ML20058A093
| ML20058A093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1993 |
| From: | Wambach T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Brinkman C ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9311300097 | |
| Download: ML20058A093 (30) | |
Text
..n November 16, 1993 Docket No. 52-002-Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systens Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Mill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500
Dear Mr. Brinkman:
SUBJECT:
COMMENTS ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS) FOR SYSTEM'80+ BY REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH The Reactor Systems Branch has reviewed the System 80+ TS listed in that were revised and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in letters dated October 11 and 27, 1993.
The staff's comments are shown on the markup copy of the affected TS provided as Enclosure 2.
Please provide responses to these comments no later than two weeks from your receipt of this letter to allow us to maintain our review schedule.
This affects nine or fewer respondents, and therefore, is not subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, 5' W y'l kr; -
3
~
/
[ThomasV.Wambach,ProjectManager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License-Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File PDST R/F DCrutchfield WTravers PDR RBorchardt PShea
'TWambach MXFranovich SMagruder JMoore,15818 TGody, 17G21 ACRS (11), w/o enclosures KShembarg r -
RArchitzel f',
0FC:
LA:PDST: AR PM:PDST:ADAR PMiPDST:ADAR SC:PDST:ADAR d
KShembarger:tz TWambach RArchitzel l
NAME:
PShea[/
11//
11/f(,/93(Crq 11/l6/93 11/'/ /93 DATE:
0FFICIAL RECORD COPY:
CETSI.KMS 9311300097 931116 PDR ADOCK 05200002 NRC RLE CENTER
^
139 g mjD0,-
ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Docket No.52-002 cc:
Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing-ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 205B5 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire l
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037-1128 Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Department ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road-Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500
-l
Revised Technical Specifications Reviewed by SRXB for System 80+
1.
TSs 1.1 through 1.5 2.
TS 2.0 3.
TS 3.0 4.
TS/ Bases 3.1.1 through 3.1.12 5.
TS/ Bases 3.2.1 through 3.2.5 6.
TS/ Bases 3.4.1 through 3.4.11, and 3.4.16 through 3.4.18 7.
TS/ Bases 3.5.1 through 3.5.4 8.
TS/ Bases 3.7.1 through 3.7.5 9.
TS/ Bases 3.9.1, 3.9.4 and 3.9.5 10.
TS/ Bases 3.10.2 through 3.10.5
,3
- c 1
Review Comments on cite Revised Technical Specifications for System 80+
r 5
- ...y MTC(Q$iE*h 3.1.4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
, MTC) @ ),
3.1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient
(
LCO 3 1.4 The MTC shall be maintained within the limits specified in.
the COLR and a maximum positive limit as specified below:
p CJ
) g p er,-4, + [3, p.
Y h
a
[0.5 E-4 k/*FfwhenTHERMALPOWERiss70%RTP: and n
7pM"
[0i ok/k/*F when THERMAL POWER is > 70% RTP.
j Nh, 3
ogr APPLICABILITY:#!g51and2.
M0
&M J
igu ACTIONS hg M. N CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l y)
M*
he A.
MTC not within limits.
A.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
~
p.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.4.1
NOTE--------------------
This Surveillance is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 2.
Verify MTC within the upper limit specified Prior to in the COLR.
entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading (continued)
CLOG STS 3.1-5 P&R 10/05/93
CESSAR'anAnia 16M 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 16.7.1 3.4.1 RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DNB LIMITS RCSpPressure. Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 34 P.c? CTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I
- M *.
~ M *' M '**j hNB) Limits 3.4.1 RCS Pressure. Temperature. and Flo LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, cold leg tempersrure, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:
1s"; s-S3if Pressunzer pressure 2 [teet psis] and 5 [Wis],
a.
b.
RCS cold leg tempera (T.):
2 [5 3*F] and s [ 5
- 1 for < 90 of RTP. or 5 'F] and s 63' ) for 2
, of RTP, and c
total flow rate 2 [95 %1 and s [116%) of 445,600 gym.
53 g A PLICABILITY: MODES I and 2.
4 ACTIONS
~
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME e.-
3 A
Pressunprgressure or A.1 Restore parameter to within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> g
RCS flowhot within limits.
limitJ.
Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> h'
associated Completion Time of Condition A not
/
met.
Y C.
RCS cold leg temperature C.1 Restore cold leg temperature 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 4
/f not within limits.
to within limitt.
4 4[
d D.
Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> d;
associate.: Completion a
p Time of Condition C not l,
act.
'e s
r}
More f-_
%.ssae:ree fu s s.,ee l'.~: 4 A.u aA- %.Gr;3:
.4 5 '/, T.T f L.%Eht fes t g.
la su.n
.g
- r. -
/.
- 4. l,.,-
ob lo*/. rte, b TuCAMM. Po a* A n.p.
euess SYSTEM 80+
3.4 1 Amendment I 16.7 1 December 21,1990
i CEA Alignment (Dir t m B 3.1.5 BASES APPLICABLE
/\\subgroupcouldbecausedbyanelectricalfailureintheCEA SAFETY ANALYSES go11powerprogrammers.
(continued)
The acceptance criteria for addressing CEA inoperability or misalignment are that there be no violations of:
a.
Specified acceptable fuel design limits:
b.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary integrity; and c.
