ML20064M818
| ML20064M818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Brogan B, Land R, Peters L WOOD-LEAVER & ASSOCIATES, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064M794 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-TM WLA-1-R-82-02, WLA-1-R-82-02-R01, WLA-1-R-82-2, WLA-1-R-82-2-R1, NUDOCS 8209080111 | |
| Download: ML20064M818 (133) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:-- Wood Leaver and Associates, Inc. WLA-1-R-82-02 Rev 1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AT THE SEABROOK . NUCLEAR POWER STATION FINAL REPORT Prepared For: YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY and PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE By B. A. Brogan R. E. Land l L. E. Peters, Jr. l A. E. Tome , Jr. ( 1 I l WOOD-LEAVER AND ASSOCIATES, INC. 296 Duff Road ! Monroeville, PA 15146 8209080111 820826 June, 1982 PDR ADOCK 05000443
h TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1
1.1 BACKGROUND
1 1.2 PURPOSE 2 1.3 SCOPE 2 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 4 2.1 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 4 2.2 STARTUP FEEDPUMP SYSTEM 8 2.3 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES 10 2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 11 3.0 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 14 3.1 FAULT TREE MODEL 14 3.2 DATA USED IN FAULT TREE QUANTIFICATION 16 3.2.1 Failure Data-General 17 3.2.2 Treatment of Time Dependent Failures 19 3.2.3 Test and Maintenance Outages 22 3.2.4 Operator Errors 25 3.3 RESULTS FROM FAULT TREE ANALYSES 28 3.3.1 Computer Codes 28 3.3.2 Events Analyzed 28 3.3.3 Numerical Reliability Results 31 3.3.4 Dominant Failures for Three Pump AFW System 32 3.3.5 Potential Common Cause Failures 36
4.0 CONCLUSION
S 38
5.0 REFERENCES
39 6.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY 40 Appendices (A-D) i
? RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The action plan developed by the NRC in response to the accident at the Three Mile Island Unit-2, NUREG-0737, requires (Item II.E.1.1) that all operating nuclear power plants or plants applying for operating licenses conduct a reliability analysis of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The analysis is to be performed using event-tree and fault-tree logic techniques and is intended to evaluate the potential for system failure during a variety of loss of main feedwater transients. The primary purpose of the reliability evaluation is to identify potential failures resulting from human errors, common causes, single-point vulnerabilities, and outages due to test and maintenance. The stated purpose of the recommendations associated with TMI Action Plan Item II.E.1.1 was to decrease the unreliability of AFW systems towards a goal of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand for loss of main feedwater and loss of offsite power transients. As a result of reliability evaluations performed both by the NRC staff (NUREG-0611) and various operating license applicants, it was deemed by the staff that three AFW pumps were necessary to achieve the desired unreliability goal assuming all other AFW system safety criteria are met. Therefore the current staff position is that applicants for operating licenses must include at least three AFW pumps in their plant design, and each pump must be capable of providing to the steam generators at least the minimum flow necessary for decay heat removal following a loss of offsite power. Also, a minimum of two of these pumps and their associated trains must be safety grade. On October 30, 1981, the NRC staff informed the Public Service Company of New Hampshire, (PSNH) of the staff position regarding AFW system reliability, and questioned the ability of the Seabrook Nuclear Station auxiliary feedwater system to meet the specified reliability goals. The 1
r I Seabrook.AFW system consists of a two-pump safety grade emergency feedwater (EFW) system and a non-safety grade "startup feed pump" that may operate in parallel with the emergency feed pumps. The staff's concern, as stated in the October 30 letter, related primarily to the perceived inability to power the third " start-up"' pump from the emergency AC buses. PSNH replied to the staff's concerns by letter on December 4, 1981.2 In this response it was noted that provisions were included in the Seabrook design to allow the startup feed pump to be powered from an emergency bus if necessary. With this provision it is the position of PSNH that the Seabrook EFW system design meets the requirements of the October 30 letter from the staff. 1.2 PURPOSE The purpose of this study was to perform a reliability analysis of the Seabrook EFW system considering the use of the startup feed pump as a third source of emergency feed water and to demonstrate using the results of the study the validity of PSNH's position, i.e., that the required reliability goals as specified by the NRC staff are met by the existing Seabrook AFW system design. In addition, this study was intended to identify for PSNH and the NRC staff any dominant faults affecting the AFW system reliability under the loss of main feedwater/ loss of power transient conditions specified by the staff in NUREG-0611. The techniques used to achieve these objectives were the logic modeling methods specified by NUREG-0737. 1.3 SCOPE The EFW system design evaluated by this study is that described in section 6.8 of the Seabrook Nuclear Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and further described in system description document SD-1M. The 1 In this report the term " auxiliary feedwater", or AFW, system as applied to Seabrook means the combined emergency feedwater and startup pump systems. 2 Letter No. SBN 198, T.F. H4.4.98 to Mr. Frank J. Miraglia from Mr. John DeVincentis. 2
design of the startup feed pump system is described in system description document SD-1Q. The primary sources of specific design information about both the systems described in these documents were facility P and I drawings and logic diagrams. A listing of all drawings used in the course of this study is provided in Appendix C. The transient conditions under which the AFW system reliability was determined are those outlined by the NRC staff in NUREG-0611, i.e., o Loss of main feedwater with reactor trip; o Loss of main feedwater with coincident loss of offsite station power; o Loss of main feedwater with coincident loss of all station AC power. For each of the transient conditions analyzed, unreliability was defined as the probability of failure of the combined EFW and startup pump system to start and provide feedwater to at least two steam generators prior to the time that the steam generators would boil dry following a reactor trip from full power. The time required to boil away the water in the steam generators is determined by the initial mass of water contained in them at the time of trip and the amount of decay heat liberated from the core. For the Seabrook station this time would generally be in the range of 35 to 60 minutes ( following a trip from full power operation; therefore, 30 minutes was selected as a conservative mission time for this reliability study. The unreliabilities calculated exclude any consideration for the causes or probabilities of the specified transient conditions, nor do they consider external common mode failure initiators such as earthquakes, floods, etc. l l l L-
2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM A schematic of the emergency feedwater system at Seabrook is shown in Figure 1. The system consists of two pumps each supplied by individual suction lines from the condensate storage tank (CST). Each pump has a design flow of 710 gpm at a head of 3050 feet and is capable of providing full cooling of the reactor coolant system in emergency situations. One pump is driven by an AC motor which is powered by one of the 4160V plant emergency buses. The second pump is steam-turbine driven with steam being supplied from either of two steam generators. Take-off points for the turbine steam supply lines are upstream of the main steam isolation valves, thereby ensuring motive power to the turbine even in the event of steam line isolation. Both pumps are attached to a comon return to the CST which is used for pump testing. This return line is isolated during normal operation. During operation of the EFW system, both pumps discharge into a common header which in turn supplies four individual supply lines to each of the four steam generator main feed lines. Each emergency feed line joins its associated main feedwater header downstream of the feedwater isolation valve and outside of containment. The emergency feedwater supply lines are each equipped with two motor-operated flow isolation valves and a flow limiting venturi. The valves are normally open and are designed to fail "as-is" on loss of power. The valve positions are set such that they assure a minimum of 235 gpm to each steam generator during normal operation with both EFW pumps running. The control systems for the valves are designed to isolate an emergency feed supply line if flow in the line exceeds a preset high flow value. This feature prevents diversion of EFW flow following a line break in any steam generator. A single flow orifice located between the isolation valves in each line provides differential pressure information to the control equipment for flow measurement. Two separate flow transmitters are used to provide independent high flow isolation signals to each of the isolation valves. The flow transmitters, control equipment, and motor-operators for the 4
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valves upstream of the flow elements are powered by train B emergency electrical buses while those downstream of the flow elements are powered by train A buses. Assuming both EFW pumps are running, flow through any EFW line is limited to a maximum of 750 gpm by a flow limiting venturi also located between the isolation valves. This flow limitation provides runout protection for the EFW pumps in the event of depressurization of any steam generator. The venturis provide an added benefit in that a pipe break in any steam generator along with failure of both isolation valves in the associated EFW line will not cause a complete loss of cooling water to the remaining steam generators. Each supply line is also equipped with a non-return valve which prevents the EFW system from being subjected to normal steam generator pressures when the EFW system is not in use. The pump discharge headers and the comon emergency feedwater header are equipped with a total of five isolation valves that are used to segregate various parts of the system for testing and maintenance activities. These valves are all manual, gear-operated valves that are locked open when the system is in its normal readiness state. The pump discharge headers are also equipped with check valves to prevent reverse flow through a pump during operation with the pump out of service. Flow diversion through the pump recirculation lines is prevented during normal operation by nonnally closed manual valves in each recirculation header. The recirculation lines are also equipped with pressure reducing orifices that will limit flow should the manual valves be left open. Each pump suction line to the CST contains two manual isolation valves, one in the tank yard and one in the emergency feed pump building. Both valves are nonnally open and locked in position. The steam supply lines for the turbine-driven EFW pump are shown in Figure 2. Steam can be supplied to the turbine from either steam generator "A" o r "B" . Steam from either steam generator is supplied to a comon header 6
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( through air-operated, fail-open valves that are actuated by an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation signal. Both valves will open as a result of a loss of offsite power, low-low level in any steam generator, or any safety injection signal.* Each steam supply line is equipped with a check valve to prevent diversion of steam from the turbine in the event of a pipe break in one of the steam lines. The connon supply header to the turbine-driven pump contains a normally open manual isolation valve used during turbine mainten-ance and a spring-loaded mechanical trip valve that closes on turbine over-speed. Oil cooling for the turbine-driven EFW pump bearings is provided by an oil cooler supplied directly from the discharge of the turbine-driven pump. The cooling flow is discharged to the comon recirculation header. 2.2 STARTUP FEE 0 PUMP SYSTEM The elements of the startup feedpump (SUF) system at Seabrook are shown in Figure 3. The system consists of a single motor-driven pump capable of supplying 1500 gpm at 3000 ft. of head. The pump takes suction from the CST via the main condensate makeup line. The suction line between the pump and CST is equipped with three normally open manual isolation valves. The discharge headers from the pump attaches to six other feedwater system headers, i.e., the main feedwater pump discharge header, the high-pressure
- feedwater heater outlet header, the condensate pump discharge header, the
! make-up header from the CST, the steam generator recirculation pump discharge l header, and the EFW pump discharge header. The pump is also equipped with a recirculation line to the CST for pump protection and testing. Flow through
- the recirculation line is controlled by a pressure-controlled throttling valve l that senses pressure at the pump discharge.
1 With the exception of the main feedwater pump discharge header, the discharge from the startup pump is isolated from all feed system headers by at least one normally closed valve. The supply path to the main feedwater pump discharge header is normally open but is equipped with a manual gear-operated I i l These same signals will also automatically start the motor-driven l EFW pump. 8
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Figure 3. Seabrook Nuclear Station Startup Feed Pump System l
r-valve to allow isolation if necessary. Flow to the EFW pump discharge header is prevented during normal operation by two normally closed manual gear-operated isolation valves. During startup, lubrication of the SUF pump is provided by a motor driven auxiliary lube oil pump. Operation of the auxiliary lube oil pump is controlled by SUF pump lube oil pressure. When the SUF pump is in the AUTO control mode, startup of the lube oil pump will be followed by start of the SUF pump when sufficient oil pressure is established. Once started, a shaft-driven lube oil pump located on the SUF pump supplies lubrication and the auxiliary lube oil pump is stopped. Should the shaft-driven pump fail, the auxiliary oil pump will automatically restart. In its normal operating mode the SUF pump will start automatically on a trip of both main feed pumps unless a safety injection or high-high steam generator level signal also occurs. 2.3 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES Emergency electrical power for the EFW and SUF systems is supplied from both 4160V emergency AC buses and both vital DC instrument buses. Power for the motor-driven EFW pump is taken from emergency AC bus E6 and diesel-generator 1B while the SUF pump, via operator action, can be powered from emergency AC bus E5 and diesel-generator 1A. The auxiliary lube oil pump used when starting the SUF pump is also supplied power by bus E5 through buses E52 and E523. Control power for the motor-driven EFW train is taken entirely from vital DC instrument bus 118. Control power for the steam-turbine admission valves is supplied from both ESF trains, one valve receiving control power from DC bus 11A in train A and the other receiving power from DC bus llB in train B. There are no AC power dependencies in the turbine-driven EFW pump train. As noted in Section 2.1, electrical power for the EFW isolation valves also comes from the emergency buses, and train separation criteria are met for each EFW supply line. 10
f 2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
-The control room operator at Seabrook has available a variety of instrumentation and controls that allow him to monitor and direct operation of both the emergency feedwater system and the startup feed pump. The important equipment relative to EFW and SUF system operation are listed below:
Instrumentation Location o Operating status lights for the Control room / remote motor-driven EFW pump safe shutdown panel o Position indication lights for Control room / remote both steam admission valves to safe shutdown panel
- the turbine-driven EFW pump o Suction and discharge pressures Control room / local for both EFW pumps o Flow indication for each emer- Control room / remote gency feedwater supply line safe shutdown panel o Three narrow-range and one wide- Control room / remote range level transmitter in each safe shutdown panel steam generator o Steam pressure in each steam Control room genera tor o Dual CST level transmitters Control room i
Ala rms Location o Trip alarm for motor-driven Control room EFW pump l 0 Alarms indicating local operation Control room of either EFW pump o Low suction pressure alarms for Control room both EFW pumps o Startup feed pump trip alarm Control room o Startup feed pump pre-lube pump Control room running alarm Position indication is available at the remote shutdown panel only for valve V-127. l l 11 l L._
o Low and low-low level alarms in Control room each steam generator o CST low level alarms Control room o SI actuation alarm Control room o Pump motor bearing and winding. Control room temperature alarms o Emergency feed pump valves Control room misaligned o SUF pump powered from bus E5 Control room Controls Location o Manual / auto controller for Control room / motor-driven EFW pump switchgear room o Manual / auto controller for Control room / remote turbine-driven EFW pump safe shutdown panel
- steam admission valve o Manual / auto controller for Control room / remote each EFW flow limiting valve safe shutdown panel o Manual / auto controller for Control room startup feed pump o Manual / auto controller for Control room startup feed pump prelube pump Automatic Actuation Signals EFW Function o Safety injection signal Starts both EFW pumps o High flow to one S/G Close both EFW isolation valves in line with high flow o Low-low level in any steam Starts both EFW generator pumps o Loss-of-offsite Starts both EFW power signal pumps Only steam-admission valve V-127 can be controlled at the remote shutdown panel.
