Text

Forwards Initial Staff Comments on ABB-CE Sys 80+ Tier 1 931020 & 1112 Submittals.Submittals Adequately Reflected Agreements Reached for Tier 1 Matl During 931004-06 Meetings.Several Open Items Remain Unresolved
	ML20058L265
Person / Time
Site:	05200002
Issue date:	12/03/1993
From:	Boyce T; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Brinkman C; ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
References
	NUDOCS 9312160233
	Download: ML20058L265 (48)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:December 3, 1993 Docket No. 52-002. Mr..C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc. l 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

Dear Mr. Brinkman:

SUBJECT:

INITIAL COMMENTS ON ABB-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING (ABB-CE) SYSTEM 80+ CERTIFIED DESIGN MATERIAL Enclosed are initial staff comments on the ABB-CE System 80+ Tier 1 submittals dated October 20 and November 12, 1993. In general, the submittals adequately reflected the agreements reached for the Tier 1 material during a meeting on ! October 4 through 5, 1993. Several open items remain unresolved from the staff's review of the standard > safety analysis report. Based on the staff's review, you may receive additional comments related to the Tier 1 material. Sincerely, , OQ';*H c'~ma n Thomas H. Boyce, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors , and License Renewal ; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation :

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure: See next page DISTRIBUTION: Docket File PDST R/F TMurley/FMiraglia DCrutchfield ' PDR PShea JNWilson RArchitzel TWambach MXFranovich RBorchardt TBoyce WTravers RJones, 8E23 AThadani, BE2 SSun, 8E23 TBoyce JMoore, 15B18 WDean, 17G21 BHardin, RES LShao, RES AVietti-Cook WRussell, 12G18 KShembarger CMcCracken, 801 JLyons, 8D1 RPerch, 8E2 GBagchi, 7H15 DTerao, 7H15 MChiramal, BH7 DEckenrode, 10D24 REmch, 10D4 SMagruder GMizuno, 15B18 MZobler, 15B18 TPolich, 9Al DThatcher, 7E4 TCollins, 8E23 MRubin, 10E7 CBerlinger, 7E2 RGramm, 9Al AThadani, BE2 BBoger, 10H1 FCongel, 10E2

JWiggins, 7025 ACRS (11) (w/o encl.) MWate man, 8H3 0FC: LA:PDST:AD PM:PDST:A SC:P h I A D:P T:ADAR NAME: PShea TBoyce:t RArchitzel RB. 'hardt DATE: 12G/ 12/Z/93 12/2/93 12 J /93 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY: ABBCELTR.TB kg 9312160233 931205 i gDR ADOCK 052000 2

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ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. Docket No. 52-002 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director - Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations : ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 i Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch ' Nuclear Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg ; Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W. ' Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W. < Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 - Joseph R. Egan, Esquire i Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ' 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037-1128 i Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President i Nuclear Systems Development i ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut- 06095-0500 l Mr. Victor G. Snell, Director Safety and Licensing AECL Technologies 9210 Corporate Boulevard Suite 410 Rockville, Maryland 20850 l

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 .                                  REACTOR SYSTEMS COMMENTS                         i All of the staff's comments on the CE ITAAC have been adequately resolved.

HU,AN M FACTORS COMMENTS All of the staff's comments on the CE ITAAC have been adequately resolved. RADIATION PROTECTION COMMENIS [ All of the staff's comments on the CE ITAAC have been adequately resolved. PRA BRANCH COMMENTS l

1. The staff has not received the changes to the Tier I and Tier 2 material -

to reflect the PRA insights and assumptions agreed to at the October 4-6, 1993 s meeting. The staff will review the submittal and provide comments when it is submitted. !

2. The staff has also not received the CE PRA insights for Tier 2, as agreed :

to at the October 4-6, 1993, meeting. The staff will review the submittal and provide comments when it is submitted. . I PROJECTS COMMENTS l

1. As discussed in the October 27 and December 1, 1993, meetings on steam ,

generator tube ruptures:

a. The N-16 monitors for the steam generators / steam lines should be placed in the minimum inventory for the control room. 7

b. Component Cooling Water System. The design description should indicate that in the event of safety injection actuation signal, the i component cooling water will not be isolated from the instrument air !

compressors (supply for the turbine bypass valves).

2. Section 1.2, General Provisions. Delete the word " initial" from the maximum core thermal power.

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3. CE has not submitted the Tier l'or Tier 2 roadmaps in Section 14.3, or in Chapter 19, or on the docket.

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4. CE did not respond to the staff's comments on defining the interfaces for the design, and verifying that the interfaces were consistent between Tier 1 & Tier 2. '

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5. The SSAR Section 14.3 was submitted in a letter of November 19, 1993. '

. The SSAR Section needs to be expanded greatly. See next page. i

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 .                 PROJECTS COMMENTS ON CE SYSTEM 80+ SSAR SECTION 14.3 General:   This section needs to be complete and detailed enough to document the basis for the staff's finding in the FSER that the ITAAC are "necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility has been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the Commission's rules and                   l regulations." (Section 52.97(b)(1)).                                                 ;

1. The subsections of 14.3 should correspond to the sections of the Tier I !

material (e.g., 5 subsections), and include discussions of the . development of the Tier 1 material in each area (e.g, Introduction, DD & ) ITAAC, Additional Material, Interface requirements, and Site j Parameters). ,

2. The submittal discusses criteria for level of detail in Tier 1 material, !

but not the methodology of development.

           - Needs to discuss conduct of development of material (e.g.,                   i multidisciplinary review, industry review, etc.).                             j
           - Needs to discuss how the technical requirements for each system were        !

identified (different sections of SSAR supporting each system). Needs i to discuss systematic selection process for Tier 1 information. ;

           - Needs to discuss how safety assumptions and insights were developed          (

and incorporated (e.g., roadmaps) 1

3. Submittal should discuss unique aspects of specific discipline areas !

such as I&C, electrical, structural, etc. Submittal focuses on : generalities instead. i

4. Criteria are mixed for "in" and for "not in" Tier 1. Could be organized- !

into criteria for "in" in one section and criteria for "not in" in another section, or similar criteria could be combined in one paragraph. '

5. Does not provide rationale for most criteria, only selected criteria. :

Can rationale be specified for all criteria 7 '

6. Should reference Section 52.97 rather than 52.47. i

7. Should include discussion of the development of the DAC, site parameters :

and interfaces as stated in the first paragraph. i 5 1 I I _. _______Z

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I SEVERE ACCIDENT COMMENTS P t Comments are on an ABB-CE letter of November 12, 1993. I l ITAAC 2.4.3, Combustible Gas Control System . The hydrogen igniter locations shown on ITAAC Figure 2.4.3-4, " Hydrogen ' igniter locations: plan View Above Elevation 91'+ 9"," are based on the IRWST i' vents being located outside the crane wing walls. The current design now locates the IRWST vents inside the wing walls. It appears that the igniter locations on the 91' 9" level may need to be relocated to be consistent with i the criteria listed in Appendix 19.11K of the CESSAR-DC. These new locations ! would then need to be shown in Figure 2.4.3-4. { Another design change that has taken place since the ITAAC team review meeting, held October 4-6, 1993, is the use of basaltic as well as limestone i' based concretes in the basemat. Severe Accident Insert I needs to reflect this change by listing the allowable range of critical constituents for ; basaltic as well as limestone based concretes. l The following values were not provided, and need to be provided prior to i approval of Amendment U: minimum thickness of cavity floor, minimum flat floor area, minimum thickness of sump floor, acceptable range of CACO 3 for limestone based concrete and the number of igniters to be supplied by ' batteries. The wording agreed to under ITAAC 2.4.3.1.a has been changed without the staff's concurrence. Instead of saying, "A group of hydrogen igniters is powered by one division of Class IE power sources ... A different group of !' hydrogen igniters is powered by the other division of Class IE power sources

           ..., " the staff would concur with the following wording, "40 hydrogen igniters       i are powered by one division of Class IE power sources ... The other 40 hydrogen igniters are powered by the other division of Class IE power sources         j I

Point of contact is Mike Snodderly at (301) 504-2047. I _ 1

    .                                      IEC TASK GROUP COMMENTS ABB/CE System 80+ ITAAC Review Comments                  .

i 2.5.1 Plant Protection System ' Page 5: Delete the phrase "one of the two channels" from the last sentence ' in the fourth paragraph from the bottom of the page. ' Insert 5: Performance is misspelled in the second bullet of Macro "DC4". Change all ITAACs that use this macro. Except where noted above, the additions and deletions to this ITAAC are acceptable. . 2.5.2 Enaineered Safety Features - Component Control System Figure 2.5.2-2 implies that the Data Processing System (DPS) receives data ' only from the Control Component logic. The DPS also receives data directly ' from the Signal Conditioning block (the Auxiliary Process Cabinets). i lhe caption for Figure 2.5.2-3 should include the Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS). Reference to the CIAS should be deleted from the caption for Figure 2.5.2-4. In ITAAC item 15, " actuate" should be replaced with " control," because the diverse manual actuation switches can actuate and deactuate equipment. 1 In ITAAC item 18, delete the phrase "one of the two channels" from the design ! commitment (DC) and the acceptance criteria (AC). Also, replace " switcher" : with " switches". 1 Except where noted above, the additions and deletions to this ITAAC are acceptable. 2.5.3 Discrete Indication And Alarm System And Data Processina System Delete " bypassed" from f)ii on page.2. Page 3: Delete the phrase "one of the two channels" from the paragraph addressing electrical isolation of the DIAS-P display devices. 3 Delete the phrase, "for at least on communication channel" from the AC for ITAAC 4.b. Delete " bypassed" from the DC and AC for ITAAC item 7.f)ii. Change " steam" to " coolant" for the DC and AC of ITAAC 7 9)iii. Except where noted above, the additions and deletions to this ITAAC are acceptable. l

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 . . 2.5.4      Power Control System / Process - Component Control System          j Add the CGID commitment in the design description to the ITAAC table.

