Loads, and Class 1E Buses 1 There are no interconnections between the Class 1E and'non-Class.1E buses. The offsite power supply feeders through tne startup sources, which supply power to both the Class 1E and non- < Class 1E buses, are not considered as bus interconnections between the Class 1E and non-Class 1E buses, since such feeders are exempt from the associated circuit requirements in IEEE 384-1974, Section 4.5. 5 i A further discussion of interconnections between Class 1E and
- non-Class 1E buses, non-Class 1E loads, and Class 1E buses is presented in Section 8.1.6.
8.3.1.1.2.6 Redundant Bus Separation O The Class 1E switchgear for the redundant Class is located in separate seismic Category I rooms 1E load divisions in the control i and reactor enclosures to ensure electrical and physical separation. Electrical equipment separation is further discussed in Section 8.1.6. 8.3.1.1.2.7 Distribution Equipment Capacities
- a. 4 kV Switchgear 1200 A continuous rating, 350 MVA 36 class, 50,000 A rms sym interrupting rating
- b. 440 V Unit load centers A
Transformers 750 and 1000 kVA, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 4160/480 V Bus 600 A continuous rating
}
8.3-7 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Breakers (metal clad) 22,000 A ras symmetrical, minimum interrupting rating
- c. 440 V Motor control centers Horizontal bus 600 A continuous rating 42,000 A rms sym bracing Vertical bus 300 A continuous rating 42,000 A rms sym bracing Breakers (molded case) 22,000 A rms symmetrical, minimum interrupting rating i
- d. 120 V Instrument ac distribution panels 4
Buses 100 A continuous rating 10,000 A rms sys bracing O Breakers (molded case) 100 A frame size 5,000 A rms sym interrupting rating 8.3.1.1.2.8 Automatic Load Shedding and Sequential Loading Shedding of the loads off the Class 1E buses is achieved by using undervoltage relays that automatically trip the breakers on bus undervoltage or a LOCA signal. Load sequencing is accomplished by using time delay relays on individual breaker control circuits. The following describes load shedding and sequential loading after a LOCA:
- a. With offsite power available, all Class IE 4 kV breakers on the unit with the LOCA, except for the RHR pump motor feeder breaker, are tripped. The required Class 1E
'oads are then started in a preset time sequence.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-8
LGS FSAR O. b. If there is a total loss'of offsite power, all Class 1E 4 kV breakers on the unit with the LOCA are tripped. The required Class 1E loads are then started in a preset time sequence. On the unit'without the LOCA, which is also experiencing loss of offsite power, all the Class 1E 4 kV breakers except the Class 1E load center feeder breakers are tripped. Manual starting of emergency loads is required for emergency shutdown. For further information, see Section 8.3.1.1.3.6. 8.3.1.1.2.9 Class 1E Equipment Identification A clear identification is provided to distinguish between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment. Each division of the Class IE equipment is identified by a unique color and a numbering system. Section 8.3.1.3 discusses Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment identification in detail. 8.3.1.1.2.10 Instrumentation and Control Systems for the Applicable Power Supply Identified [ Power for the four divisions of Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits is supplied by the respective division of the Class 1E instrumentation and control distribution equipment. The power supplies for instrumentation and control circuits are described below.
- a. Instrumentation - The instrumentation ac system supplies 4
power for the Class IE instruments. Four independent Class 1E 208/120 V ac power supplies are provided to supply the associated four channels of the instruments. The four-bus arrangement provides a separate electric power supply to each of the four channels that are electrically and physically isolated from the other channels. Each power supply consists of a 480-208Y/120 V transformer and a distribution panel. The 440 V power supply is provided by the corresponding 440 V Class 1E motor control center.
- b. Control Circuits - Control power for the 4 kV Class 1E O switchgear is supplied by the Class IE 125 V de system, 8.3-9 Rev. 12, 10/82
._. , ..,..-_w- , __ - - . _ .,. ,,____.,...-..,m_ . . . _ . - _ . _ _ . _
LGS FSAR while load centers and motor control centers use 120 V ac for control power. De control power for the Class IE switchgear is provided from Class 1E batteries of the same division. Four divisions of Class IE batteries supply control power to the associated four divisions of the Class IE switchgear. For a further description of the de system, see Section 8.3.2. For each Class IE load center, control power is supplied from a control bus connected to the load center power bus through a control transformer. Motor control center control power is supplied by individual control transformers connected to those breakers requiring control power. 8.3.1.1.2.11 Electric Circuit Protection Systems Protective relay schemes and direct-acting trip devices on h primary and backup circuit breakers are provided throughout the onsite power system to:
- a. Isolate faulted equipment and/or circuits from unfaulted equipment and/or circuits
- b. Prevent damage to equipment
- c. Protect personnel
- d. Minimize system disturbances
- e. Maintain continuity of the power supply The short-circuit protective system is analyzed to ensure that the various adjustable devices are applied within their ratings and set to be coordinated with each other to attain selectivity in their operation. The combination of devices and settings applied affords the selectivity necessary to isolate a faulted area quickly, with minimum disturbance to the rest of the system.
Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-10
LGS FSAR Each protective device including circuit breakers and protective relays is equipped with a visual indicator to identify its actuation. To avoid spurious trips and to ensure correct selective operation of the protective devices and their associated breakers, minimum
- time intervals are maintained between the characteristic tripping curves of the various protective devices to account for pickup tolerances.
4 When coordinating inverse time overcurrent relays, the time interval between relay characteristics is a minimum of 0.3 to 0.4 seconds. The interval consists of 0.08 seconds for circuit breaker operating time (5 cycles, 0.10 seconds for relay overtravel, and 0.12 to 0.22 seconds for safety factor. The , minimum time interval between relay characteristics and fuse ' characteristic curves is 0.2 seconds. The current pickup [ intervals between relay characteristics are selected to maintain
- tripping selectivity, which includes the separation margins required by relay pickup tolerances.
1 When coordinating low voltage power circuit breakers, molded case O circuit breakers and fuses, the characteristic curves generally do not overlap. In general, only a slight separation is made , between the different characteristic curves because the curves
- represent minimum and maximum clearing times and include the
! tolerances of the protective device. Major types of protection measures employed include the ( following:
- a. Bus differential relaying A bus differential relay scheme is provided for each Class IE 4 kV bus. These relays provide high-speed clearing of internal bus faults by tripping all circuit breakers connected to the faulted bus.
- b. Overcurrent relaying Each Class 1E 4 kV bus feeder circuit breaker is equipped with three very inverse-time overcurrent relays and one inverse-time ground fault relay to sense, and
[ 8.3-11 Rev. 12, 10/82
. . ~ . _ - _..-_ . _ _ _ _
LGS FSAR protect the bus from, overcurrent condition and to provide backup for feeder circuit protective relays. Each 4 kV motor feeder circuit breaker has three overcurrent relays, each with one long-time, one high dropout instantaneous, and one standard instantaneous element for overload, locked rotor, and short-circuit protection. Each breaker is also equipped with an instantaneous ground sensor relay. For 4kV Class 1E motors, the circuit inverse-time protection is set for overload alarm at 115 percent of motor full load current (FLC) for motors with service factor (SF) = 1.0 and at 130 percent FLC for SF = 1.15. The high dropout instantaneous element is at 175 percent FLC and will trip for locked rotor and short circuit currents, provided the inverse time element has operated. The standard instantaneous element is set at greater than or equal to 160 percent of motor locked rotor current for short circuit trip. Each Class 1E 4 kV supply circuit breaker to a 480 V load center transformer is protected by three extremely inverse-time overcurrent relays with long-time and instantaneous elements. An instantaneous overcurrent ground sensor relay provides sensitive ground fault protection. For Class 1E 480V load center transformers, the transformer primary inverse-time protection is set between 200 to 300 percent of the transformer OA rating.
- c. Undervoltage relaying Each 4 kV Class 1E bus is equipped with undervoltage relays for initiating the automatic transfer from the preferred to the alternate offsite power source, shedding the loads off the 4 kV Class 1E buses as described in Section 8.3.1.1.2.8, and starting the diesel-generator when both the preferred and alternate offsite power sources are not available.
Each Class 1E 4 kV bus feeder is equipped with an undervoltage relay for automatic transfer blocking. gg Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-12
$5 LGS FSAR O d. Diesel-generator differential relaying Each diesel-generator is equipped with differential relaying protection. This circuitry provides high-speed disconnection to prevent severe damage in case of diesel-generator internal faults.
- e. 440 V Load center protection Each load center circuit breaker is equipped with
. integral, solid-state, adjustable, direct-action trip devices providing instantaneous and/or inverse-time overcurrent protection. Motor feeders are equipped with l solid-state adjustable instantaneous and long-time overcurrent trip devices.
4 The overcurrent devices for breakers supplying 480V i motor control centers are set to protect the feeder cables from short circuit and thermal damage and to be selective with downstream protective devices. Motor feeder long-time overcurrent devices are set at 145 to 150 percent motor full load current (FLC) for motors with service factor (SF) = 1.15, and 130 to 135 percent for motors with SF ='1.0. The instantaneous trip is set greater than or equal to 160 percent motor locked rotor current. The time delay setting is adjusted for the motor characteristics such that acceleration is permitted, while protecting the motor for a locked rotor condition and thermal overload,
- f. 440 V Motor control center protection Molded-case circuit breakers provide inverse-time overcurrent and/or instantaneous short circuit protection for all connected loads. For motor circuits, the molded-case circuit breakers are equipped with an adjustable instantaneous magnetic trip function only. ,
Motor thermal overload protection is provided by the heater element trip unit in each phase of the motor i feeder circuit. The molded-case breakers for non-motor feeder circuits provide thermal inverse-time overcurrent protection and instantaneous short-circuit protection. The thermal overload trip units for safety-related motor-operated valves are normally bypassed except 8.3-13 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR during maintenance tests. For safety-related motor-operated valves controlled by keylocked control switches, the thermal overload trip units are not bypassed. Motor overload heater elements are set at 115 percent ! motor full load current (FLC) for motors with service j factor (SF) = 1.0, and at 133 percent FLC when SF = 1.15. The magnetic instantaneous trip on the molded case breaker is set in the 10 - 13 x FLC range to override the motor locked rotor current and to provide short circuit protection. 1 The thermal magnetic breakers for non-motor feeder circuits are set to have a thermal pickup at approximately 125 percent FLC and a magnetic instantaneous trip setting in excess of the load inrush current. 8.3.1.1.2.12 Testing of the ac System During Power Operation All Class IE circuit breakers and motor starters, except for the electric equipment associated with Class 1E loads identified in Chapter 16, are testable during reactor operation. During periodic Class 1E system tests, the subsystems such as safety injection, containment spray, and containment isolation are actuated, thereby causing appropriate circuit breaker or contactor operation. The 4 kV and 440 V circuit breakers and control circuits can also be tested independently while individual equipment is shut down. The switchgear circuit breakers can be placed in the test position and exercised without operation of the related equipment. The 440 V circuit breakers are placed in the tripped position, and the control circuits can be exercised without operation of the related equipment. 8.3.1.1.2.13 Power Systems and Equipment Shared Between Units Each unit is provided with separate and independent onsite Class 1E ac power systems. The Class 1E power system for each l unit consists of four independent Class 1E buses, powered by four independent diesel generators, which provide power to four , divisions of Class 1E loads. There is no sharing of Class 1E power supplies and equipment between Units 1 and 2. O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-14
LGS FSAR (A 8.3.1.1.3 Standby Power Supply The standby power supply for each division consists of one diesel-generator set complete with accessories and fuel storage and transfer systems. Each diesel-generator is connected to only one 4 kV Class 1E bus and is interlocked to prevent parallel operation during loss of offsite power. The four Class 1E buses for each reactor unit are operated as separate buses (split bus system) and are not synchronized. Each diesel-generator set is operated independently (from the other sets) and is disconnected from the utility power system, except during tests. Each unit has four channels of standby power supply and four load divisions. The operation of three out of four channels of the standby power supply is adequate to satisfy minimum Class 1E load demand caused by a LOCA or loss of offsite power sources. A detailed discussion of the load demand on each diesel, which includes load characteristics, load sequencing, bus assignments, etc, is covered in Section 8.3.1.1.3.6. The diesel-generators are capable of supplying power to the loads necessary to shut down and cool down the associated unit safely. t O' Each diesel-generator is rated at 2850 kW for continuous operation and at 3135 kW for two hours of short-time operation in l any 24-hour period. The diesel-generators are selected so that their ratings satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9, as discussed in Section 8.1.6.2. In addition, the diesel generators are capable of operating for extended periods of time at either low load or unloaded in the case of a LOCA occurring with the availability of offsite power. For extended periods at low load operation, the diesel generators are operated at 50 percent load or greater for at least one hour for every 12-hour period that the diesel generators are operated at low loads of less than 30 percent. This prevents possible accumulation of combustion and lube oil products in the exhaust system. If a LOCA should occur and offsite power is available, the diesel generators would start automatically and run unloaded. After the offsite power grid, reactor parameters, and support systems have been stabilized, the unloaded diesel generators would be manually stopped and returned to standby. Even though the diesel generators are not operated for extended periods, the capability l to load the diesel generators to remove possible combustion and lube oil products from the exhaust system would be provided. The following sections discuss the functional aspects of the diesel-generator. l O x_- 8.3-15 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR 8.3.1.1.3.1 Starting Initiating Circuits The diesel-generators are started by any of the following conditions:
- a. Total loss of offsite power at the 4 kV Class 1E buses
- b. Low reactor water level
- c. High drywell pressure coincident with low reactor pressure
- d. Manual actuation of the start / auto /stop control switch in the control room when the remote / local selector switch is in the " remote" position
- e. Manual actuation of the start /stop control switch on a local control station when the remote / local selector switch is in the " local" position Two redundant control / starting circuits are provided for each diesel-generator. The failure of one circuit does not prevent the respective diesel-generator from starting or from operating continuously.
Although started automatically, the diesel-generators are not automatically connected to their associated 4 kV Class 1E buses until the generator voltage and frequency are established, the breakers connecting the emergency buses to the offsite sources are tripped, and the bus voltage is zero. The diesel-generator is stopped by the operator after he/she determines that continued operation of the diesel is not required. 8.3.1.1.3.2 Diesel Starting Mechanism and System The diesel-generator start system is described in Section 9.5.6. Each diesel engine is provided with immersion heaters in the engine jacket water and the lube oil system to maintain the engine coolant and lube oil temperature at an operable level for fast and reliable starting of the diesel engines. The standby jacket coolant heater and the standby jacket coolant circulating pump are interlocked for simultaneous operation when the jacket Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-16
LGS FSAR O water temperature drops below the preset temperature. The standby lube oil heater and the standby lube oil circulating pump are interlocked for simultaneous operation when the oil is below a preset temperature and the engine is below a preset speed. See Sections 9.5.5'and 9.5.7 for further der ription. 8.3.1.1.3.3 Tripping Devices Each diesel engine and related generator circuit breaker, while supplying loads during a LOCA, are tripped by protective devices under the following conditions only:
- a. Engine overspeed
- b. Diesel-generator differential overcurrent
- c. 4 kV bus differential overcurrent For all operating situations, except during a LOCA, each diesel engine and related generator circuit breaker are tripped by the respective protective devices under the following conditions, in addition to the above-listed trips:
- a. Generator phase overcurrent
- b. Generator ground neutral overcurrent
- c. Anti-motoring
- d. Jacket coolant high temperature
- e. Jacket coolant low pressure
- f. Lube oil high temperature
- g. Lube oil low pressure
- h. Fire protection system actuation ,
I 8.3-17 Rev. 12, 10/82 !
LGS FSAR An individual alarm is provided for each of these abnormal conditions at the local control panel. A common trouble alarm is provided in the control room. Also, a status alarm is provided in the control room to alarm if a diesel-generator is not ready to start. Directional overcurrent (reverse power) protection is provided but is permitted to trip only during operation of the diesel-generator in parallel with the preferred power supply during manually initiated testing. To prevent spurious tripping of the engine due to malfunction of an engine protective device, three independent sensors are provided and connected in a two-out-of-three tripping logic for all trip conditions except engine overspeed and protective relays. The overspeed trip device is a simple, highly reliable mechanical device for which two-out-of-three tripping logic is unnecessary. The starting circuit is equipped with a " fail to start" relay that interrupts the starting of the diesel generator if the diesel generator does not reach 200 rpm within a preset time following a start initiation. The " fail to start" relay causes the shutdown relay and the governor shutdown solenoid to become energized, and provides a failure-to-start alarm both locally and in the main control room. Energizing the shutdown relay and the governor shutdown solenoid will shut down the engine. The " fail to start" relay must be reset at the diesel generator. After correcting the trouble, the engine shutdown reset must be manually operated either locally at the diesel generator local control panel or remotely from the main control room. 8.3.1.1.3.4 Breaker Interlocks Interlocks are provided in the closing and tripping of the 4 kV Class 1E circuit breakers to protect personnel and equipment from the following conditions:
- a. Automatic energizing of electric devices or loads during niaintenance
- b. Automatic closing of the diesel-generator breaker to any energized or faulted bus Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-18
l l LGS FSAR
.1
- c. Connecting two sources out of synchronism 8.3.1.1.3.5 Control Permissive A single key-operated local / remote selector switch at the local control panel is provided for each diesel-generator to block automatic start signals when the diesel is out of service for maintenance. An annunciator alarm in the control room indicates
" diesel not in auto" when the switch is not in the remote t position.
A control switch in the control room and a local control switch ! on the local control panel in the diesel-generator room are l provided to allow manual starting of the diesel when all i protective systems are permissive. During periodic diesel- ,
- generator tests, permissives and interlocks are designed to l
! permit manual synchronizing and loading of the diesel-generator ! with either offsite power source. 8.3.1.1.3.6 Loading of Diesel-Generators , The diesel-generators are designed to start and attain rated voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The generator, static l exciter, and voltage regulator are designed to permit the unit to ! accept the load and to accelerate the motors in the sequence and ! time requirements shown in Table 8.3-1. Voltage drop ! 4 calculations on starting large motors have been made to ensure : i proper acceleration of the pumps under the required conditions l for core cooling after a DBA. Proper control and timing relays are provided so that each load is applied automatically at the , proper time and in the starting sequence indicated in Table 8.3- )
- 1. When the automatic loading sequence of the Class IE loads is
- completed, the operator may manually add additional loads as assigned in Table 8.3-3 but these loads should not exceed the ;
j continuous rating of the diesel-generator. He/she may also trip 6 Class 1E loads if their continued operation is not necessary. {; l Load shedding before diesel-generator operation is discussed in l Section 8.3.1.1.2.8. ! Table 8.3-2 summarizes the maximum loading conditions of any one diesel-generator for the situation in which all four diesel . generators in each unit are in service and also for the situation , in which any one of the eight diesel-generators is out of ! service. Tables 8.3-3 through 8.3-17 provide detailed backup j ( data for the summary of Table 8.3-2. Table 8.3-3 shows the assignment of individual loads to the eight emergency buses and 8.3-19 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR the eight diesel-generators. Tables 8.3-4 through 8.3-8 indicate how heavily a diesel-generator may be loaded during Unit 1 operation before Unit 2 is completed for time intervals of 0-10 minutes, 10-60 minutes, and beyond 60 minutes. Tables 8.3-9 through 8.3-17 indicate how heavily a diesel-generator may be loaded during a Unit 1 DBA and a spurious LOCA in Unit 2 followed by an emergency shutdown of Un,it 2 for time intervals of 0-10 minutes, 10-60 minutes, and beyond 60 minutes. These tables show that the calculated maximum loading of any one diesel-generator for all time periods following a DBA is within the DEMA (Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association) continuous rating of typical diesel-generators that have been qualified and furnished for nuclear standby service. 8.3.1.1.3.7 Testing Diesel-generator testing consists of the following:
- a. Preoperational test - Each diesel-generator is tested at the site before reactor fuel loading, in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
- b. Periodic test - After being placed in service, the O
standby power system is tested periodically to demonstrate continued ability to perform its intended function, in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel-Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," is discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.20. 8.3.1.1.3.8 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System The diesel-generator fuel oil system is described in Section 9.5.4. 8.3.1.1.3.9 Diesel-Generator Cooling and Heating Systems The diesel-generator cooling and heating systems are discussed in Section 9.5.5. Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-20 l
LGS FSAR O 8.3.1.1.3.10 Instrumentation and Control Systems for Standby Power Supply Control hardware is provided in the control room for each diesel-generator for the following operations:
- a. Starting and stopping
- b. Manual synchronization
- c. Frequency and voltage adjustment Control hardware is provided at each of the local control panels for the following operations:
1
- a. Starting and stopping
() b. Frequency and voltage adjustment
- c. Automatic or manual voltage regulator selection
- d. Local or remote control selection (key-operated switch)
Electric metering instruments are provided in the control room for surveillance of the following diesel-generator parameters:
- a. Voltage
- b. Current
- c. Frequency
- d. Power output (watts)
- e. Reactive power output (var)
O 8.3-21 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- f. Field voltage
- g. Field current Electrical metering instruments are provided at the local control panel for surveillance of the following diesel-generator parameters:
- a. Voltage
- b. Current
- c. Frequency
- d. Power output (watt)
- e. Reactive power output (var)
- f. Energy output (watt-hour)
- g. Field voltage
- h. Field current The following abnormal diesel engine and generator conditions are I annunciated at the local control panel:
- a. Lube oil pressure low
- b. Lube oil keep-warm failure
- c. Lube oil temperature high
- d. Lube oil filter differential pressure high
- e. Lube oil strainer differential pressure high Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-22
_ _ _ . . a, --= .-.-- - - - . . ..- - -- - ._-, - _ . _- _ _ _ . - LGS FSAR () f. Lube oil level low I l 1
- g. Lube oil or jacket water circulating pump failure !,
- h. Jacket water keep-warm failure i
- i. Jacket water temperature high
- j. Jacket water expansion tank level low 1 l
- k. Jacket water pressure low
['
- 1. Starting air pressure low
- m. Fuel oil pressure low j l
() n. Fuel oil strainer differential pressure high I
- o. Fuel oil filter differential pressure high l l
- p. Fuel oil day tank level low !
i
- q. Fuel oil day tank level high l
- r. Overspeed trip r
j s. Crankcase pressure high j
- t. Drip pan / dirty fuel oil level high l
i I l l
- u. Start failure i i
- v. Not ready for auto start O w. Generator stator temperature high ;
8.3-23 Rev. 12, 10/82 !
*_, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , , - - . - - - . - - - - - . - - - , - . - - - - - - - _ - , . - - - - - . - - - - ~ ~ - . . = - -
LGS FSAR ,
- x. Generator bearing temperature high
- y. Generator field grcund
- z. Generator loss of excitation aa. Generator overexcitation bb. Field flash voltage loss cc. Emergency stop dd. De fuel pump running ee. Fuel oil transfer strainer differential pressure high ff. 480 V ac auxiliary power off gg gg. 125 V de control power off hh. Dc fuel pump power off
- 11. Generator overvoltage jj. Switch not in auto kk. Fuel oil day tank temperature high
- 11. Diesel-generator protective trips not bypassed for LOCA test The following abnormal diesel engine and generator conditions are annunciated at the main control panels:
- a. Diesel-generator trouble (for alarms a through 11, ll above)
Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-24
LGS FSAR [T
- b. Diesel-generator differential / ground lockout ,
- c. Generator overcurrent .
l I
- d. Generator neutral overcurrent
- e. Diesel-generator not in auto l
- f. Diesel-generator failed to start l l
- g. Diesel-generator fuel oil storage tank high or low I
- h. Diesel-generator not reset
- i. Diesel-generator protective trip not bypassed for LOCA test O 8.3.1.1.3.11 Prototype Qualification Testing To confirm the ability of the diesel-generator to perform as required, in September 1968 the diesel-generator manufacturer conducted a series of tests designed to:
- a. Simulate the conditions experienced during nuclear plant protection service
- b. Record performance under such simulated conditions
- c. Allow the use of recorded performance data to design optimized generator and excitation system
- d. Demonstrate starting and load acceptance reliability The details of the motor starting test program are covered in IEEE Conference Paper No. 69CP 177-PWR, " Fast Starting Diesel Generators for Nuclear Plant Protection."
O 8.3-25 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR The diesel-generator manufacturer has extensive operational experience with skidded control systems, including the many nuclear protection units already tested and delivered. The LGS diesel-generators are nearly identical to the diesel-generators used to demonstrate start and load acceptance reliability tests. The differences are that LGS diesel-generator units have tubular heat exchangers while the test unit was radiator-cooled, and the LGS units have combustion air that passes from the turbocharger to the blower while the order is reversed for the test unit. These differences are judged to be an improvement of reliability and load acceptance capability. Therefore, the tests are applicable to the LGS diesel-generator units. . 8.3.1.1.4 Electrical Equipment Layout Class 1E switchgear, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels of redundant channels are in separate rooms or are spatially separated by a predetermined safety distance or barrier. They are located in the reactor enclosure or the control enclosure. Standby diesel-generators, Class 1E switchgear, and associated equipment are in separate rooms of the seismic Category I diesel-generator enclosure. Each room is provided with a separate ventilation system. The controls and monitoring instrumentation associated with each diesel generator are installed on a freestanding floor-mounted control panel. Each control panel is physically separated from the diesel generator within the diesel generator enclosure. 8.3.1.1.5 Design Criteria for Class 1E Equipment The fo'llowing design criteria are applied to the Class 1E ; equipment supplied from the onsite ac power system: !
- a. Motor size - Motor size (horsepower capability) is equal !
to or greater than the maximum horsepower required by the driven load under normal running, runout, or discharge valve (or damper) closed condition. O, Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-26
LGS FSAR O b. Minimum motor accelerating voltage - The electrical system is designed so that the total voltage drop during the start of the'last largest motor on the system is less than 25% and 20% of the nominal bus voltage at the 4 kV and 440 V buses, respectively. The Class 1E motors are specified with accelerating capability at 80% nominal voltage at their terminals for 440 V motors and
'75% for 4 kV motors.
- c. Motor starting torque - The motor starting torque is capable of starting and accelerating the connected load to normal speed within sufficient time to perform its safety function for all expected operating conditions, including the design minimum terminal voltage.
- d. Minimum motor torque margin over pump torque through accelerating period - The minimum motor torque margin over pump torque through the accelerating period is ,
determined by using actual pump torque curves and ! calculated motor torque curves at 75 or 80% terminal
- voltage. The minimum torque margin (accelerating '
torque) is such that the pump-motor assembly reaches nominal speed in less than 5 seconds. This margin is l O usually not less than 10% of the pump torque. [ e. Motor insulation - Insulation systems are selected on the basis of the ambient conditions to which the '. insulation is exposed. For Class 1E motors located within the containment, the insulation system is selected'to withstand the postulated accident j environment. l
- f. Temperature monitoring devices provided in large horsepower motors - Six resistance temperature detectors (RTD) or six thermocouples (TC), two per phase, are provided in the motor stator slots for Class 1E motors, as shown in Figure 8.3-1. In normal operation, the RTD l
or TC at the hottest location (selected by test) monitors the motor temperature and provides an alarnt on l high temperature. Each bearing has a Type T copper-constantan thermocouple bearing temperature device to alarm on high temperature.
- g. Interrupting capabilities - The interrupting capabilities of the protective equipment are determined
() as follows: 8.3-27 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- 1. Switchgear Switchgear interrupting capabilities are greater than the maximum short-circuit current available at the point of application. The magnitude of short-circuit currents in medium-voltage systems is determined in accordance with ANSI C37.010-1972.
The offsite power system, a single operating diesel-generator, and running motor contributions are considered in determining the fault level. Medium-voltage power circuit breaker interrupting capability ratings are selected in accordance with ANSI C37.06-1971.
- 2. Load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels Load center, motor control center, and distribution panel interrupting capabilities are greater than the maximum short-circuit current available at the point of application. The magnitude of short-circuit currents in low-voltage systems is determined in accordance with ANSI C37.13-1973 and NEMA AB1. Low-voltage power circuit breaker interrupting capability ratings are selected in accordance with ANSI C37.16-1973. Molded-case circuit breaker interrupting capabilities are determined in accordance with NEMA AB1.
l
- h. Electric circuit protection - Electric circuit l protection criteria are discussed in Section '
8.3.1.1.2.11.
- i. Grounding requirements - Equipment and system grounding are designed in accordance with the applicable industry codes and standards.
8.3.1.1.6 Logic and Schematic Diagrams Sufficient logic and schematic diagrams are provided in the FSAR to permit an independent evaluation of compliance with safety criteria. See Section 1.7. ., O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-28
l l LGS FSAR O 8.3.1.1.7 Cable Derating and Cable Tray Fill
~
Cables are sized and cable trays are filled in accordance with ! the applicable codes and standards. The cables are properly derated for specific application in the location where they are installed.
- a. Cable derating ,
l The power and control cable insulation is designed for a conductor temperature of 900C. The allowable current carrying capacity of the cable is based on not exceeding the insulation design temperature while the surrounding air is at.an ambient temperature of 570C for the primary containment and 400C for all other areas. The design operating conditions of all Class 1E cables are i discussed in Section 3.11. , . l The power cable ampacities are established in accordance l with IPCEA publications P-53-426, P-54-440, and P ' t 426. They are derated based on the type of O installation, the conductor and ambient temperatures, the number of cables in a raceway, and the grouping of the raceways. The method of calculating these derating factors is determined from the IPCEA publications and other applicable standards. For control circuits, which usually carry currents of less than 10 amperes, minimum No. 14 AWG conductors are generally used. Instrumentation cable insulation is also designed for a conductor temperature of 900C. The operating currents of these cables are low (usually mA or mV) and do not cause the design temperature to be exceeded at maximum design ambient temperature.
- b. Cable tray fill In general, cable tray fill is limited to 30% by cross-sectional area. In cases where the limitation is exceeded, a review is performed for each case for the O adequacy of the design.
8.3-29 Rev. 12, 10/82
l l t LGS FSAR Conduit fill is in compliance with Tables I and II, Chapter 9, National Electrical Code, 1975.
- c. Cable description Power cables, control cables, and instrumentation cables are defined as follows:
- 1. Power cables Power cables are those cables that provide electrical energy for motive power or heating to 13.2 kV ac, 4 kV ac, 2.3 kV ac, 440 V ac, 115 V ac, 240 V de, and 120 V de loads. For loads with voltage levels higher than 440 V ac, cables with 15 kV insulation are used. For loads with voltage levels at 440 V ac or lower, including de loads, cables with 600 V insulation are used.
- 2. Control cables Control cables are generally the cables for 120 V ac 250 V de, and 125 V de, circuits between components responsible for the automatic or manual initiation of auxiliary electrical functions and the. electrical indication of the state of auxiliary components.
- 3. Instrumentation cables f
Instrumentation cables are those cables conducting low-level instrumentation and control signals. These signals can be analog or digital. Typically, these cables carry signals from thermocouples, resistance temperature detectors, transducers, neutron monitors, etc. 8.3.1.1.8 Fire Barriers and Separation Between Redundant Trays Electrical equipment and cabling is arranged to minimize the - propagation of fire from one separation group to another. Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-30
l l LGS FSAR O Physical separation of cabling systems is discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.14. Where the minimum physical separation cannot be met as specified in Section 8.1.6.1.14 and a fire barrier is selected as the alternative, a Marinite board is installed in combination with solid top and bottom tray covers. The bolts and hardware used to secure the Marinite panel to the tray support are coated after installation with fireproofing coating. 8.3.1.2 Analysis ; 8.3.1.2.1 General Design Criteria and Regulatory Guide l Compliance l The following paragraphs analyze compliance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, and 50 of 10CFR50, Appendix A. All {_ regulatory guides are discussed in Section 8.1.6. i a.
- O General Design Criteria 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena, and 4, Environmental and Missile Design Bases - The requiremeats of the criteria l
l are met, in that all components of the Class 1E onsite l ac power system are housed in seismic Category I structures designed to protect them from natural ! phenomena. These components have been qualified to the , appropriate seismic,1:ydrodynamic, and environmental j conditions as described in Chapter 3. I
- b. General Design Criterion 5, Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components - This criterion is met, in that I there are no Class 1E components of the onsite ac power system that are shared between Units 1 and 2.
- c. General Design Criterion 17, Electric Power Systems - An l onsite electric power system is provided to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components
- important to safety. With total loss of offsite power,
, the onsite power system provides sufficient capacity and capability to ensure that: l
- 1. Specified acceptable fuel design limits and design l O conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary l l
l 8.3-31 Rev. 12, 10/82 I
LGS FSAR are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences.
- 2. The core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained if there are postulated accidents.
Section 3.2 contains a list of structures, systems, and components important to safety. Table 3.2-1 shows that each of these loads important to safety is supplied from the onsite electric power supplies. The onsite electric power system includes four load divisions per unit. The load divisions are redundant in that three load divisions are capable of ensuring 1 and 2 above. Sufficient independence is provided between redundant load divisions to ensure that postulated single failures affect only a single load division and are limited to the extent of total loss of that load division. The redundant load divisions remain intact to provide for the measures specified in 1 and 2 above. During total loss of offsite power, the Class 1E system O is automatically isolated from the offsite power system and non-Class IE onsite ac system. In addition, each load division of the Class 1E power system is automatically isolated from the redundant load divisions. The combination of these factors in the design minimizes the-probability of losing electric power from the onsite power supplies as a result of the loss of power from the transmission system or any disturbances of the non-Class 1E ac system. The turbine-generator is automatically isolated from the switchyard following a turbine or reactor trip. Therefore, its loss does not affect the ability of either the transmission network or the onsite power supplies to provide power to the Class IE cystem. Transmission system stability studies indicate that the trip of the most critical fully loaded generating unit does not impair the ability of the system to supply plant station service. Further discussion is provided in Section 8.2.2. O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-32
t LGS FSAR l O d. General Design Criterion 18, Inspection and Testing of l l c Electric Power Systems - The Class 1E system is designed l to permit:
- 1. During equipment shutdown, periodic inspection and !
testing of wiring, insulation, connections, and I , relays to assess the continuity of the systems and l the condition of components j l
- 2. During normal plant operation, periodic testing of the operability and functional performance of onsite power supplies, circuit breakers, and l associated control circuits, relays, and buses l l
- 3. During plant shutdown, testing of the operability f of the Class IE system as a whole. Under }
conditions as close to design as practicable, the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of signals of ! the engineered safety features actuation system and ! the transfer of power between the offsite and the () onsite power system, is tested. I
- e. General Design Criterion 50, Containment Design Bases - !
This criterion, as it relates to the design of circuits ! using containment electrical penetration assemblies, is I met as discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.12. ! 1 8.3.1.2.2 Class 1E Equipment Exposed to Hostile Environment j 4 i I The detailed information on all Class 1E equipment that must l operate in a hostile environment during and/or subsequent to an l accident is furnished in Section 3.11. t 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment ( r i 1 Each circuit and raceway is given a unique alphanumeric i identification, which distinguishes a circuit or raceway related l to a particular voltage, function, or channel. In addition, : channel identification'for Class 1E cables and raceways is designated by a color scheme. One alpha character and the j related color code are assigned to a load division on the basis O j of the following criteria. , l t 8.3-33 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- a. Engineered safeguard channel A (blue) - Class 1E instrumentation, controls, and power cables, raceways, and equipment related to Division I loads
- b. Engineered safeguard channel B (green) - Class IE instrumentation, controls, and power cables, raceways, and equipment related to Division II loads
- c. Engineered safeguard channel C (red) - Class 1E instrumentation, controls, and power cables, raceways, and equipment related to Division III loads
- d. Engineered safeguard channel D (light brown) - Class 1E instrumentation, controls, and power cables, raceways, and equipment related to Division IV loads
- e. Non-Class IE - Non-Class 1E instrumentation, controls, and power cables, raceways, and related equipment
- f. Separation group W - (blue / yellow) - RPS and NSSS instrumentation, control, and power cables, raceways, and equipment associated with Division A1 loads
- g. Separation group X - (green / yellow) - RPS and NSSS instrumentation, control, and power cables, raceways, and equipment associated with Division B1 loads
- h. Separation group Y - (red / yellow) - RPS and NSSS instrumentation, control, and power cables, raceways, and equipment associated with Division A2 loads
- 1. Separation group 2 - (light brown / yellow) - RPS and NSSS instrumentation, control, and power cables, raceways, and equipment associated with Division B2 loads The raceways are marked in a distinct, permanent manner at l
intervals that do not exceed 15 feet. The cables in these raceways are marked in a sufficiently durable manner and at intervals that do not exceed 5 feet throughout the entire cable length, except for portions of cable enclosed in conduit. O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-34
-_-___--a__ A
LGS FSAR O Nameplates with yellow faces and black cores are provided fcr all Class 1E equipment. The applicable channel or division designation is marked on each nameplate. Design drawings provide distinct identification of Class 1E equipment. The applicable separation group or load group designation is also identified. Operating and maintenance documents pertaining to Class 1E equipment are distinctly identified. 8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems Section 8.1.6.1.14 contains the description of the criteria and their bases that establish the minimum requirements fcr the independence of redundant Class 1E electrical systems through physical arrangement and separation. This section discusses the criteria and bases for the raceway and O cable routing systems for preserving the independence of the redundant Class 1E power systems. 8.3.1.4.1 Raceway and Cable Routing Raceways are designated to route the following types of cable functions:
- a. Both ac and de power and control circuits below 600 volts, including current and potential circuits for metering and relaying
- b. Low-level signal and instrumentation circuits
- A raceway designated for one type of cable function contains cables of that function only. Wherever possible, trays are arranged so that power and control trays are at the top and instrumentation and low-level signal trays on the bottom.
4 kV Class 1E safety-related cables are routed in conduit only,
~
() as are 4 kV non-Class IE cables. 8.3-35 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Cables ccrresponding to each channel separation group, as defined in Section 8.3.1.3, are run in separate conduits, cable trays, ducts, and penetrations. 8.3.1.4.2 Administrative Responsibilities and Controls for Ensuring Separation Criteria The separation group identification described in Section 8.3.1.3 facilitates and ensures the maintenance of separation in the routing of cables and the connection of control boards and panels. At the time of the cable routing assignment, during design, the persons responsible for cable and raceway scheduling ensure that the separation group designation on the cable or raceway to be routed is compatible with a single-line-diagram channel designation and other cables or raceways previously < routed. Extensive use of computer facilities assists in ensuring separation correctness. Each cable and raceway is identified in the computer program, and the identification includes the applicable separation group designation. Auxiliary programs are made available specifically to ensure that cables of a particular i separation group are routed through the appropriate raceways. The routing is also confirmed by quality control personnel during installation, to be consistent w!'h the design document. Color identification of equipment and ca- 'ng (discussed in Section 8.3.1.3) assists field personnel in this effort. i 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.2.1 Description i l Completely independent Class 1E and non-Class 1E de power systems are provided for each unit. There are no common or shared de power systems. The de system for Unit 1 is shown in Figure 8.3-3. The system for Unit 2 is similar to that for l Unit 1. There are four independent, four-division Class 1E de systems for each unit; two 125/250 V three-wire systems for Division I and II and two 125 V two-wire systems for Divisions III and IV. In addition, each unit has a 250 V non-Class 1E de system, and a l 125/250 V non-Class 1E de system, which are separate and independent from the Class 1E de systems O' Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-36
i LGS FSAR
- O 8.3.2.1.1 Class IE dc Power System Each 125/250 V system is comprised of two 125 V batteries, each with its own charger, a fuse box for protection of each of the several 125 V power distribution circuits supplying 125/250 V motor control centers (one for Division I and two for 1 l
Division II), and two 125 V power distribution panels, Each 125 V system is comprised of one 125 V battery with its own charger and a fuse box for protection of each of the several , 125 V power distribution circuits supplying two 125 V power distribution panels. , 8.3.2.1.1.1 Class 1E de System Equipment Rating
- a. 125 V de Systems Battery 60 lead-calcium cells, 200 amp-hr (8 hrs to 1.75 V per
() cell B 770F) Charger ac input - 480 V, 30, 60Hz de output - 75 A continuous rating ! Fuse box Bus 600 A continuous rating, 40,000 A short-circuit bracing Fuse 200,000 A interrupting rating Distribution panels Panel 1 Main bus 200 A continuous rating, 40,000 A short-circuit bracing l O Fuses 200,000 A interrupting rating 8.3-37 Rev. 12, 10/82
e LGS FSAR Panel 2 Main bus 100 A continuous rating, 40,000 A short-circuit bracing Fuses 200,000 A interrupting rating
- b. 125/250 V de System Battery 120 lead - calcium cells, 1500 amp-hr (8 hrs to 1.75 V per cell 8770F)
Chargers ac input - 480 V, 3B, 60Hz de output - 300 A continuous Fuse box Bus 2000 A continuous rating, 40,000 A short-circuit bracing Fuse 200,000 A interrupting rating Motor control center Main bus 600 A continuous rating (horizontal) 22,000 A rms sym short-circuit bracing Vertical bus 300 A continuous rating, 20,000 A rms sym short-circuit bracing Fuses 200,000 A interrupting Distribution panels Panel 1 Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-38
I , LGS FSAR Main bus 200 A continuous rating, 40,000 A short-circuit bracing . l [ Fuse 200,000 A interrupting rating Panel 2
- Main bus 100 A continuous rating, 40,000 A short-circuit bracing Fuse 200,000 A. interrupting rating 8.3.2.1.1.2 Class 1E Batteries The 125/250 V battery consists of two sets of 60 shock-absorbent, clear plastic cells of the lead-calcium type. The 125/250 V battery is rated 1500 ampere-hour at an 8-hour discharge rate, based on a terminal voltage of 1.75 V per cell at 770F.
l The 125 V battery consists of a set of 60 shock-absorbent, clear plastic cells of the lead-calcium type. The 125 V battery is rated 200 ampere-hour at an 8-hour discharge rate, based on a terminal voltage of 1.75 V per cell at 770F. Each Class IE battery bank has sufficient capacity without its charger to independently supply the required loads for 4 hours, as shown in Tables 8.3-18 through 8.3-26 and Figure 8.3-3. In accordance with IEEE 450-1972, " Battery Replacement Criteria," l initial rated battery capacity is 25% greater than required. This margin allows replacement of the battery to be made when its capacity has decreased to 80% of its rated capacity (100% of design load). 8.3.2.1.1.3 Class 1E Battery Chargers ! The chargers are full wave, silicon-controlled rectifiers. The housings are free standing, NEMA Type I, and are ventilated. The 1 chargers are suitsble for float charging a lead-calcium battery. , , The chargers operate from a 440-volt 3-phase, 60 Hz supply. The chargers are supplied from separate 440-volt motor control i 8.3-39 Rev. 12, 10/82 _ , _ ~ . _ . - - -
LGS FSAR centers. Each of these motor control centers is connected to an independent Class 1E ac bus. The chargers are in compliance with all applicable NEC, NEMA, and ANSI standards. The chargers are capable of carrying the normal de system load and at the same time supplying sufficient charging current to restore the batteries from the designed minimum charged state to the fully charged state within 8 hours. The battery chargers are the constant voltage type, adjustable between 120 and 145V, with capability of operating as battery eliminators. The battery eliminator feature is incorporated as a precautionary measure to protect against the effects of inadvertent disconnection of the battery. The battery chargers are designed to function properly and remain stable on the disconnection of the battery. Variation of the charger output voltage hac been determined by testing to be less than 1/2 percent with or without the battery connected. Maximum output ripple for the 125V de charger is 30 millivolts rms with the battery and less than 1 percent rms without the battery. There are no planned modes of operation that would require battery disconnection except for periodic battery discharge tests which are performed only during plant shutdown. Each battery charger output voltage is protected against overvoltage by ahigh voltage shutdown circuit. The overvoltage protection feature is incorporated to protect equipment from damage due to high voltage. When high voltage occurs, the unit disconnects the auxiliary voltage transformer, which results in charger shutdown. Before the unit is re-activated, it must be reset manually. l ! 8.3.2.1.1.4 Class 1E Battery Loads l Loads are diversified among different battery systems so that each system serves loads that are identical and redundant, or are different but redundant to plant safety, or are backup equipment to the ac driven equipment. Where two- or four-channel redundancy and separation are required, such as control power for the four diesel-generators and the four emergency switchgear assemblies, the loads are divided among the four divisions. O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-40
LGS FSAR Power required for the larger loads, such as de motor-driven pumps and valves, is supplied at 250 V from the two 125 V sources of each system, connected in series and distributed through 250 V de motor control centers. Also, the de motor control centers supplying power to the non-Class IE inverter loads are tripped on a LOCA signal. I Power required for all de control functions, such as that required for the control of the 4 kV circuit breakers and control relays, is supplied at 125 V from the several 125 V sources and distributed through 125 V de power distribution panels. The loads on each Class 1E battery system, along with its length of operation during a loss of all ac power, are shown in Tables 8.3-18 through 8.3-26. 8.3.2.1.1.5 Separation and Ventilation
- For each Class IE de system, the battery bank, chargers, and de switchgear are located in separate compartments of the seismic O Category I control structure. The battery compartments are ventilated by a system that is designed to preclude the possibility of hydrogen accumulation. Section 9.4 contains a
; description of the battery compartment ventilation system.