12
I o Trip of both main feed pumps - Starts SUF pump
- o Low bearing oil pressure at Starts SUF prelube SUF pump pump i
k i i 4 This signal is prohibited if either a safety injection or steam generator high-high level signal is present. I 13 i J..,_.~_- _ _ . - . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . . _ - _ - _ . . _ _ _ , - - - _ . . , - - - ~ _ . - . . . - . - - - - - - . _ _ _ _ - - - - . . . ~ . - . _ - - - - - - - ~ , - - - - -_ - - - - , - - - - -
3.0 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 3.1 FAULT TREE MODEL The fault tree model used for this study was developed from an existing fault tree created several years ago as part of a " mini WASH-1400" review of the Seabrook station. In its original form the tree considered the two-pump emergency feedwater system but did not include modeling of the startup feed pump. In the initial phases of this study the old fault tree model was reviewed for accuracy and revised as necessary to properly reflect the current EFW system design at Seabrook. In addition, the logic necessary to model the impact of the SUF system on AFW system reliability was incorporated into the trees. As a result, the fault tree now models the entire "three pump" AFW system as it currently exists in the Seabrook design. In essence, failures of all components shown in Figures 1 through 3 of this report are now considered by the fault tree model. A logic diagram of the complete fault tree is provided in Appendix A. In addition to component failures, the fault tree also includes logic to consider the effects of failures in interfacing systems on AFW system reliability. Examples are failures of the electrical power sources for the EFW and SUF pump and controls, failures of reactor protection system actuation signals, failures at piping interfaces with the main feedwater/ condensate systems, failures in the steam generators, and errors by plant personnel while maintaining and operating the system. The handling of operator errors by the Seabrook EFW system fault tree requires some discussion because of the potentially large impact such errors might have on the capability of the startup feed pump to function as a backup to the safety grade EFW system. As was noted in Section 1.0, the primary reason for conducting the reliability analysis reported here was to demonstrate this backup capability. To do this, two key concerns had to be addressed: the ability to provide emergency AC power to the SUF system and the ability to align the SUF system with the EFW system. In the current Seabrook design these two functions can be accomplished only through a specific set of operator actions at locations other than the control room. 14
In order to provide power to the SUF pump from an emergency AC bus, an operator must manually " rack out" the SUF pump breaker from bus 4 located in the non-essential switchgear room, move it to the essential switchgear room, and manually " rack in" the breaker to emergency bus E5. He must also change the bus transfer switch to the E5 bus position. .The breaker has been equipped with built-in rollers to facilitate moving it from room to room. In addition, the two switchgear rooms are adjacent to each other minimizing the distance that the breaker must be moved. Aligning of the SUF pump with the EFW systems also requires an operator (or operators) to change the position of three manual isolation valves. One of the valves (V-109) must be closed to prevent possible flow diversion of the SUF pump discharge to the condensate tank via the SUF recirculation line should power be lost to the SUF pump recirculation valve (PCV-4326). The remaining two valves (V-156 and V163) must be opened to connect the SUF pump discharge header to the EFW system header. Valves V-109 and V-163 are located in the turbine hall. Valve V-156 is in the emergency feed pump room. The approach used in this analysis to correctly depict the operator actions outlined above was to consider alignment of the SUF pump for emergency operation to be four distinct actions rather than just one. Failure to perform any one of the four can prevent the SUF pump from performing the desired function under the appropriate set of conditions. The first three actions relate to operation of the three manual valves in the cross-tie and pump discharge headers. Failure to change the position of any valve was assumed to prevent flow from the SUF reaching the EFW header. Each operation was considered to be a separate event because of , the different valve locations, and because more than one operator might be l I sent to perform the required actions. The fourth action considered in the fault tree was the loading of l the startup pump system onto an emergency bus. In reality this action l represents multiple operations (viz. starting the prelube oil pump, moving the pump circuit breaker to the essential switchgear room, starting the SUF pump, etc.). In this case, however, all the controls necessary to start both the 15
SUF prelube pump and the SUF pump are available on the main control board. The only actions required outside the control room are moving of the pump breaker and changing of the bus transfer switch as described earlier. This is likely to be done by one operator following well defined procedures. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, it was judged that a single operator error event could adequately represent failures in the pump loading process. In addition to using four operator errors that could result in failure of the SUF pump system, special consideration was also given to the failure rates applied to these actions. Even though it is assumed that specific emergency procedures and operator training will be used at Seabrook to ensure proper utilization of the SUF pump during emergencies, the failure rates used in this study for these operator errors is significantly higher (.01/ demand)* than would normally be expected for situations where well developed procedures are in place and special operator training is provided. Again use of the higher values was felt to be necessary to reflect the disparity in locations where actions must be performed and because of the short time (a 30 minutes) available for the actions to be completed. Further discussion of these and other operator error rates is provided in the following section. 3.2 DATA USED IN FAULT TREE QUANTIFICATION Previous analyses similar to the one presented here that have been conducted by other utilities owning plants designed by Westinghouse have generally had as an objective a comparative evaluation of the reliability of a specific emergency feedwater system with generic reliability analyses reported by the NRC staff in NUREG-0611. However, as noted in Section 1.0 of this report, the October 30th,1981 letter to Seabrook specified a quantitative reliability goal for emergency feedwater system performance. For that reason the component failure data presented in NUREG-0611 was considered to be too The error associated with isolating the SUF pump recirculation line was assigned a value of 10 3/d because it was assumed to be coupled with opening one of the cross-tie isolation valves. See Section 3.2 for further discussion. 16
general to allow an accurate fault tree analysis of system unreliability to be performed. Therefore, it was decided that the best failure information available to date would be incorporated in this study. The following section presents that data and the sources from which it was taken. 3.2.1 Failure Data - General Table 8.1 (Appendix 8) presents a compilation of data for various failure modes of different power plant components, both mechanical and electrical. The data was extracted from the following sources:
- 1) The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)
- 2) GE-22A2589, Recommended Component Failure Rates, May 1974
- 3) IEEE-Std 500-1977, Nuclear Reliability Data Manual.
and the following reports from the Licensee Event Report (LER) evaluation program:
- 1) NUREG/CR-1205, Data Summaries of LER's of Pumps
- 2) NUREG/CR-1362, Data Summaries of LER's of Diesel Generators
- 3) NUREG/CR-1740, Data Summaries of LER's of Selected Instrumentation and Control Components
- 4) NUREG/CR-1363, Data Sunnaries of LER's of Valves.
The data values obtained from the above references are r resented in Table B.1 for each failure mode for which data from that reference was applicable. To avoid ambiguity where multiple values are presented for a single failure mode, Table B.1 indicates the recommended value that was used 17
, -. w. - - - , _ , -
in the fault tree analysis. In the cases where multiple data values exist, engineering judgement was used to detennine the most appropriate data based on similarity of the plant component, function and environment to the equipment represented by the data. In some instances the data presented in the referenced sources were either too general or the component data were obtained on like components having dissimilar functions. In particular, NUREG/CR-1205 presents component failure data for pumps by generic classification, namely, running, alternating and standby. However, review of the LERs revealed that sufficient data was available to extract specific component data for motor and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Similarly, the generic values presented in NUREG/CR-1363 for safety / relief valve failure rates were calculated using primary side components (i.e., pressurizer relief valves, pump relief valves, etc.) only. The components of interest in the Seabrook fault tree were the steam generator safety / relief valves. A limited amount of data existed in the LERs on secondary safety / relief valve failures. Also, it was noted that licensees do not always report relief valve failures since no credit is taken for them in accident analyses. To compensate for these facts, the values presented in Table B.1 for safety and relief valve premature opening were calculated using the information available in NUREG/CR-1363 and applying a factor of 5 to the safety valve failure rate and a factor of 10 to the relief valve failure rate. One further point should be mentioned as to the conservative bias built into some of the data. In particular, the failure rates of the diesel generator, as taken from NUREG/CR-1362 for weekly testing, are 1.0 x 10-2/d for the failure to start mode and 6.0 x 10-3/hr for the failure to run mode. These failure rates are calculated assuming that all plant diesel generators are tested weekly. However, this does not account for the many starts of the diesel generators which occur outside of normal testing periods. Therefore, the number of demands on the diesel generators are underestimated while, conversely, the number of failures reflects diesel generator failures which occur during all phases of operations. For those reasons, the failure rates from NUREG/CR-1362 associated with weekly testing were considered to be most representative of the diesel failure frequencies to be expected at the Seabrook station. 18
3.2.2 Treatment of Time Dependent Failures Failure rates used in the fault tree analysis are either demand dependent or time dependent. Demand dependent failure rates are applied to static components which are required to change position. or state to perform their required function. Examples are the auxiliary feedwater pumps which are required to start on demand and certain valves, such as the steam turbine inlet valves (V-127 and V-128), which are required to change state upon receipt of the appropriate actuation signal. Time dependent failures are characterized by the necessity of a component to maintain condition, position or status in order to perform its required function. Examples are the auxiliary feedwater pumps which must continue to run once started, valves which must maintain their position (e.g., remain open), and electrical components which must maintain their status (e.g., pump breakers do not trip) for the entire mission time prescribed for a particular transient. Time dependent failures a:e also characteristic of components which are in a standby condition and which could fail prior to operation. The unavailability of a time dependent component is calculated from the hourly failure rate and a mission time for operating components, or a testing interval for standby components. The time interval used is dependent on the testing frequency, the actuation circuitry employed, and the operational requirements of a component for the transient being considered. I For example, consider the actuation circuit of the motor- driven emergency feedwater pump shown in Figure 4. This pump can be started automatically on receipt of either a safety injection signal, a loss of offsite power signal, or on a low-low steam generator water level signal. It can also be started manually from the control room by the operator using manual / auto control station CS-4255-1. The Technical Specifications require that the motor-driven EFW pump be tested every month. During these tests the pump will be started manually from the control room using CS-4255-1. This procedure will also test j the integrity of the control circuit frnm CS-4255-1 to the pump. Therefore, for certain failure modes of the control circuits, the proper testing fre-quency would be calculated from the one month testing interval, i.e.: 19
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[5 4755 2 e' f F- 1C311 AT 5WGst I w t. 3 * 3%f 6 l l I t I l t l Figure 4. Motor-Driven EFW Pump Control Logic l 20
. l r
F t = [30 days x 24 hours / day] /2 = 360 hours. In comparison, the tests of ETV system components to actuate on an automatic signal will be perfonned only>ievery 18 months. The unavailability of a component due to failure to receive an automatic actuation signal therefore would be calculated on the basis of the following time interval: l. t = (18 months x 720 hours / month) /2 = 6480 hours. It is assumed that for'the monthly test of the turbine-drivenf emergency feed pump only one of the two steam acmission valves is opened and that these valves are used alternateTy from one test to the next. Therefore; the control circuitry to the steam inlet valves V-127 and V-128 would each be tested on a bi-monthly interval, and the unavailability of these valves due to failures of the control system are calculated using the following interval: k t=[60daysxb4 hours / day]/2=720 hours. ,
~
- t ,( >
/j .
Theunavailabiiitycfs compqnents which are required to operate or
. maintain condition are calculated using the mission time. In the study presented { here the mission time is the time in which the stdam generators woul'i,bo'il dry given an insufficient, suphly of water frca the emergency feedpater system. ! <I //
t I, ,. : Ij - t < The unavailability \of each failure e' vent used in the Seabrook fault tree analysis, defined using t e criteria discussed above, is presented in 3 TableB-2(AppendixB). ,
. , s ..
,f a f )
i {f ;
\
9 F 5
.. a 21
(
3.2.3 Test and Maintenance Outages In addition to a component being unable to accomplish its function due to mechanical or electrical faults, a component may be unable to respond to a system demand because that component is out of service due to maintenance or testing. Technical Specifications limit the time during which some components can be unavailable and the plant still maintained at full power conditions. At Seabrook one such limit applies to the EFW system. In the event that an emergency feedwater pump is disabled, restoration must occur within 72 hours or the plant must be placed in a hot standby condition. This 72 hour limit is assumed to apply also to pump discharge isolation valves if they require servicing. All other components within the emergency feedwater system at Seabrook are assumed to have no time restrictions in relation to plant operation. However, the assumption was made that combinations of components which disable more than one emergency feedwater supply line could not be taken out of service simultaneously. No maintenance requirements were considered for manually operated valves within the emergency feedwater system since these valves are located in low energy lines and position changes, other than those required for testing, do not routinely occur between scheduled outages. Unavailabilities of these valves due to maintenance errors during scheduled outages have been considered and will be described in a later section. Maintenance unavailabilities were calculated from data presented in NUREG/CR-1635, Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System 1979 Annual Reports of Cumulative System and Component Reliability. This source presents average restoration times for various components and failure modes. For those components whose outage times are limited by the Technical Specifications, the average restoration time was assumed equal to 72 hours if the average time specified by NUREG/CR-1635 was greater than 72 hours. The maintenance unavailability for a compor. ant was then calculated as follows: O maint =Nxt /T 22
where: N = number of maintenance acts t = average component restoration time T = total component calendar hours. Note that this calculation introduces additional conservatism because it assumes all maintenance acts are perfonned while the plant is operating at power. A list of maintenance unavailabilities is presented in Table 1. Additional unavailabilities can be assigned to emergency feedwater system components due to periodic testing. In particular, the Technical Specifications require that the emergency feedwater pumps be started every month. Referring to Figure 1, the procedure for testing pump P-37A or 378 is to close either manual isolation valve V-65 or V-71 and open manual valve V-67 or V-73 to recirculate emergency feedwater to the condensate storage tank. The startup feed pump can be tested in several ways. One method would be through the normally open manual valve V-100 in the line which connects the startup pump discharge to the discharge line of the main feed-water pumps. Another would be to close V-100 and recirculate water to the condensate storage tank through PCV-4326 which will open automatically on high pump discharge pressure. However, if the startup pump is needed, PCV-4326 will automatically close as pump discharge pressure decreases thereby eliminating possible flow diversion. Neither of these test methods change the configuration of the startup feed pump; therefore, no test outage was applied to the startup feed system. One exception to this assumption is discussed in the section on operator actions. The test frequency for the emergency system is once per month and the time interval of the test was assumed to be the average test time for pumps of 1.4 hours found in Table III 5-1 of WASH-1400. The unavailability due to testing therefore is: Q test = 720 = 2 x 10 The test unavailabilities and the components to which they apply are shown in l Table 1. 23 l
Rav. 1 TABLE 1 SU MARY OF MAINTENANCE AND TEST UNAVAILABILITIES Components Maintenance Test Total
- 1) Motor Driven EFP-378 4.2 x 10-4 N/A 4.2 x 10-4
- 2) Turbine Driven EFP-37A N/A 9.4 x 10-4 Pump contribution Turbine contribution 4.2x10-f 5.P. x 10-
- 3) Startup Feed Pump P-113 7.0 x 10-4 N/A 7.0 x 10-4
- 4) Lube Oil Pump P-161 5.0 x 10-4 N/A 5.0 x 10-4
- 5) Diesel Generator 7.0 x 10-4 N/A 7.0 x 10-4
- 6) Valves i
a) Emerg Feed Flow 8.5 x 10-4 N/A 8.5 x 10-4 Isolation Valves l (4214,4224,4234, l 4244,75,87,93 81) b) Steam Supply 8.7 x 10-4 N/A 8.7 x 10-4 Valves V-127, V-128 c) Steam Supply 1.0 x 10-4 N/A 1.0 x 10-4 Valve V-129 i d) Manual Isolation 9.3 x 10-6 2.0 x 10-3 2.0 x 10-3 Valve V-65,V-71 24
3.2.4 Operator Errors Operator errors can be divided into two basic types,1) errors of comission and 2) errors of omission. Errors of comission occur when the operator perfoms an action which tenninates or reverses the normal operation or condition of a component. Examples would be the operator shutting off a running pump or changing the position of a valve. Errors of omission occur when the operator fails to perform an action which would initiate component operation or place it in its proper operating condition given that these actions have not occurred automatically. Errors of omission also occur when the operator is the prime mover causing a system to function, such as in the proper alignment of the startup feedwater system to provide backup emergency feedwater flow. This type of error also includes failure to restore valves to their proper position following maintenance test acts. A description of all operator actions used in the fault tree analysis and their associated unavailabilities are shown in Table 2. The guidelines of NUREG/CR-1278, Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications, and NUREG-0611 were used in formulating the unavailabilities. As a general rule, errors of commission are assigned a probability of 1 x 10-4 and errors of omission a probability of 1 x 10-3 . These probabilities are adjusted for abnormal circumstances. For instance, a probability of 1 x 10-3 would normally be assigned both to errors of omission by the operator for actions which can be performed from the control room and to maintenance restoration acts. However, if the operation must be performed locally (outside of the control room) or under potentially adverse conditions, the failure probability is increased accordingly. Except for automatic actuation of the lube oil pump (P-161), the startup feed water system requires manual operation outside of the control room for alignment to the emergency feedwater system. (Refer to Section 3.1 for a discussion of the assumptions used to model the startup feed pump for the Loss of Main Feedwater transient.) In the event of Loss of Station Power 25 i
the operator must manually transfer the startup pump breaker from Bus 4 in the non-essential switchgear room to Bus E5 in the essential switchgear room, change the bus transfer switch to the E5 bus position, open discharge isolation valve V-156 in the emergency feed pump building, open discharge
. isolation V-163 and close condensate storage tank recirculation line isolation valve V-109 in the turbine hall. This last action (closing V-109) is necessary to prevent a diversion of flow from the startup system because a loss of Station Power could result in PCV-4326 opening due to loss of air.