Except where noted above, the additions and deletions to this ITAAC are ' acceptable. 2.7.15 Ecuipment and Floor Drainaae System l Figure 2.7.15-1, Level instruments for the containemnt floor drain sump and the reactor cavity sump should be shown. : 2.7.25 Communications Systems t 5 ; The additions and deletions to this ITAAC are acceptable. + b Comments should be directed to Mike Waterman (504-2818). l

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ELECTRICAL TASK GROUP COMMENTS (

1. There have been some changes to the wording of the Part 52 Interfaces for !

the Offsite Power System specified in the ABWR DD/ITAAC. Although the CE Interface is slightly different, in general, these wording changes should be considered for the CE 80+ DD/ITAAC. Note the changes regarding the 10% i voltage variation. ; Revised Interfaces for the ABWR:

             - The offsite system shall consist of a minimum of two independent offsite transmission circuits from the transmission system.
             - The offsite transmission circuits shall be sized to supply their load requirements, during all design operating modes, of their respective           :

Class lE divisions and non-Class lE loads. ;

             - Voltage variations of the transmission system shall not cause voltage variations at the loads of more than +/- 10 % of the loads nominal             !

voltage rating. l i

             - The normal steady state frequency of the offsite system shall .be            j within +/- 2 hertz of 60 hertz during recoverable periods of system            !

instability.

             - The independence of the offsite transmission system's power,                 !

instrumentation, and control circuits shall be compatible with the ; portion of the offsite transmission system's power, instrumentation, and control circuits within CE's scope. ~

             - Instrumentation and control system loads shall be compatible with the capacity and capability design requirements of the dc systems within CE's design scope.

Verify that all the above applicable items have been covered in 2.5.1.

2. The interface requirement for the offsite frequency decay should be revised back to 3 Hertz /sec.

3. Section 8.1.4.5 of the SSAR lists a number of COL Action Items. Some of l the items appear to address analyses which are to be performed as part of i ITAAC. This information should be incorporated into the SSAR to support the ITAAC and then the separate COL Action Item can be eliminated. Specific COL ;

Items involved include: B,C,F,G,H,J, C, L, V, W, X, Y, AA, AC. ' In addition, the Section 8.1.4.5 list of COL Action Items includes items which ! are either interfaces or part of the conceptual design scope of the Offsite Power System. These should be incorporated into the SSAR as appropriate as , Interfaces or Conceptual design information and then the separate COL Action items can be eliminated. Specific COL Items involved include: M thru U. , 1 J l 1 l

  . 4. The following item was deleted from Section 8.1.4.5 for COL Action items:
        "The COL applicant will provide provisions and procedures to test the status     i and operability of protection circuits bypassed during accident conditions."

Justify why it was deleted.

5. Per your proposal, the environmental qualification of the electrical penetrations is to be addressed by the inclusion of the following in the Design Description (2.6.4): -

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        " Containment electrical penetrations assemblies are equipment for which paragraph number (3) of the " Verification for Basic Configuration for Systems" of the General Provisions (Section 1.2) applies."                                :

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6. It is our understanding that the Design Description for the AC '

Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (2.6.3) is being : revised to use a parenthetical clarification to address the fact that the SSAR uses the term Vital and the DD/ITAAC is not using this term. The clarification should read, for example ("also referred to as the Vital DC , power system"). i h a i l

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 .                                    STRUCTURAL TASK GROVI COMMENTS Comments on System 80+ ITAAC/ Tier 1 Submittal (Mechanical, Structural, Materials, and Chemical Engineering)              '

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GENERAL COMMENT

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1. Our general comment (A.3) previcusly identified stated:

In many systems, a phrase similar to the following has been used: "The ' safety-related equipment shown in Figure - is qualified Seismic Categnry I. " This phrase is insufficient 5ecause it does not depict - what portion of the system is Seismic Category I and what portion is . not. It was agreed previously that a note would appear in the figure , stating that all ASME Code Class components in the figure are safety-related. Otherwise, the Design Description must clearly specify the . boundaries of the Seismic Category I portion of the system. l Alternatively, state in the Design

Description:

"The ASME Code Class           ,

components shown in Figure __ is qualified Seismic Category I." This comment was corrected for some systems (e.g., SDS) but there are ? still others systems that did not adequately address it (SCS,.AVS, SIS). ! SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS ! 2.1.6 Reactor Vessel Internals I At the end of fourth paragraph, the words, "and mid-loop monitors," i which was agreed to be added was not incorporated. j 2.3.1 Reactor Coolant System :

1. The dimensions on the reactor vessel figure (Fig. 2.3.1-3) were deleted i and should not have been. The agreement was to consider the dimensions 1 reference numbers (i.e., for reference only) or reformat the Design Description to show that the information is not part of the Design Certification Material.

2,3,4 ESSS Intearity Monitorino System

1. The response acceptably revised the SSAR Table 3.2-1 in Amendment T.

However, the Desip' Description was not revised. The Design Description should be reviseo to add the same information that is in SSAR Table 3.2-1, Note 32 in Amendment T. 3.1 Pinina Desian

1. The DD should contain an introductory sentence that states, "The requirements for piping design in this section apply to ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping that are classified as seismic Category I unless.

Otherwise noted." 5

. 2. In the sixth paragraph (beginning, " Piping systems are designed to ; reduce...), the phrase, "and to reduce the potential for," should be ' inserted between the words " corrosion" and "waterhammer" (not between- > the words, " erosion" and " corrosion"). i

3. In the same paragraph as 2. above, the words, " erosion, corrosion

should be changed to, " erosion / corrosion."

4. In the last paragraph, add the phrase, "in seismic Category I and non- +

nuclear safety-related (NNS) piping systems," after the words, " dynamic ! effects of postulated pipe breaks." 5 Add a new last paragraph to state: " Structures, systems, and components that shall be required to be functional during and following an SSE i shall be protected against the effects of spraying, flooding, pressure, ' and temperature due to postulated pipe breaks and cracks in seismic Category I and NNS piping systems."

6. In Table 3.1-1, Design Commitment #4 should be revised to be consistent j with the changes to the Design Description discussed in 4. above. l i

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Comments on System 80+ Supperting-SSAR Markups for ITAAC (Mechanical, Structural, Materials, and Chemical Engineering) i

1. As a result of our review of site parameters, an SSAR markup is needed to include liquefaction effects of soils under buried piping. This was ;

one of the items remaining from the October 4-6, 1993, meeting on ITAAC. -

2. In the October 6, 1993 agreed-upon version of the ITAAC, Figure 2.1.1-12 was revised to add a note indicating that Unit Vent is not a Category I structure. The advance copy of CESSAR Amendment T, Table 3.2-1, shows .

Unit Vent as seismic Category I again. This is not acceptable and the 1 SSAR must be revised to be consistent.with seismic classification in l Tier 1. i

3. As a result of our review of the Nuclear Island Structures, CESSAR

Amendment S incorporated the changes that were agreed-upon during the :

October 6, 1993 meeting with the exception of revising Figures 1.2-2, ' l.2-3 and 1.2-11. Amendment T does not include these missing revisions.

4. The agreement reached during the October 6, 1993 ITAAC meeting relative !

to the Nuclear Annex Ventilation System was not incorporated into SSAR i Table 3.2-1, Sheet 16 in Amendment T. '

5. SSAR Amendment T and ITAAC (11/12/93) include all the agreed changes for the Process Sampling System except for revising SSAR Table 9.3.2-2. The {

modified table (added capability for taking pressurized PASS samples t from hot leg and cooling system miniflow HX) will be included in ; Amendment U. ' i n i r i t [ 1 i l

I Comments and Unresolved SSAR lssues (ECGB) [

1. In the development of site-specific seismic spectra for use in the design of site-specific structures, systems, and components in the System 80+ standard plants, the following criteria shall be used to ,

ensure that the seismic margin is at least equivalent to that of the , standard certified design. The horizontal and vertical free field, ground-surface site-specific ground motion spectra for the controlling earthquake (s) should be obtained using the procedures of SRP 2.5.2. The maximum spectral amplitude of these spectra in the frequency range of 5 to 10 hertz should be obtained. Both the horizontal and vertical design response , spectra for the System 80+ certified design, RG 1.60 shapes anchored to ! 0.3g peak ground accelerations, should be scaled throughout their entire i frequency range in such a manner that the minimum spectral amplitudes of the certified design spectra are equal to the maximum amplitudes of the horizontal and vertical site-specific ground motion spectra, respectively, in the 5 to 10 hertz frequency range. The resulting design response spectra should be used as the minimum input loading for ' the design of site-specific structures, systems, and components for the System 80+ p', ant. ABB-CE should include this criterion in the CESSAR-DC. i r I l y k

 .                            Weldina and Weld Acceptance Criteria The requirements listed _below are considered by the staff to be essential in controlling welding activities and are needed to support the welding ITAAC requirements stated in 1.2, " General Provisions." ABB-CE should add the following welding commitments to its SSAR in the appropriate sections.

