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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20249C1601998-06-24024 June 1998
Transmits Revised Fda for Sys 80+ Design,Per App O of 10CFR52.Duration of Fda Conforms W/Duration of Design Certification Rule for Sys 80+ Std Design
LD-98-009, Forwards 3 Copies of Amend X to CESSAR-Design Certification (DC) Sys 80+ Std Plant Ssar Which Is Reprint of CESSAR-DC That Incorporates Revs Made to Approved Design Matl in Dcd. All CESSAR-DC Pages Designated Except for Listed Info1998-03-13013 March 1998
Forwards 3 Copies of Amend X to CESSAR-Design Certification (DC) Sys 80+ Std Plant Ssar Which Is Reprint of CESSAR-DC That Incorporates Revs Made to Approved Design Matl in Dcd. All CESSAR-DC Pages Designated Except for Listed Info
ML20203J3231997-12-17017 December 1997
First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App a & B Encl & Will Be Available in PDR
ML20149J7101997-07-23023 July 1997
Requests That R Simard Be Removed from Service Lists & R Bell Be Added to Svc Lists,Due to Recent NEI Reorganization
LD-97-020, Requests That Errata Be Corrected in Errata Amend to Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule.Memo from Egan & Assoc to C Brinkman Which Lists Errata,Basis for Correction & Suggested Corrections Encl1997-06-13013 June 1997
Requests That Errata Be Corrected in Errata Amend to Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule.Memo from Egan & Assoc to C Brinkman Which Lists Errata,Basis for Correction & Suggested Corrections Encl
LD-97-015, Informs That ABB-CE Has Completed Review of Effective Page Listing & Sys 80+ Design Control Document Revs Dtd Jan 19971997-05-0707 May 1997
Informs That ABB-CE Has Completed Review of Effective Page Listing & Sys 80+ Design Control Document Revs Dtd Jan 1997
LD-97-014, Transmits Final Version of Sys 80+ Design Control Document (DCD)1997-04-30030 April 1997
Transmits Final Version of Sys 80+ Design Control Document (DCD)
ML20138E0301997-04-25025 April 1997
Informs That Portion of Info in Encl 1 of Vendor 960416 Submittal of Presentation Matl on ABB-C-E Licensing Plan for Full Batch Implementation of Abb Advanced Fuel for Meeting Held on 960416 W/Nrc Will Be Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790
ML20147C0881997-01-23023 January 1997
Responds to Requesting Opportunity to Review Design Certification Rule for Abb Combustion Engineering Sys 80+ Before Sending to Office of Fr for Publication
ML20133A9791996-12-18018 December 1996
Approves Rules Certifying Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering Sys 80+ & General Electric Nuclear Energy Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
ML20133A9811996-12-18018 December 1996
Informs That NRC Has Approved Rules Certifying Two Evolutionary Reactor Designs:Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering Sys 80+ & GE Nuclear Energy ABWR
ML20133A9871996-12-18018 December 1996
Informs of NRC Approval of Rules Certifying Two Evolutionary Reactor Designs,Asea Brown Boveri-CE Sys 80+ & GE Nuclear Energy ABWR
ML20133A9901996-12-18018 December 1996
Informs That NRC Has Approved Asea Brown Boveri CE Sys 80+ & GE Nuclear Energy ABWR as Evolutionary Reactor Designs
ML20133B0191996-12-18018 December 1996
Informs of Approval of Rules Certifying Two Evolutionary Reactor Designs,Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering Sys 80+ & GE Nuclear Energys Advanced BWR
LD-96-062, Requests Authorization to Conduct Narrowly,Focused Review of Design Certification Rule for Sys 80+ Before Sending of Office of Fr for Publication1996-12-18018 December 1996
Requests Authorization to Conduct Narrowly,Focused Review of Design Certification Rule for Sys 80+ Before Sending of Office of Fr for Publication
LD-96-060, Forwards Rev to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document1996-12-13013 December 1996
Forwards Rev to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document
ML20149M3091996-12-10010 December 1996
Responds to Which Requested Status of CESSAR-DC Relative to Fda for Sys 80+ Design
ML20129E7111996-10-0101 October 1996
Forward RAI Re CENPD-137,Suppl 2-P, Calculative Methods for Abb CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model. Submittal Being Withheld from Public Disclosure Pending Staff Final Determination,Per 960523 Request
LD-96-042, Submits Misleading Statement by BNL on C-E Reactor Coolant Pump Seals.Statement Correction Listed1996-09-26026 September 1996
Submits Misleading Statement by BNL on C-E Reactor Coolant Pump Seals.Statement Correction Listed
ML20128P4981996-09-23023 September 1996
