ML20207N672
| ML20207N672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1987 |
| From: | Matt Young NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2174 CIV-PEN, EA-84-137, NUDOCS 8701140347 | |
| Download: ML20207N672 (28) | |
Text
-_-_____-
.,2/ 74 "O ATEu COictLdtwuc.pcq DOLKEiED UiNRC January 9,19N M UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0FFR.t r -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKL E.
A--
- . NI BR R -
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION
)
(Civil Penalty)
)
License No. DPR-73 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
)
EA 84-137 Unit No. 2)
)
NRC STAFF FOURTH SUPPLEMENT L RESPONSE TO GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS I.
INTRODUCTION On September 23, 1986, the NRC staff served "NRC Staff Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's First Set of Interrogatories" and "NRC Staff Partial Response to GPUN's Mrst Request for Production of Documents."
In that response, the Staff noted that it intended to provide certain sup-plementary information promptly upon its becoming available, and to iden-tify or provide additional responsive documents as appropriate.
On October 9, 1986, the Staff served "NRC Staff Supplemental Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's First Set of Interrogatories and NRC Staff Supplemental Response to GPUN's First Request for Production of Docu-ments. "
In response to discussions between the parties, additional docu-ments were identified and/or provided under cover of letters dated October 28, 29, November 6,13, and December 15, 1986; in "NRC Staff Second Supplemental Response to GPU Nuclear Corporation's First Set of Interrogatories And Request for Production of Documents,"
dated kkIIQCK47 870109
')
05000320 C
_)
. December 15, 1986, and the Staff's Third Supplemental Response to Dis-covery, dated January 5,198.
The Staff has received further information from certain Commission offices, reviewed additional documents received therefrom, and hereby provides this supplemental response.
Should further responsive informa-tion or documents come to the Staff's attention, additional supplementation will be made.
i II.
NRC STAFF SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES INTERROGATORY NOS. 8 and 11 Statements by King concerning when his affiliation with Quiltec be-came known to Bill Austin.
Interview of Lawrence Peter King by OIA, dated June 7,1985, at 29-31, 36-38. (Resner)
INTERROGATORY NOS. 63(b) and 65(b)
In addition to the individuals who may have previously been identi-fled, the following individuals participated in the evaluation of the validi-ty of the safety concerns of Richard Parks:
Technical Reviewers in preparation of OI Report of 9/1/83:
1.
A. Bill Beach, USNRC, Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment (1983, and at present).
2.
Walter
- Rogers, USNRC, Senior Resident Inspector, Davis-Besse (1983, and at present).
3.
Roger Walker, USNRC, Region II (1984), Region II (at present).
1 i
4.
Fred Clemenson, USNRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg-l ulation (NRR) (1983), retired,
6005 Kingsford Road, Bethesda, MD 20817 (at present).
I i
, Technical Reviewers for SECY-84-36 1.
Bernard Snyder,
- USNRC, Program Director, TMIPO (1983); (at present)
B. B. C.
Brown Boveri Nuclear
- Services, Inc.,
9190 Red Branch Road,
- Columbia, MD 21045.
(301-964-3210).
2.
Lake Barrett, USNRC, Deputy Program Director TMIPO (1983); U.S. Department of Energy (at present).
3.
Michael Masnik, USNRC, TMIPO (1983), TMI-2 Cleanup Directorate (at present).
4.
Richard Weller, USNRC, TMIPO (1983), NRR, PWR-B Project Directorate # 6 (at present).
5.
Thomas Poindexter,
- USNRC, TMIPO (1983), Bishop,
Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds.,1200 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 857-9800 (at present).
6.
Philip Grant, USNRC, TMIPO (1983); EGaG (TMI Site)
(at present).
7.
Anthony Fasano, USMRC TMIPO (1983); currently Con-sultant, Seabrook Facility, Seabrook, N.H.
8.
George Kalman, USNRC TMIPO (1983); NRR PWR-B Pro-ject Directorate # 6 (at present) 9.
Joel Wiebe, USNRC, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
TMI-2 (1983); SRI, Duane Arnold (at present).
l 10.
Lee Thomas, USNRC. TMIPO (1983); TMI-2 Project Di-rectorate (at present).
(Masnik)
INTERROGATORY NOS. 63(c) and 65(c)
In its January 5, 1987 supplemental responses, the Staff identified, as item 9, an April 30, 1984 memorandum for the NRC Commissioners, which included a draft letter to Congressman Udall.
A similar letter dat-ed May 30, 1984, was subsequently sent to Mayor Arthur E.
- Morris, Chairman, Advisory Panel for Decontamination of TMI-2, with a number of attachments (PDR Accession No. 8406050015). Because the Staff had pre-viously identified one of the attachments as a document not publicly
1 l
-4_
available (item 7, page 5, of the Staff's December 5, 1986 supplemental responses) and the Staff has now determined that this document was re-leased to the public, it is being provided herewith.