The core must remain subtritical after accident transients.
Three types of misalignment are distinguished.
During movement of a group. one CEA may stop moving while the other rEAs in the group continue.
This condition may cause excessive power peaking.
The second type of misalignment occurs if one CEA fails to insert upon a reactor trip and remains stuck fully withdrawn. This condition requires an evaluation to determine that sufficient reactivity worth is held in the remaining CEAs to meet the SDM requirement with the maximum worth CEA stuck fully withdrawn.
If a CEA 1s stuck in the fully withdrawn position. its worth is added to the SDM requirement. Since the safety analysis does not take two stuck CEAs into account.
The third type of misalignment occurs when one CEA drops partially or fully into the reactor core.
This event causes an initial power reduction followed by a return towards the original power due to positive reactivity feedback from the negative moderator temperature coefficient.
Increased peaking during the power increase may result in excessive local linear heat rates (LHRs).
Two types of analyses are performed in regard to static CEA Rg#
t misalignment (Ref. 4).
With CEA banks at their insertion m
K' li-t{. one4yp analys1s considers the case when any one g9 CEA is inserte [
inches into the core.
The second type p
y 4f an lysis c s rs the case of a single CEA withdrawn A
g,,.
[]1 ches from a bank inserted to its insertion limit.
f#f(
Sat fying limits on departure from nucleate boiling ratic u BR) in both of these cases bounds the situation when a
~
CEA is misaligned from its group by [7 inches).
Another type of misalignment occurs if one CEA fails to insert upon a reactor trip and remains stuck fully (continued)
CEOG STS B 3.1-25 P&R 09/20/93
LHR (Oi f.ali
.i B 3.2.1 1
BASES BACKGROUND Power distribution is a product of multiple parameters.
(continued) various combinations of which may produce acceptable power distributions.
Operation within the design limits of power distribution is accomplished by generating operating limits on the LHR and departure from nucleate boiling (DNB). [,bM ] aA 7
Proximity to the DNB condition is expressed by,.tne departure from nucleate bolling ratio (DNBR). defined as the ratio of d
the cladding surface heat flux required tof ause DNB to the 3
actual cladding surface heat flux.
The minimum DNBR value during both normal operation and.A00s isfcalculated by the C,
orrelat1on (Ref m2%and corrected for such factors.as
-G.r oiWgrid spacer (.
It'is accepted as an appropriate MFrg n to UNB for all operating conditions.
g Jhere3retwosystemsthatmonitorcorepowerdistribution enline :
the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) j $and tha core protection calculators (CPCs).
The COLSS and CPCs at monitor the core power distribution are capable of
' 'verif ing that the LHR and the DNBR do not exceed their-C limi s.
The COLSS performs this function by continuously
\\
mo toring the core power distribution and calculating core N
p er operating limits corresponding to the allowable peak N'
The CPCs perform this function by-c continuously calculating an actual value'of DNBR and local i
i#
power density (LPD) for comparison with the. respective trip.
a p,c(
setpoints.
/
(
A DNBR enalty factor is included in both the COLSS and CPC g# A [5 DNBR ca culations to-accomodate the effects of rod bow.
I>g&
Fpe The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the C[' tf.c.h average bernup experienced by that assembly. Fuel f'
assemblies that incur higher than average burnup experience D
a greater magnitude of rod bow.
Conversely, fuel assemDites 6
9 that receive lower than average burnup experience less rod.
bow.'
In design calculations'for a reload core, each batch' of fuel is assigned a penalty applied to the maximum integrated planar radial power peak of the batch. This penalty is correlated with the amount of rod bow determined' from the maximum average assembly burnup of the batch.
A I
single net penalty for the COLSS and CPCs is then determined l'
from the penalties associated with each batch that comprises -
l a core reload. accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower raolal power peaks in~the higher burnup batches.
l I
(continued)
CEOG STS B 3.2-2 P&R- 09/20/93 1
f CESSAR n!nnene.
1 RCS, Pressun. Tempecure, and Flow DNB Umits 3.4.1 l
1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMCF'TS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l
....<c z,r nac SR 3.4.1.1 Ven ressure 2 [4aN( psia and 5 [t3331 psia.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.4.1.2 Venfy RCS cold le temperature 2 [543*F] and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> s [5 for <
of RTP or 2 5 'F]and s [5,' -] for 2[9@E of RTT,
7le wii.or,
,,,,7.on-.yt y. i:r in M2 b R
/ (n 1
- all Lcts raw.).
3 J
, S 3.4.1.3 Venfy RCS total flow rate 2 [955] and s [116%) of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> y# J' 445,600 gpm.
UOY '%="LYh h_
opt yd*E L. E & M u
&, --- n =
_- g,.3 2. arr.
_m p.,--
t-
.6 SR 3.4.1.4 D:rr: '- RCS total flow rate 2 [95 %] and s [1165]
[18 months]
lpo -
of 445,600 gpm.e &": 2+..:... r f ;:
l W rih b y fn r...a hu+ batwo ht g
SYSTEM 80+
3.4-2 Amendment K 16.7-2 October 30,1992
.CESSAR 1HQCAm,.
