ML19323A133

Response to Intervenor Sc Sholly Fourth Set of Interrogatories.Includes Info Re Design Adequacy & Operation of Control Room.Attachments Contain Supporting Data Re Surface Water Sampling Locations & Aquatic Sediment

ML19323A133
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/31/1980
From:	Trowbridge G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML19323A128	List: ML19323A127 ML19323A133
References
NUDOCS 8004170281
Download: ML19323A133 (45)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ - __

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C:)

Lic 3/31/80 ,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear

)  ;

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO STEVEN C. SHOLLY'S  ;

FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES INTERROGATORY NO.16-007 With regards to qualifications of a witness to permit review of Licensee's Security Plan, what qualifications would be acceptable  !

to Licensee?

+

! RESPONSE There are no qualifications which per se qualify a witness to review Licensee's Security Plan. As discussed in Pacific Gas

, and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398 (1977), whether a particular witness 4

is qualified to review a licensee's security plan, subject to .

protective order, can only be addressed after the following i threshold showing has been persuasively demonstrated by the inter-

• venor sponsoring the witness: (1) the relevancy of the inter-  ;

venor's security-related contention (s) to specific aspects of j Licensee's Security Plan, and (2) the relevancy of a particular I

witness' expertise to those portions of Licensee's Security Plan  !

, which the intervenor has demonstrated are relevant to its conten-tion (s). Thus, whether Intervenor Sholly's witness.will be 80041703 9) ,

, 1 1

sufficiently qualified to review specific aspects of Licensee's I l

Security Plan will depend upon the nature of the witness' exper-tise, the area (s) in which the witness will be called to testify, i the specific aspects of Licensee's Security Plan sought to be re-viewed by the witness, and the relevancy of this review to Sholly l Contention 16. .

i INTERROGATORY NO.15-005  !

Has Licensee or its contractors ever asked TMI operators to l evaluate the design adequacy of the control room?  !

RESPONSE

Although there previously was not a formal program estab- l lished for asking the TMI-l operators to evaluate the design adequacy of the Control Room, the organization structure and ,

communications betwcen the Operations and Engineering sections [

of the Company did permit an exchange of comments and ideas j

concerning the Control Room design. Since the TMI-2 accident of Marchi28, 1979, a formal program has been established to '

I solicit comments from the operators on the design changes as- ,

sociated with the restart of.TMI-1.

The review of the Control Room design referred to in answer i j to Interrogatory 15-002 will be performed in coordination with ,

1 l

plant operators, who will have an opportunity to make comments on the design and layout of the control panels.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-007 Specify the environmental conditions present in the Unit-1 con--

trol room, including temperature, humidity, noise level, light -

ing requirements, and provisions for protection against contami-nants (radioactive or otherwise). Specify how these environmental s; conditions are maintained..

l 4

, s RESPONSE  !

The Unit 1 FSAR section 9.8 " Station Ventilation Systems" [

provides design bases and system function descriptions. In par- >

ticular, sections 9.8.2h, 9.8.3.4, and 9.8.4f deal with the con-l trol room.

{

The relative humidity in the Control Room will vary from 10 percent to 60 percent depending on the season and mode of tempera- j i'

ture maintenal:ce, i.e., heating or cooling.

The componerts or systems associated with the Control Room i

generate insignificant noise, except for alarms, which are inten- l ded to attract attention. l i

The Unit 1 Technical Specifications describe how the Control Room filtration system is tested and surveilled. Additional in- '

formation is contained in FSAR section 1.4.11.

t l The lighting design for the Control Room called for 150-foot j i

candles at the fixture. This would result in an average of 100-foot candles of light at'a height of 2.5' feet above the floor, i i

INTERROGATORY NO.15-008 f What is Licensee's policy regarding housekeeping duties in the l control room?

l RESPONSE l i

At least one individual from the Maintenance Department is  !

.I assigned janitorial duties in the Control Room, working the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift Monday through Friday. The Control Room 1 operators are not assigned. housekeeping duties in the Control

Room while they are assigned;to the Control Room operator watch station.  !

I f

INTERROGATORY NO.15-011

+

Describe in detail how the control room panels are layed out in  :

i functionally demarcated areas. j r

RESPONSE

i The Control Room is arranged so that displays and controls frequently employed on a routine basis or which would be needed ,

i quickly in case of an emergency are mounted on an operating panel  :

i which is clearly visible and close to the ope'rator. Less fre-quently used controls and indicators, and those which would not be needed quickly in an emergency are located further away from j the operator on vertical panels.

Further, the controls are grouped by the system to which they i

relate. Different systems (e.g., reactor control, turbine con--

trol, condensate, electrical) have their respective controls in  !

I functional groupings on the panels. This is further explained in i

Section 7.4 and Figure 7.21 of the FSAR. See also response to

Interrogatory No.15-013.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-012 i i

Detail all instances in which operators have resorted to their  ;

own labelling in the control room of Unit 1 due to inadequacies in the original labelling. *

RESPONSE

Licensee has not maintained records regarding the use of temporary labels. Operators do not normally resort to their own independent labelling in-the Control Room. If the original-labelling were discovered to be inadequate, new-permanent replace-ment labels would be constructed and installed with.the approval of unit management. t i

, i Temporary "Dymo" tape labels are used in the Control Room l in cases where permanent labelling would not be feasible (i.e.,

changing setpoints of instruments) and as a temporary replace-  ;

ment for permanent labels which have been damaged while new  !

t permanent labels are being constructed.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-013 For panels in the control room having similar controls for a number of different features, discuss how these controls are '

differentiated other than by labelling. Discuss the extent to ,

which large numbers of similar controls on any given panel gives rise to operator error because of the absence of differ- .

ences in appearance, shape, color, and/or texture. I t

RESPONSE I Position of controls on Control Room panels and grouping of '

various related controls are general means utilized to differen-tiate such controls. Licensee's response to Interrogatory 15-016 provides photographic documentation on Control Room panel and con-trol layout. Licensee has not correlated similarity of controls to operator error rate and the overall impact of appearance, shape, j

, color, and/or textures on that rate, per se,. However, past prac-tice has been to review operator errors and other incidents as I

they occur, and to implement whatever. corrective action necessary' to minimize the likelihood of recurrence.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-014 Discuss precautions taken to ensure that controls for protection systems in the-Unit 1 control room cannot be accidently manipu-lated.

, i

RESPONSE

Precautions which are incorporated to ensure that controls for protection systems are not accidently manipulated are listed below:

(1) Operator training - provides recognition for and l

[

knowledge of consequence of control manipulation; .

i (2) Administrative procedures and security controls - (

limits access to the location of controls; and 1 (3) Design of controls - key locks, interlocks, alarms, and physical force required to manipulate controls preclude or protect against accidental movement.

i INTERROGATORY NO. 15-0U Discuss how operators may determine if an annunciator lamp is burned out.  ;

I RESPONSE  :

An annunciator lamp that has burned out would be discovered i 4

during alarm tests conducted each shift in which all annunciator window lights are turned on. Absence of the illuminated an- l nunciator window during this test would be investigated and repaired as necessary.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-016 Discuss how meters used in the control room are coded to permit easy determination by operators of whether the meters indicate normal, marginal, or out-of-tolerance conditions.

RESPONSE-The information requested in this interrogatory can be ob-  !

tained from detailed photographs of the Unit 1 Control' Room

a 1

which have been taken by the Licensee. These photographs will

. be placed in Licensee's Discovery Reading Roon by approximately ,

April 15th.  !