I The batteries are separated so that no single hazard could cause the loss of more than one division. , 8.3.2.1.1.6 Inspection, Maintenance, and Testing Testing of the de power systems is performed before plant operation in accordance with the procedures described in IEEE 450-1975. Inservice tests, inspections, and resulting maintenance of the de power systems, including batteries, chargers, and auxiliary, are specified in Chapter 16. 8.3.2.1.2 Non-Class 1E de System () The non-Class 1E de systems, which are comprised of a 250 V and a 125/250 V de system, are separate and independent from the 8.3-41 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Class IE de systems. The non-Class 1E and Class IE de systems do not share any loads. 8.3.2.1.3 Cable Derating and Cable Tray Fill A discussion of cable derating and cable tray fill is included in Section 8.3.1.1.7. 8.3.2.1.4 Fire Barriers and Separation Between Redundant Trays A discussion of fire barriers and separation between redundant trays is included in Section 8.3.1.1.8. 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3.2.2.1 Compliance with General Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, and IEEE Standards The following paragraphs analyze compliance of the Class 1E de O power systems with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, and 50; Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, 1.41, 1.81, and 1.93; and IEEE 308 and 450.
- a. General Design Criteria 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena, and 4, Environmental and Missile Design Bases - The requirements of these criteria are met, in that all components of the Class 1E de system are housed in seismic Category I structures designed to protect them from natural phenomena. These components have been qualified to the appropriate seismic, hydrodynamic, and environmental conditions as described in Chapter 3.
- b. General Design Criterion 5, Sharing of Structures, System, and Components - This criterion is met, in that there are no Class 1E components of the de system that are shared between Units 1 and 2.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-42 i 9
LGS FSAR
- c. General Design Criterion 17, electric power systems l Consideration of Criterion 17 leads to the inclusion of the following factors in the design of the de power systems:
- 1. Separate and independent 125 V and 125/250 V de systems supply control power for each of the Class IE ac load divisions.
- 2. The ac power for the battery chargers in each of these de systems is supplied from the same ac load division for which the de system supplies the control power.
- 3. Four independent Class 1E de systems are provided to ensure the availability of the de power system for maintaining the reactor integrity during postulated accidents.
- 4. Each of the four independent Class 1E de systems, including batteries, chargers, de switchgear and distribution equipment, are physically separate and independent.
- 5. Sufficient capacity, capability, independence, redundancy, and testability are provided in the Class 1E de systems to ensure the performance of safety functions, assuming that there is a single failure.
- d. General Design Criterion 18, inspection and testing of electric power systems l
Each of the Class 1E de systems is designed to permit:
- 1. Inspection and testing of wiring, insulation, and connections during equipment shutdown to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of its components.
O d 8.3-43 Rev. 12, 10/82 e
LGS FSAR
- 2. Periodic testing of the operability and functional O J performance of the components of the systems during .
normal plant operation. The Class 1E de systems are periodically inspected and tested to assess the condition of the battery cells, charger, and other components in accordance with Chapter 16. Preoperational testing is discussed below in assessing compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.41.
- e. General Design Criterion 50, Containment Design Basis -
This criterion, as it relater to the design of de
~
circuits using containment electrical penetration assemblies, is met as discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.12.
- f. Regulatory Guide 1.6, " Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems (1971)
I Separate Class 1E de systems supply power for each of the four Class 1E load divisions. Loss of any one of ' the Class 1E de systems does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed. The Class 1E chargers are supplied from the same ac load division for which the de system supplies the control power. Each of the four de systems, including the battery bank, charger, and distribution system, is independent of each other system and of each non-Class 1E de system. No i provision exists for transferring loads between ; redundant de systems. Thus, sufficient independence and redundancy exist to ensure performance of minimum safety functions, assuming that there is a single failure.
# pare battery chargers are provided to replace any of ;
tLO Class 1E chargers. It is possible to replace a me functioning charger within a 2-hour time span i (Regulatory Guide 1.93) to prevent plant shutdown due to a malfunctioning battery charger. The spare chargers are direct replacements for chargers that become inoperative; therefore, they will be installed at the same location and fed from the same power source as the l chargers that they replace. The two Class 1E spare t battery chargers are rated as follows: , l
- 1. OCDD103 Input: 480V ac, 3-phase, 60Hz l Output: 132V de, 75A Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-44
l LGS FSAR I
- 2. OABD103 Input: 480V ac, 3-phase, 60Hz Output: 132V de, 300A
! g. Regulatory Guide 1.32, "Use of IEEE Standard 308-1971, l Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power
~ Generating Stations" (1977)
The battery charger capacity for each of the Class IE de systems complies with this regulatory guide. Each Class 1E battery charger has sufficient capac,ity to supply the largest combined demand of the various steady-state loads and the charging current required to. . restore the battery from the design minimum charge state ! to the fully charged state, regardless of the plant ' i status during the time in which these demands occur.
- h. Regulatory Guide 1.41, "Preoperational Testing of Redundant Onsite Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments" (1971)
- To comply with this Regulatory Guide, the Class 1E de systems are designed in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.32 and are tested as follows:
- 1. Testing of the de power system, including an
- acceptance test of battery capacity, is performed ,
before unit operation and after major modifications or repairs in accordance with the requirements described in Chapter 14.
- 2. The charger, battery connections, and charger supply are verified for proper assignment of ac load division.
- 3. Class 1E de systems are functionally tested along with the associated ac load division by disconnecting and isolating the other ac load division, its ac power sources, and the associated de system. Each test includes simulation of an engineered safety features actuation signal, ;
startup of the standby diesel-generator and the O load division under test, sequencing of loads, and the functional performance of the loads. During 8.3-45 Rev. 12, 10/82 , I l
LGS FSAR these tests, the ability of the de system to perform.its intended functions, e.g., control of diesel-generators and Class 1E ac switchgear, is verified.
- 4. During the testing of the Class 1E de system associated with one ac load division, the buses and loads of the de systems associated with other ac load divisions not under test are monitored to verify the absence of voltage, indicating no interconnection of redundant de systems.
. i. Regulatory Guide 1.81, " Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants" (1975) The requirements of the regulatory guide are met. Each generating unit is provided with separate and independent onsite de electric power systems capable of supplying power to the control systems of the Class 1E loads and loads such as valves and actuators required for attaining a safe and orderly cold shutdown of the unit, assuming that there is a single failure.
- j. Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electric Power Sources" (1974)
Compliance is discussed in Section 8.1.6.
- k. IEEE Standard 308-1974, " Criteria for Class IE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" The Class IE de systems provide power to Class 1E loads and for control and switching of Class 1E systems.
Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided to prevent the occurrence of common mode failures. The design of the Class 1E de systems includes the following:
- 1. The Class 1E de systems are separated into four channels to provide power to the four redundant load divisions.
Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-46
l LGS FSAR O l U 2. .The safety action by each division of loads is ( independent of the safety actions provided by their redundant counterparts. f i
- 3. - Each Class 1E de system includes power supplies ;
that consist of one battery bank and one or two ! chargers as required. i 4. Each Class 1E distribution circuit is capable of transmitting sufficient energy to start and operate [ all required loads in that circuit. Distribution ! circuits to redundant equipment are independent of l each other. The distribution system is monitored ; to the extent that it is shown to be ready to , perform its intended function. The de auxiliary l devices required to operate equipment of a specific ; ac load division are supplied from the same load i division. l
- 5. The status of each protective de fuse is monitored l
! by an undervoltage relay which provides a Eystem- j
- Out-of-Service alarm in the control room when dc !
control power is lost to a safety system or any of l its components. I Each battery supply is continuously available during i normal operations and following the loss of power from i the ac system to start and operate all the required ! loads. ! l The de systems are ungrounded; thus, a single ground fault does not cause immediate loss of the faulted , system. Ground detection and alarm is provided for each ! de system so that ground faults can be readily located l and removed. l i The Class 1E de system equipment is protected and ! isolated by fuses for short circuits. The status of j each de system is monitored by checking for system ; undervoltage, system grounding, and battery charger : trouble (ac undervoltage, charger failure, or charg.er i output breaker trip). The batteries are maintained in a fully charged ! condition and have sufficient stored energy to operate 8.3-47 Rev. 12, 10/82 l l
LGS FSAR all necessary circuit breakers and provide an adequate amount of energy for all required Class 1E loads for 4 hours after loss of ac power. Each battery charger has an input ac and output de circuit breaker for isolation of the charger. Each battery charger is designed to prevent the ac supply from becoming a load on the battery due to a power feedback as the result of the loss of ac power to the chargers. The battery charger ac supply breaker is periodically opened to verify the load carrying ability of the battery. Each Class 1E de system is designed to meet seismic Category I requirements, as stated in Section 3.10. The batteries, battery chargers, and other components of the ! de system are housed in the control enclosure, which is : a seismic Category I structure. The periodic testing and surveillance requirements for the Clasc 1E batteries are detailed in Chapter 16. ;
- 1. IEEE Standard 450-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practice for !
Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead : Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations" The recommended practices of IEEE 450 for maintenance, ! testing, and replacement of batteries are followed for ; the Class 1E batteries and are discussed in Chapter 16. 8.3.2.2.2 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment Physical identification of Class IE equipment is discussed in Section 8.3.1. l l O Rev. 12, 10/82 8.3-48
i LGS FSAR 8.3.2.2.3 Independence of Redundant Systems The general considerations for the independence of Class IE de power systems are described in Section 8.3.1.4. The physical separation criterion is discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.14. 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS The measures employed for the prevention of and., protection against fires in electrical cable systems are covered in Sections 9.5.1, 8.3.1.1.7, and 8.3.1.1.8. f O s ' mm - 1, A N
% vg u - ' ,
s 's l O x
\
l 8.3-49 Rev. 12, 10/82 x ., . E
w ." a ba a a .nn u g , -- --- --.v g ,, _ _ g y
, . . , . .. . . , r...q r' --- -.:: ** :w.g :
4
- 2.g : .. ;
0 :: 4, . ~ ,.a . . . . .; l (; l yy- 5- l
- g
- M
.n. ..,x--._. .
em. .'. " 1... .=
.m.. . ..s. . . .an.a.c.. . ;
__.m. ed .". . . . . .
. . , <. ,, . r-- -
e => , T,- g 1 e-" I
.3 -
.%I P :.
w " Q & g:- I"T g.i L. g ii c'P, ;J..r P .. I"lh.:: 145' 1r; l'r I:s lir .. - it ,
.b . It . It . u .hr
,c.
.a. c. . , ,c... . , .e. r e..
s.
; .-m . i ,
r.
,... -,,..) p . it
.. .q I
mt. &.w,ut.e 9,?e l,e M..i .!gt.y,. . ,. n ui.ed *. n d.e
's.
,n J E .* ; w l 'sucJ '.e= .) mj et le '
- w. J un' l< .
~ . g e .
l ' ,. I u , 1e , m - - - Iq. .c4 E+ ' .. .
-:s c : i: 5 : : .
# #= @ @ is!:LE @ @ @ @ s i 8
! we :s l. se w erw w.~.l i , i -
wr i
~ ' ~ '
i i r--- [h' ' ]~~~ -- I'"*;;'~ :
; . ,r -
6*
. Sefr=- [g ;.;El ;
;,:-1 e ll l ,
.--1 r- u.---
(, o
- .g. s weausno ,
, :t.
. ( . . . e ,, . ,.
's..
...J
- . ... .,.tzw.. i
.m. - u :m "...J L. .: -
c
.s.
n.
' w~ y Iu.gni,, ir~ iw Ig - 1 1. s l
to W,- ie m ie in it - tu g-I.& Rs l c4
-, .- . ~
g-i i.s,..., r .
.n. r, . .
~, =. .
l .... Io . ige A e,P. ei; peg g ,
.... r,.r . .. . , .
r.. .
,p r.. . . . .. , -
<;S : e,. . y :
i w w w w/:w*.n.i. h r i
- wpi, 1 A,, "ime ein ,.J se J i.
.m J.3 ; a
. set.
n-g
< < . .a ;, e -
t
,. 2- n , -
a i : y ..
;e
- : i ieji
. : -t : li l I nn- @ l i @ :E!@ @ @ @ 8 ms,. m. _._
~ - . i =. - me.me m *%.~.- ,w iF-- .m-
- ~ ~ ~
l
..N.
N
+-
f r N u w.., .t---- ---- - ej [y y g:.yL M-- u,, u _ _ . m,g......., I -Q' j ,,,
.e4 .n. . **;. ~
lf....;,-.a.
~
a ; ly c4w si.nsui n.-om .. .. e., - l
, - - 6 ...L,,.......s,,,,, gf
.... o tc. v..a w - . ~
- o. ,.
1 o .- n i i. a Dm eo: I "-o. .u.- IL Fe 1 1 i-M jy s 11 - - ~ - IFm' 7 g, p ;.' "" gM." - y: i . t ,. p. y p p w e. =._e.--. _ hN r- ' ig' ' ..# e- '-'
, .! b.d. . .. ,g li N.pY!.!if. . 3($M.g#.
51
. N..#.
!g
"[' N".'.'. [ ~.' "
L i J 'm J p lr-i..J Wj W' !w j;
.. s c
'm j a'
= ~ ~ " " -
)r =3 t ase 3 . s
=
.[
f ' , -= ** ':: .M'O 2 { =.= [, - ! u ! .ua.::. . -
,r.-ru.~ -
a .; .i .t.1 . ; a - a w '** . - ~
/:0. . . .
in @ m@ _- @m ~p@,w i
", ".'~.~
!E g.r a rei @.'~' .e._r-Ii
.se fPraia. i el 3 ef. . s , . A-,.g)
.^-
.i aj m
..a v. --
j lg . . NOTES
~
. p'/ !
-g ; 2. "" M p.tSAPeouaeD.. . ..-=
emcu=o. ,
'Z".Yc*MI.*IO.
;;;;,.: .;gg a.'I.T*EIIT
* * ' a--a**
...J L ...
.Y. .2' D:sti,'f,,,J
**
- 2. SAFEGUARD BUS 101 IS THE PREFERRED I , e -m . . . 4" # .** r *
- POWER SOURCE FOR CHANNELS A AND C
'U**.' N= j h e
.,. '"?
}% } g* *.
- 41 FOR UNIT 1.
SAFEGUARD BUS 201 IS THE PREFERRED [i.'
- p* @ [*DnOy % ,,g $"si ff&t W *Odg: l POWER SOURCE FOR CHANNELS B AND D.
+.'.41 It ,_ ILm *if l
_t1 It , $1 , ,
,a {r1 ,
FOR UNIT 2.THE PREFERRED AND ALTERNATE SOURCES FOR EACH BUS AF'E REVERSED. y ,y . , p . y1g,y',---,3c r--- y7--- g - -p . . . q W y:r.... - -ed: &. . e.&. ewe d'sm%. de i. : yi : en e i,m u- . : J eJe. J j. 'em ;, 'aer 1 wm ,( hmji .. e i r,
,I ~,. .,e e , 1 - > s
-i ~ ens'a
,i ,.i 9
.j.g:, . . .
4 3g. - 1 il . . .@_ r.=j ..@ @ @ @ . .P ==g -EE ".";;" -!!G -X" f . .---.m - LIMERICK GENERATING STATION 4 tlNITS 1 AND 2
~[ FINAL sal ETV ANALYSIS REPORT t
' 4 KV CLASS IE POWER SYSTEM FIGl3RE 8.3-1 REV.12.10/82 l l
1
LGS FSAR CHAPTER 9 TABLES (Cont'd) Table No. Title 9.5-8 Diesel Generator Starting System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 9.5-9 Diesel Generator Lubrication System Design Parameters 9.5-10 Diesel Generator Combustion Air { Intake and Exhaust System Design l Parameters 9.5-11 Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 9.5-12 Lighting System Intensities of Illumination O O l 9-xiii Rev. 12, 10/82 l { l
u LGS FSAR () CHAPTER 9 FIGURES (Cont'd) Ficure No. , Title 9.4-6 Primary Containment Vacuum Relief Valve Schematic 9.4-7 Drywell HVAC System P&ID 9.4-8 Drywell Air Cooling System Layout 9.4-9 Hot Maintenance Shop HVAC System P&ID 9.4-10 Miscellaneous Structures HVAC Systems 9.4-11 Administration Building HVAC System P&ID 9.5-1 Fire Protection P&ID , 9.5-2 Riser Diagram, Public Address System for Unit 1 9.5-3 Riser Diagram, Puble Address System for Unit 2 9.5-4 Riser Diagram, Public Address Syntem for Miscellaneous Structures 9.5-5 Riser Diagram, Telephone System for Unit 1 9.5-6 Riser Diagram, Telephone System for Unit 2 9.5-7 Riser Diagram, Telephone System for Miscellaneous Structures 9.5-8 Standby Diesel Generator and Plant Fuel Oil Systems 9.5-9 Diesel Generator Cooling Water System 9.5-10 Diesel Generator Air Starting System 9.5-11 Diesel Generator Lubrication System l 9.5-12 Diesel Generator Air Intake and Exhaust System l ( l 9-xviii Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR C
\
V = pool volume (ft3) A = activity in SFp (Ci/ft3) Since SFP makeup water will be available, the evaporation lambda is found by dividing the evaporation rate (ft3/sec) by the constant pool water volume (ft3),
- c. The activity released to the atmosphere at any incremental time t is given by the following equation:
n R(t ) = R(t ) +A V A(t )(1-f)At (9.1-3) n n-1 ev n where: R = activity released (Ci) f = SGTS filter efficiency fraction The above equations are solved iteratively, using time steps of 450 seconds.
- d. The thyroid dose at the LPZ is calculated using the equations and models from Regulatory Guide 1.3.
9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9.1.4.1 Design Bases The fuel handling system is designed to provide a safe and effective means for transporting and handling fuel from the time it reaches the plant until it leaves the plant after post-O irradiation cooling. Safe handling of fuel includes design considerations for maintaining occupational radiation exposures 9.1-45 Rev. 10, 09/82 L.
LGS FSAR as low as reasonably achievable during transportation and handling. . l Design criteria for major fuel handling system equipment are provided in Tables 9.1-7 through 9.1-9, which list the safety class, quality group, and seismic category. Where applicable, the appropriate ASME, ANSI, industrial, and electrical. codes are identified. Additional design criteria are shown below and expanded further in Section 9.1.4.2. The transfer of new fuel assemblies between the uncrating area and the new fuel inspection stand and/or the spent fuel storage pool is accomplished using the reactor enclosure crane, equipped with a general purpose grapple. The reactor enclosure crane auxiliary hoist is used with a general purpose grapple to transfer new fuel from the new fuel inspection stand to the fuel storage pool. From this point ~on, the fuel is handled by the telescoping grapple on the refueling platform. The refueling platform is seismic Category I from a strucUural standpoint, in accordance with 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendices A and B. The allowable stress due to safe shutdown earthquake loading is 120% of yield or 70% of ultimate, whichever is less. A dynamic analysis is performed on the structures using the response spectrum method, with load contributions resulting from each of three earthquakes being combined by the RMS procedure. Working loads of the platform structures are in accordance with the AISC Manual of Steel Construction. All parts of the hoist systems are designed to have a safety factor of 5 based on the ultimate strength of the material. A redundant load path is incorporated in the fuel hoists so that no single component failure could result in a fuel bundle drop. Maximum deflection limitations are imposed on the main structures to maintain the relative stiffness of the platform. The welding of the platform l is in accordance with AWS D14-1 or ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section 9. Gears and bearings meet AGMA Gear Classification Manual and ANSI B3.5 requirements. Materials used r in the construction of load bearing members meet ASTM ! specifications. For personnel safety, OSHA Part 1910.79 is applied. Electrical equipment and controls meet ANSI C-1, National Electric Code, and NEMA Publication No. ICl, MGl requirements. O Rev. 12, 10/82 9.1-46
LGS FSAR The key bender is designed to install and remove the anti-rotation key that is used on the thermal sleeve. ; 9.1.4.2.10 Description of Fuel Transfer 9.1.4.2.10.1 Arrival of Fuel Onsite ! New fuel is delivered by truck (or by rail) and moved into the refueling hoistway at grade. Secondary containment can be maintained while the new fuel is being hoisted to the refueling floor. I 9.1.4.2.10.2 Refueling Procedure i The plant refueling and servicing sequence diagram is shown in Figure 9.1-13. Fuel handling procedures described below and are shown visually in Figures 9.1-14 through 9.1-16. The refueling floor layout is shown in Figure 9.1-17. Component drawings of the principal fuel handling equipment are shown in Figures 9.1-5 through 9.1-12. The fuel handling process takes place primarily on the refueling floor above the reactor. The principal locations and equipment are shown in Figure 9.1-17. The reactor, fuel pool, and cask l storage pit are connected to each other by slots, as shown at (A) and (B). Slot (A) is open during reactor refueling, and slot (B) is open during spent fuel shipping. At other times the slots can be closed by redundant gates, which make watertight barriers. New fuel, in shipping crates, is brought up to the refueling floor through the hatches, and spent fuel, in a shipping cask, is lowered through the hatches to a truck or rail car near grade level. The handling of new fuel on the refueling floor is illustrated in
. Figure 9.1-14. The transfer of the bundles between the crate (C) and the new fuel inspection stand (D) and/or the spent fuel storage pool (F) is accomplished using the 15-ton auxiliary hoist of the reactor enclosure crane equipped with a general purpose grapple. The fuel bundle cannot be handled horizontally without support, so the crate is placed in an almost vertical position 9.1-59 Rev. 12, 10/82 l
l
LGS FSAR before being opened. The top and front of the crate are opened, and the bundles are removed in a vertical position. The auxiliary hoist is also used with a general-purpose grapple l to transfer new fuel from the inspection stand to a storage rack position in the fuel pool. From this point on, the fuel is handled by the telescoping grapple on the refueling platform. l The storage racks in the fuel pool hold the fuel bundles or assemblies vertically, in an array that is subcritical under all l possible conditions. The new fuel inspection stand holds one or two bundles l Vertically. The inspector (s) rides up and down on a platform, I and the bundles are manually rotated on their axes. Thus the inspectors can see all visible surfaces on the bundles. The refueling platform uses a grapple on a telescoping mast for lifting and transporting fuel bundles or assemblies. The telescoping mast can extend to the proper work level, and, in its fully retracted state, it maintains adequate water shielding over the fuel being handled. The reactor refueling procedure is shown schematically in Figure 9.1-15. The refueling platform (G) moves over the fuel pool, lowers the grapple on the telescoping mast (H), and engages the bail on a new fuel assembly that is in the fuel storage rack. The assembly .is lifted clear of the rack and moved through slot (A) and over the appropriate empty fuel location in the core (J). The mast then lowers the assembly into the location, and t;& grapple releases the bail. The operator then moves the platform until the grapple is over a spent fuel assembly that is to be discharged from the core. The assembly is grappled, lifted, and moved through slot (A) to the fuel pool. Here it is placed in one of the fuel prep machines (K). An operator, using a long-handled wrench, removes the screws and springs from the top of the channel. The channel is then held, while a carriage lowers the fuel bundle out of the channel. The channel is then moved aside, and the refueling platform grapple carries the bundle and places it in a storage rack. The channel l Rev. 12, 10/82 9.1-60
LGS FSAR O V handling boom hoist (L) moves the channel to storage, if appropriate. l l In actual practice, channeling and dechanneling may be performed ' in many sequences, depending on whether a new channel is to be 1 used or a used channel is to be installed on a new bundle and l returned to the core. A channel rack is conveniently located near the fuel prep machines for temporary storage of channels that are to be reused. To preclude the possibility of raising radioactive material out of the water, redundant electrical limit switches are incorporated in the hoist and interlocked to prevent hoisting above the preset limit. In addition, the cables on the auxiliary hoists incorporate adjustable stops that jam the hoist cable against the hoist structure, which prevents hoisting if the limit switch interlock system fails. When spent fuel is to be shipped, it is placed in a cask, as shown in Figure 9.1-16. The refueling platform grapples a fuel . bundle from the storage rack in the fuel pool, lifts it, carries i it through slot (B) into the cask storage pit, and lowers it into the cask (M). When the cask is loaded, the crane sets the cask I cover (N) on the cask and then lifts the cask out of the pool. , The cask is then decontaminated and lowered through the open hatchway (P) to the truck or rail car at near grade level. The provision of a separate cask storage pit, capable of being isolated from the spent fuel pool, eliminates the potential for accidental dropping of the cask and rupturing of the fuel storage pool. Additional detailed information is provided below.
- a. New fuel preparation
- 1. Receipt and inspection of new fuel l
The incoming new fuel is delivered to a receiving station within the reactor enclosure. The crates are unloaded from the transport vehicle and examined for damage during shipment. The crate O' dimensions are approximately 32 inches x 32 inches x 18 feet long. Each crate contains two fuel l j 9.1-61 Rev. 10, 09/82
LGS FSAR bundles supported by an inner metal container. The shipping weight of each unit is approximately 3000 pounds. The receiving station includes a separate area where the crate covers can be removed and the inner metal container can be removed from the crate. Both inner and outer shipping containers are reusable. Handling during uncrating is accomplished either by use of the reactor enclosure crane extending down from the refueling floor through the equipment hatch or by a separate receiving room crane.
- 2. Channeling new fuel Usually, channeling new fuel is done concurrently with dechanneling spent fuel. Two fuel preparation machines are located in the fuel pool; one can be used for dechanneling spent fuel and the other for channeling new fuel. The procedure is as follows:
Through the use of a jib crane and the general purpose grapple, a spent fuel bundle is transported to the fuel prep machine. The channel is unbolted from the bundle by using the channel bolt wrench. The channel handling tool is fastened to the top of the channel, and the fuel prep machine carriage is lowered, removing the fuel from the channel. The channel is then positioned over a new fuel bundle located in fuel prep machine No. 2, and the process is reversed. The channeled new fuel is stored in the pool storage racks ready for insertion into the reactor.
- 3. Equipment preparation Before the plant shutdown for refueling, all equipment must be placed in readiness. All tools, grapples, slings, strongbacks, stud tensioners, etc are given a thorough check, and any defective (or well worn) parts are replaced. Air hoses on grapples are routinely leak-tested. Crane cables are routinely inspected. All necessary maintenance and interlock checks are performed to ensure that there is no extended outage due to equipment failure.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 9.1-62
LGS FSAR O( ,/ TABLE 9.1-6 (Page 1 of 2) TOOLS AND SERVICING EQUIPMENT FUEL SERVICING EQUIPMENT Fuel preparation machines New fuel inspection stand Channel bolt wrenches Channel handling tool Fuel pool sipper Channel gauging fixture General purpose grapples Fuel inspection fixture Jib crane SERVICING AIDS Pool tool accessories ' Actuating poles General area underwater lights Local area underwater lights Drop lights
. Underwater TV monitoring system i Underwater vacuum cleaner Viewing aids Light support brackets Incore detector cutter Incore manipulator REACTOR VESSEL SERVICING EQUIPMENT Reactor vessel servicing tools Steam line plugs Shroud head bolt wrenches Head holding pedestals Head stud rack Dryer-separator sling Head strongback Service platform Service platform support Steam line plug / installation tool Vessel nut handling tool Head nut and washer storage racks IN-VESSEL _ SERVICING EQUIPMENT Instrument strongback, Control rod grapple Control rod guide tube grapple
(%) Fuel support grapple x. Rev. 12, 10/82
l LGS FSAR () TABLE 9.1-6 (Cont'd) (Page 2 of 2) Grid guide Jet pump servicing tools ' Control rod latch tool Instrument handling tool Control rod guide tube seal Incore guide tube seals Blade guides Fuel bundle sampler Peripheral orifice grapple Orifice holder Peripheral fuel support plug l Fuel bail cleaner REFUELING EQUIPMENT Refueling equipment servicing tools
- Refueling platform l
STORAGE EQUIPMENT Spent fuel storage racks Channel storage racks l O Control rod storage racks In-vessel racks Defective fuel storage rack 1 l Control rod guide tube storage rack Defective fuel storage container UNDER-REACTOR VESSEL SERVICING EQUIPMENT l CRD servicing tools l CRD hydraulic system tools NMS servicing tool Spring reels CRD handling equipment Equipment handling platform Thermal sleeve installation tool Incore flange seal test plug Key bender O Rev. 12, 10/82 l w -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ __ _ . - - . . . - ._ - - . ._.. . - ..- - - . _. . - -
7 S-TON AUX 3LIARY HOIST OF i RE ACTOR BUILDING CRANE I I l ; l FUEL SH3'PINO l l E CRATE l I NE W FUEL INSPECTION STAND I D I , l APPROX 5* e l "
~
^ ^ [_-
-: ^ C[:}$2-:i^5 l I::5fj f. {. $.::j 4 . . : *.').'[{ *:i i j'k'{r,g.ff g, . .[.[;:jg'.Q.'
;. {.*. *'jf .f A w Ii 4l
.1
- i.
sww::: h <i:-..... -a.:; ::.,#:p-{ d~ m.,- i.59 .::~...l."
-Ti '
ll :.8 :9. .,. . ; f: %. .;T);.3 [j?p ll
~
- U. 5 i.Mfe'il 8 .jilA gg s!'[J.
'4-
"# . ..;.8..';[ 'ej *$:5*?"~
~
ll U
'T y:
t
's.I$n.,[M5...fJ)).-
'/-
- Yt ,l:o T. Ni5 $7:$;:*~.(k:.j!.
- q f. ". .;' : : :...e : . .l' .3 "'"
FUELPOOL b'- "'
$b 5I.5 '
.p:l.yl ?.hi/N . T Si}S:*
F '.7!;g ii.6;.;' . ' ...l' ~ -' ;: .I fy.p .h l..
- g;., , .;_ 5:*3: %e
;.s' ( R&*:.:::Q [..f'i> ..fy;; .
? .is T:. 3 ..) *j# f::: 4 .'s.n ; 6 :iie-y .' :-:.e;c.. .
c e.? 6 i.: t.?'.:c.e,$hk , ..h.hl:0.h.Y.:.fbk. j f. '_ . :4 :-%.- e::e@: .
* :::p:. %1l
..^6 :,
ll 3_ e .: '- Q_, ;-{e4:.+_ f.b : F 5& te a:!;'( : FUE L STOR AGE '.? a RACKS ' '.l . . e ': n J:,e
^
?Sh.: :.. h $!:: k
':lp /.f t.[i,5k?9 *. 'b.
' .:{i,Q %
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION l UNITS 1 AND 2 j FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT I SIMPLIFIED SECTION OF NEW FUEL HANDLING FACILITIES (SECTION X X, FIGURE 9.1 17) FIGURE 9.114 REV.12,10/82 L
~,
l 1
~
D n,1 q /.- - 's q _,_g .A - 1:..? in x.
/ -
n 9 . , . _ _ _ esDaL%
~ l l
/- ,,._
i
+
1.-;
..N /
s y"s ' _ - -~~ J ___ N j ,-
/ 1
,' ']
i 1 I L -g l
$-++ -
l r'q... IM ~ C' f /
~
/
b E [t / ,[ t Y i- ' g-l f [ fy 0 / ( _. -_2 Y
^ ~
\ {
h --{i l
.sC ;$n 15 ? 1- --
b g M i . I r sp 4 \
\ [=
~
.w e w. ~
--u- . - _ ,
l
,- m.a.s =- .sn
,p.
,,<4"43 , _ h /
.co %.
4 .
/N -
n . -. --
- rm -
.S*s
~
r , /s
)
/ t. ;
x
=g j ( :ll --:=.._ j
%d
; ll es,sQ' ,
;p -
"s-h_- 9 y i @' La-Tr 10-&
1 1 . .1 t ** W VO __ t* D' E4 , A_ A A I$ G.? Q7) 89 _REEUELIN1_.f.L,OQfL
% ew .
m .,*me
~
\.
Jl .. ..y l l l o-W W H. H COOCO9 O N__ m m - , _ < . O V V G V , ,J VV \ ' L _ _ _ _
. - - . Y l Ofl.'A'*l . . . . ,
r Ti i l LT3- p 7';l
'C ,r, ,,. m s x
N,
~m k '
i #____ _ _ _ . . 'Tf." <.i___ __.l s'l
-' *M
% m- if=.y g -
-'I g h -- ,6 % yf 1_ --
Y' A - N ,' q '
* # # f. % # Its i s x ,y g 7 T-',l. l
, l; _ _
c;- Y
'!o_ /\ 4Y _ $ .x N.
I s tg -i , {..
's t'_
y, ' ,i _- , w. ,, s l- - j l t*$..
.i 3x
- i. .
, ~~~
\ \. '-{;p. J 8
i
. . ' ,y
\ +l- _ ,, n.- ,
r< en
$, 'i.
v I
,A -
7 \
,;; p ;
_g_ t g.,yy,v.wn,-) + _ bg. 3-m_ , i iin t _ . . . e _
-f- .
f Uk ji
~ '
jl N b@_N lQ , .' i =a=; O
/ .ll
.,/ ,/NlI Mit d
4 i Q .' ' I + l e l ;
/l l p
; s f-
/ J, <
, -l Z Q 'G f ,- 0 l
_ %g , ' ;' tL k 2 l -iar r
@ ~~~v q' r - .
l 'g%%' fH V"_-x - - _ __-- s . erem e narr % ) I
~T _;;,
i g l . ~.,o. c.c. f
- it -
M- J" M' M%T
.m l
a,wa- x l
\ ;
- i. , N !
l
._ __q L___ :
_fj. j _ k. l ,8 .A u c *** " /"" ,y,, w^'c6
)
} ~.
..e.. n .2 9
QS.'h ,
/ < .
i, : l
/
'. i, '
If I / Nl o Ns . H _ _ . _
.g _ _- g*F _
.. , .j n- - - L ,. .i - .n.
! 'N. -
u..,I . m
. . , , , . , LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 h b.'s b FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT REFUELING FLOOR LAYOUT FIGURE 9.1 17 iREV. TZ~1tTiBd
<* 247
'g Ag t=
.i r ; (i e W
t>
.?, 2fn b U E c,.st --1t g u. .... .
MATC9 3 EL x / ,
; et.sar-o-pr .
- in J
, _,, .J i A 1
- i. **'
==
;,smoP. r
! = s mo *L*s 'r egn'ig.5g ava, p'.
.m- .
. m -. , .
3 ELEv p a5. - AIR LOCK N [ Pool nuG ] POOL PLU 7dAgh (I , I j@ - -j - j $ POOL PLUG-) e 0 . ..
,e,,a no,; .
y.b
, , , , , ,-- /* f f
h) Li// [ $ sL 'f A {'# A II -
< L, j} .,
CG , srotAos naat EL.3tTV-
& . Q- i
/
f '- sTeau l
' 5t"^'c" \ \s -
ax .usT - l **" } } 3 fl / '-)i> 0 -- t
~
s s,u,oeLw y
~
a PL o
'n f4An#%%
i////v
/ / W /'/ / /
RPV HE AD HEAD Mi"'#! N5'=oa**ca /.,v'%Ao N r 53
' t'MJ g ^","
_ _Q ' _ '"5Mo" , / !cavasto mao ) : jli l\ ! I b \ ;i } Y'Ma l b, ,,. -,
._. N, ,
u _ -- x .- waev stavic: M" ATFCRM
- - .. ~ -
I ouitt k Oo az ~,. } .Q A'" Loc"
. . . . . . . q EXHAUST j!REACTOA ---
8 e e e e e e- %
p i I
~
I m- '" i LEGEND REACTOR ENCLOSURE CRANE _ ,, ij @ '_f' MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED WITHIN neow FitTE2 .-
% 4 g THE CROSS-HATCHED ZONES.
Inom FILTE3 b g ges patr tiTiish , ps'. o* i' l , N.
, g-EL. 3 3 2'- o*
/ I
. - <W s i ""W h
^
# ~ # '
D me rm V l- 4
^
l lH" Ik ~ i , j( j"i ?YlWl,7777,Z 777W' - f. R' w$s t r.
\
i
/ 4
/ ', 2' k
T,_ _ _ .
) s 5
REACTOR W) , /V l k, L [ i
/
/ ,
, ; +.- Exw4usi y-- STACK
__l W -
~ ~ ~ "~~
of///// ~ l 4
/\/ /////)
/ / / f / -/J '/
l l l l'
' ~> n l ~
\ , V \ I' ;
% / /
Y) ' j; X t tj' l ' 55' i \ , S - r.u x
;vq
_xt w _v y - - _ .. -- ' 7. . _ ..
.. q ,q .,,,, s{ ,
m
, ..~ .
. . . s I~ k' o REACTOR
$ e e e @ e 8 ~ I LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT REACTOR ENCLOSURE CRANE RESTRICTED AREA FIGURE 9.1-24 REV.12,10/82
~ _ _ . _ ,
~ LGS FSAR O the' storage tank through one of the condensate filter-demineralizers. Makeup for the refueling water storage tank is supplied by the demineralized water transfer pumps, taking suction from the demineralized water storage tank. The refueling water storage tank also provides water to fill the , spent fuel cask storage pit. This water can be returned to the tank by the refueling water pumps through one of the condensate filter demineralizers. The Unit 1 and the Unit 2 condensate storage tanks and the refueling water storage tank are located outdoors, and are provided with freeze protection. The area occupied by the Unit I condensate storage tank and refueling water storage tank is surrounded by a common dike capable of holding the combined contents of the tanks in the event of tank rupture or overflow. The Unit 2 condensate storage tank is surrounded by a dike capable of holding the tank contents in the event of tank rupture or overflow. Tank overflows are routed directly to the liquid radwaste system. Drains from the dike areas can be selectively routed to either the normal waste or radwaste systems. 9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation O The condensate and refueling water storage facilities have no safety-related function except for the section of piping located in the reactor enclosure that supplies condensate to the HPCI pump (Section 6.3). Failure of the nonsafety-related portions of the system does not compromise any safety-related system or component, nor does it prevent a safe shutdown of the plant. , 9.2.7.4 Tests and Inspections l The condensate and refueling water storage facilities are ! preoperationally tested in accordance with Chapter 14, and periodically tested in accordance with Chapter 16. 9.2.7.5 Instrumentation Applications 9.2.7.5.1 Condensate Storage Tanks These tanks are each provided with a level transmitter that operates a pen recorder located in the control room. In addition to the level transmitters, each tank has high and low level switches that alarm in the control room, and a low switch that trips the condensate transfer pumps and the condensate transfer jockey pump when the tank level reaches 135,000 gallons. . 9.2.7.5.2 Refueling Water Storage Tank This tank is provided with a level transmitter that operates pens !() on Unit 1 and 2 pen recorders located in the control room. In 9.2-47 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR addition, the tank has high and low level switches which alarm in the control room, and a low level switch that trips the refueling water pumps on tank low level. 9.2.8 REACTOR ENCLOSURE COOLING WATER SYSTEM The reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW) system is a closed loop system that provides cooling water for miscellaneous reactor auxiliary plant equipment. The RECW system is not safety-related, except for the containment penetrations and isolation valves associated with the water supply to the reactor recirculation pump seal and motor oil coolers. 9.2.8.1 Desion Bases
- a. The RECW system is designed to remove the maximum anticipated heat loads developed by the components served by the system over the full range of the normal plant operating conditions and ambient temperature conditions.
- b. The RECW system is designed to operate during normal operation and on loss of offsite power wituout occurrence of a LOCA.
- c. The system is designed to permit the use of corrosion inhibitors to prevent long-term corrosion and organic fouling of the water passages in the system.
- d. The RECW system is designed to serve as a barrier between potentially radioactive systems and the plant service water system.
- e. The seismic category, quality group classification, and corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the RECW system are discussed in Section 3.2.
9.2.8.2 System Description The RECW system consists of two 100% capacity cooling water pumps, two 100% heat exchangers, one head tank, one chemical addition tank, associated valves, piping, and controls as shown in Figure 9.2-25. Major equipment design parameters are summarized in Table 9.2-21. The RECW system provides demineralized cooling water to nonessential equipment located in the reactor and radwaste enclosures which have the potential to carry radioactive fluids, or ! which require a clean water supply to minimize long-term corrosion. { l During normal operation, one RECW pump and heat exchanger is in I service. The second pump automatically starts on low pressure in l} Rev. 12, 10/82 9.2-48
c LGS FSAR CHAPTER 9 (~'} U TABLES (Cont'd) Table No. Title 9.5-8 Diesel Generator Starting System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis l 9.5-9 Diesel Generator Lubrication System Design Parameters 4 9.5-10 Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System Design Parameters 9.5-11 Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 9.5-12 Lighting System Intensities of Illumination ! l 1 l O 9-xiii Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR O
\,,) CHAPTER 9 FIGURES (Cont'd)
Fioure No. , Title 9.4-6 Primary Containment Vacuum Relief Valve Schematic 9.4-7 Drywell HVAC System P&ID 9.4-8 Drywell Air Cooling System Layout 9.4-9 Hot Maintenance Shop HVAC System P&ID
.9.4-10 Miscellaneous Structures HVAC Systems 9.4-11 Administration Building HVAC System P&ID 9.5-1 Fire Protection P&ID 9.5-2 Riser Diagram, Public Address System for Unit 1 9.5-3 Riser Diagram, Pubic Address System for Unit 2 9.'5-4 Riser Diagram, Public Address System for Miscellaneous Structures 9.5-$ Riser Diagram, Telephone System for Unit 1 9.5-6 Riser Diagram, Telephone System for Unit 2 9.5-7 Riser Diagram, Telephone System for Miscellaneous Structures 9.5-8 Standby Diesel Generator and Plant Fuel Oil Systems 9.5-9 Diesel Generator Cooling Water System 9.5-10 Diesel Generator Air Starting System 9.5-11 Diesel Generator Lubrication System l 9.5-12 Diesel Generator Air Intake and Exhaust System l O
9-xviii Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR O a. Equipment and floor drainage radwaste systems:
- 1. The liquid radwaste, collection subsystem collects potentially radioactive, liquid wastes from equipment and floor-drainage of the primary containments and the reactor, turbine, and radwaste enclosures. All such drainage is conveyed by
, gravity to sumps within the respective enclosures and pumped from there to the collection tanks, except for the drywell sumps which are gravity drained to the respective collection tanks.
- 2. The chemical waste collection subsystem collects corrosive, potentially radioactive liquid wastes-from the washdown areas, floor and equipment drain filters, condensate and fuel pool filter-demineralizers, laboratory drains, and other miscellaneous sources in the turbine and radwaste
, enclosures. Nonradioactive, high conductivity wastes from the condensate demineralizer cell cooling coil drains and the turbine enclosure water cooling system drains from Units 1 and 2 are also collected by this system. Liquid wastes from the hot maintenance shop are collected in the shop sump
() 3. and pumped to the chemical waste subsystem. The laundry waste, collection subsystem collects potentially radioactive liquid wastes from the personnel decontamination stations in the reactor and radwaste enclosures, and from the laundry facilities in the radwaste 1 closure.
- 4. Treatment of the above wastes is discussed in
, Section 11.2.
- b. Nonradioactive liquid wastes:
- 1. Oily waste drainage systems collect liquid wastes from the nonradioactive equipment areas in which oil is expected to be present. These areas include, turbine enclosures, the circulating water pump structure, diesel-generator enclosures, transformer areas, lube and diesel oil storage tank
- areas, oil unloading areas, and the auxiliary j boiler enclosure.
l 2. -Acid waste drainage systems collect liquid wastes l containing nonradioactive chemicals and corrosive l substances from the water treatment enclosure. () 3. Storm drainage systems collect water resulting from precipitation on enclosure roofs and areaways, and 9.3-13 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR paved and unpaved surface areas outside the enclosures.
- 4. The normal waste system collects liquid wastes from the nonradioactive equipment and floor drains, and is routed to the holding pond. Two parallel 750 gpm gravity differential oil separators, located immediately upstream of the holding pond, treat all flows entering the holding pond except for floor drainage from the holding pond treatment enclosure which is routed directly to the holding pond. If necessary, further treatment at the holding pond includes pH adjustment, coagulation of suspended solids, and oil separation.
The plant drainage systems consist of collection piping, equipment drains, floor drains, vents, traps, cleanouts, collection sumps, sump pumps, tanks, and instrumentation. The arrangement is such that the nonradioactive drain systems serve only nonrestricted areas where no radioactivity potential is present, exclusive of the lavatory wastes in the access control areas that are collected by the sanitary drainage systems. The potentially radioactive wastes from personnel decontamination facilities in the access control areas are collected by the laundry waste collection system. The drainage sources and expected inputs from areas of potential radioactivity are shown in Table 11.2-6. 9.3.3.2.2 Component Description Components of the plant drainage systems are described in the following paragraphs. Major components and design parameters are listed in Table 9.3-5. All plumbing and drainage systems are installed in accordance with ANSI A40.8, National Plumbing Code, and applicable local or state codes. In all areas of potential radioactivity, the collection system piping for the liquid system is carben steel. Potentially radioactive laboratory and decontamination waste, regeneration waste, and detergent waste collection system piping is stainless l steel. The fabrication and installation of the piping provides I for a uniform slope which induces waste to flow in the piping at a velocity of not less than two feet per second. Equipment drainage piping is terminated not less than six inches above the finished floor or drain receiver at each location where the discharge from equipment is to be collected. The final connections are made after the equipment is installed in its proper location. Rev. 12, 10/82 9.3-14
i LGS FSAR O All floor drains are installed with rims flush with the low point elevation of the finished floor. Floor drains in areas of potential radioactivity are welded directly to the collection piping and provided with threaded plugs of the same material. The plugs are used to seal off the floor drains for pressure testing of the drainage systems. They may also be installed to prevent aspiration of radioactive particulates into the normally dry systems. Inlets to all drainage systems (except those in areas of potential radioactivity) are provided with a vented P-trap water seal to minimize entry of vermin, foul odors, and toxic, corrosive, or inflammable vapors into the enclosure. Vent lines to the outside atmosphere are provided downstream of the P-traps to prevent excessive backpressures that could cause blowout or siphoning of the water seal. Traps are not normally installed on inlets in areas of potential radioactivity, in order to reduce the potential for accumulation of radioactivity. . Cleanouts are provided (when practicable) in all collection
- system piping where the change of direction in horizontal runs is 4
900 and at maximum intervals of 50 feet. Cleanouts for the potentially radioactive collection systems are welded directly to
; the piping.