Forwards Proposed Rule Language for 3 Design Certifications Discussed at 960827 NRC Briefing
ML20128N6001996-09-16016 September 1996
Provides Addl Info in Response to Several Questions Raised by Commission During 960827 Briefing on Design Certification Rulemaking
LD-96-029, Forwards Finalized Package of Six Draft Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document.Changes Will Be Formally Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document at Conclusion of Design Certification Rulemaking1996-07-25025 July 1996
Forwards Finalized Package of Six Draft Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document.Changes Will Be Formally Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document at Conclusion of Design Certification Rulemaking
LD-96-028, Submits Addl Draft Changes for Staff Review & Approval. Changes Listed on Attached Table W/Details Shown on Encl Design Control Document Pages1996-07-17017 July 1996
Submits Addl Draft Changes for Staff Review & Approval. Changes Listed on Attached Table W/Details Shown on Encl Design Control Document Pages
LD-96-024, Transmits Finalized Package of Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document1996-06-27027 June 1996
Transmits Finalized Package of Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document
LD-96-021, Submits Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document as Requested by for Staff Review & Approval1996-06-11011 June 1996
Submits Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document as Requested by for Staff Review & Approval
ML20107G1451996-04-17017 April 1996
Transmits CEOG Task 931 Survey Questionnaire-CEA Insertion Experience W/High Burnup Fuel Mgt
ML20101P1231996-03-15015 March 1996
Expresses Appreciation for Opportunity on 960308 to Brief Commission on Views on Design Certification Rules, Particularly W/Respect to Issue of Applicable Regulations
LD-95-026, Requests Addl Explanation of Probablistic Risk Assessment. Request for Clarification & Does Not Impact Conclusions of Evaluation Already Reported in FSER1995-10-0606 October 1995
Requests Addl Explanation of Probablistic Risk Assessment. Request for Clarification & Does Not Impact Conclusions of Evaluation Already Reported in FSER
LD-95-040, Forwards ABB-CE Proposed Statement of Considerations to Accompany ABB-CE Proposed Rule,Presented in Form of Complete Rulemaking Package1995-09-0505 September 1995
Forwards ABB-CE Proposed Statement of Considerations to Accompany ABB-CE Proposed Rule,Presented in Form of Complete Rulemaking Package
ML20092D2561995-08-23023 August 1995
Forwards Correction to Comment 20 Re Proposed Design Certification Rules for Standardized Advancement Reactors. Last Line of Text May Have Been Lost Due to Word Processing Error
ML20092D2871995-08-23023 August 1995
Forwards Correction to Comment 19 Re Proposed Design Certification Rules for Standardized Advanced Reactors. Last Line on First Page May Have Been Lost Due to Word Processing Error
ML20085G2711995-06-14014 June 1995
Proposes to Respond to RAIs on GE TR NEDE-32177P, Tracg Computer Code Qualification, Dtd Jan 1993 in Three Groups as Indicated in Attachment
ML20082G5511995-04-10010 April 1995
Provides Documents & Info Requested in NRC Audit (950407- 950410) Re Rv Fabrication
ML20203J4371995-04-0404 April 1995
Forwards Fr Notice Re Proposed Amends to Commission Regulations for Commercial Npps,Adding New App a to 10CFR52 Which Will When Promulgated Certify Sys 80+ Std Design of ABWR
LD-95-015, Transmits Corrected Page for Incorporation Into Sys 80+ DCD Revs1995-03-27027 March 1995
Transmits Corrected Page for Incorporation Into Sys 80+ DCD Revs
LD-95-013, Transmits Supplementary Revs for Incorporation Into DCD & Affidavit.Changes Resolve Inconsistencies Identified by NRC & by ABB-CE1995-03-24024 March 1995
Transmits Supplementary Revs for Incorporation Into DCD & Affidavit.Changes Resolve Inconsistencies Identified by NRC & by ABB-CE
LD-95-011, Forwards Rev Pages for Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Margin Bar Adjacent to Change & Rev Date Will Be Added to Revised DCD Page1995-03-17017 March 1995
Forwards Rev Pages for Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Margin Bar Adjacent to Change & Rev Date Will Be Added to Revised DCD Page
LD-95-003, Provides Addl Info on Removal of Auxiliary Throttle Seal Coolers from Reactor Coolant Pumps,In Response to NRC Questions from Review of Sys 80+ Design Control Document1995-03-0303 March 1995
Provides Addl Info on Removal of Auxiliary Throttle Seal Coolers from Reactor Coolant Pumps,In Response to NRC Questions from Review of Sys 80+ Design Control Document