Further, Licensee notes that Intervenor Sholly visited the ,

TMI-l Control Room accompanied by a photographer on March 7, 1980. Photographs taken are currently in Intervenor Sholly's possession. l i

INTERROGATORY NO.15-017 i Discuss the extent to which analog trend recorders are utilized in the Unit 1 control room.

RESPONSE

See photographs referred to in response to 15-016. '

INTERROGATORY NO.15-018

! Identify and provide the locaticn within the Unit 1 control room l

of all chart recorders which . record more than six (6) functions.  ;

RESPONSE  !

See photographs referred to in response to 15-016.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-019 How many annunciator lights are there in the Unit 1 control room?

How many separate meters? How many control switches? How many strip chart recorders?

RESPONSE

l See photographs referred to in response to 15-016.

i INTERROGATORY NO.15-020 ,

How many alarrs which appear in the Unit 1 control room refer an operator to a remote (out-of-control-room) location, requiring the operator to leave his station or send an auxiliary operator to answer the alarm or assess the cause for the alarm or correct

, - -. v -

=

the alarm-causing situation. Identify each alarm and the name and location of the remote statior. to which the operator is re-  :

ferred by the alarm.

l

RESPONSE

There are fifteeen-(15) alarms which appear in the Unit 1  !

Control Room which refer the Control Room operator to a remote (satellite) annunciator which in turn may have several alarm windows with respective alarm response procedures. Upon re-ceipt of the " satellite trouble" alarm, the Control Room operator would first acknowledge the Control Room alarm and then dispatch an auxiliary operator to the satellite station in order to assess and correct the cause of the alarm. A table listing the various alarms is attached.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-021 For all the following code colors used in the Unit 1 control room, list each separate meaning which this color can-have  ;

(i.e., valve open, flow stopped, etc.):

a. Red d. White l

b. Green e. Blue

c. Amber f. Flashing lights of any color

RESPONSE

The following color coding scheme for indicating lights has been utilized in TMI-l Control Room:

Green - to indicate close-off or nonoperating nosition; Red - to indicate open, on or operating position; Amber - to indicate abnormal condition or where applicable, engineered safeguards actuated equipment in ab-normal position;

- v v

Control Rom Alam Remote Station Alam Panel Incation Alarm Description Building Panel Description M1in 11-1-5 Boiler Trouble 'Ibrbine Auxiliary Boiler Annunciator Panels A&B Ieft B-7-8 Circulating Water CNCL House Circulating Water Chlorinator Panel Chlorinator Trouble Main A-1-5 D/G 1B Trouble D/G Diesel Generator Annunciator Panels A&B Main B-1-5 D/G 1A Trouble Main Is-2-6 Generator Hydrogen Seal Turbine Hydrogen Seal Oil Annunciator Panel Oil System Trouble Inft A-8-10 Cycle Make-Up De- Turbine Illinois Water Treatment Annunciator Panel mineralizer Trouble INDS-1-10 Radioactive Waste Auxiliary Radioactive Waste Annunciator Panel Panel Alarm left-B-5-8 Powdex Trouble 'Ibrbine Powdex Annunciator Panel left A-7-10 Cycle Make-UP Pre- Pretreat2nent Pretreatment Annunciator Panel treatment Plant Trouble left B-7-7 River Chlorinator FHCL River Water Chlorinator Annunciator Panel Trouble Icft B-6-8 River Rake or Screenhouse Screenhouse Annunciator Panel Screens Trouble Main Ir-3-7 Generator Stator Turbine Stator Coolant Annunciator Panel Liquid Charge Syst s Trouble Main M-1-6 230kV Substation Substation Substation Annunciator Trouble Right Front 7-2 Industrial Waste Industrial Industrial Waste Treatment Syst m Annunciator Treat 2nent Trouble Waste Right Front 8-2 Industrial Waste Industrial Industrial Waste Filter Systm Alarm Panel Filter Trouble Waste Right Front 7-4 UPS Diesel Generator UPS Diesel UPS Diesel Generator Alarm Panel

- Trcuble

i ,

i i

l Blue - to indicate limit conditions or where applicable, engineered safeguards actuated equipment in normal- '

position; I White - to indicate available condition such as energized  ;

4 i line, available power, etc.  !

i I Flashing indicating lights for system or equipment status

have not been used in TMI-l Control Room design. The plant annunciator provides a flashing window feature for alarm sequerras, l and computer-driven CRT displays also flash under certain condi-tions. i i

INTERROGATORY NO.15-022  ;

i  !

To what extent has Licensee used " task analysis" as described in -

EPRI NP-309, " Human Factors Review of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Design", in evaluating the design of the Unit 1 control room? j i

RESPONSE  ;

i' The procedure used for design of the control board is tradi-tional in this industry. This involves a physical mockup of the l i

control b' cards, using paper facsimilies for the control board' l mounted devices. Numerous meetings were held with Metropolitan'  ;

t Edison personnel, including the Station Superintendent and Senior- {

Operating Staff to perform simulated operations on the control l board mockup. Through this technique, the physical arrangement of the devices on the control board was established, utilizing  ;

the combined experiences of all personnel involved. After the physical arrangement was established, drawings were made from the mockup and' issued to the control board fabricator.-

l

INTERROGATORY NO.15-023  :

Identify by name, title, organization, and professional qualifi-cations of any and all experts in the field of human factors en-gineering who participated in the design or review of the design of the Unit 1 control room, or any portion thereof.

RESPONSE

Licensee is not aware of any persons who participated in the original design of the Unit 1 Control Room who would qualify as &

~

an " expert" in the field of human factors engineering. ,

INTERROGATORY NO.15-029 To what extent does the Unit 1 control room make use of com-puter-based graphic display to inform operators of system status and parameters?

RESPONSE

Licensee is presently developing the capability to use computer-based graphic displays in the MODCOMP computer system.

The extent to which these will be used has not been defined.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-034 What means will be utilized in the Unit 1 control room to assure '

that operators know the status of the PORV on the pressurizer, i.e., whether the PORV is open or closed? Is this means single-failure proof? Is the pressurizer qualified as " safety-grade"?

If not, why not?

RESPONSE

TMI Unit 1 control room instrumentation that provides infor-mation on the PORV status is described in Licensee's Restart Re-port, Section 2.1.1.

Licensee has objected to the last two questions in this interrogatory.

i l 1

l l l l

i INTERROGATORY NO.15-035 On what panel in the Unit 1 control room are the following features ;

located:

(a) PORV status (b) Status panel for RCDT (reactor coolant drain tank)

(c) Emergency Auxiliary feedwater controls (d) Display for reactor coolant pump vibration and eccentricity (e) Pressurizer level indication (f) Reactor coolant pump seal pressure '

(g) Reactor coolant pump seal temperature (h) Reactor coolant pump controls (i) Borated water storage tank controls (j) High pressure injection controls (k) Low pressure injection controls (1) Decay heat indicatore (m) Decay heat pump controls ,

(n) ECCS actuation control (o) ECCS status panel (p) Letdown controls (q) Intermediate closed cooling pump controls

RESPONSE

See photographs referred to in response to 15-016.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-039 Provide evidence that Licensae will provide a direct indication of emergency feedwater flow to the steam generators to the Unit 1 control room panels.

