ML20011D840

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LER 89-030-01:on 890824,determined That Pump Discharge Pressure & Flow Less than Required.On 890826,plant Entered Hot Standby.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Impeller in Pump.Original Impeller Reinstalled Upon repair.W/891222 Ltr
ML20011D840
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/1989
From: Moffatt L, Widell R
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F12389-20, LER-89-030, LER-89-30, NUDOCS 9001020119
Download: ML20011D840 (10)


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W 2 22, 1989-3F1289-20  ;

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory cannission ,

Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No. 89-030-01~

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a supplement to Licensee Event Report (IER)89-030 which was previously submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Shcatld there be any questions, please contact this office. ,

Very truly yours, L '

Rolf C. Widel Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support-WIR: mag Enclosure xc: Regional Mministrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector 9001020119 891222 PDR S ADOCK 05000302 PDC -

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1 l GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 Thirty fourth Street South

  • P.O. Box 14042
  • St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 + (813) 866-5151 A Florida Progress Company  ;

C ora M4 U.S. NUCLEAR G.50VLATO4Y COMMilstON APPROVED OMS NO. 31bO104 l

. EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED $URDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THl3 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ENMENTsTEo*ARo'i G fu"D&Es'ThATYT"%E REcN"Cs AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P 630). U S NUCLE AR T P APE RWO RE T I'ON J (3 [O IC OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20603.

  • CILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBE R (2) FAGE (3 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 .,-

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" ' ' ' ' ' ' DELIVERY, INSTALLATION, AND ACCEPTANCE OF INCORRECT IMPELLER LEADS TO ENGINEERED l SAFEGUARDS PUMP INOPERABILITY, OPERATION OUTSIDE PLANT DESIGN BASIS, AND PLANT SHUTDOWN. I EVENT DATE ($1 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE (76 OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED tel SI DAY vfAR F ACiteTV Nauts DOCKET NUMSERisi MONT H DAY YEAR YEAR "m' ' ['j,$ MON 1 H N/A 0lSl0l0l0; ; l

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0l8 2l6 E 9 8l9 0 l 3l 0 0l 1 1l2 2l 2 d9 N/A 0l5l0l0;o l l l THIS REPORT 18 SUOMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RkOUIREMENTS Os 10 Cf R 5 (ChecA eae or more e' f*e ferrowmspf (113 OPE R ATING MODE m } 20 40216) 20 406ts) 60 73deH2Havl 73.7116)

R 20 406teH1 Hit 60 MteH11 lo.73(eH2Het 73 71 tal (101 l9l M 406(elMHill 60.MisH23 E73ieH2Hyd HER I es A 20 4064eH1 Helt) 60.73te H2 Hil 60.73te H2 Hvo.H A) J66Al 20 406(eH1Hevi 60.736eH2HH S0.73teH2Hve61HBI l 20 4086eH1Hvl 60.73:eH2Hml to 736eH2Hal LICENSEE CONT ACT FOR TH18 LER 4123 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE L. W. Moffatt, Nuclear Safety Supervisor 91 0;4 7l9 1 5l-l6[4 p l6 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRitED IN THit REPORT (13)

R ORiA H ORfA LE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT "(N'g AC. oqpn 5 CAUSE S v 8T E M COMPONENT "(hC- qpp g I i 1 I I I I e 1 i i l l I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT E XPECTED (141 MONTH DAY vfAR SU6MisS40N 4 E5 (19 vee comotore fX9fCriO Sv0wSSION OA TEI NO l l l L95Tt1ACT (Umst to 14# weces e e nooros.mewy 9.rteen sm,'e spect tsorwestren knev (16>

l On August 24, 1989, Crystal River Unit 3 was operating at 95% Rated temal l Power, generating 823 Megawatts Electric. Testing of the "B" Emergency 1Alclear l Services Seawater Ptm1p (WP-2B) was in progmss. It was detemined that the l pump discharge pressure and flow were less than required ard the pump was l l declared inoperable. WP-2B is an Engineered Safeguards Pump, required to be operable by Crystal River Unit 3 'Ibchnical Specifications. A plant shutdown l was begun. At 1115 on August 26 the plant entered Hot Standby, completing a i shutdown required by the Technical Specifications. S e rotating - mbly of  !