The operator failure rates for the first three actions are assumed to be 1 x 10-2/ demand because these actions, even though assumed to be covered by emergency procedures, may include multiple steps and must be done at different locations. In contrast, the failure probability assigned to the closing of V-109 is assumed to be only 1 x 10-3 Since both V-163 and V-109 are located in the same vicinity, it was assumed that a single operator would be assigned the task of changing the position of both valves. Therefore, the failure to complete both actions will be dominated by the failure to perform the first, and the failure probability for the second action is more appropriately represented by the standard failure rate for errors of omission. Thus, the total failure probability for completing both actions is 1.1 x 10-2 , i 26
TABLE 2
SUMMARY
OF OPERATOR ACTIONS / FAILURE PROBABILITIES Operator Action / Error Failure Probability
- 1) Operator fails to open either 5 x 10-3 Steam Supply Valve V127 or V128 given failure to open automatically.
- 2) Operator fails to close an isolation 5 x 10-3 valve which fails to close automatically
- 3) Operator fails to close Emergency 9 x 10-1 Feedwater System manual isolation valve to isolate rupture in header
- 4) Operator fails to restore valve to 1 x 10-3 nonnal position after maintenance
- 5) Operator inadvertently blocks 1 x 10-4 actuation signal, turns off running pump, shuts an isolation valve or fails to restore valve given indi-cation of improper positioning.
- 6) Operator fails to open V-156 in startup 1 x 10-2 feed pump discharge line and align pump to emergency power within 30 minutes
- 7) Operator fails 'to open V-163 in startup 1.1 x 10-2 feed pump discharge line and close V-109 in recirculation line to the CST
- 8) Operator fails to start the startup 1 x 10-3 feed pump (P-113) from the control room given no automatic actuation signal and existence of emergency procedure
- 9) Operator fails to properly transfer 1 x 10-2 breaker for SUF pump to bus ES 27
3.3 RESULTS FROM FAULT TREE ANALYSES 3.3.1 Computer Codes All qualitative cut-set analyses and numerical evaluations of unreliability made usin the Seabrook AFW system fault tree model were performed by the WAMBAM 1) and WAMCUT(2) computer codes. Versions of these codes were obtained from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) by PSNH and its service organization, Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (YAEC) for the purpose of conducting this study. Some modifications were required to the codes to reduce their memory requirements during execution so that they could be run on the CDC-7600 computer at YAEC; however, the modifications only affected the size of the fault tree that could be analyzed and not the numerical probability calculations or cut-set evaluations performed by the code. 3.3.2 Events Analyzed Three specific events were analyzed using the Seabrook fault tree. They were: o A loss of main feedwater transient with reactor trip (LMFW) o A loss of main feedwater transient with coincident loss of offsite power (LMFW/LOSP) o A loss of main feedwater transient with coincident loss of offsite power and both onsite emergency diesel-generators (LMFW/LOAC). In all cases, successful operation of the AFW system required that at least two of the four plant steam generators be supplied with cooling flow from the AFW system. t In a general sense, a loss of main feedwater event is the transient for which the auxiliary feedwater system is intended to provide protection. Therefore the reliability of the AFW system for the LMFW transient can be viewed as a reference against which reliability calculations for the other e 28
transients may be compared. The fault tree described in the previous sections and presented in Appendix A was designed specifically for the LMFW event. Evaluations of the other transients were made by modifying this baseline fault tree as described later. Before discussing the modifications necessary to model these other events, one point of conservatism regarding LMFW events that has been included into the fault tree should be reiterated. As was noted in Section 3.1, fault tree modeling of the effects of the startup feed pump on AFW system reliability assumed in all cases that the SUF pump was successful only when supplying the emergency feedwater header. As a result all the operator actions required to achieve this goal must be successful. This includes manually starting the SUF pump and, if necessary, loading it on an emergency bus. It also requires the necessary actions to change the positions of the three valves in the startup pump discharge and cross-tie headers as was described in Section 3.2.4. In many LMFW transients, however, none of these actions will be required. In those transients which result in a trip of the main feed pumps but dc not result in either a high steam generator level or a safety injection signal, the SUF pump will be automatically started and will deliver flow to the steam generators by way of the main feed lines. Therefore no operator actions are necessary to receive the benefit of cooling from the SUF pump. Similarly, if these same transients are accompanied by a loss of the normal SUF pump power source, only the actions to load the SUF pump on the emergency bus and isolate its recirculation line are necessary. Flow can ! still be provided to the steam generators through the main feedwater lines without additional valve manipulations.* Thus the fault tree model, by requiring the SUF pump to supply cooling water via the EFW headers in all cases, provides conservative estimates of reliability for these transients l where main feedwater flow paths are still available and in which a safety injection or high steam generator level signal is not generated. l Note that if the cause of the power loss is a loss of offsite power, the main feedwater lines will not be open because of closure of the main feedwater isolation valves on loss of power. 29
The LMFW/LOSP transients impact the EFW system in only one way. They eliminate the redundant electrical power sources for both the motor-driven EFW pump and the motor-driven SUF pump. As a result the reliability of both pumps is reduced because all single point failures causing loss of the emergency bus supplying the pump will also result in loss of the pump. In the case of the startup pump, the necessity of an operator action to load the pump on the emergency bus is also introduced into the system. Modeling the loss of offsite power in the fault tree was done by converting gates EP 21 (pg. A-38 of Appendix A) and SUP 21 (pg. A-43 of Appendix A) to AND gates, converting gates EPE6 (pg. A-38 of Appendix A) and SUP 19 (pg. A-43 of Appendix A), and M004 (pg. A-45 of Appendix A) to OR gates, and inputting an LOSP frequency of 0. This has the same effect as inputting an LOSP frequency of 1.0 in the reference tree but greatly reduces the computer calculations required to evaluate the tree. All cut-sets and failure probabilities determined for the modified tree will be conditional on the LOSP event even though the code cut-set output will not include specific indication of that fact. The total loss of AC power events have a much more drastic effect on AFW system reliability. In essence the system is reduced to a single pump system because both motor-driven pumps become unavailable. Thus, all single point failures disabling the turbine-driven EFW pump result in loss of system function. For the total loss of AC power events, the fault tree modifications were also more extensive. All tree structure below gates AF127, SUP1, and M004 (pgs. A-30, A-41, and A-45 of Appendix A) was eliminated. The net effect is the same as inputting frequency values of 1.0 for both the LOSP event and failure of both diesel generators in that both motor-driven pumps are eliminated from the system. Again code results are conditional on these failures although the conditionality is not reflected specifically in the output. i i 30
Rev. 1 3.3.3 Numerical Reliability Results A total of five cases were analyzed with the Seabrook AFW system fault tree model. They were the LMFW, LMFW/LOSP, and LMFW/LOAC events assuming all three pumps are part of the EFW system, and the LMFW and LMFW/LOSP events assuming only the two-train emergency feedwater system is used to provide steam generator cooling. The latter two cases were done to provide a reference for evaluating the effect of the SUF pump on overall system reliability. The results of the five cases are shown in Table 3. TABLE 3 AFW SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY TRANSIENT 3-PUMP AFW SYSTEM 2-PUMP EFW SYSTEM LMFW 2.1 x 10-5 2.8 x 10-4 LMFW/LOSP 5.6 x 10-5 5.8 x 10-4 LMFW/LOAC 2.1 x 10-2 2.1 x 10-2 It is clear from these results that the Seabrook AFW system easily meets the NRC specified reliability goals when use of the SUF pump is I considered for the LMFW transient. Even with a coincident loss of offsite
- power, the' system exhibits an unreliability of better than 10-4/ demand. In terms of the results published by the NRC in NUREG-0611 for other Westinghouse plants, the Seabrook AFW system would fall into the high, high, and medium categories respectively for the LMFW, LMFW/LOSP and LMFW/LOAC transients.
31
3.3.4 Dominant Failures for Three Pump AFW System Dominant contributors to availability of the AFW system at Seabrook for the three loss of main feedwater/ loss of power events are shown in Tables
^4, 5, and 6. Events are ranked by the magnitude of their contribution to system unavailability. It should be noted that no single point failures
- were found in either the LMFW or LMFW/LOSP events that would disable the entire AFW system, although, as should be expected, a number of single failures will disable the turbine-driven pump train during a LMFW/LOAC event.
l l l l l
- One single failure exists that will disable the AFW system under any circumstance. That is a failure of the condensate storage tank such that no water is available to the suction of any of the pumps. The probability of such a failure was assumed negligible for the purposes of this study.
32
TABLE 4 DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEE 0 WATER EVENT CONTRIBUTION TO EVENT UNAVAILABILITY
- 1. Equipment and maintenance faults: Failures 7.0 x 10-6 preventing motor-driven EFW pump from func-tioning coupled with maintenance errors causing isolation valve V125 to be closed.
- 2. Maintenance faults: Maintenance outage 3.0 x 10-6 of motor-driven EFW pump train coupled with maintenance errors causing isolation valve V125 to be closed.
- 3. Maintenance faults: Maintenance errors 2.0 x 10-6 causing isolation valve V125 to be closed and the motor-driven EFW train to be inoperable,
- 4. Equipment and operator faults: Equipment 1.9 x 10-6 failures in both EFW trains coupled with failure of operator to properly align SUF pump with EFW system.
- 5. Equipment faults: Equipment failures dis- 9.0 x 10-7 abling motor-driven EFW pump train and iso-lation valve V125.
i 6. Equipment faults: Equipment failures 7.3 x 10-7 i disable all three pump trains.
- 7. Equipment, maintenance and operator faults: 5.9 x 10-7 Equipment failure in one EFW train while other EFW train out of service coupled with l failure of operator to properly align SUF l pump with EFW system.
- 8. Cut-sets with unavailability values less than 4.4 x 10-6 1 x 10-7 Total unavailability (all cut-sets) =
2.1 x 10-5 l 33 l
4 Rev. 1 TABLE 5 DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEE 0 WATER / LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER EVENT CONTRIBUTION TO EVENT UNAVAILABILITY
- 1. Equipment and maintenance faults: Failures 2.1 x 10-5 preventing either diesel generator IB or
, motor-driven EFW pump from functioning l coupled with maintenance errors causing
- isolation valve V125 to be closed.
- 2. Equipment and operator faults: Equipment 8.5 x 10-6 failures disabling both EFW trains coupled with failure of operator to properly align SUF pump with EFW system.
l 3. Maintenance faults: Maintenance outages 5.6 x 10-6 or errors disabling motor-driven EFW pump train coupled with maintenance errors causing isolation valve V125 to be closed.
- 4. Equipment faults (triples): Equipment 7.0 x 10-0 failures disable all three pump trains.
l S. Equipment faults (doubles): Equipment 2.0 x 10-6 failures disabling motor-driven EFW pump train coupled with failure of valve V125 to remain open.
- 6. Maintenance, equipment, and operator 2.2x 10-6 faults: Maintenance outage of one EFW pump train coupled with equipment and I operator errors that disable both the I remaining EFW pump train and the SUF pumps.
l
- 7. Maintenance, equipment, and operator 3.3 x 10-7 faults: Maintenance errors that disable turbine-driven EFW pump train coupled with failures of diesel-generator 18 and failure of operator to properly align SUF pump with EFW system.
- 8. Cut-sets with unavailability values less 9.4 x 10-6 than 10-7 ,
Total unavailability (all cut-sets) = 5.6 x 10-5 34
TABLE 6 DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER/ LOSS OF ALL AC POWER CONTRIBUTION TO EVENT UNAVAILABILITY
- 1. Equipment faults: Failure of turbine-driven 1.4 x 10-2 EFW pump to start or continue running once started.
- 2. Maintenance faults: Maintenance errors 4.1 x 10-3 causing turbine-driven EFW train to be inoperable.
- 3. Maintenance faults: Turbine-driven EFW 2.5 x 10-3 train out of service for maintenance.
- 4. Equipment faults: Miscellaneous single 7.0 x 10-4 t
valve failures.
- 5. Maintenance faults: Miscellaneous 8.5 x 10-5 multiple maintenance errors causing turbine-driven EFW train to be inoperable.
- 6. Cut-sets with unavailability values 1.1 x 10-5 less than 10-5 Total unavailability (all cut-sets) = 2.1 x 10-2 l
35
3.3.5 Potential Common Cause Fail ures The cut-set results from the reliability analysis were also used in conjunction with the system engineering drawings to conduct a qualitative review of potential common-cause failure modes of the Seabrook AFW system. During the review, consideration was given to potential dependencies resulting from connon location, environment, human interactions, and support equipment for all three AFW pump trains. As a result of this investigation, two potential susceptibilities were identified. The first of the comon-cause susceptibilities results from a combined location and environmental dependency. Because both emergency feedwater pumps are located in the same pump room, conditions which result in an extreme environment in that room can adversely affect both pumps. An obvious potential source for such an environmental upset are failures associated with the steam turbine-driven pump that cause steam to escape into the pump room. The resultant high temperatures and high humidity might result in consequential failure of the motor-driven pump. Failure of the two EFW pumps alone are not sufficient to fail the AFW system because of the availability of the SUF pump which is located in the turbine building. However, for the SUF pump to be able to supply cooling to the steam generators via the EFW piping requires that manual isolation valve V156 be opened. This valve is located in the emergency feed pump room and would be inaccessible in the event of extreme environments in the room. As was noted in Section 3.3.2, in many situations it will not be necessary to align the SUF pump with the EFW system in order to use it for plant cooling. Only in circumstances where the normal flow path through the j main feedwater lines is unavailable will this be required. Therefore, even l should both EFW pumps fail due to a pump room steam leak and valve V156 also be inaccessible, the ability to cool the plant will still exist in most l circumstances. l Most probable causes for steam leaks in the pump room of sufficient i severity to cause environmental problems are associated with cracks in the pump turbine casing or breaks in the steam supply lines to the turbine. The 36
most likely cause of the main feedwater lines being unavailable for supplying cooling to the steam generators is a safety injection signal which will cause closure of the main feed isolation valves. The probability of simultaneous occurrence of these. events is small compared to the overall system unavailability predicted by the fault tree analyses.. Therefore this comon-cause susceptibility has a negligible effect on the system. A ccmon-cause failure potential often present in systems that incorporate automatic feedwater line isolation features is the possibility of a faulty calibration procedure causing all isolation setpoints to be impro-perly adjusted. As a result, inadvertent closure of all isolation valves can occur during system startup or following system flow perturbations. The design of the Seabrook system avoids this problem by incorporating control logic to inhibit isolation of more than a single EFW line. Signals denoting the closure of EFW isolation valve in any EFW line will inhibit closure of additional valves in the remaining lines. No other common-cause susceptibilities were identified which might adversely impact the Seabrook AFW design. Electrical power sources were found to be sufficiently separated and diverse to prevent dependencies due to power failures. With one exception,* all powered valves critical to system operation are of a fail-safe design such that loss of air or loss of power events do not pose threats to system function. With the exception of the location dependency noted above, separation of the SUF pump from the EFW pumps provides protection from location dependent effects such as vibration, grit, temperature, impact, explosions, etc. Separation of the SUF and EFW pumps also provides protection from electrical train common-cause failures due to localized grounding of power supplies. Recirculation valve PCV-4326 on the SUF pump discharge. 37
Rev. 1
4.0 CONCLUSION
S The results presented in this report lead to the following conclusions: -
- 1. The Seabrook combined auxiliary feedwater system consisting of the two-train emergency feedwater system and the single-train startup feedwater system has an unreliability of 2.1 x 10-5 for a loss of main feedwater event and is well within the range of un-reliability specified by the NRC staff in their October 30, 1981 letter to the Public Service Company of New Hampshire.
