ML19327B219

Rev 2 to Enhanced Design Basis Document for DHR Sys,Sys Code:Dh. W/Four Oversize Drawings

ML19327B219
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/26/1989
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19327B218	List: ML19327B217 ML19327B219
References
NUDOCS 8910270128
Download: ML19327B219 (61)

Text

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ATTACHMENT NO. 1- ,

i FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION l1 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ENGINEERING

,, CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 -

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s ENHANCED DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT 1

FOR THE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM. , ,

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u SYSTEM CODE: DH 3 o

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l L, Revision Rev0 Revi Rev 2 Rev_ Rev ,

Date 6-8-89 7-4 89 7-24-89 nams sashar M.Tafazzoli

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8910270128 891020

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.1 0 w l CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 2 of 49 1 EMANCED DESIGN BAS!$ DOCUMENT  !

DECAY HEAT REN0 VAL SYSTEM j

REVISION LOG <

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l Revision /Date Desgriotion 0 / 6-8-89 < Initial issue. Revised to address FPC comments-contained in letters from Knoll. to Stephens dated 5- ,

15-89, 5-19-89 and 5-25-89. Editorial corrections '

have also been made. l

' l / 7-4-89 Revision-1 issued to address FPC comments' contained in l letter NEA 89-0888 dated 6-23-89. ,

2 / 7-26-89 Revision 2 issued due to reformatting'of the document ,

as a result of incompatible software. No revision-bars were used due to the nature of revision.. L 1

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1 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 3 of 49 EMANCED DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT l DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM .

l Table of Contents l

l 1.0 $UMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION..................................... 7 l 1.1 System Boundaries........................................ 7 1

1.2 Functi onal Requi rements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 i 1.3 Relevant Design Topics................................... 8 1.4 System Interface Summary................................ 12 2.0 SYSTEM PARAMETERS............................................. 15 3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETERS.......................................... 27 DH-001-FS1 LPI Flow A1 arm.............................. 35 DH 001-FS2 LP I Fl ow A1 a rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 l Injection Flow Ins trument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 DH 001-FT3 DH-001-FT4 Injection Flow Ins trument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 l DH-002-TEl DHHE Temperature Instrument................. 33 .

i DH-002-TE2 DHHE Temperature Instrument................. 33 DH 006-TEl DHHE Temperature Instrument................. 33 DH-006-TE2 DHHE Temperature Instrument................. 33 l DH-006-TS1 DH System High Temperature Al arm. . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1

DH-006-TS2 DH System High Temperature Alarm............ 35 l DH-007-LT BWST Level Instrunent...................... 33 DH-007-LT BWST Low Level Al a rm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 DH-008-TE BWST Temperature Instrument................ 34 DH-009-TE BWST Temperature Instrument................ 34 DH-009-TTS BWST High Temperature Alarm................ 36 DH-010-TE BWST Temperature Instrument................ 34

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3 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 1 Page 4 of'49 l EIGIANCED DESIGN SASIS DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REN0 VAL SYSTEN 4 l

Table of contents ]

DH-010-TTS BWST Low Temperature Al arm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 DH-019-LS BWST Heater Interlock Instrument. . . . . . . . . . . 34 DH-037-LT BWST Level Instrument..................... .33 .

DH-038-FE Crossover Line Flow Instrument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 DH-045-FE Dropl ine Flow Instrument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 DH-046-FE Aux. Pressurizer Spray Flow '

Instrument.................................. 34 DH-049-FE Reactor Coolant. Inventory Trending System Fl ow 0r i f i ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5  ;

DHHE-1A, - -

DHHE-1B- Decay Heat Removal Heat Exchangers. . . . . . . . . . 27 DHP-1A, ',

DHP-1B Decay Heat Removal Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 DHT-1 Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST)........... 32 DHV-1 Decay Heat System Final Check -

Va1ve....................................... 36 .

I DHV-2 Decay Heat System Final Check  :

Va1ve....................................... 36 t DHV-3 Dropline Isol ation Val ve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 DHV-4 Dropline Isol ation Val ve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 DHV-5 LPI Containment Isol ation Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 DHV-6 LPI Containment Isolation Valve............. 37 DHV-7 Crosstie Va1ve.............................. 38 DHV-8 Crosstie Va1ve.............................. 38 DHV-11 DHP 3A Discharge to MVP Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 DHV-12 DHP 3B Di scharge to MVP Val ve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 DHV-17 DHP-1A Discharge RV......................... 39

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+ .I CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 5 of 49 DMANCED DESIGN BA$!$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM L Table of contents l

L DHV DHP- 1 B Di s c h a rge RV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 1

i DHV 34 DH Suction from BWST Valve. . . . . . . . . . . ........ 39  :

DNV-35 DH Suction from BWST Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

, DNV-37 DHP-1A Suction RV........................... 39 DNV-38 DHP-1B Suction RV........................... 39

!' . DHV-39 DH Isol ation to DHP-1 A Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

DHV-40 DH Isol ation to DHP-1B Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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4 DHV-41 Containment Isol ation Val ve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 g DNV-42 Sump / Containment Isol ation Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . 41 j

> a DHV-43 Sump / Containment Isolation Valve............ 41 [

t DHV-44 Dropline RV................................. 39 s

. DHV-69 BWST Vacuum RV.............................. 41

, DHV-70 BWST Vacuum RV.............................. 41 is f DHV-91 Containment Isol ation Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 l DHV-93 Containment Isolation Check l Valve....................................... 42  ;

9 1

DHV-Il0 Automatic Flow Control Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 DHV-111 Automatic Flow Control Val ve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 .

DHV-114 Dropline Over Pressure Protection '

Va1ve....................................... 43 DHV-116 Dropline Over Pressure Protection Va1ve....................................... 43 R B Sump ............................................ 32

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i WD-301A-LT Sump Level Instrument....................... 35

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WD-3018-LT Sump Level Instrument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 WD-302A-LT Sump Level Instrument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

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>> Page 6 of 49 DECAY MAT REMOVAL SYSTDI I o Table of Contents WD 3028 LT Sump Level In st rument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 j c .

WD 303A LT Sump Level Instrument....................... 35 i

" I WD 3038 LT Sump Level Instrument....................... 35 j WD 304A LT Sump Level Instrument....................... 35 I WD 3048-LT Sump Level Ins t rumen t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 I 4.0 RE F ERDIC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 1 i

TABLE 1.......................................,............... 47 i 1.0 . Reg ul a t o ry Docume n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 2.0 Codes and Standards..................................... 49 i

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ctYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 7 of 4g ENHANCED DESIGN SA515 DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM j l

1.0 .SlaglARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION  ;

1.1 System Roundaries l

The DH System piping boundaries for this Enhanced Design Basis Document (EDBD)  !

are presented on Flow Diagr u FD 302 641. The Borated Water Storage Tank l (BWST) and Reactor Building (RB) sump are addressed in this ED80.

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For the purposes of this ED80, the system electrical and pneumatic boundaries l are established at the system component. Power and air supply are addressed as  ;

interfaces. 4 1.2 Functional Reauir- ats {

During normal operation, the DH System provides controlled cooldown of the Reactor Coolant (RC) System at reactor coolant temperatures below 280'F. The  :

system maintains decay heat removal from the core during reactor shutdown and ,

refueling. During accident conditions, the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) l portion of the DH System injects borated water into the reactor vessel for emergency cooling and reactivity control. Credit is taken for LPI in the Loss ,

of Coolant Accident (FSAR 14.2.2.5). Normal decay heat removal is addressed in  :

the Steam Generator Tube Failure Accident (FSAR 14.2.2.2). DH system design is governed by LDCA conditions.  !

1.2.1 The safety functions of the DH System after a Loss of Coolant Accident  !

includes

-The DH System automatically provides borated water to the core for  :

short term cooling and reactivity control.  !

The DH System provides long term core cooling and reactivity control by L recirculation of borated water from the RB sump. l For a small break LDCA, the DH System may be required to provide suction for the Makeup and Purification (MU) pumps for high pressure injection / recirculation. This mode of operation is called " piggyback".

To prevent boron stratification / precipitation in the core, the DH System ensures cross flow through the core. This is achieved by establishing gravity flow in the dropline through the inoperable DH train to the sump or by establishing flow in the auxiliary pressurizer '

spray line.

-The BWST and RS sump provide borated water for the High Pressure Injection (HPI), low Pressure Injection (LPI), and Reactor Building Spray (BS) functions post accident,

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CRYSTAL RIVER LMIT 3 Page 8 of 49 D64ANCED DESIGN BAS 15 DOCLMENT (

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM l

By cooling the RB sump fluid during recirculation, the DH System  !

supports containment heat removal. l 1.2.2 The operational functions of the DH system include:

-The system provides controlled plant cooldown.  !

