ML19325F334

LER 89-035-00:on 890906,discrepancy Noted in dc-powered Component Rated Voltages & Actual Voltages Seen by Components.Caused by Inadequate Control of Design Process. All Components Replaced Prior to startup.W/891110 Ltr

ML19325F334
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/10/1989
From:	Moffatt L, Ken Wilson FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F1189-14, LER-89-035, LER-89-35, NUDOCS 8911200152
Download: ML19325F334 (13)

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November '10, 1989 3F1189-14 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Otannission .

Attention: Document Control Desk 1 Washington, D. C. 20555 .

i

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3- .

Docket No. 50-302  ?

Operating License No. DPR-72 ,

Licensee Event Report No.89-035 {

Dear Sir:

4

,j Enclosed is' Licensee Event Report '(IER)89-035 which is subnitted '

(1. in accordance with 10 C2R 50.73.- -

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I Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

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l{'o ' very truly yours, . ,

Nb lj Fantuth R. Wilson 1jf Manager, Nuclear Licensing 1.. ,

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l); j xc: Regional Administrator, Region II ,

Nq! : Senior Resident Irspector

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ANO REPOR13 MANAOtME NT DRANCH (P 630), U S NUCLE AR REOULATOHY COMMI5510N. W A$HINGTON. DC 20t46. AND TO THE P APE RWORK RIOUCTION PROJECT Q1h00104), OFFICE OF MANAOt MENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,DC 70603.

PACILITV NAME HI DOCE S T NUMSE R Q1 PAGE W CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 o l 5 l 0 l 0 l 0 l' 3l 0l 2 1 loFl 12 1 TIT't al INADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROLS LEAD TO SAFhir RELATED GUMPONENIb DELNG 5UUJLGILU IU VOLTAGES HIGHER THAN MAXIMUM RATED VOLTAGE.

Eve;T OATE (8) LER NUMeth tel REPORT DATE 171 OTHER F ACILITit$ INVOLVED ($1 MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR IIj (Ak ,y, *y,$ MONTH OAY VEAR F ACILIT v N AMts DOCEl1 NUMetRist N/A 0l5l0l0l0; i l

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} 60,73naH2Hul to f aieH2HumHal to.73teH2 Hull 50 73deH2Hal LICEN$EE CONTACT FOR THIS LER H2I DAME TELEPHONE NUMetR AR& A COD 4 L. W. Moffatt, Nuclear Safety Supervisor 9; 0,4 7;9,5l-l6;4 8g ()

COMPLETE ONE LtNE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRittD IN THIS REPORT tt3)

R T MA AC R O TA f CAU$t $YsTEM COMPONENT "^N(

y AC. o pR CAUSE svtT EM COMPONE N T pp I I I I 1 ~l i I I I I I I I I I I l l I I I I I I I I 1 SUPPttM8NT AL REPORT GXPtCTED 1141 MONTH OAV YEAR SUDMt8$ ION it$ IH ves. con pere f M9tCTIO SV04*IS$10N DA tle NO l l l ASSTMCT IL*mit to 9400 wesee, o e , eneronunerely hereen song'e spece ryorerrown tonest Gel On the basis of a rm---rdation from the B&W Owners Group " Safety and l Performance Improvement Program", an investigation of DC powered components was conducted. A discrepancy was found in the cmponents' rated voltages and the actual voltages seen by the cmponents. On September 6, 1989 this was determined to be an operation outside the design basis for Crystal River Unit

3. At the time this determination was made, the plant was in MODE 5, COLD SHITfDOWN, for maintenance not related to the DC power system.

l Each component was examined to determine if it was operable. A total of 270 l components were found to be affected, and 32 we.re determined to be inoperable.

I All inoperable o7uponents were replaced prior to the unit start-up on October 13, 1989. All other affected DC components are being evaluated for future replacement. 'Ihis event was caused by inadequate control of tne engineering design process by Florida Power. Future design processes will utilize the "desigr. basis document" to correctly specify the required voltage range.