4 RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 i
i i
i
- i i
s i
[
ii i
e i
i l
._. _ _ _ - _. INSERVICE _ _ _
i f
INSPEC110N &
a 2e -
TEST
/
8 0'
543 F 1905 pela LOWEST
! Minimum SERVICE t
TEMPERATURE
- Pressurizer N N
i l
Pressure a
483 F,1305 psia
..c
/ nanowed U
8 h*
~
/OP842a-1 e
5 a\\
/ /
ISOTHERMAL -
e CRITICAL S
%100 VMR N
%8 50TMR
...sN40TMR 40 TMR l
~
\\
80 TMR e 100 TMR I e
~ 14N 90LTUP TEW.
e N
1m 1N am No 300 No e
ele 500 Ele 0
ACTUAL FLUlO TFMPERATURE, *F RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS K
(HEAT UP) g J
W g.' '
M M ncURE 3.4.31A
[,2.[0.2.'[
3.44 p
SY3 TEM 8 M GP
~,,
W@A 16
CESSAR !!Mulcam.
RCS P/r Limits 3.4.3
& - M r,
NSEAvicE._. -r*
g h$PECTCed&
3*80 MYDROSTATC TEST e
l >A D u
9 e
am 8
s43 F. tses pas Minimum towEst L"%m.
l Pressurizer \\
Pressure w
f l
483 F.1306 pee
/4 l
nanoed/
fu 3
y lNcome cec 4L p/
eon 8
ace t
8 eve e
newm 8
100 Tm n
a a
a a
a
/
0
- ACTUAL FLUCTEMPERATURE Y e vM M*h i'
r y" g.P p
W-,;'r&L** Y.
I
-t G*
y RCS PRESSURE AND'f'AMPERATURE LIMITS.po *>), >
M*'
y 1
y/
g
{r f, FIGURE 3.4.3-1B p
.g f.
M*
c k &> -
'i i
SYSTEM 80+
3.4 7 Cr A ment K -
16.7-7 October 30,1992
CESSAR naincam.
RCS Imps - MODE 3 3.4.5
$URVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILIANCE Verify required RCS loop h opf f=1fo^ -
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.4.5.1 Verify seccedary-side water level eMiteam generatorf 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> K 3.4.5.2 2: [25]% wide tsege indications.
SR 3.4.5.3 Venfy correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days j
available to e '= = "C." p: ".CS !::;.
9 Ae.,yi.a pop A.+ n ~4 h opsis)bA.
Q p
Q p-
/ hW Qbgv
'f I
/
3.4 10 SYSTEM 80+
Amendment K October 30,1992 16.7 10
Ene m E J cy Coet C=uh fysTc.4 (ras) 16.s 3.5 s u u:y !s; = cN 3. L mz e s, 16.8.1 3.5.1 SATETY INJECTION TANKS (SITS)
Safety injecuon T 3.5.1 o
M FsI' racy (DRs C c6L.4 6-SysT k fM S 3
3.3 w r e <rr encN sysn M is::)
J 3.5.1 Safety frieetion TanksISII) b l b
\\,$.J &.
1
LCO 3.5.1 Four SITS shall be OPERABLE.
6fSs
- W,)f
?
/ y\\
k gu' APPLICABTLITY:
MODES 1 and 2, -
b MODES 3 and 4 with pressuruer pressure 2: (900]
j p
Wh/??@$, $
i)
ACTIONS d g%
CONDmON REQUIRED ACTION COMPh0N TIME h A.
One SIT inoperable due A.1 Restore borco concentration 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> p@L [k t
to boroo coocentration to within limits.
p not within limits, p (., -
-}Ak F
B.
One SIT inopersble for B.1 Restors SIT to OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 4
reasons o6er than status.
Condidon A.
C.
Required Actions and C.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 houn associated Comptedon Times of Coodidon A Atil2 or B oot met.
C.2 Reduce pressurtzer pressure 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to < (900] pais.
D.
- E M : SITS D!
Enter LCO 3.0.3.
f = u ='afy inopersble.
l SYSTEM 80+
3.5-1 1
Amendmesit I 16.8-1 December 21,1990
( i E. D 3 A N c i G H inc m u
~ l q
I Safety Iqjection Tanks 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY J
SR 3.5.1.1 Verify each SIT isolation valve is fully open.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> f
SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borsted water volume in each SIT is a (1625 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> I
cubic feet (25% narrow range) and s 1902 cu'oic feet, (75% narrow range)).
b' j
SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover-prusure in each SIT is 2 (575]
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> '
Psig and s [627] psig.
(q p
Q
%ea 1 i L fu 7
/
f SR 3.5.1.4 Verify boron concentration in each S1T is
[9886]
31 days
/
(P l
ppm and s [4400] ppm.
AtG2 4
r Once within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
aAer each solution
)
volums incresee of 2 [I %) of tank j
volums,tLA ;5,,gt A f
l' res,1+.f adot. - fr.m N N j _,
' '_g A x SR 3.5.1.5 h-g y 7, J'"-F V7 f __
[W
/
a m
Verify powe/ removed from each $1T isolatigs(. vs 31 days operatorM m pe+nue(ser pass. 13 p[9mOh L
' NOTE
^
M SR 3.5.1.6 yhwbes4GS. pressure is f (900] h.
m pe.a e-
,i Verify powedremoved from each SIT vent valve 31 days
(
/j operator.