(Masnik)
III.
SUPPLEMENTAL NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS As indicated in the Staff's partial response to GPU Nuclear Corpora-tion's First Request for Production of Documents, the Staff had continued its search for responsive documents.
In accordance with GPUN's request for identification of documents, the Staff has identified certain additional documents in its supplemental answers to GPUN's first interrogatories.
Those documents are being provided herewith, are otherwise available to GPUN, or are being withheld from disclosure on grounds identified in the Staff's supplemental answers.
Respectfully submitted,
/
K' Mitzi A Y ng Counsel for NRC Staff l-Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 9th day of January,1987 l
l l
1 1
s t
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE I
l In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION
)
(Civil Penalty)
)
License No. DPR-73 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
)
EA 84-137 Unit No. 2)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL T. MASNIK I, Michael T. Masnik, being duly sworn, st' te as follows:
a 1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Technical Assistant, TMI-2 Cleanup Project Directorate, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
A copy of my professional qualifications has been previously provided.
2.
I am duly authorized to respond to those interrogatories served September 4, 1986 by GPU Nuclear Corporation to which my name has been appended to the answer.
I hereby certify that the statements and opinions given are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
j d
[
Michael T.'Masnik i
Subsc bed and sworn to before me th '
day of January,1987
/ Nota Public
(/ / '
f o//
My commission expires:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION
)
(Civil Penalty)
)
License No. DPR-73 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
)
EA 84-137 Unit No. 2)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK ERIC RESNER I, Mark Eric Resner, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an Assistant to the Director in the Office of Inspector and Auditor. A copy of my professional qualifications has been previously provided.
2.
I am duly authorized to respond to those interrogatories served September 4,1986 by GPU Fuclear Corporation to which my name has been appended to the answer.
i I hereby certify that the statements and opinions given are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
i Mark Eric Resner Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of January,1987 Notary Public My commission expires:
p, 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8
4 INTERVIEW OF 5
LAWRENCE PETER KING 6
7 OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND AUDIT 8
9 Friday, June 7, 1985 Room'465 10 11 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12 4340 East-West Highway 13 Bethesda, Maryland 14 15 16 The Interview was convened at 10:00 o' clock, a.m.
17 PRESENT:
18 MARK E.
RESNER 19 Senior Criminal investigator 20 Office of I nspec t &oY ens and Auditbr 21 i
22 ANTHONY WARD 23 Investigator. OlA 24
~~.)
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29 MR. KING:
Right.
2
..[
NR. RESNER:
Did you ask Joe Chwastyk to go to Id' S
Beaver Uaiiey?
4 MR. KING:
I don't remember whether I asked or he 5
volunteered. but I knew he was going.
6 MR. RESNER:
Okay.
Was there a discussion at that 7
time of whether or not it was a conflict of interest, the idea 8
^ ". '
9 MR. KING:
I don't remember whether there was any 10 discussion of whether it was a confIict of interest.
No, t
11 don't think there was.
I would have to say no.
12 MR. RESNER:
With respect to Ted Rekart doing work 13 for Quiltec/, would you explain how that came about?
14 MR. KING:
I think that is pretty much detailed in 15 conversations with Arnold and whatever.
So what I would be 16 saying right now is to the best of my memory, okay.
17 Like i said, I am poor on dates, so -- I can 18 remember Slone caliIng me and telIing me welI, he came down 19 for the quick look.
l 20 MR. RESNER:
The quick look was at TNI?
21 MR. KING:
Right 22 MR. RESNER:
And it was June of what, '827 23 MR. KING:
June of
'02.
He came down for the quick 24 look.
And at that time, Stone h
came over t o me and said, I 25 guess he was walking to people about how he was making all
--r-
80 t
this money as a consultant, and he said he was besieged by a.:/
.b 2
resumes, one of which -- and that's one of the issues that i 3
had with this NUREG here 1 don't know whether the people 4
that wrote it weren't aware of it or whatever -- but one of 5
the resumes was Mr. Austin's.
6 MR. RESNER:
Austin was --
7 MR. KING:
Who supposedly identified my involvement withQuiltec[later O
on.
9 MR. RESNER:
Austin was a GPU employee?
10 MR. KING:
A GPU employee.
And I think it is 11 probably pretty well documented.
Parks had asked me if it was 12 okay to go ahead and get these resumes typed up.
At any rate, 18 1 remember calling Slone.
I asked him -- sometime right after 14 that, Austin came in, and I was still in the Administration 15 Building at the time, and asked me for a job, and I was 16 floored that he knew about Quiltec/.
17 MR. RESNER:
This is Rekart?
18 MR. KING:
No, this is Austin.
So I called Stone i
19 again that time and asked him, you know, how Austin knew.
I 20 said, "Do you have his resume?"