This event is reportable wrler 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) .

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! EVINP IESCRIPTICN on September 6, 1989, it was detemined that scne safety related DC powered cu ve,wnAs had been e W to voltages in excess of the manufacturers' stated j voltage ratings. At that time, the unit was in ! ODE 5 (COID SHUTDOWN) with the Peactor Coolant System [A8) (RCS) tenperature at 150 degrees Fahrenheit and the pressure at 150 pounds per square inch for a maintenance outage unrelated to the DC power systems. %e DC voltage in exc*=a of the couponents' rated maximum is considered an operation outside the design basis of Crystal River i Unit 3, and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) .

l On June 29, 1988 Florida Power Coraoration received an item from the hWh and Wilcox Owners Group (BWOG) com..ttee conducting the Safety and Ibrformance Inprovement Program (SPIP) rw--% ling the owners investigate the possibility that DC powered cxmponents were subjected to voltages outside their normal operating range. his was done at Crystal River in two parts, overvoltages and undervoltages. We undervoltage portion of the study was found to contain no concerns that would cwpunise the operation of equiptent, or thus the safe operation and shutdown of the unit. he overvoltage portion of the study showed that there were potential concerns. An in-depth review was perfomed i and it identified 270 (two hundred seventy) DC powered components that could have been subjected to high voltages. mis was documented by the issuance of NCDR 89-219 on September 6, 1989. Of the 270 items involved in the ove.rvoltage issue, 159 were found to be acceptable "as is" based on analysis of s its failure mode or availability of reduntint equipnent. Another 79 of the I

items were found to be non-safety related or not affecting any safety related function, even if failed. A total of 32 items were determined to be inoperable due to the failure made or due to the consequences of the component failing.

We repair of these inoperable items became a MODE restraint; i.e. , no 10DE c.scension or unit start up until the items are repaired and the Technical <

Specifications involving these itens are satisfied. Eis was completed for each inoperable item prior to the unit start up on October 13, 1989.

CAUSE mis report documents several " events" that had the same end result in the plant; that is, components installed that are not rated for the entire range of voltages that the components experience while in service. The cause of this was an inadequate control cf the design process. Most of the affected components were replaced or added to the system by a plant modification. An investigation shows components to have been incorrectly specified in the modification design, he root cause of this was the lack of adequate documentation of the design basis for the s'fstems.

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F ACILITV NAMt it) DUCKtT NUMelh (2) LER NuhettR (6) PA06 43l vtAR se iA6 .

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Text <n . w. , we ,,,,, mm4 w nn EVENP EVA111ATION Decause thexe are a large number of items to be evaluated, each item is listed,- i

! along with the EIIS and IEEE codes, and is followed by the evaluation for that l l item. Whexe several items have the same design and function, they are listed l together. Se first items listed are those evaluated and found to be  !

i inoperable due to overvoltage failure potential. Wey are listed in l

alphabetical order of their plant tag number. % e evaluation for each contains the purpose of the ocmponent, the consequences of failure, and redundant  ;

systms or canponents available. l Se following unv ients o were declared incperable:

, CIV-34-SV1 [IN,VIV) CIV-34-SV2 [FN,VIV) l- CIV-35-SV1 [IN,VIV) CIV-35-SV2 [FN,VIV)

CIV-40-SV1 [IN,VIV) CIV-40-SV2 [1N,VIV)

CIV-41-SV1 [IN,VIV) CIV-41-SV2 (1N,VIV)

MUV-49-SV [CB,VIV) SW-151-SV [CC,VIV) 3ESAR4/RCA [JE,RLY) SW-354-SV2 [CC,VIV) 1 3ESBR4/RCB (JE,RLY) SW-355-SV [CC,VIV) l 20X/SW-37 (CC,RLY) SW-12-SV1 [CC,VIV) 20XB/SW-353 (CC,RLY) SW-12-SV2 (CC,VIV) 20XB/SW-354 (CC,RLY) SW-152-SVA [CC,VIV) 20X/SW-43 [CE,RLY) SW-1S2-SVB [CC,VIV) l 33XB/SW-353 [CC,RLY) SW-353-SV1 (CC,VIV]