-After reactor coolant pump operation is terminated, the system supplies auxiliary pressurizer spray for RC System depressurization.

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-Shutdown and refueling decay heat removal are maintained by the system.

During refueling the system is used to fill and drain the fuel transfer canal (FTC).

-During shutdown and refueling, purification and chemistry control for t the RC System and FTC inventory is provided by the system in conjunction I with either the Makeup and Purification (MU) System or the Spent Fuel i Cooling (SF) System.  !

-The system is protected against overpressurization by the high pressure i isolation valve Automatic Closure and Interlock System which, when RC l System pressure approaches the DH System design pressure, closes the RC i hotleg isolation valves and prevents them from opening until the  !

i pressure has decreased (FSAR Section g.4.2.7). The ACIS also prevents the valve from initially opening when the RC system pressure is above the DH System design pressure.  ;

-During boron concentration reductions, the system is required to l provide a minimum flow through the vessel if the reactor coolant pumps l are not operating.  ;

-lhe system has the capability to provide cooling to the spent fuel  !

pool. i 1.3 Relevant Desien Tonics

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Appendix R/Firo Protection  ;

The DH System requirements for safe shutdown for 10CFR50, Appendix R, are j idnntified as RC System hotleg isolation, RB sump isolation from the BWST and decay heat removal (for cold shutdown only). Appendix R considerations are provided in the " Crystal River Unit 3 Fire Hazards Analysis" Report No.

03 0920-1103.

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I CRYSTAL RI MR UNIT 3 Page 9 of 49  !

D64ANCED DE$leN BA$l$ DOCLINENT ,

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL $YSTEM i

Equipment Qualification  !

Environmental Qualification (EQ) requirements for the DH System components are provided in the ' Environmental and Seismic Qualification Program Manual". The FPC Safety Listing provides a summary of safety classification requirements including EQ requirements for DH components and instruments. ,

$eismic .

DH System components essential to safe shutdown are designed as Seismic Category I in order to maintain system functional integrity during an *  ;

earthquake. The system Flow Diagram, FD 302 641, depicts the Category I i boundaries. The system (except for the BWST) is housed in the Reactor Building  !

and Auxiliary Building which are Seismic Category I structures. The BWST is

• also Seismic Category I. Seismic qualification requirements are provided in  :

the ' Environmental and Seismic Qualification Program Manual' (FSAR 5.1.1.1, .

6.1.2.2,6.1.2.4).  !

Flooding [

Flooding outside the Reactor Building does not create a hazard to safe shutdown of the plant as reported in GA! Report No. 1811. " Effects of High '

Energy Piping Systems Breaks Outside the Reactor Building", Revision 4.

Post LOCA flooding inside the Reactor Building is expected, up to an approximate elevation of 99.85 feet, in order to provide long term cooling (FSAR 6.2.2.1). All safety related electrical equipment is located above the  ;

maximum expected post-accident water level in the RB. The Auxiliary Building and BWST area are protected from external flooding by water tight doors (FSAR 2.4.2.4). (See also references 40 and 41, and the " Environmental and +

Seismic Qualification Program Manual", Section 4.9.)

Missile Protection Protection of safety related DH components from externally generated missiles '

is provioed by the Seismic Category I Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings. These buildings are designed for protection against dynamic effects including the effects of missiles (FSAR 5.2.1.2.6,5.4.3.2.2).

Internal missile protection is provided by either direct shielding or physical separation of redundant equipment. Protection is required for the DH System injection lines within the Reactor Building and for both suction lines from the sump (FSAR 6.1.2.6).

External Events The DH System is designed to remain operable during postulated tornadoes and hurricanes to assure reactor safe shutdown (FSAR 2.4.2.4). The system (except for the BWST) is installed within the Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings which

CRYSTAL RIMR talli 3 Page 10 of 49  !

D64ANCEO DEllGN Balls DOCUMENT l DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM j

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are designed to withstand the effects of severe storm conditions. '

Single Failure ,

The DH portion of the DH System is designed so that a single failure will not l prevent operation of the system or reduce system capacity below that required I to reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition. FSAR Table 6 4 provides the I Single Failure Analysis for Emergency Core Cooling System components (FSAR i 1.4.42, 6.1.2.5 Table 6 4, 9.4.2.2).

l Separation /IsolaMon )

4 The DH System is provided with separate and independent flow paths and l redundancy in active components to ensure that required system safety )

functions will be performed. Separate power sources are supplied to the  ;

redandant active components and separate instrument channels are used to i actuate the system (FSAR 6.1.1,9.4.2.2).

HELS High Energy Line Break (HELB) considerations for the DH System are based on gal Renort No.1811, Revision 4, " Effects of High Energy Piping System Breaks Outside the Reactor Building". This report conservatively evaluates a HELB in the DH System during reactor cooldown. A HELB will not preclude RC System cooldown; either the undamaged DH System train or the Makeup and Purification (MU) System and secondary systems can be used to get the plant into a safe shutdown condition.

Remote Shutdown The Remote Shutdown Panel is utilized whenever the Main Control Room (MCR) must be evacuated due to uninhabitable conditions (e.g. fire, toxic gas, etc.). The Remote Shutdown Panel provides the capability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition from outside the MCR. The required shutdown equipment and the location of alternate control is provided in FSAR Table 7-10.

Containment Isolation DH System piping penetrates the Reactor Building in six locations. Each line contains isolation valves to ensure building isolstion during accident 1 conditions. Lines not required for core heat removal post accident may be '

remotely closed by the operator (FSAR 5.3.2, FSAR Tables 5 4 and 5 9).  !

Leakage testing for the valves is conducted in accordance with Technical l Specification 3.6.1.2 (FSAR 5.6.4.3).

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EtYSTAL tlVER LBlli 3 page 11 of 49 DDWICED DE$ltN BA$!$ DDCUNDfT i DECAY HEAT RDIOVAL SYSTEM i

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Regulstory Suide 1.97

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i DH System instrumentation provides monitoring of selected variables  ;

post-accident. Current commitments to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, are

, provided in Reference 23. The instruments which support this monitoring .

capability are identified in the FPC Safety Listing. l l

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l caVITAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 12 of 4g i DOWICED K$lell BASIS DOCLSIDfT I NCAY. MAT RDIOVAL SYSTDI l

l 1.4 SYSTDI INTERFACE SL30WtY I r

1!i11ll REQUIRDtENT1fUNCT10N l AH XJ Auxiliary Building Air The Auxiliary Building Air Handling i Handling System maintains negative internal  ;

butiding pressure to prevent r uncontrolled leakage to the  !

environment. The system also i provides an exhaust vent for the  ;

Borated Water Storage Tank and t ventilation for the DH pump area. .

BS - Reactor Building Spray The BWST supplies borated water for  !

post accident containment cooling  ;

and iodine removal.

i CA - Chemical Addition and Sampling The CA System supplies concentrated .

boric acid to the Borated Water .

Storags Tank for chemistry control  !

j. . and makeup.  ;

1 ,

CA (PASS) - Post Accident Sampling The liquid sampling portion of the  !

System CA System (PASS) allows for normal '

and post-accident sampling of the DH ,

System. j CF Cort flooding The CF System provides an injection  ;

path via CFV 1 and CFV 3 for the DH  :

System during normal and accident  !'

conditions.

DC - Decay Heat Services Closed The DC System provides cooling to DH  !

Cycle Cooling System components (e.g. heat l exchangers and pump motors) during  !

normal and emergency conditions.  ;

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,. l CRYSTAL RIVER Wif 3 Page 13 of 49 DHWCED DE$1m BA$!$ DOCUMENT .

DECAY MEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM j l

11113 REQUIREMENT / FUNCTION DW Domineralized Water The DW System supplies domineralized water to the Borated Water Storage Tank for boron concentration control and makeup.

Electrical Power (including The Electrical Power System provides j Emergency Diesel Generators) Class IE and non Class IE power to  ;

DH System electrical components.

l ES - Engineered Safeguards The ES Actuation System (ESAS) .I automatically actuates DH System pumps and valves during emergency conditions to ensure automatic 1 initiation of low pressure 1 injection. I Mu Makeup and Purification The BWST supplies borated water for high pressure injection to the reactor vessel. The DH System in conjunction with the MU System i j filters and domineralizers may J

provide purification of the Reactor  ;

Vessel and Fuel Transfer Canal )

inventory.

The DH System provides suction for l the MU pumps following a small break LOCA when the BWST is exhausted and i the RC System pressure is above the I shutoff head of the DH pumps.  !

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CRYSTAL RIVER Laitt 3 Page 14 of 49 j FJMANCED DElltN SA$ll DOCLBIDif i DECAY MEAT RDIOVAL SYSTDI l

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11113 REQUIREMENT /FUNCT10N l

1 RC Reactor Coolant The DH System assists in normal  !

cooldown and depressurization. It  !

also provides decay heat removal and purification / chemistry control  !

during cold shutdown and refueling.  !