-' i

{:

RESPONSE

1 i

A description of Control Room indication provided to indi-i cate Steam Generator emergency feedwater. flow is contained in Licensee's Restart Report, Sections 2.1.1 and Supplement 1, Part 1, Questions 4 and 6 and Supplement 1, Part 2, Questions 4 and 5.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-040 -

l Provide evidence that Licensee will provide an alarm or other ,

! appropriate indication that the emergency feedwater system is -

misaligned or otherwise inoperative. j

{ RESPONSE ,

l The administrative controls which verify the operational

{

readiness of Emergency Feedwater components are summarized below:

1. ESAS Checklist  ;

This checklist verifies the readiness of EFW com-ponents each shift. It verifies Control Room [

valve position and control switch positions for the above systems. l The checklist is initiated by the off-going i shift and signed by the on-coming Control Room :  ;

operators, Shift Foreman and Shift Supervisor.  ;

2. Administrative Valve Controls 7 4

Critical valves in the EFW. systems have been  ;

either locked or placed under routine surveillance. ,

This includes locking of manual overrides where ,

applicable, and/or routine checking of the manual overrides as part of the auxiliary operator log ,

sheet entries.  ;

3. Log Sheets i Noncontrol room indicated main flow path EFW .

valves will be checked either with each shift- l or daily as to correct position. The determina- ,

tion of frequency is based on accessibility not.  !

only to the operations staff but to other.per-

, sonnel who may be. working in.the plant. ':

o

, o i

1 4.

Verification Prior to Surveillance or After Maintenance  !

EFW valve positions will be checked as part of the initiating procadure for the redundant train prior to initiating surveillance on any EFW train. Upon completion of surveillance the valves or switches that were' manipulated will be verified by procedure as to correct position.

Prior to returning components to service after main- l tenance or special testing the affected components '

and all other components within the boundaries of  ;

the maintenance will be verified to be in the correct position by two independent verifications. >

INTERROGATORY NO.15-043 Provide appropriate documentation'that would provide assurance j that visual acuity has been properly considered in the design of the Unit 1 control room. l I

RESPONSE

Visual acuity of components on the Control Room console and vertical boards was one of the main elements' checked during board  ;

design, manufacturer and vendor inspection prior to shipment of the equipment. To Licensee's knowledge, there is no adequate  !

documentation that exists. l INTERROGATORY NO.15-045 i Describe the extent to which video monitors in the control room at Unit 1 permit reactor operators to monitor critical areas within the plant. If such monitoring capability is not yet '

available, describe when it will be available or explain why it _

i will not be made available before restart.

RESPONSE

Licensee has no present plans to install video monitors in the Control Room to monitor critical areas within the plant. "

Licensee believes that such monitors'are not necessary and

~

f could distract the Control Room operators.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-046 How many CRT displays exist in the Unit 1 control room? What types of information can be displayed on these CRT's? Does the CRT display system have computer-based graphics capability, i and, if so, to what extent will this be used in the Unit 1 con-trol room? '

RESPONSE

At present there is one CRT display in the Unit 1 Control Room which can display alpha numeric information. It does not  !

I have computer-based graphic capability. It is anticipated that  :

additional CRT displays' driven by the new MODCOMP computer will  ;

be installed in the Control Room. The exact number ..ad type of displays have not yet been defined. It should be noted that t

these CRT displays are not required by the-reactor operators to i operate the plant safely.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-047 ,

Describe the measures taken to assure that critical controls are not subject to unintentional or accidental initiation while operators are manipulating other controls or attempting to monitor meters, displays, and charts. Identify any and all instances in which protective systems and engineered safeguards systems have c unintentionally or accidently been initiated. ,

RESPONSE ,

In addition to the response provided for Interrogatory No.

i 15-014, the following information concerning unintentional ES Systems actuation is.provided:  ;

Report 50-289/74-29 discusses the inadvertent actuation of the Make-up Pump 1C, Diesel Generator 1B, Decay Heat Pump 1B and

, the Reactor Building Isolation and Cooling Test Group I valves.

This actuation resulted from a faulty test switch and did not affect the design basis for system operation' capabilities.-

Report 50-289/77-15/3L discusses the inadvertent starting of the 1A Diesel Generator as a result of the deenergized 230kV substation Bus 4. This Diesel Generator start did not affect the design basis for system operation capabilities.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-048 Discuss the extent to which inadvertent or accidental initiation of protective systems or engineered safety features systems may '

cause such systems to be challenged more' frequently than their design basis.

RESPONSE

As demonstrated by our response to 15-047, inadvertent actua- l tion of ES featurec is a very infrequent occurrence and as such is of little consequence with respect to challenging the design  !

basis for component operation. - I INTERROGATORY NO.15-050 To what extent does the alarm / annunciator display system in Unit 1 make use of auditory discrimination and/or prioritization systems to assist operators in locating alarming indicato s and assessing possible patterns in alarm conditions? If suc'.1 methods are net used, explain why not. If they are used, explain how they work and provide the design basis for such methods.

RESPONSE

Certain sets of alarms, e.g., computer alarms, are auditorily discriminated. Key critical alarms such as reactor trip, turbine trip and certain engineered safeguard system alarms are color coded to indicate their importance. )

INTERROGATORY NO.15-051 Is there an annunciator for reactor trip in the Unit 1 control room? If so, where is it located? If not, explain.why not.

2

l RESPONSE ,  !

Yes there is a reactor trip alarm. It is located on the main annunciator panel window box F-1-1.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-052 - i Explain the extent to which extinguished indicator and/or alarm lamps are utilized by reactor operators as positive indicators of system status. Explain, if such positive indication is based '

upon extinguished lamps, how this impacts on the availability of critical information for reactor operators during emergency  :

situations when accurate information is an absolute necessity.

RESPONSE

Extinguished lights are not used to' indicate system status.  !

critical pumps or valves for instance have positive indication l provided consisting of an energized /deenergized (open/ closed) i i' light position indication of different colors.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-054 '

Discuss how operators determine that the primary system has  ;

reached saturation conditions. If done manually, explainLwhy this function cannot be monitored by the Unit 1 computer, thus assuring that when saturation conditions occur, operators are '

2 immediately aware of the condition.

RESPCNSE f j i

Licensee's Restart Report, Section 2.1.1, Supplement 1, Part l 1, Response to Question 20, and Supplement 1, Part 2, Response to -

l l Question 94, contain. responsive information. .

I  !

s INTERROGATORY NO.15-055 Explain why there is not a consistent practice in the placement ~

L of-labelling at control / display locations'in the Unit 1 control  :

room, i.e., wh  !

placed EeTow. yDiscuss some labels are placed the extent above to which such andinconsistent others are >

practices may cause confusion among operators'and why a con-sistent labelling practice in this regard would not reduce the  ;

chances for operator error, and thus provide more protection '

! for public health and safety. .

i l

i-RESPONSE  !

l The Control Room review referred to in the response to j Interrogat.ory 15-002 does include a specific review of labelling-practices. Operator training and qualifications relative to Con- ,

) l trol Room labelling currently minimize the risk of operator l error.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-056  !

During what year did preliminary work begin on the design of the Unit 1 control room? Identify by name, title, and organization {

who worked on the initial design of the Unit 1 control room. 1 Similarly, identify who was responsible for the final design of  :

the Unit 1 control room.  !

RESPONSE l i

Work on the design of the TMI Unit 1 Control Room began in  :

1 ate 1966, and evolved through numerous conferences with the  !

architect engineer, the owner and the reactor vendor.

The principal individuals who participated in the design -

i 1

l and review are as follows:  !

GAI  !

MET ED B&W ,

W. F. Saller R. M. Klingaman F. Thomasson li W. E. Meek J. L. Wise H. Stevens i

V. H. Willems H. R. Morris K. Schroeder i J. R. Floyd W. E. Wilson l l

1 D. E. Wurster t l INTERRO ATORY NO. 057 What formal steps'has~ Licensee-management taken to ensure that '

the capabilities and limitations, both physical'and mental, of i reactor operators are taken-into account in the design and re-  ;

view of the~ design of the~ Unit:1 control room? Is-there a formal '

plan for periodic. review of control room design which reviews

~

l

, operator concerns about'the control room-design? ~ If:so, identify-  ;

l and. discuss. If not, explainiwhyfnot.