! 33XB/SW-354 [OC,RLY) SW-353-SV2 (CC,VIV]

SW-354-SV1 (CC,VIV) 63Z1/RB4(A) [JE,74]

REIAY 76X (EK,76) 63Z1/RB5(A) (JE,74)

B71E A AND B TRAIN DIESEIS 63Z1/RB5(B) [JE,74]

Camponent: CIV-34-SV1 (IN,VIV) CIV-34-SV2 [1N,VIV]

CIV-35-SV1 [FN,VIV) CIV-35-SV2 (IN,VIV]

CIV-40-SV1 (IN,VIV) CIV-40-SV2 [1N,VIV]

CIV-41-SV1 [1N,VIV) CIV-41-SV2 [1N,VIV]

Evaluation: %ese valves are the reactor cavity cooling unit (VA) cooling Vdter (and Reactor Containment Building [NH) (RB)) isolation valves. Rese cooling units are arrarged so that one is always in operation while the plant is runniry. We isolation valves are pneumatic operated valves; air to open, spring to close. %e solenoid valves are energized to open, bleeding pressure 4

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IACIL47Y 88AM4 06 DOCnti NUMSER tal 44R NUMSN ($1 PA04 (31

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 ol5l0jojol3l0l2 14 9 0]3l5 -

Q0 0l4 0F 1b rixt in m w w =ac r mm4w nn off the valve operator and allowing the spring to close the valve. Since one unit is always idle, one set of valves is always closed, with the solenoids ized. Upon ES achaation, all the solenoids wuld be energized, all the cool unit valves closed. Se solenoids could then be subjected to an overvoltage condition that would raise the taperature above the limit. Wis l could cause a failure of the solenoids and, in turn, allow a RB isolation valve

~

to fail open. Because this system is arranged such that all the autmatically  !

operated valves are outside the RB, and all are included in this overvoltage issue, this potential failure is defined as a loss of RB integrity as defined by the plant Technical Specifications. We valves were declared inoperable.

Even though the valves were declared inoperable, a release path frm the RB to the envivamiant would not exist unless there had been a concurrent rupture of the Industrial Cooling System (EM] (CI) piping.

C m u it: MUV-49-SV (CB,VIV]

Evaluation: Wis solenoid valve is part of the operator for valve MN-49 (CB,ISV), a pneumatically operated RB isolation valve. mis valve is the outside RB isolation valve for the reactor coolant letdown line. We letdown line is normally in operation to allow a continuous purification f1w from the Reactor Coolant Systnm (RCS) [AB). During an Engineered Safeguards (ES) [JE]

actuation, the letdown line is isolated to assure RB integrity. Se overvoltage could cause this solenoid to fail such that MOV-49 fails open, which is considered a loss of RB integrity. If the outside isolation valve 1 failed open, the automatic isolation would be accomplished by the inside RB i isolation valves. Inside the RB there are three parallel valves which are i electric motor operated and are not part of the concern for the DC pwer l overvoltage.

Gavur=>t: SW-151-SV (CC,VIV) SW-355-SV [CC,VIV]

SW-3M-SV2 (CC,VIV) l 20XB/SW-353 [CC,RLY) 33XB/SW-353 (CC,RLY) l 20XB/SW-354 (CC,RLY) 33XB/SW-354 [CC,RLY)

Evaluation: Rese valves (SW-151, 354 and 355) are used to change the cooling water for the RB cooling units [VA] from the normal emi, CI, to the post accident source, Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System (SW) (CC).