Following a LOCA, the DH System i provides low pressure injection and  !

long term core cooling.

i The RC System provides a suction l source for the DH pumps during  :

normal DH System operation, j l

SF Spent Fuel Cooling During refueling, the DH System is  !

used to fill and drain the Fuel t Transfer Canal. The DH System in  !

conjunction with SF System filters and domineralizer may provide purification of the Reactor Vessel l and Fuel Transfer Canal inventory. l The SF System also provides a means i to recirculate and purify the  !'

Borated Water Storage Tank.  ;

The DH System has the capability to  ;

provide Spent Fuel Pool cooling. ,

WD - Radioactive Waste Disposal The WD System collects and processes  :

DH System drainage and overflow. WD I instrumentation provides RB sump .

level indication.  !

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CRYSTAL klVER LB117 3 Page 15 of 49  !

,. DHUICED DE$10N BA51$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL (

t.0 $YSTEN PARAMETER $ {

I PARAMETER REASON 500RCE The system design Design pressures and temperatures References 4, 17, l pressures and are chosen based on r.aximum 18 temperatures for operational values. The DH System  !

major piping components are subjected to more i sections are as severe conditions during normal  !

follows: operation for decay heat removal  :

than during emergency conditions,

s. 75 psig,150*F Lines connected to the RC System .

from the BWST to were designed for the RC System i

, DHV 34,-35 design temperature (through the first valve) and pressure (through

b. 345 psig, 300'F the second or third valve) '

from DHV-34, 35 to ,

li DHP-1A, 1B and to DHV 4 USAS B31.1.0 was the piping code I

c. 520 psig, 300'F from DHP 1A,-1B to in effect during the original i DHV-5,-6 design stage. -

d. 2500 psig,  !

300'F from DHV 5,-6 to the CF l check valves, between DHV 3 and DNV 4, and from DHV 91 to RCV-53 i

e. 2500 psig, -

650*F from the CF check valves to -

the reactor vessel and from the 'B'  ;

hotleg to DHV-3

f. 80 psig, 300'F .

from the RB sump

! to DHV 42,-43 ,

The DH System piping is designed in accordance with the Power Piping ,

Code USAS B31.1.0,

Page 16 of 49 DECAY MEAT REMOVAL I i

2.0 $YSTEN PARAMETER $ l PARAMETER REASON SOURCE i

1967 Edition.  !

The DH System was fabricated,  ;

. erected,and I inspected to I B31.7 69 (Class 1 )

from the B hotleg l to DHV 41 and Class 2 from a DNV 41 to the DH l pumps). i r$AR F5Ar4 Section 6.1.2.4, Table 6 3 -

t For a large break A conservative 90% of DH System References 1, 2 LOCA, the minimum design flow-(3000 gpm) was used in ,

analyzed injection the LOCA analyses to ensure  !

l flow rate is 2700 sufficient core cooling for large  !

gpa at,an RC break LOCA injection and '

I System pressure of recirculation. This value allowed  !

94 psig. for pump degradation. A lower r flow rate could negatively impact  !

core cooling and cause the plant i to exceed 10CFR50.46 limits.

T.S. Technical Specification 4.5.2 requires demonstration of a LPI  :

System flow capability between i 2800-3100 gpa after any  !

modification which could alter  :

system flow characteristics. j FSAR FSAR Section 6.1.2.1.2 l L For a small break Following a small break LOCA when Reference 1 l

LOCA, the DH the BWST is exhausted, the DH ,

System provides System may be used to boost  ;

suction for the MU suction pressure to the MU pumps  ;

pumps from the (piggyback mode). The DH flow .

sump. rate would be the same as the MV  !

flow rate and would be dependent -

on RC System pressure. Piggyback  ;

mode continues until the RC System pressure decreases below the DH

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i CRYSTAL RIVER Lail" 3 Page 17 of 49 l DDIANCED DESIGN BA$l$ DOCUMENT i DECAY HEAT REMOVAL j 2.0 SYSTEM PARANETER$ l I

i PARANETER REASON $00RCE i I

pump shutoff head allowing  ;

standard LPI operation.  ;

h Each train of the The design flow is specified for References 2, 24  !

system is designed optimum plant cooldown. With both  !

to deliver 3000 trains operating, the system was .

gpa at an RC originallydesignedtocooltheRC  !

System pressure of System from 280 F to 140'F in 14  !

85 psig, hours. 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> was selected for economic and operational considerations to minimizo the time required for the cooldown ,

process and still comply with  ;

vessel cooldown limits. Due to an increase in the maximus DC System -

operating'F reach 140 has been extended, temperature, the time to j T.S. Technical Specification 3.1.1.2 i equires a minimum core flow of 2700 gpa during any intentional  ;

l boron concentration reduction l o>eration. During Modes 5 and 6  :

I tiis core flow is provided by the DH System. This flow rate

>rovides adequate mixing, prevents

>oron stratification and ensures r gradual reactivity changes in the >

core.

T. 5. Technical Specification 4.9.8 References 7, 8  :

I requires demonstration of a l minimum core flow capability of l 2700 gpm during Mode 6 to ensure l adequate core cooling and to minimize the effects of a boron dilution event. However Technical Specification Interpretation 88-03  ;

justifies operation at a lower flow rate as long as the RC System temperature can be maintained at or below 140'F. A minimum 500 gpm flow is required to prevent a

. l CRYSTAL RIVER L3117 3 Page 18 of 49 DelANCED DE$14N BAS!$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL 2.0 SYSTEN PARAMETER $ )

PARAMETER REASON SOURCE

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1 return to criticality after an h unintentional boron dilution ]

event. This flow must be l maintained to provide RCS l circulation to prevent boron j stratification and meet the 1%  !

delta k/k shutdown margin with no i rods in the core. l FSAR FSAR Sections 6.1.2.1.2, 9.4.2 I

i During the The design requirement for system References 4, 9,  !

post LOCA heat removal was based on normal 10, 24  :

recirculation RC System cooling requirements.  !

mode, the The post-LOCA capability is  !

required system consistent with heat exchanger i heat removal performance data. l capability is j 88xE06.8TU/hr with -

sungwaterat i 243 F. ,

i 1  ;

l Each train of the With both trains operating, the References 4, 9, f system is designed system was originally designed to 10, 24 ,

to remove lloxE06 cool the RC Systei from 280'F to i BTU /hr(originally 140*F in 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />. Due to an i 125xE06 increase in the maximum DC System  !

l BTU /hr)with RC  !

System at 280*F operating'F reach 140 has been extended. temperature, A

the time to <

and 30xE06 BTU /hr longer cooldown time does not l-with RC System at impact plant safety. The system is  :

i 145.5'F also required to maintain the RC '

(originally System at or- below 140'F for '

140'F) . refueling. The temperature range was chosen for economic and .

I personnel safety considerations. l 4

f r

e .- -, ----... . ....,-,- -

, . i

~

CRYSTAL tl H R Lalli 3 Page 19 of 49 DelANCED DE$)tN BA$!$ DOCUMENT DECAY NEAT REMOVAL j I

t.0 SYSTDI PARANETER$

i PARAMETER REASON SOURCE l l

The system is designed to account ,

for normal (RCS cooldown), i emergency (post LOCA r recirculation), and holding l decay heat  ;

(shutdown removal) and refueling'he design conditions.  !

requirement for heat removal  !

capability was based on the core i decay heat generation rate at i approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after i reactor shutdown. Changes in heat i removal capability due to  :

increased X System cooling water l temperatures would impact plant '

cooldown time and post LOCA heat removal, i FSAR FSAR Section 9.4.2 .

i One of the following a LOCA, there is a References 1, 11, ,

following modes of tendency for boron concentration 12, 13 operation must be in the core to increase due to  :

initiated within boil off. As the concentration  !

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> post-LOCA increases there is a possibility  ;

i to prevent boron that the boric acid could i l precipitation. precipitate out of solution causing degradation of core flow ,

and cooling. To prevent i Establish a precipitation, the OH System is  ;

minimum dropline aligned to ensure cross gravity flow of 40 flow / circulation through the core. -

gpe. This is achieved by establishing  :

gravity flow in the dropline i Establish a through the inoperable OH train to  :

minimum auxiliary the sump or by establishing flow

• pressurizer spray through the auxiliary pressurizer i flow of 40 gpm. spray line.

