ML20199K473

Sys Readiness Review Summary Rept

ML20199K473
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/24/1997
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
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ML20199K454	List: 3F1197-55, Forwards Crystal River Unit 3 Sys Readiness Review Summary Rept, for NRC Info & Review ML20199K473
References
NUDOCS 9712010133
Download: ML20199K473 (34)

Text

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l Crystal River Unit 3 '

System Readiness Review Sumia, ;,y firut'it November 24,1997 f

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! W ll k'.l!'i,Y Sitit Progt m Manager Date il 7 17 I

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O CONTENTS Srd1011 htge 1.0 SUh1 MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 11 1.1 Summary 1.2 Conclusions 2.0 SYSTEht READINESS RP'itiW SCOPE AND PROCESS 21 2.1 Overall Approach and Scope ,

2.1.1

Background:

Design and Licensing Basis Conformance 2.1.2 Phased Approach for SRR 2.1.3 System Prioritization for SRR

, 2.1.4 Structure of SRR Teams 2.2 Discovery - Phase 1 of SRR 2.2.1 Vertical Slice hiethodology 2.2.2 Initial Walkdowns 2.2.3 Screening of Open items for Restart Requirements 2.2.4 initial Reports

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. Resolution and System Readiness - Phases 2 and 3 of SRR 2.3.1 Emerging issues, Final Walkdowns and Open item Closure 2.3.2 Final Reports 2.3.3 Presentation to System Review Panel and Acceptance by Operatbns 2.3.4 Report to SSOD and Readiness for Next Run Cycle 3.0 SUh1 MARY OF SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW RESULTS 31 3.1 Discovery - Phase I of SRR 3.1.1 Vertical Slice Results and Citaracterization of Findings 3.1.2 Screening of Open items 3.1.3 Walkdown Results 3.1.4 Assessment of Results by Topic Areas ii

o 3.2 Resolution and System Readiness Phases 2 and 3 of SRR 3.2.1 Open items 3.2.2 System Readiness Status 3.3 Ma:ntenance Rule Structural Baseline Inspections 3.4 Configuration Document integra' ion Program 3.5 Licensing Basis Review Project

4.0 REFERENCES

41 Eigurn 2.1 Key Elements of Design Basis / Licensing Basis Evaluations 2.2 System Readiness Review Plan ,

2.3 System Acceptance Process ,

t 3.1 Topic Review Summary Level 1 Systems Checks and Discrepancies Inbks 21 Graded Approach for System Readiness Review 22 Crystal River Unit 3 System Readiness Review System Review Level 3-1 Summary Number of Checks and Findings Generated by SRR 32 Summary of System Related Open items Tracked by SRR iii

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6 Section 1 SUnth1ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1,1 SUhth1AIW in responee to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Request for Information dated October 9, 1996, pursuant to 10CFR$0.54(f), Florida Power Corporation (FPC) conunitted to perform a System Readiness Review (SRR) of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR 3) systems prior to restart. The SRR pmvides a systematic review of each of the 105 plant systems. These reviews are one part of a comprehensive restart program that provides reasonable assurance that CR 3 systems are operated relir.bly within their design and licensing basis.

SRR consists of 4 Phases: Phase 1 Discovery, Phase 2 - Outage Activities hionitoring, Phase 3 Final System Readiness Reviews, and Phase 4 - Startup and Power Ascension. Phases 1,2 and 3 of the System Readiness Review Program have been completed and the results are summarized in this report. The final phase of the SRR will be completed during system testing and performance monitoring during plant startup.

The SRR utilized a vertical slice or Safety System Functional Inspe: tion type review of all 105 plant systenu prioritized into three levels; . Level 1 - system readiness certification Level 2 -

system readiness assessment, Level 3 system readiness walkdown, A readiness review significance system ranking was determined and used as a tool to determine which systems received a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 review.

The SRR vertical slice review addressed 30 Topic Areas covering the Design Basis, Licensing Basis, Operations, hiaintenance, Surveillance, Training, Corrective Action Programs and as built configuration of the plant. The SRR activities also reviewed and included the results from other design basis and licensing basis activities, including the Configuration Document integration Project, the Licensing Basis Review Project and hiaintenance Rule Evaluations as part of the overall SRR process. The detailed results for evaluating systems are documented in comprehensive SRR system reports. The SRR results were also used to assess the effectiveness of existing CR 3 programs and processes that are used to control design and licensing information and identify potential programmatic issues. Specific actions to enhance existing programs and correct programmatic deficiencies were identified and initiated.

More than 12 man-years were invested directly into the discovery phase of the SRR by participants from Systems Operations, Design, and industry experts. Over 16,000 individual attribute checks were perfonned as part of the reviews. These checks resulted in initiation of 1712 open issues by the SRR Teams; 705 of these issues are SRR restart items. Five of the SRR-identified open items were reported to the NRC in Licensee Event Reports (LER). Each of the open items has been entered into the appropriate CR 3 corrective action program. The issues identilied by the SRR Teams as well as previously existing and emerging open items were reviewed for their importance to restart. Potential restart items were identified and were entered 1-1

O into the tracking databases of the SRR Program. A total of 1485 restart items were placed in the SRR database. Following review of the SRR results. including the ongoing resolution of restart items by a System Ownership Team which included personnel from Systems, Design, and Operations, each system was accepted by Operations. Remaining restart required open items are being closed on a schedule consistent with restart and continue to be tracked by the System hhnagers.

1.2 CONCLUSION

S The SRR effort has been efTective, based on; the results of the SRR reviews documented in the final reports for each of the plant systems, the evaluations of potential programmatic issues, and the results of several independent self assessments and audits, including a recent NRC SSF1 for two plant systems. The System Readiness Review Program has provided an effective means of:

. identifying specific system and programmatic deficiencies e assessing the restart significance of new and previously identified problems, and e monitoring the successful resolution of those problems.

Upon completion of the remaining restart required corrective actions and startup testing:

. We will have established reasonable assurance that the CR 3 systems are capable of meeting their design and licensing basis requirements.

• The systems are ready for reliable operation for the next operating cycle.

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Section 2 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW SCOPE AND PROCESS 2.1 OVERALL APPROACll AND SCOPE

2.1.1 llathatuynd

Design and Licensine Hasis Conformant.c in the sununer of 1996, FPC and the NRC conducted a number of assessments and evaluations  !

related to design basis and configuration management issues at CR 3, which identified the need l for improvement. These evaluations included an Independent Design Review Panel (IDRP), an  !