Potentially radioactive collection sumps are provided with a fitted checker plate access cover for convenient maintenance access. All sumps except for the drywell are recessed in l concrete located at the lowest elevation of the area served. The drywell sumps are located below the drywell slab. Each turbine, reactor, and radwaste enclosure sump is fitted with a four-inch vent pipe to exhaust potential sump gases to a ducted filtered, enclosure exhaust system. The drywell sumps vent back into the drywell. Floor drain sumps in the reactor, turbine, and radwaste enclosures and the hot maintenance shop are provided with traveling belt-type oil removal equipment. The drywell equipment drain sump and the reactor enclosure equipment drain sump are provided with cooling coils to keep the wastes at or below a temperature of 1400F. 9.3.3.2.3 System Operation The various subsystems drain directly to the appropriate collection point by gravity. The system will cool equipment leakage and drains in the drywell equipment drain sump and reactor enclosure equipment drain sump. After collection in. area sumps, the liquid radwaste is then either gravity drained or pumped to the liquid radwaste, processing system for treatment.
. Sump pumps are started automatically when a predetermined high level in its sump is reached; the sump pump stops at a
- predetermined low water level.
9.3-15 Rev. 12, 10/82
- .- ~.---
LGS FSAR Leaks inside the drywell drain to the drywell floor drain sump, except for piped valve and pump seal leakoffs which are routed to the drywell equipment drain sump. Washdown of liquids to the plant radwaste floor drains will be~ administratively restricted to limit introduction of oils and other organic compounds to the radwaste system. Most oils that enter the area floor drain sumps are removed from the sump liquids before they can be transferred to the radwaste system. Sump pump setpoints are chosen to prevent pumpdown of the top several inches of the sump contents, including any oils or other organic compounds collected on the surface of the sump liquid. Sumps are routinely inspected for presence of oils. Traveling belt-type oil removal equipment is provided and operated as necessary in the sumps to ensure that accumulated oils are not transferred to the radwaste system. Oils removed by the belts are gravity drained to a collection drum for disposal. Other organic compounds present in the sump liquid and not removed by the oil removal equipment are transferred with the floor drain waste to the floor drain collection tank for processing (Section 11.2.2.1). Treated waste is collected in sample tanks, mixed by recirculation, and sampled. The treated waste is recycled to the condensate storage tanks for reuse only when samples indicate that it meets condensate water quality specifications. Treated waste that contains unacceptable levels of organic compounds is not transferred to the condensate storage tanks, but reprocessed in the liquid radwaste system or discharged from the plant. The storm drainage system collects water resulting from precipitation on enclosure roofs and areaways, paved and unpaved surfaces, and irrigation runoffs outside the enclosures, and conveys it to Possum Hollow Run and the Schuylkill River. Five 150 gpm oil interceptors are installed in yard areas to intercept accidental oil spills near the points of oil storage and use. Effluent from the oil interceptors, as well as other normal waste drainage, is routed to the holding pond via two parallel 750 gpm oil separators. Equipment drains from the main turbine bearings and turbine lube oil centrifuges are gravity drained to the oily waste drainage system. The turbine lube oil reservoirs are enclosed within l curbed areas, which can be drained through oily waste plumbing to ! the oily waste sump. Oily waste from each turbine enclosure oily l waste sump passes through an oil interceptor and the water is routed through a filter train, which consists of an inclined plate oil separator, a solids prefilter, an oil coalescing filter, and a carbon filter. The oil-free water is then routed out of each turbine enclosure to the radwaste discharge line. The separated oil is transferred to the two 3000-gallon oily ll waste storage tanks located outside. Rev. 12, 10/82 9.3-16
ll LGS FSAR O -The' acid waste system collects liquid waste containing chemicals and corrosive substances (including caustic spills) discharged by laboratory fixtures and equipment. The acid waste system also serves the drains which are located in the water treatment enclosure and conveys the liquid waste directly to the chemical waste sump. The acid and caustic waste in the chemical waste sump (resulting from accidental spills, leaks, and tank ruptures as well as from normal regeneration of the demineralizers) will be pumped to either of two 15,000-gallon neutralizing tanks for pH adjustment before release to the settling basin via the water treatment enclosure sump. Clarifier blowdown, filter backwash, and other floor drainage in the water treatment enclosure is routed to the settling basin via the water treatment enclosure sump. The settling basin effluent is routed to the holding pond. The sanitary drainage system collects liquid wastes and entrained solids discharged by all plumbing fixtures located in areas with no sources of potentially radioactive wastes and conveys them to a sewage treatment facility. 9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation Except for the containment penetrations ano the drywell boundary extension of the drywell drainage system, the plant drainage O systems have no safety-related function. Failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related system or component, or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant. The containment i O 9.3-16a Rev. 12, 10/82
1 LGS FSAR 1 l THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O O Rev. 12, 10/82 9.3-16b
3 , s', ,
.+ .
pa ~~ /, j ; n 5t- , LGS FSAR N q , ,,
^
* ; R .._ l
\- ' 9.4.4.5 Instrumentatidn_ Requirements All hand control switches for the turbine enclosure ventilation system are on local control panels in the turbine enclosure. The local panels transmit any ventilation alarm signal on to the control room panel. The following abnormal conditions are '
annunciated: ' [ %~
- a. Air flow failure (all'dagted fans) 's
- b. Supply air heating coil failure ,,
- c. Supply air cooling coil failure , ,
- d. High motor or_, generator exhaust temperature;
- e. High general area exhaust temperature - ,
t
- f. Highequipmentcompartmentexhausttjemperature' y ,
N.
~
l g. High charcoal adsorber temperature
- h. High demineralizer cell exhaust temperature
- i. High compartment temperature (compartments with unit
\ coolers only)
- j. High pressure differential across supply filter
- k. High pressure differential across equipment compartment exhaust filter train
- 1. Supply filter media runout There are various sensors, controllers, switches, time delays, and indicators to automatically switch or stop fans, open and close isolation dampers, advance roll-filter media, modulate control dampers, open steam heating coil valves, open or modulate cooling coil valves, adjust fan blade or inlet guide vane pitch, start unit coolers and unit heaters, and indicate temperature, enclosure pressure, and filter resistance.
9.4.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM
' Ventilation of the primary containment is provided by two systems: the containment atmospheric control system and the s drywell air cooling system. -
l 9.4.5.1 Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) System O The CAC system incorporates features for accomplishing a number of functions, including inerting of the primary containment with l 9.4-35 Rev. 12, 10/82 s
LGS FSAR nitrogen, purging of the primary containment, limiting the differential pressure between drywell and wetwell, monitoring of hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the primary containment, and controlling corbustible gas concentrations in the primary containment after a LOCA. Those functions relating to post-LOCA combustible gas monitoring and control are discussed in Section 6.2.5, whereas all other functions are described in this section. The CAC system serves the drywell and suppression chamber in various modes of operation during reactor operation, reactor shutdown', and post-accident conditions. Portions of the system are safety-related. 9.' '~1.1 Design Bases
.. The CAC system is designed to provide a means by which nitrogen gas can be introduced into the primary containment at a high flow rate, thereby displacing air s ,}, originally in the containment volume, for the purpose of l
\ reducing the oxygen concentration in the containment atmosphere.
0%g q b. The CAC system, operating in conjunction with the
- reactor enclosure ventilation system, is designed to
~
\p ' provide a high-volume purge flow to the drywell and
\
suppression chamber to provide the proper atmosphere for early personnel access following shutdown of the reactor.
- c. The low-volume purge mode of the CAC system is designed to control the containment pressure and oxygen s - concentration during all modes of reactor operation by
,, ~
supplying nitrogen gas to and/or releasing gases from the primary containment in a controlled manner. IN d. The CAC system, operating in conjunction.with the
' treactor enclosure ventilation system, the RERS, and the l ,,
i
. SGTS, is designed to remove radioactive contaminants x from all primary containment gas prior to its release to h
\' the environment.
l i e. The CAC system is designed to monitor the hydrogen and oxygen content of the primary containment atmosphere during normal operation and following a LOCA.
- f. The CAC system is designed to provide a means of hydrogen and oxygen recombination with sufficient l
capacity to prevent the accumulation of a combustible concentration of gases within the primary containment following a LOCA. e, Rev. 12, 10/82 9.4-36 l l n L_-__--__-_-_-__-_-____
p* , LGS FSAR , g. The CAC system is designed to permit a controlled purge of the primary containment atmosphere at a low flow rate following a LOCA, as a backup means of combustible gas control.
- h. The CAC' system is designed to automatically isolate the
- lines that penetrate primary containment to ensure the integrity of the containment boundary during accident conditions.
- i. The CAC system is designed to monitor the pressure and the temperature in both the drywell and suppression chamber.
t
- j. The CAC system is designed'to limit the differential j pressure that can develop across the diaphragm slab.
- k. The safety-related portions of the CAC system are designed to remain functional after an SSE.
- 1. The CAC system is designed so that a single failure of any active component, assuming loss of offsite power,
! cannot result in the loss of a safety function. () 9.4.5.1.2 System Description The CAC system is shown schematically in Figure 9.4-5. With the 1 exception of the liquid nitrogen facility, which is located 4 outdoors, the system is located entirely within the reactor ! enclosure. Nitrocen_Inertino During power operation of the reactor, the oxygen content of the primary containment atmosphere is maintained at a concentration ! no greater than 4% by volume. This limit is established to preclude the attainment of a combustible gas mixture inside the containment if combustible gases are released into the containment atmosphere following a postulated accident. l i This low-oxygen atmosphere is achieved by displacing air in the primary containment with nitrogen gas. The nitrogen is supplied from a liquid nitrogen facility, which consists of two liquid nitrogen storage tanks and one steam-heated water bath vaporizer. The liquid nitrogen facility is common to both reactor units. Gaseous. nitrogen from the discharge of the vaporizer is supplied to-the drywell and/or the suppression chamber as selected by the operator. The' flow rate of nitrogen is controlled to a value that is also selected by the operator. Gases released from the i primary containment during nitrogen inerting are processed O through the filters of the SGTS (described in Section 6.5.1.1) before release to the environment. 9.4-37 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR During the inerting operation, nitrogen is supplied to the containment and gases are released from the containment through the four high-volume purge penetrations. Once the specified oxygen concentration in the primary containment has been achieved, nitrogen flow is terminated and the isolation valves in the high-volume purge lines are closed. Hich-Volume Purce Immediately before reactor sh.sdown, when access to the primary containment by plant personnel is anticipated, the primary containment is purged by a high-volume flow of air to re-establish a normal air atmosphere and to remove any airborne radioactivity that may have accumulated in the containment atmosphere during reactor operation. This high-volume purge is continued during the shutdown to maintain a well-ventilated environment for personnel occupancy. High-volume purge air is supplied to the CAC system by the reactor enclosure HVAC system, which is described in Section 9.4.2. The purge air is maintained within a temperature range of 65 to 950F. Gases exhausted from the primary containment during the high-volume purge mode are processed by the SGTS (described in Section 6.5.1.1) prior to releasc to the environment. The four high-volume purge lines are each provided with two normally-closed butterfly valves for containment isolation. The inboard isolation valve is pneumatic-cylinder-operated, and the outboard valve is motor-operated. These valves can be operated by hand switches in the control room and are automatically closed upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. The isolation signals to the inboard valves may be overridden by using keylocked bypass switches. Containment isolation is discussed further in Section 6.2.4. . Low-Volume Purce Low-volume purging is performed during the operational modes of startup, power operation, and hot shutdown to maintain the pressure and oxygen concentration of the primary containment atmosphere within specified ranges. During reactor operation, the primary containment pressure is maintained in the range of 0.1 to 1.5 psig and the oxygen concentration is restricted to 4% (by volume) or less. Low-volume purging involves introducing nitrogen into the primary containment and/or releasing gases from the primary contai.nment. Gaseous nitrogen is supplied from the liquid nitrogen facility and is introduced into the containment through a 1-inch low-volume purge line that connects to the discharge lines of both containment combustible gas analyzer packages, between the containment isolation valves on the latter lines. The flow rate of nitrogen into the containment is controlled by a motor-operated valve in the 1-inch line. O Rev. 12, 10/82 9.4-38
LGS FSAR O Gases are released from the primary containment through 2-inch low-volume purge lines that connect to the high-volume purge exhaust. lines from the drywell and suppression chamber, inboard of the containment isolation valves on the latter lines. The exhaust flow rate is controlled by a motor-operated valve in each of the 2-inch lines. The exhausted gases are processed by the reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters (described in Section 9.4.2) prior to release to the environment. Each low-volume purge line is provided with two normally-closed globe valves for containment isolation. The inboard isolation valve is motor-operated and the outboard valve is air-operated. These valves may be opened from the control room during normal plant operation and are automatically closed upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. Containment isolation is discussed further in Section 6.2.4. The need for containment purging during normal operation is minimized by providing a primary containment instrument gas (PCIG) system (described !.n Section 9.3.1.3). Purging for pressure control is required periodically during reactor system heatup and cooldown, if the PCIG system is out of service and the instrument air system is being used as a backup, or when other system leakage causes pressurization. Combustible Gas Analyzers Redundant hydrogen and oxygen analyzers are provided to monitor the primary containment atmosphere during normal operation and following a LOCA. The sampling system and analyzer packages are described in Section 6.2.5. Each gas sample line is provided with two solenoid valves in series, for containment isolation. The isolation signals to these valves may be overriden by using keylocked bypass switches. Containment Hydrocen Recombiner Packaces In the event of a LOCA, hydrogen and oxygen may be generated inside the primary containment. To control the buildup of oxygen and prevent a combustible concentration from occurring, redundant containment hydrogen recombiners are provided, as described in Section 6.2.5. The process gas supply and return lines for the recombine: packages connect to the high-volume purge lines, inboard of the latter's containment isolation valves. The supply and return lines are each provided with a normally-closed, ll motor-operated butterfly valve for containment isolation. These valves may be operated from the control room during normal plant operation, and they automatically close upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. For operation of the recombiners O after a LOCA, the isolation signals to these valves are overridden 9.4-39 Rev. 12, I'0/82
LGS FSAR by using keylocked bypass switches. Containment isolation is discussed further in Section 6.2.4. Post-LOCA Purce As a backup to the rein. dant oxygen recombiners, post-LOCA oxygen concentration can be sontrolled by purging the containment atmosphere. The post-LOCA purge is accomplished by the same method described above for the low-volume purge. Under post-LOCA conditions, however, the gases exhausted from the containment are processed through the RERS and the SGTS (both are described in Section 6.5.1) prior to release to the environment. The isolation signals to the containment isolation valves on the low-volume purge lines may be overridden by using keylocked bypass switches. Containment isolation is discussed further in Section 6.2.4. Primary Containment Vacuum Relief Valve Assemblies In order to limit the degree to which suppression chamber pressure can exceed drywell pressure, four primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies are provided. The assemblies are located in the suppression chamber, each assembly being mounted on the side of a downcomer. Each assembly consists of two 24-inch (nominal diameter) vacuum relief valves mounted in series. When the suppression chamber pressure exceeds the drywell pressure by a specified amount, the vacuum relief valves open automatically, allowing gases from the suppression chamber to enter the downcomer and flow upward into the drywell, thereby equalizing pressure above and below the diaphragm slab. A single vacuum relief valve (upstream type) is shown schematically in Figure 9.4-6. The downstream valves are the same, except for a shorter body length. The valve consists of a swinging disk that closes an orifice in the body of the valve. The valve disk is keyed to a body-penetrating shaft that rotates as the disk opens or closes. By way of lever arms also keyed to this shaft, a compression spring holds the valve disk against the seat. When the differential pressure across the disk (in the opening direction) results in a force greater than the force exerted by the spring, the valve begins to open. The opening set pressure of the valve is 0.5 psid. The valve reaches the fully-open position when the differential pressure is 1.5 times the opening set pressure, i.e., 0.73 psid. At differential pressures between 0.5 and 0.73 psid, the valve disk is at some position between full open and fully closed. Using the spring constant and the moment of inertia of the valve disk, the valve manufacturer has calculated that the valves reach the fully-open position within 0.2 second after the instantaneous application of a differential pressure of 0.73 psid. Since the transients that result in pressurization of the suppression chamber above the pressure of the drywell occur relatively slowly Rev. 12, 10/82 9.4-40
LGS FSAR compared to the above opening time, the vacuum relief valves would open gradually in response to the increasing differential pressure. The flow loss coefficient for the vacuum relief valves was calculated based on actual flow measurements conducted in the manufacturer's shop. The valve was mounted in a test rig, a differential pressure established across the valve, and the resulting flow rate was measured. Using this measurement, the loss coefficient for 24-inch pipe size was calculated to be 1.78 for a single valve and 3.87 for two valves mounted in series. A valve operator is provided so that the valve can be opened to check the operation of the valve and the disk position indication system. This operator has no safety function and is not required to be operable under accident conditions. Associated hand switches are located on a test panel in the reactor enclosure so that the valve may be tested remotely. When the switches are actuated, air pressure is applied to the actuating cylinder. This pressure overcomes the closing force applied by the spring and thus opens the valve. 9.4.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation i h] The safety-related functions of the CAC system include primary containment isolation, suppression chamber to drywell vacuum relief, suppression chamber pressure monitoring, and post-LCCA combustible gas monitoring and control. All safety-related portions (including supporting structures) of the CAC system are designed to seismic Category I requirements as defined in Section 3.7. That piping which is safety-related is designed, fabricated, inspected, and tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 2, as discussed in Section 3.2. All safety-related portions of the CAC system are located within the reactor enclosure, which is designed to seismic Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.8.4. Evaluation of the CAC system with respect to the following areas is discussed in the following sections:
- a. Protection from wind and tornado Section 3.3 effects
- b. Flood design Section 3.4
- c. Missile protection Section 3.5
- d. Protection against dynamic effects Section 3.6 associated with the postulated rupture of piping
- e. Environmental design Section 3.11 9.4-41 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Each line penetrating the primary containment (other than the hydrogen recombiner supply and return lines) is provided with redundant isolation valves powered from different divisions of Class 1E power. Therefore, in the event of failure of one division of Class 1E power, no more than one containment isolation valve in each pair is disabled, and the isolation function is assured. Each supply and return line for the hydrogen recombiners is provided with a single containment isolation valve. The hydrogen recombiner loops are closed systems outside containment, so that failure of an isolation valve in the open position would not constitute a breach of containment integrity. The bypass of an isolation signal to any valve is annunciated in the control room. The simplicity of design of the primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies assures their ability to operate, when necessary, to limit the differential pressure across the diaphragm slab. The valves are of the swing check configuration and require no motive power other than the differential pressure across the valve. The use of two valves in series within each assembly prevents a failure of any single valve in the stuck-open position from compromising the pressure suppression capability of the primary containment. Post-LOCA combustible gas monitoring and control is discussed in detail in Section 6.2.5. A failure modes and effects analysis for the CAC system and the drywell air cooling system is presented in Table 9.4-11. 9.4.5.1.4 Tests and Inspections The CAC system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. Inservice inspection of the safety-related portions of the system is in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, for Section III, Class 2 components. The primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies are preoperationally tested by the manufacturer to verify the opening set pressure. The set pressure is determined by applying a slowly increasing pressure to the inlet side of the valve and observing the point at which the inlet pressure suddenly stops increasing. This point indicates the start of leakage across the valve disk, which is the definicion of the beginning of valve opening. 9.4.5.1.5 Instrumentation-Applications The CAC system is designed to be operated remotely from the ' control room. Power-operated valves are provided with hand switches and < position indicating lights in the control room. All operations other than containment isolation are performed manually. ; Rev. 12, 10/82 9.4-42 {
. l
LGS FSAR
) l i The liquid nitrogen facility is provided with controls and -
instrumentation necessary to maintain the pressure and . temperature of t'ne gaseous nitrogen supplied by the facility ! within appropriate ranges. The steam inlet piping to the water i bath vaporizer is provided with a control valve which modulates ! to control the rate of steam admission to the steam coil inside ! the vaporizer. A temperature sensor immersed in the water bath ! provides a signal to this control valve so that the water bath : temperature can be automatically controlled within a preset ! range. The pressure of the gaseous nitrogen leaving the liquid : nitrogen facility is maintained at 50 psig by a pair of pressure j control valves located in the nitrogen supply piping downstream i of the vaporizer. A dual setpoint temperature switch installed ! in the nitrogen supply piping near the two pressure control ; valves is wired into the control circuits of those two valves, i The presence of nitrogen in the piping at a temperature outside ! the range defined by the setpoints of the temperature switch will f cause the switch to trip and the pressure control valves to close, thereby terminating the flow of nitrogen gas from the
- liquid nitrogen facility. ;
i During inerting of the primary containment through the i high-volume purge penetrations, the desired flow rate of nitrogen l
; into the high-volume purge piping is set by the operator on a !
O flow controller in the control room. The measured flow rate in the nitrogen supply piping is displayed on the flow controller and is automatically compared to the value set on the flow i controller; a signal corresponding to the difference between i t these two values is used to automatically modulate a flow control ! valve in the nitrogen supply piping so as to maintain the desired i flow rate. When nitrogen is introduced into.the primary i 4 containment in the low-volume purge mode, the nitrogen flow rate in the low-volume purge piping is recorded in the control room and the operator controls the flow rate by remotely actuating a : motor-operated valve in that piping. j
. j Gas pressure in the nitrogen supply lines is indicated in the !
control room. Temperature in the nitrogen supply lines is ; indicated locally. t / Position indication for each vacuum relief valve is provided by a i set of position switches that operate off the same body- , penetrating shaft to which the valve disk is attached.. The ! redundant position switches and their associated indicating ! lights on a test panel in the reactor enclosure provide visual l indication when the valve is "not fully closed" or "not fully I open." When the valve is in an intermediate position, both the l "not fully closed" and "not fully open" sets of lights are on. l The plunger-type "not fully closed" switches have a hysteresis, l or differential travel of 0.004 inch. The switch hysteresis is j multiplied through the mechanical linkage to the valve disk, so ! that when the valve is opening under differential pressure, the j ! i i 9.4-43 Rev. 11, 10/82 ; I . . . _ _ _ -
LGS FSAR disk of the downstream valve is 0.06 inch off the seat before the "not fully closed" lights comes on. The upstream valve can be 0.04 inch off the seat in the same situation. When the valve is closing under differential pressure or when the valve is opening or closing by the actuator, the mechanical linkage ensures that the "not fully closed" lights are on unless the disk is on the seat. A valve position other than fully closed is annunciated in the control room. Atmosphere temperature in the drywell and suppression chamber is monitored by two temperature elements in each volume. The temperatures at all four points are recorded simultaneously in the control room. Drywell temperature is also indicated at the ; remote shutdown panel. Pressures in the drywell and suppression chamber are monitored by I pressure transmitters mounted outside the containment and are indicated in the control room. Suppression chamber pressure is also recorded in the control room. 9.4.5.2 Drywell Air Coolino System The drywell air cooling system serves to remove heat from the drywell during normal plant operations and to maintain air ' circulation in the drywell under accident conditions. This latter function is safety-related. 9.4.5.2.1 Design Bases
- a. The drywell air cooling system is designed to limit the temperature inside the drywell, during normal reactor operation, to an average of 1350F, with the maximum not to exceed 1500F.
- b. The drywell air cooling system is designed to limit the temperature inside the drywell, in the event of loss of offsite power and reactor scram, to 1860F in general drywell areas and 2100F in the area below the reactor vessel (inside the reactor pedestal).
- c. The drywell air cooling system is designed to prevent concrete structures within the primary containment from exceeding their maximum design temperature during normal operation.
- d. The drywell air cooling system is designed to maintain the drywel1 atmosphere in a thoroughly mixed condition following a LOCA to prevent stratification of oxygen that may be generated as a result of the accident.
- e. Safety-related portions of the drywell air cooling system are designed to remain functional after an SSE. lh 1
Rev. 12, 10/82 9.4-44 l
LGS FSAR G. O e. Generatar hydrogen seal oil unit - deluge
- f. Generator equipment area - pre-action sprinkler
- g. Railroad access area - pre-action sprinkler
- h. Reactor recirculation pump motor-generator set -
pre-action sprinkJer i Diesel-Generator Compartments The four diesel-generators for each reactor unit are separated from each other and other structures of the plant by fire barriers having 3-hour fire resistance ratings. An automatic pre-action sprinkler system protects each diesel-generator cell and provides complete coverage of the cell. Smoke detectors and heat detectors are provided in each diesel-generator cell. The smoke and temperature detection systems annunciate in the control room. Each diesel-generator cell is provided with trapped and vented floor drains and an adequate drainage capacity to cope with the maximum sprinkler water flow in each room. The drainage system 4 is arranged to prevent flow from one diesel-generator cell from backflooding into another cell. Each diesel-generator cell-is; provided with a separate ventilation system which is controlled manually from a local ] control panel and is also started automatically by either high air temperature or a diesel engine start signal. The diesel oil day tank for each diesel-generator and the lube oil tank are installed within a 3-hour rated enclosure located inside the diesel-generator cell. A pre-action sprinkler system is provided for each day tank enclosure. Diesel Oil Storace Area There are eight 41,500 gallon capacity diesel oil storage tanks buried underground in the yard southwest of the diesel-generator i enclosures. Buried tanks meet the 3 hour fire resistance guidelines of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. Safety-Related Pumps The safety-related pumps located at the lowest elevation of the reactor enclosure are separated-from each other by 3-hour rated fire walls. Access openings provided with watertight doors are non-rated. i O 9.5-15
LGS FSAR Fire suppression provisions for the safety-related pump compartments in the reactor enclosure consist of pre-action sprinklers for the HPCI and RCIC compartments, portable extinguishers at or near the compartment entrances, and hose stations close enough to the compartment entrances to provide complete coverage. In consideration of the low combustible loading in the spray pond pump structure, portable extinguishers only are deemed adequate to control and extinguish a single fire event at any pump in that structure. Safety-related pump compartments are provided with smoke or temperature detectors that will annunciate in the control room. Storace Area A storage area is provided in a concrete vault with access from the top at the refueling floor level of the reactor enclosure. There is no combustible material inside the vault. A cover is provided for the vault and consists of steel plate welded to grating. The cover is normally kept on the vault except during periods of transfer in or out of the vault. A portable extinguisher is available in the area immediately adjacent to the storage area, and a hose station is available within effective range. A floor drain in the refueling floor slab serves to collect any water in the vicinity of the storage vault cover. A floor drain is also provided at the bottom of the storage vault. Spent Fuel Pool Area A hose station and portable fire extinguisher are available at the spent fuel pool. Radwaste Enclosure The radwaste enclosure is separated from other structures by 3-hour fire barriers. Automatic sprinkler protection is provided in the waste drum storage area at El. 217 feet in the enclosure. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are located on all levels of the radwaste enclosure and are within reach of the waste drum storage area. Yard Transformers , High-voltage, oil-filled transformers are installed outdoors and r are protected by automatic deluge systems. Fixed temperature l detectors annunciate in the control room. Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-16
LGS FSAR This system provides an additional station-to-station, intra-plant communication system for use during startup, maintenance, and normal operation, and consists of telephone jack stations located at various selected areas throughout the plant. The use of maintenance telephones allows uninterrupted private communication between the control room and the following areas: , control rod drive equipment area, refueling platfctm area, , turbine-generator operating deck, areas containing switchgear, ! load centers, and motor control centers, and other high l maintenance activity areas. Although intended for maintenance, : the capability exists to utilize this system in areas covered by l the PABX system. l ( l Evacuation Alarm and River Warning System 9.5.2.2.4 The evacuation alarm and river warning system is provided to warn personnel of emergency conditions. Tnis system supplements the radiation monitoring systems described in Section 12.3.4. ! The evacuation alarm system consists of a siren tone generator, PA system speakers, and a roof siren. The evacuation alarm is manually initiated by a selector switch in the control room. This selector switch also selects the evacuation alarm coverage in the drywell of Unit 1, the drywell O-of Unit 2, or the whole plant including the initiation of the roof siren and the river broadcast speakers. l The river warning system consists of a tape recorder, a l microphone, river broadcast speakers and an output feedback i monitoring system. I i l The tape recorder transmits recorded messages, and the microphone i transmits warning instructions through the river broadcast l speakers. An initiation signal from a selector switch in the l control room starts the tape recorder or renders the microphone ; available for transmission. The monitoring system monitors the output of the river broadcast speakers and transmits it back to the monitoring speaker when the tape recorder is initiated or te the VU meter when the microphone is activated. Monitoring speaker and VU meter are located in the l control room. l l Power for this system is supplied from a seismic Category I l distribution panel that is fed from a Class IE bus. 9.5.2.2.5 S"curity e Communication and Alarm System The security communications system is described in detail in the l O Physical Security Plan which has been submitted as a separate part of the license application. l 1 9.5-21 ,
LGS FSAR 9.5.2.3 Safety Evaluation The communication systems are not safety-related and are classified as non-Class IE. When components of the communication systems are located within seismic Category I structures, these components are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA requirements described in Section 3.2. The basis for providing Category IIA supports is to prevent the communication equipment from falling on safety-related equipment and impairing its ability to perform safe shutdown functions during a seismic event. The systems described above are conventional and have a history of successful operation at similar existing plants. System design considerations include diversity and operational reliability. Physical and electrical separation is provided between primary and backup systems to minimize the possibility of a single occurrence affecting more than one system. The communication systems have adequate flexibility to keep plant personnel informed of plant operational status at all times. If one handset station of the PA system is damaged or inaccessible or if extreme background noise prevents its use, multiple handset locations at each plant elevation provide easy access to an alternate handset of the PA system. Failure of a single PABX telephone station does not affect the balance of the PABX telephone system. If failure of the central exchange or some other such failure makes the complate system inoperable, the public address system is used as backup in-plant communication. l The public address system is powered from a Class IE 440V motor control center through a 480V-120V transformer and a 3-phase, 120V distribution panel. The transformer and panel are seismic Category I and feed only the PA system and fire alarm system which are non-Class IE. The cabling for these systems is routed in independent and separate conduits and no other systems' cables are routed in these conduits. For this reason and reasons of plant safety, this panel remains connected to the Class IE bus during a LOCA. The Class 1E 440V motor control center is powered ! by the channel D Class 1E 440V load center. The Class 1E 440V l motor control center and load center are part of the Class 1E ac ll l power system (Section 8.3.1.1.2). Failures of the fire alarm or l Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-22
)
LGS FSAR ) PA systems will not affect the Class IE bus because of the use of overcurrent protection devices and isolation transformers. ! 1 The PABX telephone system is powered by a non-Class IE power source which can be connected to the diesel generator. Failure of any or all of its components will not affect any nuclear safety-related equipment. i During the loss of both offsite power and the diesel generator associated with channel D bus, communication is maintained by the
- security communications system and the PABX telephone system.
During the design basis seismic event which assumes failure of all non-seismic equipment and components, the intra-plant communications with all safety-related areas is maintained by the security communications system. 9.5.2.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements The communication systems are preoperationally tested. System operability is demonstrated by use during normal plant operation. Communication equipment used for security is tested in accordance with the requirements of the security plan. 9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEM The plant lighting system provides illumination levels required for safe performance of plant operation, security, shutdown, and maintenance duties. Emergency de lighting is provided in . essential areas for the safety of personnel during an ac power failure. 9.5.3.1 Desian Bases
- a. The lighting system is designed to' provide illumination intensities required for the performance of activities l in the various areas, and is equal to or greater than l those recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society. Lighting fixtures have been selected with consideration for environmental conditions and ease of maintenance.
O 9.5-23 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- b. The emergency lighting system provides lighting intensities required for use during emergencies or shutdown and meets the requirements stated in the
" Building Regulations for Protection from Fire and Panic," Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry.
- c. The lighting system for safety-related areas, including the control room, portions of the auxiliary equipment room, diesel-generator enclosures, emergency switchgear area, and other areas requiring lighting during emergencies, is comprised of the normal lighting and emergency lighting systems as described in Sections 9.5.3.2.1 and 9.5.3.2.2.
- d. The control room lighting system is provided with a fluorescent lighted glare-free luminous ceiling with special attention given to the reduction of glare and shadows at the control panels.
- e. Mercury vapor fixtures are not used inside the primary containment or directly above the refueling area. &
Mercury switches are not used in the lighting system. W
- f. Outdoor area lighting uses high-pressure sodium lamps that provide illumination for plant security and safe movement of plant personnel. Lighting of the protected outdoor area is sufficient to permit effective visual inspection to facilitate nighttime television surveillance and patrol of the perimeter fence. The average footcandle level inside and along the security fence is 0.2 fc or greater.
- g. All lighting system components are non-safety-related seismic Category II components. These components, when located in safety-related areas, are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA requirements as described in Section 3.2. The criteria for this selective basis and the design basis for seismic Category IIA supports are described in Section 3.2.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-24
T LGS FSAR 9.5.3.2 System Description 9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting Power for normal lighting is supplied from the unit auxiliary or the startup buses which are described ~in Section 8.3.1. This system provides lighting for all indoor and outdoor areas. Outdoor security and roadway lighting-is described in Section 9.5.3.2.3. t The high-pressure sodium, mercury vapor, and some of the fluorescent lighting fixtures rated at 480/277V are fed from 480/277V, 3-phase, 4-wire, grounded neutral system lighting panels, which are fed from the normal 440V motor control centers. The-incandescent and the fluorescent lighting fixtures rated at 208/120V are fed from 208/120V, 3-phase, 4-wire, grounded neutral system lighting panels. These lighting panels are also fed from the normal 440V motor control centers through dry-type transformers. 9.5.3.2.2 Emergency Lighting
)
The emergency lighting installation consists of an emergency de and an emergency ac lighting system as described below: 4
- a. Emeroency ac Lichtino Emergency ac (277/480V) lighting is supplied from the Class IE buses that automatically transfer to the -
diesel-generator upon loss of the normal source. However, the emergency ac lighting panels are shed from the Class IE buses if a LOCA occurs. The panels are manually reconnected to the Class IE buses following a LOCA through administrative controls. Emergency ac lighting is provided in the safety-related areas and the areas-requiring lighting during emergencies.
- b. Emeroency de Lichtina Emergency de lighting consists of a combination of ac-dc lighting fixtures normally supplied from the Class IE buses. Upon loss of the Class IE ac source, an automatic transfer switch transfers this lighting 9.5-25 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR immediately to the 125V de non-Class IE station battery source. The 125V de non-Class 1E station battery source will provide power to the emergency ac-dc lighting system for one hour. The additional loads powered for this 125V station battery during a LOCA condition are , shown in Figure 8.3-3. All emergency ac-dc lighting fixtures are incandescent type. Emergency lighting in remote structures and areas where the above de source is not available consists of battery-powered self-contained units. Emergency de lighting fixtures and illuminated exit signs are located in the control room, stairways, and along exit routes from each floor throughout the plant. On loss of offsite power and failure of all nonseismic equipment / components, the 125V de power-supplied emergency lighting provides minimum lighting levels in the control room and other indicated vital areas until the emergency diesel generators have come on line and emergency ac power has been restored. Table 9.5-12 identifies the illumination intensities for the O vital and hazardous areas where emergency lighting is needed for safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident. The table provides both the normal and emergency operating conditions for these areas. These illumination levels conform to the IES Lighting Handbook recommended levels. Column 4 of Table 9.5-12 shows the 125V de power-supplied lighting illumination intensity levels that are maintained in the control room and other areas of the plant between loss of offsite power and availability of onsite power. The emergency ac/dc lighting system provides for approximately 10 to 20 percent of the total lighting in all operating and service areas of the plant. The percentage of emergency lighting power is as follows:
- a. Channel A = 6%
- b. Channel B = 32%
- c. Channel C = 12%
- d. Channel D = 50%
The emergency lighting load is not divided equally among the four diesel generators due to plant utilization. Emergency lighting, Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-26
l l LGS FSAR s , both ac and de,-has been provided for all vital and hazardous ! areas as shown in Table 9.5-12. In some areas, the loss of the ! single power channel would leave the de-supplied power system to provide lighting for evacuation of personnel. 9.5.3.2.3 Outdoor Security and Roadway Lighting l l ! Outdoor security and roadway lighting is provided by sodium vapor ; , luminaires. The lighting illuminates the " security" area and the i security fence to 0.2 fc or greater. l 1 The outdoor lighting poles do not exceed 130 feet in height. Any f 130-foot pole is designed to withstand a' sustained wind velocity l of 90 mph and gusts of up to 117 mph. Shorter poles are designed ! to withstand winds of higher velocity. All exterior lighting i poles are designed in accordance with 1975 AASHTO specifications l
- for structural supports for highway luminaires.
The security area lighting is supplied from the non-Class 1E i buses. The other outdoor area lighting is generally supplied ; O from the normal 440V buses. In the far areas, remote from the ; normal 440V source, this lighting is supplied from the nearby Class IE buses. The lighting supplied from the Class IE buses is j shed on a LOCA signal. This lighting, however, can be manually i reconnected to the Class IE buses following a LOCA through i administrative controls. l 9.5.3.3 Safety Evaluation j The lighting systems are not safety-related and are classified as l
- non-Class IE. When components of the lighting systems are
i located within seismic Category I structures, these components l l are supported on a selective basis to seismic Category IIA ; requirements described in Section 3.2. The basis for providing l i Category IIA supports is to prevent the lighting equipment from i falling on safety-related equipment and impairing its ability to l 4 perform safe shutdown functions during a seismic event. j i l i Lighting is provided to permit the operators to shut down the ; plant safely and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition at all ! times. The lighting system provides lighting'at all times in l _ areas used during reactor shutdown or emergency. ! 9.5-27 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR During normal plant operation, all plant lighting systems are energized from the respective unit auxiliary buses and startup buses. In the event of ac power loss from both unit auxiliary and startup buses, the normal lighting =ystem is inoperable. The emergency lighting system, however, remains operable, being energized from the safeguard buses. The emergency lighting system is provided with the capability for full functional tests to ensure the operability of the automatic switches and other components of the system. In the event of ac power loss from both unit auxiliary and startup buses, the standby diesel-generators start and energize the respective Class IE buses within 10 seconds. During the 10-second delay (diesel startup time) the de emergency lighting system remains energized from the station 125V de battery supplies. This system design ensures continuity of illumination in all indoor and essential operating areas including all emergency access and exit routes. All emergency lighting is automatically isolated from the Class IE buses on receipt of a LOCA signal. l 9.5.3.4 Inspection and Testino Requirements l The lighting systems are preoperationally tested. System operability is demonstrated by use during normal plant operation. 9.5.4 DIESEL-GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system provides onsite storage and delivery of fuel oil for at least seven days of operatica to all diesel-generators with the diesels operating at their maximum operating load. The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is a safety-related system. 9.5.4.1 Desian Bases The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system design bases are as follows:
- a. To provide onsite storage of fuel oil for the diesel-generators for at least seven days of continuous operation and to allow for subsequent refilling
- b. To ensure that the single failure of any active component does not affect the operation of more than one diesel Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-28 I
; LGS FSAR 4
- c. To remain operable during and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) 4
- d. To withstand sind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles j l e. To be capable of being tested during plant operation The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed to seismic Category I requirements. The quality group classification and corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the system are discussed in Section 3.2. The quality assurance program is discussed in Chapter 17.
9.5.4.2 System Description The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system P&ID is shown in Figure 9.5-8. Major component design parameters are ! listed in Table 9.5-3. Each diesel-generator is provided with an i independent fuel oil system. Each fuel oil system consists of a diesel oil storage tank, a diesel oil transfer pump, a day tank, an engine-driven fuel pump, a de motor-driven auxiliary fuel pump, and associated piping, valves, strainers, and instrumentation. Details of the diesel oil storage tanks and I their support structures are shown in Figure 3.8-64. The j locations of the diesel oil storage tanks and the piping leading i to the diesel-generator enclosures are shown in Figure 3.8-58. The description of the diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system components is as follows: Diesel Oil Storace Tanks - One 41,500 gallon capacity storage tank is provided for each diesel-generator. The 41,500 gallons of stored fuel oil is sufficient for seven days of full load continuous generator operation. The tanks are buried underground approximately 150 feet from the diesel-generator enclosure as shown in Figure 3.8-58. Connections for level instruments, manhole, day tank overflow return, vent, and pump support flange are provided on top of the tank. A concrete manhole for each tank, from grade to the tank connections, is furnished for access, maintenance, inspection, i and repair. A common underground sump surrounding all eight tanks is provided for oil collection in case of a tank leak. A l~ ( ) l 9.5-29 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR sump is provided at the bottom of the tank for water / condensate collection and for periodic removal by means of a sump pump. The exterior surfaces of the tanks are painted with two coats, each of 15 to 18 mil thickness, of a bituminous protective coating. The tanks are vented through a flame arrestor above grade. The tank vent point and the fill pipe opening are higher than the probable maximum flood level. The tanks are provided with a pressure / vacuum relief valve to protect against overpressure and vacuum. Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps - One diesel oil transfer pump is provided for each storage tank. The pump is connected to the pump support flange such that the pump casing and impeller are submerged. The diesel oil transfer pump discharge lines run directly to the diesel oil day tanks. A suction strainer is provided at the pump inlet and a duplex strainer is provided in the pump discharge line. Diesel Oil Day Tanks - One 850-gallon capacity diesel oil day tank is provided for each diesel-generator. Each tank is located in a separate diked compartment within the diesel-generator enclosure that is capable of containing a liquid volume in excess of the day tank capacity. The tanks are provided with connections for filling, overflow, vents, drains, supply and with return piping, and with access for tank inspection. Each tank contains sufficient fuel oil for 4 hours of continuous diesel-generator operation at full load. The day tanks are vented to outside the diesel-generator enclosure, through a flame arrestor. The tanks are protected against overpressure and vacuum conditions. Their location provides a slight positive pressure at the fuel pumps. Diesel-Generator Fuel Pumps - Each diesel-generator is provided i with two positive displacement fuel oil pumps, one diesel l engine-driven and one de motor-driven. Relief valves and line filters are furnished on the discharge of each pump. The pumps, valves, and associated piping are all located on the diesel engine skid in the diesel-generator enclosure. l Associated Pipino - The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and i transfer system piping is made of carbon steel up to the day tank. As shown in Figure 9.5-8, piping to and from the engine skid is carbon steel in accordance with ANSI B31.1 piping code. Skid suction piping to the fuel supply pumps, and the pressurized 1 Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-30 ,
- - ~ _
LGS FSAR O fuel return to the day tank are. carbon steel / copper in accordance . with ANSI B31.1 piping code. The engine mounted piping to the . ! fuel header jumpers and the drains is carbon steel / copper
- fabricated to the manufacturer's standard.
The diesel oil storage tanks are filled and replenished from trucks through the fill connection which branches to each of the reactor unit's four tanks. Each supply tank fill line has its own shutoff valve. A duplex-type basket strainer is provided in the fill line to prevent solid particles or debris from entering the storage tanks. Diesel oil is pumped from the diesel' oil storage tank to the day tank by a motor-driven diesel oil transfer pump. The diesel oil supply and return lines of the four fuel oil systems associated with each unit are cross-connected so that any one of the diesel engines can be supplied from any one of the diesel oil storage tanks. The piping between the diesel oil storage tank and the diesel-generator enclosure is buried. Corrosion protection for this underground piping is provided by protective wrapping and coating. Cathodic protection is also provided. All valves are located in a valve pit at the diesel oil storage tank or within O the diesel-generator enclosure. Basket strainers are provided in each pump discharge line to prevent solid particles or debris from entering the day tanks. t Because the capacity of the transfer pump is greater than the fuel oil consumption of the diesel engine, the pump can supply fuel oil to the diesel and simultaneously increase the inventory of the day tank. The fuel oil transfer pumps are started and stopped automatically by day tank level switches. The pumps can also be operated manually at the local engine control panel by control switches. An overflow line from the day tank to the storage tank is furnished. j The diesel fuel pumps take suction from the day tank and pump fuel oil to the diesel engine. The de motor-driven pump starts simultaneously with the engine-driven pump when the diesel is started, and shuts off automatically about 7 seconds after the diesel attains a speed above 600 rpm. Four seconds after the de motor-driven pump stops, it is set to restart automatically if the fuel oil pressure of the engine-driven pump drops below
'1-0 psi. When started by a low fuel oil pressure signal, the pump will automatically stop if the engine receives an emergency stop l signal or when fuel oil pressure has increased to 15 psi. The fuel is then provided by the engine-driven pump only.