RESPONSE

During the original design of the Unit 1 Control Room, a mockup of the control panels was constructed and used to de-fine the locations of controls and instruments. Reactor oper-ators participated in this design process to ensure that ,

the control panels meet the needs of the operating staff.

See also response to Interrogatory 15-006.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-058 What mechanism exists within Licensee's organization to review and approve proposed changes to control room design? Besides this mechanism, what other sources are called upon to partici-pate in such reviews?

RESPONSE {

Any physical change proposed for the unit will be developed, l documented, reviewed and approved by fulfilling the requirements of the Engineering Change / Modification Procedure (AP-1043).

Completion of this procedure will require that along with other requirements the proposed change must receive multi-discipline -

technical reviews, a safety evaluation, and several levels of .

management approval. These reviews and approvals involve both onsite and offsite organizations. For organizational responsi-bilities see the Restart Report, Chapter 5. -

l INTERROGATORY NO.15-059 Identify by name, title, and organization, who among the staffs l of Licensee, the Unit 1 architect-engineer, and Babcock and Wil - l l

cox which participated in the design or review of uasign of the Unit 1 control room had formal training and education in human factors engineering. For each such person, identify the extent I to which he or she participated in the design or review of the-  !

design of the Unit 1 control room. Identify recommendations ]

regsrding control room design made by such individuals and ex-  !

plain whether or not their advice was followed, and if it was i

not, explain why not. j L l l l l

l 1

i RESPONSE  !

Participants in the arrangement and the design of the TMI Unit 1 Control Room were experienced reactor operators or reactor I systems engineers, familiar with the requirements for operating l a unit of this type. To Licensee's knowledge, they did not have j i  ;

formal training in human engineering.  ;

INTERROGATORY NO.15-060 i

To what extent during the design of the Unit 1 control room l

were mockups utilized to assess the design of the Unit 1 con-  :

trol room?

RESPONSE

See answer to Interrogatory No.15-057.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-061 Identify any mechanisms within Licensee's organization which provide a systematic review of operator performance and provide  ;

suggestions for improvements in control room design, operating i procedures, and training programs.

RESPONSE I See answer to Interrogatory No.15-005. Licensee has objected ,

to this interrogatory insofar as it relates to operating procedures and training. ,

l 4

INTERROGATORY NO.15-069 i

Describe the physical and medical standards which control room operators and senior reactor operators must meet, especially-with respect to limitations imposed by the design and layout of the TMI-l control, room as it now exists. Include in your de- i scription any standards on the following which operator or -i senior operator candidates must meet and maintain compliance with:

(a) Visual acuity requirements (b) color blindness tests

-(c) Hearing' tests

(d) Psychological evaluations (e) Evidence of drug or alcohol use (f) Height and weight limits (g) History of fainting, seizures, and cardiovascular problems.

RESPONSE

Licensee has no special medical standards imposed by the de-sign of the Control Room. 10 C.F.R. Section 55.11 specifies medi-cal and physical requirements for licensed operators. NRC Form 396, Certificate of Medical History, is completed periodically for each of Licensee's licensed personnel. Licensee evaluates per-sonnel testing results individually in pertinent areas.

INTERROGATORY NO.15-076 Identify by name, title, and position within Licensee organiza-tion, any and all persons on the PORC with formal training in the field of human factors engineering.

^

RESPONSE

The PORC membership is described in the Unit Technical '

Specifications Section 6.

The qualifications and professional background of Licensee PORC members are contained in Licensee's Restart Report, Section

5. Names of specific individuals of interest will be provided on request.

INTERROGATORY NO.17-001 In reference to scenario "B"'in Contention No. 17 as admitted by the Board, could the diesel generator therein described have been placed in an operable condition,- given the facts of' the conditions as they existed on March- 28, 1979 at Unit 2 of TMI?

If so, how. Be specific. If so, could this have been done without significant risk to the health and safety of the person or persons involved in placing the generator in an operable con-dition?

f

RESPONSE

If the TMI-l diesel generator fuel rack is tripped, it must be reset locally. This would be done by positioning the fuel-  !

i rack reset lever to the reset position and pressing the reset push ,

button on the engine mounted instrument panel. The TMI-l EDG building is not directly connected to any other building which >

normally contains radioactive material. Access to the EDG build- j ing does not require passage through any building normally con- j taining radioactive material. Therefore, safe access to the  ;

diesel to perform the reset function could be performed during an incident similar to that of TMI-2.  ;

INTERROGATORY NO.17-002 l In reference to scenario "B" in Contention No. 17 as admitted v by the Board, if a total offsite power loss had occurred before f the diesel generator referenced in Contention No. 17 had been j j placed in an operable status, could the diesel generator have  !

l been placed in an operable condition before significant core .

melting would have occurred, given the situation as occurred  !

on March 28, 1979 at TMI-2? l RESPONSE ,

Yes. The operators available for dispatch to reset the diesel generator would normally be in the Control Room or at the control point of the auxiliary building. The Control Room is the most distant from the diesel generator buildir.g. Based on actual tests, an operator can travel from the Control Room to the EDG building and reset the fuel rack.in less than three minutes. -All known analyses of alternative scenarios have indicated a substan-tial margin beyond three minutes before core melting might have occurred.

i '

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INTERROGATORY NO.17-003 What is Licensee's opinion regarding the impact on the sequence ,

of events at Unit 2 and their subsequent ' resolution" if person-l nel from Unit 1 had not been available for assistance?

RESPONSE

Licensee's opinion is that the sequence of events at Unit 2'and the subsequent resoluti.a would not have been significantly impacted if personnel from Unit 1 had not been available for i

assistance. ,

i INTERROGATORY NO.17-004 .

Given the description of scenario "F" in Contention No. 17 as '

accepted by the Board and given the sequence of events as they

• l transpired on March 28, 1979 at TMI-2, would the venting de- +

scribed in scenario "F" have required any type of protective i action in order to protect the public health and safety? If so, describe. If so, also describe whether or not such protec-tive actions could have been implemented in sufficient time to  :

be of use in reducing public exposure to radiation.  !

RESPONSE  ;

By 0700 on March 30, 1979, the inventory of gases in the  ;

makeup tank had been reduced considerably by the necessarily fre- '

quent venting to the vent header for tank pressure control. In fact, at 0901, the valve was opened'for venting and left open con-tinuously. l The release of the gases from the makeup tank did not require l l

any type of protective action. Refer to TDR-TMI-ll6 for resultant j radiological data. Leaving the valve open would not have materially altered the situation.

i 1

1 O

INTERROGATORY NO.17-005 Assuming that the condition of the Unit 2 reactor had been as described in scenario "C"'in Contention No. 17 as accepted by the Board, to what extent would the total amount of radiation released to the containment as well as to the auxiliary building (from all pathways) have been increased beyond what was so re-leased during the Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979? Specify in your answer any increases in the following isotopes:

(a) Iodine-131 (c) Cesium-137 (b) Strontium-90 (d) Krypton-85

RESPONSE

Licensee has underway an evaluation which will provide the answer to this interrogatory and expects to supplement this re-sponse in about two weeks.

INTERROGATORY NO.17-006 Inasmuch as the Battelle, Columbus Laboratories report on the TMI accident and alternative sequences (NUREG/CR-1219) identi- ,

fies as Case 8 " loss of all AC electric power", and inasmuch as this proposed case falls within the scope of scenario "B" in Contention No. 17, and inasmuch as the Battelle report predicts complete core meltdown by 2.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> if power is not restored, explain why the Licensee should not be required to install meltdown mitigation features at TMI-l prior to restart to en-sure sufficient time for evacuation in the' event of a complete core meltdown.