- 2. The unreliability of the Seabrook combined AFW system during combined loss of main feedwater/ loss of offsite power events is 5.6 x 10-5, and for a combined loss of main feedwater/ loss of all AC power event is 2.1 x 10-2 These values compare favorably with analyses done for auxiliary feedwater systems at other plants of Westinghouse design.
- 3. Major contributors to system unreliability generally relate to failures of pumps and to maintenance errors causing pump trains to be inadvertently disabled.
- 4. No severe common-cause failure susceptibilities were identified for the Seabrook auxiliary feedwater sys-tem.
l 38 l _ _ _
l l l f
5.0 REFERENCES
- 1. F. L. Leverenz and H. Kirch, " User's Guide.for the WAMBAM Computer Code," EPRI 217-2-5, January 1976.
I
- 2. F. L. Leverenz and H. Kirch, "WAMCUT, A Computer Code for Fault Tree Evaluation," EPRI NP-803, June 1978.
4 39
6.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY
- 1. NUREG/CR-1205, " Data Sumaries of Licensee Event Reports of Pumps at U.S. Comercial Nuclear Power Plants," January 1, 1972 to April 30, 1978, W. H. Sullivan, et. al. , January 1980.
- 2. NUREG/CR-1363, " Data Sumaries of Licensee Event Reports of Valves at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1978, Warren H. Habble, et. al., June 1980.
- 3. NUREG/CR-1362, " Data Sumaries of Licensee Event Reports of Diesel Generators at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,"
January 1,1976 to December 31, 1978, J.P. Poloski, et. al., March 1980.
- 4. NUREG/CR-1740, " Data Sumaries of Licensee Event Reports of Selected Instrumentation and Control Components at U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," C.F. Miller, et. al., May 1981.
- 5. NUREG/CR-1278, " Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis With Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications."
, 6. NUREG/CR-1635, " Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System 1979 Annual Reports of Cumulative System and Component Reliability," l Southwest Research Institute, September 1980. l 7. ANSI /IEEE Std 500-1977, "IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, and Sensing Component Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." l l 8. NUREG-0611, " Generic Evaluation of Feedwater Transients and l Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accidents," January 1980. l 9. NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," l November, 1980. l 40 I
APPENDIX A SEABROOK EFW SYSTEM FAULT TREE l l l i l
APPENDIX A The following is a guideline for interpreting the basic fault identifiers used in the attached Seabrook EFW fault tree and in fault identifier Table B-2. Each fault identifier consists of 10 alphanumeric characters of the form: X-XX-1-XXXX-XX The first character identifies the system to which the component belongs (seeTableA.1). The second and third characters identify the component type (Table A.2). The fifth through eighth characters are for component identi-fication and the last two characters identify the fault codes (Table A.3). A-1
.. . ~. . .- - .- - ..__ - .
i, TABLE A.1 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION CODE l j C - Condensate System M - Emergency Feedwater System Q - Steam Supply System t R - Electrical Distribution System ' 1 5 - Condensate Storage System i 6 - Control / Protection System l l 1 s l i l
-l
- A-2 l i
1
. . , . . - - - - _ - , - - - - - - - - - - . < - . - - - - - - - - -~I
TABLE A.2 COMPONENT TYPES BA - Batteries BC - Battery Chargers CA - Circuit Breaker CB - Contactor CC - Controller CD - Starter CE - Switch - EC - Electrical Conductors GD - Diesel Generator HX - Heat Exchanger IC - Instrument Controller ID - Sensor / Detector / Element - Pressure IE - Sensor / Detector / Element - Temperature IF - Sensor / Detector / Element - Flow IG - Sensor / Detector /Elenent - Level IH - Sensor / Detector /Eleinent - Radiation IP - Power Supply IX - Instrument Error MA - AC Motor MD - DC Motor 0A - Piping less than 1 inch in diameter OB - Piping greater than 1 inch but less than 2 inch OC - Piping greater than 2 inch but less than 3 inch OD - Piping greater than 3 inch but less than 4 inch OE - Piping greater than 4 inch but less than 6 inch 0F - Piping greater than 6 inch but less than 8 inch OG - Piping greater than 8 inch but less than 10 inch OH - Piping greater than 10 inch but less than 12 inch 0I - Piping greater than 12 inch but less than 16 inch OJ - Piping greater than 16 inch but less than 24 inch OK - Piping greater than 24 inch but less than 36 inch OL - Piping greater than 36 inch A-3
i TABLEA.2(CONT'D.) .i PB - Centrifugal Pump I-RA - Control, General Purpose TR - Transformer TU - Turbine VA - Check Valve ] VB - Relief Valve
- VC - Vacuum Relief VD - Isolation, Shutoff Valve VG - Flow Control I
t 1 1 0 I a 4 A-4 i
- , , - - . - - . - . , , - - . - - . . - - - ~ , , . , , . , , , - - . , . , - , , - - - , - - , , . . - . . , . , - , , . , , - , - . , - , , . - , , -
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0 APPENDIX B FAULT TREE DATA
TABLE 8.1 MECHAh! CAL AND ELECTRICAL COMPONENT FAILufiE RATES l FA! LURE RATE WASH-1400 GE NRC IEEF-500 RFrasser knrn FAILURE BWR PWt CATEGORY COMPONENT MDDE 5.3 x 10'4/d 2.4 x 10'3/d Pumps Pump Falls to start 1 x 10~3/d (2.4 x }0-3/d)* (MotorDriven) 7.9 x 10'0/hr. 3.7 x In",/d 3 x 10-o/h . 3.4 x 10'3/d Fatis to run 3 x 10 5/hr. _ 8.4 x 10' /hr _ (3.4 x 10 g/d)* Pumps Falls to start 3 x 10~3/d I 5.5 x 10 /d fgf4 3
/d)* 8.4 x 10~3/d (Turbine Driven) 7.9 x 10-6/hr. 8.4 x 10 /hr 5.7 x 10'3/d Falls to run 3 x 10 5/hr. 3 x 10-Mx m-/hbM Motors Motor Fatis to start 3 x 10'4/d 3 x 10'4/d Fatis to run 1 x 10-5/hr. 1 x 10-6/hr. 1 x 10-5/hr Olesel Diesels Fatts to start 3 x 10-2/d 4.0 x 10'2/d 4.0 x 10-2/d (monthly)
Falls to run 3 x 10 3/hr. , g-2/hr 3.0 x 10-2j ,,, (monthly) W _ _ _ . b Pipe Pipe < 3* Rupture -1 x 10'S/hr. I a 10/hr Pipe > 3' Rupture 1 x 10-10/hr. 1 x 10-10/hr Values Motor Operated NO F0 1 x 10'3/d 1.6 x 10'0/hr 3 x 10'3/d 2 x 10'3/d 2 x 10'3/d NC FC 1 x 10'3/d 1.5 x 10-6/hr 1 x 10'3/d NO FC 1 x 10'4/d 0.15 x 10-6/hr 1 x 10'3/d 5 x 104 /d 5 x 10'4/d NC F0 1 x 10'4/d 0.16 x 10-6/hr 1 x 10'4/d Rupture 1 x 10-8/hr. I a 10-8/hr Check Valve Falls to open 1 x 10'"/4 0.15 x 10-6/d 1 x 10'4/d 2 x 10'4/d *** 2 x 104 /d Internal Leak 3 x 10'I/hr.** 1.6 x 10-6/hr 1.2 x 10-6/hr 4.7 x 10*I/hr 4.7 x 10'I/hr Rupture 1 x 10'0/hr 1 x 10'0/hr
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Manual Valve FTRO (plug) 1 x 10'4/d Rupture 1 x 10-8/hr. 1 x 10'#/hr 2 x 10-8/hr 2 x 10-8/hr Fall to operate _ 1 x 10-4/d 2 x 10-5/d 3 , 33-57 , 1.2 x 10'#/hr 1.2 x 10'#/hr notor Driven Spurious Opening Operators Spartuus Clostng 1.2 x 10'#/hr 1.2 x 10'I/hr 2.5 x 104/d Fati to Open 2.5 x 10-6/d Fall to Close 2.5 x 10/d 2.5 x 10/d
- Specific to Aux. Feed Pumps * *** Value for Westinghouse c* 95 percent corfidence tend
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TABLE 8.1 MECHAhfCAL AhD ELECTAIC4L COMPOhE%T FAf t tar RATES FAILURE RATE WASH-1400 GE hRC ftEE-500 arrnness amen FAILURE Bun pus CATEGORY COMP 0hENT Moor Circutt Breakers Relays (Motors) Failure to energize g ,go-4/d 1 a 10'4/d (cont'd) Coll open I a 10*I/hr 1 a 10'I/hr Coll short to power 1 a 10-8/hr 1 x 10-8/hr i Transformers Transformers Open circult: Prtrary or Seconder] 1 a 10-6/hr 1 a 104 /hr Short: Primary to Secondarj 1 x 10-6j ,, 1 a 10-6thr Single Phase: 2 - 30KV Open 3.2 a 10-8/hr 3.2 m 10'8/hr en E Three phase: V Dry 15 - 40KV Open 7,4 , 10-8j3, 7.4 a 10-8 hr 60lv - 15KV Open 3,9 , to-8/hr 3.9 s 10-8/hr Ltquid 2- 30 KV Open l 3.6 a 10'8/hr
- 6 a 10-8/hr 31 - 72 ' KV Open 4 5.2 a 10-8/hr .2 a 10 /hr
. 73 - 145KV Open 1.4 a 10/hr ' 8.6 x 10/hr 146 - 242KV Open 1.9 a 10-8/hr 1.9 a 10-8/hr 243 - 346KV Open the 9.2 a 104 /hr 347 - 550KV Open 9.2 5.4 xa 10 106
/hr 5.4 s 104 /hr Electrical Bus Open 4.2 a 10/hr Otstribution 4.2 a 10/hr Shcrt 7.0 a 10 /hr 7 s 10-8/hr Wires Open Circuit 3 a 10-6/hr 3 a 10'0/hr Short to Ground 3 x 10'I/hr 3 a 10'I/hr Short to Power 1 x 10-5/hr I a 10-5/hr Power Supply No Output 1.4 a 10-6/hr 1.4 10/hr
. - . .. .= .- . - _ - - .-
TABLE B.1 MlCMANICAL AND ELECTRICAL COWGNENT FAILURE RATES FA! LURE RAIE , i WASH-1400 GE NRC IEEE-500 krermarknrn FAILURE 8ua pua ! CATEGDRY COMPONEhT Muor Electrical Cable l Distributton Power: Open circuit 9.1 a 10*I/hr
" 9.1 a 10*I/hr
! Copper short to ground 1.7 a 10-6/hr 1.7 a 10-6/hr Short to power 4 1.0 a 10 /hr 1.0 a 10-6the Alminum Open circuit 1.1 a 10-6/hr 1.1 a 10-6the Short to ground 3.9 a 10-6/hr 3.9 a 10'0/hr short to poner 1.5 a 10/hr 1.5 a 10'0/hr Control: Open circutt 9.1 a 10*I/hr 9.1 a 10'I/hr Copper Short to ground 2.4 a 10'0/hr 2.4 a 10/hr y Short to power 1.0 a 10-6/hr 1.0 a 10-6/hr v1 _ _ _ . . . . . - -- . - - - . - - Terutnal Boards Open 1 a 10'I/hr 3.3. a 10-6/hr 3.3 a 10-6/hr Short 1 a 10-8/hr 1.4 a 10-6/hr 1.4 a 10/hr Instrumentation Relay Coll fatis to 1 a 10 /d .4 a 10-6/hr 1 a 10'4/d and Controls o w ate Coti fatis to open 3 a 10'I/hr .08 a 10-6/hr 3 m 10'I/hr Temperature Fatis to operate 1.4 a 10-6/hr Sensing Device 1.4 a 10-6/hr [3] Degraded operation 6.6 a 10'I/hr 6.6 a 10*I/hr Temperature Element Fati to operate -6
.1.8 a 10 /hr 1.8 a 10-6/hr Degraded operation .
.1.2 a 10'0/hr 1.2 a 10-6/hr Temperature Falls to operate 3.8 a 10'I/hr 3.8 a 10'I/hr Transattter Degraded operation 3.6 a 10' /hr 3.6 a 10'I/hr
[3] Sensing Device includes switch, monitor, sensor, and transmitter s
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T ABLE 8.1 AILURE RATES l MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL COMPCNENT F FAILURE RATE ' _...RLC w r W n IEEE-500 I NRC f J f GE .. i I PWR j WASH-1400 J ' BWR 2.6 a 10/hr FAILURE -6
-6 2.6 x 10 /hr 5.2 s 30/hr fT)Qf f COMPONENT 3.1 m 10-6/hr 5.2 x 10-6/hr CAllGORY 3.9 a 10-6/hr 5.7 a 10 /hr -6 Fati to operate 1.4 a 10-6/hr level Sensing -6 1.4 x 10-6/hr Instrwentation
- Degraded operation 3.9 x 10 /hr -6 1.1 a 10 /hr 1.1 a 10 /hr
{c g""d 3 m 10*I/d Level Element 3 x 10'I/d 3.4 a 10-8/d Fati to operate 3.4 a 10-8/d Level Transmitter Degraded operation 4.5 x 10'I/d 4.5 a 10'I/d -6 Fall to operate I a 10 /hr I a 10-6/hr Level 5.ttch Spurtous operettons 1 x 10 /hr 1 a 10 /hr -6 Degra$ed operations 4 2 s 10 /hr 2 a 10 /hr
-6 Fatt to operate 4.2 u 10 /hr Level Controller Spurtous operations 4.2 a 10' /hr ^
f Degradedoperationf 4 4.2 x 10 /hr
! Fati to operate '~~~ 4.2 a 10/hr -6 2.8 x 10-6fn, E/S Converter 2.8 x 10-6/hr 1.9 a 10-6/hr Fatt to operate '
1.9 m 10 /hr Sqare Root Con. -6 l verter 4.2 m 10 /hr -6 Fall to operate 1 x 10 /hr Power Supply Degradcd coeratton - 1 x 10/hr 3 a 10 /hr
-6 I a 10 /hr I a lO/br Solid State: Falls to function 1 x 10'#/hr Low Pm.er 1 a 10'4/d Fatis Shorted -6 3 a 10 /hr Fatis to Function 10' /hr -7 High Power ~
g , gg /hr Fatis Shorted 1 x 10'4/d -8 Falls to operate 3 a 10 7g, Torque Switch I a 10' /hr hormally open Sultch Contacts switches fall 1 a 10'8/hr
,1 to close Normally closed 3 a 10/hr j tuttches fall to close 1 x 10/hr
[ She across con-
j TABLE B.2 , ENCY FEED STATION FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK FAILURE RATE E UNAVAILABILITY - DESCRIPTION ER -6 ' IDE ~7 1.2 x 10 /hr _ 6 0 x 10 S.G.A. Relief Valve Calibration __
-6 Valve ~7 1.2 x 10 /hr QVBISGAROH 6.0 x 10 S.G.D. Relief Valve Calibration -6 Shift -7 1.2 x 10 /hr QVBISGDROH 6.0 x 10 S.G.C. Relief Valve Calibration -6 Shift -7 1.2 x 10 /hr QVBISGCROH 6.0 x 10 S.G.B. Relief Valve Calibration -8 Shift -8 8.4 x 10 /hr QVBISGRROH S.G.A Relief Valve Control Wiring 4.2 x 10 Reversed -8 QVBISGARMM -8 8.4 x 10 /hr S.G.D Relief Valve Control Wiring 4.2 x 10 Reversed -8 QIX1SGDRMM -8 8.4 x 10 /hr S.G.C Relief Valve Control Wiring 4.2 x 10 Reversed -8 QIX1SGCRMM -8 8.4 x 10 /hr 4.2 x 10 S.G.B Relief Wiring Reversed Valve Control
-3 QIX1SGBRMM 5.7 x 10 /d _
Turbine Driven Pump P-37A 5.7 x 10-3 MPB1T37AMG rails to Run -3
-3 3.4 x 10 /d_
Motor Driven Pump P-37B _ 3.4 x 10 Fails to Run -8 1 x 10' /hr MPB1D37BMG 5 x 10 Isolation Valve V-30 In Feedwater Supply Line to S.G.A Ruptures -
-8 MV01V30AMJ ~9 ' 1 x 10 /hr -
S x 10 Check Valve V-29 In Feedwater Supply Line To S.G.A Ruptures MVA1V29AMJ -9 1 x 10-8/hr Stop Check Valve V-76 In Aux. 5 x 10 Feed. Supply Line A Ruptures -7 MVA1V29AMJ -0 'l x 10 /hr ~ 5 x 10 Flow Control Valve FV-4214 InAux. -8Feed.