'h
...a)eTr.
g(
J 4 be M.
,.,x., w.-
,Fe de d SIT
.j '
f;
,,,,,,. e *
\\
SYSTEM 80+ -
3.52 Amendment Q
(.
16.8-2 June 30,1993 4
- m m.
___._.____________._______.,________.___._____.._________.________________.______.d__.m
DEDOMM E5TincATCN O
SIS - Operating 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUE g N
'SR 3.5.2.1 Verify the following valves are in the listed positiony I
r:9 l
[fM$,(I r x % % &c.af<re4..-en d.
Valve 3. #g 7.
0 Numbpr Position Function
- s4 5
M
)
Q~
~
p A
)
[SI604)
(Shut)
[ Hot Les] Injection
[SI609)
[ Shut]
[ Hot Legl Injection
[
j SR 3.5.2.2 Verify each SIS manual, power operated, or automatic 41 ys
/
valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or
/ ()
\\
otherwise secured in position is in its corre:t position. \\, f h g, b ~
b,aae SIS pipingb of wsw.
/
1 de
/
hR3.5.2.3 D-Injection pump k IU In accordance N f
Verifgesch.SapM -' e differents
[]
the Inservice SR 3.5.2.4
-dTD Pg [,
'^~'
t a
ca.
S:r-9 ' eac[$IS train automatic valve in the flow
[18 vu,
{
SR 3.5.2 5
- g. N n
path actuates to )Ercorrect position on [an] actual or bg 4
s J_
r r
aimulated n'a r u actuation signalhd.
[18hths N
h^-
NYbc each Safety lejection pump starts
^-
/
~7 automatically on an actual or simulated ' --.
f vf.J b
.ct= tion signal.
0 SR 3.5.2 7 Verify, by visual inspection, that M C L_ n T.,. [18h eths v
s Al f
idesed the IRWST Hotdup Volume Tank is not restricted by debns and _:., -- -- M " trash p
racks and screens show no evidence of structural Wg
- mabommaicoroei..
9 n$ #
> d a. ~ R W f
)
m...u a sts r, u s
.n.
m s u.y e.
w 7
,,u u3 p s
t 3 y-a
.f
[
],.
%y-go r,a s y a a f3 s&s a
a e
cI SYSTEM 80 3.5-4 N lA.Li aL*~A 'b W Aw
& du kr b>itC L M' ^*. ? mmdmat0 A
W-3 v;.
w.,___ W M, June 30,1993 I
a r,- - -
.,w. g;a
~
C,
- L
p s y-i g -
-v 7----v-------------------y---T------
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[ct,di7(CC 2 36 u l f ?J a>
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r M. [,w E F.C E'.t y o pf tede.
11.1 St>h d d.Evd puQ b 7
5-c?u asti s+sG.
c a
t
- a. Cet tu bisa L i h.be em udsx6 u 6<s 6 pueole cesa 6e sta 6.
L c. cw me Aq W c.( R Ae.
as EN
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- didwa, Puy b ceseAote sk.6 l
ww Ia/u >4l..
- c. a ec9\\di h,,a M A E A.t i
w-I O
k
,a3m ii4d G%skLem A c>
1 Ce s b e ~
b.2 -
.: ~ e :
A.3.:.C. u+ m L-t k
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3e A Mcbd 4.
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Q[@C C A D DESI'N -
w M n Cf RTifr CATl!M s
EFW System
.y 7
.:a tu -
3.7.4 e
g.,
SURVED1.ANCE REQUIREMENTS f' C SURVEILLANCE
)
FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Venfy each EFW manual, power M, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path %st is not locked, sealed, or otherwtae secured in position, is in its cornet position.
- r.h rW *-~t
'*!4' I 5 E*^
SR 3.7.4.2 NOTE y r e. y,'a.es 1s n pur,-..J rse A rsro.h
/
e,,l. _.
ntic" re* L.J3 Lt'.J f r. m o'a TL
/
s.v., m um.yyu -.. -,. _.,
" #~ l' ' '
- A c;mdx b MODE ^, im puposes of usung A i
'v
,du.
E~'.'.'y ye,./., L usca ed k u [
hl) days on a r
Asw.
EFW pumpy &>
p f h" at STAOGERED TEST WW the flow test point is 2: the required developed BASIS.
k--A.
_N
- m each' automatic valve actuates to its 18' months
, ee.,
. c.,re,
~
correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
, u,N..O.T. E...,.. :.
vs.e. s w r <<.
~w
_r _. p..,. / u.- n a ~
> p g<-,.. r. ~s,j
.c...
ae..
,4.R3.0A-n: w d hfu _rj n
1 iese=d ^p-i~e b MODE *.O, y-y _- Of e '9 W-- i ;= EN ----
18 ' months in N "l+n-*- each EFW pump stans automatically on an actual or simW '..d actuation signal.
.. -..,., r
",. e, c w r.,.-
-he required flow paths fece4e-Prior to entering MODE 4+.d~ A mergency Feedwater Stors= T-4 m MSteam 2 whenever unit has been E
-. d ;; G c m t J-D )
in MODE 5 or 6 for >
Gene l
37;7,= q_c'rt 30 days.