RESPONSE

• As described in the. answer to Interrogatory No.17-002, power could be readily restored prior to the time that core melting is hypothesized in this accident sequence.

.~. - . , . _ -

INTERROGATORY NO.17-007 Given the facts as described in Interrogatory 17-006 (above, reconcile Licensee's Emergency Plan with the fact of potential complete core meltdown by 2.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> into this particular acci-dent sequence, i.e., how does this fact change the validity of the assumptions and bases utilized in determining the sizes of Licensee's proposed EPZ for plume exposure?

RESPONSE

The " validity of the assumptions and bases-utilized in determining the sizes of Licensee's proposed EPZ for plume ex-posure" would not change. See responses to Interrogatories17-006 and 08-006. Licensee's " proposed EPZ for plume exposure" is based on NRC guidance contained within NUREG-0396 and l NUREG-0654. .

INTERROGATORY NO.01-010 Explain why the proposed high-radiation containment isolation signal cannot be made to comply with the single-failure criterion.

RESPONSE

The high radiation containment isolation signals probably could be designed to meet the single failure criteri'a but this is not necessary. See also response to Interrogatory No.01-002. ,

INTERROGATORY NO.01-011 In reference to Licensee's proposed use of Reactor Trip in place of HPI initiation as a diverse containment isolation signal, is there any condition under which HPI injection could i

occur in the absence of Reactor Trip or after the Reactor Trip signal has been cleared? If so, identify and describe each  :

such condition. ,

RESPONSE

There is no condition under which HPI injection demand could occur in the absence of the demand for a reactor trip.

i An HPI injection signal could not occur after the reactor trip

isolation signal had been reset w'thout reinitiating the reactor trip signal.

INTERROGATORY NO.01-012 f By what date will Licensee have developed the bypass and over-ride procedures for containment isolation?. Will these procedures I be submitted to NRC for review and approval prior to proposed ,

restart?

RESPONSE

Emergency procedures that address containment isolation i bypass and override procedures are: EP-1202-6A/B/C and EP-1202-4.

These procedures have been implemented.

Operating procedure revisions of relevance to containment isolation bypass and override are scheduled for completion by ,

June 1, 1980.

Licensee procedures are not specifically submitted to the NRC for review; however, the NRC may review and audit Licensee procedures at its discretion. See also response to Interrogatory-No.01-003.

INTERROGATORx NO.04-012 Provide a copy of Licensee's REMP, including locations of all sampling devices.

RESPONSE

Copies of the Radiation Environmental Program for Units 1 i and II may be found in their respective unit technical specifi-cation. Locations of sampling sites and devices are found in Attachment A.

I e

INTERROGATORY NO.04-013 Identify any and all changes made to Licensee's REMP since the Unit 2 accident in March 1978.

RESPONSE

With respect to the REMP referred to in Interrogatory No.04-012, at the present time the program is operating pursuant to the current technical specification of the Unit. Revisions to i

the pertinent sections of these documents are being prepared for regulatory approval. Changes made to the REMP since the Unit 2 accident are described in Licensee's Annual Radiological Monitor-ing Report for 1979. A copy of this report is to be provided to the NRC on April 1, 1980, and a copy will then be placed in Li-censee's Discovery Reading Room.

INTERROGATORY NO.05-007 Does Licensee have installed at Unit 1 or plan to install ef-fluent radiation monitors capable of remaining on-scale during the highest release period which would be associated with a com-plete core melt accident? If not, explain why not. If so, specify each such monitor, including its location, model and manufacturer, and operating range.

RESPONSE

Licensee has provided extended range effluent monitors as described in the Restart Report Section 2.1.2. These extended ranges are intended to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0578.

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INTERROGATORY NO.09-004 Does Licensee plan to utilize radiation monitoring devices whi'ch are capable of transmitting radiation monitoring readings directly to the Unit 1 control room from remote-locations off-site? If so,- >

specify the number, model and manufacturer, and locations for such devices. If not, explain why such devices will not provide  ;

substantial protection of public health and safety by providing  ;

rapid and direct measurement of radiation levels in the environ-

! ment, measurements which could be utilized in providing informa-i tion to off-site authorities on which protective action decisions l could be made. i

RESPONSE

P Licensee does not believe that offsite radiation monitoring devices that readout in the Control Room would provide adequate protection of the public.  ;

Licensee's Emergency Plan provides for conservative, antici-  :

patory estimations of potential offsite conditions before off-site monitors would record them. This is essential to an effec-tive, anticipatory Emergency Plan. Further, Licensee will pro- i vide mobile teams to monitor and track a moving plume. Fixed-location monitors may not be in the plume and thus may be of  :

little value in real time assessments.

INTERROGATORY NO.09-005  ;

Does Licensee have or plan to have before restart.the Atmospheric l Release Advisory Capability System (ARAC) ? If not, explain why this system will not provide' substantial additional protection of l public health and safety, particularly in view of the potential for personnel error in calculating off-site radiation dose rates.-  !

RESPONSE

Licensee does not plan to install the ARAC system prior to restart. Licensee is investigating the upgrading of dose assess-ment capability for_use during an emergency. Presently, Li- ,

censee uses a calculation procedure that is very easy to follow and check. Each calculation is double checked by another indi-f

J vidual. This can be done more rapidly than using a computer system which must first be started up and relevant release in-formation must be fed into it and checked for accuracy by another individual. In any event, dose calculations are con- i firmed by offsite radiological monitoring teams.

INTERROGATORY NO.09-006 Has Licensee ever requested that the NRC install ARAC at TMI-l?

If so, provide documentation of this request, including'NRC re- l sponse. If not, why not?  !

RESPONSE

No. See answer to Interrogatory No.09-005.

INTERROGATORY NO.11-006 How many hydrogen recombiners of the type Licensee intends to install at Unit 1 would be required to successfully recombine the amount of hydrogen generated during the TMI-2 accident?

RESPONSE

The design basis for hydrogen recombiner capacity Licensee will install and have available at TMI-1 is described in Licensee's Restart Report, Section 2.1.1, and previously submitted Licensee's responses to Sholly's Interrogatory No.03-005. The system is capable of recombining the amount of hydrogen generated in the TMI-2 accident at the rates specified in the above documents.

l INTERROGATORY NO.11-007 In reference to Licensee's answer to Interrogatory 11-006, what  !

is Licensee's judgment as to any potential impact on containment ,

integrity which might result from the installation of that number ,

of hydrogen recombiners? '

i

RESPONSE

I See response to 11-006.

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i INTERROGATORY NO.11-008 Has Licensee investigated alternative means of controlling hydro-gen gas concentrations in the Unit 1 containment (other than hydrogen recombiners and venting)? If so, specify the methods -

investigated, who performed the investigations, and the results i of these investigations. If not, explain why not.

RESPONSE

As stated in the Restart Report, Section 2.1.1, and NRC Status Report dated January 11, 1980, Section C-8, Licensee's  ;

decision to install hydrogen recombiner capacity is voluntary and not required by the NRC. Licensee has not investigated means other than hydrogen recombiner capacity and venting for  !

controlling hydrogen gas in the Unit 1 containment.

INTERROGATORY NO.13-010 ,

Does Licensee's proposed new computer for Unit 1 have the capa-  !

bility of determining position on fault-trees, and displaying such data to plant operators? If not, is the computer capable of being so modified as to provide this capability?