~
MVD14214MJ -9 1 x 10 /hr _ Stop Check Valve V-94 In Aux. 5 x 10 Feed. Supply Line D Rupture MVA1V94DMJ 1 x 10-7/hr 5 x 10'O Flow Control Valve FV-4244 InAux. -8Feed MVD14244MJ -9 1 x 10 /hr i Stop Check Valve V-88 In Aux. 5 x 10 Feed. Supply Line C Rupture MVA1V88CMJ 1 L B-8 L L - _--_____-__ - --
TABLE B.2 (Continutd) . FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE IDE ER Flow Control Valve FV-4234 In Aux 5 x 10 -8 MVD14234MJ Feed Supply Line C Ruptures 1 x 10-7/hr Stop Check Valve V-82 In Aux. MVA1V82BMJ Feed. Supply Line B Ruptures 5 x 10 -9 1 x 10-8/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4244 In MVD14224MJ Aux. Feed. Supply Line B Ruptures 5 x 10 -8 1 x 10-7/hr Isolation Valve V-57 In Feedwater MVD1V57DMJ Supply Line D Ruptures 5 x 10 -8 1 x 10-7/hr Check Valve V-56 In Feedwater -8 MVA1V56DMJ Supply Line D Ruptures 5 x 10-9 1 x 10 /hr Isolation Valve V-48 In Feedwater MVD1V48CMJ Supply Line C Ruptures 5 x 10-8 1 x 10-7/hr Check Valve V-47 In Feedwater MVA1V47CMJ Supply Line C Ruptures 5 x 10-9 1 x 10-8/hr Isolation Valve V-39 In Feedwater MVD1V39BMJ Supply Line B Ruptures 5 x 10 -8 1 x 10-7/hr Check Valve V-38 In Feedwater MVAlB38BMJ Supply Line B Ruptures 5 x 10 -9 1 x 10-8/hr Manual Valve V-75 In Aux. Feed. MVM1V75AMJ Supply Line A Ruptures 1 x-10-8 2 x 10-8/hr Gear Driven Valve V-65 In P-37A -8 VMDIV65AMJ Discharge Line Ruptures 5 x 10 -9 1 x 10 /jr Manual Valve V-152 In Feedwater -8 MVM1V152MJ Recirc. Line A Ruptures 1 x 10 2 x 10-8/hr Gear Driven Valve V-156 In Start-MVD1V156MJ up Feed Pump Discharge Line Rup. 5 x 10 -9 1 x 10-9/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-510 In MVD1V510MJ Feed. Supply Line A Ruptures 5 x 10-8 1 x 10-7/hr Manual Valve V-87 In Aux. Feed. MVM1V87DMJ Supply Line D Ruptures 1 x 10-8 2 x 10-8/hr Manual Valve V-153 In Feedwater MVM1V153MJ Recirc. Line D Ruptures 1 x 10-8 2 x 10-8/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-540 In I MVD1V540MJ Feed. Supply Line D Ruptures 5 x 10 -8 -7 1 x 10 /hr !
. B-9
TABLE B.2 (Continued) K EMERGENCY FEED STATION FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THEFAILURE UNAVAILABILITY SEABROO RATE I DESCRIPTION l
-8 IDE ER -8 2 x 10 /hr I 1 x 10 I Manual Valve V-93 In Aux. Feed.
' Supply Line C Ruptures r
-8
~0 2 x 10 /hr MVM1V93CMJ 1 x 10 Manual Valve V-154 In Feedwater
! -7 Recirc. Line C Ruptures ~0 1 x 10 /hr MVM1V154MJ 5 x 10 Flow Control LineValve FCV-530 In f Feed. Supply C Ruptures /hr MDV1V530MJ 1 x 10
-8 l 2 x 10'0 Manual Line B Ruptures Valve V-81 In Aux. Feed. -0 1 x 10 /hr i
8 ~9 MVM1V81BMJ 5 x 10 Gear Driven Valve V-71 In P-37 2 x 10~0/hr Discharge Line Rupture l i -8 i MVDlV71BMJ , 1 x 10 Manual Valve V-155 In Feedwater
. Recirc. Line B Ruptures -8
-7 1 x 10 /hr MVM1V155MJ 5 x 10 Flow Control Feed. Supply LineValve FCV-520 In B Ruptures /
-8 1 x 10 /hr
~9 MV01VS20MJ 5 x 10
- Check Valve V-64 In P-37A Dis-charge Line Ruptures -9 1 x 10'8/hr MVA1V64AMJ ' 5 x 10 I Check Valve V-70 In P-388 Dis- -8 charge Line Ruptures 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10'g MVA1V70BMJ Valve V-129 Steam Inlet In P-37A Turbine Line Ruptures -8
-8 2 x 10 /hr QVD1V129MJ 1 x 10 t Manual bine Steam Valve V-95Ruptures Inlet Line l In P-37A -9 Tur- 1 x 10
-8
/hr 5 x 10 QVM1V95AMJ Check Valve V-94 In Ster.m Supp y ,
Line A to P-37A Ruptured ~9 1 x 10-8/hr QVA1V94AMJ 5 x 10 f Check Valve V-96 In Steam Supply Line A to P-37A Ruptures ~7
-8 1 x 10 /hr QVA1V96BMJ 5 x 10 Steam Supply Line A Control Valv ~0 V-127 Ruptures -8 2 x 10 /hr QVXIV127MJ 1 x 10 Steam Supply Line A Manual Bypast, -7 l
Valve V-171 Ruptures -8 1 x 10 /hr QVM1V171MJ 5 x 10 Steam Supply Line B Control ,
- 8 Valve V-128 Ruptures -8 2 x 10 /hr QVXIV128MJ 1 x 10 Steam Supply Line B Manual By-i pass Valve V-172 Ruptures QMVIV172MJ B-10
~~- ~~ W~_
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK FMERGENCY FEED STATION DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE IDE ER Manual Valve V-155 In P-37A FVM1V155MJ Suction Line Ruptures 1 x 10-8 2 x 10-8/hr Manual Valve V-154 In P-37A FVM1V154MJ Suction Line Ruptures 1 x 10-8 2 x 10-8/hr Manual Valve V-159 In P-27A FVM1V159MJ Suction Line Ruptures 1 x 10-0 2 x 10-8/hr Manual Valve V-158 In P-37A Suction Line Ruptures -0 -8 FVM1V158MJ 1 x 10 2 x 10 /hr Isolation Valve V-30 In Feedwater MVD1V3pAMB Supply Line A Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Flow Control Valve FV-4244 In Aux. MVD14244MB Feed Supply Line D Fails To Close 2 x 10 -3 2 x 10-3/d Flow Control Valve FV-4234 In Aux, MVD14234MB Feed. Supply Line D Fails To Close 9 x 10 -4 9 x 10-4/d Flow Control Valve FV-4224 In Aux, MVD14224MB Feed. Supply Line D Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Isolation Valve V-57 In Feedwater MVD1V57DMB Supply Line D Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Flow Control Valve FV-4214 In Aux, MVD14214MB Feed. Supply Line A Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 2 x 10-3/d Isolation Valve V-48 In Feedwater MVD1V48CMB Supply Line C Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 -4 9 x 10 /d Isolation Valve V-39 In Feedwater Supply Line C Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 -4 MVD1V39BMB 9 x 10 /d Flow Control Valve FCV-510 In MVD1V510MB Feed. Supply Line A Fails To Close 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Flow Control Valve FCV-540 In MVD1V540MB Feed. Supply Line D Fails to Close 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Flow Control Valve FCV-530 In MVD1V530MB Feed. Supply Line C Fails To Close 9 x 10 -4 -4 9 x 10 /d Flow Control Valve FCV-520 In MVD1V520MB Feed. Supply Line B Fails To Close 9 x 10 -4 9 x 10-4/d Isolation Valve V-30 In Feedwater MVD1V30AMC Supply Line A Fails To Remain C1. 2.3 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7/h - B-11 I I
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE IDE ER Flow Control Valve FV-4244 In Aux. Feed. Supply Line D Fails T MVD14244MC Romain Closed 6.0 x 10-0 1.2 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4234 In Aux. Feed. Supply Line C Fails To MVD14234MC Remain Closed 6.0 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4224 In Aux. Feed. Supply Line B Fails To MVD14224MC Remain Closed 6.0 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-7/hr Isolation Valve V-57 In Feedwater Supply Line D Fails To Remain MVD1V57DMC Closed 2.3 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4214 In Aux. Feed. Supply Line A Fails T MVD14214MC Remain Closed 6.0 x 10 -8 1.2 x 10-7/hr Isolation Valve V-48 In Feedwater Supply Line C Fails To Remain MVD1V48 CMC Closed 2.3 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7/hr Isolation Valve V-39 In Feedwater Supply Line B Fails To Remain MVD1V39BMC Closed 2.3 x 10 -7 4.5 x 10-7/hr tiow control valve tLV-Ibu in Feed. Supply Line A Fails T MVD1V510MC Remain Closed 8.5 x 10-8 1.7 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-540 In MVD1V540MC Feed. S 1 Line D Fails T 8.5 x 10-8 1.7 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-530 In Feed. Supply Line C Fails T MVD1V530MC Remain Closed 8. 5 x 10-8 1.7 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-520 In Feed. Supply Line B Fails T MVD1V520MC Remain Closed 8.5 x 10 -8 1.7 x 10-7/hr MVD14214 MD Flow Control Valve FV-4214 Fails To Remain Open 8 x 10-8 1.6 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4244 Fails MVD14244MD To Remain Open 8 x 10-8 1.6 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4234 Fails MVD14234MD To Remain Open 8 x 10-8 1.6 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FV-4224 Fails 8 x 10-8 -7 MVD14224MD To Remain Open 1.6 x 10 /hr i Isolation Valve V-65 Fails To MVD1V65AMD Remain Open (Plugged) 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d l Steam Supply Inlet Valve V-129 l QVD1V129MD Fails To Remain Open 2.3 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7/hr B-12
TABLEB.2(Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE Isolation Valve V-125 Fails To Remain Open (Plugged} 1 x 10-4 -4 MVD1V125MD 1 x 10 /d Isolation Valve V-126 Fails To
'MVD1V126MD Remain Open (Plugged) 1 x 10-6 1 x 10-4/d Isolation Valve V-127 Fails To MVD1V127MD Remain Open (Plugged) 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Isolation Valve V-71 Fails To MVD1V71BMD Remain Open (Plugged) 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Steam Supply Line A Flow Valve QVXIV127MA V-127 Fails To Open 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Steam Supply Line B Flow Valve QVXIVL8MA V-128 Fails To Open 9 x 10-4 9 x 10-4/d Steam Supply Line A Flcw Valve QVXIV127MD V-127 Fails To Remain Open 2.3 x 10 -7 4.5 x 10-7/hr Steam Supply Line B Fails To QVXIV128MD Remain Open 2.3 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7/hr Stop Check Valve V-76 Fails To
-4 MVA1V76AMA Open 2 x 10-4 2 x 10 /d Stop Check Valve V-94 Fails To MVA1V94DMA Open 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4/d Stop Check Valve V-88 Fails To MVA1V88CMA Open 2 x 10 -4 2 x 10-4/d Stop Check Valve V-82 Fails To 2 x 10-4 -4 MVA1V82BMA Open 2 x 10 /d MVA1V64AMA Check Valve V-64 Fails To Open 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4/d l Steam Supply Line A Check Valve QVAIV94AMA V-94 Fails To Open 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4/d Steam Supply Line B Check Valve QVA1V96BMA V-96 Fails To Open 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4/d Check Valve V-70 Fails To Open 2 x 10-4 -4 l MVA1V70BMA 2 x 10 /d Valve V-75 In Aux. Feed Supply MVD1V75AMD Line A Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d B-13
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY ER FAILURE RATE Valve V-87 In Aux. Feed Supply MVD1V87DMD Line D Plugged 1 x 10,4 _4 1 x 10 /d Valve V-93 In Aux. Feed Supply MVD1V93CMD Line C Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Valve V-81 In Aux. Feed Supply MVD1V81BMD Line B Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Manual Valve V-95 In Turbine QVM1V95AMD Steam Supply Line Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Manual Valve V-155 In P-37A FVM1V155MD Suction Line Plugged 1 x 10-4 -4 1 x 10 /d Manual Valve V-154 In P-37A FVM1V154MD Suction Line Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d i Manual Valve V-159 In P-37B FVM1V159MD Suction Line Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Manual Valve V-158 In P-37B FVM1V158MD Suction Line Plugged 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Feedwater Supply Line Ruptures M0J1606BMJ Between V-20 and V-30 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Supply Line Ruptures M0J1606AMJ Between V-30 and S.G.A 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr / l Aux. Feed. Supply Line A Ruptures M0E1614AMJ Between V-76 and Main Supply Line 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed. Supply Line A Ruptures M0E1614BMJ Between FV-4214 and V-76 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr' Feedwater Supply Line D Ruptures M0J1609AMJ Between V-57 and S.G.D 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. teea suppiy Line U Ruptures Between V-94 and Main Feed. M0E1617AMJ Supply Line D 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr l Feedwater Supply Line C Ruptures
- M0J1608AMJ Between V-48 and S.G.C 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr l Aux. Feed. Supply Line C Ruptures M0E1616AMJ Between V-88 and Main Feed.
Sucoly Line C 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supply Line C Ruptures MDE1616BMJ Between FV-4234 and V-88 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr B-14
TABLEB.5(Continu;d) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE; jEABR00K EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRINIgN UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE
/ Feedwater Supply line B Ruptures M0J160/AMJ Between V-39 and S.G.B 5 x-10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed. Supply Line B Ruptures en 82 and Main Feed.