WP-2B was examined on September 4,1989, and found to be equipped with an I incorrect impeller. Se impeller was installed in April, 1989. mis was a condition outside the plant's design basis. Se condition was the result of two events, installation of, and failure to detect the incorrect impeller. Se I incorrect impeller was removed from the pump and the original impeller was  ;

sent to the vendor for repair. Se plant remained shut down until WP-2B was returned to service and successfully tested. Improved methods for determining i pump perfomance in the W System are beiry investigated. S e procurement process which led to obtaining the incorrect impeller from the pump vendor was investigated. Several actions were taken or are planned, to improve inspection of these impellers.

NRC Perm 366 (64191

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0l 1 0l2 OF 0l9 itXT U mese ansee e soeuse6 uma adsteans/ MC Forrn JEEn3 (17) i EVENE IESmIPI1W On August 24, 1989, Crystal River Unit 3 was in LODE 1 (ECWER OPERATION), at 95% Rated Thermal Power ard Generating 823 Megawatts Electric. Quarterly '

testing of the "B" Emergency Nuclear Services Seawater Punp [1G,P] (RWP-2B), in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI, was in prtxJress. At 0300, it was determined that the punp flow was less than required andithe punp was q declared inoperable. RWP-2B is an - Engineered Safeguards (JE] punp and is -

required to be operable in Operational Modes 1 through 4 by Crystal River Unit 3 Technical Specification 3.7.4.1. At 2200, the decision to begin a plant '

shutdown was made because the time which would be required to return the punp to operable status was determined to exceed the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.4.1. At 1115 on August 26, 1989, the plant entered Operational Mode 3 (Hot Standby), thereby empleting a shutdown required by the Technical Specifications. 'Ihis is a reportable event under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (A) . 'Ihe forced shutdown also required entry into the Radiological Emergency Response Plan as an Unusual Event. The Unusual Event was declared at 0521 on August 26, 1989, when the plant output breakers were opened and was exited at 1639 on August 27, 1989 after the plant entered Operational Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) . Declaration of the unusual event was reported to the NRC via phone (FI,TEL] at 0600 on August 26, 1989 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (a) (1) (1) .

Originally, the low flow developed by RWP-2B was thought to be caused by a buildup of silt and marine organisms in the Seawater Punp Pit [IG,GA] which could have h = hi flow to the punp intake (see Figure 1). 'Ihis was believed because the punp had been rebuilt and tested satisfactorily. in May,1989 and inspections of the punp conducted on August 24 and on August 27 did not reveal any other obstructions in the punp nor any abnormal wear. - However, upon removal of the silt, the punp was run again on Septen1ber 2, 1989 and still I

failed to develop the zwquired flow.

The rotating element of RWP-2B was removed and examined on September 4, 1989.

'Ihis inspection revealed that an incorrect impeller had been installed in the punp. This inpeller was installed during the rebuild of the punp which was .

cmpleted in April., 1989. Operation of the plant with the incorrett, inpeller installed in RWP-2B was considered to be a condition outside the plant's design basis and was reported to the NRC via phone at 1230 on September 4, 1989, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (ii) (B). Operation outside the design basis is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (ii) (B) .

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NRC Form 3 eta (649)

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l l Wis condition was the result of two separate events. h first event i involved installation of an in.wan inpeller in WP-2B and the second event was the failure to detect @bi operation of the punp during the May,1989 post maintenance test. Ea2 of the events is dieW belw.

1. Installation of the ir uuact inpeller. >

We inpeller that was installed in WP-2B in April,1989 was a spare impeller which was received at CR-3 in October, 1981 and was maintained in storage  ;

until it was withdrawn for installation. h inpeller was ordered frun a vendor parts list whid specifies parts for all five Nuclear Services Seawater (W) Punps (Serial #'s 290493 - 290497) in use at CR-3. 2e parts list made no distinction between inpellers used in any of the W punps even though there are three different flw ratings among the five punps. W arefore, a single impeller was ordered to serve as a spare for any one of the five W punps. We Florida Power Corporation purchase order identified the serial numbers of all five punps, the original purchase order and specification numbers, and the part number of the impeller.