RESPONSE ,

The new computer for Unit 1 is believed to have the in-herent capability for displaying position on fault-trees, but .

i the Licensee has no plans to pursue such an approach.

F INTERROGATORY WO.13-011 ,

Does the new computer-proposed for Unit 1 have the capability of providing CRT display output to several CRT's simultaneously, ,

each displaying different data?

l RESPONSE The new computer at Unit 1 has the capability of providing CRT display outputs to several CRT's simultaneously each dis-playing different data. ,

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. INTERROGATORY NO.13-012 Does the new computer proposed for Unit 1 have the capability of t providing hard copy of graphs of plant operating parameters?

RESPONSE

Yes, but only for 112 analog and 112 digital preselected points. This data is only available for historical reviews.

INTERROGATORY NO.13-013 Does the new computer proposed for Unit 1 have the capability to provide data to a remote offsite location? If not, why not? Has either the NRC or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ever requested ,

that computer display information be transmitted directly to -

them from either the Unit 1 or 2 control room? If so, provide documentation regarding such requests, including Licensee's responses to such requests. '

RESPONSE

The new computer being installed at Un.it I has the capabil'.ty to provide data to remote offsite locations.

INTERROGATORY NO.14-003 .

List and describe each and every change in personnel at the management or supervisory level, directly affecting the operation ,

of Unit 1, which have been made since the 28th of March 1979.

For each new person hired by Licensee, describa his new position, professional qualifications, and experience in the nuclear. power field.

RESPONSE

Section 5 of the TMI-l Restart Report describes the organiza-tional and personnel changes in Licensee's management operations affecting Unit 1 since the TMI-2 accident. Biographical informa-tion indicates which of those personnel have joined Licensee since the time of the TMI-2 accident. s ,

INTERROGATORY NO.14-004 Inasmuch as NRC's I & E Special Review Group has cited quality assurance / quality control as being the " master control system available to management to assure that all management ~ control i

l_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

- i i

systems are operable and effective in terms of providing safety",

describe each and every change made to Licensee's QA/QC program at Unit 1 since the Unit 2 accident.on March 28, 1979.

RESPONSE  :

Revision 7 to the Operational Quality Assurance Plan for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, which Licensee has placed in i

its Discovery Reading Room, describes the QA/QC program and  ;

organizations in existence at the tine of the TMI-2 accident. .

Licensee is currently finalizing changes which will be described  !

in Revision 8 to the Plan. Licensee will place Revision 8 in the Discovery Reading Room when it is completed.  ;

INTERROGATORY NO.14-005 l

Describe the mechanisms within Licensee organization which assure that Licensee management reviews work performed by its personnel. t to verify that its directives and policies are effectively carried out on a timely basis.

RESPONSE i The organizational mechanisms and controls for verifying  :

that Licensee's management' directives and polities are effec-tively carried out are contained in the Nuclear Assurance Pro-gram, as described in Section 5.3.2 of the Restart Report.

INTERROGATORY NO.14-006  :

l Identify and describe any and all new technical capabilities which have been added by Licensee since the Unit 2 accident, ,

specifying under what terms these capabilities are to be pro-vided and within what time frame they are available in the event  :

of a serious accident at Unit 1.

RESPONSE ,

, Sections 4 and 5 of the TMI-l Restart Report describe the areas in which Licensee has increased its managerial technical

resources and capability in connection with Unit 1 operations.

These technical improvements primarily fall in the areas of (1) organizational realignment to provide greater emphasis on techni-cal support (Restart Report at SS 5.1-5.3) ; (2) addition of a shift technical advisor (Restart Report at S 5.2); and (3) in-creased and improved emergency planning to provide timely tech-nical support response in the event of an accident (Restart Report at S 4.5). Insofar as the " time frame" for these in-creased capabilities, the shift technical advisor will be avail-able in several minutes and the technical support response under Licensee's emergency plan will be available in the time frames described in Table 8 to the emergency plan.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE By: A ,M i

$ 6rgg F. Trowbridge Robert E. Zahler Dated: March 31, 1980

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' ATTACHMENT A- -

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SURFACE'NATER  ;

i Station Code Distance'(miles) Azimuth  ;

i- .

' I TM-SW-13S2 0.1 270 I

9A2 0.5 188 i

. -9B1 1.5 - 178 i IC3 2.3 347  !

1 8C2 2.8 165 ,

i i 8E1 4.1 160  !

15F1 8.7 308 l 1 r

. i 1

7G1 14.4 124  !

l 7G2 13.6 128 j 1 7G3 14.8 124 l 14.7 9G2 178 1

6G3 12.6 122  ;

j - See attached page for locations I i i

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y y .-y- p q ,.,v.. .n-,+,---,--- ,-. , - - ms. m m's w

.. 6 'N' DIRECTIONS TO WATER S*. !PLING LOCATIONS '

TM-SW-lC3 Swatara Creek Exit from Rc. 441'in Royalton onto Market Street, (a left turn if going north on Rt. 441 from TMI, a right_ turn if comir.g from Middletown) . Market Street ends at the creek.

The sample is collected from the boat ramp, or if the water level is low, from a boat drawn up on shore or from the shore itself.

When composite sampler is installed on Swatara Creek, proceed as follows; Take Rt. 441 into Middletown, turn south on Mill Street (a right turn just past railroad underpass if going into town from TMI, a left turn just before the underpass if coming out of town). Follow Mill Street approximately two blocks to Middletown Water Co. (white building on left). The sampler is inside a small white concrete block building on the right just before the bridge over the Swatara.

TM-SW-15F1 Steelton Water Co. Take Rt. 230 into Steelton. Turn west onto Franklin Street (left at first stop light after flashing light as you proceed north out of Steelton business district, or right at first light as you enter Steelton from Harrisburg. Tall red and white checkered natural gas tank is landmark, it sits alongside Franklin Street and the river). Follow Franklin Street west, l it bends south toward Bethlehem Steel Plant. Follow to end. ,

Water plant is on right. Composite sampler is inside lab on the left as you enter the building.

TM-SW-8C2 '

York Haven Hydro Plant Take I-83 to Newberrytown exit (Exit 13). Follow Rt. 382 east i to York Haven. At stop sign proceed straight rather than following Rt. 382. Go downhill to the railroad tracks. Cross tracks and turn lef t immediately. Follow sign to Met-Ed York Haven Plant. Composite sampler is inside plant, just outside Control Room on the top floor of the generating area. The sampler is housed in a blue metal cabinet along' the outside wall.

TM-SW-8El Brunner Island Follow'same directions to York Haven Hydro Plant, except after

, crossing railroad tracks, proceed across the bridge and continue on the road which follows the creek. Turn into Brunner Island Plant entrance immediately on the left after crossing concrete bridge over the creek cutoff to the river. Proceed to gate, sign in. . Drive straight through to the main entranceway of the office building, on the left. Sample is collected 'in jugs inside water lab (first door on left).

.Page Directions to Water Sampling Locations (cont,.)

TM-SW-8E1 Brunner Island (cont.) (If coming from York, take Rt. 181 north to Manchester. Turn right on Rt. 921 at the stop light, then left at High Street.

The street becomes Board Road. Follow it approximately 1 1/2 miles until it joins Hartman Run Road at the bottom of a hill.

Turn left and follow under a railroad overpass and stay left

.on the main road. Proceed north along the tracks to the plant entrance.)

TM-SW-9G2 '

York Water Co. If coming from Columbia on Rt. 30, proceed to North George Street i

and turn left onto North George Street. If coming from York Haven or Brunner Island on I-83, exit onto North George. Street, if on Rt. 181, it becomes North George Street.

