ML19324B387

LER 89-034-00:on 890926,two Conditions Determined to Be Outside Plant Design Basis Re Solenoid Control Valves.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Test Solenoid Valve Circuits Provided W/Isolation fuses.W/891026 Ltr

ML19324B387
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/26/1989
From:	Moffatt L, Ken Wilson FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F1089-20, LER-89-034, NUDOCS 8911060191
Download: ML19324B387 (4)

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Power coneonation

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~i October 26, 1989 l 3F1089-20

.l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ocnnission ,'

Attentiotu W = ant Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 ,

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No.89-034

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (IER)89-034 which is submitted in accordanoo with 10 CFR 50.73. 1 Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Very truly yours, Fenneth R. Wilson

', Manager, Nuclear Licensing WIR: mag r

Enclosure l

l xc: Regional Mministrator, Region II L

Senior Resident Inspector

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l l 8911060191 891026 I, PDR ADOCK 05000302 S PDC

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9 ACILITY NAME stp DOCRt1 NU400t R (26 FAGE W CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 1 jorl0 l1 title 641 o l5 l 0 lD l 0 l3 10 l2 Personnel Errors by Architect Engineer Result in Plant Operation Outside Design Basis IVENT DAf t (St LERpsWMSER461 REPORT DAf f 171 OTHER F ACILifitt INVOLVED (81

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l l 1 I i i l l I I I l l l l 1 I l l l 1 l I l l [ l I SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT EXPECTED (141 ( MONT H DAY vtAR OSMI5510N YiS (!* yes. comptete GKPGCtfD $Uent/SSION CATRI NO l l l A9ST%kCT tremor to 1400 speces o e , esorosometsty corteen erngre nonce two.wrotten knes) Ott On September 26, 1989, while in MODE 5 (00ID S1K7TDOWN), two recently identified conditions were determined to be outside the Crystal River Unit 3 design basis.

First; solenoid control valves for eight Control Complex FNAC dampers, one INAC control panel and s2x Containment Isolation Valves were powered from a non-1E distribution panel. Secord; non-cafety related testirg solenoid valves shared common circuits with safety mlated actuation solenoid valves on each of four Main Steam Isolation Valves, without proper isolation.

One of these conditions has existed since initial plant operation in 197'?. 'Ibe other has existed since 1986. 'Ihe cause was cognitive personnel error, the Architect Engineer and utility engineering personnel failed to recognize all applicable design requirements.

An Engineering Evaluation was performed and determined that the INAC dampars, the HVAC control panel, and Containment Isolation Valves remained operable.

'Ihe test solenoid valve circuits have been provided with isolation fuses.

Nuclear Engineering Procedures have been upgraded to insure that all applicable design requirements are satisfied during design review.

A modification will be installed to provide the class 1E circuits with class 1E power supplies.

NRC f eem 360 (6491

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EVElfr DESCRIPTION: .

At approximately 1500, on September 26, 1989, with Crystal River Unit 3 in } ODE 5 (CDID SturDOWN), two reports of conditions that rendead the plant outside  ;

its design basis were delivered to the control Roca (la). One of these i conditions has existed since original mu:huction, the other had existed since 1986.

On Septanber 23, 1989, while performing a revalidation of the Crystal River Unit 3 electrical distribution design and configuration, a utility engineer discovered that the solenoid control valves (PSV) for six antainment Isolation Valves (JM,ISV) and eight Control Ca@ lex HVAC Damers (VI,DMP), and a HVAC Control Panel (VI,PL), all classified as safety related in the CR-3 Safety

• Listing, were powered frun a non-1E power source. All of these valves ard '

dagers are sprire loaded to their safeguards position ard held open with air pressure. W e solenoid valves are energized to open. mis condition had existed since original wsdalction in 1977.

21s condition was reocynized in 1978 but no action was taken because a failure of the power supply would result in the valves and dagers going to their safety function position.

On Septembe.r 26, 1989, while performirg follow up investigations on an Engineering Question, another utility ergineer discovered that twelve safety

, related solenoid control valves in the Steam Line Isolation System (SB) shared l ocmnon circuits [SB,JX) with eight non-safety related solenoid valves.

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Each Main Steam Isolation Valve (SB,ISV) nas six solenoid valves associated I with it. Two for testirg, two for actuation when not testing, and two shared between two Main Steam Isolation Valves for actuation during testing. We valves in each pair are powered frun a different source. W e four actuation solenoid valves are class 1E, the two testing solenoid valves are non-class 1E.

On each Main Steam Isolation Valve, one of non-safety test solenoids shared a ccumon circuit with the control relay for one of the safety related actuation solenoids. Prior to 1986 the test solenoid which shared a circuit with the actuation solenoid was classified as class 1E. In 1986 the classification of this solenoid was changed to non-1E, without providing proper isolation from the class 1E circuit. h is is contrary to the plant's design basis.

CAUSE:

Rese design discrepancies were caused by cognitive personnel errors by the Architect Engineer ard utility ergineerirg personnel. Se requirement to provide 1E circuits for safety related components was not recognized. When the safety classification of the solenoid valves was charged the need to isolate them frun the class 1E circuit was not recognized.

wi<xtLTIVE ACTIONS:

An Engineerirg Evaluation was performed ard determined the Containment j

Isolation Valves, HVAC dampers, and HVAC control panel remained operable.

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0 10 0p or 0 l3 ftKT M snswo apsse m #seweesf. was ameerW NRC fome Was 11h Isolation fuses have been installed between the non-lE testing solenoid valve cirulits that will protect the 1E circuits frun a fault in the non-1E cirulits.

Inprovements to cryyineering procedures which have occurred since these errors were made will onsure that all applicable design requiraments are satisfied. l A modification will be perfonned to pIUvide class 1E power supplies for the class lE circuits.

SAFEIY ANALYSIS:

The safety significance of these deficiencies is negligible, they do not threaten the health and safety of the public. 'Ibe Containment Isolation Valves and Control Canplex HVAC danpers go to their safety function position on a loss of control power. The Main Steam Isolation actuation has two redundant channels, a sirgle failure of any one of the actuation solenoids would not prevent the redundant channel frun isolating a ruptured steam lino.

SIMHAR EVENTS 1 No previous reports have been submitted due to mixing of safety and non-safety related circuits and ccmponents. However, sixteen reports have been submitted due a failure to reccgnize all applicable design requirements. ,

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C~.C Fonn se6A (6491 i