i In 1982, Florida Power Corporation ordered one additional spare impeller using the same specifications as the 1981 order. During the procurement process for this impeller, the vendor notified' Florida Power Corporation that there are three different inpellers for the five punps. h irpeller received in 1981 was trinned to the proper dimension for WP-2A and WP-2B and 'its CR-3 inventory data was modified to reflect that it was for use in only these two pumps, h 1982 purchase order was aisi.3ed to require two inpellers; one for

! each of the rema:ning pump types. Specifications for each of the impeller I types are listed in the table below, i

l Puno Part DWu. # Pattern # Vanes Di==ater ,

WP-1 113 I)-11059 3413VC-1 5 23-5/16 WP-2A,2B 113 D-11060 3413VC 7 24-15/16 WP-3A,3B 113 D-11059 3413VC-1 5 20-1/8 h impeller supplied by the verxior in 1981 was the correct diameter for W P-2A and 2B, but had five vanes rather than the seven required. We vendor.

information available to Florida Power when the impeller was ordered did not provide details on these differences.

2. Failure to detect the incorrect inpeller through post maintenance testing.

It cannot be determined, for certain, why WP-2B post maintenance testing in May, 1989, failed to detect installation of the incorrect impeller. We most likel'f cause was incorrect measurement of Nuclear Services Seawater System flow NIC Fonn 30sA (EL89)

E XPt7.E S. 4/30f.2 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) f,ys"#$%',ugM Won'53*5i1' .n 'l'2' ,T",'n'j TEXT CONTINUATlON C *"A",'o'."11",i"%*s?'."18lc"l'",'MS".'"M MA 1 P APE RWO RE flON ('3 60 De i OF MAhAGEMENT AND SvDGET.we ASHWQTON, DC 20603.

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during the test. Mechanisms for obtainirq an incorrect flow measurement am I believed to be related to the flow maa % i.:=d. instrumentation used to conduct ,)

the test. -

A. 'Ihe flow measurement is made with a amovable pitot tube device which is inserted into the Nuclear Services Seawater System piping and wuswted to a differential pressure gauge which is markett to indicate flow. 'Ibe gauge is an analog flow meter, laid out in an arc on a six inch rectangular meter face. ,

'Ibe gauge used has a zero to twenty thousand gallon per minute scale, each minor division being two hundred gpm. When the instrument valves are full open the irxlicated flow on the measurement instrument oscillates over a range 2000 -

to 3000 gpn wide. Instructions are given in the procedure to throttle the instrument valves to reduce the instrument oscillations to within an-acceptable range. A mistake in the throttling process could have resulted in an incorrect flow measurement.

s B. 'Ihe flow element is sensitive to foreign material in the flow stream (ie.

j silt, shells, grass, etc.) . Intrusion of any foreign material during the test could have prr*ad an erroneous flow measurement.

l C. 'Ihe flow meter is connected to the pitot tube with flexible tubing at two l threaded connection points (see Figure 2). 'Ihese connections are inside a box holding the flow meter and are difficult to reach. A loose connection on the low pressure side of the flow meter could cause a false high flow indication.

D. 'Ibe flow metcr is equimed with bleed valves for venting and flushing the instrument. 'Ihese valves are located inside a box which holds the flow meter and must be manipulated with a screwdriver. Failure to get the low pressure side bleed valve fully closed would result in a false high indication. Failure _

to fully close the valve could be related to difficulty in manipulating it or could be caused by a small piece of debris lodging in the seat. 'Ihis cause is considered the most likely to have caused the erroneous post maintenance test results in May, 1989.

EVENI' ANAIESTS

'Ihe "B" Emergency Nuclear Services Seawater Pump is one of two 100% capacity, redundant punps which supply cooling water - to the Nuclear Services Heat Exchangers [m,HX] through ocxmon piping. 'Ihe Nuclear Services Heat Exchangers remove heat frun the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System [CC). 'Ihe Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System, which supplies cooling water to various nuclear related ccroponents is also configured with two 100% capacity, redundant emergency duty punps and ccanon piping (see Figurn 3). 'Ihe Nuclear Se.rvices closed Cycle Cboling System cools the following Engineered Safeguards ccuponents urder accident conditions:

- One High Pressure Injection Punp [BQ,P],

'Ihree Reactor Building Fan Cooler Units (BK,AHU),

- Motor Driven Emergency Feodwater Punp [BA,P].

