ML20043B809

LER 90-007-00:on 900112,discovered That Door Between Control Room Complex & Turbine Bldg Removed for Mod Work,Resulting in Inoperability of Both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys.Door Replaced & Warning Signs affixed.W/900523 Ltr

ML20043B809
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/23/1990
From:	Boldt G, Stephenson W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F0590-15, 3F590-15, LER-90-007, LER-90-7, NUDOCS 9005310322
Download: ML20043B809 (4)

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!!- 4 i-May 23, 1990  ;

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' U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

Attention: - Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Sub' ject: Crystal River Unit 3

-Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No.90-007

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Dear Sir:

- i Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER)90-007 which is submitted in- ,

.accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office. <

-Sincerely, G. L. oldt

-Vice President, Nuclear Production  !

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y. Enclosure xt: Regional Administrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector E

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' POST OFFICE BOX 219

• CRYSTAL RIVER, FLORIDA 326290219 * (904) 563-2943 A Florida Progress Company

RC ORJ 308 - U.S. NUCLEAR Kt0ULA103Y COMMiss10N APPR0vtD OMB NO. 3160 o104

. . EXPIRES 4/3a/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) Y*

, fM ,T cA si l s P apt RWO Rt TION JC 3 to 04 0 IC OF MANAGEMENT AND DVDGET WASHINGTON.DC 70603.

• ACILITY NAME m DOCKtY NUMSER {3) FAGE (3i CRYSTAL' RIVER UNIT 3 olsjotolot 3l0 12 1 jorl 0 l3 Inadequate Implementation of Control Complex Habitability Study Leads to Breach of Habitability Envelope and Inoperability of Both Trains of Emergency Ventilation System

SVENT DATE (Si LER NUMetR tel REPORT DAf t til CTHER $ ACILITill INVOLVED tti MONT H DAY YEAR YEAR b" ( [*jfM MONT H DAY YEAR F AciLity Names pocktY NvMatRist N/A o]6lol0lot l l

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,,,,,,,,, THis REPORT is svouifTED puRsvANT TO THE Rh0VIREMENTS OF to CFR l. (Ch.c4 on e, more of th. follow' api H18 Metm 6 a 4a3m n ao.m .o ni.imt i unm g n sosi.imm so.wi.mi nummm n Tim Hoi OOi i0 no soni.imm sommm so n-mwm gHEgjagee o.mmmt.m L n.n-mm son.imweAi uw n oi.imoi n.n-mm un.,mi.am<.,

n 44t.1tilM to.734.H2tMil to 73i.l(2Hal LICEN$tt CONTACT FOR THIS LtR Uti NAME TILIPHONG NUM$f R W. A. STEPHENSON, NUCLEAR SAFETY SUPERVISOR 9 l0 1 4 7 l9 l5 l- l6 l4 j8 l6 COMPLETE ONt LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT f AILURE DESCRitt0 IN THl4 REPORT H31

"$'g A C. R ORfA 1 i CAU$t SYST E M COMPONINT R{ ,Ta p CAUS$ SYSTEM COMPONENT MA%AC pp 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 l l l l l l 1 1 I SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT E MPECTtD (141 MONT M OAY YEAR Yts IIf ..s torneo.t. LXPECTRO SUOMISSION DA TE) NO l l l AuT R ACT m.,, ,. . ,.. . . . ... . ., . .,~. w.. o.~.o H .i On January 12, 1990 Crystal River Unit Three was in OPERATIONAL MODE ONE (POWER OPERATION) at 98'/s RATED THERMAL POWER. During a walkdown of the control complex ventilation system, a utility engineer discovered that a door between the control complex and turbine building had been removed for modification work. On April 23, 1990, following extensive research and interpretation, it was determined that this was an operation prohibited by Technical Specifications because it allowed excessive leakage into the control complex habitability envelope, rendering both trains of the Control Complex Emergency Ventilation System inoperable.

This event was caused by inadequate implementation of the Control Complex Habitability Study, which had been performed in response to NUREG 0737, Item III.D.3.4.

The door was replaced within about eight hours of discovery by the utility engineer. Development of corrective action to preclude recurrence is not complete, but will include placement of appropriate warning signs on all habitability envelope doors, and the development and implementation of a program to control all control complex habitability envelope penetrations.

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- On January 12, 1990, Crystal River Unit Three was in OPERATIONAL MODE ONE (POWER OPERATION) at 98% RATED THERMAL POWER. During a walkdown of-the Control Complex Ventilation System [VI), a utility engineer discovered that a door [VI,DR].

between the control complex [NA] and the turbine building (NM] had been removed for modification work. The engineer questioned whether this door was a part of the control complex habitability envelope and whether its removal _during power operation was allowed. No Technical Specification exists for the Control Complex Habitability Envelope. -The door was replaced within about eight hours of removal.

On April 23, 1990, following extensive research and interpretation on this issue, it was determined that removing this door rendered both trains of the Control.

Complex Emergency Ventilation System inoperable. Technical Specifications require that with both trains of the Control Complex Emergency Ventilation. System inoperable either one train be restored to operability within one hour or the plant be placed in Operational Mode Three (HOT STANDBY) within the following six hours. This door was removed for about eight hours without complying with this specification. -This constitutes an activity prohibited by Technical Specifications and, as such, is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B.

CAVSE NUREG 0737, Item III.D 3.4, required that each plant perform a Control Room Habitability Study. . Crystal River Unit Three performed this study and submitted a report to the NRC on June 30, 1987. This report contained calculations of control complex habitability envelope leakage based on the assumption that each door and other penetration remained intact. No guidance for operating the plant within these assumptions was implemented into plant procedures or Technical Specifications. Therefore, the cause of this event was inadequate implementation of the Control Complex Habitability Study.

EVENT EVALUATION No redundant equipment was available to perform the safety function of this system. If an accident involving a large radioactive release had occurred during the time that the door wr.s removed, cperator radiation doses might have exceeded those calculated in the FSAR. Similarly, if a large chemical release had occurred during the time that the door was removed, the chemical concentrations in the control complex atmosphere might have exceeded those calculated in the FSAR. It is unlikely that either of these events would have resulted in the inability of the operators to perform their functions. No such accidents occurred; therefore, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public.

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0 10 013 OF 0 l3 rww- a., w... - acwauanm The Control Complex Emergency Ventilation System was in normal standby status throughout this event. No compensatory measures were taken because the-door had been re-installed'before a determination of the operability of the control Complex Emergeacy Ventilation System was made.

CORRECTIVE ACTION ,

The door was replaced as soon as possible after the engineer began questioning its impact on control complex habitability. The door was removed for a total of about eight hours.

Signs will be posted on all control complex habitability envelope doors. These signs will contain warnings about the special nature of the doors and state what-actions must be taken before performing work on the doors or maintaining them open. A program; to control all control complex habitability envelope -

penetrations will be developed.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS No previous events ' involving degradation of the control complex habitability envelope were found.

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