9 mi 3.rt:
( 7; N
N A
Q.
W )k t\\'
W
'Y HM y / g*f.
.df Cl W
W J. &
M SYSTEM 80+
3 x
v Arnedrnent Q 16.10-10 June 30,1993
CESSARiniiricamu M ::
3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 16.12.1 3.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION Boron Concentration 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3 9.1 Boron Concentration 5
~ _ _ _.
LCO 3.9.1 TheNron concentrations of tb ctor Coolant System [the refueling apd x
the refuehog cavity) shall maintained within the limit specified in th COL.
d e d.n A (o w >~d ' 5 % > q c.g\\ p fu<.hc" ggj
. f t4 g gg 9,;k APPLICABILITY:
MODE 6 dt CD L.R v T% Ti p-c.L -s e.
x
_s CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION
. COMPLETION TIME /
A.1 Boron Concentration A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately not within linut.
ALTERATIONS M
E A.2 Suspend positive rea:tivity Immediately additions.
m A.3 Initiate actior6to restore immediately lK'-
1 boron concentration to within limit.
SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS f
u
(.-
t SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Venfy boron concentration withm limit as specified in the
.72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> g
COLR.
l t
K.
l '..
SYSTEM 50-3.9-1 l'
E Amendment K~'
16.12-1 October 30,1992 i.
H l
CESSARn!Lm, i
SCS - High Water Level 3.9.4 SURVETLLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE 7.-- 5 h op v*Ai o S FREQUENCY SR 3.9.4.1 Verify one SCS divisioni,-
^ - and circu greactor 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> l
coolant, at o Qu vA G
_o gfm.
N V
f 5 ~Wc. a.,. I,b go +q,p r
p &p$ h W f,$
U u b. A N n I
- Ja 4 s3r[L p + r' VN p #.
l
-(
1
)
.1
(
SYSTEM 80+
3.9-7 Amendment K 16.12-7 October 30,1992
.\\
1
TCESSAR49fi?iew: -
~
~~
16.13.2 3.10.3 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - VENT PATHS Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Vent Paths 3.10.3 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS 3.10.3 Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Vent Paths LCO 3.10.3 A RCS Vent Path of 2[ Pressurizer Manway Removal] is established and maintained.
1:
APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY Abt MODE 6 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY WTm RX VESSEL HEAD IN PLACE
- ACTIONS CONDmON REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME K
A.
m ra' A.1 ste action to mstore Vent
[Immediately]
pa fi
}
d' g
.. 1 9
A.2 Complete restoration of vent
[6 hours]-
[,,#'l r#
9
,,.I I*
N g5 f'
,, P' p' fpW de, s.M ys p 4pt A.3 Monitor RCS temperature, level
[ Hourly) 0 4 _ ^ d4 p# 7 a
94 J and SCS performance.
y
[ Re Action and B.1 Restore RCS Level to -
[6 hours) completion time not
>[EL - 117'0*]
met.-
l-
- One or more head bolts tensioned.
SYSTEM 80+
3.10-5 Amendment K 16.115 October 30,_1992
- CESSAR infincuin
~
- O 16.13.4 3.10.4 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS - HEAT REMOVAL Reduced RCS Invetory Operations - Heat Removal 3.10.4 3.10 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY OPERATIONS 3.10.4 Reduced RCS Inventory Ooerations - Heat Removal LCO 3.10.4 Two Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) divisions shah be OPERABLE, and at least a.
one division shall be in operation.
b.
The 'onainment Spray pump shall be OPERABLE in the operaung division.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY AND MODE 6 REDUCED RCS INVENTORY AC1" IONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One SCS divimon A.1 Restore division to (15 minutes)
- db.
OPERABLE status.
h
- \\
b [
} *
\\)
\\
A.2.1 one SCS
/JA g%
g
' vision is operaung.
f ( ) " g et[ an 0
d" A.2.2
'tiate action to place
/ j gIj4g o.e ScS mo. m 5
operation.
B.
Regured Action and B.1 Raise RCS level to
[6 houn]
associated on
> [EL-117'0*].
SYSTEM 80+
3.10-7 Amendment Q 16.13-7 June 30,_1993
AUl N I
4 Reduced RCS Inves2 tory Operations Heat Remova.1 3.10.4 ACTIONS (Continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACI' ION COMPLETION TIME C.
No SCS division in C.1 Suspend all operations involving
[Immediately]
operation.
reduction in RCS boron CoDecotration.
M C.2 Initiate action to restore one SCS
[Tmm~me.ly) division to OPERABLE status and place in operation.
M C.3 Initiate action to raise RCS level
[T=madiat*1y]
to >[EL 117'0*]
ContainmDenprty-D.1 Initiate action to place the
[6 boun]
Pump in operstmg altemate division in operation if division inoperable the contamment spray pump in
.g i that division is OPERABLE.
4 yi M',
/M 4
J*
Vy '
W d
6 g
5 D.2 Monitor SCS performance.
[Every 30 minutes]
9,#g
- ,)
4>
c M
b 5
8
@7 D.3 Restore inoperable Contamment
[48 hours]
Spray Pump.
Required Action and E.1 Raise RCS Level >[EL-117'0']
[6 hours]
Completion time of item D.3 not met.