NIC f orm 306A 16491

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f ACILITV NAME til DOCKET NUMBtM (2) HR NMER (6) PAOS '3)

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The Emergency Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System also supplies cooling water to the Chilled Water System ()M) for cooling the control Canplex (1%).

'Ibe configuration of these systems is such that either punp in the Emergency Nuclear Services Seawater Systan in acabination with either punp of the Emergency Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System can fulfill the cooling requirements of all cwwa:uts served.

In addition, the functica of all the above Ergineered Safeguards cupants, which are cooled by the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System, is backed up by altermte ecpipment which is cooled by the Decay Heat' Closed Cycle - 3 Cooling System (BI) or does not require an external cooling source to operate. l

'Ihe Decay Heat Closed Cycle Coolirq System is conprised of two independent, l 100% capacity trains.

'Ihe Ergineered Safeguard Ccmponents cooled by the Decay Heat Closed Cycle I Coolirg System are:

- One HPI Punp

'19o Trains of the Baildirg Spray System (BE) (Backup to Fan Coolers) .

'Ihe second Emergency Feedwater Punp is turbine driven and is self cooled.

Backup cooling to the Chilled Water System .is supplied by the Secondary Services Closed Cycle Cooling System (KB), Backup cooling for the Control complex can also be supplied by a dedicated diiller. system.

In consideration of this redundancy and diversity, it is concluded that sufficient cooling water could have been supplied to at least one train of Engineered Safeguards canponents under accident conditions while PHP-2B was l inoperable.

Additionally, an engineering analysis was conducted following the discovery that an incorrect inpeller had been installed in IMP-28. 'Ibe purpose of the analysis was to determine whether the degraded punp could provide sufficient flow to meet the accident cooling load requirements of the plant. 'Ihe conditions assumed in performance of the analysis were as follows:

o Tide Condition - Blowout hurricane level, o Ultimate Heat Sink Teperature - 90 degrees F. based on highest recorded tenperature from May to August 27, 1989, o Accident Corditions - Worst case heat load per Final Safety Analysis Report o Pung Flow - From a curve developed frun actual measured flow of RWP-2B with incorrect inpeller installed.

NXC Form 305A (649)

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'Ihe results of the analysis indicate that even in its degraded condition, the flow provided by WP-2B would have been sufficient to meet the accident cooling

, load requirements of the plant.

CERBCTIVE ACfIGE

'Ihe plant was shut dcwn upon the determination that WP-2B was not developing the required flow. 'Ibe incorrect impeller was removed from the ptmp and the original inpeller was sent to the manufacturer for repair and refurbishing.

'Ihe original impeller was reinstalled upon return from the manufacturer. 'Ihe l plant remained shut down until WP-2B was returned to service and su-= fully tested.

'Ihe flow meter was removed frun its box to facilitate connecting the hoses and allow unobstructed arvw= to the bleed valves. 'Ihe procedures which govern use of the flow measurement equipnent now require checking for leakage past the -

bleed valves prior to recording flow data.

'Ibe procurement process which led to obtaining the incorrect impeller frcan the As a result of the investigation, l punp severalmanufacturer actions werewas also investigated.

taken. 'Ihe actions inclwlad verification of the trim dimension and number of vanes in each W punp inpeller currently in storage at Crystal River Unit 3, and includad a verification of the trim dimension and number of vanes in the inpe.ller that was reinstalled in RWP-2B. Another action was the developnent of a Receipt Inspection Plan which requires verification of the trim dimensions, number of vanes and other physical characteristics of inpellers ordered frun this vendor in the future.

, Alternate or inproved methods for determining the flow rate in the Nuclear l Services Seawater System are being investigated. If the results of these l investigations indicate there are more accruate and reliable methods for measuring flow in this system, they will be considered for future installation.

WEVIouS SIMIIAR EVDFFS

'Ihis event is considered to be an isolated occurrence.

NIC Form ae6A (6496

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