Independent Performance Assessment Process (IPAP), including a Safety System Functional  !

inspection (SSFI) of the decay heat removal system, and specific reviews of design basis issues l

- and design margin related to the emergency feedwater system and the emergency diesel generators.  ;

. A comprehensive root cause analysis of the results of these reviews resulted in the Management Corrective Action Plan Phase 11 (MCAP 11) and a decision was made by FPC to keep CR 3 shut down to resolve the deficiencies with the emergency diesels and the emergency feedwater and to take other actions to assure that CR-3 is operated in accordance with the design basis, j in the response to NRC's 10CFR$0.54(f) letter, FPC committed to perform a System Readiness Review (SRR). The SRR provides a phased and prioritized approach for the review of each of the 105 plant systems. These reviews are one part of a comprehensive restart program, in conjunction with other ongoing programs at CR 3, and resolution of any outstanding issues j required for restart, the 3RR provides reasonable assurance that the system operation: l

. is capable of meeting its functional requirements.  :

. is within its regulatory design basis, and  ;

. is within its licensing basis.

The SRR activities were supported by results from other design basis and licensing basis activities including the Maintenance Rule Structural Baseline inspections, the Configuration

' Document Integration Project, and the Licensing Basis Review Proje:t, These parallel activities are described in Sections 3.3,3 A and 3.5, respectively. Figure 2.1 depicts the overall relationship of the SRR, Configuration Document h,tegration Project and key plant modifications.

l This System Readiness Review Summary Report summarizes the results of the SRR Program through Phase 3. Phase 4 of the SRR will be completed during system testing and performance monitoring during plant startup. A summary description of each of the phases is provided in the ,

next section.  ;

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2.1.2 l'huitdApntrach for SysitnLiltadiness Revicus The overall approach and detailed implementation guidance for the CR 3 System Readiness l Heview Program is provided in Reference 1. Under the program, the readiness fbr restart of each  ;

of the 105 systems at CR 3 was assessed in a prioritized and phased approach.

in order to ensure that the systems receive the appropriate level of evaluation and resources, systems were prioritized and assigned to one of three lev,cis of review. The scope of review Ibr systems within each SRR Level is shown in Tables 21 and 2 2. The prioritization strategy is summarized in Section 2.1.3.

As shown in Figure 2.2, the review of each system is divided into fbur phases and an initial preparation step. The scope of the preparation step and each phase is as follows:

. Preparation - This step includes fonning and training of the review teams and familiari-zation with design and licensing basis documentation. The training is conducted in accordance with documented qualification requirements that cover plant procedures,

, processes, and computerized document search tools, as well as the vertical slice safety system functional inspection (SSFI) methodology.

. Phase 1 This is the discovery and assessment phase. This phase includes the perfbrmance of the vertical slice review of the system, conduct of the initial system walkdowns and assessment against the restart criteria of both discrepancies identified by the SRR and previously identified open items. The products of the Phase 1 SRR for each system me a report and databases that document the completed assessment, and identify the actions that are recommended for restart. The Phase 1 results fbr the Level I systems were also used to define any required expansion of the Level 2 review scope and to identify any programmatic concerns or generic issues that may cross system boundaries.

. Phase 2 - During this phase, the syste:n manager monitors the identified open items fbr adequate closure and screens any emergent items for restart requirements.

. Phase 3 - During this phase, the final system walkdowns are conducted, the fmal system readiness status is verified and documented in a final report. The SRR results are reviewed by a System Ownership Team consisting of personnel from Systems, Design and Operations, and the systems are turned over to Operations for plant startup.

• Phase 4 - During this phase, the system manager supports the Plant Startup and the Power Ascension Program. Based on the system performance and testing results obtained and the status of any remaining open items, the system manager aftirms that the system is ready for the next run cycle.

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1 s

2,1.3 System Prioritiration for SRR The 105 CR-3 systems were prioritized and classified into one of three SRR review levels. The classification process took into account factors such as: I

. the importance of the system in maintaining the integrity of the fission product boundaries (fuel clad, reactor coolant system and containment),

. Probabilistic Safety Assessment ranking,

. the importance of the system to plant safety as determined by the Maintenance Rule ranking process,

. a regulatory factor including consideration of regulatory design basis,

. the number of modifications performed on the system, and other opportunities for configuration change, e results of prior system reviews (EDSFI, SWSOPI, etc.)

The prioritization of the systems was reviewed by several independent expert groups. The resulting system classifications are such that, based on a PSA risk reduction worth perspective and excluding contributions due to human error, the Level I systems are relied upon in accident sequences which account for 87% of the core damage frequency. In addition, the i.evel 1 and Level 2 systems are relied upon in accident sequences which account for 100% of the core damage frequency.

A more detailed discussion of the prioritization process and the resulting rankings is provided in the SRR Plan (Reference 1).

2.1. 4 Sinttture Of SRR Teams The SRR program includes and obtains input from personnel with a wide range of experience and expertise.

. The FPC System Manager provides a detailed knowledge of the system, including its functional requirements and its performance history. The system manager also brings ownership of the system: at the conclusion of the SRR the system manager determines

- whether the system is ready for restart and will need to " live" with the system following startup.

. The System Operator participates in the SRR, in the initial and final system walkdowns and by reviewing and signing the initial and final SRR reports. Operations accepts the Final SRR Reports Ihr each system.

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. The Design Engineer for the system provides suppmt as required and participates in the

' jstem Ownership Team review of the appropriate Configuration Document integration Project documents, including FSAR revisions.

. Maintenance and Licensing personnel provide support as required.

. MPR Associates bring detailed knowledge and experience with the vertical slice and SSFI process, and provide an independent perspective grounded in experience at other plants.

. Framatome Technologies bring the unique knowledge of the design basis for CR 3 and other B&W plants and direct access to previously conducted and ongoing design basis analpes.

The SRR effort helps provide the basis for reasonable assurance that the CR 3 systems are within their licensing and design bases. These results, together with resolution ofidentified restart issues lead to system acceptance by Operations, for system startup testing and plant startup.

. The SRR reviews also lead to improved knowledge of the design bases and provide the system managers with improved skills for performing subsequent vemeal slice and SSFI activities.

These improved skills and capabilities can be used by the system managers and plant management to reduce future threats to system licensing and design bases and system functional requirements. These skills can help support reliable plant operation.

2.2 DISCOVERY - PilASE 1 OF SRR 2.2.1 Ytrikal Slice Methodology Phase 1 of the SRR employs a vertical slice approach similar to the methodology of a Safety System Functional inspection (SSFI). This approach evaluates selected system functional and safety requirements (Attributes) against plant configuration, as well as design, licensing, operations and maintenance documents (Topic Areas) on a sampling basis.

The assessments include comparison and evr.luation of documents as well as observations of plant condition and contiguration during system walkdowns. The results are documented in Attribute Assessment Forms and issue Tracking Forms in the SRR Database. Discrepancies are entered into the CR-3 corrective action program. Database manipulation and reporting capabilities assist in reporting, tracking and identification of generic issues and trends.