ASME Code Weldina Welding activities shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of Section 111 of the ASME Code. The required nondestructive examination and acceptance criteria are stated in Table 1. Component supports shall be i fabricated in accordance with the requirements of Subsection NF uf Section III I of the ASME Code except that the visual weld acceptance criteria shall be the , Nuclear Construction Issue Group (NCIG) standard NCIG-01, " Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria for Structural Welding of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2. Weldina of non-ASME oressure retainino Pinina l Welding activities involving non-ASME pressure retaining piping shall be i accomplished in accordance with written procedures and shall meet the ' requirements of the ANSI B31.1, Code. The weld acceptance criteria shall be as defined for the applicable nondestructive examination method described in ANSI B31.1 Code l Weldina of Structural and Buildina Steel Welding activities shall be accomplished in accordance with written procedures and shall meet the requirements of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual of Steel Construction. The visual acceptance criteria shall be as defined in NCIG-01, Revision 2. ! l Weldina of Electrical Cable Tray and Conduit Supports Welding activities shall be accomplished in accordance with the American Welding Society (AWS) Structural Welding Code, DI.1 The weld visual acceptance criteria shall be as defined in NCIG-01, Revision 2. Weldina of Heatina Ventilatino and Air Conditionino Supports Welding activities shall be accomplished in accordance with the American Welding Society (AWS) Structural Welding Code, DI.1 The weld visual acceptance criteria shall be as defined in NCIG-01, Revision 2. Weldina_pf Refuel Cavity and toent fuel Pool Liners Welding activities shall be etccmplished in accordance with the American Welding Society (AWS) Structural WeJding Code, DI.1 The welded seams of the liner plates shall be spot r.0isgr#)hed, liquid penetrant and vacuum box examined after fabrication tr cissce that the liners do not leak. The acceptance criteria for these examinations shall meet tha acceptance criteria stated in subsection NE-5200 of Section III of the ASME sode.

. TABLE 1 Welding Activities and Weld Examination Requirements for ASME Code, Section III Welds Class 1 Components (1)(2)(3) Component Weld Type NDE Requirements Vessel Category A (Longitudinal) RT plus NT or PT Vessel, Pipe, Category B RT plus MT or PT Pump, Valve (Circumferential) __ Pipe, Pump, Butt weld RT plus MT or PT Valve Fillet and socket welds MT or PT Vessels (6) Category C and similar RT plus MT or PT. RT must be welds multiple exposure Partial penetration and MT or PT on all accessible surfaces fillet welds Category D Vessels (6) a) Butt welds, all RT plus MT or PT

 & Branched     b) Corner welded nozzles           RT plus MT or PT Connections    c) Corner welded branch and        RT plus MT or PT piping connection exceed-ing 4" nominal diameter d) Corner welds branch and         MT or PT piping 4" and less e) Weld buildup deposits at        UT plus a, b, c above if connected to openings                      nozzle or pipe f) Partial penetration             MT or PT progressive and final surface g) Oblique full penetration        RT or UT plus MT or PT. In addition, branch and piping             UT of weld, fusion zone, and parent connections                   metal beneath attachment surface.

General Fillet, partial penetration, NT or PT socket welds General Structural attachment welds NT or PT Special welds. 1) Specially designed seals MT or PT

2) Weld metal cladding PT

3) Hard surfacing PT a) Valves 4" or less None

4) Tube-tube sheet welds PT

5) Brazed joints VT 1

Class 2 Components (1)(2)(4) Component Weld Type NDE Requirements Vessel Category A (Longitudinal) a) Either of the members exceeds RT 3/16 inch b) Each member 3/16 inch or less MT, PT, or RT Pipe, Pump. Longitudinal RT Valve Vessel Category B (Circumferential) a) Either of the members exceeds RT 3/16 in. b) Each member 3/16" or less MT, PT, or RT Pipe, Pump and Circumferential Valve a) Butt welds RT b) Fillet and partial penetration MT or PT Vessel (6) and Category C similar joints a) Corner joints, either of the RT in other members exceeds 3/16" of components thickness b) Each member 3/16" or less MT, PT, or RT c) Partial penetration and fillet MT or PT welds Vessel (6) and Category D similar welds a) Full penetration joints when RT in other either membe-s exceed 3/16" of components thickness b) Full penetration corner MT or PT joints when either member exceeds 3/16" c) Both members 3/16" or less MT or PT d) Partial penetration and MT or PT fillet weld joints Branch Con. a) Nominal size exceed 4" RT and Nozzles in b) Nominal size 4" or smaller MT or PT (external and pipe, valve,. pump accessible internal surfaces) I Class 2 Components (Cont'd)(1)(2)(4) - Component Weld Type NDE Requirements Vessels Cat. A RT designed to Cat. B RT ; NC-3200 Cat. C, Butt weld RT l Cat. C, Full penetration corner UT or RT Cat. C, Partial penetration corner MT or PT both sides ; and fillet welds ; Cat. D, Full penetration (6) RT Cat. D, Partial penetration MT or PT both sides Fillet, Partial Penetration, socket, MT or PT and structural attachment welds Special Welds a) specially designed seals MT or PT b) weld metal cladding MT or PT c) hard surfacing PT d) hard surfacing for valves with None , inlet connection 4" nominal pipe size or less , e) tube-tube sheet welds PT f) Brazed joints VT , Storage Tanks a) side joints RT ! (Atmospheric) b) roof and roof-to-sidewall VT c) bottom joints vacuum box testing of at least ! 3 psi d) bottom to sidewall vacuum box + MT or PT e) Nozzle to tank side MT or PT f) Nozzle to roof VT g) Joints in nozzles RT h) others Similar welds in vessels Storage Tanks a) sidewall RT (0-15 psi) b) roof RT ; c) roof-to-sidewall RT if not possible, MT or PT : d) bottom & bottom-to-side vacuum box method + MT or PT ! e) nozzle tank MT or PT f) joints to nozzles RT g) others same as similar vessel joints ! 6 l t

=_

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 .                                    Class 3 Components.(1)(2)(5) r f

Component Weld Type NDE Requirements Vessels Category A (longitudinal)

1. a) Thickness exceeding the limits RT :

of Table ND. 5211.2-1 t b) Welds based on joint effi- RT ciency permitted by ND.3351.1 c) butt welds in nozzles attached RT ' to vessels in a or b above

2. Welds not included in 1 above Spot RT each 50 ft of weld.

additional RT to cover each l welder's work.

3. Nonferrous vessels exceeding 3/8 RT inch Pump, Valve, Pipe -

pipes greater than 2 in. size RT, MT, or PT l i pumps & valves greater than 2 in, according to the product form , Vessel Category B (Circumferential)

1. a) Thickness exceeds Table RT ND.5211.2 for Ferrous metals b) thickness exceeds 3/8 in for RT nonferrous metals c) joint efficiency according to RT ND.3352.1(a) ,

d) attachments to vessels and RT l exceeds nominal pipe size 10" or thickness 1 1/8 in. l 1

2. welds not involved in 1 above RT 6 in. long sections + the i intersections of Cat. A welds l pipe, pump and Greater than 2' nominal pipe size RT, PT, or MT valve Vessel Category C:

1. a) Thickness exceeds Table RT ND-5211.2 or ND-5211.3 b) Attachments exceed 10 inch RT NPS or 1 1/8 inch wall thickness

2. Welds not involved in 1 above Spot RT to cover each )

welder's work i Fipe. Pump, Valves Greater than 2" nominal pipe size RT, PT, or MT f 4

i Class 3 Components (Cont'd)(1)(2)(5) f Vessel Category D:

1. Full penetration butt welds RT '

designed for joint efficiency per ND.3352.l(a)

2. In nozzles or communicating RT :

chambers attached to vessels or heads requiring full RT

3. Welds not covered by 1 and 2 Spot RT to cover each above welder's work Fipe Pump and Greater than 2" nominal pipe size RT, PT, or MT Valve Special Welds a) weld metal cladding PT b) hard surfacing PT (i) hard surfacing for valves none with inlet connection 4" nominal pipe size or less c) tube-tube sheet welds PT d) Brazed joints VT Storage Tanks a) sidewall joints Same as Category A or B (Atmospheric) vessel joints b) roof and roof-to-sidewall VT c) bottom joints vacuum box testing of at i least 3 psi, or PT or MT l plus VT during pressure test l d) bottom to sidewall Same as bottom joints i e) Nozzle to tank side MT or PT .j f) Nozzle to roof VT g) Joints in nozzles ex. roof nozzles MT or PT i h) others Similar welds in vessels Storage Tanks a) sidewall Same as Category A or B (0-15 psi) vessel joints b) roof Same as Category A vessel !

c) roof-to-sidewall joints j Same as above if possible, ! or MT or PT i d) bottom & bottom-to-side Vacuum box testing at least i 3 psi, or PT or MT plus VT { during pressure test e) nozzle to tank MT or PT f) joints in nozzles MT or PT g) others same as similar vessel . joints l l 1

1 a : Containment Vessel (1)(2)(6) , l l I l Component Weld Type NDE Requirements ; Containment Category A, Butt Welds (Long'l) RT l- ' Containment Category B, Rutt Welds (Circ.) RT Containment Category C, Butt weld RT : Containment Category C, Nonbutt Welds UT or MT or PT i Containment Category D, Butt Welds RT Containment Category D, Nonbutt Welds UT or MT or PT Containment Structural attachment welds a) Butt Welds RT , b) Nonbutt Welds UT or MT or PT Special welds Weld Metal Cladding PT Components Supports (1)(2)(7) Component Weld Type NDE Requirements I t Class 1 Primary Member, Full Supports Penetration Butt Welds RT All other welds MT or PT ; Secondary Member Welds VT b Class 2 and MC Primary Member, Full Supports Penetration Butt Welds RT Partial Penetration or fillet MT or PT welds throat greater than 1" ' All other Welds VT Secondary Member Welds ' VT Class 3 Primary Member, Groove or MT or PT ;

     . Supports      throat greater than 1" All other welds                   VT Secondary Member Weld VT                            .