LD-95-007, Forwards Revised Sys 80+ Design Control Document1995-02-22022 February 1995
Forwards Revised Sys 80+ Design Control Document
LD-95-006, Forwards mark-up Pages Identifying Revs Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Revs Provided in Response to Comments Provided by NRC & as Result of Changes Identified by ABB-CE & Discussed W/Nrc1995-02-16016 February 1995
Forwards mark-up Pages Identifying Revs Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Revs Provided in Response to Comments Provided by NRC & as Result of Changes Identified by ABB-CE & Discussed W/Nrc
LD-95-001, Forwards Rev 2 to Technical Support Document for Amend to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accident Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design1995-01-0606 January 1995
Forwards Rev 2 to Technical Support Document for Amend to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accident Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design
NRC-94-4383, Comments on Review of Draft NUREG-1512 for Proprietary Info1994-12-27027 December 1994
Comments on Review of Draft NUREG-1512 for Proprietary Info
LD-94-072, Provides Justification for Tier 2 Seismic & Valve Testing Expirations1994-12-16016 December 1994
Provides Justification for Tier 2 Seismic & Valve Testing Expirations
LD-94-073, Forwards Sys 80+ Design Control Document, Vols 1-241994-12-16016 December 1994
Forwards Sys 80+ Design Control Document, Vols 1-24
LD-94-071, Transmits Addl Input to System 80+ Design Control Document1994-12-15015 December 1994
Transmits Addl Input to System 80+ Design Control Document
LD-94-069, Forwards marked-up CESSAR-DC Figure 5.1.2-2 Re Proposed Design Change to Remove RCP Seal Coolers1994-12-0808 December 1994
Forwards marked-up CESSAR-DC Figure 5.1.2-2 Re Proposed Design Change to Remove RCP Seal Coolers
ML20078N8961994-12-0101 December 1994
Forwards Copy of Ltr NFBWR-94-033
ML20149H1941994-11-14014 November 1994
Responds to Indicating Concern Re Application of Set of Interrelated Elements That Defines Technical & Regulatory Aspects of design-basic Accident Source Term for Licensing of Passive Plants
LD-94-065, Submits Proposed Language Related to Tier 2 for Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule1994-10-28028 October 1994
Submits Proposed Language Related to Tier 2 for Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule
LD-94-063, Forwards Rev 1 of Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design1994-10-10010 October 1994
Forwards Rev 1 of Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design
1998-06-24
[Table view]
Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARLD-98-009, Forwards 3 Copies of Amend X to CESSAR-Design Certification (DC) Sys 80+ Std Plant Ssar Which Is Reprint of CESSAR-DC That Incorporates Revs Made to Approved Design Matl in Dcd. All CESSAR-DC Pages Designated Except for Listed Info1998-03-13013 March 1998
Forwards 3 Copies of Amend X to CESSAR-Design Certification (DC) Sys 80+ Std Plant Ssar Which Is Reprint of CESSAR-DC That Incorporates Revs Made to Approved Design Matl in Dcd. All CESSAR-DC Pages Designated Except for Listed Info
ML20149J7101997-07-23023 July 1997
Requests That R Simard Be Removed from Service Lists & R Bell Be Added to Svc Lists,Due to Recent NEI Reorganization
LD-97-020, Requests That Errata Be Corrected in Errata Amend to Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule.Memo from Egan & Assoc to C Brinkman Which Lists Errata,Basis for Correction & Suggested Corrections Encl1997-06-13013 June 1997
Requests That Errata Be Corrected in Errata Amend to Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule.Memo from Egan & Assoc to C Brinkman Which Lists Errata,Basis for Correction & Suggested Corrections Encl
LD-97-015, Informs That ABB-CE Has Completed Review of Effective Page Listing & Sys 80+ Design Control Document Revs Dtd Jan 19971997-05-0707 May 1997
Informs That ABB-CE Has Completed Review of Effective Page Listing & Sys 80+ Design Control Document Revs Dtd Jan 1997
LD-97-014, Transmits Final Version of Sys 80+ Design Control Document (DCD)1997-04-30030 April 1997
Transmits Final Version of Sys 80+ Design Control Document (DCD)
LD-96-062, Requests Authorization to Conduct Narrowly,Focused Review of Design Certification Rule for Sys 80+ Before Sending of Office of Fr for Publication1996-12-18018 December 1996
Requests Authorization to Conduct Narrowly,Focused Review of Design Certification Rule for Sys 80+ Before Sending of Office of Fr for Publication