Establishing the specified minimum i flow by one of the above methods within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> will ensure sufficient flow through the core to prevent precipitation.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was specified based on the

,2. >, _-__,...-.,-_,_,_w-,,__.,-_ , . _ _ . . , . . . _ . . my,rw,... _._,,.m,.m__m.,,m,.-m,m,,,-.w ,wrw.-w,,,,----, .ve, -.,w=--

. - - -- - ~ _ - - - - - - -

f I

9 l '

CRYSTAL RI M R WIT.) Page 20 of 49 D64ANCED Dellen BA$!$ DOCUMENT ,

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL 2.0 SYSTEN PARAMETER $  ;

i PARAMETER REASON SOURCE f

maximum allowable boron concentration. l The auxiliary Auxiliary pressurizer spray is l pressurizer spray needed to control cooldown and Reference 4  !

design flow rate depressurization of the RC System .;

for depressuriza- after Reactor Coolant Pump  ;

tion is 65 gps, operation is terminated. The flow  !

requirement is based on the desired depressurization rate and i rate of pressurizer temperature i reduction.  ;

The minimum The MU, DH and BS Systems initiate Reference 5 l required system automatically to mitigate the

• inventory (BWST consequences of a LOCA. Sufficient  :

is BWST volume is required to ensure  !

capacity) 415,200 ga llons adequate NPSH for all pumps and to  :

(44.2 feet) during ensure that sufficient time is ,

Modes 1 4. provided for operator action to  !

switch DH pump suction to the sump  ;

before the BWST is depleted, j i

l A sufficient amount of borated  !

water is required to ensure enough  ;

water volume is in the containment l for the DH and BS Systems during '

the post-LDCA recirculation mode -

to support conteinment energy removal for containne.'t t temperature / pressure etntrol and core cooling.

The minimum volume of borated i water is assumed in the lodine Removal Analysis to ensure acceptable equilibr1um pH (7.2-11.0) for the US System. An acceptable pH band minimizes the E

-___.-_m_,_..,._,,,,_c..,_, -

y.,-,.... - . _ ....,.,y..-,-.,.m._.~,,.,-,.m ,. _ , . , ..m,

i in . j

,# 3 caVITAL RIVER tallT 3 Page 21 of 49 ,

DRWICED DE$len SASI$ DOCUMENT l DECAY HEAT REMOVAL l

2.0 SYSTEM PARAMETER $

)

)

PARAMETER REASON SOURCE

]

I amount of iodine and the effect of l caustic stress corrosion cracking '

on mechanical components. This  !

requirement is the most limiting for minimum BWST volume.

i For refueling, the minimum volume Reference 14 i is sufficient to fill the Fuel '

Transfer Canal and incore i instrument tank.  !

The minimum tank level was calculated based on a 40 foot i diameter tank. I i

T.S. Technical Specifications 3.1.2.9  !

3.5.4 i FSAR FSAR Table 14A-4.1, Section I 8.1.2.4 The maximum The maximum volume of borated Reference 5 ,

allowable system water is assumed in the lodine inventory (BWST Removal Analysis to ensure ,

capacity) is acceptable equilibrium pH  !

449,000 gallons (7.2-11.0) for the BS System. '

(47.8 feet). i The maximum tank level was calculated based on a 40 foot  !

diameter tank.  !

T.S. Technical Specification 3.5.4 FSAR FSAR Table 14A-4.1, Section  !'

6.1.2.4 The minimum Technical Specifications require a required systein minimum volume of borated water to i inventory (BWST ensure a shutdown margin of 1%

capacity) is delta k/k. This requirement can 13,500 gallons be met by either the concentrated ,

i

-. . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . , , _ , _ , _ _ _ . _ _ - . . , . . _ . _ . ~ . ,

i n . ,

.1 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 22 of 49 l DMANCED DES 10N BA$18 DOCUMENT  !

i DECAY HEAT REMOVAL 2.0 SYSTEM PARAMETER $

I J

PARAMETER REASON SOURCE during Modes 5 and Boric Acid Storage Tank with 600

6. gallons or by the BWST.

T.S. Technical Specification 3.1.2.8 The analyzed BWST The minimum temperature is References 1, 2, 25 temperature range specified to ensure the fluid does is 40*F to 90'F. not freeze. It is also used in the  !

analysis which evaluates minimum l containment backpressure.  ;

The maximum temperature limit is -

used to ensure adequate core cooling and containment pressure  !

control. A higher maximum temperature could adversely affect ,

core cooling capability and ,

containment pressure response, j i

Note: The LOCA and containment Reference 2 pressure analyses used the 90'F -

value. A later B&W evaluation i determined that 120*F would yield i acceptable analytical results for core cooling, however; it was  !

recommended that the 90*F limit be i maintained until the effect on the containment pressure analysis was evaluated. '

T.S. Technical specification 3.1.2.8,  !

3.1.2.9, 3.5.4 FSAR FSAR Table 14-46 i The maximum Following a LOCA, DH is required References 1. 2 analyzed LPI to be fully operational within 35 response time for seconds to support the LOCA the system to be analyses. A longer delay in low available to pressure injection could impact deliver water to core cooling.

o .

l

^

CRYSTAL RIVER LBilf 3 Page 23 of 4g ,

I DHUICED DESIGN BA$!$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT RD00 VAL l t.0 SYSTEM PARAMETER $  !

t PARANETER REASON SOURCE l

the vessel is 35  !

seconds after the Technical Specifications require l ESAS signal is that the DH System be aligned and i initiated. (The ready within 25 seconds. This time  ;

ESAS initiation accounts for simultaneous loss of t variables for LPI normal power sources and is based i are: RC pressure on diesel generator, load i below 500 psig or sequencer, pump and valve  !

Reactor Building operation times, t pressure above 4  !

psig.) '

T.S. Technical Specification Table l 3.3-5  ;

FSAR FSAR Sections 6.1.3.2, 7.1.3.2.1, i Table 613 The DH System is Following a LOCA, LPI is References 1, 2 l designed so that automatically actuated since it is no operator action unreasonable to assume operator  !

is necessary for action within 35 seconds. The LOCA  ;

l the first 15 analyses assumes that no operator  ;

minutes following action is necessary within the  ;

a LOCA. first 15 minutes. The system can ,

operate automatically for at least l 30 minutes based on BWST volume  !

(with all Engineered Safeguards pumps operating and assuming the maximum break size). After that ,

time, the operator is required to switch pump suction to the sump, to realign the system for boron '

precipitation prevention, and to ensure flow through both injection '

lines. >

Note: The NRC allows credit for Reference 15 ,

simple operator action (e.g.,

pushing a button) 10 minutes after l the accident. Credit for more l complex operator action (e.g.,

l flow balancing) can be taken 20 minutes after the accident.

p .

i CRYSTAL RIVER tatif 3 Page 24 of 49 DHWICED DE$1m SA$18 DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT RDIOVAL j t.0 SYSTEM PARAMETERS PARAMETER REASON SOURCE l

FSAR FSAR Section 8.1.2.1.2 [

i The minimum The minimum boron concentration is Reference 5  !

required BWST assumed in the lodine Removal .

boron Analysis to ensure acceptable  !

concentration is equilibrium pH (7.2 11.0) for the  :

2270 ppa. BS System.

A boron concentration of 1800 ppe is sufficient to maintain the core at 15 subcritical post LOCA. The i 2270 ppe value is more ,

conservative for suberiticality .

concerns. However, the impact of  ;

this lower concentration (and t resultant higher pH) on the sump '

equilibrium pH post LOCA has not been evaluated.  :

1800 ppe is also sufficient to  !

provide a shutdown margin of 1% i delta k/k from all operating .i conditions. This concentration  !

, ensures the reactor will remain  ;

suberitical in the cold condition i following mixing of the BWST and RCS volumes or unintentional  ;

dilution. ,

l T.S. Technical Specification 3.1.2.9,  ;

3.5.4  !

FSAR FSAR Sections 6.1.2.4. 9.4.2,  !

Table 14A 4.1  !

The maximum This maximum boron concentration Reference 5 allowable BWST is assumed in the lodine Removal boron Analysis to ensure acceptable i concentration is equilibrium pH (7.2 11.0) for the  ;

2450 ppm. BS System, t

6

- .,_..,,---.~,,,.,-,,,,,,_...,___,,.,,___,.,.-_,.,,,,-mm,,,.,,. ,,,,,,,,,,,--.,,e,.r emm..,---

}

h CRYSTAL RIVER tail" 3 Page il of 49 [

DOENCED Dell 8N BA$!$ IN20NENT  !

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL t.0 SYSTEN PARAMETERS u  ;

PARAMETER REASON SOURCE

]

T.S. Technical Specification 3.1.t.9,  :

3.5.4  !