Special Welds Transmitting Loads 'in the UT base metal beneath the weld ! Requirements, Through Thickness Direction in All Classes Members Greater than 1" t 1

l . NOTES:

1) The required confirmation that facility welding activities are in compliance with the certified design commitments will include the following third party verifications:

a. Facility welding specifications and procedures meet the applicable ASME Code requirements

b. Facility welding activities are performed in accordance with the applicable ASME Code requirements

c. Welding activities related records are prepared, evaluated and maintained in accordance with the ASME Code requirements L d. Welding processes used to weld dissimilar base metal and welding filler metal combinations are compatible for the intended applications

e. The facility has established procedures for qualifications of welders and welding operators in accordance with the applicable ASME Code requirements '

, f. Approved procedures are available and usa e or preheating and post i I heating of welds, and those procedures meet the applicable requirements of the ASME Code ,

g. Completed welds are examined in accordance with the applicable ;

examination method required by the ASME Code )

2) Radiographic film will be reviewed and accepted by the COL applicant's nondestructive examin. tion (NDE), Level III examiner prior to final '

acceptance :

3) The NDE requirements for Class I components will be as stated in .

subarticle NB-5300 of Section III of the ASME Code

4) The NDE requirements for Class 2 components will be as stated in !

subarticle NC-5300 of Section III of the ASME Code {

5) The NDE requirements for Class 3 components will be as stated in i

l subarticle ND-5300 of Section III of the ASME Code

6) The NDE requirements for containment vessels will be as stated in subarticle NE-5300 of Section III of the ASME Code

7) The NDE requirements for component supports will be as stated in i

subarticle NF-5300 of Section III of the ASME Code

8) For corner joints UT may be used instead of RT. For Type 2 full penetration corner weld joints, if RT is used, the fusion zone, and parent metal beneath the attachment surface shall be UT examined af ter welding. ,

l LEGEND: RT . Radiographic Examination; UT - Ultrasonic Examination; MT - Magnetic Particle Examination; LP - Liquid Penetrant Examination; VT - Visual Examination l

Include the following figures from the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (Section III) in the SSAR: Fig. NB-3351-1, Welded joint locations typical of categories A, B, C, and D Fig. NB-3352-1,- typical butt joints i l- . l r i STRUCTURAL TASK GROUP COMMENTS l i The COL licensee should perform a seismic walkdown to ensure that the as-built ! plant matches the assumptions in the System 80+ PRA-based seismic margins I analy'is and to assure that seismic spatial systems interactions do not exist. : The w.ikdown should be conducted in accordance with the proceduras outlined below. The walkdown procedures should be incorporated into the SSAR. , l Validation of Plant HCLPF 3 1 1 The COL licensee will be required to verify that key assumptions for structures, systems, and components considered in the seismic margins < assessment (SMA) are valid under the as-built plant conditions. This verification process consists of steps as described below, and is modeled j after the EPRI and NRC SMA process. The analysis consists of five steps. j Step 1 - Preparation for Plant Walkdown Step 2 - Plant Seismic Logic Model Walkdown Step 3 - Assessment of As-Built SMA SSC HCLPF Values Step 4 - Seismic Plant Walkdown Step 5 - Plant Damage State and Plant Level HCLPF Calculations These steps are discussed in detail in the remainder of this section. Steo 1 - Preparation for Plant Walkdown: The SMA presented in Section ????? of the SSAR contains seismic logic models for the plant. These models include the seismic-induced failures that were considered necessary to be evaluated as part of the SMA. These failures, and the associated HCLPF values of the SMA i SSCs shall be reviewed. In preparing for the plant walkdown, all. appropriate l information regarding these failures should be gathered. These include, but are not necessarily limited to;

piping & instrumentation drawings, electrical one-line diagrams, plant arrangement drawings, detailed design drawings, procurement specifications, a construction drawings (especially those concentrating on seismic detailing and load paths),

quality assurance records,

seismic. analysis used for defining floor response spectra, floor spectra used as required response spectra by vendors, engineering analyses of seismic performance (especially for _ representative seismic anchorages), and j l equipment qualification data / material test data. l I

Sten 2 - Plant Seismic loaic Model Walkdown: The walkdown will cor.centrate on the identification of potential systems interactions that could impact the performance of the front-line and support SSCs included in the models. The , original SMA model considered in Section ??????? included the most significant systems interactions (e.g., collapse of major buildings). However, it is i necessary to assure that no other interactions exist in the as-built plant j that were not included in the SMA model. The~ walkdown should include a thorough examination of the SSCs included in the SMA, including piping runs, ' cable trays, etc. During the walkdown process, the team should identify the presence of any SSCs whose failure could impact the performance of the SMA SSCs. These include such things as: non-load bearing walls adjacent to SMA SSCs. non-safety components above or adjacent to SMA SSCs. hard surfaces within deflection range of SMA SSCs. flooding / deluge sources in the vicinity of SMA SSCs. All such potential interactions should be identified, along with the failure mode that could impact the performance of the SMA SSCs. These are new failure modes based on as-built plant conditions. This must be done for 100% of the SMA SSCs included in the event and fault tree models. These new failure modes should be added as basic events on the SMA fault / event trees as oppropriate ; and be added to the list of SMA SSCs. In addition, the design information > specified in Step 1 should be assembled for these new failures. Note that all future reference to SMA SSCs is intended to refer to the expanded list, including the newly added system interactions. Sten 3 - Assessment of As-Built SSC HCLPF Values: For each SMA SSC, a compilation of the design characteristics that control the HCLPF value should > be prepared. These design characteristics can be one of two things: either ' they directly contribute to the dominant failure mode (s) or to failure modes that are close to being dominant. The dominant failure modes (s) is defined as the failure modes (s), from the list of all potential failure modes that will cause the SSC to be unable to perform its safety function, whose HCLPF value is the lowest (or equal to the lowest). Thus, the reduction of the HCLPF value of this failure mode would result in a corresponding reduction in the HCLPF of the SSC. This being the case, the design characteristics that would be compiled would include all of the specific design conditions that directly contribute to the dominant SSC failure mode (s). Another way to express this is that any change in any one of these design conditions that results in a reduction in seismic capacity will directly cause a reduction in the SSC HCLPF value. In addition, they would also include all such conditions that directly contribute to SSC failure mode (s), if any, that could become the dominant failure mode if it were to have a "somewhat" lower HCLPF value. For the purpose of this review, "somewhat" is defined as about a 10% to 20% HCLPF reduction. Thus, these failure modes are those whose calculated HCLPF value is only on the order of 10% to 20% higher than the dominant failure mode. The characteristics that would be identified could include such things as:

size, type and number of anchor bolts, a size, type and orientation of support members, a distance between rigid pipe supports (allowance for differential .

motion), ,

              =   distance between components.                                           .

The specification of these characteristics should be quite definitive (i.e., numerical where possible). Step 4 - Seismic Plant Walkdown: Final determination of the as-Duilt plant design characteristics to meet the calculated HCLPF values is required. This should take the form of a final plant walkdown of the SMA SSCs. As a product ' of Step 3, a compilation of key design characteristics (those that control or could control the HCLPF value of the SMA SSCs) was prepared. The plant ; walkdown is intended to determine the extent to which these design characteristics exist in the plant. Each SSC should be inspected and the as-built condition compared with the key design characteristics. It is not required to perform a detailed walkdown inspection of 100% of the ! SMA SSCs. A 100% " walk by" is sufficient. The " walk by" is intended to ' assure that there is a reasonable basis for the assumption that the HCLPF of , broad classes of SSC are essentially the same (i.e., that the SSCs are of similar design and manufacture and are similarly anchored). For each group of SSCs for which this condition of similarity can reasonably be established by the " walk by" it will then be necessary to select one representative SSC from each group to be subjected to a more rigorous inspection. This inspection will be conducted in such a manner as to determine if the representative SSC is in agreement with the assumed design characteristics compiled in Step 3. It is understood that it will not always be possible to visually determine the existence of all the key characteristics, since some of them may be embedded 1 within walls or in other inaccessible places. In such cases, it will be acceptable to use the construction QA records as adequate demonstration that the as-built SSC has the design characteristics required. In all cases, the result of the seismic plant walkdown should be fully documented. Step 5 - Plant Damaae State and Plant level HCLPF Calculations: The final step in the process is to determine HCLPF values for each event sequence, each plant damage state and for the overall plant. This should be done using both the min-max and convolution approaches and reported in the same form as in the SMA in the SSAR. J / e

     .                        PLAMT visrents copin1EMB;
. ITAAC 2.4.6 - Containment Sprav System

1. In Item 35 of the PRA Insights for System 80+, the emergency spray backup system is identified to be important enough to be included in the ITAAC such that the containment spray headers can accept flow from an external source of water. It is not clear from the design description of ITAAC No. 2.4.6 and Figure 2.4.6-1 that the above concern has been addressed. We suspect the PCPS connection in Figure 2.4.6-1 addresses the concern, but there is no description to confirm that.

ITAAC 2.7.4 - FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM

1. Modify the design description (DD) of ITAAC 2.7.4 to state the sesimic Classification of the equipment discussed in the DD (seismic Category II).

2. Use the boilerplate wording for the basic configuration ITAAC (ITAAC #1) for ITAAC 2.7.4.

ITAAC 2.7.15 - E0VIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINS

1. Revise CESSAR-DC Figure 9.3.3-1 to include the flow meter on the outlet of the containment sump pumps as shown on ITAAC Figure 2.7.15-1.

2. Revise ITAAC Figure to show the code breaks on the downstream side of the discharge valves from the reactor building and nuclear annex sumps.

SPLB

. ABB-CE should incorporate the following coments in ITAAC and/or SSAR, as applicable:

1. Revise SSAR Figures 9.4.2 through 9.4-10 and 10.1-2, 10.3.2-1, 10.4.1-1, 10.4.2-1, 10.4.3-1, 10.4.5-1, 10.4.7-1, and 10.4.9-1 to reflect the corresponding ITAAC figures.