LD-96-060, Forwards Rev to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document1996-12-13013 December 1996
Forwards Rev to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document
LD-96-042, Submits Misleading Statement by BNL on C-E Reactor Coolant Pump Seals.Statement Correction Listed1996-09-26026 September 1996
Submits Misleading Statement by BNL on C-E Reactor Coolant Pump Seals.Statement Correction Listed
ML20128P4981996-09-23023 September 1996
Forwards Proposed Rule Language for 3 Design Certifications Discussed at 960827 NRC Briefing
ML20128N6001996-09-16016 September 1996
Provides Addl Info in Response to Several Questions Raised by Commission During 960827 Briefing on Design Certification Rulemaking
LD-96-029, Forwards Finalized Package of Six Draft Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document.Changes Will Be Formally Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document at Conclusion of Design Certification Rulemaking1996-07-25025 July 1996
Forwards Finalized Package of Six Draft Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document.Changes Will Be Formally Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document at Conclusion of Design Certification Rulemaking
LD-96-028, Submits Addl Draft Changes for Staff Review & Approval. Changes Listed on Attached Table W/Details Shown on Encl Design Control Document Pages1996-07-17017 July 1996
Submits Addl Draft Changes for Staff Review & Approval. Changes Listed on Attached Table W/Details Shown on Encl Design Control Document Pages
LD-96-024, Transmits Finalized Package of Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document1996-06-27027 June 1996
Transmits Finalized Package of Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document
LD-96-021, Submits Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document as Requested by for Staff Review & Approval1996-06-11011 June 1996
Submits Changes to Sys 80+ Std Plant Design Control Document as Requested by for Staff Review & Approval
ML20107G1451996-04-17017 April 1996
Transmits CEOG Task 931 Survey Questionnaire-CEA Insertion Experience W/High Burnup Fuel Mgt
ML20101P1231996-03-15015 March 1996
Expresses Appreciation for Opportunity on 960308 to Brief Commission on Views on Design Certification Rules, Particularly W/Respect to Issue of Applicable Regulations
LD-95-026, Requests Addl Explanation of Probablistic Risk Assessment. Request for Clarification & Does Not Impact Conclusions of Evaluation Already Reported in FSER1995-10-0606 October 1995
Requests Addl Explanation of Probablistic Risk Assessment. Request for Clarification & Does Not Impact Conclusions of Evaluation Already Reported in FSER
LD-95-040, Forwards ABB-CE Proposed Statement of Considerations to Accompany ABB-CE Proposed Rule,Presented in Form of Complete Rulemaking Package1995-09-0505 September 1995
Forwards ABB-CE Proposed Statement of Considerations to Accompany ABB-CE Proposed Rule,Presented in Form of Complete Rulemaking Package
ML20092D2561995-08-23023 August 1995
Forwards Correction to Comment 20 Re Proposed Design Certification Rules for Standardized Advancement Reactors. Last Line of Text May Have Been Lost Due to Word Processing Error
ML20092D2871995-08-23023 August 1995
Forwards Correction to Comment 19 Re Proposed Design Certification Rules for Standardized Advanced Reactors. Last Line on First Page May Have Been Lost Due to Word Processing Error
ML20085G2711995-06-14014 June 1995
Proposes to Respond to RAIs on GE TR NEDE-32177P, Tracg Computer Code Qualification, Dtd Jan 1993 in Three Groups as Indicated in Attachment
ML20082G5511995-04-10010 April 1995
Provides Documents & Info Requested in NRC Audit (950407- 950410) Re Rv Fabrication
LD-95-015, Transmits Corrected Page for Incorporation Into Sys 80+ DCD Revs1995-03-27027 March 1995
Transmits Corrected Page for Incorporation Into Sys 80+ DCD Revs
LD-95-013, Transmits Supplementary Revs for Incorporation Into DCD & Affidavit.Changes Resolve Inconsistencies Identified by NRC & by ABB-CE1995-03-24024 March 1995
Transmits Supplementary Revs for Incorporation Into DCD & Affidavit.Changes Resolve Inconsistencies Identified by NRC & by ABB-CE
LD-95-011, Forwards Rev Pages for Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Margin Bar Adjacent to Change & Rev Date Will Be Added to Revised DCD Page1995-03-17017 March 1995
Forwards Rev Pages for Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Margin Bar Adjacent to Change & Rev Date Will Be Added to Revised DCD Page
LD-95-003, Provides Addl Info on Removal of Auxiliary Throttle Seal Coolers from Reactor Coolant Pumps,In Response to NRC Questions from Review of Sys 80+ Design Control Document1995-03-0303 March 1995