For Level I and Level 2 systems, each system review team develops a list of specific system attributes to be assessed. These attributes are selected to cover the functional reqmrements of the system and its critical camponents. The selection of the system attributes is based on existing PSA evaluations and the expertise of the reviewers. Licensing requirements and design basis documents including FSAR, Technical Specification, and DBDs are also used to define specific attributes. Generic requirements, such as Station Blackout, Environmental Qualification, 2-4

Appendix R. etc. are also selected as system attributes when appropriate. The system specific bases for selection of system attributes are docu.nente<1 in the initial SRR Report for each system. The Level 3 system review teams also use the FSAR, the Technical Specifications and Design 13 asis Documents, if applicable, to establish functional requirements to be addressed in the assessment. Ilowever, specific system attributes are not defined for the Level 3 reviews.

The scope of the venical slice review performed on a system was recorded in a system readiness  !

review matrix, for Level I and Level 2 systems and included in the individual system reports.

The system attributes selected for review form the rows of this matrix. The sources of information or Topic Areas which are included in the vertical slice form the columns of the  ;

matrix.

The requirements associated with each of the selected attributes are evaluated against specific Topic Areas or sources ofinformation, on a sampling basis. Tiie topic areas cover design and licensing documents, operating, maintenance and testing procedures as well as programmatic issues such as corrective action programs. The focus of these evaluations is to assess consistency and conformance of current plant configuration and operation to current plant design and licensing basis requirements. For Level I systems, all 30 Topic Areas are covered. For Level 2

, systems, a minimum of 14 Topic Areas are covered, with emphasis on design and licensing documents, plant modifications, plant operating procedures, una plant configuration, The minimum scope of the Topic Areas covered by Level 1 and Level 2 system reviews is summarized in Reference 1. Level 3 system reviews focus on the system functional and safety requirements as decumented in the FSAR,ITS and DDDs. Level 3 system reviews also cover plant work control databases including sed documents as REAs, hiARs, precursor Cards, Work Requests, and Operator Workarounds.

For Level 1 and Level 2 systems, the results of the individual checks of attribute requirements against topic areas are documented in Assessment Fonns and are entered into the SRR database.

Identified discrepancies are documented in the issue Tracking part of the SRR database. Copies of the completed Attribute Assessment iorms are inclu#d in the initial reports fbr the individual systems.

For all three level system reviews, identified discrepancies are entered into the appropriate CR-3 corrective action or work control process. Resulting Precursor Cards are included in the initial reports for the individual systems.

2,2,2 lultial Wa& downs The assessment of each system includes walkdowns during the initial discovery phase of the SRR and during the final resolution Phase. A plan for the system walkdowns is developed fbr each system, using the guidance in the SRR Plan (Reference 1). The walkdown team consics of the system operator, the core members of the SRR team perfbrming the assessments, and when requested by the System hianager, representatives from hiaintenance, Licensing, and Design.

The walkdowns focus on equipment reliability or operability issues as well as conformance with system design basis contiguration.

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. As with evaluation of documents, results of the walkdowns are documented on Assessment  !

Forms and entered into the SRR database for Level I and Level 2 systems. For all three Level systems, discrepancies are entered into the appropriate correciive action program and are tracked - l to satisfactory resolution. l 2.2.3 ScreeningDffnen items For Rcilart Reuulrnncub l The SRR Teams review open items generated in the SRR and existing open items (e.g.,

Precursor Cards, Requests for Engineering Assistance, Modification Approval Records, Operator Workarounds, etc.) and determine whether the items need to be resolved prior to restart, using establ%hed restart criteria. Those items that are recommended by the SRR Team for resolution  !

prior to restart are forwarded for further evaluation and are entered into appropriate data bases for l tracking as part of Phase 2 and 3 of the SRR Program. j included in the review of existing open items were previously identified Restart issues that apply l to individual systems. Fer some systems, the ongoing actions to address these Restart issues i include analyses and plant modifications that are fundamental to the compliance of the system l with its design and licensing basis and to the system readiness for restart. These issues are  :

Identified and summarized in the individual system SRR reports.

2.2.4 inidaLEconth The results of Phase 1 of the SRR are documented in un initial Report fos cach system. Each ,

report documents the scope of the review and summarizes the results obtained. The report provides the fbundation for the conclusion that a system is within its licensing and design basis,  ;

contingent upon resolution ofidentified discrepancies.

Discrepancies that were identitled are described, entered into the appropriate FPC work control "

system and tracked to satisfactory completion in an SRR database. Copies of any Precursor Cards that were generated are included in the report. The level of detail provided for each report is commensurate with the SRR review Level (1,2, or 3) for the system. The Initial Reports receive mveral levels of review and approval as described in the SRR Plan and are transmitted to ,

FPC Records Management.

2.3 RESOLUTION AND SYSTEM READINESS - PilASES 2 AND 3 OF SMR 2.3.1 Emergine Issuch.EhuiLWalkduitni.amL0 pen Item closure During Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the SRR, the System Ownership Team concept is implemented, as described in the SRR Plan. The System Ownership Team is comprised of the System lingineer/ System Manager as the lead, the Design Engineer (optional for Levels 2 and 3), the System Operator (optional for Level 3), a Licensing representative (optional) and the  ;

Configuration Document Integration Project Writer / Integrator, for implementing the design basis  ;

documentation.

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The System Ownership Team has the responsibility for keeping abreast of on-going system activities, including Restart Action items, and fbr providing technical input to help ensure that these activities are completed satisfactorily. Any new discrepancies that are identined are documented, reviewed for restart significance, and entered into the appropriate corrective action program. Closure of restart required open items are reviewed and if the resolution is appropriate.

the item is documented as closed in the SRR database. Revised con 0guration documentation such as the FSAR. EDDD, and ITS are reviewed by the System Ownership Team and comment resolution coordinated uith the CDip.

The System Ownership Team also resiews the open Restart items and open items on the Work Control documents to confirm that deferred work is not required prior to restart. The potential cumulative impact of deferred work is considered.

Walkdowns are pertbrmed of work in progress during Phase 2 as required and final walldowns are perfbrmed in Phase 3, with emphasis on Restart Action items, previously identified problem areas, and system modifications, if any.

2.3.2 EhinLReimris Each System Ownership Team has the responsibility for preparing and presenting a system specific Final System Readiness Report. The Final SRR Report documents the discrepancy and open item infbrmation gathered in Phase 2 and Phase 3, and summarizes the evaluations based on the Maintenance Rule performance criteria.

The Final Report provides a status and summary of the completed and open (if any) SRR restart items and a final review of any other items that are open against the system. A list of remaining open restart items is presented together with a committed completion schedule that is consistent with plant restart.