2. Control Comolex Ventilation System .rTA At z.7.r7

a. SSAR Table 9.4-1, Sheet 13 of 18, data for heat load, air, and ,

cooling water for " Personnel Decon. Rooms" should be identical to ) those data existed in " Men's and Women's Change Rooms" which were - deleted. ,

b. Revise Table 9.4-5, Sheet 2 of 14, to delete exception for demisters and humidity control as discussed in telecon with Duke Engineering Services.

c. Revise SSAR Pages 9.4-2, 5b, 6b, 7b and 9b be consistent with ITAAC .

2.7.17, as marked. '

3. Fuel Buildino Ventilation System 1 mac c. 7.l9

a. Revise SSAR Page 9.4-13, to be consistent with ITAAC 2.7.18 as marked.

4. Subschere Buildino Ventilation System r r7bte r. . 7. z o

a. Revise SSAR Pages 9.4-24 and 9.4-26 and SSAR Table 9.4-1, Sheets 4 and 5 of 18 to be consistent with ITAAC 2.7.19 as marked. ;

5. Containtnent Purae and Coolina Ventilation System TrA a c_ a .7. e l

a. Revise SSAR Page 9.4-32, to be consistent with ITAAC 2.7.21 as marked.

6. Nuclear Annex Ventilation System rre c z . 7.13

a. Revise SSAR Page 9.4-39, 40, 42, 43, and 45 and to be consistent with ITAAC 2.7.23 as marked. If, " Essential Chilled Water System" is '

captioned as " Safety-Related Chilled Water System," then revise SSAR Section 9.4 accordingly, i

7. Main Steam Supply System r n to c. z. S 7.

a. Add an item to ITAAC Table 2.8.2-1 to state that " Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions and between Divisions and non-Class iE equipment in the main steam supply system."

8. Condensate and Feedwater System r r/HR t . S . t-

a. Add an item to ITAAC Table 2.8.6-1 to state that " Independence is provided between Class iE Divisions and between Divisions and non- ,

Class iE equipment in the main steam supply system."

9. Emeroency Feedwater System r- 7 /Mr r. s. 9

a. Revise SSAR Page 10.4-59 to be consistent with ITAAC 2.8.8 response, as marked.

SPtB :

CESSAR nainemon I TABLE 9.4-5 (Cont'd) (Sheet 2 of 14) DESIGN COMPARISON TO REGULATORY POSITIONS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52 l Regulatory Guide 1.52 Position Syster see

d. The operation of any ESF atmosphere Complies.

cleanup system should not deleteriously affect the operation of other engineered safety features such as a containment spray system, nor should the operation of other engineered safety features such as a containment spray system deleteriously affect the operation of any ESF atmosphere cleanup system.

e. Components of systems connected to Complies.

compartments that are unheated during a postulated accident should be designed for post-accident effects of both the lowest and highest predicted temperatures.

2. System Design Criteria -

a. ESF atmosphere cleanup systems designed Complies, except that and installed for the purpose of demisters are not mitigating accident doses should be provided. Water i redundant. The systems should consist of !

droplets will not be . the following sequential components: entrained in the (1) demisters, (2) prefilters (demisters ! ; airstream. Humidity may serve this function), (3) HEPA , control is provided by filters before the adsorbers, (4) iodine i safety-related air- / l adsorbers (impregnated activated carbon \ conditioning system ,e or equivalent adsorbent such as metal \ which has provisions zeolites), (5) HEPA filters after the \ for dehumidifying. i adsorbers, (6) ducts and valves, N (7) fans, and (8) related -- instrumentation. Heaters or cooling I coils used in conjunction with heaters should be used when the humidity is to be , t controlled before filtration.

b. The redundant ESF atmosphere cleanup Complies.

systems should be physically separated so that damage to one system does not also cause damage to the second system. The generation of missiles from high-pressui. equipment rupture, rotating machinery failure, or natural phenomena should be considered in the design for separation and protection.

                                                                 .      Amendment T November 15, 1993                                     !

l

4

dESSARnnincum @' l bb ur.l-tuasc- ir gwp Joym .o wc W i kil Gel loh Jah dlib f sc{wz% eft control room in order to provide a safe naven and Wafe exit

                                                                           *y cloJG-
                                                                                      *VA    *lWg/s)Nif for crig plant personnel.

g-In the event of a fire, area fire detectors will sound an alarm ' in the control room and the supply fan may be deactivated manually if required. Smoke removal is then manually initiated from the Control Room or the Remote Shutdown Room by a smoke '

                         ' fan, outside makeup air and _ associated ductwork and 1 dampers. The fire dampers   in HVAC ductwork close under                       ,

d ign air flow conditions. g K) The Containment, the Reactor Building Subsphere, the Fuel P J' M w g the Nuclear Annex, and the two diesel generator areas e ven ated, heated and cooled with 100% outside air systems. ; The supply and exhaust fans are available for smoke control. The i d M control area has dedicated smoke control fans. The Turbine at;)i )0 Building ventilating fans are available for smoke control. ; p y ' 9y ) The Nuclear Annex, Fuel Building, and Reactor Building Subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to the atmosphere. In order to control airborne activity, the outside air is generally supplied directly to the clean areas and exhausted from the potentially contaminated areas, creating a positive flow of air from the clean areas to the potentially contaminated areas. HVAC penetrations through security barriers are designed to provide Guide 5.65. security protection to meet the intent of Regulatory , I Table 9.4-2 tabulates the RCS insulation heat loads within the containment. i Table 9.4-3 tabulates the data *used for Chapter 15 offsite and control room dose analysis. With the exception of carbon ' adsorbers in the filtration units for the control room, no credit

             -is   taken for any carbon filtration for post accident dose analyses.                                                                                   l Table 9.4-4 tabulates the heat loads from NSSS Support Structures within the Containment.                                                                      ,

9.4.1 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.1.1 Desian Basis ! ( The Control Complex Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (CCVS) is designed to maintain the environment in the control room envelope and balance of control area within acceptable , limits for the operation of unit controls, for maintenance and testing of the controls as required, and for uninterrupted safe Amendment T 9.4-2 November 15, 1993 -!

t

E :- . 2.7 CESSAR En cmo,. Rec. Guide Title 1.29 Seismic Design Classification 1.52 Design, Testing and Maintenance for Post i Accident Engineered Safety Feature ' Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants; Table 9,4-5 provides the design comparison to regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52. 1.78 Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release 1.95 Protection of Nuclear Power Plant ~ Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine ; Release

).

1.1 g*"p Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for

                                          +p/ 'guormal

(, Ventilation Exhaust System Air 6 iltration and Adsorption Units of Light l C y';gfjihXc0b3;& Dsj V *** m M( M ,1*g[pW 9.1. 'ing of ductwork conforms to Sheet Metal Welding Code AWS u' 3,Jsf Ac bd $* u q 9.4.1.2 Systes Description en/$f *f flENW'( j; em e**

           "                                          o s,yi <=.4 Y)

The main control, roo air-conditioning- system co s of two g,d redundant air-hi~'linhunity afety-related g

chilled water cooling coily for + heat 1 ribh (filtery,nd fany for air rdmoval, !

circulation. --,% rir- latien ryrt- p ' " = J i% 1 j trains b-ith pati =l:t; fil+ rr, ~ he ame0 = ev *ir cir=1stien. Each of the gfilm r;ine- consists o f4'+ eve and fane e-kM% prefilter, electric heater, absolute filter, (HEPA) carbon adsorbery and post filter (HEPA)falong with ducts and valves and related instrumentation. Chi Essential Chilled Water System.31ed water is supplied from the During normal operation, return air from the control room is mixed with a small quantity of outside air for ventilation, is filtered and conditioned in the control room air-conditioning unit, and is delivered to the control room through supply l ductwork. Duct-mounted heating coils and' humidification equipment provide final adjustments to the control room ; temperature and humidity for maintaining normal _confort I conditioW thch 0;Y httr Jfru chst u fr.vioG d sW reda dw & E"#,#,%w n y..:wy dre,'c4 & es wrr def 9ehf / The designated TCR flicration units and ventilation fan start automatically on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) or high radiation signal. Upon failure of the designated filtration unit, the redundant filtration unit starts automatically. The emergency 4 w = 5 en e La.--filters particulates and potential i f/t &

L Amendment T 9.4-5b November 15, 1993

~ CESSAR sinam:,, @ hrWev radioactive iodines from a portion of the return air, and delivers the filtered air to the inlet of the main air & M4 = unit. gg k ' l The Technical Support Center air-conditioning system consists of an air-handling unit, return air a/df smoke purge fans, and an emergency filter unit. The TSC is paintained et 1/8" water gauge positive pressure with respect to {urroundingsareas during post-accident conditions. A common supply air header and common outside air intake dampers are shared by the TSC and the control room to protect the TSC from the contaminants in the outside air intakes. using mhnualThe TSC can be isolated from the Main Control Room by controls. The TSC is automatically isolated if control room pressurization falls below its design value. The TSC is provided with shielding protection from direct radiation radioactivefrom an external radioactive cloud and -internal sources. protection measures isThe combined designed to beeffect of alltoradiation adequate limit the overall calculated radiation exposure to the personnel inside the TSC to the requirements of GDC 19. The computer room air- i l conditioning system consists of two 100% air-conditioning units and associated fans. Both the Technical Support Center and computer seismic. room air-handling systems are nc -safety and non- I Q ,'fign

                                         /                                          l l The balance of control comp 19fc air-conditioning systems consists of two redundant air-(andlin'g its, each with roughing filters, l safety-related chilled w r cooling coils and fans serving Division I electrical rooms, Channel A and Channel C.