9.5-31 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR The de motor-driven pump can also be operated manually and provides a backup to the engine-driven pump during normal operation. The source of electric power for the de fuel oil pump motor is the Class 1E 125V de power system from the respective electrical division of the diesel generator. The condition of the de motor-
- driven pump is indicated / alarmed at the local control panel as i
"DC FUEL PUMP POWER OFF" and, if the pump is running, "DC FUEL PUMP RUNNING".
i The fuel injection pumps are connected by a mechanical linkage to the electrical / mechanical governor system, which provides for proper fuel supply under all engine operating conditions. Normally the electrical governor subsystem operates the linkage through its actuator. In case of electrical governor failure, the mechanical governor takes over. The injection pump-governor linkage can also be. manually set for the engine manual start or stop. Both the de motor-driven pump and the engine-driven pump supply more fuel to the diesel engine than the engine can consume. The excess fuel is returned to the day tank. In the unlikely event of a failure in one of the supply systems, the associated day tank low level alarm will annunciate when the fuel oil remaining in the tank will provide approximately 1 more hour of full load operation, so that the operator can take corrective action to prevent the loss of the diesel. 9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed to seismic Category I requirements as defined in - Section 3.7. The components of the system are located in the diesel oil storage tank valve pit or the diesel-generator enclosure, which are designed to seismic Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.8. Protection against hurricanes, tornadoes, and missiles is provided by locating system components either underground or within the seismic Category I diesel-generator enclosure. , Evaluation of the diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system with respect to the following areas is discussed in separate FSAR sections as indicated: lll Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-32
LGS FSAR O a. Protection against wind and tornado effects 3.3
- b. Flood design 3.4
- c. Missile protection 3.5
- d. Protection against dynamic effects 3.6 associated with the postulated rupture of piping
- e. Environmental design 3.11
- f. Fire protection 9.5.1 Exposure of the fuel oil system to ignition by flame or hot surfaces is minimized by underground burial of the piping and i
storage tanks outside the buildings, and by separation of the j individual systems inside the building in a pipe trench below the diesel generators, except for a short run of piping on the diesel O. generator elevation to connect to the day tank and diesel. The total capacity of the underground diesel-generator fuel oil storage tanks is sufficient for seven days of operation of the diesel-generators at the largest operating load for a design basis accident (DBA). The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed so that failure of any one component results in the loss of fuel supply to no more than one diesel-generator. Physical ; redundancy of active components in each diesel-generator fuel oil l system is not provided. An independent fuel oil supply train is ! provided for each diesel-generator. Each transfer pump is powered from the bus served by its respective diesel-generator. Failure of l r l one pump or diesel-generator will not affect the operability of any component in another train. Only three of the four diesel-generators supplied for each unit are required during loss of offsite power and DBA to meet the safeguard load requirements. . Therefore, failure of any one component of the diesel-generator ! l fuel oil storage and transfer system does not preclude safe . ! shutdown of the plant following a LOCA and/or loss of offsite i power. See Table 9.5-4 for a failure mode and effects _ analysis of [ the system. j O t t 9.5-33 Rev. 12, 10/82 [ i l
~. ..-___ - _ _ , . . . , - - . . - - - - - -_ _ _ - - _ - . - -
LGS FSAR The diesel oil transfer and return lines of the four fuel oil 9i systems associated with each unit are cross-connected so that any one of the diesel engines can be supplied from any one of the diesel oil storage tanks, if required. These cross-connections are valved and require manual operation. An adequate supply of diesel fuel oil is readily available from a large number of suppliers in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, with one-day truck deliveries available. Each diesel oil day tank is provided with a temperature switch that shuts off the diesel oil transfer pumps on high temperature. This prevents the pumping of fuel oil to the day tank in case of a fire in the day tank. Diesel fuel oil protection against low temperatures is achieved by enclosing the equipment in heated enclosures and by burying below the frost line. , 9.5.4.4 Tests and Inspections The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. Periodic testing includes fuel oil sampling to ensure that the fuel quality requirements of the diesel manufacturer are met. The fuel oil storage tanks are provided with concrete manholes that permit access to the tank connections for periodic inspection of the tanks, pumps, and instrumentation. The day tanks, fuel pumps, and associated piping, strainers and valves are in the diesel-generator enclosure and are accessible for inspection during testing and operation. I 9.5.4.5 Instrument Applications Local and remote indicators, alarms, and pressure relief valves are provided to monitor the system process and protect system l components. 1 1 High and low levels in the diesel oil day tanks and storage tanks are monitored. A secondary means of tank level determination is provided by dip sticks and level gauges for the storage and day tanks, respectively. Differential pressures across the transfer pump discharge duplex strainers, the fuel pumps' intake basket strainers, and the fuel pumps' discharge duplex filters are monitored. Local pressure indicators and flow meters monitor each transfer pump discharge line. Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-34
LGS FSAR O b The following functions are alarmed at the local engine control board and at a common trouble alarm in the control rooms
- a. Fuel oil pressure low
- b. Fuel oil high differential pressure across fuel pump inlet duplex strainers
- c. Fuel oil high differential pressure across fuel pump outlet duplex filters
- d. Day tank low /high levels j e. Fuel oil high differential pressure across transfer pump discharge duplex strainers The fuel oil storage tank low /high levels are alarmed in the j control room only.
O 9.5.5 DIESEL-GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM The diesel-generator cooling water system provides cooling water to the station diesel-generators and is safety-related. 9.5.5.1 Desian Bases l The design bases of the diesel-generator cooling water system are as follows:
- a. To cool the engine cylinder jackets, the combustion air, and the lubricating oil sufficiently to permit continuous operation of the diesel-generator at full load
- b. To maintain the jacket coolant in a warmed condition while the diesel engine is in normal standby status to promote starting O
9.5-35 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- c. To ensure that the single failure of any active component will not affect the operation of more than one diesel-generator
- d. To remain functional during and after an SSE
- e. To permit testing of active system components during plant operation
- f. To withstand wind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles.
The diesel-generator cooling water system is designed to seismic Category I requirements. The quality group classification and corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the system are discussed in Section 3.2. 9.5.5.2 System Description The diesel-generator cooling water system consists of two separate cooling loops: the jacket water cooling loop and the air cooler coolant loop. The cooling water system is shown schematically in Figure 9.5-9. Each loop is cooled by the emergency service water (ESW) system discussed in Section 9.2.2. The general arrangement of the diesel-generator system is shown in Figures 1.2-35 and 1.2-36. The lube oil cooler coolant loop is discussed in Section'9.5.7. 9.5.5.2.1 Jacket Water Cooling Loop The jacket water cooling loop circulates treated cooling water that cools the diesel-generator cylinder jackets and consists of the following:
- a. An expansion tank
- b. An engine-driven jacket water pump
- c. A motor-driven circulation pump and an electric heater to keep the engine warm during shutdown periods Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-36
o- , i
, , a y 4'
LGS FSAR d.' An automatic thermostatic control valve es
. s -s
~
- e. A heat exchanger to dissipate the he'at il1 the jacket water
- f. Alarms, trips, indicators, valves, and piping
] The jacket water cooling loop component design parameters are given in Table 9.5-5. The engine-driven jacket water pump dihcharges the cooling water through the engine passages an,d the engine jacket header, and delivers it to a three-way thermostatically controlled valve. This valve directs the flow through or around the jacket water heat exchanger and back to the pump suction. The system-is designed to completely fill without special venting provisions.
- Initial system fill and any subsequent refills will be_done in -
accordance with the diesel generator operation and maintenance manual. To ensure that all components and piping are maintained full of water, an expansion tank is connected to the pump suction ! piping. The expansion tank also serves the air cooler coolant-l loop. , The cooling water in the closed cooling system is treated to. [ maintain the following water chemistry I pH 8.5 to 9.5 . I Total hardness as CACO 3 (max) 50 ppm ~s . ,, 3 i Chlorides (max) 50 ppm , Total dissolved solids (max) 150 ppm ! Sufficient capacity in each diesel-generator cooling water system j
.iis provided so that the unit may be started from tne standby i condition and operated at full load. This operation can occur i for at least 3 minutes without service water flow through the ;
coolant heat exchanger before abnormally high temperature is- l
- reached.
i . The jacket water heat exchanger is a shell and tube' heat . l exchanger served by the ESW system in the tube side. During ! shutdown periods, a motor-driven recirculation pump and an j . electric immersion heater keep the jacket water warm to improve j engine start. The recircolation pump takes suction from the i I 9.5-37 Rev.+12,110/82 1 i i
~
. ( t- '
^+ LGS FSAR
~s 2, t-engi,ne jacket discharge header, directs the water through the O heater, and_ discharges it to the engine passages.
9.5.5.2.2 Air Cooler Coolant Loop The air cooler coolant loop is a closed loop thht provides cooling for the diesel-generator turbochargers and consists of the following:
- a. An air cooler
- b. An engine-driven air-cooler water pump
- c. An automatic thermostatic valve
- d. An air cooler Coolant heat exchanger eo
- e. Alarms,' indicators, valves, and piping.
The' air cooler coolant loopfdesign parameters are given in Table 9.5-6. - The engine-driven air-cooler water pump discharges the treated cooling water through a three-way thermostatically-controlled valve that directs the flow through or around the air cooler r coolant heat exchanger.< The water quality of the treated cooling wat?r is the same as discussed in paragraph 9.5.5.2.1. The cooling water is then' directed back to the engine where it goes through the air cooler and back to the pump suction. A constant water inventory is maintained in the system by an expansion tank that is connected to t The expansion tank i also serves'the jacket,hewater pump suctionloop. cooling piping.The air cooler and the air cooler coolant heat exchangers are shell and tube heat exchangers served by a closed loop cooling water system and the ESW system, respectively.
~
9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation The diesel-generator cooling water system is designed so that
' failure of any one component results in the loss of no more than
, ,one, diesel-generator. Since only three of the four
/ Rev. 12, 10/S2 9.5-38
LGS FSAR diesel-generators provided for each unit are required, failure of , any one component of the diesel-generator cooling water system does not preclude safe shutdown of the plant following a LOCA and/or loss of offsite power. , i Protection against hurricanes, tornadoes, and missiles is provided by locating system components within the diesel-generator enclosure. Each diesel-generator cooling water system ; is completely enclosed with its respective diesel in a concrete, ! missile-protected cell that is isoleted from the other units. l l The diesel-generator cooling water system is designed to seismic j Category I requirements as defined in Section 3.7. The system f components are housed with their respective diesel-generator unit ! in the diesel-generator enclosure that is designed to seismic ; Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.8. Evaluation of the diesel-generator cooling water system with ( respect to the following areas is discussed in separate FSAR . sections as indicated: ! O a. Protection against wind and tornado effects 3.3 f
- b. Flood design 3.4 j
- c. Missile protection 3.5 l
- d. Protection against dynamic effects f associated with the postulated !
rupture of piping 3.6 I
- e. Environmental design 3.11 l l
l
- f. Fire protection 9.5.1 l 9.5.5.4 Tests and Inspections :
Testing of the diesel-generator systems is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1. ; O : I Rev. 12, 10/82 l 9.5-39 l
}
LGS FSAR The diesel-generator cooling water system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. 9.5.5.5 Instrument Applications Local and remote indicators, alarms, and pressure relief valves are provided to monitor the system's processes and protect systems components. The following functions are alarmed at the local engine control board and at a common trouble alarm in the control' room:
- a. Jacket cooling water high temperature
- b. Jacket cooling water expansion tank low level
- c. Jacket water heater system failure
- d. Jacket cooling water low pressure
- e. Jacket water circulating pump failure.
The following signals trip the diesel engine and related generator circuit breaker during normal operation (i.e., testing, loss of offsite power, or manual start):
- a. Jacket cooling water high temperature
- b. Jacket cooling water low pressure During emergency operation (LOCA) these trips are bypassed.
9.5.6 DIESEL-GENERATOR STARTING SYSTEM The diesel-generator starting system supplies sufficient compressed air at sufficient pressure to initiate an engine start Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-40
LGS FSAR so that within 10 seconds after receipt of the start signal, the diesel-generator is ready to accept load. The diesel-generator starting system is safety-related except for the air compressor and motor. 9.5.6.1 Desian Bases The design bases of the diesel-generator starting system are as follows:
- a. To initiate an engine start so that within 10 seconds after receipt of the start signal the diesel-generator is ready to receive load
- b. To remain functional during and after an SSE
- c. To ensure that the single failure of any active component does not result in the loss of the starting function of any diesel-generator l
- d. To allow testing of active components of the system l during plant operation l
! e. To withstand wind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles The seismic category, quality group classification, and corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the l diesel-generator starting system are discussed in Section 3.2. l 9.5.6.2 System Description Each diesel-generator is equipped with two independent air starting systems. Each consists of a reciprocating air compressor, one air receiver, line filters, and associated piping and valves. Each compressor is driven by a 20 hp motor connected to a 440V non-Class 1E ac power supply. The air starting system is shown in Figures 9.5-8 and 9.5-10 and major component design , parameters are listed in Table 9.5-7. The diesel-generator i general arrangement is shown in Figures 1.2-35 and 1.2-36. O 9.5-41 Rev. 12, 10/82
l LGS FSAR Piping, valves, and air receivers are constructed of stainless steel to prevent any carryover of rust particles to the air start solenoid valves. The motor-driven air compressors cycle on and off to maintain the pressure in the air receivers within the proper range. The air compressors are sized such that each compressor can fully charge its air receiver in no more than 30 minutes. Each air receiver is sized to provide five, under ten second starts of the diesel engine when fully charged. Each air receiver is provided with relief, drain, check, and shutoff valves to permit any receiver to be removed from service, repaired, and replaced, without affecting the air compressor or the other air receiver. Starting air passes through the starting air valves and then to the air distributors and piping to the diesel cylinders. A 5-micron air filter is provided for protection from dust and particulates. The system is designed for manual operation in the event of automatic starting air valve failure. 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation Safety-related components (including supporting structures) of the diesel-generator starting system are designed to seismic Category I requirements as defined in Section 3.7. The system is located in the diesel-generator enclosure that is designed to seismic Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.8. The diesel-generator starting system is designed so that failure l of any one active component does not result in the loss of j starting air to any diesel-generator. Therefore, failure of any i one component of the diesel-generator starting air system does l not preclude safe shutdown of the plant following a LOCA and/or y I loss of offsite power. See Table 9.5-8 for a failure mode and i effects analysis of the system. Each diesel-generator unit is protected against the effects of natural phenomena such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods. Evaluation of the diesel-generator starting system with respect to the following areas is discussed in separate FSAR sections as indicated: l a. Protection against wind and tornado effects 3.3 1 Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-42
LGS FSAR O
\ s' b. Flood design 3.4
- c. Missile protection 3.5
- d. Protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping 3.6
- e. Environmental design 3.11
- f. Fire protection 9.5.1 4
The starting air compressors are tripped during loss of offsite power; however, adequate compressed air for each diesel is stored in its individual storage and starting systems. Each air start system holds sufficient air to start the diesel five times under a no-load condition without compressor assistance.
/~' Two solenoid air start valve trains are installed on each diesel.
Each train supplies air to half of the cylinders. If one valve train fails, the.other valve train supplies sufficient starting air. Failure of the compressors is indicated by an air receiver ' low pressure alarm. A single active failure in either starting system does not compromise the' ability of the systems to accomplish their function. -In addition, manual air start valves are supplied on both air-start valve trains. 9.5.6.4 Tests and Inspections i Testing of the diesel-generator systems is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1. The diesel-generator starting system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of
- Chapter 16.
9.5.6.5 Instrument Applications O Each starting air system is provided with a pressure switch, a pressure indicator, and a low pressure alarm. The low pressure i 9.5-43 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR alarm is annunciated on the local generator control board and at a common trouble alarm in the control room. The pressure switch . starts the air compressor when the air pressure in its receiving tank drops to 225 psi and stops the compressor when the pressure reaches 250 psi. 9.5.7 DIESEL-GENERATOR LUBRICATION SYSTEM The diesel-generator lubrication system provides essential lubrication to the components of the diesel-generators. The system is safety-related. 9.5.7.1 Desion Bases The diesel-generator lubrication system is designed to perform the following functions:
- a. To supply a continuous flow of oil to all surfaces requiring lubrication at controlled pressure, temperature, and cleanliness
- b. To warm and circulate the oil in normal standby status to promote diesel starting and prevent extreme lube oil viscosities
- c. To ensur'e that the failure of any single active component does not affect the operation of more than one
! diesel
- d. To remain functional during and after an SSE
- e. To withr.tand wind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles l f. To permit testing of active system components during l plant operation I
The diesel-generator lubrication system is designed to seismic Category I requirements. The quality group classification and corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the system are discussed in Section 3.2. gg Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-44
I LGS FSAR 04 s- 9.5.7.2 System Description The diesel-generator lubrication system consists of an oil sump in the engine frame, an engine-driven positive-displacement pump, a suction strainer, a duplex filter, an oil cooler, a duplex full-flow strainer, a prelube ac motor-driven pump, a c re'irculation pump, an immersion electric heater, and a lube oil makeup tank. Major component design parameters are shown in Table 9.5-9. The diesel-generator general arrangement is shown in Figures 1.2-35 and 1.2-36. A schematic diagram of the lubrication system is shown in Figure 9.5-11. The oil sump is a gravity-type closed vessel complete with a low level alarm and dip stick. Each diesel engine is provided with a built-in crankcase evacuation system using an ejector to maintain a negative pressure in the crankcase to prevent explosions. The engine-driven pump is a positive displacement pump that has sufficient capacity to provide all lubricating oil requirements under full load operating conditions. The duplex filter is sized to ensure continuous full-flow operation for a minimum of 175 hours, utilizing throwaway O cellulose cartridges. The filter elements are designed to remove particles down to 25-micron size and to absorb water contamination. A manual bypass is provided to prevent lubricating oil flow restriction due to clogging. The filter is also fitted with a differential pressure indicator and a pressure switch that alarms on high differential pressure across the filter. , The lubricating oil cooler is of the shell-and-tube type with a removable tube bundle of floating head design. The tubes are cleanable without removal of piping. The ac motor-driven prelube pump and the circulating pump are of the positive displacement type. The electric immersion heater is equipped with a thermostatic control to keep the lube oil temperature at a preset i value. The lube oil makeup tank is of the vertical construction J type and supplies lube oil for at least 175 hours of diesel-generator operation. l I The diesel-generator lubrication system operates automatically, excluding the lube oil makeup and storage sections. The engine-driven lube oil pump takes suction from the diesel-generator sump and delivers the oil through the duplex ! filter to a three-way thermostatically controlled valve that , O, directs the oil through or around the oil cooler. The oil then goes through a full-flow duplex strainer and back to the sump. l 9.5-45 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR In addition to the engine-driven pump, a motor-driven prelube pump is also provided. On normal exercising diesel generator start, the prelube pump is started manually and is shut down automatically after 2-1/2 to 3 minutes before the diesel generator is permitted to start. On emergency diesel-generator start, the prelube pump does not start. On manual start, the prelube pump will lubricate all wearing parts. Periodic testing of the diesel generators will provide sufficient oil film to automatically start the engine, and the angine-driven oil pump will maintain the lubrication. Excessive oil pressure in the lubrication system is prevented by the use of relief valves. The system also includes an electric immersion heater to keep the engine in a warm standby mode for quick-start operation. A motor-driven positive-displacement circulating pump takes oil from the sump and directs it through the heater, the main oil filter, the engine bearings and piston passages, and back to the sump. Level switches are provided to detect and annunciate improper system operation and the need for lube oil makeup. Lube oil can : be added manually to the engine during operation if necessary. 9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation , The diesel-generator lubrication system is designed to seismic I Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.7. The system is located within the diesel-generator enclosure that is designed to seismic Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.8. The diesel-generator lubrication system is an integral part of the diesel-generator. The system meets the single failure , criterion in that, if a failure in this system prevents the : satisfactory operation of the associated diesel-generator, the other three diesel-generators will provide adequate power to safely shut down the plant or to mitigate the consequences of the postulated accidents. l To prevent possible damage or shutdown of a diesel engine from low lube oil, sump low level instrumentation is provided. Set points for alarms are sufficient to allow plant personnel , adequate time for corrective action. Evaluati'on of the ; diesel-generator lubrication system with respect to the following areas is discussed in separate FSAR sections as indicated: O i l Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-46 l l
1 LGS FSAR 1 (3r
\
- a. Protection against wind and tornado effects 3.3
- b. Flood design 3.4 l c. Missile protection 3.5 i
- d. Protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping 3.6
- e. Environmental design ,
3.11
- f. Fire protection 9.5.1 9.5.7.4 Tests and Inspection The diesel-generator lubrication system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and
[~) x-periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. 9.5.7.5 Instrument Application Local and remote indicators, alarms, and pressure relief valves are provided to monitor the system's processes and to protect system components. The following functions are alarmed at the local engine control board and on a common trouole alarm.in the control room.
- a. Lubricating oil low pressure
- b. Lubricating oil high temperature
- c. Lubricating oil high differential pressure across the filter
() d. Lubricating oil high differential pressure across the strainer 9.5-47 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- e. Lubricating oil low level
- f. Circulating oil pump failure / malfunction
- g. Lube oil heating system failure The following signals trip the diesel engine and related generator circuit breaker during normal operation (i.e., testing, loss of offsite power, or manual start):
l a. Lube oil high temperature
- b. Lube oil low pressure During emergency operation (LOCA) these trips are bypassed.
Low oil level in the sump, low lube oil pressure, and high temperature in the engine are monitored and alarmed. The sump is piped up to a 250-gallon makeup tank and can be gravity fed by opening the manual valve. 9.5.8 DIESEL-GENERATOR COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM The diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system supplies combustion air to the diesel engines, and exhausts the combustion products to the atmosphere (Figure 9.5-12). The l diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is a safety-related system. l I l 9.5.8.1 Design Bases The diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is designed to the following design bases:
- a. To be capable of supplying adequate combustion air.and disposing of resultant exhaust products to permit continuous operation of the diesel-generators at full load i
Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-48
LGS FSAR A U b.. To remain functional during and after an SSE
- c. To ensure that the single failure of any one component does not result in the loss of more than one diesel-generator d.. To be capable of being tested during plant operation 4
- e. To withstand wind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles The diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is designed to seismic Category I requirements. The quality group classification and corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the system are discussed in Section 3.2.
9.5.8.2 System Description The diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is shown schematically in Figure 9.5-8 and the design parameters are
-/ listed in Table 9.5-10 The diesc!-generator general arrangement is shown in Figures 1.2-35 and 1.2-36.
Each diesel-generator has a separate exhaust and intake system consisting of an air intake filter, an exhaust silencer, and the necessary interconnecting piping and expansion joints for connection to the engine turbochargers and exhaust manifold. l The intake system draws air from inside the diesel generator enclosure, where outside air is drawn by the local HVAC system through an indoor-type air filter that is capable of removing 100-micron particles. The exhaust silencer is of the i
" residential" type, constructed of welded carbon steel. The l expansion joints for the engine exhaust and air intake system are stainless steel, of the unguided bellows type, with flanged connections. The piping is carbon steel.
Exhaust gas-driven turbochargers draw in a volume of air that is directed to the two banks of combustion cylinders by intake l manifolds. The air is compressed by the turbochargers and cooled by circulating cooling water in the air coolers. The air coolers l are fin-tube type and are mounted directly in the engine air l O inlet headers downstream of the turbochargers. Operating in
. series with the turbochargers is a mechanical blower driven off l
9.5-49 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR the engine crankshaft. The function of the blower is to provide scavenging air at low load and speed until the turbochargers build up speed and capacity. Following combustion, the hot exhaust gases leave the cylinders through the exhaust manifold and are used to drive the turbochargers. The gas leaves each turbocharger through an expansion joint, enters the exhaust piping, which includes a cilencer, and is finally discharged to the atmosphere. 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation All equipment and supports for this system are designed to seismic Category I requirements as discussed in Section 3.7. The diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is designed so that failure of any one component results in the loss of no more than one diesel-generator. The loss of one diesel-generator does not preclude adequate core cooling under accident conditions. Therefore, failure of any one component of the diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system does not preclude safe shutdown of the plant following a LOCA and/or loss of offsite power. See Table 9.5-11 for a failure mode and effects analysis of the system. Protection against hurricanes, tornadoes, and missiles is provided by locating system components within the diesel-generator enclosure. r The probability of a fire outside the diesel generator enclosure concurrent with a loss of offsite power that would cause products ! of combustion to foul the diesel air intake is extremely low. A l spontaneous main turbine trip would not result from this external fire. A fire in one of the fuel or lube oil storage tanks outside the enclosure would immediately be alarmed in the control room and would be extinguished by a manually activated foam injection system provided with each tank. The area is protected by a fire hydrant system. Normal local winds would carry combustion products away from the diesel generator intakes as shown in the wind rose in EROL Figures 2.3.2-1 through 2.3.2-3. Evaluation of the combustion air intake and exhaust system with respect to the following areas is discussed in separate FSAR sections as indicated: l Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-50
d LGS FSAR
- a. Protection from wind and tornado effects 3.3
- b. . Flood protection 3.4
- c. Missile protection 3 . 5,
- d. Protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated
,- rupture of piping 3.6 e.. Environmental design 3.11
- f. Fire protection 9.5.1 The air intake opening of the diesel generator enclosure and the outlet of the exhaust duct are designed to prevent recirculation of exhaust products and contamination of the diesel intake air.
The combustion air intake is located at the diesel generator
- enclosure air intake plenum. The air intake screening opening of the enclosure is located on the upper part of the south wall and is protected from rain, ice, and snow by a roof overhang.
; The exhaust duct is terminated above the roof with a 6-foot piece of cast iron pipe, an elbow, and a 3 foot section cut at a 45 degree angle for protection from rain, ice, and snow. This elbow 4
is 18 feet higher than the enclosure air intake opening. , l This arrangement prevents the air entering the enclosure from contamination by exhaust products. , Because the anticipated specific gravity of the exhaust gases l leaving the exhaust duct at 7300F is approximately one-third of ' the standard air specific gravity, exhaust gases contamination of l air at the enclosure intake opening will be negligible even when the outdoor ambient temperature is higher than that of design , conditions. Irrespective of orientation, winds would not increase the concentration of exhaust gases at the enclosure intake opening because it will carry away and disperse these gases into the atmosphere. The exhaust duct extension, beyond O the diesel generator enclosure roof,.further improves exhaust gas dispersion. This extension is considered non-safeguard in that 9.5-51 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR it is not required to meet the system design requirements, and in that its failure will not interfere with the exhaust duct gas flow and consequently the performance of the diesel-generator. If the cast iron pipe is broken by missiles, small pieces of metal might fall into the exhaust duct, but would not reach the turbocharger because of the duct arrangement. Larger pieces of metal or the entire cast iron pipe might fall on the enclosure roof but would have no destructive effect because the roof is missile protected. For the low probability event of the cast iron pipe breaking off, the vertical discharge velocity and low specific gravity of discharge ensures that recirculation would not be a problem. The engine silencers are provided with drains for elimination of water resulting from condensation or being blown in by the wind. Any dust that might accumulate will be blown out by the exhaust gases during periodic testing. The engine is equipped with temperature indicators in the air inlet manifolds and cylinder exhaust thermocouples to monitor the intake and exhaust temperatures. There is also a gauge on the local engine control panel to monitor exhaust pressures. The engine is not equipped with alarm or shutdown sensors for abnormal conditions in the intake and exhaust systems because the engines are designed to operate under all specified operating conditions. There are no system interlocks. 9.5.8.4 Tests an'd Inspections The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14 and periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. Testing of the diesel-generator system is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1. The diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is operationally checked during the periodic testing of the diesel-generator system. 9.5.8.5 Instrument Application The temperature of the exhaust gases is locally indicated by a temperature indicator. Rev. 12, 10/82 9.5-52
l' s LGS FSAR O 9.5.9 REFERENCE 9.5-1 Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection Evaluation Report I i I O i I l l I O ' 9.5-53 Rev. 12, 10/s2
. _ . _ - . . _ _ - . _ . _ . _ . _ _ - . _ . - . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ . ~ . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ ,
l- x LGS FSAR TABLE 9.5-5
' DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET WATER COOLING LOOP DESIGN PARAMETERS EXPANSION TANK
. Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total)
Capacity, each 80 callons Design code requirements ASME Section III, Class 3 ENGINE-DRIVEN WATER PUMP Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Centrifugal Capacity, each 800 gpm Head 46 psi Design code requirements- Manufacturer's standard MOTOR-DRIVEN CIRCULATION PUMP Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type. Centrifugal Capacity, each 40 gpm Head 6.5 psi Motor power rating 1 hp Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Shell and tube Duty, each(*) 3,365,000 Btu /hr l Shell design Fluid Treated water Flow rate 500 gpm Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 3000F Tube design Fluid Emergency service water Flow rate 700 gpm Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 3000F Design code requirements ASME Section III, Class 3 & Commonwealth 6f Pennsylvania STANDBY JACKET COOLANT HEATER Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Immersion, electric Rating - 15 kW () (2) Based on a fouling factor of 0.0025 Rev. 12, 10/82
4 LGS FSAR TABLE 9.5-6 DIESEL-GENERATOR AIR COOLER COOLANT LOOP DESIGN PARAMETERS AIR COOLER Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) Type Shell and tube Shell design
- Fluid Treated water
- Flow rate 400 gpm Design pressure 30 psi Design temperature 3000F i Tube design l Fluid Air
! Flow rate 15,000 cfm f Design pressure 30 psi Design temperature 3000F Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard ENGINE-DRIVEN AIR COOLER WATER PUMP Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total)
- O Type Capacity, each Centrifugal 400 gpm i Head 35 psi Design code requirements Manufacturer's standard I
AIR COOLER COOLANT HEAT EXCHANGER . Quantity 1 per diesel (4 total) j Type Shell and tube l Duty, each(2) 2,909,000 Btu /hr l d Shell design
- Fluid Treated water Flow rate 400 gpm
{ Design pressure 150 psi { Design temperature 3000F 1 Tube design i Fluid Emergency service water Flow rate 700 gpm Design pressure 150 psi Design temperature 3000F Design code requirements ASME Section III, Class 3, &
- Commonwealth of Pennsylvania f (*) Based on a fouling factor of 0.0025 l ,
i Rev. 12, 10/82
~. ,,-,.--,_-mn , -- . .--,, w- .__.c_ , . . , . . , . - , , ., ., ,. _ _ - , , , _ _ _ - . . , n.,,-- ,o v -%..,,4 .. +-+
LGS FSAR () TABLE 9.5-7 DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS l STARTING AIR COMPRESSORS Quantity 2 per diesel, 8 total (100% capacity each) Type Reciprocating Capacity, each 44 cfm Motor power rating 20 hp Voltage 460V ac, three-phase, 60 Hz Code design requirements Manufacturer's standard
-AIR RESERVOIR Quantity 2 per diesel, 8 total (100% capacity each)
Type Vertical, cylindrical Design Pressure 275 psig Capacity, each 5 normal diesel starts Code design requirements ASME Section III, Class 3 1 . O Rev. 12, 10/82
.- LGS FSAP TABLE 9.5-12 LIGHTING SYSTEM O. -
INTENSITIES OF ILLUMI j l Normal Ma intaine d LOCATION (1) l Foot Candles i I l Main Control Room El. 269'-0" l 100 I i l Cable Spreading Room El. 254'-0" l 30 i l i l Emergency Auxiliary Equip. El. 2398-0" 1 30 1 13kV Switchgear Area El. 217'-0" l 30 l I l Access from Control Room to Emerg. l As indicated by l Auxillary Equip. l applicable areas l l below I 1 l Access from Control Room to Peactor l As indicated by l Area l applicable areas l l below l l Reactor Enclosure l l l l Elev. 177'-0" l l Elev. 201'-0" l l Elev. 217'-0" l refueling floor -30 l Elev. 253'-0" ] operating areas -20 l Elev. 283'-0" ' non-operating -10 l Elev. 313'-0" & 331'-0" areas l Elev. 352'-0" l l l l Diesel Generator Enclosure l l elevation 217'-0" l 30 1 I i' Turbine Operating Floor l 30 I j Corridors & Stairways l 20 l Intake Structure - Control Panels and Switchgear Area l 20 I l Radwaste i I l Laboratory 1 100 l Non-Operating Areas 10 General j 20
) (1) Locations are inclusive of vital and hazardous areas
^
N l a IATION Emergency Lighting - Foot Candles l AC Supplied l DC Supplied l __ l 1 20 l 3 l _-. l i 10 l Silhouette l l l 10 l 3 l E I - Silhouette l I I i
$ Silnouette ]
I I I " I I 1 -- I I 1 I J - l 1 - 1 1 I I I I h _ m Silhodette ' -
, I 1 I -
E I I -- 10 l 3 1 1 1 Silhouette l l I I w Silhouette l Silhouette l g j b Silhouette l
\1 Silhouette ,
l C Silhouette l Silhouette , l 9M I - - - I ! mi 9 5 e m a 5
~
R ev. 12, 10/87
P t Tr 4 y set .es.n*1 ut. k l--- , 1 [ ; H g p____ t { - m . f, e -m JL r.e.:ms.-~.--------_--_----------_
'* ? W. U r1r '~~y -
g;j cetm. i < .g r-,e 2 e. - c*** r..- m i p.4 tact ,I s c, <. . <
',l E"v] == i ;.c. u j M REFERENCE DRAWINGS , n n o n
,.,,, ,,, Q g'= ,,,
L P&ID FSAR
) ,,l -- -- - - - - -
u- f,,,,,,. g
- i. {, k 'd NO. FIG. NO. ,,, n y t ,,, .
5 170.su ALE o,t Tams T.k.$st e pifwp - d.s % . M 0 '- 8 M 21 10.4 8 ; g __ - ' 1 - _ " f "'"*no. " m M 81 9.49 g {_-_**_**___
--),
p, J
* . us J .
l l l i y x ,______. 5- , , , , , , , v . , 7_ %' .YhW - hmh-- am ,,3% ,,,_ h* m-,. u. Q p,. .,. l___ . 7 -.
, , ~.: w, -
.a. tu.m ret m .
, = kj ,,13,g e .. 4 i
'S ' 5 '* _
(t .. i k _r..... .ru .l$
'~ ~
F Y,,- - ,, _g r, g;- --- - ,, , E ,,
,g.
___--_.___e______-. 1._..m[i* .
\
"7 '
hg h.. L.T- h t l_[_ _ - g' J . s y -, b @4.N E c- - 2 .s--6:. W
'ctst7 g:j %; Wil j 4 j ,c,33 .
,cesie *- c c $
a s _ r-. w .r
" w-
, r..- --- rd , .u '
__14""~"'G<
&, - @..... E ;l l
__ __.___ ___.__, .h . U.. ?:T,
---cs , . , , , , ,. m_ s__' * "
h.L-g c. 3
. v i .c i k ,
b . . ..h,, , , ha 7 ... . N _ 7 39*1 o . . r; v .
; . . . y. _ a m -
h i : A 4 iers2s. 1;; =s t P = r '" ;.y ,1 sy5 -: e sg.
"'"' li.i '~ "N D I / ~ m'.T ' . *A =
r,.. . u ai eS "" "- '#" i 91.. # l +. i e2 1 _-_~. - r '
'1 m . n.,
',.,...m. r.I: f@1m @
;.a'.
g .i.
-~
E g g 2'~ i hTC.MsE
!!nh @g,~
g
@ f-
<r au-]lw.f. .. ..
;:' aw p -
r th m yJMA 'd -so . o-
-o".' - - _ -- -?" ~
~- - - - - - - _
~
g i 3, 4W e m j g w a_lrd,
"'* "*? ra$ rP 9"5-% il=
l ,
.f g. ,,4
'Q jo _ -
amia
- #, m, ,a<. ._
m
- - n..
"- - -S g a" 4 _ c.
_4 v' r. 7 . . ,
;, : - ,, f M., , .. .,,,. ---f;2"4
- -- l 5'6' U[-
gg _ s '
, J*g*j 8 N h ,o -, ,,;I 1 8 '
- t kT@
l I, 'C
^.o, ,, .
I i . 6, t , + (4) o e
- g l .
@..,; , p.
lg < i e6 g , g l _ .r_ . _ ,, - 3;J
. .,. [
m
'U5' 0 "fr' , i I <
+ ,.
._ , . .. r B
j'u Te dw$f t.Puup 't n i
- .. i w a.
l
.z. Alij
.m , oo,sii
,.,,,, ';h3. , o" 5'* ! .... i e* g 'l I '.:,' t.,.O.t.OL..T* 7
-_lg * . l.
a e.
*:l] It w s
_;-- I Cl o to ,I ' ,,
@. v
' -l i
13.'.+ 1 t vencu n i Ig R y = _*' - 3 .; . __i q g I
,,,,,, W, W,, ,< j i, .: r r.
- s'. v. r. r --,
s M,,bej _ _ c a . ., p ,; ,
's o c ' 5 's e- --**[_am i
ug*g* ; r~ . - y
, m _ . , - ,
.:, . . .s.u uu es . . .st.. m.. n.
!! a w o u. f-.e d ' I [ uvos b --='e-'
h 53)h, 'I. fd . D
% a ,. 8 l 7 6 5 l l
I -
^ ?' Uyr,]*Q... f.C.i.;
=
N l a....... H- n .gu.c
..s- =...e.
3 h,- ( ,,. . .. . ..u ,n .. . . t. ) ,, n = ' " " y, g . ,g,..g-b ~<4' :" "',".'ut."it'm-- - -- f w- r-- -" . A -* 7 u., 3
.i.t 9 m,
-". . > = . - . - au o.e,a.u I r
-i
~
i
, a t t ,
t ii ."J
.,. c t
-....s w . .i Do~; . , -
./44 ,.
t*nd 1. i -.6%,., ..: <- :: + 5.y u e r
.... .i<,
v . . i? + +
, . a s s is .
Drd""$.f . [ .- . wi.ne g .
,f e
_ @., [ . M.I !_ " .' ,,. ! $i .iy
,gv, 3 .- * .,
[ l ~,, " fr" l c ,- :' :, ,,,,,, Q , _,
- w .u-,,>
j
- ,r ,9 - , a; . v .-
tjg',
,. i t
...--.m,,. [k l M, li.. .. .;
7'.le...u[g"., u o I I * *-*p+"
- 4. . m Z GQ'an... g"'- s....
g g
- .w e .. .
[. .y w . .p.y .y . r.... ..
.o .
ac;, n,.,,.ua i ..
- v. m.. . m 7ay = =n. ....r ,.r.w-h ~ ~. . - . .l i:~ ;;~:!
q.-
;3.;
n i m.e {df ...+ , 1
,- ,di p-a ,,,a,....- q:
_M
- e. ,c,,s
*'*PL=s
,.,S M ov.in .itnew a -. ** .'- > - ri-m ' = 5 '" . ;,
" ;'p.',,';'-
a 1-z. i i:m p .. -.~i .-.- -; i m 4
-<A -1 ' pg .I(+iMh.* =
I
.,,, t w -
.esa ct.i.cn -o g f, .
g.- .:l@.
.,: .g. ,
Q;. . . . . = ~ .
. um i~ ~ _ _ _
_ L a. . . .
.,y
... a :a-q* I:j
~
'_ -"." . g .:+:l@ ."-
- - 9_.
- g M P',".';",*n -- -- -- --
-- .. .. . .c..,,i. --- . laEl g ..
y.. .... .
""9' 1 -
g .. .,. ......
,- -g 1 a pit $E t E h3E p..ms
.a. h 1r ,tm eh,.o - d..m
( ..<w Ft.E Ptr s.
' ** ** E a s *e y. w. .is6es y. 9 oo p 3 ,
h. ~-~c'."".'"."..". . _ _ . . l S,,7,, u,'. ,,) ..
"-'"h,, ,,.a
.-e. c,,t,n s) - 5"'**
l l CO8s64
- ~ "*****.m l rev n. .sa s, is.= -.1 --
"5"m' r ca=
!!p
/ f , ug.re .:u " -r
- at ntu aev i
<@ l
- ** g .!LOJ.LI.!L .
r ,,. L YP'...n, m.,- e c ., i I r. ,, w. . . ,. n.. 9'>
.. i
"_r==,..
57Foo r so7_,
-@< -@,, un l
7 -; ~ """ _ __J ,,.. 4. ii. .. o 4,,,,.,,,,,, 0 95'7 - - -" i
~ . . s-.
II
...., i
,,,o,i mI n r.r
>-r 3
.. c.
J L
,. .ca .r*w* c. t am oimt 3
Ym.:.+r m. - r -- ~ g,[ OOPSt7 k _g _ __ 4--- y t ; %. .. - f~~ n, ====a.m : =c:==== = == = =c. : I b( @.. . . MI , .cD- a--- .,% t ii B. w---W--4 ;w- .:- H o. W,[,if l' E -. ! @M ,i0 ll l , m,
- --- .:--- -------- , k, .
h J W! ' (* ,,@, ,- , e - - mg i $! $! $,--(;y' p%":~1,g i , ._. t-- 6, 2.";t:.3pgs
, s .,
C F.: g ..
, 9__. ,%. .__;;-. . _. s
. . .m.. . ,
t
- i @. e_ 6_ g_ e_ ..@. @ -@.- I 9... ,. ""',.a i _.__ <
'."I }5 L
D[' W m .. . -
', t T ie t,. Tt n
,* r2
?
I i,-I, h .. ,l ex auxiumav so:tta oess 2 o.,o .,p;7;;;t, @+l e
'-r*
3
- Hi1 _g
~ a "u'".".".;
f
'h' ". $*. I I
Nc s 2 m ,, ,, 'p,t,sr*iy LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 N ) <= . .. ~~a< o -rx.wA> t -o 4. '~"*'"*". a.s *+" =i 3 4g FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
, -- il l ra ' g .g.,, s, ,
21 g .T.' -
* / - -] "'"' ::tir.l."?!?t.'."!n.T.ni'L".1""" "'"'" """* ""'"
atseunov 'E 4 I I .'l' f".*."l "',.".*l").'"iff,."'!'.;TJ'";;.'ll"."'la' STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR AND souns % y o,m .u., l-*( - l l,g-- 6e l 2 , ' .';lJ.:.,',,..=. .l.n.,..;.,'",';.;';;;;-ll,;;;,$,"l,
- n. . PLANT ;li,'2,FUEL 01L SYSTEMS g
9 - Mf' a ~* % __ve s m..e.o _; %,, FIGUR E 9.5-8 REV.12,10/82
~
l 4 l 3 l 2 j I C l
CUT AT 450 ROOF ~ ui ! k 1 7 - DRAIN EXHAUST SILENCER T~ AIR DEFLECTION LINTAKE BAFFLE N SCREEN A a NSOUTH AIR INTAKE
" FILTER CYLINDERS EXHAUST 1-12 EXHAUST MANIFOLD EXP 8 T1 T1 O mmm INLETS
'T T TT" DIESEL ENGINE ENGINE GAUGE BOARD CRANKCASEp . AIR INTAKE VACUUM MANIFOLD l NOTES.
i l 1. OFF-SKlD AIR INTAKE PIPING IS DESIGNED TO , ANSI B31.1 REQUIREMENTS. 1
- 2. OFF-SKlD EXHAUST PIPING IS OF ASTM A155 GRADE 55 (FIRE BOX QUALITY) MATERIAL AND DESIGNED TO SEISMIC CL ASS 1 REQUIREMENTS (EXCEPT AS NOTED).
- 3. ON-SKID AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST PIPING IS DESIGNED TO MANUFACTURERS STANDARD.
LIMERICK GENERATING STAT!ON UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM FIGURE 9.5-12 REV.12,10/82
c , I 1 l 1 LGS FSAR 4
,\
I CHAPTER 10 i
- FIGURES Fioure Title i
10.1-1 Guaranteed Heat Balance l . 10.1-2 Valve Wide-Open Heat Balance i 10.2-1 Extraction Steam P&ID 10.2-2 Generator Hydrogen Cooling and Carbon
- Dioxide Purge P&ID
! 10.3-1 Main Steam Supply System P&ID 10.4-1 Air Removal and Sealing Steam System P&ID j 10.4-2 Circulating Water System P&ID (3 Sheets) 10.4-3 Condensate Filter /Demineralizers System PEID 10.4-4 Condensate System P&ID i 10.4-5 Feedwater System P&ID i 10.4-6 Auxiliary Steam System P&ID I l 4
- O 10-v Rev. 12, 10/82
I LGS FSAR O 10.2 TURBINE-GENERATOR The turbine-generator receives steam from the nuclear steam supply system, converts a portion of the thermal energy contained in the-steam to electric energy, and provides extraction steam for feedwater heating and for driving the reactor feed pump l turbines. The turbine-generator is not safety-related. l 10.2.1 DESIGN BASES
- a. The turbine-generator is designed to meet the conditions listed in T.able 10.2-1, which shows conditions at both 100% and 105% reactor steam flow. The associated heat balances are shown in Figures 10.1-1 and 10.1-2.
- b. The turbine-generator is normally base-loaded, but it also includes design features to allow the unit to operate on a load-following basis. The steam generation rate of the RPV can follow turbine load demand changes of as much as 35% without control rod movement by adjusting the recirculation flow rate through the core.