Upon ES actuation, valves SW-151 and SW-355 (CC,ISV) are designed to close to isolate the CI system. At the same time, valve SW-354 (CC,ISV) is designed to open to complete the SW cooling water flow path. Se arrangement of the SW system valves used to switch the cooling water supplies is shown in Figure 1.

me solenoid valves, SW-151-SV and SW-355-SV, must energize to close their respective valves and SW-354-SV2 must energize to open valve SW-354. A field walkdown of these solenoids showed they were not rated for the overvoltage

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Se 20XB relays are used to energize the solenoids that, in turn, admit air to the operator that opens the SW system isolation valves SW-353 and SW-354

[CC,ISV). If these relays fail, the SW system isolation valves will fail in the closed position. @ese valves are required to open after an accident to provide cooling water to the RB coolers. So, if these relays fail, the valves would not have perforned their intended safety function and were therefore declamd inoperable.

W e 33XB relays provide position indication for the SW system isolation valves l as well as interlock functions with other SW valves. Failure of these relays l- prevents proper indication of valve position and defeat of the interlock I l function. mus, these relays were declared inoperable.

Failure of these solenoids or relays would prevent ' SW cooling water frrxn properly supplying the RB cooling units (AHUs) [VA) as is assumed in the safety analyses. However, the safety analyses states the three cooling units, OR the building spray system, OR a ccxnbination of coolers and spray can provide adequate cooling for the RB after an accident. terefore, proper cooling would have been maintained unless there had been a concurrent failure of the three coolers and one of the two building spray trains.

C u p m ->L: SW-12-SV1 [CC,VIV]

SW-12-SV2 [CC,VIV) I SW-152-SVA [CC,VIV)

SW-152-SVB [CC,VIV)

SW-353-SV1 [CC,VIV)

SW-353-SV2 [CC,VIV]

SW-354-SV1 [CC,VIV]

Evaluation: These valves have been walked down in the field and verified to be HC type coils with a rating of 140 volts. While these are not an overvoltage concern, management decided to replace the solenoids with the "NP" type solenoids while work was in progress on the SW system valves.

Cu p a uiL:

3ESAR4/RCA [JE,RLY) 3ESBR4/RCB [JE,RLY]

Evaluation: Rese relays receive an ES signal on High Pressure Injection (HPI) [CB] actuation and close contacts to serd an anticipating actuation signal to the Emergancy Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) . If either of these relays fail, EFIC will not automatically start on an ES HPI signal.

Relay failure will not defeat the EFIC system, nor prevent the operators from manually starting the EFIC system. During an emergency, there is another function that will automatically start EPIC; that is, all four reactor coolant i

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P ACILITY NAWS Hi DOCK 67 NUMetR 12) LtR NUMetR (6) PAGE (3)

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TaxT in A w w mec ,., mim Hn punps shut down. Se other EFIC start signals basM on steam generator l corditions are also unaffected.

1 C@uit: 20X/SW-37 (CC, Rill) )

20X/SW-43 (CC,RIN) l Evaluation: 2ese relays are usM to operate the solenoids for the i pneumatic RB isolation valves (SW-37 and SW-43 (CC,ISV)). If these relays l l fail, the solenoids are de-energized and the RB isolation valves open. Wese 1 valves are designed to be open after an accident to provide cooling water to j the ES RB coolera. We failure of these solenoids would not impact this ES j function. However, the solenoids and the valves they operate must be operable l to isolate a SW system leak inside the RB. % ese valves are normally open and l the solenoids de-energized so there is only a very remote possibility that the i solenoids would have been exposed to the overvoltage in the DC power.

Redundant manual valves, SW-38 and SW-47, could be used to isolate these lines if an SW leak occurred in the RB.