units are serving Division II Channel B and D. EachTwo equal Division vill function with one of the redundant air handling units i delivering filtered, conditioned air to the various electrical i j equipment rooms including essential battery rooms. Chilled water is supplied from the Essential Chilled Water System. Each l l Division also contains redundant battery rooms with fan operating continu)usly to maintain the hydrogen concentration below two percent. Outlet ducts in battery rooms are located near ceiling for hydrogen control. i The Remote Shutdown Panel Room is located in the Division I area. Normally this room is cooled by the 70' Elevation Division I , Elect,rical Equipment Roon Air handling Unit. For redundancy l purposes, the Remote Shutdown Panel Room is also cooled by a l Division II powered air handling unit which receives Division II l Safety-related Chilled Water. Return air from the various essential electrical equipment areas I is mixed with a portion of outside air for ventilation, is i filtered and conditioned in the air-handling unit, and is i delivered to the rooms through supply ductwork. Duct-mounted { heating coils provide final adjustments to temperature j in selected equipment rooms. ) I Amendment T 9.4-6b November 15, 1993 1

CESSAR !annemon S CO' The operation Support Center, personnel decon rooms, B eak Room, l Shif t Assembly and Officeg;, Radiation Access Control ud Cas. and Sec. Group areas all are served by an individual airb=dling - unit consisting of a centrifugal fan, non-safety relat6d chilled l vater coil and roughing filter. Two non-essential electrical and CEDM control rooms are served by two 100% air [h thd44mg units consisting of a centrifugal fan, non-safety related chilled water coil and roughing filter. Each non-safety related electrical room A/C unit also serves non-safety related battery rooms and each of these battery rooms contains an exhaust fan operating continuously to maintain the hydrogen concentration below two percent. As shown on Figure 9.4-2 all of these areas can receive outside air from the cleanest of two sources described for the control room. The roof exhaust fan shown serving the break room, personnel decon rooms, and shift assembly offices is actually located at least 80 feet from the outside air intake. 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation The air-conditioning system serving the control room proper l consists of two completely redundant, independent, full-capacity cooling systems. Each system is powered from independent, Class 1E power sources and headered on separate Essential Chilled Water Systems. Equipment capacities are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area temperatures. The control room, and other support areas are designed to maintain approximately 73*F to 78'F and 20% to 60% maximum relative humidity. The battery room is designed to maintain approximately 77'T (60*F min. to 90*F max.) The mechanical equipment room is designed to maintain' a maximum temperature of 104*F. All other areas are designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 85'F. These conditions are maintained continuously during all modes of operation for the protection of instrumentation and controls, and for the comfort of the operators. Both, the Technical Support Center and computer room air-conditioning systems are non-safety anst non-seismic. Failure of either does not compromise other safety-related air-conditioning - systems or prevent safe shutdown. The balance of the Control Complex Ventilation System consists of l two independent, full capacity systems. Each system serves the associated train of essential electrical equipment areas. Each system is powered from independent Class 1E power sources and served from weparate essential chilled water systems. Equipment capacities are based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of surrounding area temperatures. l

                                                        . Amendment T 9.4-7b              November 15, 1993

CESSAR REW"ic$en 9.4.1.4 Inspection and Testina Recuirements The Control Complex Ventilation System is in continuous operation and is accessible for periodic inspection. Safety-related l electrical components, switchcovers, and starting controls are .

 . tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter to                       r         I demonstrate system readiness and operability.                                                     l Performance characteristics of the Control Complex Ventilation System will be verified through qualification testing of safety-related components as follows:                                                                   )

A. Air-handling fans are tested in accordance with AMCA I standards to assure fan characteristics and performance curves. Remaining fans are qualified by similarity. , B. Heating and cooling coils are leak-tested with - air, or . hydrostatically, to assure integrity. ! l C. HEPA filters are manufactured and tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. HEPA filters will be tested in place after initial installation and periodically thereafter. , Carbon adsorbers are leak-tested initially and periodically . i thereafter to ensure bypass leakage through the adsorber I section is less than that assumed in the dose assessment. D. Ductwork is f abricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA. Where applicable, duct and housing leak tests are performed in accordance with the provisions of ASME N510. All Main Control Room Air-Conditioning System (MCRACS) ductwork outside MCREZ including the filtration units is either leak tight or is of welded construction. The applicable welding code is AWS D9.1. The ductwork will be pressure tested for leakage. . The 3eaksge through MCR intake auctworX shall ne less than , the .naximum allowable for the associated design. ' 8')i 'k i

                                                                             ,65U Fungtional testing is performed prior to initial startup to Vi J *p verify proper operation of the controls and interlocks. Response              I times of applicable components are verified.                        f p-ct

dj i 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation Aeolicati' "

Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual N operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. Amendment T 9.4-9b November 15, 1993 ,

CESSAR !!nincanos b B. Two 100% capacity Exhaust Systems complete with filter trains and associated fans, dampers, ductwork, supports and control systems. Outside air is supplied to the fuel handling area by a supply ' system consisting of one 100% capacity f an with heating and cooling coils, filter section and associated ductwork. Cooling coils are served by non-essential chilled water system. , The Fuel Building ventilation Exhaust System consists of two $ 00% capacity filter trains. This portion of the Fuel Building ventilation System is an engineered safety feature. The two filter trains receive separate emergency power. Each of the filter trains consists of a moisture eliminator, prefilter, electric heater, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber and post filter (HEPA) along with ducts and valves and related instrumentation. It is equipped with a bypass section. The normal mode of operation for the filter trains is in the bypass position. Radiation detection is provided in the duct system header, upstream of th7 filter train inlet to monitor l radioactivity. Upon indication of high radioactivity in the l exhaust duct system, the bypass dampers will automatically close !

and the filter train inlet dampers will automatically open to l direct air flow through the filter trains. Air from the Fuel 1

    '     k      Building Exhaust System is directed to the unit vent, where it is t                                   6      M,e-monitored before fe                 e  atmosphere.

h , 4 issIathm defer ere /80 ffwedAeg$h2r M

j. -- ~

                .MIdit'Qij      Tf. f gk Duringallfuehhin               perations, the 100% outside air supply system remains in operation and the 100% exhaust air system is set manually in the filtered mode.        Both filtrati n units of the FBVS operate continuously during fuel handling operations and the i

radiation monitor has no control function during this time. ~ The nuclear annex, fuel building, and reactor building subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to the atmosphere.~ 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation i The Fuel Building Exhaust System is an engineered safety feature. Each redundant filter train (two 100% capacity), fan, and motor operated damper is served from a separate train of the emergency Class 1E standby power. This assures the integrity and availability of the Exhaust System in the event of any single active failure. Air exhausted from the fuel handling area is monitored by a radioactive gaseous detector sampling the air in the exhaust duct I header between the fuel handling area and the inlet to the filter trains. The radiation detectors are located to ensure that dampers will have ccmpletely actuated to direct exhaust flow I huhutT l 9.4-13 ' November 15, 1993

1 . l CESSAR MuinCADON 5 l l H. Applicable components and controls conform to the i requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA. l I. The following Regulatory Guides have special signifiehnce to the Subsphere: Rec. Guide Title 1.29 Testing of Nuclear Air Treatment Systems ASME N510 1.52 Design Testing and Maintenance for Post Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmospheric Cleanup System Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 1.140 Design, Maintenance and Testing Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Powered Plants. 9.4.5.2 Eyf_ tem Descriction The Subsphere Building Ventilation System is shown in Figure 9.4-5 and consists of the following: A. A supply air system complete with air-handling unit, two 100% fans, dampers and associated ductwork for each division. B. An exhaust air system rated for higher capacity than the supply air system, complete with full filter train, two 1004 exhaust fans and associated ductwork for each division. l C. Safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling units. l The safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling units consist of a cooling ceil with recirculation fan and dampers to remove heat generated within the space. A recirculation cooling unit is provided in addition to a once-through ventilation system because the served areas are potentially contaminated. Applicable areas include the following: Safeguard component areas including Safety Injection pump _a , (ed.x rooms, Shutdown Cooling pump rooms, containment Spray pump

               -mooms, Fuel Pool Heat-X rooms, motor-driven and steam-driven Emergency Feed Water pump rooms, Shutdown Cooling Heat-X rooms, Containment Spray Heat-X rooms, Shutdown Cooling Heat-X rooms, Penetration rooms, and associated piping and valve galleries.

Amendment T 9.4-24 November 15, 1993

CESSARnahuou @ mechanical equipment rooms, and Division II cooling system serves Division II essential mechanical equipment rooms. Each train is powered from independent, Class 1E power sources. (Units with chilled water cooling coils are headered on separate Essential Chilled Water Cooling Systems.) Equipment capacities are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area ' temperatures. Failure of one train may cause subsequent loss of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since full redundancy of components is provided. essential mechanical l All safety-related components of the mechanical equipment room

      ,              cooling systems are designed as Seismic Category I equipment, and will remain functional following a design basis earthquake.

