ML19332F017

LER 89-038-00:on 891029,util Engineers Discovered That Administrative Controls Not in Place for Three Makeup & Purification Sys Valves.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Procedures revised.W/891130 Ltr

ML19332F017
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/30/1989
From:	Moffatt L, Widell R FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F1189-20, LER-89-038, LER-89-38, NUDOCS 8912130286
Download: ML19332F017 (7)

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C O R P O R Allo N Novenber 30, 1989 3F1189-20 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Omsnission Attention:' Document control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No.,50-302 Operatirq License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No.89-038

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (IIR)89-038 whicts is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

V truly yours, Rolf . Widell Director, Nuclear Operations Site Stqport i WIR: mag

!~ Enclosure xc: Regional Administrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector l n 2 QQj$k d!.h go2 c l

POST OFFICE BOX 219

• CRYSTAL RIVER, FLORIDA 32629-0219 + (904) 563-2943 A Florlds Progress Company l

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Crystal River Unit 3 was in HOT STANDBY, on October 29, 1989. At 1R00 on that date utility engineers discovered that administrative controls were not in place for three Makeup and Purification System valves. Under certain system alignments, the valves were required to be de-energized in position in order to '

satisfy 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. Failure to satisfy Appendix R requirements constituted a condition outside the plant design basis.

This event was caused by personnel error. Personnel did not recognize the need to administratively control Makeup and Purification System valves in position and de-energized. '

Plant personnel will revise plant procedures to include the necessary administrative controls over Makeup and Purification System valves. Personnel have also reviewed the equipment identified as requiring administrative control by the Appendix R study. Appropriate controls are in place for the equipment identified.

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0 l0 0l2 or 0 l6 TEKT (# more sinese a newscer, yee esegener 44C Aerm W W tih EVENT DESCRIPTION Crystal River Unit 3 was in MODE 3, HOT STANDBY, on October 29, ,

1989. At 1800 on that date utility engineers discovered that I necessary administrative controls were not in place for three  ;

Makeup and Purification (MU) System valves (CB,V). Under certain  ;

MU system alignments, the valves were required to be de-energized )

in position in order to natisfy 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. -

Engineers made the discovery during review of modification ,

documentation. Upon further review of the discrepancy, plant I personnel determined the failure to satisfy Appendix R requirements '

constituted a condition outside the plant design basis. This determination was made on October 31, 1989.

The MU System includes three Makeup Pumps (MUPs) (CB,B), (Refer to Figure 1). The MUPs provide makeup flow to the Reactor Coolant ,

System (RCS) (AB), as well as High Pressure Injection (HPI) (BQ).

During normal plant operation, MUP-1B provides makeup flow to the RCS. Pumps MUP-1A and 1C are normally idle. These two pumps are normally selected to start and provide HPI flow following Engineered Safeguards System (ES) (JE) actuation. The Makeup Tank (CP,TK) provides the suction source for MUPs during normal operations, as well as plant heatup and cooldown. The Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) (BP,TK) provides MUP suction via MUV-58 and MUV-73 following ES actuation. Plant Technical Specifications require two independent operable HPI trains during MODES 1, 2, and 3 (POWER OPERATION, STARTUP, and HOT STANDBY respectively) . The MUP suction cross-tie valves, MUV-62 and MUV-69, (CB,SHV) are aligned to provide proper HPI suction paths. Whenever MUP-1A or MUP-1C is taken out of service or returned to service, operators realign suction cross-tie valves to maintain proper suction supply to the HPI trains.

The Crystal River 3 Appendix R fire study established requirements to de-energize MUV-62 and MUV-69 in their required positions when aligning Makeup Pump 1B for HPI service in place of MUP-1A or MUP-1C. The study also required that MUV-9 be de-energized open.

These actions were intended to prevent valves from repositioning due to potential short circuits caused by fire. These requirements were established in April of 1984. Instructions for de-energizing '

valves were not added to the procedures following completion of the Appendix R fire study.

9MSE This event was caused by personnel error. Plant personnel did not recognize the need to de-energize and administratively control j Makeup System valves as described by the Appendix R fire study.

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The utility implemented many modifications based on the Appendix R

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study. Among these modifications were changes to the position indicator circuits associated with MUV-9, MUV-62, and MUV-69.

Contract engineering personnel prepared instructions and documentation for the circuit modifications. Due to the design of the position indicator circuits, indication would be lost when valves were de-energized. The documentation package for the circuit modifications identified that the changes were necessary because the valves were to be de-energized. However, the modification did not establish the administrative controls l necessary to ensure that the valves remain de-energized. Personnel l that reviewed the modification package did not recognize the need

to incorporate such administrative controls into plant operating procedures. During the Appendix R fire study, additional documentation was developed to identify plant equipment that required specific administrative controls. However, this documentation did not identify that valves MUV-9, MUV-62, and MUV-69 should have been de-energized in position.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Plant personnel will revise plant procedures to include the necessary administrative controls for MUV-9, 62, and 69. Personnel have also reviewed the additional documentation mentioned above.

Appropriate controls are in place for the equipment identified.

l EVENT ANALYSIS In accordance with the Appendix R fire study, the MU System is required to provide the makeup flow necessary to complete a controlled shutdown. The study assumes one MU pump is out of i

service, and a second pump is lost due to fire. Plant Abnormal i Operating Procedures require operators isolato letdown flow from the Reactor Coolant system during certain fire scenarios. In such a scenario, suction from the BWST would be required to ensure sufficient makeup volume during cooldown. With MUP-1A out of service, and MUP-1B selected to provide HPI flow, system alignment will be as shown in Figure 1. In this alignment, MUV-69 must remain open to provide BWST suction to MUP-1B, and MUV-62 must remain closed. Similarly, with MUP-1C out of service, and MUP-1B selected to provide HPI flow, MUV-62 must remain open to assure BWST suction to MUP-1B, and MUV-69 must remain closed (Refer to Figure 2).

1 In addition to MUP suction valve alignment requirements, the 1 Appendix R fire study established two makeup flow paths necessary l to ensure safe shutdown capability. In order to maintain proper I flow path operability, the study requires MUV-9 be de-energized l open. I 1

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reposition, isolating suction to the operating MUP, or isolating a required makeup flow path.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS '

Florida Power Corporation has submitted one previous Licensee Event Report concerning failure to satisfy Appendix R criteria. Report 88-12 concerned failure to satisfy electrical isolation requirements for temperature instrumentation.

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