Cuienu L: RELAY 76X [EK,76)

B01U A AND B TRAIN DIESEIS Evaluation: he 76X relay is an auxiliary relay for device 76, an i l overcurrent protective relay for the diesel generator field. his relay is l l normally de-energized. A relay DC power overcurrent condition would have to '

occur simultaneous with a diesel generator field overcurrent so that the relay is energized during an overcurrent condition. We relay is only momentarily energized in any event ard the relays are factory surge-tested to 200 per cent of rated voltage. Since the DC power overvoltage concern is only 113 per cent of rated voltage, failure during momentary energization at a voltage less than already tested for does not seem credible. If failure did in fact occur it would rerder the diesel unprotected frm field overcurrent but this would not shut the diesel down or prevent it fr a starting. But, because there is no way l to recover the diesel from a field failure due to overcurrent, and because the diesel could be recovered frm a diesel protective relay trip; these relays were declared inoperable.

CuvcaniL: 63Z1/RB4(A) [JE,74) 63Zl/RB5(A) [JE,74) 63Z1/RB5(B) [JE,74]

Evaluation: %ese relays are normally energized relays that are in the circuit that monitors RB pressure. When the pressure switches detect an increase in building pressure the switch actuates and the relay de-energizes.

%e de-energization of the relay annunciates an alarm in the control room as

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, CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l 3l0 l 2 8l9 0l7 0F 1 l2

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I. well as actuate that channel. If cany one channel actuates due to a relay I

failure, then this amounts to a nuisance alann. But there could be sinultaneous failures that would activate the ES. While in the most pmbable scenario one relay would fail at a time, be detected and repaired, since it is ,

, possible to get an ES actuation due to relay failum, these relays were i

! declared ir. operable. l In addition to the safety related items dim-d above, one hundred fifty l

nine (159) safety related items were examined and found to fail in a safe I mode, or not to be subject to failure due to high DC power voltage. We items are listed in Table 1, attached.

< In addition to the safety related cmponents that were examined and found I operable, another seventy nine (79) items were examined and found to either not be safety related or to have no impact on safety related components or safety functions, or found to have the correct DC voltage rating for all actual I

operating conditions. Rese cmponents are listed in Table 2.

l l wxxwnVE ACTION All of the items identified as " inoperable" were replaced with components rated for the higher voltages that occur during periods of battery charge equalization. All of the items justified as "no current safety impact" are

, being evaluated for replacement before or during Refuel VII. All of the items identified as non-safety related are being evaluated for future replacement with no currently defined thnetable. Two valves (EGV-38-SV and EGV-42-SV

[EK,VIV]) are being deleted from the diesel air start system because they serve no purpose.

Rese actions will assure that all installed cmponents are capable of withstanding the entire range of voltages they will be exposed to during all MODES of operation.

Nuclear engineering has developed a design basis document. By locating the bases of the systems' design in a single reference document, nuclear engineering has assured that the engineers working on design or pmcurement specifications will have all of the relevant information available for their use. We use of this document will assure that future design and procurunents will specify the appmpriate range of voltages.

PREVIOUS SIMIIAR EVENTS Sere have been other engineering / design basis problems at CR-3 that have led to reportable events (see 11R 89-033 for details) . Were were no previous reportable events identified in which the DC power system was suspected of having the potential to damage equipment by operating at a higher than expected voltage.

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I 'hable 1 SAPE1Y RE2JmllD G3GGENIS EVATIDm!D TO IE NYTPEMEE IECMEE 'mEY FAIL SAFE AND TO IE REPIJOD BY REFUEL VII

, 1

! TAG N A CGGONEN1' 00DE l M N-1A-SV1-5 [VL,VIV]

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M N-IA-SV2-5 [VL,VIV) R AHV-1D-SV1-2 [VL,VIV] l i

AHV-1D-SV2-2 [VL,VIV) j l CAV-6-SV [KN,VIV] '

l CAV-7-SV [EN,VIV]

DCV-10-SV [BI,VIV] <

DCV-12-SV [BI,VIV) l DFP-1C [DC,P]

DFP-1D [DC,P]

DFP-3A [DC,P]

DFP-3B [DC,P]