FSAR FSAR Table 14A-4.1 I

i The analyzed The DH System penetrates Reference 6 8 leakage outside containment and circulates sump  :

containment for water that could contain fission  :

the DH and BS products post-LOCA. Component Systems combined leakage must be limited in order  :

is 0.5958 gph. to restrict fission product i leakage to the environment. The ,

Maximum Hypothetical Accident '

safety analysis calculated the DH l and BS System dose based on 0.5958  ;

gph. This contribution to total i offsite dose is minimal and well  !

, below 10CFR100 limits.  !

i I i l T.S. Technical $ ification 4.5.2 j i (Currently ing revised to -

i restrict leakage to 0.57 gph.) f FSAR FSAR Table 6 11 The maximum A maximum flow rate, temperature Reference 16 ,

allowed flow to and pressure is specified to '

the MU System prevent damage to MU filter and (with one demineralizer components.  :

purification train  !

in operation) for  !

purifying the RC ,

System / Fuel i Transfer Canal  !

inventory is 80 i gps.

• i The maximum allowed fluid .

temperature and  !

l pressure is 135'F l and 150 psig. }

l t l

l

\ .

CRYSTAL tivtt laitt 3 Page 26 of 49

! De4ANCED Dellen BA$!$ DOCUKINT DECAY MEAT RD10 VAL t.0 SYSTDI PARANETER$

PARAMETER REASON SOURCE

b. ' F AAR FSAR Section 9.1 The maximum A maximum flow rate, temperature Reference 16 allowed flow to and pressure is specified to the SF System for prevent damage to SF filter and purifying the RC domineralizer components.

SystesVFuel Transfer Canal inventory is 200 gps.

The maximum allowed temperature and pressure is 135'F and 125 psig.

FSAR FSAR Section 9.3 l

The nominal flow These values are specified to Reference 16 to the SF System maintain the Spent Fuel Pool at I

for Spent Fuel 140*F and to conform with SF Pool Cooling is component design requirements.

1500 gpa at 140'F The DH System is adequate for

, and 125 psig. maintaining Spent fuel Pool water l temperature at or below 140'F for the full core offload that fills the pool.

FSAR FSAR Section 9.3

m

[ .

- 1 o

+

l L ctYSTAL RIVER LalIY 3 Page 27 of 49 .

DDIANCED Dellen SA$18 DOCUNENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN l

3.0 CONP0NENT PARAMETER $

Component /Paramater- Reason /Sourca Interface j l

Decay Heat Heat Exchangers Tag Numbers:

DWlE-1A, DWlE-It i

The controlling This heat load was based on The DC System )

design requirement one-half of the core decay heat provides cooling l for heat transfer generation rate at approximately flow for heat  !

l is 30xE06 Btu /hr 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. . exchanger heat 1 at 145.5'F Originally the design was intended removal. i (originally 140*F) to reduce the RC System Key Parameters:

and a system temperature from 280*F to 140*F Flow Rate  ;

design flow of within 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />. An increase in (gpa) 3000 gpa the maximum expected DC System Temperature ,

(tubeside). operating tem >erature has resulted ('F)  ;

in a reduced Test transfer Flow control using i capability. Decreasing the heat input from: l removal capability would impact DH 17-TC

. normal cooldown time and post-LOCA DH 18-TC  ;

heat removal.  ;

References 4, 9, 24  !

FSAR FSAR Section 9.4.2 The heat exchanger A standard cleanliness factor was {

design cleanliness specified based on the heat factor is 0.85. exchanger using treated water. 1 Changes in the cleanliness factor l affect required heat transfer area '

and therefore heat removal i capability.  ;

References 4, 28 The design i pressure drop is 4 The heat exchanger pressure drop  ;

psi with a maximum affects total system flow losses.

of 10 psi allowed if the pressure drop is too large (tubcside). the total system resistance may 1

..--...,-,,_,,,._,.-...,rm,, -

, . - - - . . ,, - . _ , ,,,,___,_,w,,_,..,m .,.n.-,w- , ,n,-.,,4 w.-

j ..

r .

Page 28 of 49 DECAY MEAT RD10 VAL SYSTDI 3'.0 COMP 0NOfT PARAMETERS

Component /paraseter Reason / Source Interface-The design prevent pumping at the expected pressure drop is 8 flow rate.

psi with a maximum of Il psi allowed References 10, 28 i -(she11 side).

The maximum The specification for the heat allowable design exchanger required that it be flow is 4500 gpa capable of handling larger than (tubeside). normal-flows to al ow for excessive flow events. A maximum The maximum flow is specified for the internal allowable design structural support design of the flow is 3750 gps. heat exchanger to minimize excess (she11 side). tube vibrat'on.

References 10, 28 l Decay Heat Pumps l

Tag Numbers:

DNP-1A, OHp-1B The required NPSH A minimum NPSH is specified by the The DC system is 12.5 feet for a vendor to prevent cavitation and provides cooling pump flow of 3032 ensure pump operability. flow for pump motor gpe. heat removal.

This parameter is specific to this Key Parameters:

pump. Flow Rate (gpm)

Temperature ('F)

References 19, 38, 39 l

FSAR FSAR Figure 6-9 The HVAC (XJ) i System maintains DH

! compartment i temperature within desigr. limits.

l Key Parameter:

i Heat Removal (Btu /hr)

4-j s a vtt t Page it of 49 i DECAY HEAT RDIOVAL SYSTEN i

3.0 COMP 0NDif PARARETERS Camponent/ Parameter Reason / Source interface j i l Electrical Powers i DNP 1A:  ;

ES 4160 BUS A t DHP-18:  !

ES 4160 BUS B j The pump design TDH is specified to the vendor to The RC Systes must f flow is 3000 gpm ensure the pump can deliver 3000 be maintained at a i at 350 feet total gpm accounting for existing system sufficient level to l developed head conditions (e.g., system losses, ensure pump NPSH  ;

(TDH). RCSystempressure). requirements are l

met during normal  !

i References 16, 20 heat removal and to i l l i

i prevent'vortexing

. in the dropline for  !

pump protection.  ;

+

RC 201 LT and RC- ,

202 LT provide-  !

indication to the operator to permit i monitoring of hot [

1eg level.

The ESAS provides  ;

the signal for pump j actuation. ,

i l (The ESAS initiation variables for the '

pump are: HPI  ;

I actuation or RC .

pressure below 500 psig or Reactor Building pressure above 4 psig.)  ;

The DH System may provide suction for r the MU pumps from .

y -e ,, , ---_-e-g--..v,-~--- --w--w,,n-----,_,m..a.w-, , - , , - - , _ , , , _ . _ _ , _ - - ~ . _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - -

gYSTAL ElHR Lalli 3 Page 30 of 49 DeMCED DESI4N BA$18 00CUMENT i DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN 3.0 COMPONENT PARAMETERS Camponent/ Parameter Reason / Source Interface j the sump following  !

a small break LOCA: i Key Parameter:

NPSH (feet) i t

The pumps must A pump response time is specified  !

attain rated flow to ensure low pressure injection ~j within 15 seconds, is achieved within 25 seconds as -

required by Technical l Specifications. Starting of the  ;

emergency diesel generators which i takes less than 10 seconds is '

included in the 25 second value, j NOTE: The LOCA analyses assume a f 35 second system response time for  !

conservatism.  !

References 1, 2

{

T.S. Technical Specification Table  ;

3.3-5 i t

FSAR FSAR Sections 6.1.3.2, 8.2.3.1  ;

! The minimum A minimum flow for pump f

( allowable pump recirculation is specified by the i flow is 80 gps. vendor for pump protection.  !

Operation at the minimum flow must  ;

Operation of the be limited to preclude hydraulic '

pumps in the instabilities which cause impeller  !

minimum vibration and eventual pump  ;

recirculation flow failure. The vendor has indicated i mode must be the pump can be operated at this restricted to two condition for only two hours -

hours cumulative before the shaft and bearings l oMirating time on require replacement. The time l' tie shaft and limit and minimum flow bearings. requirement is currently being reviewed by the vendor.

l l DN-027-F0 and This parameter is specific to this DH-028-F0 are pump.

sized (0.675

C. >

f i

, i Page 31 of 49 DECAY MAT RDIOVAL $Y51DI )

i 3.0 COMP 0HDiT PARAMETER $ l I

Component /Paraseter Reason / Source Interface l I

inches to limit  !

the ma)imum x l References 16, 20, 22, 43 recirculation .

flow. ,

I i

i i

l

.)

i I

i t

i k

i I

i t

l l

i i

l s

..,_-, ., -__....,_,,_ _ , ,...,.,_ ,,, , ,,,-n.n.,- ,,w,,-.,-.n-,.,- ,

p '

I CRYSTAL RIVER LBiff 3 Page 32 of 4g DOWICES DE$leN SA$!$ DOCUNDIT l' DECAY HEAT RDIOVAL SYSTDI l

!' 3.0 COMP 0NDIT PARAMETER $ l Ceaponent/ Parameter Reason / Source Interface i Sorated Water Stor ank 0 -1 The maximum The BWST provides the inventory The CA System capacity of the required for short term core provides boric acid BWST is 457,000 cooling by the LPI and HPI Systems for BWST makeup to a gallons, and containment cooling by the BS maintain boron 1 System. Inadequate capacity would concentration. l i

affect the Engineered Safeguards '

systems' ability to mitigate the The CA (PAS $)

consequences of a LOCA. See DH System provides  ;

System parameters for specific boron concentration  !

inventory requirements. sampling capability i via sample i This parameter is specific to this connection CE-131.  ;

tank. l The DW System  !

provides .