Provides Addl Info on Removal of Auxiliary Throttle Seal Coolers from Reactor Coolant Pumps,In Response to NRC Questions from Review of Sys 80+ Design Control Document
LD-95-007, Forwards Revised Sys 80+ Design Control Document1995-02-22022 February 1995
Forwards Revised Sys 80+ Design Control Document
LD-95-006, Forwards mark-up Pages Identifying Revs Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Revs Provided in Response to Comments Provided by NRC & as Result of Changes Identified by ABB-CE & Discussed W/Nrc1995-02-16016 February 1995
Forwards mark-up Pages Identifying Revs Incorporated Into Sys 80+ Design Control Document. Revs Provided in Response to Comments Provided by NRC & as Result of Changes Identified by ABB-CE & Discussed W/Nrc
LD-95-001, Forwards Rev 2 to Technical Support Document for Amend to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accident Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design1995-01-0606 January 1995
Forwards Rev 2 to Technical Support Document for Amend to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accident Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design
NRC-94-4383, Comments on Review of Draft NUREG-1512 for Proprietary Info1994-12-27027 December 1994
Comments on Review of Draft NUREG-1512 for Proprietary Info
LD-94-072, Provides Justification for Tier 2 Seismic & Valve Testing Expirations1994-12-16016 December 1994
Provides Justification for Tier 2 Seismic & Valve Testing Expirations
LD-94-073, Forwards Sys 80+ Design Control Document, Vols 1-241994-12-16016 December 1994
Forwards Sys 80+ Design Control Document, Vols 1-24
LD-94-071, Transmits Addl Input to System 80+ Design Control Document1994-12-15015 December 1994
Transmits Addl Input to System 80+ Design Control Document
LD-94-069, Forwards marked-up CESSAR-DC Figure 5.1.2-2 Re Proposed Design Change to Remove RCP Seal Coolers1994-12-0808 December 1994
Forwards marked-up CESSAR-DC Figure 5.1.2-2 Re Proposed Design Change to Remove RCP Seal Coolers
ML20078N8961994-12-0101 December 1994
Forwards Copy of Ltr NFBWR-94-033
LD-94-065, Submits Proposed Language Related to Tier 2 for Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule1994-10-28028 October 1994
Submits Proposed Language Related to Tier 2 for Sys 80+ Design Certification Rule
LD-94-063, Forwards Rev 1 of Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design1994-10-10010 October 1994
Forwards Rev 1 of Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design
ML20072T2691994-08-30030 August 1994
Advises That Industry Intends to Comment in Opposition to Applicable Regulations Approach & Proposed Text of Applicable Regulations in Design Certification Rulemaking Proceeding for Both ABWR & Sys 80+
LD-94-059, Forwards Draft Notice of Issuance of EA & Draft Fonsi, Together W/Supporting Draft Proposed EA for Consideration,W/ Respect to Draft EA NRC Producing for Proposed Sys 80+ Design Process1994-08-22022 August 1994
Forwards Draft Notice of Issuance of EA & Draft Fonsi, Together W/Supporting Draft Proposed EA for Consideration,W/ Respect to Draft EA NRC Producing for Proposed Sys 80+ Design Process
ML20072B9641994-08-12012 August 1994
Requests That Author Name Be Added to Sys 80+ Service List. Author Counsel to Westinghouse in AP600 Design Certification
ML20072E3561994-08-0909 August 1994
Requests Addition of Author Name to Sys 80+ Svc List
ML20073E1721994-07-25025 July 1994
Forwards Rept Entitled, Analysis of Ex-Vessel Steam Explosions for Combustion Engineering Sys 80+ Using Gtsf Computer Code. Provides Comments on Central,Outer & Multiple Instrument Tube Failures
LD-94-054, Forwards Errata to Sys 80+ Certified Design Matl,In Response to Editorial & Word Processing Errors1994-07-21021 July 1994
Forwards Errata to Sys 80+ Certified Design Matl,In Response to Editorial & Word Processing Errors
LD-94-052, Requests That Service List for Docket 52-002 Be Updated in Accordance W/Encl Listing,Due to Changes in Position Titles, Affiliations & Organizations.Correspondence on Docket 52-002 Should Be Addressed to Listed Address1994-07-20020 July 1994
Requests That Service List for Docket 52-002 Be Updated in Accordance W/Encl Listing,Due to Changes in Position Titles, Affiliations & Organizations.Correspondence on Docket 52-002 Should Be Addressed to Listed Address
LD-94-053, Seeks Confirmation of Vendor Understanding of NRC Fee Regulations in 10CFR170 as Pertaining to Sys 80+ Design Certification Rulemaking as Set Forth in Encl1994-07-20020 July 1994