M0E1615AMJ ht , ,p 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed. Supply Line B Ruptures M0E1615BMJ Between V-4224 and V-82 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Supply Line D Ruptures M0E1609BMJ Between V-56 and V-57 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Supply Line C Ruptures M0J1608BMJ Between V-47 and V-48 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Feedwater Supply Line B Ruptures M0J1607BMJ Between V-38 and V-39 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supply Line A Ruptures M0E1614CMJ Between V-75 and FV-4214 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed. Supply Line A Ruptures M0E1614DMJ Between V-75 and Aux. Feed Supply Header 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supoly Header Ruptures M0G1613AMJ Between V 125 and Reducer 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Pump F-J/A Ulscharge Piping Ruptures Between V-65 M0F1610AMJ and Supply Header 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr teeawater xecirc. Line A Kuptures M0F1606AMJ Between Aux. Feed. Supply A and V-152 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Startup Feed Pump Discharge Line M0F1632AMJ Ruptures Between V-156 and Aux. Feed. S# ply Header 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Recirc. Line A Ruptures M0E1606BMJ Between V-152 and Main Feed Sup- 5 x 10-11 nly Iino a 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Supply Line A Ruptures M0J1606CMJ Between FCV-510 and V-29 5 x 10-11 -10 1,x 10 /hr Aux. Feed Supply Line D Ruptures M0E1617CMJ Between V-87 and FV-4224 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supply Line D Ruptures Between V-87 and Aux. Feed
.M0E1617DMJ Supply Header 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed. Supply Header Ruptures M0G1613BMJ Between V-87 and V-126 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr B-15
TABLE B.2 (Continu:d) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE Feedwater Recirc. Line D Ruptures M0E1609AMJ Between Aux. Feed. Supply Line D and V-153 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Recirc. Line D Ruptures M01609BMJ Between V-153 and Main Feedwater Supply Line D 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Supply Line D Ruptures M0J1609CMJ Between FCV-540 and V-56 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed. Supply Line C Ruptures M0E1616CMJ Between V-93 and FV-5234 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. reea dupply Line L Huptures M0E1616DMJ detween V-93 and Aux. Feed. Supply Header 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supply Header Ruptures M0G1613CMJ Between V-126 and V-127 5 x 10-y1 1 x 10-10/hr Feecwater KeClrC. Llne L Kuptures M0E1608AMJ Between Aux. Feed. Supply Line C and V-154 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Recir. Line C Ruptures M0E1608BMJ Between V-154 and Main Feedwater 5 x 10-11 sunniv Iino c 1 x 10-10/hr Feedwater Supply Line C Ruptures M0J1608CMJ Between FCV-530 and V-47 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supply Line B Ruptures M0E1615CMJ Between V-81 and FV-4224 5 x 10-II 1 x 10-10/hr Aux. Feed Supply Line 8 Ruptures 1 x 10 -10 /hr M0E16150MJ Between V-81 and Aux. Feed Supply 5 x 10-11 P& Aux. Feed Supply Header Ruptures M0G1613DMJ Between V-127 and Reducer 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr l Feed. Pump P-37B Discharge Line l M0F1612AMJ Ruptures Between V-71 & Reducer 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr teeawater Hecirc. Line b Huptures M0E1607AMJ Between Aux. Feed Supply Line B and V-155 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr ' Feedwater Recirc. Line B Ruptures M0E1607BMJ Between V-155 and Main Feedwater 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr s,,nnly iino n Feedwater Supply Line B Ruptures M0J1607CMJ Between FCV-520 and V-38 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feed. Pump P-37A Discharge Line M0F1610BMJ Ruptures Between V-64 and V-65 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr B-16 i
TABLEB.2(Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION FAULT IDENTIFIER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE Feed Pump P-37B Discharge Line M0F1612BMJ Ruptures Between V-70 and V-71 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feed Pump P-37A Discharge Line Ruptures Between P-37A and V-64 -10 M0F1612CMJ 5 x 10-l'1 1 x 10 /hr Feed Pump P37A Recirc. Line Rup-MOD 1610AMJ tures Between V-67 and Pump 5 x 10-10 1 x 10-9/hr Discharge Line Turbine Steam Supply Line. Ruptures Q0E1449AMJ Between V-95 and V-129 5 x 10-31 1 x 10-10/hr Turbine Steam Supply Line Ruptures Q0E1449BMJ Between V-129 and Turbine 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Turbine Steam Supply Line Ruptures QOF1449AMJ Between Tee and V95 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr steam dupply Line b Kuptures Between Reducer and Turbine QOF1109AMJ Inlet Line Tee 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Steam Supply Line A Ruptures 00F1009AMJ Between Reducer and Turbine 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Inlet Line Tee steam Supply Line b Kuptures Q0E1143AMJ Between V-128 and V-96 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Steam Supply Line A Ruptures Q0E1043AMJ Between V-127 and V-94 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Steam Supply Line A Ruptures Q0E1043BMJ Between V-94 and Reducer 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Steam Bypass Exit Line Ruptures Q0A1036AMJ Between V-171 and Steam Supply. 5 x 10 -10 -9 1 x 10 /hr Line A Steam Supply Line A Ruptures 00E1042AMJ Between Reducer and V-127 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Steam Bypass Inlet Line Ruptures Q0A1035AMJ Between Steam Supply Line A 5 x 10 -10 1 x 10-9/hr
~~ and V-171 Steam Supply Line A Ruptures 00F1008AMJ Between Main Steam Line A and 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Reducer Q0K1SL1AMJ Main Steam Line A Ruptures 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Steam Supply Line B Ruptures i
QQF1143BMJ Between V-96 and Reducer 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr B-17
TABLE B.2 (Continu:d) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE Steam Bypass Exit Line Ruptures Q0A1136AMJ Between V-172 and Steam Supply 5 x 10 -10 -9 1 x 10 /hr LNc B Steam Supply Line B Ruptures Be-Q9E1142AMJ tween Reducer and V-128 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Steam Bypass Inlet Line Ruptures Q0A1135AMJ Between V-172 and Steam Supply 5 x 10-10 1 x 10-9/hr Line B Steam Supply Line B Ruptures QOF1108AMJ Between Main Steam Line B and 5 x 10-11 Reducer 1 x 10-10/hr Q0KISL1BMJ Main Steam Line B Ruptures 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feed Pump P-37A Suction Line F0G1081AMJ Ruptures Between V-15 and Pump 5 x 10-11 inlet 1 x 10-10/hr Feed Pump P-37A Suction Line F0G1081BMJ Ruptures Between V-154 and V-155 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feed Pump P-37A Suction Line F0G1081CMJ Ruptures Between Condensate Tank 5 x 10-II and V-154 1 x 10-10/hr Feed PumpP-378 Discharge Line M0E1612CMJ Ruptures Between P-378 and V-70 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Feed Pump P-37B Recirc. Line MOD 1612AMJ Ruptures Between V-73 and Pump 5 x 10 -II 1 x 10-9/hr Discharae Line Feed Pump P-37B Suction Line F0G1082AMJ Ruptures Between V-159 and 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Pump Inlet Feed Pump P-37B Suction Line F0G1082BMJ Ruptures Between V-158 and V-159 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Feed Pump P-37B Suction Line F0G1082CMJ Ruptures Between Condensate Tank 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr a n ri V 1 RR Turbine Driven Feed Pump-37A MPB1T37AME Fails To Start 8.4 x 10-3 8.4 x 10-3/d Motor Driven Feed Pump P-37B MPB1037BME Fails To Start 2.4 x 10-3 2.4 x 10-3/d Turbine Driven Feed P-37A Out MPB1T37A00 of Service 4.2 x 10-4 Motor Driven Feed Pump P-37B Out MPB1037800 Of Service 9.4 x 10_4 B-18
TABLEB.2(Continued) FAULT 1DENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDEN DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY ER FAILURE RATE Flow Control Valve FV-4214 Out MVD1421400 of Service 8.5 x 10-4 MVD1V75A00 Valve Out of Service 8.5 x 10-4 Flow Control Valve FV-4244 Out MVD1422400 of Service 8.5 x 10-4 MVD1V87000 Valve V-87 Out of Service 8.5 x 10-4 Flow Control Valve FV-4234 Out MVD1423400 of Service 8.5 x 10-4 MVD1V93C00 Valve V-93 Out of Service 8.5 x 10-4 Flow Control Valve FV-4224 Out MVD1422400 of Service 8.5 x 10-4 MVD1V81B00 Valve V-81 Out of Service 8.5 x 10 4 MVD1V65A00 Isolation Valve V-65 Out of Service 2.0 x 10-3 Steam Supply Valve V-129 Out of QVD1V12900 Service 1.0 x 10-4 QMV1V95A00 Manual Valve V-95 Out of Service 0.0 Steam Supply Valve V-127 Out of QVXIV12700 Service 8.7 x 10-4 Steam Supply Valve V-128 Out of QVXIV12800 Service 8.7 x 10-4 P-37A Suction Valve V-155 Out of FVM1V15500 Service 0.0 P-37A Suction Valve V-154 Out of FVM1V15400 Service 0.0 Isolation Valve V-125 Out of MVD1V12600 Service 0.0 Isolation Valve V-126 Out of MVD1V12600 Service 0.0 l B-19 l
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY ER FAILURE RATE Isolation Valve V-127 Out of MVD1V12700 Service 0.0 Isolation Valve V-71 Out of - MVD1V71800 Seryice 2.0.x 10-3 P-37B Suction Valve V-159 Out FVM1V15900 of Service 0.0 P-37B Suction Valve V-158 Out . FVM1V15800 of Service 0.0 Operator Fails to Open Steam QVXIV1270A Supply Valve V-127 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Open Steam QVXIV1280A Supply Valve V-128 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1V30A0B Supply Line A Isolation Valve V-30 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Flow MVD1422408_ Control Valve FV-4224 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Flow MVD1422408 Control Valve FV-4234 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Flow MVD142440B Control Valve FV-4244 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1V57008 Supply Line D isolation Valve V-57 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Flow l MVD142140B Control Valve FV-4214 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails.to Close Feedwater MDVIV48 COB Supply Line C Isolation Valve V-48 5 x 10 -3 -3 5 x 10 /d Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1839B0B Supply Line B Isolation Valve V-39 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d i i Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1V5100B Flow Control Valve FCV-510 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Supply MVD1V12508 Header Isolation Valve V-125 .9 .9 Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1V540pB Flow Control Valve FCV-540 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d B-20
^
1 TABLE B.2 (Continued) l
}
FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRUTION UNA W LAB M FAILURE RATE Operator Fails to Close Supply MVD1V1260B Header Isolation Valve V-126 .9 .9 Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1V53008 Flow Control Valve FCV-530 5 x 10 -3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close Supply MDV1V12708 Header Isolation Valve V-127 .9 .9 Operator Fails to Close Feedwater MVD1V52008 Flow Control Valve FCV-520 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Close P-378 MVD1V65A08 Discharge Isolation Valve V-65 .9 .9 Operator Fails to Close P-378 MVD1V71808 Discharge Isolation Valve V-71 .9 .9 Operator Fails to Restore Manual MVM1V1520C Valve V-152 1 x 10 -3 -3 1 x 10 /d Operator Fails to Restore Manual MVM1V1530C Valve V-153 1 x 10-3 -3 1 x 10 /d Operator Fails to Restore Manual MVM1V1540C Valve V-154 1 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore Manual MVM1V1550C Valve V-155 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d 61CIAFSAOC Operator Defeats Train A"S" Signal 1 x 10 -4 -4 1 x 10 /d l 61CIAFSBDC Operator Defeats Train B"S" Signal 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d
- Operator Inadvertently Closes MVD1421400 F1ow Control Valve FV-4214 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Operator Inadvertently Closes MVD1V75AOD Valve V-75 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Operator Inadvertently Closes MVM142440D Flow Control Valve FV-4244 1 x 10 -4 -4 1 x 10 /d Operator Inadvertently Closes MVD1V87000 Valve V-87 1 x 10-4 -4 1 x 10 /d Operator Inadvertently Closes MVD1423400 Flow Control Valve FV-4234 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d B-21
TABLE B.2 (Continu::d) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE Operator Inadvertently Closes MVD1V93C00 Valve V-93 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Operator Inadvertently Closes MVD142240D Flow Control Valve FV-4224 1 x 10-4 -4 1 x 10 /d Operator Inadvertently Closes Valve V-81 -4 MVD1V81 BOD 1 x 10 1 x 10-4/d Operator Fails to Restore P-37A
~
MVM1V65AOD Isolation Valve V-65 1 x 10 -4 1 x 10-4/d Operator Fails to Restore Manual QVD1V95A00 Valve V-95 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore P-37A FMV1V1550D Suction Valve V-155 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore P-27A FVM1V1540D Suction Valve V-154 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore Supply MVD1V12500 Header Valve V-125 1 x 10 -3 -3 1 x 10 /d Operator Fails to Restore Supply Header Valve V-126 1 x 10-3 -3 MVD1V12500 1 x 10 /d Operator Fails to Restore Supply MVD1V1270D Header Valve V-127 1 x 10 -3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore P-378 MVD1V7180D Discharge Isolation Valve V-71 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Operator Fails to Restore P-378 FVM1V1590D Suction Valve V-159 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore P-378 FVM1V15800 Suction Valve V-158 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Start Motor MPBID3780E Driven Pump P-378 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Operator Turns Off Turbine Driven MPB1T37A0G Pump P-37A 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Operator Turns Off Motor Driven MPB103780G Pump P-378 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4/d Circuit Breaker to Motor Driven MCA2037BMK Pump P-378 Open 1.5 x 10-6 4.2 x 10-9/hr B-22
TABLE B.2 (Continued) ) l FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION l DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE IDE ER Control Circuit to Steam Supply QRA2V127MK Valve V-127 Open 6.5 x 10-4 9.1 x 10-7/hr Control Circuit to Steam Supply QRA1V128MK Valve V-128 Open 6.5 x 10-4 9.1 x 10-7/h Train A Control Circuit to Motor MRA1A37BMK Pump P-37B Open 5.9 x 10-3 9.1 x 10-7/hi Train B Control Circuit to Motor MRA1837BMK Pump P-37B Open 5.9 x 10-3 9.1 x 10-7/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-510 Flow MCE1V510MK Control Switch Open 1.5 x 10-8 3 x 10-8/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-540 Flow MCE1V540MK Control Seitch Open 1.5 x 10-8 3 x 10-8/hr Flow Control Valve FCV-530 Flow -8 MCE1V530MK Control Switch Open 1.5 x 10-8 3 x 10 /hr Flow Control Valve FCV-520 Flow -8 MCE1V520MK Control Switch Open 1.5 x 10 3 x 10-8/hr Steam Supply Valve V-127 Switch QCE1V127MK Open 2.2 x 10-5 3 x 10-8/hr P-37B Motor Controller Circuit MCEID37BMK Open 3.3 x 10-4 9.1 x 10-7/he MCK1D37BMK P-378 Motor Starter Circuit Open 1.2 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-3/d l l Turbine Driven Feed Pump P-37A l MPB1T37ALB Lubrication Failure 0.0 Motor Driven Feed Pump P-37B Luabrication Failure 0.0 MPB1D378LB
-5 LOSP Loss of Station Power 7 x 10-6 1.4 x 10 /hi STA1TK25MJ Condensate Storage Tank Ruptured 5 x 10
-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr 6IC1FWIAMN No Train A Feedwater Isolation 5.8 x 10 -3 5.8 x 10-3/d sinnal No Signal From FE-4224 to Flow MIF14224MN Control Valve FV-4224 2.0 x 10-3 3.1 x 10-7/hr l
B-23
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION
~
FAULT DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE IDENTIFIER No Signal From FE-4234 :.o Glow MIF14234MN Control Valve FV-4231 2.0 x 10-3 3.1 x 10-7/hr No Signal From FE-4224 to Flow MIF14244MN Control Valve FV-4244 2.0 x 10-3 3.1 x 10-7/hr N0 Signal From FE-4214 to Flow MIF14214MN Control Valve FV-4214 2.0 x 10-3 3.1 x 10-7/hr No Train B Feedwater Isolation 6IC1FWSBMN Signal 5.8 x 10-3 5.8 x 10-3/d No Signal From FE-510 to Flow MIF1VS10MN Control Valve FCV-510 1.5 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-7/hr No Signal From FE-540 to Flow MIF1V540MN Control Valve FCV-540 1.5 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-7/hr No Signal From FE-530 to Flow MIF1V530MN Control Valve FCV-530 1.5 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-7/hr No Signal From FE-520 to Flow MIF1V520MN Control Valve FCV-520 1.5 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-7/hr No Signal From Safety Injection Signal Train A 5.8 x 10-3 -3 61CIAFSAMN 5.8 x 10 /d
. No Signal From Safety Injection 6ICIAFSBNM Signal Train B 5.8 x 10-3 5.8 x 10-3/d Spurious Signal to Flow Control
