ML19325E737

LER 85-034-01:on 850310,valve Alarm Function for Core Flood Tank Isolation Valves Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.On 850809,unit Entered Mode 3 & Then Raised RCS Pressure Above 750 Psig W/O Meeting Operability surveillances.W/891027 Ltr

ML19325E737
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/27/1989
From:	Moffatt L, Ken Wilson FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F1089-13, LER-85-034, LER-85-34, NUDOCS 8911080371
Download: ML19325E737 (4)

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C O R P O ft A t i O N Octnhar 27, 1989 3F1089-13 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ocunission Attention: M = ant control Desk '

Washington, D. C. 20555 Subjects crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 .

Operating License No. DPR-72 i Licensee Event Report No. 85-034-01  !

Dear Sir l Enclosed is a supplement to Licensee Event Report (IER)85-034 M11oh was previously subnitted in accordance with 10 CPR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Very truly yours, [

! A Fenneth R. Wilson Manager, Nuclear Licensing ,

WLR: mag Enclosure  ;

xc: Regional Administrator, Region II f Senior Resident Inspector ,

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Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.5.1 requires the core flood tank isolation .

valves (CFV-5 and CFV-6) to be operable khon in lODOS 1, 2 and 3 with systen l pressure greater than 750 psig. T.S. Sutvoillance 4.5.1.d requires the "Valvo liot Open" alarm annunciator to be testod at a systs pressure abovo 750 psig. '

In addition T.S. 4.0.4 prohibits HODE ascension or chargos in specificd applicability conditions, unicas the applicablo sutveillances have bocn perfomed within the required sutvolllance period. 7ho canbinod requirments of the abwe T.S. items presents a difficult situation khan ascending !OECS frm LODE 4 and the valvo alam function is inoperablo. Ettring the plant rhutdown on liurh 10, 1985, the valvo alam function for CFV-5 failed to moet ,

the acceptanoo criteria and corrtetive mintenanoo was performod during the outage. On August 9, 1985, CR-3 entered LODE 3 ard then raisod Reactor Coolant Systm pressure above 750 psig without mootirg the required operability surveillances for T.S. 3.5.1.a. As required by the sutveillance proceduro, the i

nocessary testil.g was perfomod in ! ODE 3. 7ho system pressure was increased '

above 750 psig and CFV-5 was cycled clocod and open. Gho alam annunciator functionod properly. 7ho event was discovered as a result of a Quality Pru3 rams Department audit ard ovahlated as reportable on llovember 6,1986.

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In addition T.S. 4.0.4 prohibits FDDE ascension or charges in specified applicability conditions, unlesa the applicable surveillances have been performed within the required surveillance period.

The ocnbined requirements of the abwe T.S. items ard pressure /tcrperature limits presents a difficult situation when ascerding from PODE 4 ard the valve alam function is inoperable due to the expiration of its surveillance time interval or corrective maintenance. Usually this is not a canoem because the valve alarm function is testod durirg plant shutdown or because tM surveillance interval has not expired prior to FDDE ascension. However, during the plant shutdown on thrch 10, 1985, the valve alarm function for CIV-5 failed to meet the aoooptance criteria of SP-402, Core Flooding System Isolation Valves Alarms Actuation. Corrective maintenance was performcd during tN outage but operability could not be verified until the surveillance was performed with system pressure ab we 750 psig.

On August 9, 1985, Crystal River 3 (CR-3) was perfoming a plant heatup following Pefueling Outage 5. m-3 entertd FDDE 3 and then raised Roactor Coolant System pressure above 750 psig without meeting the required operability surveillanoen for T.S. 3.5.1.a. Docause core flood tank isolation valve CFV-5 was technically inoperable ard because it had to be cyc1cd closed ard cien for testing, CR-3 effectively entered FDDE 3 ard increased pressure abwe 750 psig urder the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Action Statement of T.S. 3.5.1.a ard in violation of T.S.

4.0.4. 'Ihis fact was not roccgnizcd at the time.

As required by Surveillance Proceduru SP-402, the rmwy testing was schedulod to be perfomed in FDDE 3. 'Ihe Reactor Coolant System pressure was increased above 750 psig ard CTV-5 was then cyclod closed and open. 'Ihe alarm annunciator functioned properly ard SP-402 was transmitted as satisfactory.

The event was discovered as a result of a Quality Programs Dcpartment audit ard on Nwenber 6,1986 was evaluated as reportable.

CAUSE Because of the given T.S. constraints, the cause of the event is inadequacy in the Surveillance Prradure SP-402. The procodore required all testing to be performed in FDDE 3. Therefore, it failed to roongnize ard provide adoquate guidance for the unique ciruinstances encountered khen ascendirg FDDES or chargirg specified applicability conditions.

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'Iho Fimi Safety Analysis Rcport statest 1) Tho 7b&nical Specifications require the core Flood Tank isolation valves to bo open and locked (electrically do-encIgized) prior to brirgiry the reactor critical; and 2) the Core Flood Tank isoletion valves are open during pwer cperation.

This event did not present any hazard to the safety of the public because: 1) the plant was in a LODE which prohibital criticality and pwer operation; and

2) the alaru anrrJaciator was verified to be operable prior to enterirg a HDDE allcwirg pwer operation.

Syd<wrWE AC' TION Technical Specification 4.5.1.d has bocn revised by Amendment No. 101 which offoctively removcd the T.S. restraint requirirg this survoillanco be performi ain/o an RCS pressure of 750 psig.

SP-402 nw requires the surveillanco requirements of T.S. 4.5.1.d bo satisfied prior to excocxiirn 7:50 psig in LODE 3.

ITEVIOUS SIMIIAR INDTIS A review of 11R history identified one previous similar event khich was reportal in IIR 83-50.

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