Follow North George Street through town to Country Club Road.

(Second light after South George Street becomes two-way) Turn right on Country Club Road, go past York College to first stop light. Turn lef t onto Grantley Road and proceed up the hill for approximately one-half mile, entrance to Water Company grounds is on the left. It is marked with a white sign.

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Follow the drive; to the plant. Enter main entrance and go upstairs to second floor-On the right is the water lab and the sample is taken from a continuously flowing tap. ,

TM-SW-7G2 Wrightsville Water Co. Coming from York on Rt. 30, exit at Wrightsville Exit. Turn right and follow road to Rt. 462, turn lef t onto Rt. 462. Follow 462 through town until you approach bridge. Go straight to bottom of hill instead of veering right with Rt. 462 (if coming from Columbia on Rt. 462, make a hard right at the end of bridge to the bottom of the hill). At the bottom of the hill, turn left onto Front Street. Proceed past factories, the road will narrow about a block past Wilton f'a ccory. Turn lef t on a gravel drive just past.

a trailer on the left with a mailbox with the name Reidle on it.

Follow drive around to left to gate in chain link fence. Key to lock is inserted inside metal collar on backside _of right gatepost-about a foot above ground. The composite sampler is sitting on metal tank approximately 100 yards back in along the quarry.

TM-SW-7G2 Columbia Water Co. If coming from TMI, follow Rt. 441 to Columbia. Cross Rt. 462 (first stop light) and turn right on Walnut Street, the first street after crossing :Rt. 462. Follow Walnut-Street toward the river. Af ter crossing the tracks, turn into the gate on the lef t at the Water Company. The compositer is inside one of the two small' brick buildings closest to the river. There is also a manual composite of finished H20, by plant personnel,-upstairs in the H2O lab.

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• Page ,

Directions to Water Sampling Locations (contt)

TM-SW-7C2 Columbia Water Co. .- (If coming from Wrightsville, cross the river on Rt. 462 and (cont.) turn right at first cross street. Go one block, to Walnut Street, turn right and follow to riser) .

~.

TM-SW-7G3 Lancaster Water Co. From the Columbia Water Plant, cross the railroad tracks and turn right on Front Street. Follow Front Street south along the tracks for approximately one mile. Tura lef t on Plane Street which goes through a large stone railroad overpass.

Stay left to the top of the hill. At the stop sign, turn right onto Manor Street, follow Manor Street to 15th Street. Turn right on 15th Street and follow it to the Lancaster Water Plant.

If the gate is closed, call 684-5056. We have no co=positer here, water is manually composited on the hour by plant personnel.

(If coming directly from TMI, on Rt. 441, turn left on.Rt. 462 in Columbia. Follow Rt. 462 to 15th Street by ITT Grinnell Plant. Turn right on 15th Street and follow 15th Street to the Lancaster Water Plant).

TM-SW-6G3 Chickies Creek Where Rt. 441 crosses Chickies Creek, just south of Marietta, a grab sample is taken from the creek.

TM-SW-9B1 York Haven Dam A grab sample is taken from the York Haven Dam on the south end of TMI. If water is going over the dam, the sample is taken from.

the boat launch above the dam. The lane back to the dam turns off the main access road on TMI just south of the laydown yards at the south end of the island.

TM-SW-9A2 West Shore of TMI A grab sample from the river along the shore just west of the lower end of the South Parking Lot. The roots of a tree growing out from the bank provides a platform from which to get samples during high flow.

TM-EW-1051 Discharge Water Sample from compositer in Discharge Building, RML-7 TM-Ew-1352 Intake Water Sample-from Intake Building,11 eft at RML-7, for us to pick up.

O 4-

, o e AQUATIbSEDIMENT Station Code Distance (miles) Azicuch i TM-AQS- 1A2 0.7 0 ,

7Al 0.3 137 10A1 0.8 202 9B1 1.5 183  ;

10B1 1.1 204 11A1 0.5 225 AQUATIC. PLANTS Station Code Distance (miles) Azimuth TM-AQP-1A1 0.7 1 9A2 0.5 188 931 1.5 183 GREEN LEAFY VEGETABLE SAMPLING STATIONS Location Azimuth Description "

4B1 11 1.1 miles ENE of site at Alwine's farm, W of. Fingrich.Rd.

7B3 125 1.5 miles SE of site at Becker's farm on E side of Conewago Ck.

14D1 296 3.7 miles WNW of site at Fisher's farm 2G1 10 10.5 miles N of site at'Oellig farm near Rt. 39, Hummelstown FRUITS Station Code Distance (miles) Azimuth- '

TM-FPF- SF2 5.1 100 12G2 13.6 240 5--

EFFLUEST WATER Station Code Distance (miles) Azimuth TM-EW-10S1 PRECIPITATION Station Code Distance (miles) Azimuth TM-RW- SA1 0.4 86

- 1 8C1 2.3 159 7F1 9.8 128 15G1 13.3 311

-MILK ,

Location Azimuth Description 1B1 11 1.2 miles N of site at Hardison's farm along Rt. 441 4B1 65 1.1 miles ENE of site at Alwine's farm, W of Fingrich Rd.

7B3 125 1.5 miles SE of site at Becker's farm on E side of Conewago Ck.

14D1 296 3.7 miles WNW of site at Fisher's farm .

2G1 10 10.5 miles N of site at Oellig farm near Rt. 39, Hummelstown FISH Station Code Distance (miles) Azimuth TM-AQF- 981 1.5 183 16B1 -1.1 337

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AIR PARTICULATE AND AIR. IODINE SAMPLING STATIONS  ;

Location Azimuth Description IS2 0 0.4 miles N of site at N weather station ,

SA1 91 0.4 miles E of site on N side of Observation Center-12B1 258 1.6 miles WSW of site adjacent to Fishing Creek ICI 359 2.6 miles N of site at Middletown substation 8C1 160 2.3 miles SSE of site at Falmouth substation 7F1 128 9.9 miles SE of site at Drager Farm off Engle's To11 gate.Rd.

9G1 184 13.0 miles S of site in Met-Ed York load dispatch station 15G1 310 15.0 miles NW of site at West Fairview substation i

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a e s SITE DESIGNATIONS AND LOC /JIONS FOR THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION TLDS THINS TI.D PROGRAM ,

lleight Distance Azimuth "

igcation Feet Miles o Description Status TM- I D- l'S 2 4 0.4 0 North weather station E, Q 111-I t)- 2S2 35 0.7 25 North bridge TM-ID-4S2 35 0.3 71 Top of dike Q

TH-ID-SS2 4 0.2 95 Top of dike Q

Ttt-In-8S1 6 0.4 167 Pole #33-HE-T-60 E

.~111-I D-9S 2 ~ 45 0.8 184 South THI i E Tri-ID-IDS 2 6 0.4 200 Pole #HE-33-T-28 .