REIAYS A,B,C,D,E [EK,74] SEE NOI'E 1 GOVERNOR M7IOR [EK,}O] SEE NOI'E 1 ALL ES 4160 NOLT [EB,52] SEE NOI'E 2 CIROJIT BREAKER GARGING ICIORS AND CICSING DEVICES ALL ES 480 NOIfr [ED,52] SEE NOI'E 2 CIRCUIT BREAKER GARGING }UIORS AND CICSING DEVICES MJP-3A [CB/BQ,P,W]

McP-5A [CB/BQ, P,W]

MJP-3B [CB/BQ,P,W]

M e-5B [CB/BQ,P,W)

MJP-3C [CB/BQ, P,W]

MJP-SC [CB/BQ,P,W]

RELAY 69X-B/Z [JM,69]

REIAY 69X-B/AA [JM,69]

20X/WSV-4 [KN,RLY]

20X/WSV-6 [KN,RLY)

" 4' ExPi ts </3 ore:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '#g^,"Ro*f;8'"$MM'&o",nT LC*'OV ,TN.'A .'s 1

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TEXT C2NTINUATION : C PAPERWO R v Ts'O C t'3 600 l t s OF MANActMENT A6dp pud 0tT,W ASHINGTON,DC 20h03. 1 PACILITV 80A884 til DOCeLET Nuts 4R GI ' LOR NUMSER (W PAOS GI "aa "St ?J'. -

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CRYSTAL RIVER' UNIT 3: o l5 l0 l0 l0 l 3l 0l2 8l 9 -

0 ]3 l5 -

0l 0 0l9OF i 1p' TEXT W summe asses e sovveest asse amamor Mtc poem m4 w (171 i ES Channel (JE,RLY) SEE NOIE 3 L

Testing Relays TAG NLMBERS: 95V13/RBB I L

95V1/RBA 95V2/RBB j 95V11/RBA 95V4/RBB '

.95V3/RBA 95V6/RBB ,

I 95VS/RBA 95V8/RBB ')

l 9577/RBA 95X1/RCBH l

95V9/RBA 95X2/RCEli l '

95X1/RCAH 95X4/RCEli 95X2/RCAH 95X6/RCEtt l 95X4/RCNI 95V10/RBB ,l l 95X6/RCAH 95V12/RBB .j 95V10/RBA 95V14/RBB L 95V2/RBA 95X5/RCAH I 95V4/RBA 95X7/RCAH '

95V6/RBA 95X5/RCBH 95V8/RBA 95X1/RCBL 95X/RC2 95V3/RBB 95X1/RCAL 95VS/RBB 95X3/RCAH 95V7/RBB ,

, 95V1/RBB 95X3/RCBH l 95V11/RBB 95V9/RBB

! NOTES:

1 B7di A AND B 'IRAIN DIESEIS 2, 25 ES 4160 WLT BREAKER CHARGING 2CIORS 25 ES 4160 WIlr BREAKER CLOSING DEVICES 1 17 ES 480 NOIIP BREAKER OIARGING }OIORS 17 ES 480 NOLT BREAKER CLOSING DEVICES 3 ALL HAVE 'IHE SAME CII@ONENT CODE, ONLY TAG NUMBERS ARE I2STED.

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TEXT CONTINUATlON  ?"".'"4'J1(^"R1"e t,YU t".!!!c'*' fP!dS"' i,MNf! -

1 PAPI WO ME U ION 3 604 04 i OF MANAGEMENT AND SUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

FACeterY 8eAant 44, DOCKtT#suMetR62) LER NUtestR (0) PA06 tal n '" "M'"E,".  %*.1 )

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 0 l5 l 0 l 0 l o l 3l 0l 2 8l9 -

0]3l5 -

0l 0l 1l 0 OF 1 l2-text,,, - . w . ace mmewtm I 'nsble 2 l l'mE FULEO 't0 IRVE NO SAFETY IMFRCF l rac - 02smEnr 03aE AH-517-SV [VL,ISV]

AH-518-SV [VL,ISV) '

20X/AH-518 [VL,RLY) l BSV-69 [BE,TV)