The Final Report also documents the review by the System Ownership Team of the revised configuration documentation, including the FSAR, the EDDB, the ITS, etc. The System Ownership Team verifies that the revised configuration documents are consistent and refleet the resolution of identified discrepancies and system modifications. Any remaining configuration document open items are listed in the Final Report and those items that are required to be resolved prior to restart are identified.

2.3.3 l!runttathmluhitutdeview Panel and Acce!) lance by Operations The process for turning each system over to Operations is described in the SRR Plan and in Administrative Instruction Al-256. The overall process is depicted in Figure 23 and for a typical system is summarized as follows.

The Final SRR Report Ibr Level 1 and Level 2 systems is prepared by the System Manager, reviewed by the System Operator, and approved by the appropriate NPTS Superv sor and by the 2-7

O NPTS hinnager. Any issues still requiring resolution must have corrective actions that are clearly defined, agreed upon by the System Operator and System Engineer and scheduled. The approved ,

~

Level I reports and those Level 2 reports deemed appropriate by the ADPO/h1NPO are presented to the System Readiness Review Board for final review and acceptance. Level 2 reports not requiring review by the System Readiness Review Board are accepted by the ADPO/h1NPO.

s For Level 3 systems, the initial Report also serves as the Final Report. Level 3 reports are presented 1a Operations for review and are accepted by the ADPO/h1NPO.

2.3.4 Brnort to SSODmLReaditten for NeitJtun cycle Phase 4 of the SRR is the plant startup, power ascension and testing. During Phase 4, the System Engineer monitors startup activities, including the results of surveillance tests, post maintenance tests, M AR functional tests, and their effect on syctem readiness.

Prior to entry to Mode 4, the System Engineer confirms the adequate closure of restart required open items and evaluates the status of any items that are not closed, including those in the SRR Open items Database and these on the CDIP Open item List, and any emergent open items

. generated since the completion of the Final Report. The status review of these ite.us is documented in a report to the SSOD by the System Engineer, with the conclusion tiot the system is ready for plaa.! startup. Concurrence that the system is ready for entry to Mode 4 is pmvided by the SSOD.

At the conclusion of Phase 4, the System Engineer issues a system readiness certification, affirming that the system has been monitored during plant startup and power ascension, that corrective maintenance activities have been reviewed and that the system is ready for ieliable operation for the next run cycle. Concurrence is provided by the appropriate NPTS supervisor and ,ue readiness certification form is thrwarded to the NPTS Manager as part of the requirements of Al 256, " Station Readiness for Restart Sequence, Reactor Restart and Power Ascension Plan",

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Table 2.1 Graded Approach for System Readiness Review Process Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Review Personnel ~ Project System hianager System Team System Operator hianager Review Design & Licensing Yes Focused Open items Documentation Review System hiaterial Yes Yes Yes Condition Documentation As Found System Condition Project System hianager System Walkdown' Team System Operator Manager identification of Deticiencies Yes Yes Yes a

Disposition, Tracking & Yes Yes Yes Reporting Restart Restraints As Lef t System Condition Yes Yes Yes Walkdown Reporting Requirements Readiness Readiness Readiness Report and Report and Report Data Base Data Dase

' Turnover to Operations Yes Yes Yes

• The Project Team for Level I reviews and walkdowns is described in Section 2.1.4 of this report. For some systems, a designated reviewer was appointed if the System hianager was not available.

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c Table 2 2 Crystal River Unit 3 System Readinest Review System Review Level SRR Review System Level identifier System Name 1 CF Cole Flood ,

Dil Decay lleat EG Emergency Diesel Generator EF / EFIC Eniergency Feedwater ,

ES Engineered Safeguards _

h1U hiakeup _

RC Reactor Coolant ,

2 All Air llandling: '

- Auxiliary Building Exhaust  :

. Control Complex l

- Reactor fluilding Recirculation

- Reactor Duilding Purge AN Annunciator System BS lluilding Spray CA Chemical Addition DC Decay IIcat Closed Cycle Cooling DP DC Electrical Distribution DR Control Rod Drive FW Feedwater hts hiain Steam h1T Auxiliary Electrical Power NI Nuclear instrumentation RA Containmen* '.ccess Rh1 Radiation h1071itoring RP Reactor Protection System RW Nuclean Services Closed Cycle Cooling SF Spent Fuel Cooling SW Nuclear Senices Closed Cycle Cooling WD Waste Disposal 3 -- Note i __

Note: 1. SRR I evel 3 systems are specifically identified in Reference 1.

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KEY ELEMENTS OF DESIGN BASIS / LICENSING .

BASIS EVALUATIONS Reasonable Assurance that CR-3 will operate within its design and licensing bases.

CR-3 can Mitigate all Design Basis Accidents 5

Modifications System Configuration

& Focused Readiness Document  ;-

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i 3.1 DISCOVERY - PilASE I OF SRR. .;

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- 3,l.1 VerticaLSileclciulh And Characterization Of Findinn -l The SRR Project reflects a significant commitment by FPC to ensuring the adequacy of the CR 3 l systems for restart. More than 12,600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> (more than six person years) were expended by the - l SRR Teams on Phase 1 of the Level 1 system reviews, including more than $60 hours on initial ,

walkdowns. It is estimated that more than six person years were also expended on the Level 2 and Les el 3 systems during Phase 1; thus the total effort expended on the Phase I discovery for  ;

the SRR was on the order of 12 person years, not including the significant management, stafTand  :

clerical clTort that has been dedicated to support these reviews. Substantial additional effort was expended on the subsequent Phases 2,3 and 4.

Detailed documentation for each system review is presented in the initial SRR Report for that system. These reports evaluate the results obtained for each system and assers the readiness of each system for restart. A typical Initial SRR Report for Level 1 systems range from about 200  ;

to 350 pages. Typical Level 2 reports range between 150 and 200 pages and typical Level 3 reports range from 10 t> ages to 50 pages. In total, SRR discovery phase reports provide on the order of 7000 pages of documentation.

. A summary of the number of checks performed in the SRR Program is presented below and in Table 3 1. This summary is based on the results at the completion of Phase 1 of the SRR. ,

During the ongoing Phase 3 efTorts, the data base used for documenting and tracking these results is being updated to reflect any final emerging issues.

The Level 1, and Level 2 system reviews included over 16,000 individual attribute checks, cove 6g all 30 Topic Areas, and substantially exceeding the goals established at the start of the ,

SRR. These checks resulted in the identification of more than 1500 discrepancies. The combined Level 1,2 and 3 reviews, resulted in 1712 individual open items. Somewhat less than half of these were recommended for resolution prior to restart. Of the open items identified by the SRR Teams at the time this report was written, approximately 930 were Precursor Cards.