Intake and exhaust structures are protected from wind-generated - or tornado-generated missiles. twe duc45;oen be H e h ilcliu x. cod inekel:y +An Ls t e +in J n fe n' us am tiWJ Vd k ter .diFlab TM I l Redundantroom cooling systems are physically separated and protected from [JeJMfe, components of the safety-related mechanical equipment internally generated missiles. When subjected to pipe break effects, the components are not required to operate because the served mechanical equipment is located in the same space as the cooling components. Therefore, a pipe break in the same mechanical safety train is the only possible means of affecting the cooling system. The Subsphere Building essential HVAC exhaust filter trains are shown in Figure 9.4-5. The HEPA filters ara designed to limit the offsite and control room dose within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The dose analysis for post accident releases from the subsphere only takes credit for the HEPA filters in the filter train. No credit is taken for the carbon adsorbers. - A differential pressure indicator controller located across the charcoal adsorber modulates a damper downstream of the filter train to maintain a constant system resistance as the filters load up. This arrangement assures a constant system flow. High and low differential pressure alarms provide indication of any abnormality in flow rates. l All safety-related components in the subsphere ventilation system are designed to permit in-service inspection. Fresh air intakes are located in the control building duct shaft and are protected against adverse environmental conditions high winds, rain, snow, ice etc. The fresh air intakes for the Subsphere Building Ventilation System are located at least 30 feet above grade elevation to minimize intake of dust into the building. The fresh air intakes are provided with tornado dampero. Amendment T 9.4-26 November 15, 1993

TABLE 9.4-1 (Cont'd) 7 . (Sheet 4 of 18) HVAC SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS Operational Mode Flow Rate / Unit Area or Type Heat Load Air Cool Water No Units Location Power N9rmal Essential System Btu /hr CFM com % Capacity Supply _Eautoment Essential X Exhaust 700 lBatteryRm.I - - 2/100 120 Div/460 Fan, lHP I ,. Essential - X Exhaust 700 l Battery Rn:II ,T 2/100 120 Div/460 Fan, litP II SI Pump Recirculating 250,000 3,000 7] [CRoom A8X t X 45

AHU I/100 TrainACoolin$tercoll, 120/460 fan fi J 3 BHP [oomB % X Recirculating 250,000 3,000 45 Train B Cooling coll. SI Pump'10] [ AHU 1/100 120/460 fan filter 3 BHP Essential X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 1/100 120 lElec.Rm. AHU 3 HP Div/460 I Prefilter,ll cooling ca Div. I Cha. A fan, 3 IIP Essential X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 lElcc. Rm. 1/100 120 AHU 3 HP Div/460 Il coolingPrefilter,il co Div. I Cha. C fan, 5 HP Ccntainment Spray X Recirculating 180,000 4,500 Pump Room Div. I AHU 40 1/100 Train A Cooling coil, (6 120/460 fan filter s 3 BHP

                                                             $61(Dy y ,    j SR'd '                      ,y        h+n N g          Luc-% T " '

Amendment T November 15, 1993 _. - - - ' _-__am_ + 2 _ __ _ _ _ _-

IMLE 9.4-1 (Cont'd) - (Sheet 5 of 18) HVAC SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETEPJ Flow Rate / Unit Operational Mo_d_e Area or Type Heat Load Air a ocation Normal Essential System Cool Water No Units Power Btu /hr - CFM com % Capac1ty_ Supply ..Eculement Containment Spray X Recirculating 180,000 4,500 Pump Room B 40 1/100 Train B Cooling coll, AHU Div. II 120/460 fan, filter 3 BHP [11] Shutdown Cooling X Recirculating 1B0,000 4.0( 30 1/100 System Pump Room AHU Train C Cooling coll, l Div. I 120/460 fan, filter 3 BHP [3] Shutdown Cooling X Recirculating 180,000 4,000 30 1/100 Train D Cooling coll, System Pump Room AHU Div. Il s 120/460 fan, filter [14] (p g g 3 BHP Safety 3 jection X Recirculating 250,000 5,000 45 Pump R AHU 1/100 Train C Cooling coll, Div.foomC I 120/460 fan, filter 3 BHP [2] 4 3 Safet ection . X Recirculating 250,000 5,000 45 Pump oom, AHU 1/100 Train D Cooling coll, Div. I 120/460 fan, filter 3 BHP [15] ggy b f f./ O' N

0:

o y,r& QYC hr N-Amendment T November 15, 1993 .-. -s. --__..-..--_.----.-_-.a .--_.----...-_._.__._.n. - . - . _ . _ . a ,e -. -e- . v ~a ,a e- -w , c ,= - - , ~ c

l i CESSAR "nWnemon 1Z The containment recirculation cooli.>g system consists of four 33% capacity recirculation cooli.ng units, each connected to an associated recirculation fan. l The CEDM cooling system consists of two 100% capacity cooling units, each with ase.ociated 100% capacity fan. The containment air cleanup systems each have one third capacity i and the high purge has one third capacity to give a total of 100% ! capacity required by ANSI /ANS-56.6. The cavity cooling subsystem consists of two 100% capacity supply fans. 9.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation Tle Containment cooling and Ventilation System provides adequate c.pacity to assure that proper temperature levels are maintained l in the containment under operating conditions. Sufficient l redundancy is included to assure proper operation of the system I with one active component out of service. Although not required, i this system operates to maintain the containment temperature within acceptable limits during a loss of offsite power. l The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is not an Engineered Safety Feature. Except as noted, no credit has been taken for the operation of any subsystem or component in analyzing the consequences of de, sign basis accidents. The high volume purge system HEPA filters are credited with filtration of the release from a postulated fuel handling accident, as are the low volume purge system HEPA filters following a Control Element Ejection Accident. No credit is taken for the carbon adsorbers

 ,         in either of the          containment purge exhaust paths.                The containment purge HEPA filters are designed to meet the intent of the Regulatory penetration    toGuide    1.52train the filter   and the  ductworkCategory is Seismic   from the containmentGAdg I. /Je gr7 J

l0VlVof'ContainmentDr[thff Each I~l % **lM*<fCO d7( M k H

lif dek of Js. riq e ~fCYP* 'l0 Purge Ventilation System supply and penetration through the containment vessel is equipped with twoexhaustswrA,[4a ,

normally closed isolation valves, each connected to separate control trains. A failure in one train will not prevent the remaining isolation valve from providing the required isolation capability. Containment purge iaolation valve closure will not be prevented by debris which could become entrained in the escaping air and steam. The isolation valves and containment penetrations are the only portions of the Containment Purge vantilation System that are engineered safety features. Redundant containment isolation valves are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2. The valves are leak-tested periodically to verify acceptability of seat leakage. Pneumatically operated valves are designed to fail closed in the event of loss of power or loss of instrument air. g Amendment T l 9.4-32 i November 15, 1993

     .                                                                                                  y CESSAR nnincanon                                                      r                      1 9.4.8.3        Safety Evaluation 1

I The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is an engineered safety feat ure. The two 100% capacity fans in each ! pump compartment are powered from separate. trains of the onsite ) power system. This assures the integrity and availability of the ventilation system single active in the event of a loss of offsite power or any failure. I 9.4.8.4 Inspection and Testine Requirements I l The Station Service Water Pump Structure ventilation System i operates as required to limit temperature in the pump structure and is accessible for periodic inspection. Safety related l ' electrical components, switchcovers, and starting controls are tested during preoperational tests. l l . 9.4.8.5 Instrumentation Aoplication Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation and of the system, both from local and/or remote locations permit verification that the system is operating satistactorily. Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. 1 j l t Space temperature indication for the pump structure is provided in the control room along with alarm indication of high and low temperatures. 9.4.9 NUCLEAR ANNEZ VENTILATION SYSTEM q .rf t! l i 9.4.9.1 pesien Basis The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System consists of a general supply and exhaust ventilation system that performs 1 eat removal and air exchange functions. The ventilation system is supplemented by ii ndividual cooling units and ventilation fans of the Normal -{

           \* Chilled Water System (NCWS) and-Essential C1illed Water System (ECWS)_ discussed in Section 9.2.9 that serve :::..Aiel and non-                 <'~~~~~

essent4sh mechanical equipment areas. 1 The Nuclear Annex & ! Ventilatibn System serves all areas of the Nuclear Annex i h Building. The Nuclear Annex structure is designed to Seismic d category I standards as noted in Table 3.2-1. l The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems l are designed to maintain the space teFperatures below 100*F at j times when the served equipment must operate. At least.one train 1 o essent44 mechanical equipment rooms is maintained below 100*F a using a single failure of an active component concurrent with a loss of offsite power. Amendment T 1 i 9.4-39 i November 15, 1993 -l l . _ . .

o e < CESSAR Eniincuio. J l The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems perform the required safety function following a safe shutdown earthquake, and are able to withstand the effects of appropriate natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricarts (GDC 2). l The safety-related mechanic.sl equipment roon ECWS cooling systems are protected from the effects of internally generated missiles, pipe break effects, and water spray (GDC 4). The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System is designed to provide ventilation and heat removal for personnel access to non- _ r e .ti areas of the building. The design temperature range or the on-erren building areas is 60*F to 100*F. dg ,M he Nuclear Annex building is maintained at a slight negative pressure potentially with respect to the environment to assure that all V radioactive releases are nor 'ored prior to atmospheric discharge. As - an AIARA conside.acion, design air flow patterns within the building are generally from clean areas

  !           to potentially contaminated areas.

9.4.9.1.1 Codes and standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards. B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). l C. Safety-related ECWS equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork AG-1. will be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI

 ,            D.      Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air conditioning contractors National Association (SMACNA).

l E. Cooling coils in the safety-related ECWS cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3. F. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ERDA-76-21, " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook."