- c. The turbine-generator control system is designed to maintain constant reactor pressure during normal operation and to operate the steam bypass system up to 25% of full load to maintain constant reactor pressure during plant startup, transients, and shutdown. The turbine-generator control system is designed to accomplish the following control functions:
- 1. Control speed and acceleration from 0 to 110% with nominal speed reference settings at 0, 6%, 30%,
85%', 100%, and overspeed
- 2. Operate the steam bypass system to keep reactor pressure within acceptable limits
- 3. Control reactor pressure from 150 psig to 1050 psig
- d. The turbine-generator and ancillaries are designed and manufactured in accordance with GE design practice.
10.
2.2 DESCRIPTION
The general arrangement of the turbine-generator and associated systems with respect to plant structures and other systems is shown in Figures 1.2-17 through 1.2-24. O 10.2-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR 10.2.2.1 Turbine The turbine unit consists of one double-flow high-pressure and three double-flow low-pressure turbines on the same shaft. The unit also includes six vertica! moisture separator vessels of the non-reheat type. The turbine is an 1,800 rpm, tandem compound, non-reheat steam turbine with 38-inch last-stage buckets. The capability of the turbine is 1,092,291 kW when operating with initial cteam conditions of 965 psia, 1191.5 H, exhausting to the multipressure condenser at 2.81, 3.56, and 4.67 inches Hg absolute backpressures, and extracting steam for six feedwater heater stages and three reactor feed pump turbines. The turbine produces 1,138,472 kW when operating at valves wide-open (VWO) and with corresponding VWO steam and cycle conditions shown in Figure 10.1-2. Steam from the reactor enters the turbine unit through four main steam lines. Each of the four steam lines to the HP turbine is connected to a main steam stop valve and a main steam control valve. The four stop valves and four control valves form a combined valve chest. A pressure equalizing line connects the stop valves together just below the valve seats. A nine-valve bypass chest is connected to the main steam lines between the MSIVs and the main stop valves to divert excess flow to the condenser. Steam from the high-pressure turbine exhaust passes through the moisture separators, where the moisture content is reduced to less than 2%, and through each of six combined intermediate valves (CIVs) to the low-pressure turbines. There is one stage of extraction from the HP turbine, one stage j from the crossaround pipes upstream of the moisture separators, ; and four stages of extraction from each LP turbine. The extraction steam is used to heat the feedwater in six separate feedwater heater stages. A portion of the crossaround steam is used to drive the reactor feed pump turbines (RFPTs) during normal operation. Main steam is used to drive the RFPTs during startup and shutdown modes. 10.2.2.2 Generator and Exciter i The generator is a 1,264,970 kVa, 1,800 rpm, direct-connected, four-pole, 60 Hz, 22,000 V synchronous generator rated at 0.90 ; power factor and 0.5d short-circuit ratio, at a maximum hydrogen pressure of 75 psig. The generator is sized to accept the gross output of the turbine. The Alterrex excitation system consists of a 60 Hz, 1800 rpm air-cooled Alterrex generator and liquid-cooled rectifiers with l static thyristor automatic regulation equipment. The exciter is rated for a maximum output of 3460 kW at 540 V. l Rev. 12, 10/82 10.2-2 L__-__________-__. _
LGS FSAR O The generator stator is water-cooled and the rotor is hydrogen-cooled. The generator hydrogen system includes all necessary controls and regulators for hydrogen cooling. A seal oil system is provided to prevent hydrogen leakage through the generator shaft seals. A hydrogen makeup supply system is provided to replace any hydrogen leakage from the generator. The hydrogen makeup supply system is located 170 feet west of the turbine enclosure. Carbon dioxide is used for purging the hydrogen supply line and/or the generator before and after generator use and ensures that an explosive mixture cannot be formed. The hydrogen and carbon dioxide systems and shown in Figure 12.2-2. Protective measures to prevent fires and explosions during purging and normal operations consist of hydrogen pressure control stations, excess flow shutoff valves, alarms, and pressure safety devices. The buried piping which extends from the hydrogen storage area to the turbine enclosure is of a pipe-within-a-pipe design providing environmental protection in the event of leakage or extended damage. Test connections are provided to analyze the air /CO, and H,/CO, concentrations during purging. Hydrogen analyzing equipment is provided to continuously monitor hydrogen purity during normal operations.
. Removable spool pieces provide additional isolation, assuring that hydrogen does not leak into the generator during maintenance activities.
10.2.2.3 Prctective Valve Functions The primary function of the main stop valves is to quickly shut off steam to the turbine under emergency conditions. The stop valve discs are totally unbalanced and cannot open against full pressure drop. An internal bypass valve is provided in one of the four stop valves to permit slow warming of the combined valve chest and to permit pressurization below the stop valve seat area to allow valve opening. The turbine stop valves are designed by using a dynamic seismic analysis to withstand the OBE and SSE loads within the limits of the manufacturer's special criteria. A statement of adequacy has been provided by the manufacturer. The function of the control valves is to throttle steam flow to the turbine. The valves, because of their size relative to their cracking pressure, are partially balanced. A small internal valve is opened first to decrease the pressure in a balance chamber. The valves are opened by individual hydraulic cylinders. The function of the bypass valves is to pass steam directly from the reactor to the condenser without going through the turbine. The bypass valve chest is connected directly to the steam lines O- from the reactor and is composed of nine valves operated by individual hydraulic cylinders. When the valves are open, steam 10.2-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
M LGS FSAR jy flows from the chest, through the valve seat, out the discharge _ c casing, and through connecting piping to the pressure breakdown <- assemblies, where a series of orifices is used to further reduce "_ the steam pressure before the steam enters the condenser # z (Section 10.4.4). T The function of the CIVs is to protect the turbine against L-overspeed from stored steam in the cro'ssaround piping and - moisture separators following turbine trip and to throttle and balance steam flow to the LP turbines. Each valve is composed of ""- an intercept valve and an intermediate stop valve incorporated into a single casing. The two valves have separate operating ;__ mechanisms and controls. One valve is a positioning valve, while ;- the other is an open-closed valve; however, both valves are _ capable of fast closure. The valves are located as close to the . turbine as possible to limit the amount of uncontrolled steam ~ available as an overspeed source. During normal plant operation, the intercept valves are open. E7 The intercept valves are capable of opening against maximum l-crossaround pressure and of controlling turbine speed during aEl blowdown following a load rejection. The intermediate stop =- r valves also remain open for normal operation, and they trip '1E closed by actuation of the emergency governor or by operation of CI the master trip. They provide backup protection if the intercept 3C= valves or the normal control devices fail. g 10.2.2.4 Extraction System Check Valves _ Ef The energy contained in the extraction and feedwater heater ) system can be of sufficient magnitude to cause overspeed of the i turbine-generator following r.n electrical load rejection or - turbine trip. Check valves are installed where necessary to prevent high-energy steam from entering the turbine under these conditions. The extraction system check valves are shown in Figure 10.2-1. _ , The check valves limit the amount of energy flashing back into _' the turbine so that the turbine speed increase is held below the maximum value. Power-assisted closure chech valves are provided for heaters 3, 4, and 6. Heater 2 is provided with folding disc - c check valves. Heater 1 has no provision for preventing flashbacks into the turbine, since the distance to the turbine is - short and internal energy is low. Heater 5 has no provision for preventing flashbacks into the crossaround piping, since the crossaround/ moisture separator system provides adequate capacity L to protect the turbine. =i Li Rev. 12, 10/82 10.2-4 " d
LGS FLAR
/~'N 10.2.2.5 System Operation 10.2.2.5.1 Control System The turbine-generator control system is a GE Mark I electrohydraulic control (EHC) system. The speed control unit produces the speed / acceleration error signal that is determined by comparing the desired speed from the reference speed circuit, with the actual speed of the turbine for steady-state conditions.
For step changer in speed, an acceleration reference circuit takes over to either accelerate or decelerate the turbine at a selected rate to the new speed. There is no limit to the deceleration. The speed / acceleration error signal is combined O l l l \ O 10.2-4a Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR i f THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK 1 i l O Rev. 12, 10/82 10.2-4b
J' N k.=;;pa;g-. t.;**
~*
-~
I a *~
.4
~
c (. . ..-) i........i a ,..
.. u.
E. 1*O0.%';.*.*. G .1h.'a 71 **** * ". ""* y ,. , -.,;. . i e. ..sa.. t . i. q tover . ;- i -+ . 7 7% ,
- 4. ,
. ...... g cg
._ [~-- ~ ~- - ~ ~l b - --:; }- -
-i-- a m- .,,,
i ::ll . '1 i 8' I
- a .qk 3.E..P. .
'l') e.
F '
' 7 .we u.= HP-
=o- -
p%. . { _.._. __. _ _ ]
"~
4 l *I hat. _.- -; '.E. E"* 'I!i- ,,* E ,,. } 3 e -9. F jE N, ,n " t-- --
'O o .,
,i a w, ) ,,
i ,
~%,.y -w s
-j w.. .,,,.
34 m.... W. .- , T H im 0 - i gt;f.. am. -. 8 a. l stan .
.l i g'. .. . . t. . . g." * -
.g, . _ i. g -
9., ._.,.
...e
.= ~ 4
;+o D $ EE* ,
I b. m N "
- x. 9'... m,,,,
W n. ! i L w 7 m ., e ..
-n-g y, t n l f
.M .S. (d I
=
g g . t : .. vu, -
*", 6
~
(. ~ e
- 88 8 ' - - k gs ""'@ - {* ( in,.
g
* 'l qn,9' g, g .._;. ,_c n-.1
....1........
- Jv s .vtas
,h t
s : I
- a. . ( ...
*:,I ,
.=g . .
A g g ,_. p.
*[ y , g " " '* "[f','"*"
8 i 7 I s I
- - . _ =
i m
~ . . . . . . . . . . , UNE.."g..T.
o .
-e m
h., ' .........m i i E t . . . .. -e c . s 4.i c. 'N 'O t
.n , e
- 11 <
1 ii,
, e. .
.J
<v, el . .u. w)
;- T - ----
A
- . ~'
I:I D Da (pg). ,_ 7i
.4 g,.g.
n . w ~ . .. - 5Hi g- i
- g GP-&-tt 4
- n g
.,.. .p m .. . . w . . .
. g . f. - . 1
[ gc .j. _ y
,. I y, e .. I u 1, <>
"f, . . . ~ . .....
{' i h_, [i! 4ll{ i ' {. "[ ca. ._ % arin _
~
g ~ _ w.
- y. It a1 4.
- y. l ~ aiw, s .r* . .. . a *%* X* r.J rd. s.*. ,
a"s r~.L . o . d.. a.- . ;:;{ ,... , 2 set e =st ,
'A I M
'{
TEST CONN. TO AN ALY2E ' Aln/CO2& H2/CO . ovamo runciNb ::it i 1
-c
{* '" * : d"u.'.". l M,
-T W
+ b#ib-- $. * @. & @ . . e' e- ....,
- ::I i
- 4. .D. :-. . .
i ! ... ... ,47.a'". ,,' ... . seni -
- e :- :: .. . . . ..-
.. ~
,qg 1
.<,<...e
... ,i.
i . r .a- a.
; o.+ ....- -. .. ~.. - . .
.. +.
~
g i ,
- p. .Im, o.
g o
- e. 3 0
lF es 1 .04.C,t
. . . , -umt LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT GENERATOR H COOLING & CO PURGE 2 2 P&lD 5 l 4 l 3 l 2 FIGURE 10.2 2 REV.12,10/B2 mesM
LGS FSAR
- 4. While a process stream is collecting in a collection tank, the isotopes already in the tank are undergoing radioactive decay (see Table 11.2-5 fec expected holdup times).
- 5. Cne refueling shutdown per year per unit, not occurring simultaneously is assumed.
The expecte6 daily inputs and activities for each of the subsystems is shown in Tables 11.2-6 and 11.2-7. An evaluation of the causes for the maximum expected inputs for each subsystem shows that operational modes exclude, and the unlikely occurrence of the same failure in both units minimizes, the potential for coincidental maximum input from both units into the same subsystem. Control and monitoring of radioactive release in accordance with General Design Criteria 60 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR, Part 50 is discussed in Sections 11.2.3 and 11.5. 11.2.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The liquid waste management system collects, monitors, processes, stores, and disposes of radioactive liquid wastes. The liquid [s waste management system piping, equipment, instrumentation, and flow paths are shown in Figures 11.2-1 through 11.2-3. Included ' in the system.are:
- a. Piping and equipment carrying potentially radioactive wastes
- b. Floor drain systems in controlled access areas which may ,
contain potentially radioactive wastes
- c. Tanks and sumps used to collect potentially radioactive wastes The liquid wastes are collected in sumps located in all the enclosures housing radioactive equipment and are pumped to collection tanks located in the radwaste enclosure. Plant drainage systems, including measures taken to limit, control, and remove oil and other organic compounds, are discussed in Section 9.3.3.
The incoming wastes are classified, collected, and treated as floor drain, equipment drain, chemical, and laundry drain wastes. Equipment is selected, arranged, and shielded to minimize exposures to plant personnel during operation, inspection and maintenance. For example, sumps, pumps, valves, and instruments O,' which may contain radioactivity are located in controlled access areas. Tanks and processing equipment that may contain 11.2-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR significant quantities of radioactive material are shielded. Operation of the liquid waste management system is normally on a batch basis, as dictated by the waste generation rate from the plant. Protection against accidental discharge is provided by instrumentation for detection and alarm of abnormal conditions and by procedural controls. The liquid waste management system is divided into several' subsystems (see Section 11.2.2.1),.so that the liquid wastes from various sources can be kept segr.egated and processed separately. Cross-connections between the subsystems provide additional flexibility for processing of the wastes by alternate methods. 11.2.2.1 System Operation l The liquid waste management system consists of four process subsystems:
- a. Equipment drain subsystem
- b. Floor drain subsystem
- c. Chemical waste subsystem
- d. Laundry driin subsystem 11.2.2.1.1 Equipment Drain Subsystem Low conductivity wastes from piping and equipment drains are collected in the equipment drain collection tank. Other inputs received in the collection tank are listed in Table 11.2-7.
Wastes collected in the equipment drain collection tank are l processed on a batch basis through a precoat filter and mixed bed demineralizer and are then collected in one of two sample tanks. From an equipment drain sample tank, wastes are normally returned to a condensate storage tank for plant reuse. A recycle routing allows high conductivity wastes or water of excessively high radioactivity concentration to be recycled to the equipment drain collection tank for additional processing through the filter and demineralizer or recycled to the floor drain collection tank for additional processing. O Rev. 2, 12/81 . 11.2-4
y -, LGS FSAR _(N such that these liquids can be discharged from the plant after
\s ,)
monitoring, if required by plant water balance considerations. Activity concentration of tritiated water discharged from the system is consistent with the discharge criteria of 10 CFR, Part 20. Normally, the liquid passing through the laundry drain subsystem is discharged directly, in accordance with 10 CFR, Parts 20 and 50 guidelines; however, it may be processed through the floor drain subsystem if necessary. The expected annual activity releases for each waste stream are given in Table 11.2-11. Design and administrative controls are incorporated into the liquid waste management system to prevent inadvertent releases to the environment. Controls include administrative procedures, operator training, redundant discharge valves, and discharge radiation monitors that trip alarms and initiate automatic , , discharge valve closure (see Section 11.5). Prior to any discharging, activity concentrations are measured in samples taken from the various sample tanks.* A single line is provided for plant discharges to minimize the potential for operator error. This line includes a loop seal with a siphon breaker to prevent inadvertent siphoning of the sample tanks. The processed liquid waste that is not recycled in the plant is I discharged into the cooling tower blowdown pipe on a batch basis. Flow rate measurement devices are provided in both the radwaste effluent line and the cooling tower blowdown line as shown on Figures 11.2-2 and 10.4-2, respectively. Processed liquid wastes are discharged at up to 280 gpm from the equipment and floor drain subsystems, and 10 gpm from the laundry drain subsystem. The discharges are mixed with the cooling tower blowdown flow of 10,000 gpm for both units, which effectively reduces the above discharge rates by at least a factor of 35 for the equipment and floor drain subsystems and 1000 for the laundry drain subsystem. This mixing eccurs within the site boundary and is used in determining specific activity concentrations for the releases. Expected average annual radionuclide concentrations are compared to 10 CFR, Part 20 limits in Table 11.2-12. The doses resulting from liquid effluents are a small fraction of the 10 CFR, Part 20 dose limit of 500 mr/yr and well within 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix I design objectives as shown in Table 11.2-13. i l
- O l
11.2-9 Rev. 12, 10/82
i LGS FSAR : () adsorption of fission product gases on charcoal is used to f provide time for delay before release. e ! } The location of the offgas system components is shown in general ! arrangement drawings in Section 1.2. l The seismic categories, quality group classifications, and j ! corresponding codes and standards that apply to the design of the j i gaseous waste management system are discussed in Section 3.2. l i 11.3.2.1.2 Process Flow Description ] I Figure 11.3-1 is the process flow diagram for the offgas system j and contains process data for startup and normal operating . conditions. i j Figures 11.3-2 and 11.3-3 are the piping and instrumentation diagrams for the offgas system. t During startup mechanical vacuum pumps are used to draw a vacuum i in the main condenser as described in Section 10.4.2. Once l condenser vacuum has been established by the mechanical vacuum , i pump and reactor steam is available, one of the two-stage steam l jet air ejector (SJAE) trains are placed in service. As an ; alternative, auxiliary steam can be provided for SJAE operation. [} The first-stage SJAEs continuously remove noncondensible gases and some steam from the condenser and discharge them to the SJAE condenser where the steam is condensed and returned to the main
- condenser. The gases are removed from the SJAE condenser by the j second-stage ejector and discharged to the gaseous radweste i recombination system together with the second-stage ejector i motive steam. This steam provides sufficient dilution to i '
i maintain hydrogen concentrations below combustible ! concentrations. A complete description of the SJAE is given in i Section 10.4.2. 1 The offgas stream from the second-stage ejector is treated first I. , in the recombiner portion of the offgas system. The purpose of j the recombiner is to reduce the offgas volume and reduce the i hydrogen concentration to less than 1% concentration by volume on a dry basis. The offgas first passes through the preheater in i order to vaporize any water droplets and to achieve a sufficient { temperature to start the catalytic reaction. Steam used for j preheating is provided from the reactor feed pump turbine steam i supply line or from auxiliary steam. The recombination process
- takes place inside a recombiner vessel. The temperature of.the l gases leaving the recombiner rises as a function of the influent
! hydrogen concentration. This temperature rise is due to the heat ;
- of reaction of the recombination process. The reaction ;
temperature rises approximately 1200F for each 1% of H, ' ( recombined. The catalyst is a metal mat-type. The elements are j i
~
i
- 11.3-3 Rev. 3, 93/82
~ --. - - . - ~ . - - _ _ . - - _ _ . - _ _ - , . - . _ - - - - - - - - , . -._ _ _.._-_~ ---..--.-
LGS FSAR made of crimped high nickel alloy ribbons coated with platinum-palladium. Each recombiner has two independent electric heater assemblies. Steam flow leaving the recombiner vessel is condensed in the aftercondenser and the offgas stream is cooled to approximately 1100F. The remaining noncondensible gas (principally air with traces of krypton and renon) is delayed in a 26-inch diameter, 125-foot long holdup pipe. At a flow rate of 75 scfm, this pipe provides approximately 6.3 minutes of delay for the offgas prior to entering the charcoal adsorption train. Piping from the delay pipe to the charcoal treatment system is heat traced to reduce the possibility of moisture collecting in the line. Further offgas cooling and condensing of water vapor takes place in the shell side of the cooler condenser heat exchanger. A chilled glycol solution is circulated on the tube side of this heat exchanger. The offgas is cooled to a design dew point of approximately 400F before leaving the cooler condenser. Water ! that has condensed is drained from the cooler condenser into the condensate accumulator. The temperature of the gas stream ; increases to ambient (approximately 650F) as it flows from the ; cooler condenser to the guard bed, thus preventing condensation. l The glycol solution circulated on the tube side of the cooler & condenser heat exchanger is cooled in a closed loop pumped W l refrigeration circuit. Dual brine pumps and redundant i refrigeration units are provided in the glycol system. Before entering the main charcoal vessels, the offgas stream j passes through a guard bed. The function of the guard bed is to ; protect the main charcoal adsorbers from moisture if a : malfunction of moisture removal features occurs as well as to i adsorS impurities in the process gas that might adversely affect perforutance of the main charcoal vessels. t After passing through the guard bed, the gas enters the main charcoal adsorption beds. The charcoal adsorption beds, l maintained at about 650F by redundant room air-conditioning units, selectively adsorb and delay the xenon and krypton from the bulk carrier gas. This delay permits the xenon and krypton , to decay in place. The offgas stream then passes through a HEPA i afterfilter where radioactive parti ^culate matter and any charcoal : l fines are retained. ! During offgas system operation, the offgas stream must pass through the charcoal adsorbers. Bypass piping around the ' adsorbers does not exist. The offgas stream is directed to the turbine enclosure vent stack > where it is diluted with a minimum of 183,000 scfm of air before , being released from the reactor enclosure north stack. Rev. 12, 10/82 11.3-4
LGS FSAR
'~
Table 11.3-1 indicates the estimated annual release rate from the offgas system. All moisture removed from the process stream is returned to the main condenser hot well or clean radwaste (CRW). . 11.3.2.1.3 System Design Considerations 11.3.2.1.3.1 Charcoal Holdup Time The krypton and xenon holdup times are closely approximated by the following equation: T = 0.26 KM (11.3-1) v where: T= hold-up time, in hours K= dynamic adsorption coefficient, in cm8/g M= mass of charcoal adsorber, in thousands of pounds V= gas flowrate, in scfr. Dynamic adsorption coefficients for krypton and xenon used to determine gaseous effluent releases are discussed in Ref 11.3-1, NUREG-0016. The charcoal adsorber beds are designed for a delay O , time of 35 days for renon under both of the following conditions:
- 1. 75 scfm flowrate using manufacturer's guaranteed adsorption coefficients (733 cm8/g for xenon and 31.8 cm3/g krypton)
- 2. BWR GALE code assumptions (NUREG-0016, Rev. 0)
The offgas system is capable of handling changes in noncondensible flowrate between 0 and 215 scfm, without operator attention. With a condenser air in leakage rate of 30 scfm, the charcoal treatment system provides a design holdup time of 52 hours for krypton and 38.6 days for xenon based upon NUREG-0016 assumptions. Since it is expected that the condenser air inleakage will be below the design value and that the charcoal adsorption coefficients will be higher than the values in NUREG-0016 (see Refs 11.3-3 and 11.3-4), the actual charcoal holdup time should be considerably longer than the design holdup time. Additionally, experience with newer fuel designs (8 x 8 assemblies) indicates that substantially lower source terms than those used for system design may be expected. 11.3.2.1.3.2 Detonation Resistance The pressure boundary of the offgas system is designed to O withstand the effects of a hydrogen detonation during all anticipated modes of operation. Interlocks are provided to 11.3-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
~
automatically shut down the system upon loss of dilution steam, since the piping between the second stage SJAEs and the preheater 9 is not designed to withstand a detonation at operating pressure. Although piping from the second stage SJAE to the preheater is not designed to withstand a hydrogen detonation, this piping is protected during all modes of operation by ensuring that sufficient dilution steam exists in this piping to prevent a hydrogen detonation. Protective circuits are provided such that loss of dilution steam will result in automatic system shutdown. Loss of dilution steam is indicated both by low flow and high recombiner outlet temperature. The condenser in the standby SJAE train is maintained at approximately main condenser hotwell pressure in order to limit the accumulation of combustible gases due to leakage from the operating train and to assure detonation resistance. The cooler condenser, guard bed, and the 13 small charcoal adsorbers are designed to withstand the effects of a hydrogen explosion, using the methodology of Reference 11.3-5. 11.3.2.1.4 Ccmponent Description The recombiner and associated equipment are located in the lowest level of the control structure. Each recombiner system consists of a preheater, recombiner vessel, and aftercondenser. The materials of construction, design temperatures, and pressures are listed in Table 11.3-3. 11.3.2.1.4.1 Preheater The preheater is a U-tube parallel heat exchanger. Main steam is used to heat process gas before entering the recombiner. The process gas enters at 2800F and is heated to 3800F. Auriliary steam is also available for heating the process gas flow, should main steam be unavailable. Condensate from the tube side of the heat exchanger is collected in a drain pot underneath the preheater and is routed back to the condenser or to CRW depending on condenser vacuum. 11.3.2.1.4.2 Recombiner The hydrogen and oxygen in the gas stream are recombined in the recombiner vessel by a catalyst of platinum-palladium. Electric heaters with automatic temperature control are provided on the shell of each recombiner. The heaters are used for preheating the recombiner during startup and maintaining it in a dry condition during shutdowns. 11.3.2.1.4.3 Aftercondenser The aftercondenser is a straight tube heat exchanger. Service water is circulated through the aftercondenser tubes to condense the steam in the offgas flow. Noncondensible gases are collected in the aftercondenser, cooled in the air cooler section to 1100F, ll Rev. 12, 10/82 11.3-6
LGS FSAR O and vented to the holdup pipe. Control' valves are used to automatically maintain proper condensate level in the aftercondenser shell. Condensate from the air cooler section is collected'in a drain tank. Condensate from both sources is returned to the main condenser hotwell, or diverted to CRW if main condenser vacuum is not available or the conductivity instrumentation indicates that a tube leak exists. 1 11.3.2.1.4.2 Holdup Pipe l The holdup pipe is approximately 125 feet in length and 26 inches ; in diameter. The purpose of this holdup pipe is to provide delay !
~
time to allow N-16 decay before entering the charcoal adsorption portion of the offgas system. Baffles are provided in each holdup pipe to assure adequate mixing and delay. 11.3.2.1.4.3 Charcoal Adsorption System 11.3.2.1.4.3.1 Cooler Condenser The cooler condenser is a straight tube heat exchanger with a glycol-water solution flowing through the tube side. The glycol , system is provided with redundant circulation pumps and redundant ' refrigeration units that are cooled by service water. Moisture formed in the cooling process is collected in an
-accumulator. This condensate is normally routed to CRW but is automatically' diverted to chemical waste if the measured conductivity indicates that a glycol leak could exist.
i 11.3.2.1.4.3.2- Guard Bed ' The function of the guard bed is to protect the main charcoal adsorbers from moisture in the event of a malfunction of the moisture removal equipment and to remove contaminants that may ts
- in the process stream which could be detrimental to the main adsorber beds. The guard bed is designed with a removable covet
~
and an internal basket which contains the charcoal adsorbent.- The basket allows easy charcoal replacement if necessary. The guard bed contains approximately 687 pounds of charcoal. l 11.3.2.1.4.3.3 Main Charcoal Adsorber Bed The Unit I adsorber train consists of two 11-foot diameter tanks {' and five 10-foot diameter tanks. The Unit 2 adsorber train consists of one 11-foot diameter tank and eight 10-foot diameter
. tanks. The different configurations for Units 1 and 2 are the ;
! result of space limitations within the enclosure, which was
- constructed before final system design.
j () Each adsorber train contains approximately 321,000 lbs of charcoal. The tanks are connected at the top and bottom by i 11.3-7 Rev. 12, 10/82 1 i f.____. _- _.. -.,-...__.___ . ___...__ - .._ _ _._ _ __ _ -.. _ ,_. ~ , - _ s
LGS FSAR 4-inch piping. Portions of each unit's offgas system use a parallel flow path through the main adsorber beds. Appropriate valves are provided to facilitate flow balancing. The charcoal adsorber tanks are maintained at a temperature of 650F or below by redundant air conditioning systems. The last adsorber tank in the Unit 1 train is not located in an air
~
conditioned vault and will operate at room ambient temperature. In the unlikely event that both air conditioning units are unable to function, the radioactive emissions from the offgas system might increase slightly. However, since substantial margin exists in the offgas system design, the releases would still be well below acceptable limits for expected air inleakage rates, radioactivity source terms, and adsorption coefficients. 11.3.2.1.4.3.4 Outlet HEPA Filter A high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter is provided to collect any entrained particulates or charcoal fines prior to release. These filters are individually tested using the dioctyl phthalate (DOP) method. The filters are equipped with hinged covers to facilitate removal and replacement of the filter element. 11.3.2.1.4.3.5 Leakage of Radioactive Gases The offgas system operates at approximately 7 psig during startup and at approximately 2 psig during normal operation. The differential pressure between the system and atmosphere is small, thus limiting the potential for leakage of radioactive gases. Leakage of radioactive gases from the offgas system is further limited by the use of welded construction wherever practicable dnd by using double stem packed valves with a bleedoff connection that is pressurized to slightly higher than the system pressure. All drains in the offgas system with the exception of the condensate accumulator drain are directed either to the main condenser or CRW during normal operation. The condensate accumulator drains are directed to CRW or chemical waste, as discussed in section 11.3.2.1.4.3.1. In order to eliminate the possibility of gas leakage to the waste collector tanks should a level controller fail, loop seals or drain pots are provided. All loop seals are tne self-resealing type. , l 11.3.2.1.4.4 Instrumentation and Control , l The offgas system is monitored at appropriate locations for flow, temperature, pressure, humidity, conductivity, radiation, and hydrogen concentration to verify specified operation and control as well as to ensure that the hydrogen concentration is maintained below the flammable limit. Sufficient instrumentation Rev. 12, 10/82 11.3-8
.- -. . . - . . . - . ~. --- -- ~ - - . ,- ~-
LGS FSAR l
. ()
is provided to permit system operation and monitoring from the j
- - main control room. Figures 11.3-2 and 11.3-3 indicate the ;
. process instrumentation. ;
I I
; A radiation monitor located downstream of the holdup pipe !
continuously monitors gaseous radioactivity input to the charcoal adsorption system. This is representative of gaseous radioactivity 3 released from the reactor and therefore indicates the condition of the fuel cladding. Provision is made for grab sampling of the j influent gases for the' purpose of determining isotopic composition. ;
- I A radiation. monitor is also provided at the outlet of the charcoal adsorbers-to continuously' monitor activity released from
- the system. The offgas system process radiation instrumentation is further discussed in Section 11.$.
i Dilution steam flow (second-stage SJAE motive steam) is monitored upstream of the preheater and recorded in the control room. Low j dilution steam flow automatically shuts the first-stage SJAE gas suction valves to prevent high concentrations of hydrogen in the j j offgas piping between the second-stage SJAEs and the preheater. j
- r
! The steam supply to the gas preheater is controlled by the offgas l l outlet temperature. !
1 i i The temperatures of the recombiner vessel and the incoming gas are monitored by thermocouples, and alarms are provided to j indicate a temperature condition above or below the design l 1 temperature, respectively. [ i Aftercondenser outlet temperature is recorded, and high temperature j J is alarmed in the main control room. This temperature indicates if j adequate cooling flow exicts in the aftercondenser. i < Three thermal conductivity-type hydrogen analyzers are used to i measure the hydrogen content of the offgas process stream at the 3 discharge of the aftercondenser. One of the hydrogen analyzers i can be switched to measure the hydrogen content of the offgas i' stream at the inlet to the recombiner. The. sample gas is i returned to the main condenser. The hydrogen analyzers are i designed to withstand the effects of a hydrogen detonation. The
- analyzer cell is not capable of causing a detonation, and the analyzer is designed with a flame arrestor on the sample side to inhibit such detonation. The hydrogen concentratior, is i annunciated both locally and in the control room for high and l high-high hydrogen concentration (2 and 4 percent, respectively).
. A common trouble alarm for cell failure, analyzer cell low flow and low bypass flow, is also provided. Because the offgas system ! is designed to withstand the effects of hydrogen detonation, no automatic control functions are required. Each hydrogen analyzer
' O is independently calibrated. Condensate from the analyzers is routed to CRW.
s ! t l 11.3-9 Rev. 12, 10/82 l t i
' , - - . . _ - _ _ - _ _ . . _ . .- _ _.--_- ___ . .--_ _-.--.--,-- ~,-_ _ ,,_-_
LGS FSAR The condensate level in the preheater and aftercendenser is maintained at appropriate lavels by level control systems. These level control systems provide dra;nage either to the main condenser or CRW. During normal operation condensate is directed to the main condenser. A conductivity element is provided in the drain to detect aftercondenser tube leakage if high conductivity is detected. Drainage is automatically routed to CRW. Cooler condenser performance is monitored by outlet temperature and moisture. High process outlet temperature is alarmed in the main control room. A moisture element is located downstream of the cooler condenser. The moisture element senses the process ! offgas dew point temperature. This temperature is indicated both at the local panel and in the main control room. High moisture in the process stream is alarmed both locally and in the main l control room. Moisture condensed from the process offgas in the cooler condenser is collected in the condensate accumulator. The condensate level is maintained at appropriate limits by a level control system. Condensate is normally drained to CRW. A conductivity element is provided in the drain to detect glycol Inleakage. If glycol inleakage is detected, drainage is routed to the chemical waste tank. The guard bed is provided with both differential pressure and h temperature indication. High differential pressure and high temperature are alarmed in the control room. The charcoal beds in the adsorber vessels are monitored by thermocouples. High temperature is alarmed in the control room and at the local panel. Individual adsorber charcoal temperature is indicated at the local control panel and recorded in the control room. Each vessel is provided with two spare thermocouples which can be used if the first thermocouple fails. Differential pressure is measured across the HEPA filter. High differential pressure is alarmed in the main control room. Flow from the discharge of the second-stage SJAE can be recycled to the main condenser if transient flow conditions approach system maximum. Recycle line operation is described in section 10.4. Process offgas flow rate is monitored downstream of the HEPA filter. High flow rate is alarmed in the main control room and at the local panel. Flow rate is indicated on the local panel and recorded in the main control room. Thermocouples are provided in each charcoal adsorber tank room. The thermocouples automatically operate the room air-conditioning units to maintain room temperature at or below 650F. Room temperature is indicated and alarmed at the local panel. Room . temperature is also alarmed and recorded in the main control room. Rev. 12, 10/82 11.3-10
,.)
LGS FSAR 11.3.2.1.4.5 Offgas System Operating Procedure 11.3.2.1.4.5.1 Startup Before starting the offgas system, the following conditions are necessary: main steam or auxiliary steam is available for the SJAEs and the preheater; cooling water (condensate) is supplied to the SJAE intercondenser; the recombiner is preheated to 4 1 !O . 1 l l l l l 1 O i l 11.3-10a Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR i THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O l l O Rev. 12, 10/82 11.3-10b
LGS FSAR ('~'\ V 11.3.4' REFERENCES 11.3-1 NUREG 0016, " Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents from Boiling Water Reactors (BWR-GALE Code)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (April 1976). 11.3-2 " Standards for Steam Sr.cface Condensers," 6th Edition, Heat Exchange Institute, N.Y.C. (1970) 11.3-3 D.P. Siegworth, " Measurement of Dynamic Adsorption Coefficients for Noble Gases on Activated Carbon," 12th AEC Air Cleaning Conference (1971). 11.3-4 D. Underhill, " Design of Fission Gas Holdup Systems," 11th AEC Air Cleaning Conference (1970). 11.3-5 Analysis of Detonation Design Pressure for Hydrogen Limerick Charcoal Offgas Treatment. Systems (Helix Process Systems, Proprietary). O O 11.3-17 Rev. 12, 10/82
}.
p i \-- liquid systems such as the condensate, reactor. water cleanup,
- fuel pool cleanup, equipment drain, and floor drain systems,
, whose activities are in turn a function of the reactor coolant 4 activity. Thefactivity of the reactor coolant is discussed in Section 11.1. Liquid waste management systems that supply input to the solid waste management system are discussed in Section 11.2. The' quantities of solid wastes genarated are dependent on the f 3 plant operating factor, extent of equipment leakage, plant : i maintenance and housekeeping, and decontamination requirements. ! Input to the solid waste management system is predominantly 1 powdered resins from filter-demineralizers and bead resins from l deep bed demineralizers. Powdered and bead resins are dewatered j 1 by centrifuge and then packaged in high integrity containers j j (HICs) for offsite disposal. 3 ' ~ 11.4.2.1.1 Wet Solid Waste Processing i i ! Wet solid wastes consist primarily of spent bead resins and i
- powdered resins backwashed from reactor water cleanup, condensate 4 filter-demineralizer, floor drain, equipment drain, and fuel pool t
~ cleanup systems.- Only spent resins from the reactor water ; cleanup system are expected to be of the high specific activity 1 j (HSA) type as defined in 10 CFR, Part 71. The rest of the solid I wastes are low specific activity (LSA). Spent. powdered resins in the condensate filter-demineralizer are
- backwashed to the respective condensate backwash receiving tank i
and from there are pumped to one of two (per unit) phase separators. When the backwash material has settled in the phase separator, the clear water is decanted to the equipment drain tank for further processing. When a preset sludge level is , reached in a phase separator,.the other phase separator is used, . while the sludge in the first phase separator is allowed to i decay. After decay the sludge is pumped in slurry form to the centrifuge for dewatering. Each condensate phase separator is sized for a normal 28-day collection and 28-day decay time. Therefore a batch of powdered condensate resins is processed l every 14 days when both units are considered. Backwash from the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system is handled in a manner similar to the condensate filter-demineralizer i system. There are two RWCU phase separators shared between two units. Each RWCU~ phase separator is sized for a normal 60-day Spen powdered e ns om the equ pment d a n a d floor drain ! filters and fuel pool cleanup filter-demineralizer are backwashed i to the waste sludge tank and then pumped to the centrifuges for dewatering. Equipment and floor drain demineralizer spent resins i 11.4-3 Rev. 12, 10/82 l i
LGS FSAR are sluiced to their respective intermediate spent resin tanks before being pumped to the waste sludge tank. The floor and equipment drain spent resin tanks each hold one batch of exhausted resin from their respective demineralizers. Therefore, the floor drain spent resin tank is emptied every 25 days and the equipment drain spent resin tank is emptied every 125 days. The waste sludge tank averages one batch every 2.5 days. Slurries from the phase separators or the waste sludge tank are pumped to one of two horizontal centrifuges. The slurry is approximately SS. by weight solid content and is dewatered to approximately 40 to 60% by weight solid content. The dewatered sludge drops from the centrifuge to its respective HIC. Centrifuge effluent water is returned to a condensate phase separator for further processing. The dewatering process is automatic, except for RWCU dewatering, and is controlled and monitored from the radwaste control room. The dewatering operation is normally terminated by low tank level or high HIC level signals, and an automatic flushing of piping up to the centrifuges takes place. The centrifuges are flushed afterward. Flush water is returned to a condensate phase separator. The centrifuge discharges through a fill head assembly that fits into the HIC opening. The fill assemblies are flushed with spray nozzles after use. Flush water is returned by gravity drain to a condensate phase separator. The fill assemblies are controlled locally, and HIC filling operations in the process cell are viewed through a shieldad glass window. Ventilation connections to the radwaste enclosure ventilation system are provided from the fill assemblies to minimize the spread of any airborne contamination. After filling, the HICs are capped by a capping machine controlled from outside the filling cell and viewed through a shielded glass windcw. The capping machine installs caps on the HIC opening in an automatic operation. During initial syster testing (preoperational), process parameters will be established that provide reasonable assurance that the dewatered sludge contains essentially zero free liquid. Periodically during system operation, these process parameters will be verified by use of appropriate system instrumentation in conjunction with sampling of dewatered sludge. Sludge samples may also be taken if an abnormal condition develops during waste processing. Records of process parameters will be maintained for individual waste batches. Dewatered waste shipments will comply with the applicable burial site criteria for maximum acceptable l free liquid content. l l 9 Rev. 12, 10/82 11.4-4
LGS FSAR ' O) e
\m 11.4.2.1.2 Concentrated Liquid Waste Processing Installation of the radwaste evaporators will not be completed for plant operation (see Section 11.2.2.1.3). Because the solid waste management system does not include an installed solidification
. subsystem, any future concentrates produced would be solidified
} , prior:to offsite shipment by an acceptable mobile solidification 1 system connected to the external processing station.
11.4.2.1.3 Dry Solid Waste Inputs Dry wastes consist of air filters, miscellaneous paper, rags, I etc, from contaminated areas; contaminated clothing, tools, and equipment parts that cannot be effectively decontaminated; and solid laboratory wastes. The activity of much of this waste is low enough to permit handling by contact. These wastes are collected in containers located in appropriate zones throughout i the plant, as dictated by the volume of wastes generated during-operation and maintenance. The filled containers are sealed and moved to a controlled-access enclosed area for temporary storage. Compressible wastes are compacted into 55-gallon steel drums by a hydraulic press to reduce their volume. Ventilation is provided to control contaminated particles while this packaging equipment is being operated. Noncompressible wastes are packaged manually l in similar 55-gallon steel drums or in other suitable containers.
- Because of its low activity, this waste can be stored until enough is accumulated to permit economical transportation to an offsite burial ground for final disposal.
11.4.2.1.4 Irradiated Reactor Internals
, Irradiated reactor internals being replaced are removed from the l RPV underwater and stored for radioactive decay in the spent fuel storage pool. Section 9.1.4 describes reactor vessel and
- in-vessel servicing equipment used for handling reactor components.
! An estimated average of seven of the control rod blades will be
- removed at each reactor outage (starting 10-15 years after operation) and stored on hangers on the fuel pool walls or in racks interspersed with the spent fuel racks. Offsite shipping is done in spent fuel shipping casks.
l [ Approximately 30% of the power range monitor detectors will be >
- replaced at each reactor outage. Spent incore detectors and dry ,
tubes are transferred by the refueling platform auxiliary hoist l underwater to the spent fuel pool. A pneumatically-operated < cutting tool supplied with the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) i allows remote cutting of the incore detectors and dry tubes on ! the work table in the fuel pool. The cut incore monitors and dry tubes and other small-sized reactor internals are shipped offsite l } l ! 11.4-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
I l LGS FSAR in suitable containers and/or shielded casks that can be loaded underwater. A trolley-mounted disposal cask with an internal cable drum is supplied with the NSSS for source and intermediate-range neutron monitor detector cables and the traversing incore probe wires. 11.4.2.2 Process Equipment Description Major components of the solid waste management system include pumps, tanks, piping, centrifuges, fill head assemblies, capping machine, decontamination equipment, hydraulic press, and handling equipment. The system is wholly located in the radwaste enclosure with the exception of the condensate and reactor water cleanup backwash receiving tanks, which are located in the control enclosure and reactor enclosure, respectively. Each design of the radwaste, turbine, and reactor enclosures is discussed in Section 3.8.4. Equipment design parameters are listed in Tables 11.4-1, 11.4-2, and 11.4-3. 11.4.2.2.1 Pumps Process pumps are vertical inline centrifugal pumps of ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3 construction. All are made of carbon steel except the RWCU sludge discharge-mixing and the RWCU decant pumps, which are of stainless steel. All are provided with a mechanical-type seal. 11.4.2.2.2 Tanks System collection and phase separator tanks are sized for normal plant waste volumes with sufficient excess capacity to accommodate equipment downtime and expected maximum volumes that may occur. Cross-connections between tanks are provided as appropriate for greater operational flexibility. Air spargers or recirculation lines are provided in the tanks to create a homogeneous slurry for pumping. All tanks are provided with overflow lines to route any inadvertent overflow to liquid radwaste collection sumps. All tanks are vented to their enclosures' respective ventilation system. See Section 9.4.3 for a discussion of the radwaste enclosure ventilation system. All tanks arr constructed to API Standard 650. See Table 11.4-1 for tank materials. 11.4.2.2.3 Piping The system piping material is carbon steel. The external processing station piping is stainless steel. Line sizing is, based on maintaining adequate flow velocities to maintain slurries in suspension. The piping is laid out to avoid low ' points and other features that could create local " hot spots." l Rev. 12, 10/82 11.4-6 l
LGS FSAR O 'O Table 11.4-10 presents the expected annual offsite shipment of solid wastes and their curie content.- 11.4.2.4 Packagino LSA and HSA dewatered wastes are packaged in large polyethylene HICs. The radioactivity contents of the shipping containers are listed in Table 11.4-7 for both expected and maximum conditions. Compressible dry waste is packaged in 55-gallon steel drums. ! Noncompressible dry wastes are packaged in 55-gallon steel drums i or other suitable containers. All containers comply with 10 CFR l Part 71, 49 CFR Parts 170 through 178, and the SCDHEC General i Criteria for High Integrity Contain'ers. ! 11.4.2.4.1 HIC Service The HIC is designed to contain concentrated radioactive waste ; materials generated during the removal of corrosion anc activation products from plant process systems. The specific ! activity of these materials will range from trace quantities to , /~'T no greater than 350 microcuries per cubic centimeter. These - \ss/ values of specific activity include only radionuclides whose I half-lives are greater than 5 years. In this specific HIC i application, the predominant radionuclides are Co-60, Cs-137, , Sr-90, and Ni-63. The containerized waste form has three main constituents other than the corrosion activation products. These are:
- a. Fiberous filter aid material derived from wood pulp I fibers (cellulose) - this material is stable with ;
respect to gas evolution in both acidic and basic { solutions. In highly acidic solutions, cellulose will ; liquefy. High levels of ionizing radiation cause a ; break in the long molecular chains (C.H:oOs) with no j significant loss of weight. i r This material is nonprotein and highly resistant to micro-organism ingestion. ! I'
- b. Ion Exchange Bead Resin - This material consists of '
cation and anion exchange resins in bead form (0.4 to . 0.5 mm diameter spheres). The individual resin beads ; are formed from sulfonated polystyrene. The material i exhibits chemical stability in pH ranges of O to 14. ; s ! I 11.4-9 Rev. 3, 03/82 i
LGS FSAR
- c. Ion Exchange Resin Powder - This is identical to the above material; however, it is crushed to powder prior to use.