References 29, 35 domineralized water for BWST makeup to maintain boron concentration. f BWST temperature BWST temperature must be Electrical Powers control is maintained to ensure the fluid DHHE 2A: ,

provided by the does not freeze. The BWST heaters 480V ES MCC 3A2 BWST heaters, and associated controls maintain Unit llA -

DHHE 2A and the tank inventory above the DHHE-28: -

DHHE-28. minimum temperature. See DH 480V ES MCC 182  ;

System parameters for specific Unit 50 temperature requirements.

Reactor Building  ;

Sump P

The sump is The sump screens are sized to The CA System '

designed to prevent unacceptably large debris (PASS) provides ,

prevent large from passing into the DH System sump sampling via debris from piping. Debris greater than 0.25 sample connection entering the sump inch could cause clogging of CE 056. R. G. 1.97 area. Sump essential components such as the requires sampling screens with 0.25 auxiliary pressurizer spray head, capability to

4 ctYSTAL RIVER Wi!T 3 Page 33 of 49 DMANCED Dell 0N &A$!$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN 3.0

• COMP 0NENT PARANETER$ i i

Camponent/ Parameter Reason /$ource Interface j inch openings are BS nozzles and core flowpaths, enable the operator I provided near the to verify boron l DH pipe suction. Reference 12 concentration and i acceptable i equilibrium pH. i FSAR FSAR Section 6.t.2.1 The WO System  ;

provides j instrumentation for  ;

sump level  !

indication to meet l R. G. 1.97 l requirements.  ;

Injection Flow R. G.1.97 requires injection flow Electrical Power  !

Instruments monitoring capability. Flow 24 V DC instrument  !

Tag Numbers: indication is used by the operator power ,

, DN-001-FT3 (CH A) post LOCA to determine if adequate  !

OH001-FT4(CH8) flow is being provided through j both injection lines. ,

9 Reference 23 l

0 H Heat Exchanger R. G. 1.97 requires DH heat Electrical Power: ,

Temperature exchanger outlet temperature 24 V DC instrument '

Instruments monitoring capability. The power Tag Numbers: operator can use the inlet and DH-002-TE1 outlet temperature indication to  ;

(outlet) determine if the sump water is '

DH-002-TER being cooled. The inlet (outlet) indication can be used to estimate  !

DH-006-TE1(inlet) sump water temperature. i DH-006-TER (inlet)  :

Reference 23 .

BW$T Level R. G. 1.97 requires BWST level Electrical Power:

Instruments monitoring. The operator uses 24 V DC instrument -

Tag Numbers: the BWST low level indication to power DN-007-LT CH A determine when to switch pump

• DH-037-LT CH B suction to the sump.

Reference 23

.,.,,-,,--.,n..,-..-..--.,----,e- - . - - , . , . , - , , - - . . . . , . - - - , - . - , - - - , , - 3

i CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 34 of 49 EMANCED DESIGN BA$15 DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM i

3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETER $

• 1 Component /ParAoster Reason /$ource Interface  :

BWST Temperature These instruments allow the Electrical Power:

Instruments operator to monitor BWST 24 V DC instrument ,

Tag Numbers: temperature. They also provide power DH-008-TE input to the heater controls to OH-009-TE maintain a specified BWST DH-010-TE temperature range.

BWST Heater This instrument de-energizes the Electrical Power:

Interlock BWST heaters on low tank level to 24 V DC instrument Instrument protect them from burning out, power Tag Number:

l- DH-019-L$

Crossover Line This flow measurement instrument Electrical Power Flow Instrument is required to enable the operator 24 V DC instrument Tag Numbers to verify the flow rate in the power l DH-038-FE injection crossover line during l long term cooling post-LOCA. The '

i instrument must be capable of measuring flow in either direction. The operator can verify flow is being provided to both injection lines from a single operable pump.

References 12, 30 Dropline Flow The NRC required that this flow Electrical Power:

Instrument measurement instrument be 24 V DC instrument Tag Number: installed to enable the operator power OH-045-FE to verify the flow rate in the dropline during the gravity draining mode. This mode is used to prevent boron precipitation post-LOCA.

Reference 13 Auxiliary The NRC required that this flow- Electrical Power:

Pressurizer Spray measurement instrument be 24 V DC instrument Flow Instrument installed to enable the operator power Tag Number: to verify the flow rate in the DH-046-FE spray line.

/, '

l CRYSTAL RIVER LA11T_.3 Page 35 of 49 I D64ANCED DESIGN BAS!$ DOCUMENT  !

ll DECAY HEAT REN0 VAL SYSTEM ,;

3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETERS l l Component / Parameter Reason / Source Interface .

I Reference 13 l Reactor Coolant This orifice is part of the lower The DH System 1 Inventory Trending tap for the RCIT System which provides for RC ,

(RCIT) System Flow provides RC level information and System hot ~1eg 1 Orifice '

RC inventory trending. level and reactor l Tag Number: vessel level i DH-04g FE Reference 27- measurements. 1 FSAR FSAR Section 7.3.4 Sump Levs,1 R. G. 1.97 requires sump level Electrical Power:

Instraents monitoring capability. The '24 V DC instrument l t Tag Numbers: . operator uses the sump level power l~ W-301A-LT indication to confirm adequate W-301B-LT inventory is available for The WD system W-302A-LT Engineered Safeguards pump provides sump level {

u W-302B-LT operation. instrumentation to

! WD-303A-LT meet R. G. 1.97 l W-3035-LT Reference 23 requirements.

l WD-304A-LT W-304B-LT LPI Flow Alarm These instruments actuate the high Electrical Powers i- Tag Numbers: and low LPI flow alarms. Tiiey are 24 V DC instrument t DH-001-FS1 required to alert the operator to power j- DH-001-FS2 potential pump runout or l inadequate core cooling i

conditions. )

l DH System High These instruments actuate the DH Electrical Power:

Temperature Alarm pump suction high temperature 24 V DC instrument Tag Numbers: al arm. They are required to alert power DH-006-TS1 the operator to the possibility of DH-006-TS2 exceeding the system design temperature.

L BWST Low Level This instrument actuates the BWST Electrical Power:

l Alarm low and low level alarms. It is 24 V DC instrument

Tag Number

required to alert the operator of power l DH-007-LT low tank level and the need for I l

switchover to the sump. l l' \

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GRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 36 of 49 DGtANCED DESIGN BAS 1$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN 3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETERS Component / Parameter Reason / Source Interface BWST High This instrument actuates the BWST Electrical Power:

Temperature Alarm high temperature alarm. It is 24 V DC instrument Tag Numbers required to alert the operator to power DH-009-TTS possible heater malfunction and high tank temperatures.

BWST Low This instrument actuates the BWST Electrical Power:

Temperature Alarm low temperature alarm. It is 24 V DC instrument.

Tag Number: required to alert the operator to power DH-010-TT5 possible heater malfunction and low tank temperatures.

Decay Heat Valves These valves open to allow LPI Tag Numbers: flow and close for containment DHV-1, DHV-2 are isolation and to prevent RC System containment leakage into the DH System.

isolation valves.

FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9, Section

1.4.53 T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 DHV-3, DHV-4 These valves are required to be Electrical Power

isolate the operable post-LOCA to allow for DHV-3

I dropline from the gravity draining through the 480V ES MCC 3Al L

RC System hotleg, dropline to prevent boron Unit 3C precipitation. 4 DHV-4:

480V ES MCC 3B1 Unit 11B RC System instrumentation i RC-3A-PS8 and RC-3B-PS9 provide RC System pressure information for ACIS input.

DHV-4 is a This valve may be remotely closed containment by the operator when containment isolation valve. isolation is required.

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' " l CRYSTAL RIVER WIT 3 Page 37 of 49 j EMANCED DESIM Basis DOCMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM ,

3.0- COMP 0NENT PARAMETERS Component / Parameter Reason / Source Interface T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 i FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9. Section 1.4.53 ,

DNV-3 is normally Power is removed from this valve closed with power ' during normal plant operation to removed, prevent spurious opening in the 2 event of a fire (Appendix R ,

concern). This action prevents '

inadvertent DH System overpressurization.