! MVD14214M0 Valve FV-4214 1.2 x 10 -3 1.2 x 10-8/d l Spurious Signal to Flow Control MVD14244M9 Valve FV-4244 1.2 x 10 -8 1.2 x 10-8/d Spurious Signal to Flow Control Valve FV-4234 1.2 x 10-8 -8 MVD14234MD 1.2 x 10 /d l Spurious Signal to Flow Control Valve FV-4224 1.2 x 10-8 -8 MVD14224M0 1.2 x 10 /d REC 118--MJ 125 DC Bus llB Shorts to Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr REC 1E612MJ 460 V AC Bus E612 Shorts to Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 19-8/hr REC 1E61-MJ 480 V AC Bus E61 Shorts to Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr B-24 l l l
I TABLE B.2 1 1 FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE ER Diesel Generator DG-1B Circuit -3 RCA1A74-MB 1 x 10-3 1 x 10 /d Breaker A74 Fails to Close Crossover Circuit Breaker DN6 RCA1DN6-MB Fails to Close 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d RCA2A61-MC Circuit Breaker A61 Open 2.1 x 10-9 -9 4.2 x10 /hr RCA1A62-MF Circuit Breaker A62 Fails to Close 1 x 10-3 'l x 10-3/d RCA1DN4-MC Circuit Breaker DN4 Open 2.1 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9/hr . RCA1DNS-MC Circuit Breaker DN5 Open 2.1 x 10 -9 4.2 x 10-9/hr RCA1DAl-MC Circuit Breaker DA1 Open 2.1 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9/hr RCA1AD6-MC Circuit Breaker AD6 Open 2.1 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9/hr RCA1A02-MC Circuit Breaker AD2 Open 2.1 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9/hr RCA1A41-MC Circuit Breaker A41 Open 2.1 x 10 -9 4.2 x 10-9/hr Circuit Breaker A41 Shorts t RCA1A41-MJ Ground 3.5 x 10 -8 -8 7 x 10 /hr RCA1A42-MB Circuit Breaker A42 Fails to Close 1 x 10-3 -3 1 x 10 /d Circuit Breaker A42 Shorts to RCA1A42-MJ Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr Circuit Breaker A61 Shorts t -8 RCA1A61-MJ Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10 /hr Circuit Breaker A62 Shorts t RCA1A62-MJ Ground 3.5 x 10-9 7 x 10-8/hr Circuit Breaker DNS Shorts t -9 RCA1DNS-MJ Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 19 /hr RCA1DAl-MJ Circuit Breaker DA1 Shorts t Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr B-25
TABLE B.2 (Continued) l FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY ER FAILURE RATE RCA1AD6-MJ r t Breaker AD6 Shorts t 3.5 x 10-0 7 x 10-0/hr RCA1AD2-MJ Circuit Breaker AS2 Shorts to ' Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr Circuit Breaker A75..S,horts to RCA1A75-MJ Ground 3.5 x 10 -8 7 x 10-8/hr RBC118--MC Battery Charger IB Opens 2.1 x 10 -9 4.2 x 10-9/hr RBC118--MJ Battery Charger 1B Shorts t Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr RBA11B--MJ Battery 18 Shorts to Ground 3.5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr RBA11D--MJ Battery ID Shorts to Ground 3.6 x 10-8 7 x 10-8/hr RBA118--MM Battery IB Undercharged 1.3 x 10-6 3 x 10-6/hr RBA11D--ft! Battery ID Undercharged 1.5 x 10-6 3 x 10-6/hr RTRIX-5 CMC Transformer X-Sc Open 5 x 10-7 1 x 10-6/hr RTRIX-2BMJ Transformer S-28 Shorts 5 x 10-7 -6 1 x 10 /hr RTR1X-2BMC Transformer S-28 Opens 5 x 10-7 1 x 10-6/hr RTRIX-5CMJ Transformer X-5C Shorts 5 x 10-7 -6 1 x 10 /hr RTRIX-3BMC Transfonner X-38 Opens 5 x 10-7 1 x 10-6/hr RTR1X-3BMJ Transformer X-38 Shorts 5 x 10-7 1 x 10-6/hr RGD118--ME Diesel Generator DG-1B Fails to Start 1.0 x 10-2 1.0 x 10-2/d RGD11B--MG Diesel Generator DG-1B Fails to Run 3.0 x 10-3 6.0 x 10-3/hr B-26
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE IDE ER RGD11B--09 Diesgl Generator DG-1B Out of Service 7 x 10 -4 Diesel Generator DG-1A Out of RGD11A--09 Service 7 x 10-4 MHX1TBRAMJ S.G.A Steam Line Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr MHX1SHRAMJ S.G. A Shell Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr MHX1TBRDMJ S.G.D Steam Line Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr MHX1SHRDMJ S.G.D Shell Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr MHX1TBRCMJ S.G.C Steam Line Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr MHX1SHRCMJ S.G.C Shell Rupture 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr MHX1TBRBMJ S.G.B Steam Line Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr MHX1SHRBMJ S.G.B Shell Rupture 5 x 10-11 1 x 10 -10 /hr Turbine Driven Feed Pump P-37A MPB1T37ACL Cooling Loss 0.0 M tor Driven Feed Pump P-37B MPB1D37BCL Cooling Loss 0.0 MTUlTD-2ME Turbine Fails to Start 0.0 Control Relay on Solenoid Valve QRA1C127MA to Steam Supply Valve V-127 Fails 3.1 x 10 -6 3.1 x 10-6/d en nnon Control Relay on Solenoid Valve QRA1V128MA to Steam Supply Valve V-128 Fails 3.1 x 10-6 3.1 x 10-6/d en Onon Solenoid Valve on Steam Valve to QVLIV127MA Steam Supply Valve V-128 Fails 1.4 x 10 -0 1.4 x 10-6/d to onen Solenoid Valve on Steam Supply QLV1V128MA Valve V-128 Fails to Open 1.4 x 10-6 -6 1,4 x 10 /d B-27
TABLEB.2(Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDEN D R ON UNAWLABRITY ER FARURE RATE Safety Valve V-6 on Steam Line QVB1V06AMC A Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-7 on Steam Line QVB1V07AMC A Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-10 on Steam Line QVB1V10AMC A Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety ' Valve V-8 on Steam Line QVB1V08AMC A Opens 5 x 10 -6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-9 on Steam Line QVB1V09AMC A Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Relief Valve on Main Steam Line QVBISGARMC A Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-50 on Steam Line QVB1V500MC D Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr QVB1V51DMC Safety Valve V-51 on Steam Line 0 Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr QVB1V520MC Safety Valve V-52 on Steam Line D Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-53 on Steam Line QVB1V53DMC 0 Ooens 5 x 10 -6 1 x 10-5/hr QVB1V54DMC Safety Valve V-54 on Steam Line D Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Relief Valve on Main Steam Line QVB1SGDRMC D Opens 5 x 10 -6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-36 on Steam Line QVB1V36 CMC C Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-37 on Steam Line QVB1V37 CMC C Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-38 on Steam Line QVB1V38 CMC C Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-39 on Steam Line QVB1V39 CMC C Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-40 on Steam Line QVB1V40 CMC C Opens 5 x 10-6 -5 1 x 10 /hr B-28
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE Relief Valve on Main Steam Line QVB1SGCRMC C Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-22 on Steam Line QVB1V22BMC B Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-23 on Steam Line QVB1V23BMC B Opens 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-24 on Steam Line QVB1V24BMC B Opens 5 x 10-6 .1 x 10-5/hr Safety Valve V-25 on Steam Line QVB1V25BMC B Opens 5 x 10 -6 1 x 10-6/hr Safety Valve V-26 on Steam Line QVB1V26BMC B Opens 5 x 10 -0 -6 1 x 10 /hr Relief Valve on Main Steam Line QVB1SGBRMC B Opens 5 x 10 -6 -5 1 x 10 /hr Loss of Voltage on S.G.A Relief OECISGARM Valve Controller 7 x 17- -6 1.4 x 10 /hr Loss of Voltage onS.G.B Relief OECISGBRM Valve Controller 7 x 10~7 -0 1.4 x 10 /hr Loss of Voltage on S.G.A Relief DECISGCRMM Valve Controller 7 x 10-7 1.4 x 10-6/hr Loss of Voltage of 5.G.D Reliet OECISGDRM Valve Controller 7 x 10-7 1.4 x 10-6/hr MVD1V8700B Operator Fails to Close V-87 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d MVD1V93 COB Operator Fails to Close V-93 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d MVD1V81B08 Operator Fails to Close V-81 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d MVD1V75ABB Operator Falls to Close V-75 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3/d MVD1V87DMB Valve V-87 Does Not Close 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d MVD1V93CMB Valve V-93 Does Not Close 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d B-29
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE ER DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY FAILURE RATE MVD1V81BMB Valve V-81 Does Not Close 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d MVD1V75AMB Valve V-75 Does Not Close 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d MVD1V87DMC Valve V-87 Fails to Remain Closed 6 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-7/hr MVD1V93 CMC Valve V-93 Fails to Remain Closed 6 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-7/hr MVD1V81BMC Valve V-81 Fails to Remain Closed 6 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-7/hr MVD1V75AMC Valve V-75 Fails to Remain Closed 6 x 10 -0 1.2 x 10-7/hr MIF1V87DMN Valve V-87 Fails to Receive Signal 2 x 10 -3 -3 2 x 10 /d MIF1V93CMN Valve V-93 Fails to Receive Signal 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d MIF1V81BMN Valve V-81 Fails to Receive Signal 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d MIF1V75AMN Valve V-75 Fails to Receive Signal 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3/d Rupture of 6" Line Between V-99 M0F1618CMJ and Tee 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Rupture of 6" Line Between V-163 M0F1618BMJ and Tee 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Rupture of 6" Line Between V-163 M0F1618AMJ and V-156 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Rupture of 6" Line Between P-113 M0F1618DMJ and V-99 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Rupture of 4" Line Between Dis-M0E1631AMJ charge Pipe and FW V-156 5 x 10 -11 1 x 10-10/hr Rupture of 4" Line Between Dis-M0E1631BMJ charge Pipe and FW V-159 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr Rupture of 4" Line Between Dis-M0E1631CMJ charge Pipe and FW V-162 5 x 10-11 1 x 10-10/hr B-30
TABLE B.2 (Continued) FEED STATION FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THEFAILURE SEABROOKRATE E UNAVAILABILITY DESCRIPTION ER IDE -11 1x 10-10/hr x 10 Rup ture of 6" Line Between Dis- 5 cha rge Pipe and PCV-4326 -10 MOD 1625AMJ -II 1 x 10 /hr pture of 16" Condensate Line 5 x 10 Ru Be tween Tank and V-141 -10 F0T1079AMJ 1 x 10 /hr Ru pture of 24" Condensate Line 5 x 10'II B etween V-143 and V-141 -10 F0K1080AMJ -11 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10 _ R upture of 24" Line Between S uction Line and V-142 -10
/hr F0K1080BMJ -11 1 x 10 Rupture of 20" Suction Line 5 x 10 l
Between V-143 and Tee ~II
-10
/hr FDJ1080CMJ 1 x 10 Rupture of 20" Suction Line 5 x 10 -
Between Tee and V-145 -10
/hr F0J1080DMJ 1 x 10 Rupture of 8" Line Between Tee 5 x 10'II and V-340 -10 F0G1080AMJ ~II 1 x 10 /hr Rupture of 8" Line Between 5 x 10 V-340 and V-152 -10 F0F1080BMJ -11 1 x 10 /hr Rupture of 8" Line Between 5 x 10 V-152 _
and P-113 -8 F0G1080CMJ ~9 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10 Rupture of V-99 -8 MVA1V99AMJ -9 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10 Rupture of V-163 -8 MVP1V163MJ -8 2 x 10 /hr 1 x 10 Rupture of FWV-156 ~8 MVM1V156MJ -8 2 x 10 /hr 1 x 10 Rupture of FWV-159 ~10 MVM1V159MJ ~10 1 x 10 /hr Rupture of Bypass Inlet une 5 x 10 ~ Between Tee and V-341 -8 F0F10900MJ ~0 2 x 10 /hr 1 x 10 Rupture of V-152 -8 FVM1V152MJ ~9 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10 - Rupture of V-340 -8 FVA1V340MJ -0 2 x 10 /hr 1 x 10 I a Rupture of V-142 FVM1V142MJ I f B-31 l
TABLE B.2 (Continued) ERGENCY FEED STATION FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE FAILURE UNAVAILABILITY SEABROOK RATE E DESCRIPTION ER IDE -8 2 x 10-8/hr 1 x 10 Rupture of V-341 -7 FVM1V341MJ -8 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10 Rupture of PCV-4326 -8 MVD14326MJ -9 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10 Rupture of V-145 -8 FVD1V145MJ 1 x 10 /hr 5 x 10'9 Rupture of V-343 -10
-10 1 x 10 /hr FVA1V343MJ f Rupture of Bypass Outlet Line 5 x 10
-10 l
Between V-341 and Tee -10 1 x 10 /hr F0G1080EMJ 5 x 10 Rupture of Bypass Outlet Line
-10 j Between V-344 and Tee -10 1 x 10 /hr F0G1090FMJ Rupture of 8" Line Between5 V-344x 10
-0 F0F1080GMJ and V-343 -8 2 x 10 /hr 1 x 10 Rupture of V-344 -8 FMJ1V344MJ 1 ~0 2 x 10 /hr 1 x 10 Rupture of FWV-162 -8 MVM1V162MJ 1 x 10 /hr Rupture of P-113 Suction Iso- 5 x 10~9 i f -8 i
1ation Valve V-143 ~9 1 x 10 /hr FVD1V143MJ 5 x 10 Rupture of P-113 Suction
-4
, Isolation Valve V-141 -4 / 2 x 10 /d FVD1V141MJ 2 x 10 Check Valve V-99 Fails to Open -4 / 1 x 10 /d
~4 MVA1V99-MA 1 x 10 ~
Manual Isolation )
, to Remain Open (Plugs Valve V-152 Fail FVM1V152MD
~4 1 x 10'4/d 1 x 10 -
~ ' Isolation Remain Open Valve V-143 f ails to
- -4 FVD1V143MD
-4 1 x 10 /d 1 x 10
~
~~Ts'51ationWve V-1T3 l FaTTs l
-2 FVD1V141MD to Remain Open f 1 x 10
-2 [1x10 /d I _
1 Operator Fails to Open V-163 \ MVD1V1630A
-2 1 x 10-2/d 1 x 10 Operator Fails to Open V-156 , _
MVD1V1560A - B-32
TABLE B.2 (Continued) Rev. 1 FAULT IDENTIFIERS FOR THE SEABROOK EMERGENCY FEED STATION IDE DESCRIPTION UNAVAILABILITY ER FAILURE RATE FVM1V15200 Operator Fails to Restore V-152 1 x 10-3
~
1 x 10-3/d Operator Fails to Restore V-143 -3 FVD1V1430D 1 x 10 1 x 10-3/d FVD1V1410D Operator Fails to Restore V-141 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d MPB1P11300 P-113 Out of Service 7.0 x 10-4 MPB1P16100 P-161 Out of Service 5 x 10-4 MPB1P113ME P-113 Fails to Start 4 x 10-3 4 x 10-3/d MPB1P161ME P-161 Fails to Start 4 x 10-3 4 x 10-3/d Circuit Breaker 1E42 Shorts RCA1E42-MJ to Ground 3.5 x 10-b 7 x.10-8/hr Operator Fails to Close Circuit RCA1A93-0B Breaker A-93 1 x 10-2 1 x 10-2/d Circuit Breaker A-93 Fails RCA1A93-MB to Close 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d Diesel Generator 1A Circuit RCA1AS4-MB Breaker A-54 Fails to Close 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3/d ! Diesel Generator a A Fails RGD1DG1AME to Start 1.0 x 10-2 1.0 x 10-2/d RGD1DG1AMG Diesel Generator 1 A Fails to Run 3.0 x 10-3 6.0 x 10-3/hr 6IC1FPSAMN No Actuation Signal Generated 5.8 x 10-3 5.8 x 10-3/d Startup Feedpump Suction Isolatio t FVD1V14300 Valve V-143 Out of Service 1.2 x 10 -4 Startup Feedpump Suction Isola-FVD1V14100 tion Valve V-141 Out of Service 0.0 B-33
APPENDIX C Engineering Drawing List For the Seabrook Nuclear Station Emergency and Startup Feedwater Systems i
Drawing Title Number Mechanical System P&I Diagrams:
- 1. MainSteamSystem(Sheet 1) 9763-F-202074
- 2. Emergency Feedwater System 9763-F-202076
- 3. Condensate System 9763-F-202077
- 4. Feedwater System 9763-F-202079
- 5. Compressed Air System, Key Plan 9763-F-202105
- 6. Compressed Air System 9763-F-202106
- 7. Turbine Building Compressed Air Headers 9763-F-202107
- 8. Miscellaneous Buildings Compressed 9763-F-202108 Air Headers Electrical System One Line Diagrams:
- 1. Unit Electrical Distribution 9763-F-310002
- 2. 4160V Switchgear Bus 1-E5 9763-F-310007
- 3. 480V Unit Substation Buses 9763-F-310013 1-E51 and 1-E52
- 4. 125VOC and 120VAC Instrument Buses 9763-F-310041
- 5. Turbine Building 480V Motor Control 9763-F-310046 Center 1-E523 Logic Diagrams:
- 1. Symbols 9763-M-503100
- 2. FW-Start-up Feed P-113 9763-M-503580
- 3. FW-Prelube P-161 For 9763-M-503581 Start-up Feed P-113 Sht 1
- 4. FW Emerg Fd P-37A Steam 9763-M-503584 Supply Viv (MS-V128) Train 8
- 5. FW Emerg Fd P-37A Stm Supply 9763-M-503585 Viv (MS-V127) Train A
- 6. FW-Emerg Feed P-378 9763-M-503586 C-1
- 7. FW-Emerg rW Bypass /Inop 9763-M-503599 Status Alann
- 8. MS-Trip & Throttle Valve 9763-M-503672 V-129
- 9. FW-Emergency Valves 9763-M-504152
- 10. FW-Emergency Valves 9763-M-504155
- 11. FW-Valve-V148 9763-M-504156
- 12. FW-Prelube P-161 For 9763-M-504157 Start-up Fd P-113 Sht 2 Control Loop Diagrams:
- 1. FW-Start-up Feed P-113 9763-M-506480
& Prelube Pmp P-161
- 2. FW-Feed Pump P-32B 9763-M-506481 Speed Control & Disch
- 3. FW-Emerg Feed Pump P-37A 9763-M-506497 (Turbine Driven)
- 4. FW-Emerg Feed Pump P-378 9763-M-506498 Discharge Flow
- 5. FW-Emerg Feed Pump P-378 9763-M-506499 TE-4271 & TE-4347
- 6. MS Supply To Emerg Fd Pmp 9763-M-506555 Turbine Isol V1v
- 7. FW-Eu rg Feed Pump P-37A 9763-M-507043 Discharge Flow
- 8. FW-Emerg Feed Pump P-378 9763-M-507044
- 9. FW-Emerg FW Valve FV-4214 9763-M-507056
- 10. FW-Emerg FW Valve FV-4224 9763-M-507057
- 11. FW-Emerg FW Valve FV-4234 9763-M-507058
- 12. FW-Emerg FW Valve FV-4244 9763-M-507059
- 13. Start-up Feed Pump 1-P-113 9763-M-310844 SHCN1a Prelube Pump 1-P-161
- 14. Prelube Pump 1-P-161 Legend 9763-M-310844 SHCN1b
& Switch C-2
- 15. Prelube Pump 1-P-161 9763-M-310844 SHCNic Cable Schematic FSAR Drawings:
- 1. Functional Diagrams-Reactor Trip Signals Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 2
- 2. Functional Diagrams-Pressurizer Trip Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 6 Signals
- 3. Functional Diagrams-Steam Generator Trip Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 7 Signals
- 4. Functional Diagrams-Safeguards Actuation Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 8 Signals
! 5. Functional Diagrams-Auxiliary Feedwater Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 15 Pumps Startup
- 6. Separation of Instrument and Control Power Figure 8.3-3 Sources I
C-3
- ~ . . _ . _ . . _ . .