M E.2 Initiate action to align alternate
[6 hours]
decay beat removal system.
SYSTEM 80+
3.10-8 Amendment Q 16.13-8 June 30,1993
$ M 1' INSERT A:
The requirements of LCO 3.4.1 represent the initial conditions for DNB limited transients analyzed in the safety analyses (Ref.1). The safety analyses have show t transients initiated from the limits of this LCO will meet the DNBR criterion of 1.3. This is acceptance limit for the RCS DNB parameters. Changes to the facility could impact these parameters must be assessed for their impact on the DNBR criterion. The transients analyzed for include loss of coolant flow events and dropped or stuck control element
)
assembly (CEA) events. A key assumption for the analysis of these events is that the core
{
power distribution is within the limits of [LCO 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Insertion Limits";
I l
LCO 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insenion Limits"; LCO 3.2.3, " AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T,)"; and LCO 3.2.5, "AX1AL SHAPE INDEX (ASI) (Digital)]; [LCO 3.1.7, " Regulating l
Rod Inser: ion Limits"; LCO 3.2.4, " AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T,)"; and LCO 3.2.5, l
" AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (AnaloR%yafelypalyses are performed over me folicaan&
@ge of initial values: RCS pressure D785-2400Lpsig, core inlet temperature [00-580) *Fh and reactor vessel inlet coolant flow rate [95-116) %.
/
The RCS DNB limits satisfy Criterion 2 of NRC olicy Statement.
-wjn 4 bal w
d. "%r 4
$5. {l, Ya Y
CD gbf ye
(
I Q
?
i ch; &.
a-m-..
CESSAR Euificari:n 16 A.7.4 B 3.4.4 RCS LOOPS - MODES 1 AND 2 RCS Isops - MODES I and 2 B 3.4.4 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLA.VT SYSTEM (RCS)
B 3.4.4 RCS Lootss - MODES 1 and 2 BASES BACKGROUND Re R.eactor Coolan't System (RCS) uses t/o reactor coolant p (RCPs) per steam ge r loop and two steam' generator loops, e pump flow rate has bee sized to pmvide core b t removal with appppriate margin to j departure rom nucleate boiling NB) during poweyoperation and fo (
anticip transients originatin ' rom power operati His specifica ' n T power /
the requ' two RCS loops wi th RCPs in each De intent ification is to require heat removal with orced flow d ration. Specifying tw oops provides the
' mum necessar fiaes (two )
team enerators) for i removal.
APPLICABLE Safety analys:s contun various assumptions for the esign ases hident(C61)
I SAFETY ANALYSES initial conditions including: RCS pressure, RCS temperature, reactor power level, core parameters, and safety system serpoints. He important aspect for this LCO is the reactor coolant forced flow rate which is represented by the number of RCS loops in service.
s y' 7
Both transient and steady state analyses have been performed to establish the effect of flow on DNB. The transienpident analysis for the plant has been performed
'ag four RCPs are in operation. He majonty of the plant safety analy a based on initial conditions at high core power or zero power. The accident analyses which involve RCP misoperation are the four or coasIdcuv'), Q eventsy, Q, pump coastdown, single pu
,[#'
Sv L <v4 mkkw 2
Steady state DNB analysis has been performed for the(four) pump
((M b
combination. Fo(four u operation, the steady state DNB analy ~.
3 g,5#
D-V enerates thedNBR limit assumes a maximum power level f [118%] ]
iN,r j
~~-~
~
RATED THERMAL ARtRTF). Tais a tne ~ esign verpowr/
e cy /p7 kl
[
condition for four pump operationJ puwe a wpeak w %Jc6 UA (i.e-., m k
d.tprMrf b (Wclerd< Nhy mbo 4
~
.] j k a % aa& avalusis Se olr. { of N *'I**" M"P tify Ouq o.d.it htJc). A m-A p al sis $ rs a n Thel ifc55 y.
M Th N 6r- ( -y+- ds4w,3 a tow s of prm"b N(contmued)
/
& N Sv r ov <>.
twk resatt
^ m M % CN84 e'4 L Weennac %{d b N N6fd.4 b h*4 AdlAbi M.
g SYSTEM 80+ OW Amendmerit Q 16A.719 June 30,1993
+- w CESSAR1Hnnemu LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES APPLICABLE
'lle LTOP system was designed to protect the RCS from overpressurization'-
SAFETY ANALYSES resulting from any of the following conditions:
(continued) t 1.
The starting of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator s- [100'F] above the RCS cold leg temperature.
2.
The simultaneous starting of all four SI pumps and its injection into the RCS.
^j During the two design bases events, no operator action is assumed to take place until ten minutes have paased.
SE8% dhes L-Phr ce ?, t t'"O ;,,,141. i LTOP Sr= r J...
Criterion 2 of the NRC hPolicy Statement N. O J Li L LCC,
' z-> M - T d._' Q ::* :. _.
7 LCor The LCO requires that the SCS Relief Valves be OPERABLE with a serpoint l at the overpressure limit, with the block valve open to ensure a clear flow path, or the RCS be depressurized via an open vent.