Reference 36  :

The ACIS provides The ACIS provides overpressure automatic closure protection for the DH System by l- of DHV-3 and DHV-4 ensuring that DHV-3 and DHV-4 are .

l- prior to a RC automatically closed whenever RC -

L System pressure of System pressure exceeds the 284 psig. The setpoint. The setpoint is  ;

maximum allowable conservatively set below the DH stroke time is 120 System design pressure (The design seconds. (Actual pressure is 345 psig for stroke time is 60 unisolated pump suction piping). ,

seconds.) The valve stro(e time is specified to ensure closure commensurate with the analyzed RC System rate of pressure increase.

References 3, 26, 31 T.S. Technical Specification 4.5.2 DHV-5, DHV-6 must A valve cycle time is specified to Electrical Power:

open within 15 ensure low pressure injection is OHV-5:

seconds. (Actual achieved within 25 seconds as 480V ES NCC 3Al cycle time is 10 required by Technical Unit It seconds.) Specifications. Starting of the emergency diesel generators which DHV-6:

takes less than 10 seconds is 480V ES MCC 381 included in the 25 second value. Unit 9C

,  :. .- - . - - . .~ . - .. - _ . . . -

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 38 of 49 EMANCED DESIGN SASIS DOCUMENT -

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM i l

3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETERS 1 i

Component /Paraseter Reason / Source Interface l 4

Reference 26 T.S. Technical Specification Table The ESAS provides 4 3.3-5 the signal for  :

valve actuation. ,

FSAR FSAR Sections 6.1.3.2. 8.2.3.1 (The ESAS  !

initiation variable .

is RC pressure i below500psig.)

DHV-5, DHV-6 are These valves are required to open TheHVAC'(XJ) ,

containment for LPI. They may be remotely System maintains DH isolation valves. closed by the operator when compartment -

containment isolation is required. temperature within .

design limits.

Key Parameter:

Heat. Removal T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 ,

FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9. Section ,

1.4.53 DHV-7, DHV-8 These valves are assumed in the Electrical Power provide cross LOCA analyses to be operable to DHV-7:

connection of the allow the operator to align the 480V ES MCC 3AB DH injection system for flow through both Unit 6AL lines, injection lines should one DH pump be inoperable post-LOCA. DHV-8:

480V ES MCC 3AB Reference 1 Unit 6AR The HVAC (XJ)

System maintains DH compartment temperature within design limits.

Key Parameter:

Heat Removal (Btu /hr)

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I CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT $ Page 39 of 49  :

EMANCED DESIGN SASIS DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM I 3.0- COMP 0NENT PARAMETERS Component /Paramater Reason /$ource Interface $

DNV-11. DHV-12 These valves are required to be Electrical Power:

provide a flow operable following a small break DHV-11:

path from the DH LOCA to enable the DH System to be 480V ES MCC 3Al pumps to the MU aligned to provide sump inventory Unit 7A pumps, to the MU System for HPI (piggyback mode). DHV-12:

Reference 26 480V ES MCC 381 Unit 5A ,

TheHVAC(XJ)

System maintains DH compartment.

temperature within design limits.

Key Parameter:

Heat Removal (Btu /hr)

DNV-17,' OHV-28 These relief valves are used to DHV-37, DNV-38, protect DH System piping and DNV-44 provide components from overpressurization  :

overpressure due to thermal expansion. The protection. The relief setpoint is equal to the valve setpoint is piping design pressure and is .

520 psig for established to ensure system DHV-17 and DHV-28. design pressure is not exceeded by The valve setpoint more than 110%.

is 345 psig for .

DHV-37, DHV-38 and References 17, 26, 31 DHV-44.

FSAR FSAR Table 9-11 DNV-34, DHV-35 A valve cycle time is specified to Electrical Power:

l must open within ensure low pressure injection to DHV-34:

15 seconds, the core from the BWST is achieved 480V ES HCC 3Al (Actual Cycle time within 25 seconds as required by Unit 4C is 10 seconds.) Technical Specifications.

Starting of the emergency diesel DHV-35:

generators which takes less than 480V ES MCC 381 10 seconds is included in the 25 Unit 6B second value.

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C H5IA4 RIVER UNIT 3 Page 40 of 49 D64ANCED DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM J 3.0. \

COMPONENT PARANETERS l

)

Component /Paramater- Reason / Source Interface l 1

' The ESAS provides the signal for

valve actuation.

(The ESAS initiation variable i Reference 26 is RC pressure 'i below 500 psig.) -

T.S. Technical Specification Table 1 3.3 5 FSAR FSAR Sections 6.1.3.2, 8.2.3.1 DHV-34, DHV-35 When the BWST is depleted, DHV-34 The HVAC (XJ) ,

provide BWST and DHV-35 must close to isolate System maintains DH isolation. the BWST.once pump suction is compartment established from the sump. temperature within i

' design limits. ,

Key Parameter:

Heat Removal (Btu /hr) .

l l DHY-39 DHV-40 These valves are required to be Electrical Power:

! provide a flow operable post-LOCA to allow for DHV-39:

path for gravity gravity draining in the dropline 480V ES MCC 3Al draining in the through the inoperable LPI train Unit 6C dropline. to the sump to prevent boron '

precipitation. DHV-40:

480V ES MCC 3B1 i Unit 6C ,

The HVAC (XJ) ,

System maintains DH compartment temperature within design limits. '

Key Parameter:

Heat Removal (Btu /hr)

DHV-41 is a This valve is required to be Electrical Power:

containment operable post-LOCA to allow for 480V ES MCC 3AB

h . .- .f ,

CRYSTAL RIVER LBIIT 4 Page 41 of 49 EIGIANCED DESIGN BA515 DOCUMENT l DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM l 4.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETER $

i l' Component /Paraseter Reeson/ Source Interface i L ,

l F isolation valve. ,

gravity draining through the Unit 4C  !

dropline to the sump to prevent boron precipitaticn. This valve TheHVAC(XJ)  ;

L1 may be remotely closed by the System maintains DH'

. operator when containment compartment i isolation is required, temperature within '

design limits.

Reference 26 Key Parameter:

Heat Removal  ;

(Stu/hr)

L T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9. Section 1.4.53 <

DNV-42, DHV-43 are These valves are required to be Electrical Power: i containment closed during the initial phase of DHV-42: 8 isolation valves, a LOCA to prevent loss of BWST 480V ES MCC 3Al inventory to the sump. Once the Unit 4B i BWST is depleted. these valves are opened to allow DH pump suction DHV 43: ,

from the sump. These valves may be 480V ES MCC 3B1 l remotely closed by the operator Unit 6A when containment isolation is required. The HVAC (XJ)

System maintains DH Reference 26 compartment temperature within design limits.

Key Parameter:

Heat Removal (Btu /hr)

T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9. Section 1.4.53 4

DNV-69. DHV-70 These valves are sized to protect provide 10 psi the BWST for maximum pump out vacuum relief. capacity.

Reference 37 m.. ~ -y, ._-,-w, .,.%,-,w,---,---.,-.,.--.-- .,...,-wy---_,,,-r,vr.._v.

. ,r.. .w, .___.__---.a -_-_ _ --- ___<_______---_------w-*

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 42 of 49 D644NCED DESIGN 4 ASIS DOCUMENT

,; DECAY HEAT REN0 VAL SYSTEM 3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETER $

Component / Parameter Reason / Source Interface I

c DNV-91 is a This valve is required to be Electrical Power:

containment operable post-LOCA to allow the 480V ES MCC 3AB +

isolation valve, operator to establish flow to the Unit SC vessel to prevent boron .

precipitation. This valve may be The HVAC (XJ)'

remotely closed ~by the operator System maintains OH-when containment isolation is compartment '

required, temperature within  !

design limits.  !

Key Parameter:

Heat Removal (Btu /hr)  :

T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9. Section 1.4.53 DNVe93 is a This valve opens to allow flow to >

containment the vessel to prevent boron '

isolation valve, precipitation post-LOCA and closes for containment isolation. .

T.S. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 FSAR FSAR Tables 5-4 & 5-9. Section 1.4.53 S

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j CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3. Page 43 of 49 i DMANCED DESIGN RASIS DOCUMENT i L ,

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 3.0 COMP 0NENT PARAMETER $

Component / Parameter Reason / Source Interface j I

DHV-110, OHV-111 These valves ensure adequate flow Electrical Power- 1 provide automatic is provided for core cooling '(low DHV-110:

flow control setpoint) and >revent pump runout 480V ES MCC 3Al (2800-3100 gpm). post-LOCA The Unit 5A i control sys(higi setpoint).

tem has time delays that delay automatic movement of DHV-111:

the valves for a'specified period 480V ES MCC 3B1 until the pump is up to speed. Unit 5B l References 11, 13, 21, 32, 33 The HVAC (XJ)

System maintains DH compartment temperature within i design limits.