IEV-77 [BE,TV) l~ BSV-70 [BE,TV) l B9V-78 [BE,TV) )

i BSV-71 [BE,TV) i BSV-79 [BE,TV) 1 BSV-72 ,. [BE,TV)

BSV-80 [BE,'IV)

BSV-73 [BE,TV) l BSV-141 [BE,TV) l BSV-74 [BE,TV)

l. BSV-142 [BE,TV)

! BSV-75 [BE,TV]

l BSV-143 [BE,TV)

BSV-76 [BE,Tv]

BSV-144 [BE,TV]

OLSX [M,RLY]

l CIsC [m,RLY]

l EGV-38-SV [EK,VIV) l- EGV-42-SV [EK,VIV]

86/27 bra (T&C) [FJ,86]

86/27BTB (T&C) [FJ,86]

86B/ESA (T&C) [FJ,86]

86B/ESB (T&C) [FJ,86]

RCP-1A/RC-42-MS [AB,VIS] SEE NorE 1 l RCP-1B/RC-65-MS [AB,VIS] SEE NorE 1 l RCP-1C/RC-88-MS [AB,VIS] SEE NorE 1

RCP-1D/RC-111-MS [AB,VIS] SEE NOIE 1 2SW-206-PS [CC,63)

UNIT 3R/41C [TB,RLY) SEE NorE 2 1 UNIT 3R/41X [TB,RLY] SEE NorE 2 I

R/AST [TA,RLY] SEE IUTE 3 L 20X/AHV-2A [VL,RLY) l 20X/AHV-1D [VL,RLY]

20XB/CIV-34 [IH,RLY]

20XB/CIV-35 [m,RLY]

20XB/CIV-40 [m,RLY) 20XB/CIV-41 [IW,RLY]

20XB/SWV-12 [CC,RLY]

l L

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3,??#a".'on'TTv"eM'.O.A.HINGTON.DC O MANAGEMENT AND SUDGET 20 PACILITY seAME tu DOCE4T NUMBER 421 Lim NUMS8R (4) . PA06 (3) viaa " M7J '.  :

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 o l5 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 3! 0l2 8l9 -

0l3 l5 -

0l 0 111 0F 1l2:

Terru - A w M =c, msninn 20XB/SW-47 [CC,EY) 20XB/SW-48 [OC,RLY]

20XB/SW-49 [CC,RLY) J 20XB/SW-50 (CC,RLY)  ;

l- 20XR/SW-79 (CC,RLY) i 20XB/SW [0C,RLY) .

I 20XB/SW-81 [CC,RLY) ,

20XB/SW-82 [0C,RLY) l 20XB/SW-83 [OC,EY] 1 20XB/SW-84 [OC,RLY) 20XB/SW-85 [CC,RLY) l 20XE/SW-86 [OC,RLY] 'l 20XB/SW-109 [CC,RLY) )

20XB/SW-110 [CC,RLY] 1 20XB/SW-152 (CC,RLY) l 20XB/SW-355 (CC,RLY) 20X/SW-39 [CC,RLY) 20X/SW-45 [OC,RLY] l 20X/MN-49 [CB,RLY]

20X/MUV-253 '[CB,RLY]

35W-47C . [CC,RLY) 3SW-470 (CC,RLY]

3SW-48C [CC,RLY) 3SW-480 [CC,RLY]

3SW-49C [CC,RLY]

3SW-490 (CC,RLY) 3SW-50C [CC,RLY]

35W-500 [CC,RLY]

3MN-490 (CB,RLY) 3NN-490 [CB,RLY) 3MN-253C [CB,RLY]

3NN-2530 [CB,RLY]

2B-MN-64C2 [CB,RLY) 3B-MN-6402 [CB,RLY) 2MUP-5C [CB,RLY]

20X/B1 [RLY]

20X/B2 [RLY]

NCrTES:

1 RESET COIL ONLY 2 EXCITER SWI'KHGEAR (SWGR) CUBICLE 1 3 'IURBINE A AUIO S'IOP SOIENOID.

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