APPLICABILITY Thi Ols a plicable in MODE 4 with the temperature of any RCS on?)_;
le
<[
],
. MODE 5, and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel
]
e LCO not L applicable for operating conditions above the [
because the pressurizer safety valves are able rovide overpressure protection. With the va*=8 E- ' J. L,. W o o or overpressure prot e applicabilityis modified by a note which states 4
thatL
.4 is' not applicable. This Note is necesary to allow entry into e applicable MODE 3 without meeting the requirements of the LCO. It I
would not be prudcet to olace the plant in a conditio2 to meet this LCO until the plant was cooled down and RCS pressure wa* reduced.
- ?
f.
I}V k.& '
t I
(continued)
SYSTEM 80+
8 3.4-49 j
Amendment O i
5 16A.7-4s May 1,1933
.=
C E S S A R n! #icuiw o
9
)
Safety Injection Tanks B 3.5.1 S
BASES 3 E t3i.
1.CO
'The LCO establishes the minimum conditions required to ensure the SITS are
-g ivailable to accomplish their core cooling safety function following a LOCA.
N!
[ ou3 SITS are required OPERABLE to ensure 100% of the contents of[throel Il q c.}.
W~g 4 4 _ of the SITS will reach the core during a LOCA.fThis is consistent with the g}
i assumption that the contents of one tank spill through the break for a DVI O
- ,-.1 e I
qF y A j $
Line break. IfJeee-than three tanks are injected during the blowdown phase of a LOCA,the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) may-eet,
[
y y{]p gp,D4 must be fully opea,'vi'h power removed;and the limits established 4for h._Jd +For a SIT to be considered OPERABLE, the isolation valve y,
5,
~
- y
.s4 In MODES I and 2, and MODES 3 and 4 with RCS pressure af [900] paik
-4 e If APPLICABILITY the SIT OPERABILITY requiremects are based on+ full powe operati j#
0 I
Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases,the S s are s '
t(#
N
.I" I]'
required to provide core cooling as long as elevated RCS pressures P
1 temperatures exist.
[ "Ty *h[]r
(,.D h3 This LCO is only applicable at pressures W[900] sia. Belo [900] s', j
- dk T y M, f MJ the rate of RCS blowdown is such that the S1 Pus can pro e k]A f4 injection to ensure that peak clad temperatu emains below the 10 f
@5 1
j 50.46 (Ref. 2) limit of 2200'F.
sn
~I " d in MODE 3 and 4 with pressure
[900]
a and in MODES 5 and 6, ibe' 2
x
.t p are osed to isolate the SITS from the U
44.~
RCS. This allows RCS cooldown an depressurization without discharg<ng SIT motor operated isolation valv
/]g 0
//
the SITS into the RCS or requiring depressurization of the SITS.
Q o-
=jj
'j n/$ (p0 0
M
(.,
aY ACTIONS M
'IF T 4 W
With the boron concentration' of one SIT"not within limits. Oc L a 3
.eeeeeewien must be returned to within the limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In i 's pJ condition, ability to maintain suberiticality or minimum boron precipitat
- j n
time may be reducedyb c~:gL-^- the volume of the SIT is still availa e for iniection.ee4the boron requirements are based on the average bo g $' p Sw # concentration of the total volume of three SITS. the consequences are I 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> gek y
severe than pr; w.1 e SIT,not available for injection.
4 y J be..f an
- were.
- Tk g l
1 V
(contmuod)
SYSTEM 80+
B3.5-5 Amendment Q 16A.8-5 June 30,1993
o u
gar s (s 4 pp m)
Verification every 31 days that power is removed from each 51T isolation valve operator when the pressurizer pressure
['kol
' is e*2000 psia ensures that an active failure could not result in the undetected closure of an SIT motor operated
)
isolation valve.
If this were to occur, only two SITS would
/
be available for injection, given a single failure coincident with a LOCA.
Since installation and removal of power to the SIT isolation valve operators is conducted under administrative control, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that p rp removed.
f
^
1
/
This SR allows power to be supplied to the motor operated isolation valves when RCS prassure is < Esse + psia, thus allowing operational flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during unit startups or shutdowns.
Even with power supplied to the valves, inadvertent closure is prevented by the RCS pressure (nterlock associated with the valves. Should closure of a b
vh ve occur in spite of the interlock, the SI signal pro ided to the valves would open a closed valve in the W h' even of a LOCA.
J, VY y%~ Y,
'K
$*T ct D
y L c' j w})
l l
l l
l 1
M A.7 5 3.6 CONTAIIGIILT GSTOIS-
-gA[1 n1a1 M WMNME,a MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE ne design buis for the MSSVs comes from the ASME Code aA limits SAFETY ANALYSES secondary system pressure to s 110% of design pressure when passmg 100 % of design steam flow. His design basis is more than sufficient to cope with any anticipated operating occurrence (AOO) or accident considered in the Design Buis Accident and Transient Analysis. For most analyzed events. RCS pressun remains below the setpoint of the pressunzer safety valves (PSVs), or, at most, cause only a short openmg of the PSVs.
A.