11.4.2.4.2 HIC Material The container is to be molded polyethylene. The suitability of polyethylene for this particular application relies on its material characteristics: outstanding dielective properties, excellent chemical resistance to solvents, acids, and alkalies, toughness, good barrier properties, high environmental stress cracking resistance, good cold impact strength, ultraviolet light stability, and radiation resistance. 11.4.2.4.3 HIC Integrity Polyethylene is an extremely corrosion-resistant material with a high degree of chemical resistance both to the contents of the HIC and the earthen environment in which it will be buried. Testing will confirm the HIC's ability to withstand vibration, drop, compression, puncture, and pressure tests. Each container receives a variety of quality control checks to confirm individual HIC integrity. 4 The HIC is designed to maintain its physical integrity for 10 half-lives of the longest lived significant isotope. For routine resin wastes, these are Cs-137 and Sr-90, which have 30 year half-lives. Therefore, the lifetime of this HIC is 300 years. 11.4.2.5 Storace Facilities Storage is provided in storage bays for the HICs. Each HIC is located in its own shielded cubicle with a removable plug on top. There are 11 low specific activity and 12 high specific activity storage cubicles. At the expected waste generation rates presented in Table 11.4-5, the low specific activity storage bay provides a minimum storage capability of 30 days and the high specific activity storage bay provides a minimum storage capability of six months. The storage compartments and process cell' areas where the HICs
~
are handled are equipped with floor drains for washdown of any spillage that may occur. Compressible and other dry wastes are expected to be of low activity, and the 55-gallon drums and other containers will be Rev. 12, 10/82 11.4-10
r , LGS FSAR
. stored in appropriately controlled unshielded areas throughout the plant before shipment.. Storage area is available for at least one truckload of waste.
The general arrangements of the solid radwaste process cells, storage, and shipping areas are shown in Section 1.2. O l l l I lO 11.4-11 Rev. 12, 10/82
r y s RWCU F/D VENT RWCU PREC0 AT TK DR AIN RWCU BACKWASH RWCU STRAINER BACKWASH 21 RECEIVING RWCU FID BACKWASH TK UNIT 1 RWCU F/D VENT -4 RWCU PRECOAT TK DRAIN II RWCU STRAINER BACKWASH RWCU F/0 BACWASH l CG I -
- I Sq i
CONDENSATE COND FID BACKWASH BACKWASH COND F/D PREC0AT TK RECEIVING TANK 25 UNIT 1 Cd J
- l N
FROM EOUlP DRAIN DEMIN EQUIPMENT ORAIN SPENT g FROM FPCC PRECOAT TK" RESIN TANK FROM FLOOR DRAIN FILTER f BACKWASH & W4 FROM EQUIP DRAIN FILTER 28 - BACKWASH FPCC F/D BACKWASH FLOOR ORAIN 3 PENT RESIN y FROM FLOOR ORAIN DEMIN TANK r__-________--___-____--___--____-c A0A0 7 l FROM RA0 WASTE EVAPORATOR , l FROM CHEMICALWASTE TANK STORAGE TK I
+ .
_________________________________q i
- INSTALLATION OF THIS PORTION OF THE CHEMICAL WASTE SUBSYSTEM WILL NOT BE COMPLETED FOR INITIAL PLANT OPERATION (SEE SECTION 11.2.2.1.3) ,
l i d F
b, t C ; TO EQUIP DRAIN COLLECTION TK mu PHASE PARATOR - y
~ ~
KU PHASE PARATOR C HIGH INTEGRITY
% CENTRIFUGE "
CONTAINER I TO EQUIP BOEMATE M ASE J COLLE T 0
- TK PARATOR IFU E A HIGH INTEGRITY NOENSATE - _
6 CONTAINER PHASE J PARATOR f - FROM UNIT 2 CONDEllSATE PHASE SEPARATORS lTE SLUOGE C
-K d ExnnNAtFnocESSiN STAnon j , ors.
l INFORMATION ON STREAM NUMBERS I IDENTIFIED BY $ GIVEN IN TABLE
>_________a .
> > .a.
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM
- FIGURE 11.4-3 REV.12.10/82 i
l
LGS FSAR A a. To provide continuous isokinetic and. representative samples of the stack flow in compliance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 64 of 10CFR50, Appendix A, Regulatory Guide 1.21, and ANSI 13.1-1971.
- b. To continuously record releases of radioactive particulates, iodines and noble gases to the environs so that the total quantity of radioactive material released can be evaluated.
- c. To alarm, in event that specified rates of release of radioactive material are exceeded,
- d. To provide continuous real-time indications of radioactive releases during the accident and post-accident modes of operation.
The north stack exhausts from the following systems:
- a. Unit I turbine enclosure exhaust
- b. Unit I turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust (including mechanical vacuum pump exhaust)
- c. Unit 2 turbine enclosure exhaust
- d. Unit 2 turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust (including mechanical vacuum pump exhaust)
- e. Radwaste enclosure equipment compartment exhaust
- f. Radwaste enclosure fume hood exhaust
- g. Radwaste service and control area exhaust
- h. Control structure battery compartment exhaust
- 1. Unit 1 steam packing condenser and effluents from the recombination system
- j. Unit 2 steam packing condenser and effluents from the recombination system
- k. Standby gas treatment enclosure exhaust
- 1. Unit I battery compartment exhaust
- m. Unit 2 battery compartment exhaust
- n. Control structure toilet room exhaust
- o. Standby gas treatment filter exhaust 11.5-11 t
LGS FSAR
- p. Drywell purge system exhaust j
- q. Offgas treatment system exhaust.
- r. Radwaste enclosure air exhaust Sampling stubs are provided on the exhaust ducts of most of the systems listed above for the purpose, of extracting grab' samples as needed (see Figure 11.5-1 for specific locations).
Units 1 and 2 share the north stack and consequently the same radition monitoring system. Under normal plant operation, the stack flow rate varies from about 183,000 cfm to about 664,000 cfm. The expected composition and concentrations of the effluent under normal plant operation are given in Table 11.5-4. Following an accident flow may be reduced as low as 1250 cfm. Under this condition, the flow rate will be below the range capability of the isokinetic sampling system, but the post-accident subsystem will continue to provide representative data. The north stack is provided with three equally-spaced honeycomb grids that serve the purpose of stabilizing, equalizing, and collirI.=ng the stack flow in order that the exhaust flow rate can be measured accurately and representative air sampling can be achieved. A flow rate sensing array is provided, consisting of 128 unifr,rmly-spaced total pressure sensors and 32 uniformly-spaced static pressure sensors for providing an instantaneous traverse across the stack. Two independent sampling arrays, each consisting of a set of 64 uniformly-spaced isokinetic nozzles are provided for extracting representative samples at the stack cross section. One array provides a sample for the normal plant operation radiation monitoring subsystem. The stack flow rate and sampling flow rate are recorded and indicated on demand. The sample is split into parallel paths. Each half is passed through a particulate filter provided with a radiation detector indicating the corresponding integrated measurement of the particulate effluent, an iodine filter provided with an in-place detector, and a noble gas monitoring chamber. Thus, each of the two redundant monitoring racks provide the following outputs:
- Sampling flow rates l
- Particulate radioactivity, integrated
- Iodine radioactivity, integrated
- Noble gas radioactive concentration From these data and the stack flow measurement, the total l radioactive effluent may readily be evaluated. Readouts from the detectors are fed into microprocessors, which in turn provide l outputs to readout modules in the auxiliary equipment room and to Rev. 12, 10/82 11.5-12
LGS FSAR (y
%s recorders in the control room. The microprocessors are provided with memory-retention capability to preclude the loss of data in event of a power failure.
For each detector there are one downscale and two upscale alarms which annunciate in the control room. The upscale alarms indicate high and high-high radiation, and the downscale alarm indicates instrument malfunction. For the normal plant operation mode, the characteristics of the isokinetic sampling system and radiation monitoring subsystem provide plant operations personnel with complete and accurate data of radioactive materials released to the environs from the north stack. The system thus enables personnel to control activity release rates. Sufficient redundancy is provided to allow l maintenance and checking of one channel without losing monitoring capability. The post-accident monitoring subsystem is independent of the normal plant operation monitoring subsystem and operates continuously. Two samples are available. One sample, drawn from the second 64-nozzle array described above, is passed through a particulate filter, iodine filter, and noble gas monitoring chamber. This provides redundancy to the normal plant operation monitoring (,,/j s-subsystem. For broad-range radiation monitoring a second, much smaller sample is drawn from a separate comb-type probe located downstream of the isokinetic nozzle arrays. This sample is passed through shielded particulate and iodine filters and two extended range noble nas monitoring chambers. Detector outputs are fed into microprocessors that evaluate the total radioactive effluents. Outputs of the microprocessors are transmitted to readout modules in the auxiliary equipment room and recorders in the control room. The microprocessors have memory retention in event of loss of power. Digitized outputs are provided from both subsystems. 4 11.5.2.2 Systems Required for Plant Operation 11.5.2.2.1 South Stack Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor The objectives and functions of the south stack monitoring system are the same as those of the north stack normal plant operation monitoring subsystem. A system for post-accident monitoring is not provided because any HVAC exhaust to this stack containing accident effluents is automatically isolated. The south stack encloses two independent exhaust ducts servicing i the reactor enclosures for Unit I and Unit 2, respectively. i The stack exhausts ventilation air from the following systems: O 11.5-13 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR Unit 1 Duct
- a. Unit I reactor enclosure exhaust
- b. Unit I reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust
- c. Refueling floor Unit 1 side exhaust Unit 2 Duct
- a. Unit 2 reactor enclosure exhaust
- b. Unit 2 reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust
- c. Refueling floor Unit 2 side exhaust Each of these two ducts is monitored by means of two redundant subsystems. Consequently, four independent sets of data are obtained of stack flow rates and corresponding sampling rates.
Flow rates in each of the two ducts vary from about 54,000 cfm to about 234,000 cfm. The expected composition and concentrations of .the effluent under normal plant operation are given in Table 11.5-4. The stack flow is collimated to provide a uniform velocity distribution over the entire cross section to assure representative sampling. Stack flow rate is measured by a manifold containing 64 uniformly spaced total pressure sensors and 16 static pressure sensors in order to provide an instantaneous ongoing velocity traverse. Sampling is done by an array of 32 uniformly spaced isokinetic nozzles. Radiation detection is done by means of a particulate filter, iodine filter and noble gas chamber in series. Each of these items is shielded and provided with a dedicated detector. The gas chamber has a beta scintillation detector consisting of a beta-sensitive crystal optically connected to a photomultiplier tube. The other two detectors are similar in construction except that the iodine detector is gamma-sensitive. The output from the preamplifier is fed to a microprocessor, which in turn feeds the readout modale in the auxiliary equipment room and the recorder in the control room. Digitized outputs are also available. For each detector there are one downscale and two upscale alarms that are annunciated in the control room. The downscale alarm indicates instrument malfunction and the upscale alarms indicate high and high-high radiation. Output records are in the form of strip chart print-outs of stack flow rates, sampling flow rates, and count rates of particulates, iodines, and noble gases. O Rev. 12, 10/82 11.5 14
} i LGS FSAR radiation monitor is provided to measure radioactivity in the system. ;
! An offline monitor is employed, to facilitate decontamination without shutdown. The channel consists of a gamma scintillation !
detector, preamplifier, ratemeter, and one-pen recorder. The t channel is provided with a low and high alarm that annunciate in
; the control room. The high alarm set point is set sufficiently l f
above background to preclude spurious alarms. A low flow annunciator also is provided. 1 11.5.2.2.13 Liquid Process Sampling System l 4
! A process sampling system is provided to allow grab sampling for evaluation of water quality and radioactivity levels in liquid 1 process waste streams. The sample analysis results will provide operators with information for taking necessary corrective
, actions. This system is designed to provide repre(betative i samples from process streams at central sample stations for use in minimizing leakage, spillage, and potential radiation exposure to operational personnel. Where applicable, means are provided for sample water cooling and for maintaining a fixed or measured sample flow rate. Although the process sampling system is designed to provide liquid samples from many plant process streams, radionuclide sampling will be periodically performed on the following process j systems:
- a. Fuel pool cooling and clean-up l
- b. Reactor enclosure cooling water l
- c. Liquid radwaste - equipment drain processing l
- d. Liquid radwaste - floor drain processing l
- e. Liquid radwaste - chemical and laundry processing l 1
l 11.5.3 EFFLUENT MONITORING AND SAMPLING 1 The requirements of General Design Criterion 64 of 10CFR50
- Appendix A are implemented with respect to effluent discharge i paths by means of the following monitoring stations
i
- a. Gaseous Effluents
- i
- 1. Reactor enclosure ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.1.2)
- 2. Refueling area ventilation exhaust (Section
- O- 11.5.2.1.3) 11.5-19 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- 3. Standby gas treatment system (Section 11.5.2.1.8)
- 4. North stack ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.1.9)
- 5. South stack ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.2.1)
- 6. Charcoal offgas system compartments ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.2.2)
- 7. Charcoal offgas system effluent (Section 11.5.2.2.3)
- 8. Recombiner, hydrogen / oxygen analyzers, and equipment drain sump (Section 11.5.2.2.4)
- 9. Steam seal effluent (Section 11.5.2.2.5)
- 10. Radwaste enclosure ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.2.6)
- 11. Hot shop ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.2.9).
Sampling stubs are provided on all major exhaust ducts for the purpose of extracting grab samples as required.
- b. Liquid Effluents:
- 1. Residual heat removal service water (Section 11.5.2.1.7)
- 2. Liquid radwaste discharge (Section 11.5.2.2.10)
- 3. Plant service water (Section 11.5.2.2.11).
11.5.4 PROCESS MONITORING AND SAMPLING The requirements of General Design Criterion 60 are implemented with respect to the automatic closure of isolation valves in gaseous and liquid effluent discharge paths by means of the following monitoring systems:
- a. Main steam line (Section 11.5.2.1.1)
- b. Reactor enclosure ventilation exhaust (Section i
11.5.2.1.2)
- c. Refueling area ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.1.3)
- d. Residual heat removal service water (Section 11.5.2.1.7) ll l
Rev. 12, 10/82 11.5-20
)
LGS FSAR p/ -
\m- e. Liquid radwaste discharge (Section 11.5.2.2.10).
The requirements of General Design Criterion 63 are implemented with respect to the monitoring of radiation levels in radioactive fuel and waste storage systems by means of the following monitoring systems:
- a. Area radiation monitor channels 31 and 32 (Section 12.3.4.1)
- b. Refueling area ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.1.3)
- c. Radwaste enclosure ventilation exhaust (Section 11.5.2.2.6)
- d. Liquid radwaste discharge (Section 11.5.2.2.10).
The following liquid process systems are provided with grab sample stations for laboratory measurement of radioactive concentrations for satisfying the requirements of General Design Criteria 63 and 64: t
- a. Liquid radwaste systems (Section 11.5.2.2.13c, d, e) l
- b. Reactor enclosure cooling water (Section 11.5.2.2.13b) l
- c. Spent fuel pool treatment system (Section 11.5.2.2.13a) l i
l O 11.5-21 Rev. 12, 10/82
(_ u"
.o..n e,
. o-g %P E_*g. d.j [%-
~
_ . . T...e--iM5 ,. 5 .=. = . . Md** m k RUERENCE DRAWINGS k C1 le! 4 gf$~ t- ::::l* ' t':
~ - -
4 W+ W+ ,*+*J' W' I 'U <=,1 2" DWG. F$AR d I . .. , / .m- 1 t *- +"?.T" _f. .S 5 S S _. _,.< 3 I~ ' NO. FIG. NO. E1C%4[.b **- N
-- Q[,;.M'i .e- L _nu_~a ~ v
~i p.
qM _, _,,JNe l
= =
w n
.e ec
- . o,i;i wy=.euniai. ( gos.~ ~Qb. c c a - S...r: b.em . o -
=. .
. s Vi L '
e- i . k fC, 'J[.I [2 - E 4 t .iain N#',,,,, , ,,, , DDhh, Fr-+ WS J .-. - .
\ . fd ; $u, i ei.a.
c:- - - [ t e . r, -
"g-e m-
--_ _ . -. . w .=-
. iu '
,,i ggg
===~e.=r **F& N.. k ..fu
- 3 e .,,, ~l** q.
* ? *'4- ;n.,.Ue3 e F~ ,
yO p [. (- - [y L i-p} ,. 3-F ; .mimusa==== e. . 4 _ I*y 7s ,f '..,.i
- l * - - - o on t%' -
I C
- s x ;. <;; ."
a.dJ W tt 3 y u .;. . . t F. =. " w ea
*I twe o ce) pet f \
IN
- m w .ed-u g -e e. . ,g
** **.angM y J eesp 1
m
. ' (( 5,iW c- , 15p
.".4 4 -
.~
v~
- "K g_
fI - ,,,. 4,,i @ l.- _ l ' *. n dr7. _
-=. Se y
e
.,c,..
'dh * !y { {
. 6.s ma nim :., @ _.a h-A .. 1 =. " x.m p v' ' ' q,fL I""' .. . .. ,....
h b, , __..- el"". '
""*""* ** ) #
- Jet T g ee[h [ s.ast er-
~***
r T7 . U__h.. _ . ,
. gac.,T. : , ._g,. 3. . .
7., .
. .. w .,
, m,,, .
- 7. ; .=,.L,.=
, .. ,,.w
'*" .$. e s
~-~
~ ' ~ - - ' " * * *
- hM -b e ,se
. , ape sa
,7, --
,.,.y*.,a- m<
eL,.;.y h==
=a - - - -
. tu.} 7, y> ,,
so n , , p ,
*,\ powe r- e e
-3*-.
EWS --
**... g 9... w 188 e .
g y.M ~=== eum ' c WEms.W em .
,,, f'
__.=e (. r ] r :
..s ,
w
.m .m- .
1 I 4 1,.. i
. _=@
y.y:
-*n, -NyJ u.u -
.J u au --
fn..<
.--.=e e -
di ,-
- a. e
. . =@ .. - ... _ -
= _=g -p , , , . 4 .y A. " 7 h
I E44 ." I $ . r.,
""Wid91PhPMiRL4N T -
- m. ,uw 8 l 7 l 6 l 9 i
! 4 ss g,
o y e I I t i m
~ .5Hi?
C= q{ . 3.?. ./ :: ; :.::= .: g .:@ Jf E. j 'tg J. Bm g. .. --- : . ;gy Vf a a,
-l# ,,,,Q p, h, .- . . , ].. ] ; *
- L .--- ' %.. x.[sp..jf """
i ;3._
- f. ig w l-g ;p s, 4 .= r. .t:::. g.J W ]. ..._... ( .
,_ .r.+eaca . . P.---T; i.tu_'ha n.d ,O t.
M u' J' L' g . g=
- A --
t I ga r.t, sr-L._.,
'- ; g*A_ A. n
. .r: E,
.tt s- .c ,. -
s: ._ g Ej E! g .4 . u.a _ !! i t
-i
- A. ,+ r. :
.[11.
_,. s. l [n'_. <t _o < '
= .=, :
y ... g a_ g & wl
.3 l 3).oi =a.. . _ ..... i v g,..;. cp4fapa G s
.--,J .- .--T k-*5 4, - 4.!
a
.,.. g\ ' '""*" ". 1
'* ~
, 3 t p"." D
" i C, ...I . '/
. & #r
;g
-. , e~-
_ . ~
- .: ,{u.....
.;. .y -.
y ** __ g e w . %.s
- .yet rex ,~_ 3 l..
f - -- yPg ;:::= 3 _. ) ji.%L" .;% it%' ' - ~ - ' - "-
;.a r
=a w ' -: -
n i,
> . . - ---i. i
.J
.i . fn - - - -"'
;, , _.M. p7 :3 7r --
--4 o l
-14 I 4
,R *"
n #t) . g- j 9, t, h(,
- pi; -.
_ _ - , 6 c LL B h -=-- = = , -
- y .
j .. _ _ 1 Mt ; t- O @~Mj a.'. , t ,,,,
-~
a j- A ^- -> g
- I p. :::. >=_ r@ ..
s .-. ^- .a:M 1; -= .s4 W e r,? r-- -> If
- & s.:.: .
-u. =pt . i --
.G. -
- =:=.7,: . =
-., 4 Hr-1
.1 ~ ~saI. ~--~g I, T,t' 124 s,
-.n i.
U g . % -,: ,_ : sst . stj4 4. r v J w g .t r m,_ wl t a . L.r} ._ - A,~':$4*a' yp r.. J.ww 9 en D
-. ". .,. . . - y . J:=. " F g ,
@ n. .::s..e..s. . .=. ==._
2? @ 4B Ul, , ,,
*:::: . _c.r.=.xr.en- . _._
g _,,g . _ _ 4 , i_ii_.-
- r P.2 . = '= = = ~ '- - "
2 e
,b-E R-- __. t
- r. = ,:r:. - .
- = -- - - - - -
@i9;-{'.Ng i ~
~$ ._1,.*~ y
.7 .
, , ,' 'El.f." M..fh." N E c
~ ma h{F'P f. w .'.'s.
__ ,; *:.r.::u.
- ,~.: ._ r.::r:::':73.:
.e : . -- -
Ke_c ;M E g **r:-m, y1No i*d =.i.L V~-=- ! 1 ._,. ,
. 4; ,c- P ~. \
i -
-= . .
m .-
=~:- ~.
.Ml*\ '
~
1-M
'r t.r, d--44 r
=Jr; f. J- -* d
~ .-
e w .> .-
# -- a ;
"I .. r
.Qs:.;g~p w !
w .t t. hj
-@1 ' ; LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
- : - + ~ = > , . .
$ $ !. UNITS 1 AND 2 7 7~ vvv L o-
_ *" .______. J FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT w- ._ i
- c. p - _ 1 1,_
- T w 3 t
- n- 4 ', Z PLANT PROCESS RADIATION
.,,,,-i h[. -
_- -j MONITORING P&lD 2"4 41 .___.____j SHEET 1 OF 4 n . O.-v. o. _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ 4 l 3 l 2 I FIGURE 11.51 REV.12.10/82
,. .s
m.
'- 1DETmtL E Z}. ..
@'"$~-@ ta
~*
gT natatuct onawincs 5 p * * @"'* '- DwG.i' NO-FSAR FIC. NO. n M" a dh h" "N[l I t--
*hJ
.* .ma. ~.~.~.i' _aJ '. .r""*
.L ...--
M-10 g.7g 9.2 1 g,g.1
.m t-
- t 3. .. a . ... .I -.. ..
3 :, . . - p\g g,
+"
- . , .. yQ... -
, , ...y.........
6 m p 4 (
"~
f & , -*&ii .
- N .-~w- IslnEE A w m%., II
; - .t.. .. _ . . . . _. . , .gL*6., ." ]" . .._ i .. ._ .. $ -+..i,s
. ..---- a g
g. L, g, .. 7. . .u .=a.'
= J, - ==l- "T* =: . ,';;". ?q'E I
.~ ~) . - - - -- '+-
, -~ ~ } - ec -
e nma 5, 4, {.,. - == -- == .m _m
,~,=,.J; ::;, =,
.g. ga;,,, ;m .o' ==
*I
=,r =. ::1.
t-- - - ~ '
%-; yw
- s {. =. .- , . . . . .
r_, l
... .,.- . .... t .; i-=
L j ,, . .. t O.
*".'. *.* .*.fS. _ . , ,
,=,,, .. .
m.4. ] e . = . s o
.._.....g 4
.p , .;.;
= . V . %. ..... 4, A f hg "
l ~ $"T f E gjg ., h '* , f...g ?""@ f"M
- I f,~ & ' Y
@ *S~'he
- p...z.
. &~
, . 9. .. .. g ,.,g
.g g M ' A* %* . Ml ==, ,. , _ ; *. ,
?- -
,"' .. C
. .. ..J. .. ::': ;;'
_ t* %
,.,.e..,
. C '
i .. _a===----.=t* I l T*
... ... .=. . . .= . . . . . ..%9 &.=...: . -
S
~.==
y*10 t.g ;,7
..- a
, . . - ,c.e
*fS eY N'..
= $ ,, , l _, + .. p*=! . . . + -*. . c.,; ~ . ..
- IS.s w .Te
- "e.**
* "*J
*=
3].* - l".O*. .*O O ."".
.?. T:.
~
.s
-- T. . '
ty;;j'6. *n'.. "'U.!
'2..:."....' '.U.q .O.
AE0 i= IIE SI g' A". v5: 7. . ;: ot: Z: Z:
*::= , = . ,_ 2 .* T .. .
e C .a.m. y . e- , ,
-=- ;;,. - -
= Ti'
=
~,=,,__.y r r e a - ~i W _.,
=- an* ** l
. = =
e ,s, pus e *
."."7."..".'.,*
s l 7 l 6
- l
- s
Imran - l utan w -._'
- I e
.m men o- - ' o
,- eg = ,=
%.+ - "t-;
- c. . . . . . _ . _ . _ . -
- = =. H X. e a.'..% '. ~ ..a s . n.
be" ::::':::::t ::
" i_p"d" T * :".:",
- 1".'ll' A, 'T *
".?.: t*.t'. .:".:r = *::: 1 P E,y . g'-.I,'"; W. -. - a,6 =7; :
L r. .Ld w ;;g;;;;,, J.::.'.t '.7.:: ,,;.;;,
- ' ,t.::.7:T
,,gu ,00.:;"~*."".
h..>* e, *3
- L..i.
7 r.
- e' c'.a 2 m.
j. (J : n,:rjj r- . %*L >...;.. . u ....; a h6i=~-lEdB
-. ".:. r '.J +t ::.' 1.'::.?4:*::.
I.6 a ir . ?".'."*.
* '.1*."*!4ll:'U:ll*
.... - . . .. - ". . "* w a gm
*: ::".' ' ,""".:::::T t'. :;:c:l;
'r. .. .
r---- - 41 . .
! -@ .mu. *
. c,
* $*[".'";l='*[.' =, ".~Er"l* -
v p.L, m . - _ = =_. - Q ,; C, . .. .. ... gp i _ .. . . M '
' \;;lgv ll ",*2.2", ""," *""' T : ".": """ *
=
(u.._%, G+ i ll:::::::::
* :: ::::::::.... . . ' .. p l . .-.=,,.g,;;.,.,g..,.,,;;rg;;;;.;;;;p.,,,
N C
. W~'U# .
p ' mnw um se. w s.m.~ i W_ . lr. ::::::::: :: l,= l m7nge Ma M@! M.; M. y
)
~~
.."."_".'.".ns
.a .u ise . c. t..
A . Ms m. E .a.E U N E..s.-
. . . - - ,c.
L**d gi su t"d A 7 7.*. 4" .ll'.*T".'. A., %' . . . . g a; ;; --f c> . . . . . . . . %= . . l .~ . g .s
..r.-I l
_.sm t : ).
.-.u.e. e.. a,s s.ng/
.. , e MTRA
.- ** h I.r.7'g.;,,; .""..E** ;, ".Y,.g .".EI E""* -
e e e e
. .s ri
..._'tc. am. r i l
y- , y, ggta r._ ,,- .4 y , ,..; t
. . - .. _ .. . D
- e. ew
. , M 19
..n...s
# .u.m .e ==
.a p. pg c.,
, ....e..-- ....+..4 , ...;.4.. .. ...4.... , . 3 g.3 n~. :_ .* * :_ :_ .. . . . '
.-B .. w
. . "') _.E'. U Y.ir= $*.h ""
- m. C' A**7 .. e["")
=_ ::. . s...or_.:=. '
. .a
=.. _.e.
r*-*? ii c-.- *r,i e-.g;e - r-* .
, mg;;=,:.;.uer_.==.
;. ;;,g ,,. = .,. =._
.I.m,. .5
@@! Fih +i_ 3_-_ 2YN
. _m c
, -t.
e , SMMMe e . n. p- e w -- y.;q rr, .rq - ,
- .i r
.co.,. ao.w .
---+.,_,s,,e 6*'. *J r-+--- .a .
e s =s
,.- s ~n- it _ .
. a.+ -.1. _ _ . . . L _ _ _ m _ _y
- . u +g*>._______ _L _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ ' . . . . J~a*.__ .y LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
..._t.- o______ .-
m.w . . . _,
,eq ________.__ c:=vs. '_________ e ,- ._., q._ 5-.e.1._
.ma_ > y UNITS 1 AND 2
-l Oy 3 31 24 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT p' c w fl peg' , --
eg (p'm j p_ - ggj e...-~ . f
' PLANT PROCESS RADIATION
't,;r v *. : ::0.t.; i.
MONITORING P&lD comuum masoct.n.f.m. .'he. . sin acumTm SHEET 2 OF 4 l 4 j 3 l 2 FIGURE 11.51 REV.12,10/82 l
,s W" r- ~- Y M *e-~=-"=~ .m=.s : . b . :l y..=< i s n'. a . ,
" " _ . . . . . . .__1.....
g g g,g3
-- "* Q l... ,
DWG. FSAR - .---- : ?"., ; .. NO. FIG. NO.
"*'"hM""W!$j;i
. i- .
b
,! ;. . . . . .....g...4 M-10 9.2-1
'w , '- #j*; ,31: h _
. "0" M-78 9.4-1 l .
- w. _ _ _
- ,.t+ .. - .
- -.7=ll _ !mmi : :$ - *='
g *-*"*'-"
. .. i- i a. c.c
's:s . l ws.n i T %& i . .- - .:x.--- - --- - -@- - - ;I""
i! ' r""i
' . . .S- r ;' . . . i%, :(j) . i fj)' e
..= i smms Q@/ @ -
,i e :
e ' 4
%n .- -- '
.2" . .s. i_i
'd e W,.saii--*nmis-
. i ,, ..a c ... . t y . . t- -
' "O j i "."ea "'
. . ;.. "' j Q -
- .%4 q g ..y. : j*.*. *.".
- M *
,....l'"... . . .
w . ., ,
. . . . . . . , , 'I -
ed g == 4.i ! p; e 4 { ! ,'
==::~_ : ?- n . i.. . :,,
b xw wg N i -- I ! $ $, ) f' iii [!^ i !F R ll"~" n IN d 'S.
's g;.u .:.u. . ' A** .
- :u*
*i . <.u.a' .
; ,:::::,,; ,, m N 9 , *' j . . -
$-h ,l @ $ ,Q,,, g - - - ----B-y -
- 4. . .,s.
- w. . w<.- . : !
33 8 < n W , _,; .-
- s w:".
, lj 1
{ "~i
$ -I -g'
..* g.
. !!2iS. O ID[ I5ET@#{,:
.- .e 2 A '""" i ==,-JU.
g .. -
.i:Ghe!:!
,, y d
- lLau.
.f, g n+ -
6.... ....... . ......... . m q., _ -
...L........;
. . . . . ~ .
i e j '--- - - ecs . . , , , r -
._ i . e..v. !e.s.
m {:1 , i 4. ........___ ___.,i, .e. N
*,'l h
g.
.. . - . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aes , /) w "#':.". =m
-- ;.- ;.---- .1 .3.,., -3 ; i i
, . ) '
, ;c e ; .
. s.j: !
,. e- .. 4 ;
3 3
!!l
! @ ll'
. - I L-UN.- - - w). ai !!! aF ...
lst
*' a"'
n .4
.m v
.w;
'4 w
.ll
. - v- .
< sl.s,
,- ;g: ' ...
--- ;a
-e:n. gi, i @ N=* l i . l, i a- p; .
- g. - ____..g....~ .... ,l
, @ q t ;r :
':lll:::'.. ::::::':::'.-'-
lll l : .,, y ' [...___.___________{ ., j'l g ;lL..___. ._Jg 6...... s.__.__..
..; l '
..4 g
m NE
. E 3D.
a s%*T *.'s?. . 8 l 7 l 6 l $
l N % MTA4 Wat J L y u
. - . . . , , n p ~~
,F, e
. w-qq . .. ,
.u.
- ., :. i
# 4: ..
4 *s:::n. g .- 4L. 4*] . - e < - g % 1l. n . . L . 4 9 7 as L .T)@. .u. f . EdC. ig lj ' f: . @ bfA..r.1Tc-illi /J ,,P., *
! ! r--,
>- _, 6
, , - :b-%
f t! _
- . . . . 3 ,,,
. . , 3 -
i' ( g -
a
. ~. . . . _ . . . . . ,
t - Ly g, g
. - g i --1 e, t-+ .-
;6.*f.
~
y I o
.=: __ q=.
hy$ mh k h... ..'g'E l i_h M* W i.2i$$h -,[4 . +g u [+_ i. y . . . - gg h'-
**~
,.3 m'C*g {
i-... m- ! t L We e men y = Q .5 a. ,, rar=.=w.' ca m e l
- - -
- t
. war .,..
r$
= I, i" N.U..SA.M. E
- 5 - -
- g. . I f.5 -
~ I
,5 l. WA2GE
.i g -
+
, l
, , #Bfw.m +-' _
= : ..~ Y gss 's M
.,i t.sa. esis
} 2*AL MT&&
_ M N
- e a a. e! = puas povf*19 P.em A
.a. j .
.a.e ses.l .
yge'g ugv rgas.se.g AnsLaurg.stma a .aiel ** f M g
~~
g y n 5;s .2.
.,o t m. , -
m p::: 1 1 Lr q' @ A-}.":.
- e. , --
,a
- - _T w
. :::..==
r,.-,- =3 ^ E" g_q. -g .., Wauwe
- ;c;;io !.- -... . c.1TN c
, ;;:::;;, 1 .
gE ! .a - - ~~t=== -. =
- al jq, Q.3 g]y j .
i e ! i.. -. 4 a .. -e I L -e ). I
. f m!
- 4
- .-~m j
@ o. g o- .. g r .r'_s-i a**
- --= ! .
l ** .*! m-;- _.
@/J{I=u
_a. . . , ._ j ' Is' LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
.=: .
PLANT PROCESS RADI ATION
.mmn.M _ m.ogn,.p. m MONITORING P&lD
';;;"=.; a =7,": SHEET 3 0F 4 i l 4 j 3 l 2 FIGURE 11.5-1 REV.12,1032
s
- be**===
PROCTSS gggg 'T REIm a n so st swt r Pcm
.sa wre s sera:
wca -aes=,ae ssTcmcite eac me. :--;-*
- m e ,c ce.,ce rasa es w t.
e es = ...-e< e G* FSAq utstl4A18D leEmS' eI 8D,e8558& G
= =
- e -.e ormet see4mb $
s sen a at
, FIGe . M 85 541stik (
5556a6 $
==
==
=
e'e*4 emensub g 60545 33% $ 4W65) w eserSW EtKwahm 9 9 erst-taste 4 C * * - , essee-mesang ( terade MethJDtage Sesamt a ps-essedib $ = memo mealm 4 est a se L10 e I~ 9e2 W 4D 9endub ( * = - DetsWS dhenseen I DIE tee em4 - - seaso4meisen a patosa M-78 9e4-1 . , . ... . . - - . - m e-.cos. , e. kaus 9995 9 s>gg 4 40-# Jeb $ - = meme seemab G eam one 4 4-Ddeset C ==
- eetmutAmes ab ( poi ene Mee-finapte 4 * = . elemet MS $ 36 433 gy9te g*ew F,em . - Saman G Infus%8 e spaces moeun ehas = =
trageget and9m '*
- Sees'G eme%4 lh Guanab gammeruaL4 ism == =
esse <uulug 6, en END4PG G86 9 suiurki D 8 emens asesret% dad eseas es mu se EECMEM gus9gs # # gasgus g*ery 5,Se tonese somett e emed54 dhd>aten tar - gregangt 4339p t o enmeen em8%8 9 emadet ee - - fuese semest a sumaet mm.6tswisla,g8hau mesm haw - -
- Simagen GeWL4 St Mosea fluemm84g sinup = =
riemerset wesenswe e, 3 gree-a# tape-see tasue = ores 4- est
- sersee get 8eKRER gammes h46-LW em85400 00 bald - elDWG1meb7 Set eos enesag*f fessurue 3 grgg4 pea ene gestite + 6 - eSDWG M WKeet emme stust. amatet, age g enan see 4 WC9 emes ease a e 9 matanua* vists case-tee
- Imen - moiss-mest estaos itsedLTES EmWm41 asash asWWE
, , Mrt-stb S$eS = 899e6-511855 BKtee emeth 55184 9'tWD EDMbeMS G 6,S e M86-sedib 9 WREG-6AS = teteeg = ettet-smeer eg eos WW.m 4 uutamm 8tf@ meD4004 9 test and e Sumeet - MDm64 meet Eaees easmans 3 *
- Sumpe*E unn e O Em4 egg gaAS4DG = M - OfDGGS456 EEEGe3 (asshei e CEW"em eBSD camag g = h*cas ettMdW*e streeg
#RD M hfu%'O 4 er gs4pse .4,8 + s= ennmapume masses 4 got ee eI4440'9.
4 86*WM e8, $t = * == wens etsm&dalt*C tie 654 Eh Magt * * - %ugaWapag maw $14486 8 sussater.n g - eenergas etsst<ueer Spress tim'unEIA fMWs ease hpegfut,uk ce maggmes.g3 . - esenrinas mast <gham DKeet S W 54 $ M aG6-4,3 = emedire etnaish gerne 84874EIR 955' Ente asAn-emie. g 4 . = - esmW*ess stees-mas mKees Efe EEf eegghp g g> game gags-gge . 33333 - ogges.gesub R Jit phesu terece 818E Sep'eB'nt se O - eat eo e a.+me namoine - enmes - ei -em == maamdasu ex e.s
== =- = pe.as' Sa.mwG-tmest e
- o ameee apt agitarrtssert e 4 4 EM gige.gg . gang messtegsigus g35 6 LEst t@ stet. Emets' CWe'ensElft LE8B # 8 f.& 51 GE st-see gue64tB = isstes - etees-onee cereat E1EE'ER K554ep Enf640B genaer - espess-ensee estet 8MbLES t e sw g
M iG-the *
- sInnsPtps start-tees target m an-sene *
- eza stadt-test eat em q.abgs mas-tett *
- ensur"ee tomP made-lett Om ee et ss-tene *
- enemaree start-eas atom E fD-@ene =
- emenh8tump els#64 ente DM eet W 8e-futG *
- msmaPque Atmas 4este Dateeg e se-eest =
- 4menerica eq ase4eed gor em Eat-the hassess stadt-deg; am men WWsIE18 Wertmaar D E ER N SH6FGES WBES
- Sth4 N We GRES43 meirEI suvts e a Kie-tie sme-ste isoies - orges.,ases torate EM*EIG WSO415 #Desee - MDeD-meeB SQLepe SS EDUKE tarftBG G Enp tFtt RIDLP-t#9C bret*9 an est ang M ae-tete emp-tme . spes4 - ette#.ese ensee ner eseem ser s en M a>ertC St&4FtC are479 - tef-4te ser #Ut ent ena-arie pie-erne a sout*9 - c' es tee-5 meets fee s ta eE le-Gree 98hf4bede = suut>9 -- Sten #4msnm em ens K441f85 Wh&*BNW
- We419 = MIS BE4JS EsE*W gaELOhdE t S Ki3-tse gel 3-tti . gesegg sags g.gagg ,ggge ch ep'E8 SLhD-stb titJ-GM sonnes - eingy.gmes gggao l
I 1 1 I I i e M MM W M M DMe 64 se 444 empfldp Wuste Ze t,o,tg,a,nsdLam gg .' d888 48Ea .an a g TIS esD4ms Ilgg painson aus j g espF garts. e*8885 eIS au esem6 48 &#ENde er j Mullt e8Dod4 4 & , asse 444Aas3 ase i that menaleL9 tasut40 0p'ga4 l LErENO' a
, isoma
*IA capF afNEAatt fp T14 95ftp4 eirinus8 e1s"3ase
RADIAVION MONITORING ECUIPMENT a::ma sEc:-7ss rtce sE:ca s I & =^C s sE m - M TEwE C EEFEEE M EE
- Es RE::- E R
- PE N
- REL * :E G
- l PE N *I %E m
- GN W N 'L a '" I D*8 '8MBC D PIE h.et-meet b& th tee me ne mie ene tab glem not h
- seep e e-mt em e # 4 sm4M meet 20L oOO ews -
kKeEW ee itNegg 37) 4M 479mg$4 ppgate snug "oweb 88per b. && t #0 Lode wa og Isb INe eub' #73 set >85=$#4 24M esset beams %-amest b3 EIKeet enA .#9 tessse og Im liesst t*g e-84 ass e # 4 InsM suas pe.nm.a.s . he & Wunes em . .- a.ge. '"'I Womese ~n e set b, 33 , DKt.0.B get eDO sh m.e 8el tss e. ano I.Ib
. ne Ilm.th.l,L,'1 ' 4, tg 4Meests #84
,, *-'S.
.. m .l .M.
OO M.0, M. 4M mIta80' 4*e=4 4G 315.400 tass Ftess' *8t
- fMA , one E &aS484 III, gg &*G E9'4 68% 0 6 4 IE%M "smet mese-asse3 3 ya egg e,n is gae og bret-nomoE & settG0 34 nesegl ten see 24s 4 94 D ERf e ***t
- um m9 Ib 8 **et sh 94 9 415 e h84 BDeegene) e pot see e.me em sie ga.
g 34 I teh Ice feb #0e e4a eb 44 y ease *was b84t-Gut 03 4 8Kans aus . AqR eim ame Ib 8Gh See e-el & D4 D EES f*8E L - - . - 4 ..e e e_. mi.4 r- - - . =.cee e
. - 4 . . e m4 mRBS BPS b S. 3 OREart teIG4mE a dEsas state aosses 3 375 *45 96 e e-m pesas ans
- = = pat ePe - eM nett osm44, e-45 m l M P -
ae6 are - ene ie=s ions e-se em i e-o D *
=
Om are - ene 8844 Sem4 853 8-55 Db 3 are
- Mere i
- elua seah am ardt SL 8 e>@
B8FS- nedas t 9ersee = . serug was est ses e.7% t+3 39498 tut luem-sena 4 gotado - geLang augass ame msg sus e .3 epgM gas EEED-WE00 I EdFe - - - MSfo StWe .8 36 >PS=3g4 394M areas I men-masa a entsee - - meme eases os e-se m e e*a pesos ==r begs-sisd a datase . gEsse eng 3Eges aus e-pt ste #-n ergM smet E154 f Seteeg - - annas anos eums ses d>4P e4 39436 One l quant t antaso -
- sutare autsee asus tes e-75 34 8 m e y*4M aust i
- - i.
e e anse e-se m .-. insme ee sere.r,e m
=
- e/4
- Wu ere ge 8tt
== e-=ms.4 .s M .m.==
SO5T e-89 Da s se artse essat Eb6 *
- BKSE* 44 fu MJG 4-PG Dh 4 M BP%3BS EdgeC
- - - **
- agrere nya fg seer msg ml e-9
- - e4 Im*M meet
*
- Aet ese gn tu eteB 679 es t e4 ED%M sewiE
- om - 3Eems g i Gsse e-as og 3 g.e gngM useg een -
Maus .,4g S seas e-se et 3 E4 m-Sma smes bQ tats 89 - *
- tergog gram eng 33 4 skets gLeapeg41 yegM gut immer I tusee - . mee enes ame e-eeg eteettei possag ens b$ SES89 - - Per sog ser e unut Ste e-eee me@mel WF4M gut
& #E4e9 =
tout spus age 91sp egeg u gn pfgM 94 B6 h& LER - -
- sE% 6E4 EWE M5 e-g eg g se ppgang eing puesgaeas e agrape - - eK ere araos use ves.geg3 temmentet gue(3 4-45 944 S 4 N 3 000476 * -
- W[afe GDLere 4I34 995 4-05 D6 6 6-3 01540u1589 W mrt-tme B 3Dt100 sem . - . or eep em 3 stee w L _ _ ansa Dft-tes mys-est B 34440 18 800
%4 sent
-
- daemo e4 af suas e.as as aggatG4s te CTm'eause' mite 4 - -
senese aim U3 iset e-es em t G4 eemes pes-tag 4 te[ea0 *#4
- eteos uma afD-P9ee fE800 g
19 1 e-as Og g e4 Cam'eteesse' Cw t suawe 3 the
- resses am Pete e-es D6 4 G-D CIsumuseer ame Wet-fett i AG D0D wh * -
fusese .4 II F9aB eat gg g e-3 Camromemuget este 6 s PKeoD e.4 -
- P8L eme awa W #mC e-es es g e-p Cassemassage anus REG-tm3 e 200B00 ms4
- 8 etese me, 5 #UBA o-as est e-3 teremunaut suas m t SEme - - +
EIE.Eps t SIE 3De uma sur #43 E-2 Fv4M Laatse
..e M - . . = es .ing IE04 m33 e.e i 4 AIEG88 . . . - amm guiset ies 4,.
thG E>tG 94 8 5>9 mM i WW434 undt
..- i -- - - .-- e . e e4 ,M u pes quistas 1 35E467 -a - - ak es' p tale e.gg 64 yegass Wh49 a Kra67 emm.est een UI a
ut fee egg Di.e
. -openes m ,
M-
.z-
- .