Key Parameter:-

Heat Removal (Btu /hr) .

. FSAR FSAR Section 6.1.2.1.2 DNV-114. DHV-116 These valves are required to be are required to be open to prevent overpressurization ,

locked open (one of the dropline in the dead space '

turn off the between DHV-3 and DHV-4.

seat). Overpressurization could result from fluid thermal expansion between DHV-3 and DHV-4 due to  :

post-LOCA environmental conditions (high temperature) in the Reactor '

Building.

References 34, 42 9

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..- **; l CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 44 of 49 l r D54ANCED DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM - 1

4.0 REFERENCES

1. BAW-10103A, Rev. 3, "ECCS Analysis of B&W's 177-FA Lowered-loop NSS", i July, 1977.

2. B&W 51-1174477-00, "CR-3 EDBD LOCA/LPI Switchover", 3/2/89.

3. Letter B&W to FPC, FPC 88 800, " Maximum RC Pressure for DH System Operation", 12/22/88.

4. B&W 51-1174506-00, "CR-3 DH System Design Bases", 3/2/89.

l S. B&W 51-1174006-00, " Basis for CR-3 BWST Volume and Concentration Limits",2/28/89. .

6. B&W 51-1174003-00, "ES Systems Leakage", 3/1/89.

7. B&W 32-1168512-00, " Decay Heat Flow to Prevent Boron Dilution / Stratification", 4/27/87.

8. Calculation CR3.5510.031, Rev. 0, " Decay Heat Removal System Minimum Flow Analysis",10/2/87.

9. ' Letter B&W to GAI, GAI-145, "DHHE Requirements", 12/9/68.

10. Letter B&W to GAI, GAI-130, "DHHE Design Points", 11/4/68. j

11. Letter FPC to NRC, " Decay Heat Pump Runout", 12/16/76.

12. Letter FPC to NRC, " Emergency Core Cooling System Analysis for Additional Information",1/13/76.

13. Safety Evaluation Report CR-3, Supplement 3, Section 6.3.3.

14. Calculation I-D-2, BWST Volume, 7/21/70.

15. Letter NRC to FPC, " Credit for Operator Action Response Time", 9/26/78.

16. B&W 67-1002386-00, " Plant Limits and Precautions", 7/15/77.

17. MAR 78-9-68, "DH Setpoint Changes", 4/27/79.

18. R0-2891, Rev.10. " Requirement Outline for Fabricated Piping", 4/14/88,

19. Letter GAI to FPC, FCS-2030, " Decay Heat Pump Flow Investigation",

2/22/82.

20. Calculation CR3.5510.2.19-2, Rev. O, " Decay Heat Pump Recirculation Loop

C '

i

'l o ] .

t-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 45 of 49 EMANCED DESIGN BAS!$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

4.0 REFERENCES

Hydraulic Study", 6/27/88. l

21. Letter GAI to FPC, FCS-1430, "DH-110 and 111 Throttling Review",

12/23/80.

22. Letter FPC to NRC, " Decay Heat Pump Failure", 8/31/78. i

23. Letter FPC to NRC, 3F0388-18, "CR-3 R. G.1.97 Variables", 3/21/88.

24. Calculation DCC-0428-5510-117-002, Rev.1, "DC Thermal Analysis",

10/7/87. -

25. Letter GAI to B&W, FCS-9638, " Input to the LOCA ABD", 7/26/88.

26. Letter B&W to GAI, GAI-495, " Valve Tabulation Sheets", 9/8/70. ,

27. MAR 81-11-06-02, "Dropline for HLLM System", 5/5/83.  ;

28. C5-3-24 Rev. 4, " Technical Specifications for Heat Exchangers for Auxiliary System Service", 5/16/68.

29. Calculation, XV-A-4, Rev. 2, "BWST Design Cales",1/15/71.

30.' Field Change FC-80 (FCN-75 609), "LPI Injection Crossover Flow",

8/14/74.

31. REI 80-3-12. " Decay Heat Removal System Relief Capacity",11/7/80.  !

32. MS-125, Rev.1, " Mini Specification for Control System Instrumentation",

9/28/84.

33. MAR 80-09-03-04, " Building Spray and Decay Heat Control System,"

12/10/84.

34. MAR 77-2 11, " Decay Heat Drop Line", 2/10/77.

L

35. Letter FPC to NRC, " Borated Water Storage Tank Overflow", 9/19/73.

36. Letter GAI to FPC, FCS-4944, " Appendix R Modifications", 4/4/84.

37. Calculation XVII-A-3, "BWST Concrete with Aluminum Liner", 7/8/69.

38. Worthington Pump Curve, Model 8HN194, 5/9/67.

39. E-196631A, Worthington Pump Curve / Test Data, 1/20/71.

40. Calculation, 04-4762-118, Rev. O, " Reactor Building Flooding Levels During a LOCA", 8/22/81.

L .,

l 3 .

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 46 of 49  !

DMANCED DESIGN BAS!$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN 4.0' REFERENCES '

41. Calculation, 0920-129 C001, Rev. 0, " Effects on Flood Level of New' e Equipment on RB 95' Elevation", 4/25/89. -

42. Letter B&W to FPC, FPC-1745, " Overpressure Protection", 7/20/76. .

43. Telecon FPC to DRESSER "DHP-1A,lB Minimum Flow", dated 10/13/88.

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, i CRYSTAL RIWR UNIT 3 Page 47 of 49 DetANCED DESIGN BA51$ DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOYAL SYSTEM TABLE 1 l

Licensing and Code summary l t 1 1.0 Regulatory Documents Draft 10CFR50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits", July 11,1967. (FSAR 1.4) Specific Criteria ,

applicable to the DH System include.

Criterion 14 Required automatic actuation of Engineered Safeguards Systems for core protection.

Criterion 27 Required two independent reactivity control systems (Control Rods and Soluble Boron Injection).  ;

Criterion 37 Required Engineered Safeguards Systems to protect the core for any size break.

Criterion 38 Required Engineered Safeguards Systems have high.

reliability and ready testability.

Criterion 41 Required Engineered Safeguards Systems to remain l operable considering a single active failure.

! Criterion 43 Required Engineered Safeguards Systems to avoid accident aggravation.

Criterion 44 Required at least two Emergency Core Cooling Systems of different principles (pumped injection and core flood tanks).

Criterion 45 Required the capability to inspect critical parts of the Emergency Core Cooling System.

l Criterion 46 Required provisions for testing active Emergency l Core Cooling System components.

Criterion 47 Required the ability to test delivery capability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

Criterion 48 Required the capability to test the operational sequence to actuate the Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

Criterion 52 Required at least two systems for containment

-l tl l s .

j CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 48 of 49 i DetANCED DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT l DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN I&Bkl1 J Licensing and Code summary  !

heat removal capable of maintaining containment ,

pressure / temperature. '

Criterion 53 Required redundant valving for penetrations that require closure for the containment function. .

Criterion 70 Required limiting accident dose level to within ' ,

10CFR100 limits. l; i '

10CFR50.46, " Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors" (F3AR 14.2.2.5.2). Requires the -

Emergency Core Cooling Systems to provide continued removal of core decay heat post-LOCA.

Regulatory Guide 1.1 (Safety Guide 1), " Net Positive Suction Head for .

Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal System Pumps",

11/2/70. (FPC-5043, 12/13/71, and Calc. II-A-3, 6/6/72 provide ,

comparison against Safety Guide 1) 't b

+

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Page 49 of 49  ;

ENHANCED DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEN TABLE 1 Licensing and Code Sunnary 2.0' Codes and Standards USAS, 831.1, " Code for Pressure Piping", 1967 Edition (FSAR 6.1.2.4) -

used in piping design.

Note: Corrections to USAS B31.1.1967 can be found in addenda b, 1971 i and addenda c. 1972. Even though these corrections are not part of the CR-3's license, it is advisable to use them in all phases of design.

USAS, B31.7, " Nuclear Power Piping Code", 1969 Edition (FSAR 6.1.2.4)  :

used in piping fabrication and inspection.

Note: The original standard used for CR-3 was USAS B31.7 (draft),

Dated February 1968, which included the June 1968 errata to this  ;

standard. This standard is no longer readily available. As a result a page by page review was accomplished comparing the above to USAS B 31.7, dated 1969. Since the ^1969 edition is readily available, the FSAR was revised to the 1969 edition of B31.7. Results of the comparison of the l two standards were acceptable.

• IEEE-279, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating -

Stations", 1968 Edition (FSAR 9.4.2.7). Applies to ACIS design.

Additional Codes for DH components are identified in FSAR Table 6 2. j l

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