                                                                  ,      Amendment T 9.4-40               November 15, 1993

I CESSAR Eni% mon 9.4.9.2.1 Component Description The Nuclear Annex Building ventilation supply systems consist of one 100% capacity supply unit and two 100% capacity supply fans per division. Supply units contain filters, heating coils, and chilled water cooling coils. Cooling coils are served from the Non-essential Chilled Water System. The supply fans are large, direct-drive centrifugal type and inlet isolation dumpers. The Nuclear Annex Building ventilation exhaust systems consist of one 100% capacity . particulate filtration exhaust unit and two and two 50% capacity 100% capacity exhaus.t f ans for Division 1, j particulate filtration exhaust units and two exhaust fans per exhaust unit for Division 2. The exhaust fans are lar centrifugal type with outlet isolation damper $ge direct-drive Fvhaust fans discharge to the ~8t . vent. g g g w ycy,;;,/ u giipmy g w do M y l The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling units consist of chilled water cooling coil, direct-drive centrifugal recirculation fan, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. The chilled water coils are served from the essential chil1=d wa+=v system. jer htt<elHed) l The a--t- r3 mechanical equipment room ECWS ventilation units con ain intake filters, direct-drive centrifugal supply and i exhaust fans, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. There are heating and cooling coils to temper the outside air as required. ' 9.4.9.2.2 System operation During normal operation of the ventilation system, outside air is. j' supplied by one 100% capacity supply unit and The onesupply of two air 100% is j capacity, redundant supply fans per division. filtered and conditioned as needed by the heaters and cooling ! coils, and the exhaust air is bypassed around the exhaust filter l train. There are two exhaust f ans provided per filter- train.. The exhaust air is monitored by a radioactive gaseous detector sampling the air in the exhaust duct upstream of the exhaust filter train. Upon detection of radioactivity,.the exhaust air is processed through one 100% capacity, exhaust filter train for Division 1 or two 50% capacity exhaust filter trains for Division 2 complete with particulate filters and carbon adsorbers prior to discharge into the atmosphere. Additional monitoring of the exhaust air is provided in the unit vent. Supply and exhaust fans are electrically interlocked such that the building will j always remain under a slight negative pressure. The nuclear Amendment T 9.4-42 - November 15, 1993

CESSAR naincano, ,6 annex, fuel building, and reactor building subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to atmosphere. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident, the general ventilation equipment will continue to operate normally, assuming off-site power is still available. Ducts to areas with essential cooling units will be isolated to enable proper operation of the emergency equipment. Normal operation of the safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling and ventilation unito is with the equipment operating as required to maintain space temperatures. The cooling systems room temperature. will operate based on heat load as indicated by In the event of a IDCA or DBA, all units are started .with the equipment being served, and will operate at full capacity throughout the event. 9.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation p0l 7 The safety-related mec 'a equipment roe CWS cooling systems l consist of two etely redundant, apendent full-capacity systems. sion I ECWS coolin system serves Division I oc:-atial mechanical equipment oms, and Division II ECWS cooling s stem serves Division II essh mechanical equipment rooms. Each train is powered fr a independent, Class 1E power sources. (Units with chilled water cooling coils are headered on separate safety-related chilled water cooling systems.) Equipment capacities l are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area temperatures. Failure of one train may cause subsequent loss of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since full redundancy of ECWS safety-related mechanical components is provided. l All safety-related components of the mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems are designed as Seismic Category I equipment, and will remain functional following a design basis earthquake. Intake and exhaust structures are protected from , wind-generated or tornado-generated missiles. The fresh air intakes for the Nuclear Annex Ventilation System are located at least 30 feet above grade elevation to minimize intake of dust into the building. Redundant components of the safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems are physically separated and protected from internally generated missiles. When subjected to pipe break effects, the components are not required to operate because the served mechanical equipment is located in the same space as the , cooling components. Therefore, a pipe break in the same mechanical safety train is the only possible means of affecting the cooling system. l Amendment T ' 9.4-43 November 15, 1993

 .                                                                Y*                         N-3 S-17-33 : 15:40 :    DLIE N & M T BY:0E&S                                                                              I CESSAR .*!=L                       17 h/y# WL NW Temperature indication for the "2                       w hancal equipment p           rooms is provided in the control room.

l The following data shall be available to determine system [ performances ; A. Entering and leaving air temperature for the supply ventilation unit. B B. Entaring and leaving chilled water temperatures at supply ventilation units. ,

c. Air flow rates far the supply and exhaust units. :

D. Chilled water flow rates to supply ventilation units. 4 h 8 , L w b A m F m l t e d

                                                                     ,                nmZ 9.4-45                    h -21, 1998 l

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .s                .

g~ s SY5 m M se p= TABLE 2.8.2-1 (Continued 1 MAIN S'IFAM SUPPLY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests.' Analyses. and Accentance Criteria pesies comandement I=_ --in Tests. Analyses Accestance Otteria will be perfonned using a signal 9.b) De MSIV bypass valves close within 10 9.b) De MSIV bypees valves close on 9.b) Te escends of receigd of a signal siamleting sieseleting a MSIS. receipt of a MSIS. a MSIS. lO' Add IfMf'

                                                    &        .7s la/ mds' y
                                                  '> fdv w e6 / AdP W C L .e. , /e a ivir;s17 %

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                                                                ' W ilP n n -f A, x                                    .

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                 #-r2-73
                                          -2.s.2                                                                 *3*

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _ - ._.____._..._._._..._._2_.__.- . . . . _ _ _ . . . . _ . . ~ . . . _ . - . _ . _ . . _ . - _...,__2_ . . . _ . _ _

                                                                ,+,~ilO                                            eh, 6t-K                                                   -
                                   .trt AI                                                                         -                                 _%_
                                    -                                                TABLE 2.8.64 (Contissedl "M W et/4e s-SYSTEM 30t                                                                              .

\ _ CONDENSATE AND FERDWATER SYSTEMS ' Ju;_#rg TMs Asa:3 . and A=wntance Crito;e

                                                                                                  "    - T *- ^ " ;

Acceptance Criteda Dudem Commmitument - Tesy Mwill be m to spee eudier 7. Each MOV having en active serejs

7. j function opens eenesTloses.

7. Mz_ , - " valves (MOVE) having close MOVs having en-active eefety j se active enfety fwh will opas,

( -- e close under Affevemessi presswa fenesion=eder yveopesicioenluffevestiet pressere or fluid flow conditions and or fluid fhrw esednesses sad under onder seenperseuse conditions.

                                .:, _ _: a condseiens,                                                                                                 valve shown on Figwe

s. Each l

                                                                                   /.      Tee willbe m no spes,sesee                                  esseeiloses, S.

Oseck volves shows se Pigese 2.s.6 Id velves shoes se Fisme 2.S.6-close A will opea jbe#se close under systee A 2.8.6- sysemen ,,__, :icent preessee, fleid flow conddians, or pM fluid flow conditiceis, or neseperusere conditions. z__ councions. These volves change position to jpe e 9., ANc9ot loss of smetive power no these9. position indecated on Figwe 2.5.6-Fm Velveswith yeasticesindicated volves will be pl _

4 fi position to loss of eeWive power.

ce Pigere 2.5.6-that 'h as ed$ Figeseepouloss of sootive power. 10 ffcf IlIAC hY 1

                                               '%                CfMJ $~           Du bi.//Q 9'l                I'f4 <c>t C /c-n jg-
                                            & r r-e                         o s.et n_         . .-p,, y W Wa "t                              5 % sy,                        ,,
                                                                                                                                                                &~z-y ,
                                                                                                                                                                     .~ - O 2,3,6

_ - - - . - - - - _ _ _ _ _ =___-. -.__.:.-.-.=---... .. - _:- . _ _ _ _ _ = . . . . .

    * ' ' CESS AR HMiriernt ,                       &                                             l Following a primary side loss-of-coolant-accident, the EW System                      !

may be used to assure that the steam generator tubes are covered-to enhance the closed system containment. boundary. The two- , motor-driven pumps will be used for this purpose as steam for the : steam-driven pumps may or may not be available. In the event of ; failure of one of the motor-driven pumps, the water supply to one of the steam generators would be tempornrily unavailable. By opening the cross-connection valves between the pump discharge lines, the one operating motor-driven pump may be used to fill j and maintain level in both steam generators. l In the unlikely event of a station blackout, the steam-driven ! subtrains are capable of providing emergency feedwater to the The l steam generators coincident with a single failure. ! steam-driven pump discharge valves are assured to open by l providing battery-backed power. Battery-backed power -is also l available to the turbine governor speed control and steam generator water level indication in order to provide steam ' generator level control for at least 8 hours with appropriate.- load shedding. In addition to the batteries, an alternate-AC source of standby power is provided for an extended station blackout period. The EW System piping is arranged to minimize the potential for water hammer occurrences induced by the piping system.- Specific design considerations are covered in Section510.4.9.1. , All components and piping are designed to protect against the effects of high and moderate energy pipe ruptures as discussed in Section 3.6. All EW System components are located in Seismic Category I-external structures which also protect the components from environmental hazards. All piping and components essential to EW operation are designed to Saismic Category I standards as described in Section 3.7, and are designed to . accommodate,

       ,T        located to protect against, or protected from internal flooding
          'AN and internal missiles as discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
  /    gT(lvl

10. .9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements hd During fabrication of the EW components, tests and inspections are performed and documented in accordancc. With code requirements As necessary, performance to assure high quality' construction. The tests of components are performed in the vendor's facility. in-service to permit EW System is designed and installed inspections and tests in accordance with ASME Code Section XI.

Amendment I 10.4-59 -

December 21, 1990

r~. -- - _-

       .;139                                          _
't    o,     .

2/, i N [N*^13) .

                                                                                  'Wn gg
           %         bk*s) Q. k & WS t$ mamtry:                 f
           & % :q       d as y J p ,a J w .         t between the EN flow sensor locatedvalve on each subtrain is

a. The temperature l rmed in the control control valve and the isolationcontinuously monitored an room. in the event of will loss of '

be Provisions are made such the sensor that can ' and indication, Operating procedures, which arethe the control room i monitored locally. the COL AppliM willAtpresent a minimum, responsibilityfor of local monitoring. least once a shif t, and ' requirements readings shall be recorded atbefore bindingand of theafter each Erw l b. The EFW system is designed to avoid steamventing lly closed isolation through the EFW ! EFW pumps by continuous systemstorage i f the tanxs and by I valves upstream of the interfacehowever, in the event that ste system; j EFW pumps does occur, the control room ad above Plant will signal l with the temperature sensorto vent discusse the EFWCat.Appie*e pumps. M will l the plant operator h . operating procedures developed by t e prescribe this action. D

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ML20058L265

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Dear Mr. Brinkman:

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GENERAL COMMENT

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ML20058L265

Text

Dear Mr. Brinkman:

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Enclosure:

GENERAL COMMENT

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