The remaining items were Work Requests, NOTES items, etc. Of the Precursor Cards, none have been graded A (most severe) 30 have been graded B,93 have been graded C, and most were graded D. Table 31 summarized these results.

Five of the open items were significant enough to result in an LER. The resolution of each of ,

these items is being tracked as a restart item. Tlu issues addressed by these LERs are summarized below. Additional detail is provided in the initial SRR reports for the applicable systems.'

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,a . , _ _ - _ , i .._ n m . ,_,w..__.,_,,,__...-._. __.m____ _ . _ _ . , _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

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. Appendix R Concern with RCP Pumn Oil Collection System Appendix R requires that oil collection systems be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the RC Pump lube oil systems. Several components in the RC Pump lube oil system were identified as being located outside the boundary of the collection system. Potential leakage sites outside the Oil Collection System will be modified or repaired prior to restart. (LER 97-0/0-01) e Control Comolex liabitability Envelope and Control Room Emergency Ventilation SyMem Design deficiencies with past modifications were identified that could have the combined ef fect of allowing calculated post accident doses to control room operators to exceed regulatory limits. New calculations for control room dose are being developed, physical modifications to the control complex ventilation system are being implemented and control complex inleakage testing is being conducted. (LER-97-022-00) e Potential Pressure Locking of Emergenev Feedwater Isolation Vnives An evaluation identified that the Emergency Feedwater isolation valves are potentially susceptible to pressure locking during a very specific set of conditions in which a steam environment is

, caused by a pipe break and the valves cannot reopen after they close on a steam generator overfill signal. Installation of cavitating venturis in the emergency feedwater discharge lines will increase the time to overfill the steam generator and the EFW isolation valves will be moditied or replaced prior to phmt restart. (LER-97-Oll-09)

. Iluildine Temocrature Variations Greater Than Assumed in Instrument Uncertainty An evaluation discovered that the temperature ranges maintained in the plant buildings exceeded in some cases the temperature ranges specified in the Envirenmental & Seismic Qualification Program Manual. which are used to calculate the temperature dependent instrument error and are used for the l&C setpoint calculations. Instrument calibrations and equipment performance could potentially be adversely impacted. (LER-97-007-01)

. Evaluation ofIIVAC Considerations in Support of Post Fire Manual Actuations The Appendix R Fire Study did not specifically evaluate potential loss ofIIVAC and its effect on manual actuations following a fire. Compliance with Appendix R for post-fire safe shutdown can not be demonstrated because the ability to perform the required manual action in areas with elevated temperatures is not documented. (LER-97-033-00)

Summaries of the open items being addreased by the SRR Program for Level 1,2, and 3 Systems are provided in the individual system reports.

To obtain an overall characteria. tion of the discrepc.ncies, each Level 1 SRR Team examined the SRR identified open issues with the objective ofidentifying broad common characteristics which would provide a basis for summarizing the issues. Based on this review, across all Level I systems, the following observations are drawn:

32

I

. Slightly more than one half of the identified issues are documentation problems such as data /information in one controlled document ditfers from that in another controlled document, and it is concluded that the discrepant data /information is unlikely to impact plant operation, maintenance or design.

. Slightly less than one quarter cithe identified issues require technical analysis or evaluation to resolve; som:. of these are recommended Ihr resolution prior to restart, based on the Restart Criteria.

. Slightly more than one quarter of the issues were identified during the walkdowns and typically represent material condition discrepancies or discrepancies between hardware and related documentr some of these are recommended for resolution prior to restart, based on the Restart Criteria.

. Approximately one quarter of the identified issues for Level 1 and Level 2 systems are recommended for resolution prior to restart. Considering all open items (Levels 1,2 and 3),less than half of the identified items are restart items.

. 3.1.2 tittrening Of OncILlkull All of the open items generated in the SRR were screenea against the restart criteria, and at the time this repoit was written almost 705 items were recommended by the SRR for resolution prior to restart. The remainder were recommended to be resolved in accordance with the normal corrective action process. Ilowever, many of these are in fact being resolved in an expeditious manner prior to restart, in addition to the Open items generated by the SRR Team, the team reviewed open corrective action items generated by others. Typically these included:

. Work Requests

. Precursor Cards not generated by the SRR Program

. hlARs (htodification Approval Records)

. REAs (Requests for Engineering Assistance)

. Problem Reports

. NOTES (Commitment tracking system)

. Restart issues identified in the CR-3 Restart Plan (Reference 5)

The existing open items were omiuated against the Restart Criteria provided in the SRR Plan.

Those items whLh the SRR Team considered to meet the Restart Criteria were identified and recommended for resolution prior to restart. As an example of the scope of this review, the SRR Teams thr Level 1 reviewed more than 1660 previously identified open items during Phase 1 of the SRR and recommended that 215 of these be resolved prior to restart. Each previously identified Open item that was recommended for resolution prior to restart for Level 1,2 and 3 systems S identified in the individual system reports and entered into the tracking databases.

3-3

3.1.3 EllkdmutRuuha Each of the SRR Teams conducted system walkdowns in accordance with the guidance provided in the SRR Plan. The results are documented in the individual system reports.

Typically, several walkdowns of specific system components were conducted during Phase 1, in order to obtain supporting information for various attribute assessments in addition, an os erall walkdown of the system was conducted.

The individual members of each walkdown team are identified in each system report. For each system, the system operator participated in the walkdown as did the core SRR Team members.

Supporting personnel from Maintenance, Design and Licensing i articipated as requested by the

- tystem manager.

The specific results have been documented in the individual system reports. Following each walkdown, the SRR Teams conducted briefings, documented the results on Assessment Forms (Level 1 and Level 2 systems) and entered the discrepancies that were identified into the appropriate CR 3 corrective action program, With specific exceptions noted in the assessments and documented in the individual system reports, the walkdowns confirmed that the system configuration confbrms to applicable design drawings and MARS. In addition, there was relatively little evidence af component deterioration corrosion or leakage and housekeeping was good.

The number of discrepancies identified during the walkdowns relative to the number of checks made during the walkdowns was not large. Ilowever, because of the :arge number of checks performed in the plant, a significant fraction of the restart recommended items were identified during plant walkdowns. For example, of the Level I r start recommended items, approximately one third resulted from walsdowns.

3.1.4 Assessment of Restdts by Topic Areas The System Readiness Review approach used the vertical slice or Safety System Functional Ir.cpection methodology across all 30 Topic Areas fc Level I systems. Individual sources of documents and sources ofinformation within each of the 30 Topic Areas were assessed on a sampling basis. This approach is used to:

. provide the most thorough reviews for the highest priority systems, nnd

. assess the effectiveness of existing plant processes and programs in maiataining the plant configuration and operation within design and licensing bases.