- ant.a.b7 M
- ?, - , e M..
. gre,, gat u.s.e,e
,M u
- e. e i E .e . .m Mu Dis -gumaeg i MSE7 - *
- EE8E7 881.80' E BEED e48 G4 DF4RE 6.ahde 3 - =
- SKS 4M u BD.See
.. teed.e . m.s.t 4Wa. - -
m.i4 targe.t
.-. emE.
. a.t.t. e=13 G .m
.-u.- WT.sm er ..t.d.B
.e.m.e
./
,Ad LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT PLANT PROCESS RADI ATION MONITORING P&lD SHEET 4 OF 4 FIGURE 11.5-1 REVe 12,10/82
i LGS FSAR O 1. 6ft .1 Preoperational and Initial Startup Testina of Feedwater ' and Condensate 5ystems for Boilina Water Reactor Power FTants (Revision 1, January 1977). t l 1.68.2 Initial Startup Test Procram to Demonstrate Remote I Shutdown Capability for Water!Dooled Nuclear Power Plants (January 1977). 4 1.68.3 Preoperational Testino of Instrument and Control Air Systems (April 1982). 1.70 Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for_ Nuclear Power Plants (November 1978).
; 1.80 Preoperational Testino of Instrument Air Systems (June 1974).
1.104 Overhead Crane Handlino Systems for Nuclear Power Plants (February, 1976). ,. Overhead crane testing exceptions are as outlined in Section 9.1.5. 1.108 Periodic Testir.c of Diesel Generators Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 1, August 1977). Testing of the diesel generators is discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.20. 1.140 Desian Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Licht-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 1, October 1979) , 14.2-19 Rev. 12, 10/82 '
LGS FSAR 14.2.8 UTILIZATION OF REACTOR OPERATING AND TESTING EXPERIENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEST PROGRAM The TRB and the PORC are responsible for ensuring that reactor operating and testing experiences of similar power plants are utilized during the initial test program. The primary sources of experience feedback material are the NRC licensee event reports for the two years preceding the initial test program. The TRB chairman and the PORC chairman are each responsible for disseminating this feedback material to individuals who are designated test procedure review responsibility. During their review of assigned test procedures, TRB and PORC members are subsequently responsible for ensuring that pertinent feedback experiences are considered. 14.2.9 TRIAL USE OF PLANT OPERATING AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES The preparation, review, and approval of plant operating and emergency procedures are described in Chapter 13. Sufficient time is provided for confirming procedure adequacy by trial use during the initial test program. Those procedures that do not require nuclear fuel are confirmed as adequate during the preoperational test program. Those procedures that require nuclear fuel are confirmed as adequate during the startup test program. The plant operating staff is responsible for confirming operating and emergency procedures. The Limerick plant superintendent is responsible for ensuring that comments and/or changes identified during confirmation are incorporated into finalized procedures. It is not intended that preoperational and startup test procedures explicitly incorporate or reference plant operating and emergency procedures, although they may do so where appropriate. These tests are intended to stand on their own, since they are not necessarily compatible with configurations and conditions required for cohfirmation of facility operating and emergency procedures. 14.2.10 INITIAL FUEL LOADING AND INITIAL CRITICALITY Initial fuel loading is accomplished in accordance with startup test (SUT) procedure, " Fuel Loading, SUT-3." Initial criticality is accomplished in accordance with startup test procedure, " Source Range Monitor (SRM) Performance and Control Rod Sequence, l Rev. 10, 09/82 14.2-20
LGS FSAR
'() TABLE 14.2-4'(Cont'd) (Page 22 of 63) l startup recirculation lines. The instrument air system and ,
process sampling systems are operational. Refueling water pumps are operational, and sufficient water is available in the refueling water tank to support this test. Low pressure air blower 10kl05 is operational, and the backwash receiving tank is ! operational with sufficient volume to support this test. l Test Method .The filter /demineralizer units are placed in operation, and their controls are operated. Effluent water purity is verified. Flow rates, flow controls, and flow balancing system is verified. Manual and automatic precoat cycle operation is verified for each vessel. Acceotance Criteria
- a. Vessel cleaning and precoat cycles operate properly.
i b. Each demineralizer produces effluent water of the proper
- quality.
.c. The system flow balancing system operates properly.
i
- d. The cation and anion feeders supply resin to the precoat tank.
- e. The precoat pump and the system hold pumps operate properly.
i f. System pneumatic valves operate properly. .
- g. System controls, interlocks, and alarms operate properly. ;
(P-41.1) Coolino Tower System l l Test Obiective - The test objective is to demonstrate the ! operability of the cooling tower chlorination system, sulfuric
- acid injection system, icing control system, and makeup water
! flow control valves. l Prereauisites - To the extent necessary to perform this test, construction is completed, and instrumentation and controls are i operable and calibrated. The service water system, circulating i water system, Schuylkill river makeup water system, Perkiomen ! Creek makeup water system, instrument air system, circulating I water pumphouse domestic water supply, and the circulating water , pump structure power roof ventilators are operational as required l to support the test. j i l 1 Rev. 12, 10/82 i i
, , , . - - - , - . , . . - , --, - , , - , . , . - . ~ . . - . . - _ , . , , , , , - - . , , , , _ , , , . . . ~, _ , - , , , , _ _ , .
LGS FSAR OUESTION 220.5 (Section 3.7.2.6) Section 3.7.2.6 of the LGS FSAR states that for design purposes, the design response value was obtained by adding the response due to the vertical earthquake with the larger value of the response due to one of the horizcntal earthquake by the absolute sum method. Regulatory Guide 1.92, " Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis" states that the design response value is obtained by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum codirectional responses caused by each of the three components of earthquake motion at a particular point of the structure. Explain and justify the approach used in the LGS analysis.
RESPONSE
The Limerick structures are designed using an absolute summation technique considering the worst case response of the horizontal excitations in combination with the response of the vertical excitation. A discussion of the adequacy of the conservatism provided by this two-component absolute summation technique as compared to the Regulatory Guide 1.92 requirement of a three-Os component SRSS procedure is provided below. The general conditions for which the absolute summation of two resultants methods is conservative may be demonstrated by considering the following: min mar R = fR where 0 5 f 5 1 where min max H H f = R R H H and l max max R = CR 05 C < = where C = R R V H V H where: l max R = Larger of the two seismic co-directional responses due 0 H to either of the horizontal earthquake components 220.5-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR min R = Smaller seismic co-directional responses due to the H other orthogonal horizontal earthquake component R = Seismic co-directional response due to vertical V earthquake min max- i f = ratio of R to R H H max c = ratio of R to R V H therefore SRSS of three components can be expressed as follows:
! max
[ min l' R + R + R i : (H / (H ) ( V) l [ max 2 [ max) 2 [ max
' R +f , R +C R :
Y Y ) ) .
/ 2 2 max T
i 1 +f +C R ) (220.5-1) ( H , The absolute sum of two components can be expressed as follows: , max . R +R ' H V max max R + CR H H I 2 h max l lR i N (1 + C) Y H j Rev. 12, 10/82 220.5-2 l____ _ ________ _
LGS FSAR V I 23 max l 1 + 2C + C l R (220.5-2)
\ l H 1 Equation 220.5-2 (absolute sum of two components) will 'se greater I than or equal to equation 220.5-1 (three-component SRSL) when I 2 f 2 2 k1+2C+C 2 y1 + f +C l or l 2 2 2 l 1 + 2C + C 2 1+f +C or l 2
2C 2 f O or l min 2 R C 2 1/2 f where 0 $ f = H 21 (220.5-3) max R H This relationship is shown in Figure 220.5-1. l The relative conservatism of the two-component absolute and the three-component SRSS summation techniques may be illustrated by considering the ratio of equations 220.5-2 and 220.5-1. This ratio will be defined as y. Then: I ,f max Y1 + 2C + C 2)kjH y = ABS of 220.5-2 = SRSS of 220.5-1 I 2 2I max l 1+f+C lR A H O 220.5-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR 2 ' y= 1 + 2C + C (220.5-4) 2 2 1+f +C where min R 05f = H $1, as before max R H This relationship is shown in Figure 220.5-2. As shown above, the Limerick two-component absolute summation method is conservative when the co-directional response due to the vertical excitation is equal to or greater than one-half the higher of the two horizontal responses (C 2 1/2), regardless of the relationship between the two horizontal responses. The minimum possible ratio between the two-component absolute O summation method and the three-component SRSS procedure is equal to 0.707. This would occur only when the response due to the vertical excitation is zero (C=0) and the two horizontal responses resulting from the two horizontal excitations are equal (f=1). However, this case is unlikely to occur, and any other relationship of the various response components would produce a ratio larger than 0.707. The ratio between the two procedures, as shown in Figure 220.5-2, would be greater than one in most cases. To further demonstrate the relationship of the seismic response components on the Limerick structures, an evaluation has been performed for selected critical structural elements within the structures. Details of the evaluation are provided in the following paragraphs,
- a. Containment Exterior Shell For the structural design of the containment shell, consideration of two horizontal ccmponents is not necessary due to the axisymmetric nature of the shell.
The maximum resulting loads from two horizontal Rev. 12, 10/82 220.5-4
l i LGS FSAR ks- earthquake components would not be coincident and would occur 90 degrees apart on the circumference of the shell. Furthermore, when the resultant force from one horizontal component is maximum at a given location, the resultant force from the orthogonal horizontal component would be zero. This relationship corresponds to f=0 in Figures 220.5-1 and 220.5-2. Therefore, the two-component absolute summation technique would produce a more conservative design.
- b. Reactor Enclosure and Control Structure l Stress evaluations were performed for critical locations in the reactor enclosure and control structure. The northeast control structure and southwest reactor enclosure corner model locations are selected because of their sensitivity to large orthogonal responses due to out-of-plane seismic motion. The results obtained from the DBE seismic analysis are combined by the two-component absolute summation and three-component SRSS methods and are compared in Table 220.5-1.
() In general, the two-component absolute summation method and the three-component SRSS method produce comparable results. Although the differences between the combined stress from the two methods are small, the values for some locations suggest that the two-component absolute summation method may not be conservative when the seismic load is considered to act alone. However, for design purposes, when seismic is in combination with other loads (i.e., dead and live load), deviations between the two methods become negligible. lO 220.5-5 Rev. 12, 10/82 1
LGS FSAR TABLE 220.5-1 REACTOP ENCLOSURE AND CONTROL STRUCTUR l l l Due to: Vert Excitation l N-S Excitation [W~Excitatien l l l (E) (MC_) (10) Elev (A) (KSF) T N-S ( KSFL_ I EML_ l l Reactor Enclosure Wall - Sou I _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ l l I I l 352 l 12.27 l 23.4 l 10.2 l 333 l 0.92 i 18.6 l 13.4 l 313 1 0.88 ! 26.4 l 19.5 l 304 l 13.85 26.5 l 22.1 l 283 l 14.19 37.1 l 30.6 l 269 l 14.56 l 43.4 l 33.0 l 253 l 14.92 l 51.7 1 39.7 l 239 l 16.11 l 59.4 l 45.7 217 16.44 71.4 55.2 O= l l 201 l l 15.18 l l 57.2 l l 55.9 l 177 l 14.35 l 63.1 l 64.2 l I .- i _1_ l Control Structure - Northe l I 352 l 12.27 25.4 l 3.9 l 333 l 0.92 l 20.1 l 5.1 l 313 l 0.88 l 29.1 l 7.5 l 304 l 13.85 l 29.8 l 8.5 l 283 l 14.19 l 41.8 l 11.7 l 269 l 14.56 l 45.6 l 12.6 l 253 l 14.92 j 54.3 l 15.2 l 239 l 16.11 l 61.9 l 17.5 l 217 l 16.44 l 74.4 l 21.2 201 1 15.18 l 74.7 21.4 177 14.35 l 73.7 24.6 O
**W4r
i
?
2 M G 5 " 5
- SEISMIC RESPONSE _;
Combined Response (Stress) l (KSF) - l l -
=
1 1 3 Component SRSS l 2 Component ABSS (PSAF 2.7.2.6) (R. G. _1._9 2) 1 _ l a hwest Corner l 'M _ _ _ l -E 28.3 i 35.7 l i l l 1 22.9 l 19.5 l , 32.8 l 27.3 l 37.2 l 40.4 l 50.1 l 51.3 l . 56.4 l 58.0 l _ 66.9 l 66.6 l _i 76.7 l 75.5 l 91.7 l 87.8 l r 81.4 l 72.4 l 91.2 l 78.6 l t L . st Corner l __ l m i I 28.5 l 37.7 l _f 20.8 30.1 l l 21.0 30.0 l l
]
33.9 l 43.7 l 7 45.7 l 56.0 l ' 49.5 l 60.2 l 58.3 l 69.2 l _ 66.3 l 78.0 l 2 79.1 l 90.8 l , 79.2 89.9 l g 79.0 88.1 -l 1
- L a
m f 2 Rev. 12, 10/82 m d _ .__._h =
N ao oo k 1.0
, , , , y y , y g 0.9 -
0.8 - 0.7 - T l 0.6 - - m _k 0.5 - y u 0.4 - - RESPONSE FROM N 2-COMPONE NT A BS >3-COMPONE NT SRSS 0.3 - 0.2 - C = 1/2 f 2 _ l 0.1 - RESPONSE FROM - XOMPONENT SRSS >2-COMPONENT ABS
' i l I l l l I 1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 08 0.9 1.0 e
fibi, (R men /Rg** * ) H
- a. C = RATIO OF THE RESULTANT DUE TO THE VERTICAL COMPONENT TO THE MAXIMUM RESULTANT DUE TO EITHER OF THE HORIZONTAL COMPONENTS
- b. f = R ATIO OF THE SMALLER RESULTANT DUE TO EITHER OF THE HORIZONTAL COMPONENTS TO THE LARGER RESULTANT I f 41.0)
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFE TY ANALYSIS HEPORT , bq ! COMPARISON OF 3-COMPONENT SRSS TO 2-COMPONENT ABS FIGURE 220.5-1 REV.12,10/82
1 i i i i i i i e i i 4 mm 1.4 - f= man " 0 <f < 1.0 C= 0<C<= " R H g man H f =0 1.3 - / ,,e / 2"
, 1 + 2C + C
' O, . p . C 2 i.f2.C2 1.2 -
f1 FOR0 <f41.0 11
- 2-COMPONENT ABS no SS CONSE RVATiVE 1+2C+C 2 FOR y > 1
< v= ID I +C 2
1+f . (Eq. 220.54) OS - - 0.8 - -
' ' i ' ' I I ' ' "
0.7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 i C, "'/Rg" e LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 DESIGN ASSESSMENT REPORT s RELATIVE CONSERTIVISM OF THE TWO-COMPONENT ABSOLUTE AND THREE -COMPONENT SRSS TECHNIQUES FIGURE 220.5 2 REV.12,10/82
LGS FSAR O QUESTION 230.5 (Section 2.5.2.5) In Section 2.5.2.5 of the FSAR, it is stated that " Principal plant structures are founded on competent bedrock". Are there any Category I structures found on soil? If so:
- 1. Provide a shear wave velocity and a compressional wave velocity-depth profile (s) representing the physical -
properties of the material upon which Category I structures are founded.
- 2. Assess the adequacy of the SSE spectra for these different ccnditions. One acceptable method for doing so would be through the use of site specific spectra, see for example Sequoyah SER.
RESPONSE
Section 2.5.2.5 has been changed to indicate which seismic Category I structures are not founded on competent bedrocks. Reference 2.5-53 has been added as a reference for the buried piping analysis. All principal Category I structures at Limerick are founded on competent bedrock. Category I structures not founded on competent bedrock are buried structures including portions of underground piping and electrical duct banks, diesel oil storage tanks, and valve pits. The properties and typical profiles of the foundation materials beneath these buried structures are provided in the responses to Questions 241.17 and 241.18.
- 1. The seismic wave velocity of the in-situ soils and the fill materials, on which the buried structures are founded, are not available. However, because of the shallow foundation soil depth to the competent bedrock and the smooth transition from rock to soil foundation (Figure 2.5-37, Sheet 9 FSAR Revision 12), Limerick Category I underground piping is designed in accordance with the procedure identified in Section 3.7.3.12 for seismic load, assuming the seismic shear wave velocity of the foundation soil is the same as the competent bedrock. The application of the bedrock seismic wave velocity to the foundation soil material in buried piping analysis is shown in Reference 2.5-53.
O 230.5-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- 2. The Limerick design response spectra, discussed in Section 3.7.1 and Figure 3.7-1 and 3.7-2, are based on data developed from records of previous earthquake activities representing an envelope of motion expected at a sound rock site. Because all Limerick seismic Category I structures, except the buried structures which have negligible inertia responses, are founded on competent bedrock, the Limerick design response spectra are applicable and adequate.
l { O l l O Rev. 12, 10/82 230.5-2
LGS FSAR O QUESTION 241.16 (Section 2.5.4.2) The properties of Foundation Rock underlying all seismic Caterory I and safety related facilities are not identified in Subsection 2.5.4.2 of the FSAR. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70 provide in this Subsection of the FSAR details of the static and dynamic engineering properties of all foundation rock in the site area including rock that was not excavated to the depth where "hard, competent bedrock" was encountered, as described in the FSAR. Include a description of the methods used to determine the properties and provide a summary table cataloging the important static and dynamic strength test results. Also discuss how the developed data was used in the safety analysis, how the test data was enveloped for design, and why the design values or range of values is conservative.
RESPONSE
Section 2.5.4.2.1 has been changed to clarify the discussion of rock properties and determinative methods. Table 2.5-3A has been changed to indicate additional properties for sound foundation rock. ( The static and dynamic engineering properties of foundation rock at the Limerick site are presented in Sections 2.5.4.2.1, 2.5.4.4, and 2.5.4.10. These properties, which include unconfined compressive strengths, laboratory and in-situ seismic velocity measurements, and modulus values, are complied in Tables 2.5-3, 2.5-3B and 2.5-3C, and are summarized in Table 2.5-3A. These data were originally presented in the Foundation Investigation Recort dated October 5, 1970 and in Site Environmental Studies dated July 31, 1970, both by Dames and Moore. Methods used to measure these properties are discussed in the FSAR sections noted above and in the Dames and Moore reports. The zone of rock weathering varies from less than 10 feet in thickness to as much as 30 feet. The weathered rock grades upward with no well fefined contact into residual soil. Therefore, the properties of weathered rock are similar to those of sound rock at the base of the weathered zone and approach those of soil at the top of the zone. Seismic Category I structures founded on weathered rock are buried structures including diesel oil tanks and portions of buried piping and electrical duct banks. In the foundation design of these structures, the bearing pressure allowable for dense natural soil O. (6,000 psf) is conservatively used, as. discussed in Section 2.5.4.10.2. 241.16-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
l l LGS FSAR The average engineering properties shown on Table 2.5-3A are used in the Limerick safety evaluations. The interaction between the structure and rock foundation has been considered for the containment structure and reactor and control enclosures as discussed in Section 3.7.2.4. Consideration of soil structure interaction for seismic Category I structures founded on competent bedrock, using the average engineering properties shown on Table 2.5-3A, produces negligible effects on structural response. Therefore, the use of these average engineering properties are adequate for design. O O Rev. 12, 10/82 241.16-2
n LGS FSAR O( ,/ OUESTION 241.17 (Section 2.5.4.2) The properties of foundation soils underlying all seismic l Category I and safety related facilities are not identified in i Subsection 2.5.4.2 of the FSAR. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70, provide in this subsection of the FSAR details of the static and dynamic engineering properties of all foundation soil in the site area. Include a description of the methods used to determine the properties and provide a summary table cataloging the important static and dynamic strength test results. Also discuss how the developed data were used in the safety analysis, how the test data were envelop'ed for design, and why the design values or range of values is conservative.
RESPONSE
Section 2.5.4.2.2 has been changed to include the properties of in-situ soils at the Limerick site for all seismic Category I and safety-related facilities. The properties of the in-site soils at the spray pond are given e in Section 2.5.4.2.2.1. The properties of the in-situ soils
\- other than the spray pond area were determined by Dames and Moore (Ref. 2.5-51) and are summarized in Section 2.5.4.2.2.4. A compaction test was performed on a sample of the overburden soil '
to obtain soil compaction characteristics. Sieve tests were performed on representative soil samples to evaluate grain-size distribution. In addition, Atterberg limits were performed on the bulk soil samplo used for the compaction test and on other soil samples to evaluate the plasticity characteristics. The locations of borings at the site are shown in Figure 2.5-20. Seismic Category I structures not founded on competent bedrock include the spray pond and buried structures described below. The manner and conservatism in which soil data were used in the design of the spray pond is discussed in Section 2.5.5. Seismic Category I buried structures include portions of underground l piping and electrical duct banks, valve pits, and diesel oil tanks. These~ buried structures are founded above the high groundwater table and have bearing weight less than the replaced in-situ soil. The static stability of the buried structures is discussed in Section 2.5.4.10.1. The seismic inertia effect of buried structures are negligible and the propagating seismic wave effegts on buried piping are considered as described in Section 3.7.3.12. O i 241.17-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR f (s)/ - OUESTION 241.18 (Section 2.5.4.7) In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70 provide, in appropriate subsections of the FSAR, profiles illustrating the detailed relationship of the foundations of all seismic Category I and other safety related facilities to in situ subsurface soil and rock material at the site, i'ncluding structural fill material. The profile should extend from plant grade to below the deepest foundations and to the depth of hard, competent bedrock. On these profiles, identify the static and dynamic properties of the soil and rock supporting all structures. Discuss, in subsection 2.5.4.7 of the FSAR, the relationship of the actual in situ soil and rock profiles and in situ soil and rock properties to the modeled profiles used to evaluate soil structure interaction effects.
RESPONSE
Figure 2.5-37 (Sheets 9 and 10) have been added to show the profiles for Category I piping and electrical duct banks supported on soil or on fill material. The plans and profiles illustrating the defailed relationship of the foundations of all ( s) seismic Category I structures and other safety-related facilities to in-situ subsurface soil and rock material are shown on Figures 2.5-9, 2.5-10, 2.5-11, 2.5-13, 2.5-26 through 2.5-31B and 2.5-37 (Sheets 1 through 10). The areas covered with Type I fill, shown on the profile (Figure 2.5-37, Sheet 9) were cleared, grubbed, and stripped of top soil and organic material, then filled to the plant grade elevation with Type I fill as defined in Section 2.5.4.5.4. References to the applicable sections of the FSAR describing the static and dynamic properties of rock and soil are made on Figure 2.5-37 (Sheet 9) in~accordance with the response to Questions 241.16 and 241.17. The foundation profiles for the seismic Category I structures are shown in Figure 2.5-37. For seismic Category I structures founded on competent bedrock, modeling techniques used in soil structure i interaction analysis are based on profiles classified as ( competent bedrock, as discussed in Sections 3.7.1.4 and 3.7.2.4. For these structures, neglible differences in seismic structural responses exist when considering soil structure interaction effects. Seismic Category I structures not founded on competent bedrock (} s_/ are buried structures that have negligible inertia effects due to seismic loads. Seismic considerations for these structures are 241.18-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR discussed in the response to Question 230.5 and in Section 3.7.3.12. Section 2 5.4.7 has been changed to indicate where soil structure interaction considerations are discussed. O O Rev. 12, 10/82 241.18-2
i l I LGS FSAR I (O V OUESTION 430.5 (Sections 7.0, 8.0) i i i Incidents have occurred at nuclear power stations that indicate a deficiency in the electrical control circuitry design. These incidents included the inadvertent disabling of a component by , racking out the circuit breakers for a different component. , As a result of these o:currences, we request that you perform a review of the electrical control circuits of all safety-related equipment at the plant, so as to assure that disabling of one component does not, through incorporation in other interlocking or sequencing controls, render other components inoperable. All modes of test, operation and failure should be considered. Verify and state the results of your review. Also your procedures should be reviewed to ensure they provide that, whenever a part of a redundant system is removed from service, the portion remaining in service is functionally tested immediately after the disabling of the affected portion. Verify that your procedures include the above cited provisions.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982. l i i O ., 430.5-1 Rev. 12,'10/82
LGS FSAR O QUESTION 430.6 (Section 8.1.2) In FSAR Section 8.1.2 you state that the 200 kV and 500 kV substations have three elements each. If these elements are buses, then a discrepancy exists between your description and the information provided on Figure 8.2.2 which shows two buses in each substation. Clarify the above, and correct the FSAR description and figures as necessary.
RESPONSE
The description in Section 8.1.2 has been clarified. The term
" element" refers to each of the bus-to-bus connections. In the 220kV substation, an element would be that which connects Bus 7 to Bus 5 and would include breakers 735, 635 and 535. It would -
also include the associated disconnect switches, potential transformers, protective relaying, and control systems. This description of an element would hold for both the 220kV and 500kV substations. O O l ! 430.6-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 L
LGS FSAR O OUESTION 430.7 (Section 3.1, 8.1)
- i Section 8.1 and 3.1 of the FSAR indicates that the design of the l onsite power system conforms only to GDC 17 ind 18 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. It is the staff requirement that the Limerick ,
offsite power system conform to GDC 5, 17, and 18 and the onsite power system conform to GDC 2, 4, 5, 17, 18 and 50. Revise the FSAR to indicate compliance with these GDCs or justify noncompliance. 1
RESPONSE
Sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 have been revised to indicate that the design of the offsite power system conforms to GDC5, 17, and 18 and that the onsite power system design conforms to GDC 2, 4, 5, j 17, 18, and 50. The follcwing discussion clarifies the methods of compliance with these criteria. Offsite Power System GDC 5 and 18 apply to power systems that are "important to O- safety". Although the offsite power systems are not "important to safety" as defined in 10CFR50, Appendix A, and as stated in the letter from J.S. Kemper to A. Schwencer dated June 15, 1982, the offsite power system design conforms to these GDCs. As shown in Figures 8.2-1 and 8.2-2 and as discussed in Section 8.2.1.1, the two offsite power sources do not share any common structures, systems, or components external to the generating station. Internal to the generating station, the offsite sources terminate in a common room on separate and independent buses that are approximately 90 feet apart. The No. 4 bus tie auto transformer ,
; that provides local flow stability between the 220kV and 500kV '
substations represents a common link between the two offsite sources; however, at least one 13kV and two 220kV circuit breakers provide isolation between the two startup feeds as shown in Figure 8.2-2. The requirements of GDC 5 are therefore met. GDC 17 is met by the present design, in that each offsite source l is capable of supplying all safety-related loads during a LOCA in one unit with a simultaneous safe shutdown of the other unit
- while maintaining proper voltage regulation. Two Class IE buses in each unit are continuously fed from one of the offsite sources with automatic transfer to the other offsite source if the preferred source should be lost. The remaining two Class IE buses in each unit are fed from the remaining offsite source.
The requirements of GDC 17 are therefore met. 430.7-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR GDC 18 is met for the offsite power systems, in that the capability exists with the present design to manually transfer all Class IE buses to either offsite source during normal plant operation. The status of the 220kV and 500kV substations is monitored in the control room, and transmission line protective relaying is tested on a routine basis without removing the line from service. Onsite Power System The design of the onsite Class IE power system fully complies with the requirements of GDC 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, and 50 as clarified below. GDC 2 and 4 are met, in that all components of the Class 1E onsite power system are housed in seismic Caitgory I structures and have been or will be qualified to the appropriate seismic, hydrodynamic, and environmental levels as discussed in Chapter 3. GDC 5 is met, in that there are no Class 1E components of the onsite power system that are shared between Units 1 and 2. GDC 17 and 18 are met as discussed in Section 8.3.2.2.1. GDC 50, as it relates to the design of circuits using containment h electrical penetration assemblies, is met as discussed in Section 8.1.6.1.12. l l l O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.7-2
LGS FSAR q Q QUESTION 430.8 (Section 8.1.2) In FSAR Section 8.1.2 you state that the transmission system to Unit I will be completed prior to Unit 1 fuel loading and the transmission lines to Unit 2 will be completed prior to Unit 2 fuel loading. No discussion or completion dates for the 500 kV switchyard (second source of offsite power) and the 33 kV Comby-Moser tie line (third source of offsite power) is provided. Provide estimated completion date for completion of all switchyards, lines that may be used to provide power to the 220 kV and 500 kV switchyard, and the'33 kV Comby-Moser line.
RESPONSE
The estimated completion date for both the 220 and 500kV substations is February 15, 1983. The completion date for the 33kV lines used for substation auxiliary power (2300 and 5500 lines) in both substations is November 1, 1982. The Moser-Cromby line (2300) is an operating line and therefore is presently in service. The estimated service date for the 20 13kV regulating transformer, located in the 500kV substation is June 1, 1983. n v 430.8-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.9 (Section 8.1) In FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.2 you state that the suitability of each diesel generator was confirmed by qualification testing which was generally in conformance with IEEE-323-1971. This is an ambiguous statement. Amend your FSAR to provide detailed information on what qualification testing was conducted and provide justification for any exception taken to the above requirements. Additionally expand your discussion on conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.,9 to demonstrate that its requirements and the requirements of ICSB-2 and IEEE 387-1977 are met as pertains to the 300 consecutive start tests.
RESPONSE
Qualification testing is discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11. Section 8.1.6.1.2 has been changed to state that the suitability of each diesel generator was confirmed by qualification testing in compliance with NUREG-0588 for Category II equipment. An Environmental Qualification Report that will provide information on the qualification testing performed will be provided in January 1983. O Limerick diesel generators are not required to pass a 300 consecutive start qualification test for the following reasons:
- a. IEEE 387-1977, which mandates a 300 start test, is not applicable to Limerick because the purchase 1
specification was issued to Colt prior to the implementation date of the standard (July 1975 vs. June 1977)
- b. The trial use version of IEEE 387, issued in 1972 and committed to for Limerick in Section 8.1.6.2, did not mandate a 300 start test.
- c. Limerick conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. O t (3/71), which requires only that "The suitability of each diesel generator ... be confirmed by prototype qualification test data and preoperational tests." .
Revision 2, which specificially endorses IEEE 387-1977, is applicable only to plants that received a construction permit after December 1979. This is indicated in Section 1.8. [} 430.9-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- d. Standard Review Plan 8.3.1 states that diesel generator qualification testing programs are acceptable if they satisfy Position 5 of Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.9.
Neither of the applicable revisions of these documents require a 300 start prototype test. The 12-cylinder model 38-TDD-1/8 Colt diesel engine employed at Limerick was qualified to a 100 start test conducted in 1968. This model engine has been used in the following plants that have received Operating Licenses: Robinson 2 Prairie Island 1 &2 Vermont Yankee Three Mile Island 1 & 2 Calvert Clifts 1 & 2 Crystal River 3 E.I. Hatch 1 &2 Duane Arnold North Anna 1 & 2 Millstone 1 & 2 Farley 1 &2 Arkansas Nuclear One, 2 ' Peach Bottom 2 & 3 Fermi 2 i Branch Technical Position ICSB-2 (PSB) Revision 1, and l Paragraph 6.3 of IEEE 387-1977, both of which require a 300 start test, specifically state that the qualification testing procedures delineated therein are only applicable to diesel , generators of a type or size not previously qualified for nuclear plant service. As evidenced by the above, the Limerick units : have been qualified and demonstrated to be reliable in nuclear service; therefore, adequate justification exists not to pursue a 300 start test. i l i 9 Rev. 12, 10/82 430.9-2
LGS FSAR (~ (s,)i OUESTION 430.10 (Section 8.1) In the FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.2 you state that the standby diesel generators are capable of maintaining during the steady state and loading sequence the frequency and voltage above a level that may degrade the performance of any load below their minimum requirements. This statement is too general. Regulatory Guide 1.9-1979 requires that the frequency and voltage not fall below 95 percent and 75 percent of nominal respectively. This guide additionally requires that frequency should be restored to within . 2 percent of nominal and voltage to within 10 percent of nominal within 60 percent of each load-sequence interval. In addition, during the recovery from transients caused by step load increases or resulting from disconnection of the largest single load, the speed of the diesel generator unit should not exceed the nominal speed plus 75 percent of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint or 115 percent of nominal, whichever is lower. Expand your FSAR to show that the diesel generators conform with the above.
RESPONSE
g Section 8.1.6.1.2 has been changed to provide the requested information. 1 g I
\~-
430.10-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR q l ) OUESTION 430.11~ (Section 8.1.6) Your. discussion on electrical penetrations in Section 8.1.6.1.12 of the FSAR does not provide sufficient information for , evaluation. We require the following requirements of IEEE 279- 1 1971 and guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.63 must be satisfied ! with regard to the protection of electrical penetrations:
)
l
- 1. The system shall, with precision and reliability aut.omatically disconnect power to penetration conductors when currents through the conductors exceed the established limits.
- 2. All primary and backup breaker overload and short circuit protection systems shall be qualified for the service environment including seismic. However, the seismic qualification for non-Class 1E circuit breaker i protection systems should be as a minimum assure that the protection systems remain operable during an oprating basis earthquake. In addition the non-Class 1E
, s circuit breaker and protection system shall be of high j quality.
- 3. The circuit breaker protection system trip set points and breaker coordination between primary and backup protection shall have the capability for test and calibration. Provisions for test under simulated fault conditions should be provided. For designs where protection is provided by a combination of a breaker and fuse of two fuses in series, provisions shall be provided for nondestructive testing of fuses.
- 4. No single failure shall cause excessive current in the penetration conductors which will degrade the j penetration seal.
- 5. Where external control power is needed for tripping breakers, signals for tripping primary and backup breakers shall be independent, physically separated and powered from separate sources.
Provide response to the above and additionally provide time-current coordination curves for each size penetration. These ('j'N ( curves shall include 12t penetration and cable rating curves for instantaneous, long and short time overcurrent trips provided by 430.11-1 Rev. 12 ', 10/82
LGS FSAR primary and backup protective devices. Include a single line diagram which shows circuit configuration and breaker coordination in addition to the provided curves. If tests have been conducted to support penetrations that are protected by current limiting devices such as transformers, or other devices provide these applicable test results.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982. O O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.11-2 ____--___-____a
l LGS FSAR D (Section 8.1.6)
\- / OUESTION 430.12 Provide a description of the physical arrangement utilized in your design to connect field cables inside containment to the I containment penetration. Provide supportive documentation that these physical interfaces are qualified to withstand a LOCA or steamline break accident.
RESPONSE i Field cables inside containment are connected to the containment penetration conductors in terminal boxes located next to the penetration. The method for connecting field cables to the penetration conductors is as follows:
- a. Medium Voltage Power Penetration i
The terminal lug on the field cable is bolted to the penetratir,n connector assembly. The terminal lug and the connector assembly are then covered by heat shrink tubing. 4 O These are non-Class 1E terminations.
- b. Low Voltage Power, Control and Instrumentation, Thermocouple and Low Level Signal
- 1. For penetration conductors that are 250 MCM, the terminal lugs on the penetration conductors and field cables are bolted and then covered by heat shrink tubing.
- 2. For all other cases, the penetration conductors and field cable are spliced by in-line barrel splice connectors covered by heat shrink tubing.
- c. Control Rod Drive Penetration Field cables and penetration conductors are terminated by circular pin connectors. These are non-Class 1E terminations.
430.12-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR
- d. Neutron Monitoring Penetration
- 1. Field coaxial cables to penetration coaxial conductors are connected by coaxial connectors covered by heat shrink tubing.
- 2. Field coaxial cables to penetration 416 AWG conductors are spliced by in-line barrel splice connectors covered by heat shrink tubing.
All splices discussed in b and d are qualified to withstand a LOCA or steamline break accident. Supportive documentation that confirms the qualification of the splices will be included in the equipment qualification report which will be submitted at least 4 months prior to the operating license. The circular pin connectors in item c above are not safety-related. The failure of the circular pin connectors will not degrade the containment pressure boundary integrity because the circular pin connectors do not form part of the pressure boundary. O O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.12-2
r j LGS FSAR e
\
OUESTION 430.13 (Section 8.1.6) l In FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.14 you discuss conformance and list
- exceptions to Regulatory Guide 1.75. Expand your FSAR to include i sufficient detailed information for staff evaluation in the following areas:
I
- 1. Provide examples of each type of re3ay or other devices i used for isolation between Class 1E and non-Class IE l circuits.- Provide analyses supported by testing to show how each type of device is qualified for this function. '
- In addition provide justification for not meeting the
~
required six inches of separation at the device terminals and demonstrate that your preposed separation distances will' provide adequate separation. ; l 2. In Section(4)(c) you state that the public address and fire alarms panels which are non-Class IE and powered ; i from a Class 1E supply are not tripped on a LOCA signal. We require that these and any other non-Class 1E loads supplied from Class 1E sources that are not tripped on a i LOCA be provided with coordinated redundant Class 1E
< Os protective devices, i.e., fuses or circuit breaks,
, connected in series. Amend your FSAR to show compliance with the above. i
; 3. In Section (b)(6) you state that the Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC) has been evaluated in G.E.
1 Topical Report " Power Generation Control Complex" NEDO-
, 10466. Our review of other BWR plants (ex-Clinton) of similar design has shown that flexible conduit is used . in the PGCC to separate the nonessential fire l protection, communication, and utility wiring from essential wiring. It is additionally used in MSIV and ! reactor protection solenoid wiring to prevent hot shorts. We require that series connected redundant i protective devices be installed in these circuits to i clear internal faults and prevent overheating of adjacent essential cables. Amend your FSAR to show compliance with the above.
I I i 4. In Section (b)(9)(d) you state that control switches for i redundant divisions may be located in the same panel provided that no single credible event can disable both ; sets of redundant controls. Provide a description (with () 1
! drawings) of detail design features, analysis and
[ 430.13-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR testing conducted to insure that no single event will S, render both redundant channels inoperative.
- 5. In Section (b)(9)(d)(1) you state that physical l limitations in cabinets 10C606, 20C606, 10C608, 20C608, 10C633 and 20C633 prevent maintaining separation between different Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E circuits.
Provide analysis and test results to show how the Class 1E and associated circuits are not degraded below an acceptable level in this application.
- 6. On the 125V DC circuito for the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) you state that even though the circuits are routed to the terminal boxes in conduit adequate separation cannot be maintained in the terminal boxes.
Provide the test / analysis results which show that a failure in these terminal boxes will not degrade the Class IE power system.
- 7. In Section (b)(9)(d)(2) you state that any exceptions to the required separation criteria will be justified by engineering analysis. Provide a list and the supporting analysis to justify the areas where you do not comply with the required separation criteria.
- 8. In Section (b)(9)(d)(2) you state that where the minimum separation requirements cannot be met for redundant devices in a single panel, one device and its associated wiring will be enclosed in fire resistant material.
Define this fire resistant material. We require that the wiring for both redundant devices be enclosed in solid conduit or an analysis provided which shows that fire in one circuit will not damage the other circuit. Amend your FSAR to provide detailed information on the above. , 9. In Section (b)(9)(c) you imply that the Class 1E cables ( of redundant trains are separated by 6 inches when l entering the control panel enclosure. IEEE 384-1974 l requires that the cables either meet the 1 foot ' horizontal /3 foot vertical clearance or be run in solid conduit in any area where this requirement is not m.et. Provide details on how your design meets the requirements or justify noncompliance. O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.13-2
f i LGS FSAR , ( 10. In Section (b)(9)(g) you state that cables run in floor j sections are color banded every 10 feet. Regulatory l Guide 1.75 requires that cables in raceways be clearly l
- identified every 5 feet. The staff considers these j floor structure raceways, therefore, we require that !
.. these cables be identified every 5 feet. '
i i +
- 11. In Section (a)(4)(b) you state that all non-Class IE 4kV motor loads that are fed from Class 1E buses are treated j and identified as Claes 1E even beyond the isolation
- devices. Expand your FSAR discussion to show the extent ,
- of these circuits meet the requirements of IEEE 384-1974 i
.. Section 4.5 and Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2, i
.Section C.4. Expand your FSAR discussion to show how l
!' the above requirements are met. l
- 12. In Section (a)(4)(c) you imply that the transformers for the public address and fire alarm parels are isolation i: devices. Provide the analysis and test results used to qualify the transformers as isolation devices, or ;
i
- identify what qualified isolation devices are used.
l 13. In Section (a)(5) you state that non-Class 1E circuits j that do not meet the separation requirements for Class 1E circuits are treated as associated circuits. i Additionally you state that 440 volt non-Class 1E motors
- that are fed from Class 1E buses are tripped (isolated)
, on a LOCA signal. Discuss how all other non-Class 1E l l loads which are fed from Class 1E buses are isolated in l the event of a fault to prevent degrading the Class IE t power source. If these non-Class 1E loads because of ,
- cable routing fail to meet the separation requirements past the isolation device then they become associated circuits and must meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2 and IEEE 384-1974. Expand your FSAR to show how these circuits meet the above requirements.
RESPONSE
i
- 1. The following isolation devices are used at Limerick to provide isolation between Class 1E and non-Class IE circuits:
- a. 4kV circuit breakers
- b. 480V circuit breakers
- c. 480V motor starters O d.
e. auxiliary relays Optic isolators l 430.13-3 Rev. 12, 10/82 4
LGS FSAR
- f. Control switches
- g. Voltage transducers The circuit breakers and motor starters are qualified to perform an isolation function through prototype tests performed to NEMA and ANSI standards. In addition, the devices are qualified for seismic and environmental conditions in accordance with NUREG-0588 as discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11.
The auxiliary relays used as isolation devices in Bechtel and General Electric designed circuits are listed in section I.C of the proprietary PECo Research and Test Division Test Repor t 48503, " Design Verification Test Report, Internal Panel Control Wiring Separation Criteria, Limerick Generating ' Station, Units 1 and 2," dated September 1, 1982. The devices were tested for both overvoltage and overcurrent isolation. The test results are given in section 5.4 of the test repcrt. Optic isolators are seismically and environmentally qualified. The fiber optic cable inherently isolates the Class 1E input from the non-Class 1E system at the receiving end of the cable. Control switches are seismically qualified and located in a mild environment. The manufacturer's test data on breakdown voltages and current interrupting capacity of the contacts are used to determine the adequacy of the device for isolation purposes. The voltage transducers are seismically qualified and located in a mild environment. They are presently being tested in accordance with IEEE 384-1981 to determine their adequacy as isolation devices. The justification for not providing 6 inches of separation at the device terminals is based on test results given in section 5.4.1 of the above-mentioned test report, which shows that no separation is required between wires terminating on isolation relays.
- 2. As stated in Section 8.1.6.1.14.a.4.c, the distribution panel and transformer associated with the public address and fire alarm systems are both seismically and environmentally qualified, even though they are non-Class IE. They are fed from a Class 1E motor control center 440V bus through a Class 1E molded case circuit breaker. The distribution panel uses a circuit break,er to feed each circuit. As a result, this configuration is in compliance with the above stated NRC position. The circuit breakers in the distribution panel are the primary isolation devices. The molded case circuit l
l Rev. 12, 10/82 430.13-4 1 i
LGS FSAR p ( breaker in the motor control center is the redundant isolation device. Both are qualified and treated as Class 1E.- The FSAR has been changed to provide this clarification.
- 3. Series-connected redundant protective devices are not required to clear faults internal to flexible conduit or to prevent overheating of adjacent cables. All flexible conduits in the powe:: generation control complex are positively grounded to panel stee) and were checked to ensure that the resistance to grouno on the conduit is less than 4 ohms at all points. The probability of the failure of a single fuse to clear a fault was given in WASH-1400, Appendix III, Table III.2-1, as 3x10-5 to 3x10-6, which shows that this scenario is an extremely low probability event. In addition, the test results presented in section 5.3.2 of the above-mentioned test report show tnat the damage of adjacent essential cables due to an uncleared internal conduit fault is not a credible event. For this reason, it is not necessary to install redundant overcurrent devices in circuits that run in flexible conduit.
- 4. The design basis for the internal panel separation criteria is presented in section 2.1 of the above-mentioned test
( report. On the basis of that test report, Revision 7 of the FSAR changed to description of the separation requirements for Class 1E components mounted in control panels (Section 8.1.6.1.14.b.9.c.5). The test program showed that the revised separation criteria are adequate for protection against the consequences of a sustained overcurrent condition on one of the circuits in the panel. The criteria are not designed to protect against an exposure fire in the panel because alternate safe shutdown methods are provided in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, in the event of a fire in the control room.
- 5. Revision 7 of the FSAR deleted this exception to the
. separation criteria. The separation provided in these pcnels will meet the criteria currently presented in Section 8.1.6.1.14.b.9.
- 6. In each MSIV terminal box, two divisions of wiring are present, i.e., reactor protection system ac (nonsafety-related) and one Class 1E de division. Given a failure in the terminal box, three types of failures can be assumed:
- a. Open circuit
- b. Hot short
- c. Short to ground (l
s_s For the first scenario, the MSIVs would fail closed because l the pilot solenoids would be de-energized. For the second , 430.13-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
I.CS FSAR scenario, while it could be postulated that the pilot solenoids would stay energized, the redundant MSIVs would not be affected because the outboard MSIV pilot solenoids are fed from different ac and de buses than are the inboard MSIVs. For the third scenario, refer to item 3) below. Any failure within these terminal boxes would not degrade the safety-related de system because:
- 1) Given any failure, only one division of the four safety-related de divisions would be involved.
