ML19338F769

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Forwards Response to Item 1 of IE Bulletin 80-04, Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Break W/Continued Feedwater Addition. Analysis of Containment Pressure Response for Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Completed
ML19338F769
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 08/27/1980
From: William Jones
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To: Seyfrit K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
IEB-80-04, IEB-80-4, NUDOCS 8010270210
Download: ML19338F769 (3)


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NSIC Omaha Public Power District .-

1623 HARNEY OMANA. NEsRAS' ** 68102 TELEPHON E 536-4000 AREA CO STATE August 27, 1980 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

The Omaha Public Power District received IE Bulletin 80-04, dated February 8, 1980, requesting an analysis of the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) event with continued feedwater addition from the auxiliary feedwater system. The analysis was to include an evaluation of con-tainment pressure response and resultant reactivity increase due to the MSLB. The results of the reactivity increase analysis requested by item 2 of the bulletin was forwarded to the Commission in the District's letter of May 15, 1980. The respor se to item 1 of the bulletin re-garding containment pressure respords for the MSLB is attached.

Sincerely, W. C. Jones Division Manager Production Operations WCJ/KJM/BJH/TLP:jmm Attachment cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D. C. 20555 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20036 8010270 , )

Request 1 Review the containment pressure response analysis to determine if the potential for containment overpressure for a main steam line break inside containment included the impact of runout flow from the auxiliary feedwater system and the impact of other energy sources, such as con-tinuation of feedwater or condensate flow. In your review, consider your ability to detect and isolate the damaged steam generator from these sources and the ability of the pumps to remain operable after extended operation at runout flow.

Response

An analysis of the containment pressure response for a main steam line break inside containment has recently been completed by our NSSS vendor. . This included the impact of runout flow of the auxiliary feedwater system and the impact of other energy sources. The analyses were performed for zero power and 102% of 1560 MWt and can be expected to bound all current or future operating modes.

The SLB event was analyzed with the assumption of a minimum three minute delay between the time of transient initiation and time when duxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow is delivered to the affected steam generator. This is conservative with respect to the expected time of AR4 initiation since the generation of the AFW signal actually occurs at the time of the low steam generator water level trip signal, and AFW flow is initiated at least three minutes following this signal. The analysis assumes, therefore, that AFW flow is delivered to the steam generator sooner than the flow is actually available and at full runout flow for both pumps, resulting in a conservative prediction of the resulting cooldown.

The. analyses considered single failures in the main steam isolation valves and the containment cooling systems. A single failure in the main feedwa?er isolation system was not considered in the FSAR stage for containment Fessure analysis. Therefore, the main feedwater isolation valves were assumed to function properly. This assumption eliminates significant ene 7y sources other than AFW from the analysis.

Initiation of the main SLB from a containment pressure of 17.7 psia for the case of a 3.65 square foot break area results in a maximum containment pressure of 59.96 psig. The above break area is 95% of a full break. The 95% break produces a higher peak pressure than the 90%

or the 100% break and was most limiting for the cases analyzed.

The containment design pressure is 60.0 psig. This analysis is conservative since credit was not taken for all heat sinks available in containment.

L

Response (Continued)

The District recognizes that the current main feedwater isolation is subject to a single failure. Therefore, existing main feedwater valves will be modified to close simultaneously with the current main feedwater-isolation valves. Specifically, valves HCV-1103 and HCV-1104 will be modified to close on the containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS) during the next refueling outage.

The existence of a damaged (i.e., broken steam line) steam genar-ator can be readily detected by comparing steam generator outlet pres-sures and reactor coolant loop temperatures. Because of the isolation logic at the Fort Calhoun Station, the broken generator will have a low pressure while the intact generator's pressure will be controlled by the steam dump and bypass system or the secondary system safety valves. The reactor coolant loop. temperatures for the broken generator can be ex-pected to rapidly decrease during steam generator blowdown and increase as heat transfer ceases. Based on this information, the operator can isolate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the affected generator while the main feedwater will be isolated on CIAS.

' A 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> endurance test of the electric and steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps has.been performed at the Fort Calhoun Station. This test demonstrated that the pumps remain within design limits with re-spct to bearing / bearing oil temperatures and vibration and that pump ambient conditions do not exceed environmental qualification limits of safety related equipment in the room. It is noted that each steam generator's auxiliary feedwater line has two control valves in series and, as such, is single failure proof. Therefore, it is anticipated the affected generator can always be isolated and the auxiliary feedwater pumps will always pump against a substantial head pressure.

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