The results obtained Ibr Level I system reviews fbr each of the 30 Topic Areas were used to identify any additional programmatic actions that may be needed to improve conformance with design and licensing bases. Previously conducted reviaws and assessments by both FPC and the 3-4

4 NitC have identified the need for improvement in certain areas and the Cit-3 ltestart Plan (Iteference 5) defines specific restart issues and associated action plans to addrass these needed improvements. Many of these restart action plans are ongoing. The SRR evaluation of the Level I results takes into account these programs.

The methodology used to evaluate the open items to identify potential programmatic issues is described in Reference 3. An Expert Panel consisting of very senior personnel representing a cross section of CR 3 plant responsibility and expertise performed the evaluat!on of potential programmatic issues resulting from the L: vel I results.

The detailed evaluations of each of the 30 Topic Areas are presented in Reference 3.

For each apic area, the following infonration is provided:

. Topic Area description

. A summary of the "3tatistics" for the discrepancies, i.e. how many attribute checks were made, and the number and significance of the discrepancies identif ed. Figure 3.1 provides an example of the information evaluated.

. A summary description of the open items identified by SRR that are recommended for resolution prior to restart

. A summary discussion of the non <cstart open items

. Identification of ongoing programs that may address potential topic area concerns

. A discussion and rationale of the potential implications of the identified open items for plant processes and procedures

. Recommendation regarding potential corrective action, taking into account existing programmatic upgrade activities This evaluation concluded that many of the Topic Areas did not require corrective action because the existing programs appeared to be perfonning well. This conclusion applied to those Topic Areas where the number and significance of discrepancies were low. For example, the review of controlled drawings included documentation for 510 individual attribute checks. which resulted in 20 open items. These items were minor discrepancies that do not impact safety o: 3perability.

No Grade A or B and only 2 grade C precursor cards were generated. Most of t' wiscrepancies are related to inconsistencies in documentation. A few of the items document ....ior differences between as built plant configuration and informatian on drawings. None of these items met the Restart Criteria. The Expert Panel evaluating these results concluded that no corrective action with respect to drawing configuration control is required.

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-- .--_ ---.---- ~ - - - . . - . - - . -

1

. i i

Several of the Topic Areas already had corrective actions initiated. For example, tha large

. number of discrepancies that the SRR ibund with the FSAR is consistent with previous observations and findings and a separate FSAR review and upgrade project was already underway. This project eventually became incorporated in the Configuration Document .

Integration Project. Consequently, no additional corrective action based on the SRR results for

this Topic Area was considered to be required by the SRR Expert Panel, i There were several Topic Areas with a relatively large number of discrepancies identified by the  !

SRR for issues that had not yet resulted in appropriate programmatic corrective action. In these .

cases, the SRR has documented the potential programmatic concerns in Precursor Cards. l Corrective action have been recommended and are being initiated for the fbliowing topic areas:

Topic Area 1. .Ijlectrical Calculations and Analysis: Calculations of Differential Pressures used to_ Calculate MOV Toraus CR 3 has already embarked on several major programs that are upgrading electrical calculations based on past deficiencies identified; this includes the emergency diesel generator load calculation which is being updated and validated based on the hiARs to be implemented bercre

. restart. These programs are expected to identify and correct most of the deficiencies in the electrical calculations topic area of the kind identified in the SRR reviews.

llowever, existing programs do not address the errors such as those found for the h!OV pressure differential calculations associated with the isolation valves in the Makeup System. PC 97 3247 has been written to identify this issue and to assess the need to review and if needed upgrade the MOV pressure drop calculations. Based on the conservatism in the currently implemented approach for electrical thrust calculations, no operability issues are expected and completion of this etTort is not a restart restraint.

Iepic Area 2.1&C Calculations and Analysis: Calculation ofInstrument String Error and Tonic Area 22. Surveillance Tests and Insnections As a result ofinconsistencies in the way trip setpoints were selected and verified by cenain surveillance procedures, CR 3 has implemented an action plan to verify and validate that the most safety significant setpoints related to the improved Technical Specification Limits are verilled prior to restart. The scope of this program is defined by Restart Issue OP-13 and is focused on RPS, ESAS, and EFIC systems. Ilowever several of the restart recommended items identified during the Level 1 reviews identify issues that are similar to those addressed by OP 13 but are not covered by the scope of OP 13. More detailed calculation ofinstrument string errors k needed for these applications. (PC 97 2224,97 2313, PC 97 0992), AJ a result of PC 97-0992, a root cause evaluation was performed and an action plan developed. These actions have been designated as non-restart restraints.

36

( _

Tonic Area 3. hiechanical & Structural Calculations and Analysis ,

This topic area represents one of the highest peaks for discrepancies identified by SRR. The deficiencies include improper inputs and assumptions, uncertain or unjustified criteria or inputs, and incomplete propagation of outputs to other related documents.

Based on the results observed the discrepancies identified with mechanical calculations have not compromised plant safety or equipment ,perability. Nevertheless, as a result of the issues identified with mechanical and structural calculations, a generic (documentation only) Precursor Card, PC 97-6247, was written. This PC notes that the individual discrepancies identified during the SRR are documented as individual PCs and are being tracked to satisfactory completion by the SRR, but that no long term corrective action plan has been developed to address the improvement of mechanical / structural calculations. PC 97-6247 focuses on the need for a long term improvement and enhancement program for these calculations. The long term improvement

- program is not a restart restraint.

Topic. Area 4. Accident Analyses

- The SRR identified several specific problems with the FSAR Chapter 14 safety analyses, as.

documented in PC 97-5788 and Restart Issue D-70. Resolution of Restart issue D-70, PC 97-5788, the ongoing review, update, and revision to Chapter 14 and the ABD, and the associated Configuration Document Integration Project, will assure that the safety analyses are current, and will bring the accident analyses and relmsd plant documentation up to date. The adequacy of the SRR results and conclusions are dependent on the successful completion of the Chapter 14 and ABD review and upgrade.

Topic Area 13. ITS and BASES PC 97 1529 identifies a generic issue with the ITS allowable values. In particulur, instrument string actuation point allowable values provided in the ITS and ITS Bases are not currently updated to reflect revised instrument loop error calculations. As a result, it is possible to satisfy the ITS requirement but not satisfy the documented design basis. Resolution of this issue is not a restart constraint.