E TM-ID-IISI 4 0.1 221 Hechanical draft towers Q TH-ID-13SI 7 0.4 270 Due west on Shelley's Island TH-I D- 14 S2 35 0.4 293 Shelley's Island TH-ID-ISSI 6\ 0.5 317 Shelley's Island

~111- I D- 16S 1 - 4 0.2 -340 North boat dock '

E, Q TH-ID-3Al 3 0.6 35 Route 441 E, Q

.TH- II)-4 A1 7' O.5 65 Laurel Road E

T!!- l p-5Al 3 0.4 86 Observation Center E, Q TH-ID-6Al, 6' O.5 117 Route 441 on light pole E TH-ID-7A1 3 0.6 143 Route 441 E, Q Mtatus: E = ETS location, Q = quality control location, N = new location

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THINS TLD PROGRAM lle i gh t Distance Az iscu th Location Feet Hiles o Description Status Til 1 I A2 6 0.5 221 Beech island Til-I I)- 16A l 4 0.4 332 Kohr Island Tri- I D- 10 n l 2( 1.1 204 Shelley's Island Tri-I D-l l n l 6 1.9 227 Route 262 Pole #)fE2890, BK722-306 E

TH-ID-12nl 4 1.3 253 Goldsboro Air Station -

E

. 1-I D- 13111 7 1.2 265 Goldsboro Marina on light pole E, Q TM-ID-14HI 7 1.4 290 Still llouse Road on tree E Til- I D- 15 BI 6 1.8 304 Still llouse Road Pole #HE2397NB, 233L-35L E Tt f- I D- I C'l 4 2.6 0 Middletown substation E

TM-ID-hcl 4 2.3 159 Falmouth-Collins substation ,

Q Til-ID-lE4 6 4.3 3 Vine Street exit from 283, Pole #HE2481-LO E Til-lil-2 E l 6 4.8 18 School llouse Lane & Hiller Road, Pole #HE782-LO E TH-ID-3E3 6 4.5 46 Kennedy Lane, Pole #74-ME-97 E

Til-ID-4E5 4 4.9 71 Beagle Road E

- Tti- I D- 5 E l 6 4.6 85 N. Harket St. (Rt. 230) & Zacger Road, Pole #PP&L 31084, E S30386 Tri-I D-6E 6 6 4.6 115 Amosite Road, Pole #PP&L 31016, S29272 E TH- III- 1E6 6 4.8 131 Bainbridge Road (Route 241) & Risser Road, Pole #HE825 E

!st, tus:

-E = ETS location, Q = quality control location, N = new location

THINS TLD PROGRAM licigh t Distance Azimuth I.oca l i on - Feet Miles o Description Status Til-I D-8E2 ~6\ 4.1 161 Guard shack at Bruriner Island E Tri- I D-9El 6 4.9 182 Canal Road, Conewago lleights, Pole #HE497 Eft, BK244122 E Til-ID-lDE3 6 5.0 200 Conewago Creek Road, Strinestown, Pole fME924CE, E-HANK 231-139 Til- I D- l_ l E3 6 4.1 ,228 Stevens & Wilson Roads, Pole #ME2521NB .E TM-ID-12E4 6 4.3 245 Lewisberry & Roxberry Roa'ds, Newberrytown, Pole #ME725NB E kt!-ID-13El 6 4.9 268 Yocumtown Road & Old Trail, Pole fME1050NB E Til-ll)- 14 E4 6 4.9 281 Route 262 & Beinbower Road, Pole IME135FA E Tri-II)- 15 El 6 5.0 313 Lumber Street, liighspire, Pole #PP&L 26827, S31990 E TM-ID-2F1 6 9.0 15 West Areba Avenue & Mill Street, lie r shey~, E Pole #PP&L 30383, S34C48 TM-I>-5F1 6 6.8 89 Ilummels town St. Elizabethtown, Pole #PP&L 32190, S30207 E Til- I D- 7 F I ' 4 9.0 132 Drager Farm Q Til- I D-3C l 4 19.7 47 Cumberland Street (Route 422) at 16th Street substation, Lebanon Til-ID-4G1 6 10.0 68 Route 241 E, Q TM- 111-6G 2 . 6 21.1 113 Steel Way & Loop Road, Lancaster, Pole #PP&L 21274, 39808, S36930 Status: E = ETS, Q = quality location,'N = new location

12 - -

. THINS TLD PROGRAM

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11eigh t Distance Azimuth Location ' Feet Miles o Description Status Til-I D- 7G1 Si 15.0 124 Columbia E

Til- I D-9G1 4 13.0 183 North York substation E 111-I D- 14 G1 6 12.2 300 Ereford Road, Camp llill, Pole #PP&L (ATTCll)23347, S33615 111-I D- 15GI 35 15.0 308 West Fairview E, Q TH-ID-IsG2 6 11.5- 307 Penn & Forster Streets, lia r ri sburg , Pole #PP&L 24035, S34066 (TH-ID-16Cl 6 11.2 330 Route 22 & Colonial Road, Colonial Park, Pole #PP&L 25874, E S35291 TM-ID-16El 6 4.9 339 Spring Carden Drive & Route 441, Pole #PP&L 27716, S32497 E TH-ID-3VI 6 7.16 48 (Conewago School) Het-Ed 1039 CW 764/185 on School llouse N Rd. nA/8 mi. West of Schanks Church TI-ID-4Fi' 65 8.53 72 (Bellaire) PP&L 32920 S31503 k mile East of Bellaire cross- N roads on Mt. Gretna Road TI-ID-6F1 6 9.36 113. (Donegal Springs) PP&L 33225 South 28173 1/8 mile West of N Colebrook Road & Donegal Springs Road intersection on Donegal Springs Road ,

T1-ID-8Fl 65 13.15 157 (Wilshire Ilills) HE 693SE Southwest corner of Orchard Road N and Stonewood Road, Wilshire Ilills TI-ID-9FI 65 6,.48 177 (Hanchester)C53-LlH HE 240 HT on Naple Street in Hanchester, "

across from liigh Street at corner of Cemetery Drive

-TI-lD-IDF1 65 7.39 196 (Zion's View) HE 1459 CE SE corner of Coppenhaffer Road

& Rt. 295 Intersection '

TI-ID-IDcl 65 12.69 204 (Weiglestown) EL&P (old Het-Ed) 6632 opposite corner of N Alta Vista Road & Fox Run Road ~l'00 yds. East of Rt. 74 tatus:

E = ETS location,.Q = quality control location, N = new location

THINS TLD PROGRAM lle igh t Distance Azimuth

- I.oca t i on Feet Miles o Description Status T1,ID-llF1 65 7.96 225 (Andersontown) IIE611 DO 2017/100 on Andersontown Road N "l/8 mile on Southwest of Orchard T I-I I)- 11 G I 65 11.71 225 (Ht. Royal) HE 3053 DO Bank 321-232 West side of Rt. 74 N at Ht. Royal Full Gospel Church TI-ID-12F1 65 8.56 242 (Maytown) 16E/78/END DJ/63 on Alpine Road ~150 yards South N of Route 177 at Haytown

• TI-II)-12C2 65 11.94 236 (Rossville) HE 574 WR Bank 474-100 West side of Route 74 N

( -<h mile from Route 177 crossroads by Earth Craf t Barn T 1- II)- 13F I 65 7 . , :' 260 (Lewisberry) PP&L 24599 South 29513 West side of Route 382 N

~% mile North of Lewisberry TI-ID-13C2 6b 10.40 274

?' (Lisburn) PP&L 23149 South 30533 Northwest corner of Lisburn N Road and Main Street of Lisburn (Route 114)

T I - I I)- 13C I ' 65 13.19 276 (Mt. Allen) Attach 21728 South 309'84 corner of Orchard Lane N

& Ilertzler Road due South of wate'r tower T I- ill- 14F 1 65 7.96 292 (Reeser's Summit) Attach 24757 South 31644 on Evergreen Road N by Fairview Brethren in Christ Church Resser's Summit TI-ID-15FI 65 8.49 308 (Steelton) PP&L 21570 S32926 across from parking lot of N Steelton Water Company TI-ID-16FI 7 8.07 340 (Rutherford lleights) Attach 27280 S34073 on Derry Street at N 66th Street Rutherford lleights, Northeast corner 4 Status: E = ETS location, Q = quality control location, N = new location

_ _ _ _ - .