APPENDIX D WAM CODE RESULTS l l l l -_
WAM Results for Loss of Main Feedwater l System Unavailability Calculated by WAMBAM: 1028 AFW 2.06786E-05 Important Cut-sets as Caculated by WAMCUT: CUT SETS FOR GATE AFW ORDERED BY FROBABILITY
- 1. 3.40E-06 MPB1DT/BMG if>D1V1250D
- 2. 2.40E-06 MPB1D37BME MVD1V1250D
- 3. 2.OOE-06 MVD1V71 BOO t1)D1V1250D
- 4. 1.20E-06 MVD1V1250D MCD1D37BMN
- 5. 1.00E-06 t1JD1V1250D FVH1V158C'd
- 6. 1.00E-06 MVD1V12500 FVM1V1590D
- 7. 9.40E-07 MPB1EG7 BOO MUD 1V1250b
- 8. 3. 40E--07 MPB1D37BMG MVD1V125MD
- 7. 3.14E-07 t1PB1EG7BNG MPB1T37AME if>D1V1630A
- 10. 2.86E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME MVD1V1560A
- 11. 2.40E-07 ff>D1V125MD MPB1EG7Bt1E
- 12. 2.22E-07 hPB1T37AME MPB1D37BME MVD1V1630A
- 13. 2.13E-07 (PB1T37ANG MPB1EG7BMG t1)D1V1630A
- 14. 2.02E-07 MPB1T37#d1E MPB1D37BME MVD1V1560A
- 15. 2.00E-07 ff>A1V70BtM if>D1V1250D
- 16. 2.00E-07 MVD1V125MD MVD1V71 BOO
- 17. 1.94E-07 MPB1T37AhG MPB1EG7BhG t1/D1V1560A
- 18. 1. 85E-O'7 MPB1T37AME MVD1V71 BOO MUD 1V1630A
- 19. 1.68E-07 t1PB1T37AME MVD1V71DOO hVD1V1560A
- 20. 1.66E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME 6IC1FPSAMN
- 21. 1.50E-07 hPB1T37ANG MPB1037BM MVD1V1630A
- 22. 1.37E-07 MPB1T37ANG MPB1D37BME MVD1V1560A
- 23. 1.25E-07 hPB1T37AMG t1/D1V71 BOO if>D1V1630A
- 24. 1.20E-07 MVD1V12*ND MCD1D37BMK
- 25. 1.17E-07 MPB1T37AME MPB1EG7BME 6IC1FPGAMN
- 26. 1.14E-07 MPB1D37EttG MPB1T37AME MPB1P113ME i 27. 1.14E-07 t1PBIEG7BMG MPB1T37AME MPB1P161t1E
! 28. 1.14E-07 MPB1T37AMG MVD1V71 BOO MVD1V1560A
- 29. 1.12E-07 hPB1T37ANG MPB1D37BMG 6IC1FPSAMN
- 30. 1.11E--07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME MRA1P161MK i 31. 1.11E-07 t1PB1T37AhE MCD1EG7DMK tf>D1V1630A
- 32. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME MCD1D37BMK MVD1V1560A i
D-1
Rr.v. 1 WAM Results for Loss of Offsite Power System Unavailability Cal ulated by WAMAM: 1028 AFW 5.63720E-05 Important Cut-sets as Calculated by WAMCUT: CUT SETS FLT< GATE AFW ORDEF:ED BY PRODABILITY
- 1. 1.OCE-05 MVD1V1250D RGD11B-ME
- 2. 3.40E-06 MPD1D37BMG MVD1V1250D
- 3. 3.00E-06 MVD1V1250D hGD11D-MG
- 4. 2.40E-06 MPD1D37BME MVD1V1250D
- 5. 2.00E-06 MVD1V71DOO MVD1V1250D
- 6. 1.20E-06 HVD1V1250D MCD1D37BMK
- 7. 1.00E-06 MVD1V125MD RGD11B-ME G. 1.00E-06 MVD1V1250D lVM1V1500D
?. 1.00E-06 MVD1U1250D FVM1V1570D
- 10. 1.00E-06 MVD1V1250D RCA1A'74-MD
- 11. '7. 40E-07 MPD1D37DOO MVD1V12500
- 12. 7.24E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B-ME MVD1V1630A RCA1A93-OD I
- 13. 8.40E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD118-ME
- 14. O.40E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B--ME RGD1DG1AME
- 15. G.40E-07 MPB1T57AME RGD11B- ME MVD1V1560A
- 16. 7.00E-07 MVD1V1250D RGD11D--DO
- 17. 6.27E-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11D-ME MVD1V1630A
- 10. 5.70E-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11B--ME RCA1A?3-OB l
- 19. 5.70E-07 MPD1T37AMG RGD118-ME RGD1DG1AME
- 20. 5.70E-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11B-ME MVD1V1560A
- 21. 4.G7E-07 MPD1T37AME RGD119-ME 6IC1FPGAMN
- 22. 3 40E-07 MPB1D37BMG MVD1V125MD
- 23. 3.36E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11D-ME MPB1P113ME
- 24. 3.36E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B--ME MPB1P161ME
- 25. 3.31E-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11B-ME 6IC1FPGAMN
- 26. 3.286-07 MPB1T37AME RGD118-ME MRA1P161MK
- 27. 3.14E-07 MPEc1D37DMG MPD1T37AME MVD1V1630A
- 20. 3.00E-07 MVD1V125MD RGD11B--MG RCA1A93-OB l
- 27. 2.06E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME 2.06E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME RGD1DG1AME 30.
- 31. 2.06E-07 MPB1D37DMG MPB1T37AME MVD1V1560A
- 32. 2.77E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B---MG MVD1V1630A RGD11B-MG RCA1AY3-OB l
- 33. 2.52E-07 MPD1T37AME 2.52E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B--MG RGD1DG1AME 34.
- 35. 2.52E-07 MPD1T37AME RGD11B-MG MVD1V1560A
- 36. 2.52E-07 MPD1T37AME RGD11B-ME RGD1DG1AMG
- 37. 2.40E-07 MVD1V12bMD MPD1037BME
- 30. 2.20E-07 MPD1T37AMG RGD110-ME MPB1P113ME 3') . 2.20E-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11D -ME MPD1P161ME
- 40. 2.22E-07 MPD1T37AMG RGD11B--ME MRA1P161MK
- 41. 2.22E-07 MPD1T37AME MPD1D37DME MVD1V1630A 2.20E-07 MV1DV65AGO RGD11B--ME MVD1V1630A 42.
- 43. 2.13E-07 MPB1T37AMG MPDlD37DMG MVD1V1630A D-2
Rtv. 1 WAM Resultsifor Loss of Offsite Power - cont'd Important Cut-sets as Calculated by WAMCUT: -
- 44. 2.02E-07 MPB1T37AME MPB1D37DME RCA1A93-OB l
- 45. 2.02E-07 MPB1T37AME MPB1D37BME RGD1DG1AME
- 46. 2.02E-07 MPB1T37AME MPB1D37E<ME MVD1V1560A
- 47. 2.OOE-07 MVA1V70BMA MVD1V1250D
- 48. 2.OOE-07. MVD1V125MD MVD1V'71DOO
- 49. 2.00E-07 MVD1V65AOO RGD118--ME RCA1A93-OB l
- 50. 2. (X)E-07 MVD1V65AOO RGD11B-ME RGD1EG1AME
- 51. 2.OOE-07 MVD1V65 ADO RGD11B--ME MVD1V1560A
- 52. 1. '?4E-07 MPD1T37AMG MPB1D37BMG RCA1A93-OB l
- 53. 1.94E-07 MPB1T37AMG MPB1D37BMG RGD1DG1AME
- 54. 1.94E-07 MPB1T37AMG MPEi1D37BMG MVD1V1560A
- 55. 1.8GE-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11B-MG MVD1V1630A
- 56. 1.05E-07 MPEi1T37AME MVD1V71DOO MVD1V1630A
- 57. 1.71E-07 MPD1T37AMG RGD11B-MG RCA1A93-OB l
- 58. 1.71E-07 MPB1T37AMG ROD 11D-MG RGD1D01AME
- 59. 1.71E-07 MPB1T37AMG RGD11B-MG MVD1V1560A
- 60. 1. 71E- 07 91T37AMG ROD 118-ME RGD1DG1AMG
- 61. 1.60E-07 :1T37AME MVD1V71 BOO RCA1A93-OB s l
- 62. 1.68E-07 WB1T37AME MVD1V71 BOO RGD1DG1AME
- 63. 1.68E-07 MPD1T37AME MVD1V71' BOO MUD 1V1560A
- 64. 1.66E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T57Ai1E 6IC1FPSAMN
- 65. 1 50E MPB1T37AMG MPB1D37BME MVD*V1630A
- 66. 1'.46E-07 MPBir37AME RGD11B-MG 6TG1FPSAMN a,. . 37E-07 MPD1T37AMG MPD1D37BME P :A1 A93-Oh l
- 68. 11.37E-07 MPB1'T37AMG MPB1D37DME NGD1DG1AME
- 69. 1.37E-07 MPB1T37AMG MPB1D37DME MVD1V1560A
- 70. .1'.25E-07 MPB1T37AMG MVD1V71 BOO MVD1V1630A
- 71. 1.20E-07 MVD1V125MD MCD1D37BMK
- 72. 1.17E-07 MPB1T37AME MPB1D37I'ME 6IC1FPSAMN
- 73. 1.16E-07 MVD1V65AGO ROD 118--ME 6IC1FPSAMN
- 74. 1.14E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME MPB1P113ME~
75, 1.14E-07 .MP B 1 D37Bt1G MPB1T37AME MPB1P161t!E
- 76. 1.14E-O'7 MPB1T37AMG MVD1'V71 BOO RCA1A93-OB l
- 77. 1.14E-07 MPD1T37AMG MVD1V71 BOO #
RGD1DGIAME<
- 70. 1.14E-07 MPB1TI7AMG MVD1V71 BOO MVD1V1560A
- 79. 1.12E-07 MPD1T37AMG MPB1D37BMG 6IC1FPSAMN
- 80. 1.11E-07 MPB1D37BMG MPB1T37AME. MRA1P1'61MK >
- 81. 1.11E-07 MPB1T37AME MCD1D37BMM MUD 1V1630A
- 82. 1.10E-07 FVM1V1540D RGD11B-ME MVD1V1630A
- 03. 1.10E-07 FVM1V1550D RGD11B-ME MVD1V1630A G4. 1.10E-07 OVD1V95AOD RGD118-MF MV1V1630A G5. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B-MG MPB1P113ME
- 06. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11D-MG MPB1P161ME
- 87. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME: J MCD1D37BMK RCA1A93-OB l SS. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME MCD1D37BMN RGD1LG1AME
- 89. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME '
MCD1D37BMK MUD 1V1560A '70. 1.01E-07 MPB1T37AME RGD11B--ME. MCD1P113MK d
- 91. 1.01E-07 MPU1T37AME RGD118-ME MCD1P161MK D-3
WAM Results for Total Loss of AC Power t i System Unavailability Calculated by WAMBAM: 702 AFW 2.13190E-02 Important Cut-sets as Calculated by WAMCUT: CUT SETS FOR GATE AFW ORDERED BY FROBABILITY
- 1. 8.40E-03 iPB1T3?AfE t
- 2. 5.70E-03 MPB1T3741G
- 3. 2.OOE-03 M/D1V6"A00
- 4. 1.OOE-03 NVD1V12tOD
- 5. 1.OOE-03 FVM1V1540D
- 6. 1.00E-03 FVM1V1550D
- 7. 1.OOE-03 GJDIV'i"AOD
- 8. 4.20E-04 MPB1T37 ADO
- 9. 2.OOE-04 MVA1V64AMA
- 10. 1.OOE-04 MVD1V1291D
- 11. 1.OOE-04 FVM1V1"A MD
- 12. 1.OOE-04 FVM1V1591D
- 13. 1.OOE-04 G/M1V95AMD
- 14. 1.OOE-04 GVD1V12900
- 15. 1.OOE-04 t1JD1V65AOD
- 16. 1.OOE-04 MVD1V6541D
- 17. 8.50E-05 MVD1421400 MVD1V1260D D-4
. _}}