Additional inforr ation regarding each of these issues and the review of all 30 Topic Areas is provided in Reference 3. ,

a 3-7

e q

1

" 3.2  : RESOLUTION. AND SYSTEM READINESS - PHASES 2 AND 3 OF SRR

3.2.11 Open items Considering Level 1; 2 and 3 system and all sources of Open Items (SRR and non-SRR), over 1

- 1480_Open items were recommended for restart and are being tracked by SRR. _

'All Open items which were reccmmended by the SRR Team for corrective action prior to restart -

were tracked _during Phase 2 and 3 by the system manager and System Ownership Team for satisfactory resolution-prior to restart. Resolution of these items and the status of unresolved items is documented in the Final SRR Report for each system, At the time this report was written, more than 1000 restart items had been closedi the total -

number of open restart items had been reduced to less than 500. Resolution of remaining Open c Restart items are proceeding on a schedule consistent with plant restart. ,

- Resolution of non-restart required open items in the SRR database is also tracked. Even though #

-. these items are not required to be resolved prior to restart, many are also being closed through the regular work control process. As of the writing of this report, about 1200 non restart open items had been entered into the SRR and about half of those had been closed. The status of both restart and non restart items broken down by the various types of open items is presented in Table 3 2. ,

3.2.2 System Readiness Status The process of completing the SRR is described in the SRR Plan and is summarized in Section 2.3 of this report. The key system related products from these activities are the monitoring of open items against the system, conducting and documenting the final system walkdowns, and the completion of the final reports.

The open item monitoring activities are summarized in section 3.2.1, above. The fmal walkdowns are documented in the Final Reports for each system, The final system walkdowns for Level I systems v re conducted by the System Engineer, System Operator and the Design

' Engineer. For Level 2 systems the Final Walkdowns were conducted by the System Engineer and the System Operator. The scope of each walkdown as well as the specific results are summarized the Final Reports.- Any new discrepancies that were identified were entered into the

' appropriate corrective action program. These Final Walkdowns results provide part of the basis for the conclusion regarding system readiness.

LAll Finst Reports had been completed and all systems have been accepted by Operations.

Presentations to the Restart Panel for some systems were continuing as of the writing of this report.- The status and resolution schedule for the remaining open items were identified in the Final Reports. Successful closure of remaining open items is being tracked by the System Engineers.- -

^

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1 For each system, the following conclusions have been reached:

. . The system meets its licensing and design basis and is ready for plant restart, contingent upon completion of the specific activities listed and scheduled in the Final Report.

1

• Based on an evaluation of the hiaintenance Rule results, the system is ready to operate reliably for the next run cycle. l l

l

. The aggregate impact of the deferred items will not impact the safe operation of the system.

3.3 hl AINTENANCE RULE STRUCTUltAL BASELINE INSPECTIONS The hiaintenance Rule Structural Baseline Inspection was performed per requirements of Pht-156. Emphasis was placed on those items or types of structures found most likely to exhibit maintenance problems (distributed equipment supports, structural steel, reinforced concrete, etc.). The hiaintenance Rule Structural Inspection provided a baseline review of CR3 plant structures to identify any maintenance concerns that would adversely affect the structural adequacy of the structure. Concerns that would adversely affect the structural adequacy were addressed in accordance with CP-111. The scope of the hiaintenance Rule Structural Inspections included all areas (inside and external) of the auxiliary building, the control complex, the diesel generator building, the emergency feedwater tank enclosure, the fire service pump house, the intermediate building, the reactor building, the spent fuel area, the turbine building and heater bay, the exterior tanks (condensate storage, condensate waste, emergency feedwater, and fire service), and external structures (cable bridge, discharge structure, intake structure, step-up transformer enclosures, switchyard, and wave embankment).

Supplementary inspections to the hiaintenance Rule Baseline Structural Inspection were conducted on three-bolt pipe clamps and anchor bolt / fasteners. The three-bolt clamp study was conducted on a limited number of pipe clamps to assure that typical three-bolt clamp contiguration at CR3 do not: (1) adversely affect the safety function of the pipe support or (2) fail accepted CR3 design criteria. The anchor bolt / fastener assessment was perfomied to determine a level of confidence that deficiencies (gross installation defects such as oversized holes, lack of preload, loose nuts, missing or damaged hardware, and degradation of connection) do not result in connections that: (1) adversely affect the safety-function of the connection, or (2) fail accepted CR3 design criteria.

In addition, the Structural Connection Configuration Assessment performed an " extent of condition" or contiguration evaluation on a selected series of safety-related structural equipmenvcomponent support connections. The objective of this program was to determine if the selected items were constructed in accordance with design drawings. This evaluation was performed on twenty (20) structures representing a cross section of mechanical and electrical equipment supports and structural-framing members, 3-9

r -

All structural and mechanical commodities were identified and documented. All inspection results were documented and entered into the Maintenance Rule Structural Baseline Inspection database.

Forty-eight (48) different structural and mechanical system components were inspected in all areas of the Plant and included concrete structures (for example, reactor building tendons and reinforced concrete), steel structures (cranes and monorails, gates, liner plate, and platforms),

architectural features (for example, doors, suspended ceilings, and windows), distributed systems and supports (piping, electrical raceways, tubing, and HVAC ductwork), and building structures (for example, carth structures, embankment protection, and building foundations). Those components referenced in these inspection programs included items identified as MX system components. Detail descriptions of the programs and results can be found in Programmatic Solutions Report No. R020-97-002 and Project Report No. 020 010.04.

All unacceptable concerns and actions to correct these concerns identified by the Maintenance Rule Structural Baseline inspection and Structural Connection Configuration Assessment walkdowns were initiated in accordance with CP-111 and CP-113A.

. Each Final SRR Report provides a summary evaluation of the Maintenance Rule data for that system. This evaluation compares the system to the Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria and provides part of the basis for the expectation of reliable operation for the next run cycle.

3,4 CONFIGURATION DOCUMENT INTEGRATION PROGRAM The intent of the Configuration Document Integration Program (CDIP) is to integrate the ,

resolution of previous findings regarding design and licensing basis issues, findings from the current extent of condition reviews, such as the System Readiness Review and the FSAR Operational Review Project, and the documentation requirements resulting from the significant changes to the facility being implemented during the current outage. The CDIP will incorporate the resolution of the design basis issues and the findings from the FSAR Operational Review and the System Readiness Reviews into the main configuration control documents at CR-3.

The CDIP project will result in Revision 24 to the FSAR, which will include the facility changes identified on the Restart issues Matrix and the resolved discrepancies identified prior to the freeze dr.te. Resolved discrepancies are those that include a SA!USQD approving any needed changes. The freeze date is based on issuing FSAP. revision 24 in accordance with NRC commitments. Discrepanc:es unresolved or identified after the freeze date will be evaluated against the Restart Criteria for prioritization of resources.

In addition, the CDIP project initiates updates to other identified documents as required, including but not limited to ths Enhanced Design Basis Documents (EBDB), Topical Design Basis Documents (TBDB), Analysis Basis Documents (ABD), Improved Technical Specification (ITS) Bases, etc. These initiated updates are recorded in the CDIP Database.