Seeks Confirmation of Vendor Understanding of NRC Fee Regulations in 10CFR170 as Pertaining to Sys 80+ Design Certification Rulemaking as Set Forth in Encl
LD-94-048, Forwards Certified Design Matl Related to Design Reliability Assurance Program & Corresponding Errata Pages for CESSAR-DC (Section 1.0,17.3 & 19.15) Amend W,To Resolve NRC Comments Received by Telcon Over Past Two Wks1994-07-12012 July 1994
Forwards Certified Design Matl Related to Design Reliability Assurance Program & Corresponding Errata Pages for CESSAR-DC (Section 1.0,17.3 & 19.15) Amend W,To Resolve NRC Comments Received by Telcon Over Past Two Wks
ML20077F4111994-07-0808 July 1994
Forwards Technical Evaluation Rept Entitled, an Analysis of Core Meltdown Accidents in CE Sys 80+ Plant Using Melcor
LD-94-047, Forwards Replacement Page for System 80+ Emergency Operations Guidelines1994-06-28028 June 1994
Forwards Replacement Page for System 80+ Emergency Operations Guidelines
LD-94-046, Submits Sys 80+ Design & Operational Features Re Deviations from Regulations1994-06-27027 June 1994
Submits Sys 80+ Design & Operational Features Re Deviations from Regulations
LD-94-044, Forwards Revised Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Rept - Design Certification,Amend W & Affidavit1994-06-20020 June 1994
Forwards Revised Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Rept - Design Certification,Amend W & Affidavit
1998-03-13
[Table view] |
Text
, . - ._ _ _ _ _ _
,;oz
. K E ASEA BROWN BOVERI May 27, 1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk .
Secretary
. Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
SECY-93-087, " Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs
Dear Mr. Chilk:
[
This
~
ABB-CE has reviewed SECY-93-087, dated April: 2, 1993.
document has significant ramifications for our System 80+" ALWR .
design which is currently in the final phases of NRC. staff review We have bee'n in close for an FDA and Design Certification.
communication with the NRC staff on all. issues-pertaining to the '!'
review of System 80+ and have been working with-them to resolve those issues. We would like to.take this opportunity to offer.our preliminary comments on SECY-93-087.
ABB-CE has also reviewed the May 11, 1993. letter from'the Electric Power. Research Institute (EPRI) to Mr.- Crutchfield of the NRC staff, and we are in agreement with the views ~on SECY-93-087' expressed therein. Enclosed are' additional or amplifying comments-which are numbered consistent with SECY-93-087.
Thank you very much for taking the comments of EPRI and ABB-CE into -
account as you reach decisions on these important topics.
Very truly yours, L
90.1 R. A. Matzie y
Vice President Nuclear Systems Development ,
cbb/lw "
Enclosure:
As Stated cc: J. DeVine (EPRI)
P. Lang (DOE)
K. Karr (INPO)
T. Wambach (NRC) t ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power crewm Enoneem inc to00 mo som ** nm.o Te.epnme {203) 688-19M 9306210122 930616 PDR Post OUce Bon 500 mm. cmnmes Ms M
. Fa= (203) 2B5 9512 Tes M7 COMBEN WSOA A
ADOCK 05200002 ,
PDR
. - -- .. -- - -. . ~ . . - . . , . -~ - -.,
ABB-CE COMMENTS ON SECY-93-087 Page.1 T
I.A - Use of a Physically Based Source Term ABB-CE strongly encourages the NRC and the industry to continue _ the implementation of the physically based source term, and we support ;
EPRI's comments on this issue. ABB-CE is far along the-path of ,
~
implementation of the physically based source term on the. . .
System 80+5 design. Resolution of the " low . volatile" fission product issue as stated by EPFI would demonstrate even lower offsite doses and increase the likelihood of' improved ALWR emergency planning for System 80+ when the industry program moves '
in that direction. ,
II.I - Post Accident Sampling Systems )
Again, ABB-CE strongly endorses the remarks of EPRI in their May ,
11, 1993 letter and the arguments which they have put forth to the ,
NRC staff and ACRS on this topic previously.
ABB-CE believes that'the concerns set forth in SECY-93-087 (page-
- 42) to justify retaining the NUREG-0737 requirement for the PWR to take pressurized post-accident samples to analyze for dissolved' gases are not fully ' applicable to evolutionary PWRs in general, and System 80+ in particular. This is explained below:~ ,
STAFF CONCERN: The possibility exists of partially mitigated-severe accidents which do not involve early- reactor- t depressurization, as was demonstrated in the TMI-2 accident. '
ABB-CE RESPONSE: Safety-grade depressurization systems have been incorporated into evolutionary PWRs to address this possibility as a result of TMI lessons learned.