- 2) There is a 5A fuse in both de feed legs in the logic panel feeding the de solenoids. There is also a 30A ;
fuse in each leg at the de distribution panel. Because these two fuses are in series between the terminal box and the de dirtribution bus, the probability of both fuses failing to clear a hot short is conservatively estimated to be 9x10-** based on failure information given in WASH-1400, Appendix III, Table III.2-1. This is considered to be acceptable.
- 3) A short of the de feed to ground would not unacceptably i degrade the de system because each de system is ungrounded. The ground would be detected by a Class 1E '
ground detector and the de system would continue to ' operate as designed. l
- 7. Revision 7 of the FSAR changed the list of exceptions to the i separation criteria listed in Section 8.1.6.1.14.b.9. Those .
exceptions are listed and justified in the above-mentioned test report. Since that FSAR change, the following exceptions have been identified: ;
- a. Thermocouple wires of different divisions of the steam [
leak detection system do not require separation from each othe:; in panels C609, C611, C620, and C640. These thermocouple wires are separated from power and control i cables using the separation criteria in Section 8.1.6.1.14.b.9. Rationale: i
- 1) All thermocouple wires are No. 16AWG, which will not ignite due to overcurrent.
- 2) All thermocouple cables for this system are routed in instrumentation trays that do not contain power or control cables; therefore, no potential l overcurrent source exists for these wires.
l b. Non-Class 1E power cables that are fed from Class 1E buses are isolated on a LOCA. These cables from the 4kV and 440 V load center buses are routed as Class IE in - Rev. 12, 10/82 430.13-6 -
LGS FSAR dedicated raceways. Where these cables enter equipment, they are treated as non-Class 1E for separation purposes. Rationale: These cables are isolated on an accident signal; therefore, they may be treated as non-Class 1E in , accordance with IEEE 384-1981.
- c. In certain cases, less than one inch separation is r^ allowed between redundant enclosed raceways. The rationale for this exception is discussed in section 5.3.2 of the above-mentioned test report.
f d. Some GE-furnished RPS cables are routed in Engineered Safeguards System raceway. These cables are identified ? as RPS and routed in steel flexible conduit in [ accordance with GE design requirements. This installation is acceptable because flexible conduit , provides the required system fail-safe prctection and
- . because none of the RPG cables are redundant to the ESS cables located in the same raceway.
{
- 8. The fire-resistant materials that are used as barriers for internal panel separation are panel steel, solid or flexible steel conduit und fiberglass sleeving. Where a barrier is O- required between devices in a common panel, the metal casing of the device is considered to be an adequate barrier for containing internal device failures. The analyses that shows that a failure of one circuit will not affect an adjacent circuit are provided in the above-mentioned test report.
- 9. IEEE 384-1981, section 6.6.2, states that Class 1E cables and wires internal to control panels are to be separated by
- 6 inches or a barrier from redundant Class 1E and/or non-Class 1E cables and wires. Internal to the panel, these requirements are met by the entering cables, as described in Section 8.1.6.1.14.b.9. External to the panel, the raceways meet the separation requirements of IEEE 384 for non-hazard areas. Where the cables pass through blockouts into the panels, they are separated by fire barriers. k 10. The longitudinal floor ducts of the power generation control b complex are marked with color-coded raceway markers on the top of the steel side beam. The cables contained in each duct are generally of one division only. A cable of one
- division may be run in the duct of another division only if it is run in flexible steel conduit. Because of the congestion of these ducts, only the top several cables are
, visible when the floor cover is removed. ~ The purpose of the requirement of IEEE 384 to color-code cables every five feet is to aid in the installation of these 430.13-7 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR l cables to ensure that they are pulled into the correct OlI raceway. Cable installation in the power generation control complex floor sections is nearly complete. Cable installation has been performed to approved quality control procedures and in accordance with the system cable routing document provided by GE. Based on the above, we believe that no increase in plant safety would be achieved by marking the cables in the power generation control complex floor every five feet and that the present ten-foot interval meets the intent of IEEE 384.
- 11. The non-Class 1E motor loads that are fed from the Class 1E buses are in full compliance with IEEE 384-1974, section 4.5.(2). The isolation device is the Class 1E 4kV circuit .
breaker. The cable schemes associated with these breakers are Class 1E and are routed as such. Because the 4kV power cables are part of these cable schemes, they are identified and routed as Class IE, even though they are non-Class 1E in function. These cables are routed in dedicated raceway and do not become associated with any other Class 1E system. The design is therefore in compliance with IEEE 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. The FSAR has been changed to provide the above clarification.
- 12. The transformer for the public address and fire alarm system is not considered to be an isolation device. Refer to tus response in paragraph 2 above.
- 13. Section 8.1.6.1.14.a.5 has been changed for clarification.
Limerick does not have associated circuits as defined in IEEE 384. All non-Class 1E loads that are fed from Class 1E buses are automatically isolated on an accident signal, except for the public address and fire alarm panel discussed in the response in paragraph 2 above. All non-Class 1E cables fed from a Class 1E bus that are isolated on an accident signal are identified and routed as non-Class 1E except as discussed in the response in paragraph 11 above. O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.13-8
LGS FSAR l$ l
'- # OUESTION 430.14 (Section'8.1.6.1.7)
Concerning Regulatory Guides 1.93 and 1.108 we will require that the final technical specifications for this station include the applicable provisions of these regulatory guides. Accordingly, verify that these specifications will include these provisions or if applicable explicitly identify any exceptions and provide justification for the exception.
RESPONSE
The Limerick final technical spscifications will provide for conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.93 and 1.108 as discussed in FSAR Section 1.8. . I O l i
\
430.14-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
% ~# ~- * -.p
LGS FSAR f3 \- QUESTION 430.15 (Section 8.1.6) In FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.19 you provide a discussion on conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.106 " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves." You state that MOVs with maintained contact control switches which are not required to operate during an accident will not have the thermal overloads bypassed. Provide a listing of any Class IE MOV on which the overloads are not bypassed during accident conditions.
RESPONSE
The overload relays do not interrupt power to the safety-related valve motors during an accident. Section 8.1.6.1.19 has been changed to reflect this current design. Safety-related motor-operated valves with maintained contact control switches have thermal overload relays that alarm in the control room. O o %J 430.15-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
i f i LGS FSAR f () GUESTION 430.16 (Section 8.1.6) i In FSAR Section 8.1.6.1 you state that Regulatory Guides 1.108, i 1.118,. and 1.129 are not applicable to LGS due to implementation l dates. These Regulatory Guides reflect staff practice used in !
, evaluating plants for a year or more prior to implementation i dates. Provir?e a detailed discussion of compliance or '
justification for noncompliance. Modify your FSAR accordingly. l t L RESPONSE-f i Section 8.1.6.1.20 has been changed to provide information on l Limerick's degree of compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.108. ! Section 8.1.6.1.21 has been changed to provide information on Limerick's degree of compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.118. Section 8.1.6.1.23 has been changed to provide information on Limerick's degree of compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.129. . i h I i I I i i l I () 430.16-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
r
. LGS FSAR
) OUESTION 430.17 (Section 8.1.6)
In FSAR Section 8.1.6.2 you state that the LGS design of the standby power supplies is in compliance with IEEE 387-1972 except for item (9)(f). Your discussion does not contain an item (9)(f) or detailed justification for noncompliance. Provide this informatfon and amend your FSAR accordingly.
RESPONSE
Section 8.1.6.2 has been changed to provide the requested information. Section 8.1.6.2 is in compliance with IEEE 387-1972 without exception. 7 i t i I i i i 1 I i i ([]) ! 430.17-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 [ l
LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.18 (Section 8.1) FSAR Section 8.1 does not provide details on how your design meets the requirements of Branch Technical Positions BTP-ICSB-4, ICSB-8, ICSB-11, ICBS-18, ICSB-21, PSB-1 and PSB-2. Provide this information and amend your FSAR accordingly. RESPONSE l l The requested information will be provided by November 1982. l 1 1 O O 430.18-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
D+ , LGS FSAR ps T_) s OUESTION 430.19 (Section 8.2) , GDC 17 requires in part that each of the offsite circuits be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of all onsite alternating current power supplies and the other offsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. The description in the FSAR as to compliance with this part of GDC 17 is not sufficient to reach a conclusion of acceptability. Describe design provisions for establishing an offsite circuit from the transmission system through the switchyard to the Class IE system assuming some event in the switchyard protective relaying that has tripped all 345 kV switchyard breakers.
RESPONSE
Limerick does not have a 345kV switchyard or circuit breakers. The Class 1E AC system is continuously supplied by the two offsite power sources. Two Class 1E 4kV buses in each unit are O supplied from each offsite source. On the loss of one of these offsite sources, degraded grid voltage relays initiate an automatic transfer to the remaining offsite source. The time i needed to complete this transfer varies depending on the magnitude of back electromagnetic force (EMF) generated on the bus by large motor loads and by the voltage level of the degraded offsite source. In all cases, the transfer is completed in less than the 13 seconds it would take to re-energize the bus from the diesel generator on the loss of all offsite power. i O 't 430.19-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 1 _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , . , , ----,c---- - - - - - - - - . . - - - , _ - . - . - - - - - - - - - . - - . , - . . - - - - - . _ _ _ . - -
LGS FSAR l OUESTION 430.20 (Section 8.2) The control and monitoring of the offsite power circuits from the switchyard to the Class IE power system is shared between units 1 and 2. Provide a description of compliance to GDC 5.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by the end of December 1982. l O l l 1 i O 430.20-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
. .- .- - . . .\
t l-l LGS FSAR l QUESTION 430.21 (Section 8.2) j , The capability to test the transfer of power from one immediate l access offsite circuit to the other circuit has not been i specifically addressed in the FSAR. Describe how this transfer can be tested during plant normal operation and its compliance j with GDC 18.
RESPONSE
The capability to test the transfer of power from one offsite source to the other circuit can be accomplished from the control room (Figure 8.1-1). By tripping either the 101 or 201 transformer breaker, the loss of one offsite source will be simulated and the automatic transfer to the other offsite source will be initiated on the four Class IE buses that are normally fed from that source. These buses can then be manually transferred back to their preferred source after the transformer breaker is closed. O 430.21-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
c LGS FSAR () OUESTION 430.22 (Section 8.2.1) In FSAR Section 8.2.1.1 you provide a discussion on the two sources of offsite power and a third source that may be connected if one.of the two primary sources is inoperative. Does each of these three sources have the capacity to supply all connected loads including loads that may be automatically transferred to them? This includes the loading that exists with an accident (LOCA) in one unit and a simultaneous safe shutdown of the Lacond unit as required by GDC 5 and GDC 17. Provide a detailed discussion on the above and amend your FSAR accordingly.
RESPONSE
All three sources of offsite power, including transmission lines and transformers, have suf ficie: : capacity to supply all connected loads including loads that may be automatically transferred to them when a LOCA in one unit coincides with a safe shutdown in the remaining unit. Section 8.2.1.1 has been changed to expand the discussion of the capacities of the offsite sources. O V b v 430.22-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR f3 OUESTION 430.23 (Section 8.2) The information provided in 8.2.1.2 of the FSAR and referenced Figures 8.2-1, 8.2-2 and 8.2-3 fails to provide sufficient information on the transmission lines that originate or terminate at the 220 kV or 500 kV switchyards. Provide a description, supplemented by drawings, which show the routing, separation, crossovers and completion dates of planned lines. Our concern is that a falling tower or transmission line may reduce the sources of offsite power to less than the requirements of GDC 17. Additionally on the provided figures, indicate the capacity of each transmission line and separately discuss the control room indication provided to monitor the offsite power system. If this information is provided in the FSAR,' reference the FSAR location where it is included.
RESPONSE
Figure 8.2-6 has been added to provide the. requested information. One 230kV transmission line (220-60) with 1200 MVA capacity will be routed on the east side of the Schuylkill River from the C') Limerick 220kV substation to a point opposite Cromby Station. From that point, the line will leave a railraod right-of-way, join an existing Philadelphia Electric right-of-way, and cross the Schuylkill River to enter Cromby Station. Another 230kV transmission line (220-61) with 1200 MVA capacity will be routed from the Limerick 220kV substation along the west side of the Schuylkill River on a railroad right-of-way to Cromby Station. The two 230kV lines do not cross each other at any point. The existing 500kV transmission line (5010) with 2780 MVA capacity crosses the Schuylkill River from the west and will run above both of the 230kV transmission lines. It will be terminated in the Limerick 500kV substation. Where the existing 5010 line leaves the 500kV substation towards the east, it will become the 5030 line.
^
Another 500kV transmission line (5031) of 2780 MVA capacity parallels the 5030 line from the 500kV substation to Whitpain for the operation of Limerick Unit 2. From the sketch, it can be seen that the requirements of GDC 17 are met in that in the unlikely event of the 5010 line falling /"~% and causing the failure of both 230kV transmission lines, the ( ,) 5030 line would still be available to provide an offsite source of power for the safe shutdown of the plant. 430.23-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR The capacities of the transmission lines have been added to Section 8.2.1.1. See also the response to Question 430.22. Control Room Monitorino of Offsite Power Systems The status of the offsite power system is monitored in the control room by the plant process computer. A dedicated supervisory CRT provides the following status indications along with other pertinent information:
*1. Transmission Line Current for:
220 - 60 Line 5030 Line 220 - 61 Line 5031 Line 5010 Line
*2. 220kV Substation Bus Voltage *3. 500kV Substation Bus Voltage *4. 220kV Substation Breaker Current *5. 220kV Substation Breaker Positions
- 6. 500kV Substation Breaker Currents
*7. 500kV Substation Breaker Positions *8. 44 Tie Transformer Watts and Vars
- 9. 44 Tie Transformer Tap Positions
*10. 4105 Startup Breaker Position *11. 4205 Startup Breaker Position
- 12. Miscellaneous 220kV and 500kV Substation Alarms
- Upon loss of the plant process computer, these items are f available from the PECo load dispatcher via dedicated phone line. ;
i 9 . Rev. 12, 10/82 430.23-2 e
LGS FSAR s OUESTION 430.24 (Section 8.2.1) FSAR Section 8.2.1.2 describes the switchyard, switchyard breakers and protective relaying. This description fails to provide sufficient information for evaluation. Expand your FSAR
~
discussion to include the following: (1) The types of relaying used for primary and backup protection of all lines terminating in the switchyards. Include figures that show this relaying. 1 (2) Justification for using a single non-Class IE dc (battery) source to supply redundant protection for the 220 kV and 500 kV switchyard relay and control systems. (3) A listing of all operating stations for switchyard breakers. 1 (4) Switchyard breaker accumulator capacity (ability to ( operate breakers with a loss of power).
}
(5) Operator action required upon loss of control or motive power to perform switching operations from local stations. (6) Periodic testing of switchyard batteries. (7) Routing and separation of control power to switchyard equipment.
~
i (8) Indication of bypassed or deliberately induced inoperability of the offsite power protection system as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.47.
RESPONSE
Figures 8.2-4 and 8.2-5 have been added and Section 8.2.1.2 has been changed to provide the requested information. () The provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.47 pertain to protection systems and their supporting auxiliary systems as defined in IEEE 430.24-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 !
1 LGS FSAR 279-1971. As such, the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.47 do not apply to the offsite power system. Failure of the offsite power system is annunciated in the Limerick control room by the degraded grid voltage protection relays described in the response to Question 430.38. Control circuits of major equipment in the substations as well as the protective relaying circuits are monitored for loss of ; voltage by indicating lights and alarms. Power supplies for solid state relaying equipment alarm upon failure. l l l i r i l i l i l t i I i O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.24-2 f i
r LGS FSAR O) (s, OUESTION 430.25 (Section 8.2.1) FSAR Sections 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2 you discuss the protective relaying for the offsite power sources and the switchyards. This discussion is not adequate to complete our evaluation. Amend your FSAR to include a figure (single line diagram) which shows the protective relaying, its power supplies and physical layout' drawing showing routing in the switchyard.
RESPONSE
Sections 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2 have been changed and Figures 8.2-4 and 8.2-5 have been added to provide the requested information. O O l 430.25-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 l l
- - ~ . - ~ - - -
7 i LGS FSAR l () OUESTION 430.26 (Section 8.2.2) 1 Section 8.2.2.1 of the FSAR discusses grid stability. Your discussion and grid stability analysis is not complete. Frovide a revised load flow and stability analysis that also covers the following: (Ref. SRP 8.2)
- 1. Loss of largest generating station
- 2. Loss of largest load
- 3. Loss of most critical transmission line or right of way if insufficient clearance exist between lines or transmission towers.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided in the first quarter of 1983. O l l l 1 l d O 430.26-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
i LGS FSAR l OUESTION 430.27 (Section 8.3.1) FSAR Section 8.3.1.1 indicates that the distribution system nominal voltage ratings are different from ANSI ratings. Do you have a 440V nominal system voltage or is it 480 or 460 volts.
RESPONSE
Section 8.3.1.1 has been changed to provide the requested information. O O 430.27-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR QUESTION 430.28 (Section 8.3.1) FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.1 states that manual intertie breakers are ' provided to connect the double ended 440 volt load centers ; together. Are-interlocks provided to prevent paralleling of the two power supplies to these buses. Provide a detail description of the interlocking and amend the FSAR accordingly.
RESPONSE
Interlocks are provided to prevent paralleling of the two power I supplies to these buses. l Section 8.3.1.1.1 has been changed to provide the requested information. i l l l j 430.28-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 l 1
r LGS FSAR QUESTION 430.29 (Section 8.3.1) FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.1 indicates that the startup and safeguard transformers are provided with load tap changers. Provide a detailed description of the load tap changer operation, i.e., manual or automatic, on-line or off-line, and range of control. Amend your FSAR accordingly.
RESPONSE
Section 8.3.1.1.1 has been changed to provide the requested inforration. . O ~ O 430.29-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR (~ \ OUESTION 430.30 (Section S.3.1) FSAR Sections 8.3.1.1.2.1 and 8.3.1.1.2.4 describes the sources of power to the 4 kV Class 1E buses. Amend your FSAR description and applicable figures to show which sources are the preferred and alternate sources. Additionally provide logic diagrams to show the transfers between preferred, alternate, and onsite standby sources of power to these buses.
RESPONSE
Section 8.3.1.1.2.4 and Figure 8.3-1 have.been changed to provide the requested information. In lieu of a diagram, the transfer logic is now discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.2.4. See also the response to Question 430.38. O i l 1 430.30-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
g_ _ I l l j LGS FSAR f
\s OUESTION 430.31 (Section 8.3.1)
FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.8 describes the automatic load shedding and sequential loading of the Class IE loads on the safety buses l for the LGS design when a LOCA exist with and without offsite l power available. Table 8.3-1 shows the sequential loading when ' offsite power is not available. Provide a similar table of the loading sequence when offsite power is available.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982. ( I 430.31-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR (o,) OUESTION 430.32 (Section 8.3.1) i Concerning the emergency load sequencers which are associated with the offsite and onsite power sources we require that you either provide a separate sequencer for offsite and onsite power (per electrical division) or a detailed analysis to demonstrate that there are not credible sneak circuits or common failure modes in the sequencer design that could render both onsite and offsite power sources unavailable. In addition, provide information concerning the reliability of your sequencer and reference design detailed drawings.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982.- l s I I l l 1 O V 430.32-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR (D x_ ,/ OUESTION 430.33 (Section 8.3) Detailed reviews of electrical control circuitry associated with the safety systems of nucJear stations shows that these circuits may differ from station to station, in that, for some stations these control circuits are arranged so that an accident signal will override a test mode condition whereas in other stations (due to those circuits) the test mode condition will take precedence. In this regard, identify any redundant electrically controlled components in the Limerick design whereby an accident signal will not override a test mode condition. Also, for each component so identified, provide technical information which supports the adequacy of this design feature. t RESPONSE The requested information will be provided by November 1982. i I l i t l l
?
430.33-1' Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR ( OUESTION 430.34 (Section 8.3.1) Recent experience with Nuclear Power Plant Class IE electrical system equipment protective relay applications has established that relay trip setpoint drifts associated with conventional type relays have resulted in premature trips of redundant safety-related system pump motors when the safety system was required to be operative. While the basic need for proper protection for feeders / equipment against permanent faults is recognized, it is the staff's position that total non-availability of redundant safety systems due to spurious trips in protective relays is not acceptable. Provide a description of your circuit protection criteria for safety systems / equipment to avoid incorrect initial setpoint selection and the above cited protective relay trip setpoint drift problems. A
RESPONSE
Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 has been changed to provide the requested (j information. O 430.34-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR (/
\s,
\
QUESTION 430.35 (Section S.3) l It has been noted during past reviews that pressure switches or other devices were incorporated into the final actuation control circuitry for large horsepower safety-related motors which are used to drive pumps. These switches or devices preclude automatic (safety signal) and manual operation of the motor / pump combination unless permissive conditions such as lube oil pressure are satisfied. Accordingly, identify any safety-related : motor / pump combinations which are used in the Limerick design that operate as noted above. Also, describe the redundancy and diversity which are provided for the pressure switches or permissive devices that are used in this manner.
RESPONSE
1 r There are no pressure switches or other permissive devices incorporated into the final actuation control circuitry for large horsepower safety-related monotrs that are used to drive pumps other than electrical portective relays. O ! L i I i t
/~' i
(~ ! i 430.35-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 [ I
LGS FSAR m k,) s DUESTION 430.3d (Sections 6.3, 8.3)
~
Identify'all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, that may become submerged as a result of a LOCA. For all such equipment that is not qualified for service in such an environment provide an analysis to determine the following.
- 1. The safety significance of the failure of this electrical equipment (e.g., spurious actuation or loss of actuation function) as a result of flooding;
- 2. The effects on Class 1E electrical power sources serving this equipment as a result of such submergence; and
- 3. Any proposed design changes resulting from this analysis.
RESPONSE
O' None of the electrical equipment that is required to mitigate the effects of a design basis event will become submerged as a result of a LOCA. The only electrical equipment that may experience temporary submergency is penetration assembly JX230A, which becomes submerged during the poolswell experienced during an SRV discharge. To ensure that suppression pool temperature indication which is monitored this penetration is maintained during the poolswell, the entire penetration is encased by an enclosure to a point above the maximum pool level, thereby assuring that the electrical portion of the penetration will not be affected by the poolswell. l 430.36-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 l
LGS FSAR OUESTION 430.37 (Section 8.3) Provide the results of a review of your operating, maintenance, and testing procedures to determine the extent of usage of jumpers or other temporary forms of bypassing functions for operation, testing, or maintaining of safety-related systems. Identify and justify any cases where the use of the above methods cannot be avoided. Provide the criteria for any use of jumpers for testing.
RESPONSE
I The requested information will be provided by November 1982. I O O 430.37-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
l t i l LGS FSAR l
- O
~
l OUESTION 430.38- (Section 8.3) !
- i BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION PSB 1 ADEQUACY OF STATION ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM VOLTAGES !
1. . A. BACKGROUND l Events at the Millstone station have shown that adverse ! effects on the Class 1E loads can be caused by sustained low ; . grid. voltage conditions when the Class 1E buses are connected i
- to offsite power. These low voltage conditions will not be j detected by the loss of voltage relays (loss of offsite i power) whose low voltage pickup ^ settings is generally in the range of .7 per unit voltage or less.
i i The above events also demonstrated that improper voltage i protection logic can itself cause adverse effects on the j . Class 1E systems and equipment such as spurious load shedding
- of Class-1E loads from the standby diesel generators and .
spurious separation of Class 1E systems from offsite power ( ' due to normal motor starting transients. i A more recent event at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) station and ; i the subsequent analysis performed disclosed the possibility i , of degraded voltage conditions existing on the Class 1E buses ! even with normal grid voltages, due to deficiencies in ! i equipment between the grid and the Class 1E buses or by the ! i starting transients experienced during certain accident j i events not originally considered in the sizing of these ! j' circuits. j i ; i B. BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION g
- 1. In addition to the undervoltage scheme provided to detect loss of offsite power at the Class IE buses, a second level of undervoltage protection with time delay ,
should also be provided to protect the Class 1E j equipment; this second level of undervoltage protection !
?
shall satisfy the following criteria: i
-(a)
! The selection of undervoltage and time delay setpoints shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the Class 1E loads at l all onsite system distribution levels; , t
! (b) Two separate time delays shall be selected for the
- second level of undervoltage protection based on the following conditions
) 430.38-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
, LGS FSAR (1) The first time delay should be of a duration that establishes the existence of a sustained degraded voltage condition (i.e., something longer than a motor starting transient).
Following this delay, an alarm in the control room should alert the operator to the degraded condition. The subsequent occurrence of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) should immediately separate the Class 1E distribution system from the offsite power system. (2) The second time delay should be of a limited duration such that the permanently connected Class 1E loads will not be damaged. Following tnis delay, if the operator has failed to restore adequate voltages, the Class 1E distribution system should be automatically separated from the offsite power system. Bases and justification must be provided in support of the actual delay chosen. (c) The voltage sensors shall be designed to satisfy the following applicable requirements derived from IEEE Std. 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations": (1) Class 1E equipment shall be utilized and shall be physically located at and electrically connected to the Class 1E switchgear. (2) An independent scheme shall be provided for each division of the Class 1E power system. (3) The undervoltage protection shall include coincidence logic on a per bus basis to preclude spurious trips of the offsite power source. (4) The voltage sensors shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits (cited in item 1.b.2 above) have been exceeded. (5) Capability for test and calibration during power operation shall be provided. (6) Annunciation must be provided in the control room by any bypasses incorporated in the design. Rev'. 12, 10/82 430.38-2
LGS FSAR
; O' (d). The Technical Specifications shall include limiting conditions for operations, surveillance requirements, trip setpoints with minimum.and maximum limits, and allowable values for the second-level voltage protection sensors and
, associated time delay devices.
- 2. The Class IE bus load shedding scheme should automatically prevent shedding during sequencing of the emergency loads to the bus. The load shedding feature should, however, be reinstated upon completion of the load sequencing action. The technical specifications must include a test requirement to demonstrate the j
operability of the automatic bypass and reinstatement features at least once per 18 months during shutdown. In the event an adequate basis can be provided for < retaining the load shed feature during the above transient conditions, the setpoint value in the Technical Specifications for the first level of
; undervoltage protection (loss of offsite power) must specify a value having maximum and minimum limits. The basis for the setpoints and limits selected must be
- documented.
( 3. The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the maximum and minimum load conditions
< that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power sources by
- appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of l the intervening transformers. The tap settings selected
. should be based on an analysis of the voltage at the ! terminals of the Class 1E loads. The analyses performed to determine minimum operating voltages should typically I consider maximum unit steady state and transient loads for events such as a unit trip, loss of coolant l accident, startup or shutdown; with the offsite power supply-(grid) at aminimum anticipated voltage and only 1 the offsite source being considered available. Maximum voltages should be analyzed with the offsite power . supply (grid) at maximum expected voltage concurrent with minimum unit loads (e.g. cold shutdown, refueling). A separate set of the above analyses should be performed , for each available connection to the offsite power . supply. l
- 4. The analytical techniques and assumptions used in the l voltage analysis cited in item 3 above must be verified i by actual measurement. The verification and test should be performed prior to initial full power reactor i
O operation on all sources of offsite power by:
~
430.38-3 Rev. 12, 10/82
----.,-r- _ , - - -,. _ _ -
LGS FSAR (a) loading the station distribution buses, including all Class 1E buses down to the 120/208 v level, to at least 30%; (b) Recording the existing grid and Class IE bus voltages and bus loading down to the 120/208 volt level at steady state conditions and during the starting of both a large Class 1E and non-Class 1E motor (not concurrently); Note: To minimize the number of instrumented locations, (recorders) during the motor starting transient tests, the bus voltages and loading need only be recorded on~that string of buses wnich previously showed the lowest analyzed voltages from item 3 above. (c) using the analytical techniques and assumptions of the previous voltage analysis cited in item 3 above, and the measured existing grid voltage and bus losing conditions recorded during conduct of the test, calculate a new set of voltages for all the Class 1E buses down to the 120/208 volt level; (d) compare the analytically derived voltage values against the test results. With good correlation between the analytical results and the test results, the test verification requirement will be met. That is, the validity of the mathematical model used in performance of the analysis of item 3 will have been established; therefore, the validity of the results of the analyses is also established. In general the test results should not be more than 3% lower than the analytical results; however, the difference between the two when subtracted from the voltage levels determined in the original analysis should never be less than the Class 1E equipment rated voltages.
RESPONSE
Branch Technical Position PSB 1 will be met at Limerick using the same degraded grid voltage monitoring system that has been accepted by the NRC for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (reference NRC-letter dated February 18, 1982 on Dockets 50-277 and 50-278 from J.F. Stolz to E.G. Bauer Jr). The following discussion responds to the numbered positions of BTP-PSB 1. Rev. 12, 10/82 430.38-4
LGS FSAR O
~
- 1. On both offsite sources to each Class 1E bus, an ITE-27D relay with a 60-second timer will monitor the offsite source voltage. This relay will be set at 0.90 per unit voltage.
Actuation of this relay after a 60-second time delay will trip the associated 4kV bus feeder breaker. Loss of voltage on the 4kV_ bus actuates an EGP relay which initiates the transfer to the alternate source. The 60-second time delay is tentative and may be shortened. Its purpose is to allow sufficient time for the automatic load tap changers on the 101 and 201 safeguard transformers to attempt to correct the degraded voltage condition. An ITE-27 inverse time relay with an Agastat timer is also installed on the source side of each offsite source to each Class IE bus. This relay will be set at 0.87 per unit voltage with a total time delay of 60 seconds or less. It performs the same function as the ITE-27D and provides inverse time delay with degrading voltage for protection of Class 1E equipment between 0.87 and 0.70 per unit voltage. The time delays associated with the ITE-27D and ITE-27 relays are automatically bypassed 6 seconds after the receipt of a LOCA signal. This limits the exposure of Class 1E equipment to degraded voltage conditions to 6 seconds maximum while preventing spurious trips of the offsite source breaker during voltage transients caused by motor starts. An NGV relay with a 1-second timer is also installed on the source side of each offsite source to each Class 1E bus. The relay is set at 0.70 per unit voltage and will perform the same function as the above relays. This relay provides for the transfer of the bus on the total loss of the associated offsite source. An EGP relay monitors the voltage on each Class 1E 4kV bus. The relay functions with no appreciable time delay when the voltage on the bus falls below 0.45 per unit. Actuation of this relay initiates load shedding and provides a permissive signal to alle' the affected bus to transfer to the alternate source. The t alay also provides an automatic start signal to the diesel generator, which will automatically energize the bus if the alternate source is not available. An NGV relay with a set point of approximately 0.95 per unit also monitors the bus voltage on the 4kV Class 1E buses. O. Actuation of this relay initiates load sequencing after the voltage has been restored to the bus. It is sealed in by the 430.38-5 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR EGP relay to allow the load sequencing to continue during motor starting transients. , The settings and time delays given in the above discussion are tentative at this time. They will be finalized upon completion of the station voltage regulation study. The above voltage monitoring scheme does not provide coincident logic to preclude spurious trips to conform to BTP-PSB 1. However, spurious action of one undervoltage relay will only transfer the affected bus to the alternate power source. The actuation of a second undervoltage relay is necessary to transfer the bus to the diesel generator. If the ITE-27D should fail to operate, it is backed up by the ITE-27. Therefore, this scheme conforms to the intent of the requirements of BTP-PSB 1. For periodic testing of this scheme, the individual relays can be bypassed with a permanently installed test block. When the test block bypass is in effect, the condition is annunciated in the control room, thereby meeting the requirements of the BTP and Regulatory Guide 1.47.
- 2. The EGP relay discussed above provides the load shedding on the Class 1E 4kV buses. It is not bypassed during load sequencing because its setpoint for dropout (0.45 p.u.) is low enough to preclude spurious tripping under all load sequences.
- 3. The analyses required by this section of BTP-PSB 1 have been performed and will be used in selecting the settings of the relays discussed above.
- 4. The tests required by this section of BTP-PSB 1 will be performed during the startup test program.
O Rev. 12, 10/82 430.38-6
r l ! LGS FSAR
, OUESTION 430.39 (Section 8.3.1.1.2.11)
- IEEE Standard 308-1974 Section 5.2.1 and 5.3.1 requires that indication be provided to identify the actuation of protective devices. Describe how your design meets this criteria. If the information is provided in the FSAR reference the section(s) where this information is included.
RESPONSE
Sections 8.3.1.1.2.11 and 8.3.2.2.1 have been changed to provide the requested information. O 1 l 4 I O 430.39-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR O kJ OUESTION 430.40 (Section 8.3) Provide a listing of.all motor operated valves within your design that require power lockout in order to meet the signal failure criterion and provide the details of your design that accomplish this requirement. (reference BTP-ICSB-4 and BTP-ICSB 18).
! RESPONSE There are no motor-operated valves at Limerick that require electric power lockout to meet the single failure criterion as described in BTP ICSB 18.
- O 1
l O V 430.40-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
~-
r LGS FSAR
,m i\ -) OUESTION 430.41 (Sections 8.3.1, 8.3.2)
Recent experience with nuclear power plant Class 1E motor-operated valve motors has shown that in some instances the motor winding on the valve operator could fail when the valve is subjected to frequent cycling. This is primarily due to the limited duty cycle of the motor. Provide the required duty cycle of the following valves as it relates to system mode of operation in various events:
- 1. Steam supply valve to AFW pump turbine (if they are MOVS)
- 2. Auxiliary feed. water flow control valves
- 3. RHR heat exchanger valves
- 4. SI injection valves
) 5. SI discharge valves
- 6. Atmost 'ere dump valves (if they are MOVS)
Demonstrate that the availability of the safety systems in Limerick design will not be comprised due to the limited duty cycle of the valve operator motors.
RESPONSE
Other than the RHR heat exchanger valves, the valves in question are associated with PWR power plants. The RHR heat exchanger valves are initially positioned to establish the desired heat removal rate. Subsequent valve repositioning may be made for occasional adjustments in cooling rates. l l Because the Class 1E motor-operated valves at Limerick are not ! subjected to frequent cycling and because most of the ac valve ! operator motors have 30-minute duty ratings instead of the standard 5-minute rating, the availability of the safety systems () in the Limerick design will not be compromised due to limited duty cycle of the valve operator motors. f 430.41-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 l - .-- - _ _ . - . _ . -
LGS FSAR
; OUESTION 430.42 (Section 8.3.1)
FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.3.3 describes the tripping devices associated with the standby diesel generators. This description fails to provide sufficient information for our evaluation. Specifically, are all trips except engine overspeed, diesel generator differential overcurrent and 4 kV bus differential overcurrent bypassed under accident conditions. If all other trips are bypassed as required; provide a detailed description of the bypass circuitry to include 1) the capability to test the status and operability of the bypass circuits, 2) alarming in the control room of abnormal values of bypassed parameters and 3) means of manually resetting of the bypass trip function. Additionally does the surveillance systems for these trips provide indication of first out alarm.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982. O 1 I l l O 430.42-1 Rev. 12, 10'/82
l LGS FSAR i OUESTION 430.43 (Section 8.3.1) In FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.3.3 you mentioned the diesel generator fail to start relay. Provide a detailed description of this feature.
RESPONSE
Section 8.3.1.1.3.3 has been changed to provide the requested information. 1 i
- l 1
i j I 3 l l O 430.43-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR r kh/ OUESTION 430.44 (Section 8.3.1) FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.3.7 states that the diesel generator preoperational test program will meet the requirement of FSAR Chapter 14. Chapter 14 Section 14.2.7.2 states that the preoperational test program will meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.108 Section C.2.a(9) which requires that 69/N or 23, whichever is larger, consecutive successful start test on each diesel generator. Define your interpretation of " intent" and confirm that preoperational testing of the diesel generators will
! conform to Regulatory Guide 1.108 or justify any deviation.
RESPONSE
The Limerick diesel generator preoperational test program will meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.108 as described in Section 8.1.6.1.20. O 430.44-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 J
LGS FSAR O
' V OUESTION 430.45 (Section 8.3.1)
Section 5.6.2.2(1) of IEEE-387-77 (endorsed by Regulatory Guide
~
1.9 Revision 2) requires that an emergency demand start-diesel signal shall override all other operating modes and return control of the diesel-generator unit to the automatic control l system. The description of your design is insufficient to ass'ess whether your design meets this requirement. Verify that your design meets this requirement and provide a revised description i in sufficient detail to permit independent evaluation of this i
-design capability.
The following discussion and recommendations are presented for your consideration: A design which does not meet the above cited requirement would 4 necessitate operator action, of varying levels of complexity depending on the circumstances, in order to enable a diesel generator (D/G) in the test mode to respond to a bona fide emergency demand signal such as Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP), Safety Injection (SI), or simultaneous SI and LOOP. The concern + here is the high probability of human failure under these stress l conditions, and the possible consequent disabling of a D/G or O other action which degrades safety margin at a time when it is most needed. Each'D/G must be periodically tested at a frequency as specified in R. G 1.108. This test frequency is normally once per month
, but could be as high as once every three days. The duration of each test is one hour. During a normal successful test the D/G would be sequentially in the following states: starting, running
, . disconnected from its bus, running loaded on its bus, tripping , and coasting to a stop. However during almost all of the one hour test period the D/G is loaded on its bus with the governor operating in the droop mode, and the load carried by the diesel engine is a function of governor speed setting and the speed droop setting. During any of the above cited test states, a D/G start signal should return control of the D/G-to the automatic control system, thereby enabling it to respond automatically to an emergency demand signal (SI or LOOP) without need for any operator action. Designs providing this capability have already been implemented in some nuclear plants. Such designs include the following features: 4 1 j i 4 430.45-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
l LGS FSAR On receipt of a SI signal (a) The D/G breaker (if closed) is tripped. (b) The D/G, if running remains running, or is started, and remains operating shifting automatically the governor from " droop" to "isochronous" mode and the voltage regulator to automatic mode. (c) The D/G protective trips are byprssed per design. (d) The offsite power feed breaker remains closed and ESF loads are connected to the bus per design. On receipt of a LOOP signal following an SI signal: (a) The offsite power feed breaker is tripped. (b) Loads are shed from the bus per design. (c) The D/G breaker is closed connecting the D/G to the bus per design. (d) ESF loads are sequenced to the bus per design. On receipt of simultaneous SI and LOOP signals: (a) The D/G breaker (if closed) is tripped (on SI signal). (b) The D/G, if running remains running, or is started, and remains operating, shifting automatically the governor from " droop" to "isochronous" mode and voltage regulator to " automatic" mode. (c) The offsite power feed breaker is tripped. 1 (d) Loads are shed from the bus per design. (e) The D/G protective trips are bypassed per design. (f) The D/G breaker is closed connecting the D/G to the bus per design. (g) ESF loads are sequenced to the bus per design. On occurrence of a LOOP condition while a D/G is on test and connected to its bus, a LOOP signal would probably not be generated because the D/G would attempt to provide power to the bus and to the offsite system through the closed offsite power feed breaker. In this case, the D/G breaker must be relied upon to trip on overcurrent or underfrequency(*). This would ll Rev. 12, 10/82 430.45-2
LGS FSAR deenergize the bus thereby producing a LOOP signal. In this case: (a)- The offsite power feed breaker is tripped. (b) The D/G remains running, shifting automatically the governor from " droop" to "isochronous" mode and the voltage regulator to " automatic" mode. (c) Loads are shed from the bus per design. (d) The D/G protective trips are bypassed per design. (e) The D/G breaker is closed connecting the D/G to the bus per design. (f) The shutdown loads are connected to the bus per design. (g) On occurrence of a LOOP condition while a D/G is on test but is not connected to its bus, a LOOP signal will be generated immediately, and this should initiated above actions (a) through (f). , (1) In some designs the diesel generator (DG) breaker is locked out for this condition. To assure continued availability of the DG unit, it is essential that the DG breaker not lock out on overload. If the lock out feature is desired, it should be designed so that lock out occurs only on bus fault.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982. 3 O 430.45-3 Rev. 12, 10/82 t
LGS FSAR (p) '~' OUESTION 430.46 (Section 8.3) Diesel generator alarms in the control room: A review of malfunction reports of diesel generators at operating nuclear plants has uncovered that in some cases the information available to the control room operator to indicate the operational status ) of the diesel generator may be imprecise and could lead to misinterpretation. This can be caused by the sharing of a single annunciator station to alarm conditions that render a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start , signal and to also alarm abnormal, but no disabling, conditions. ' Another cause can be the use of wording of an annunciator window that does not specifically say that a diesel generator is inoperable (i.e., unable at the time to respond to an automatic ; emergency start signal) when in fact it is inoperable for that purpose. Review and evaluate the alarm and control circuitry for the diesel generators at your facility to determine how each condition that renders a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal is alarmed in the control room. These conditions include not only the trips that lock out the b) diesel generator start and require manual reset, but also control switch or mode switch positions that block automatic start, loss of control voltage, insufficient starting air pressure or battery voltage, etc. This review should consider all aspects of possible diesel generator operational conditions, for example test conditions and operation from local control stations. One area of particular concern is the unreset condition following a manual stop at the local station which terminates a diesel
~
generator test and prior to reseting the diesel generator controls for enabling subsequent automatic operation. Provide the details of your evaluation, the results and conclusions, and a tabulation of the following information. (a) all conditions that render the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal for each operating mode as discussed above; (b) the wording on the annunciator window in the control room that is alarmed for each of the conditions identified in (a); _/ (c) any other alarm signals not included in (a) above that also cause the same annunciator to alarm; I 430.46-1 Rev. 12, 10/82 '
LGS FSAR (d) any condition that renders the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal which is not alarmed in the control room; (e) any proposed modifications resulting from this evaluation.
RESPONSE
The requested information will be provided by November 1982. O l 9l Rev. 12, 10/82 430 16-2 [ l
LGS FSAR
-C]' t OUESTION 430.47 .(Section 8.3)
LThe availability on demand of an emergency diesel generator is dependent upon, among other things, the proper functioning of its controls and monitoring instrumentation. This equipment is generally panel mounted and in some instances the panels are mounted directly on the diesel generator skid. Major diesel engine damage has occurred at some operating plants from vibration-induced wear on skid mounted control and monitoring instrumentation. This sensitive instrumentation is not made to withstand and function accurately for prolonged periods under continuous vibrational stresses normally encountered with internal combustion engines. Operation of sensitive instrumentation under this environment rapidly deteriorates calibration, accuracy and control signal output. Therefore, except for sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring instrumentation should be installed on a free standing floor mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and located on a vibration free floor area. If the floor is not vibration free, the panel shall be equipped with vibration mounts. O Confirm your compliance with the above requirement or provide justification for noncompliance.
RESPONSE
Section 8.3.1.1.4 has been changed to provide the requested information. The diesel generators do not generate harmful torsional vibrations when operating at any speed from 0 to 115% of rated speed. The engine gauge panel is located on the engine generator skid; however, it is mounted in a cradle on isolation springs. Colt has successfuly used this method of mounting engine gauge boards for several years. Further, items critical to the continued operation of the unit are not mounted in the gauge panel. The annunciator and other sensitive items are located in freestanding electrical control panels. The control panel is physically separated from the diesel generator. i O 430.47-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
LGS FSAR l OUESTION 430.48 (Section 8.3) ! Provide a detailed discussion (or plan) of the level of training l proposed for your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, i and supervisory personnel responsible for the operation and i maintenance of the emergency diesel generators. Identify the ; number and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned from your general plant t operations and maintenance groups to assist when needed. ! i In your discussion identify the amount and kind of training that : will be received by each of the above categories and the type of l ongoing training program planned to assure optimum availability . of the emergency generators. ( r i Also discuss the level of education and minimum experience , requirements for the various categories of operations and ; maintenance personnel associated with emergency diesel [ generators. j () RESPONSE i I ^ The requested information will be provided by November 1982. ! l . I f I I i { i i i i 430.48-1 Rev. 12, 10/82
. , - , - - w- - --._--g
LGS FSAR (
' OUESTION 430.49 (Section 8.3)
Periodic testing and test loading of an emergency diesel generator in a nuclear power plant is a necessary function to ! demonstrate the operability, capability and availability of the unit on demand. Periodic testing coupled with good preventive l maintenance practices will assure optimum equipment readiness and ; availability on demand. This is the desired goal. ; To achieve this optimum equipment readiness status the following I requirements should be met: l f
! 1. The equipment should be tested with a minimum loading of j
- 25 percent of rated load. No-load or light-load !
. operation will cause incomplete combustion of fuel ! resulting in the formation of gum and varnish deposits ! on the cylinder walls, intake and exhaust valves, pistons and piston rings, etc., and accumulation of l unburned fuel in the turbocharger and exhaust system. ! The consequences of no-load or light-load operation are ! potential equipment failure due to the gum and varnish ! deposits and fire in the engine exhaust system. i . 2. Periodic surveillance testing should be performed in l 1 accordance with the applicable NRC guidelines l (R.G. 1.108), and with the recommendations of}}