3-10 L __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

r The CDIP interacts with the SRR through the System Ownership Teams (SOT). The SOT is responsible for:

• Affirming the consistency ofinformation in FSAR changes with other design basis documents and other FSAR sections, especially Chapter 14 (safety analyses) e affirming the accuracy and completeness ofinformation in document changes e identifying and implen.enting changes to other programs as required by the document changes e identifying discrepancies between the FSAR and the current outage completed design, procedural or program changes.

The CDIP Process is described in Reference 7.

The final SRR report for each Level 1 and Level 2 system includes a summary of the CDIP Ownership Team review, and documents any outstanding CDIP item on the SOT Review Open item List, specifically identifying those that need to be resolved prior to restart. Satisfactory resolution of these and other restart open items are considered as part of the SRR Report to the SSOD for Entry into Mode 4 and the System Readiness Certification.

3.5 LICENSING BASIS REVIEW PRO, LECT Early in the SRR discovery process it was recognized that assuring consistency of system and component capability with licensing commitments requires a time-consuming search through various intbrmation sources. To -ssist with this effort and to help establish effective access to specific licensing commitments. le Licensing Basis Review Project (LBRP) was initiated. The LBRP process is described in Reference 8.

The Licensing Basis Review Project (LBRP) collected, reviewed and assessed licensing and design basis information for the SRR Level I and Level 2 systems. The licensing and design basis information was derived from the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the improved Tbchnical Specifications and Bases (ITS and ITSBASES), docketed correspondence between FPC and the NRC since issuance of the original Operating License, and the Design Basis Documents, Enhanced Design Basis Documents and Topical Design Basis Documents.

The LBRP defined specific Structure, System and Component (SCC) Attributes for each Level 1 and Level 2 system, similar to the Attribute selection methodology utilized in the SRR. A System Attribute Table for indexing design and licensing basis intbrmation against the SCC Attributes was developed.

The LBRP provided a review of docketed correspondence to assure the validity of current licensing basis infonnation presented in the FSAR, ITS and ITSBASES. Discrepancies that were identified were documented as Precursor Cards and restart-required items are tracked by the system engineer in the SRR open issues database to assure system readiness for restart.

3-11 i

• i

o. i Products from the LBRP included an annotated copy of the current revision of the FSAR relating each section of the FSAR to the applicable docketed NRC correspondence supporting that :

section as well as a Licensing Basis Table that relates the licensing and design basis information gathered to the source docketed correspondence. This table also provides a searchable listing of docketed correspondence since issuance of the original Operating License.

An individual LBRP notebook including searchable table and annotated FSAR were provided for each Level 1 and Level 2 SRR system to the applicable System Engineer, as well as to the Configuration Document Integration Project (CDIP). These products provide effective tools that will assist in maintaining the plant within its licensing and design basis in the future.

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t Table 31 Summary of Number of Checks and Findings Generated by SRR (all issues, whether open or closed)

Leveli Level 2 Level 3 Total Attribute Checks 6759 9328 na 16087 Discrepancies 638 900 na 1538 SRR ltems initiated 526 845 341 1712 SRR Restart Recommended items 193 230 282 705 Grade A Precursors 0 0 0 0 Grade B l'recursors 7 16 3 26 Grade C Precursors 40 14 10 64 Grade D l'recursors 308 50 39 397 LERs 2 3 0 5 3-13

(.

i- .,;

4-.

1 Table 3 2 Summary of System Related Open items Tracked by SRR (Across Level 1,2 and 3 systems)

Non restart Required Restart Required initiated Open Required Open Precursor Cards 775 445 302 23 Work Requests 329 123 862 189 MARS'- 15 12 65 46 REAs 63 36- 59 4 NUPOST 17 14 5 :0 '

prs 9 8 20- 2 Restan issues - 0 0 133 49 miscellaneous 24 22 39 5 TOTAL 1232 660 1485 318 3

4 1

• k 3-14

- -. - - . . . . . . - . . .- - - - - . -, - - - . ,. - = . -- -. - -- .

I C b - -

l I

Electrical Cales / Analysis I&C Cales/ Analysis i I

I Mech & Struct Cales / Analysis Accident Analyses i I

Dr3 wings Safety Func/Legic Diagrams y CMIS Specincations i E

EDBDs/TBDs/ABDs Change Doca /50.39 Reviews i t

E D C o""

Z Z Ternporary Mods c c  %

3 U U 3 I OO FSAR Review r $,

$ R b y RR '

yI g~

t; o Gr ;7 ITS / Bases , to in h ,h h. Licensing Cornmitrnents i

' $Ca 3

. $ E ' 08 g .9

$ E w 9. Notices / Bulletins

,ii Procedures ' gg "O cc

s Operstor V*.xk Amunds

$ (D ,

a  ; n-a g*.a Industry Operating Exper. ' g g I M M

Maintenance Pmeedures

' E

, B Vendor Technical Info g Preventive Maintenance  ;

Surveillance Test & Inspectiora '

W Secnon XI !$7/ Performance i Tests I

~ i As Built Venfications 302/208 Drawings ,

Surveillance Programs  ;

y PC/REATRCorrective Actions ,

n h$

mu QA Audits & Other Assessments m~

Training ussan Plans

~

[

' 0 Open Items (Backlog) 3 0

fv Section 4 REFERENCES

1. System Readiness Review Plan, Revision 4

2. CP 111, Compliance Procedure, Processing Precursor Cards for Corrective Action Program

3. Crystal River Unit 3 Level 1 System Readiness Reviews Phase 1 Results

4. Crystal River Unit 3 Self Assessment Program (For CR-3 Plant Staff Activities),

Revision 0,

5. Crystal River Unit 3 Restart Plan

6. Maintenance Rule Structural Baseline Inspection Report

7. Configuration Document Integration Project Process Guide, Revision 0, dated July 28, 1997

8. Licensing Basis Review Project Process Guide, Revision 0, August 14,1997 9a. FPC CR-3 System Readiness Review Program Report of Self Assessment of Program Activities NPTS97 0183 conducted during the week of March 17,1997 9b. FPC CR-3 System Readiness Review Program Report of Second Self-Assessment of Program Activities conducted during the week of May 19,1997 and documented with the response in NPTS97-0480 9c. FPC CR-3 System Readiness Review Program Report of Third Self-Assessment of Program Activities dated July 31,1997.

10a. Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit 97-04 Report dated June 2,1997 (QPA-97-0018) 10b. Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit 97-05 Report dated June 27,1997 (QPA-97-0023) 10c. Quality Programs Surveillance Report QPS-97-0082 dated June 6,1997 10d. Quality Programs Surveillance Report QPS-97-0147 dated October 27,1997.

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