STAFF CONCERN: PWRs may have a problem in maintaining reliable natural circulation and decay heat removal in the presence of non-condensible gases that would evolve during depressurization. .The SECY-93-087 rationale goes on to explain that.this is'. basically a passive PWR staff concern because the passive plants "are highly dependent ~on natural circulation."
ABB-CE RESPONSE: The concern expressed has been addressed by an improved System 80+ Safety Injection System and reactor vessel head =
venting capability. Furthermore, ABB-CE has performed.a computer simulation of a natural circulation cooldown of the System 80+
Reactor' Coolant System (RCS)- from normal operation to -Shutdown cooling System (SCS) entry conditions. This simulation has been approved by the NRC and was performed in accordance with U.S. .NRC- -
Branch Technical Position (BTP) RSB 5-1. Potencial steam bubble i formation in the reactor vessel upper head is rigorously modeled, 6
ABB-CE COMMENTS ON SECY-93-087 Page 2 the concurrent loss of offsite power and a single failure. This analysis concludes the System 80+ RCS can be cooled and depressurized to SCS entry conditions in conformance with the BTP RSP 5-1 requirements. Once depressurized to shutdown cooling entry condition, the System 80+ RCS would use the SCS to provide forced cooling for decay heat removal. Similar analyses /operatione apply to other evolutionary PWRs.
STAFF CONCERN: Also, in these reactors, non-safety systems would need to be used to perform the final cooldown depressurization.
The reactors referred to are again passive PWRs.
ABB-CE RESPONSE: Evolutionary PWRs continue to use the safetv-grade SCS to continue cooldown and depressurization.
ABB-CE is concerned that the staff has not appropriately differentiated between the attributes of evolutionary and passive PWR designs related to this issue.
Since the review schedule of the passive plants is substantially behind the evolutionary plants, it is not fair to await resolution of the passive plant-related concerns to dictate the policy for the evolutionary plants. Ironically, if the passive plant applicants eventually prevail in getting this current requirement rescinded, the evolutionary PWR design could be locked into a pressurized sampling system design because it will already have an FDA and possibly a design certification.
It is not a trivial matter to design the post-accident sampling system to obtain and analyze pressurized samples. As reported in NUREG/CR-4330, the number of valves in the system can be reduced by a factor of ten if pressurized samples are not required (from 40 or 50 valves, to 4 or 5 valves). EPRI has determined that such a simplification results not only in a capital cost savings of approximately one million U.S. dollars per plant ($1M/ plant) , but also in a substantial reduction in operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. A simplified post-accident sampling system without pressurized sampling capabilities will be easier to put into operation during plant start-up, will eliminate expensive debugging problems encountered at existing facilities, and will require less maintenance, fewer modifications and less attention by the plant staff. In summary, ABB-CE believes that a requirement for pressurized sampling by the post-accident sampling system contravenes the conclusion of NUREG/CR-4330, and would result in an unnecessarily complex and costly design without a significant enhancement to safety.
Based on the arguments put forth by EPRI and the ACRS, ABB-CE requests the Commission to release all ALWR's from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34 (f) (2) (viii) and item III.B.3 of NUREG-0737 related to having the capability to analyze dissolved gases and chloride.
If this is not possible, ABB-CE requests the Commission to
ABB-CE COMMENTS ON SECY-93-087 Page 3 recognize the differential between the evolutionary and passive PWR designs as it relates to the staff's stated concerns and delete this requirement for evolutionary PWRs.
II.D - Leak-Before-Break (LBB)
In the section entitled " Design Basis with LBB" SECY-93-087'(page 34 adaLes that "the broad scope rule introduced an acknowledged inconsistency into the design basis by excluding the dynamic- 7 ef fects of postulated pipe ruptures while retaining non-mechanistic:
pipe rupture for the containment, ECCS, .and environmental' qualification (EQ) of safety-related electrical and mechanical equipment." The SECY goes on to describe the distinction it draws between " local dynamic" and " global" effects from pipe ruptures. '
ABB-CE agrees with the distinction between local and global effects, but recommends that the actual maximum break . areas associated with failure of pump seals, valve packings, ' flanged connection, bellows, manways, rupture disks and branch' lines be-applied in the context of the " global" analyses. The maximum break ;
areas are well defined for each ALWR.
This realistic application of break . sizes is particule .
appropriate in conjunction- with the ' core coolability. and containment pressure / temperature analyses .of - low probability, beyond design basis scenarios such as multiple failures in mechanical / fluid safety systems or common mode failures of digital protection systems.