,v Q
ne events that challenge the MSSVs' relieving capacity, and thus RCS QL, y."
pressure, are those charactenzed as Decreasai Heat Removal events, and are r/g presented in Section 15.2 of the CESSAR DC (Ref. 4). Of these, the full
/
power loss of condenser vacuum (LOCV) event is the limiting AOO. A Md' LOCV isolates the turbine and condenser, and termmates normal feedwater to the Steam Genentors. Before delivery of E Feedwater to e a., R s 2,63 psia. His V j./y peak is less than 110% of the design pressure o, 00 psia, but bM $
V k p[
high coou ao the PSVs. The manmum relieving rate during the pL/
)
LOCV event is.5 ur which is less than the rated capacity of three of the MSSVs.
i g g
> /q
/
ne limiting accident for peak RCS pressure is the full power feedwater line y
(\\ 'M,
break, inside Contonmaat, with the failun of the backflow check valve in the feedwater line from the affected Steam Generator. Water from the affected
^
/
f steam generator is assumed to be lost through the break with mmimal h
/
[.
/
, additional heat transfer from the RCS. With heat removal limited to the
-fl/
//
unaffected Steam Generator, the reduced best transfer mies an increase in j, '
RCS temperature and the resulting RCS fluid expansson an increase h^K )
/
in pressurs The RCS pressua M osia.
th the PSVs
! Pf providing relief capacity, ne mari = relievinEof MSSVs during the feedwater line_btnak evant =-[s 2.5 E6_Ib ch is less than the
-isred capocaty of two of the MSSVs.-
Using conservative analysis anumptions, a small rsage of feedwater line stzes, I a full double otine break, produces an RCS 2,7 5 ' 's for a pened
- exceeding 110 5 (2,750 paia) of design pressure This is cocaa acceptable as RCS pressure ta still well below 120% of design pressure where deformation might happen.
He probability of this event is also very low, in the rsnge of 4 E 6/ year.
(continued)
SYSTEM 80+
B 3.7-2 Amendment i 16 A.10-2 December 21,1990
r CESSAR imincuia o
?.
Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Vent Paths B 3.10.3 BASES _
ACTIONS A.I. A.2 and A.3
[6 Immediate action shall take place to restore the RCS vent path used for
'kg reduced inventory operations should it be discovered to be inoperable /
(o % 1-isolated.
,%y A time o 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s] 's provided to allow for vent path restoration.
N During the penod of time that the vent path is inoperable, reduced RCS inventory instrumentation such as RCS temperature, RCS level and SCS performance shall be monitored hourly by the control room operator in order to detect a trend leading to the loss of DHR.
lll The RCS level shall be restored to a level > reduced inventory elevation of (117'-0*} within [6 hours] should any of the allowed Completion Times menuoned above exceed the allotted time period. (6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s} is considered reasonable time to secure RCS openings and restore RCS level.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Once the vent path is initially established it shall be verified established and unobstructed once per shift (12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s] by operstag personnel. Once per shift is considered a reasonable time interval for operating personnel to perform this verification.
REFERENCES 1.
CESSAR DC, Appendix 19.8A, Shutdown Risk Evaluation Report, Section 2.3.3.3.
i SYSTEM 80+
B 3.10-14 Amendmesit O 4
16A.13-14 May 1,1993
]
f.~
E l
o CESSAR EnWic4rio~
Reduced RCS Inventory Operations - Heat Removal B 3.10.4 BASES LCO This LCO does not permit periods of time where decay beat removal (continued) capability can be intemipted to permit surveillanoe testing or pump switching.
It is understood that these activities could result in RCS boiling as discussed previously or may cause perturbations in RCS level which could lead to the air binding of the operating SCS division and subsequent RCS boiling.
APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 5 and MODE 6 with siduced RCS inventory to ensure that decay beat is adequately removed from the RCS and that the necessary redundancy is provided during this condition.
7 ACTIO
. l. A.2.1. A.2.2 sad B. I f
Wi one SCS division inoperable, the division shall be ect RABLE L,
and e other SCS division will be verified in operation y action initiated to
/.'
f) 1 h'/ (
pl the other SCS division in operation within (15 m0Edtest%r i+=dt%' -
to raise RCS level to a beigut greater than elevation (117'-0*] to n
re from reduced RCS inventory operatias.
1 4
o l
p s
e time to RCS boiling csjeulations (Refe-coce 1) can be as little as 15
{
minutes if decs; heat removal is intenupted. He (15 minute] time limit is
\\
$' \\ [
considered sufficient to a!!ow the operator to deemine the cause for the loss
~
t of redundancy and restore the division to OPERABLE status.
\\
Y C. I. C.2. and C.3 l
If no SCS division is in operation then immediately suspend all operations involving as reduction in RCS boroa concentration, initiate medon to restore one SCS itivision to operable status and place it in operation, and initiate action to siise RCS level to > EL [117'#]. These actions are for the i
purpose of restoring core cooling and to prevent a boroa dilution event.
\\
D.1. D.2 aod D,3
\\
g If the Coovinmect Spray Pump in the operstmg SCS division is inoperable, y
actico mun be initiated to place the alternate division in operation (if the q'
cootamment spray pump in the alternate division is OPERABLE) within (6) bours. Also, SCS performance must be monitored every (30] minutes and the inoperable Cootainment Spray Pump must be restored to OPERABLE condition within (48] bours.
(coctinued)
SYSTEM 80+
B 3.10-16 Amendrnent Q 16A.13-16 June 30,1993
)