-T II.M - Reliability Assurance Program (RAP)
ABB-CE agrees that the RAP should be divided into two stages (design and operational) and we agree ^that-ITAAC should not be developed for the RAP. However, we disaaree with the interim staff position on RAP which stipulates that "a high level commitment to .'
a RAP applicable to design certification (D-RAP) should be required as a non-system generic Tier 1 requirement'..."
ABB-CE has provided a description of the design reliability assurance program - (D-RAP) in CESSAR-DC ' which meets the , design associated goals of the RAP as outlined in SECY-93-087. We believe that this commitment to D-RAP is sufficient.- The D-RAP is only one of a series of programs which the COL holder will;use to properly design, construct, operate, test and maintain the plant such that the reliability of the original design is retained. It was not'our initial intention to include the' RAP description in the SAR. We
believe that the D-RAP is in the category of _ Operating 1 Support Information which is between the designer .and l the ; operator and i which should have the flexibility to develop according to the requirements of the end user. Based-on the NRC staff's request, ;
4 ABB-CE COMMENTS ON BECY-93-087 Page 4 requirements of the end user. Based on the NRC staff's request, ABB-CE incorporated the D-RAP description previously submitted on the System 80+ docket into CESSAR-DC in February 1993. Now the staff is requesting that design certification applicants make the D-RAP a Tier 1 commitment.
The criteria for inclusion in Tier 1 is principally based on the level of safety importance. However, the D-RAP does not have the same level of safety importance as the issues which the staff and industr; have previously agreed belong in the Tier 1 category.
This is particularly the case for evolutionary ALWRs.
Elevation of the D-RAP to Tier 1 in the design certification rulemaking process provides enforcement authority to the staff to ensure that the terms of the D-RAP are rigidly maintained. This creates justifiable concerns on the part of potential purchasers of these ALWR designs that a plant could be shutdown if some measure of the reliability of a risk-significant structure, system or component decreased below the value assumed in the PRA regardless of the overall safety of the plant. While all parties to the SECY-93-087 decision-making process would agree today that there is no such intention, elevation of D-RAP to Tier 1 status may provide the groundwork for that type- of future contention and is thus destabilizing from a licensing perspective.
A Tier 1 D-RAP commitment is not necessary to ensure that the design can be constructed and operated safely as some may argue.
Safe operation as related to the design is assured through Tier 1 systems and structures certified design commitments and their associated ITAAC, commitments in Tier 2, as well as the plant's Technical Specifications and Emergency Operating Procedures and compliance with NRC regulations including the maintenance rule.
The relationship of the RAP and the maintenance rule is still undefined, but it is possible that the activities related to the maintenance rule may encompass the D-RAP. Elevation of D-RAP to' Tier 1 might, however, create unforeseen conflicts at the regulation level since neither program has yet been implemented.
It does not seem rational to us that there be a generic Tier 1 program commitment without having a demonstrable acceptance criteria. However, following much prior effort and a prolonged debate between industry and NRC staff, it was concluded that acceptance criteria which are both meaningful and unambiguous cannot be written for programmatic topics such as the D-RAP. It seems inevitable to ABB-CE that if there is a generic Tier 1 commitment to the D-RAP, it will lead to the need for a demonstrable acceptance criteria.
ABB-CE requests that the Commission disapprove inclusion of the D-RAP in Tier 1.
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- ABB-CE COMMENTS ON BECY-93-087 Page 5 III.G - Simplification of Offsite Emergency Plan.4ing:
ABB-CE agrees with and has actively supported the ALWR program initiative on simplified emergency planning, which is coordinated by EPRI. We note a recent letter from the ALWR Utility Steering Committee Chairman to the NRC which states, " ... any ALWR, includina evolutionary olants, (emphasis added) should have the opportunity to demonstrate that it meets the criteria and thus be carr M arad #nr ALWR emergency planning."
ABB-CE has examined the technical bases and criteria being developed in the ALWR program and has evaluated the System 80+
design against those criteria. Results have been submitted to the NRC staff and have been included in CESSAR-DC. As expected, the active safety systems such as containment spray show the robustness of the design and demonstrate that System 80+ easily meets the Protective Action Guideline of 1 rem whole body dose at the site boundary. Since this issue is equally applicable to both passive and evolutionary designs, it is recommended that issue III.G (Simplification of Offsite Emergency Planning) be presented in
- Section II of SECY-93-087 which addresses "Other Evolutionary and Passive Design Issues" to avoid the implication that it is applicable to only the passive designs.
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