He said, "Yes, if you want to 21 call it that, but I'm not interested."
l 22 So Austin knew at that particular time, which was 23 back in June, because he came in an asked me, and I would be 24 willing to take a lie detector test or anything on that
~-
25 matter.
y 31 ja And at that time -- now the conversation with the 2
Rekar t was somewhere in there.
I think it had to be later on a
when Ben told me that he was I can't remember whether that
)
4 was Herlihy or me, but somewhere in there they had all these 5
resumes, and he called me, and they wanted me to accept the 6
position up there working for the start-up manager as, you 7
know, a consultant.
8 MR. RESNER:
Up at Shoreham?
9 MR. KING:
At Shoreham.,Because he had my resume 10 with him.
And I told him I wasn't interested.
And that's how 11 Herlihy got involved, because he was the next resume that he 12 picked.
18 MR. RESNER:
Did you ask him to work for Quiltec[ or f
14 suggest that he work for Quiltec[?
15 MR. KING:
No.
As a matter of fact, he -- and 1 16 think it's pretty well documented he came and wanted to 17 discuss it with me, and we went out to eat lunch, and he asked 18 me why I wasn't taking the job, because as far as he could 19
- see, it would be a lot of money involved, and I gave him the 20 reasons that I wasn't.
21 And I knew that he had been looking around for a 22 job, and I didn't really realize how much until later on, one 28 of the things that came out during the discovery process was 24 that he had kept detailed notes of all the interviews he had
,N_,
l 25 within GPU.
He had notified Barton that he wanted another l
l -
s or anything like that.
36 2
MR. RESNER:
You're
,. odN saying, what 8
you're then is, your telling m involvement, when they found out 4
about involvement your in Quittec you're saying that 5
they used that 4 a convenient excuse to suspend you or try to terminate you?
6 MR. KING:
Yeah, I think 1 7
then I was in a controversial very position for not signing of on things with Kant 8
and Thesing and Barton, because I had asked B 9
So, you know, all of a sudden 10 i
they discover my involvement Quittecp -
- well, ir as I mentioned before and 11 I'd be very glad to swear this on a lie detector, Austin knew involvement.
in June about 12 my 13 MR, RESNER:
Austin is the 14 GPU manager to earlier?
you referred 15 MR. KING:
Right.
And if you look back in the Stier 16 report, you'll see that when Stier is 17 asking a question, it's might shaky in there about the involvement.
18 MR. RESNER:
That is Jim Stier, ST I ER 19 (spelling)?
20 MR. KING:
Yes.
He knew.
21 So my position is, when i was called in there,, whether i did something right 22 later or wrong on in retrospect, at that time i knew what the 28 motivation was.
It was very clear 24 in my mind.
The motivation was to get rid of me because I was 25 creating a problem.
Asd when Clark called down, when Barton talked
F 37 into that, he said, "Well, I didn't know Clark was coming down
-H 2
to see you," so when Clark called him and they were going to 3
I guess the conversation was, "Well, what are the details 4
he wants to talk to you about," I hadn't given Clark the 5
details.
I felt that was better to discuss man-to-man.
6 MR. RESNER:
We're talking about the details of 7
problems which you felt there were at the site?
8 MR. KING:
That's right.
Which were later brought 9
out in a letter, which I don't know if you have or not, that 10 Arnold wrote to me "These are your safety concerns" type 11 things -- which didn't include all of them, because I had 12 asked both Clark and Arnold to have access to the files.
I 18
- said, "I'm not used to going in and making accusations without 14 having documentation to prove it."
15 MR. RESNER: So what you're trying it's my 16 understanding, what you are trying to characterize to me then 17 is that because you were controversial, in the sense that you 18 were raising concerns about, quote, " safety problems at TMI,"
they used Quiltec[ as 19 you feel that an excuse to dismiss you j
20 from your job up there.
And you are saying John Austin I'm 21 sorry, what's his name?
Bill Austin knew about your 22 involvement with Quiltec[ a long time before your suspension?
28 MR. KING:
Oh, you read in here -- and I know that's 24 what he said, you know, that they were on skiing trip or 25 something and I recall that particularly because Kanga was
.y-1 upset that Thesing was supposed t o be back.
They went out "to
)~
2 idaho to supposedly talk to somebody and went on a skiing 8
trip.
4 And Austin knew of course, I had no way of 5
knowing at the time when talking to Arnold, you know this 6
all came out later on.
7 Mk. RESNER:
Okay.
So I understand what you're 8
trying to N jthe picture and the setting you're trying to 9
describe.
10 11 12 18 14 15 16 17 i
18 i
l I
19 20 21 22 28 24 25
/.
UNITED STATES S
.. O E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
- g (
- h. j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 V..m/
cNam"^"
May 30, 1984 Mayor Arthur E. Morris, Chair' man The Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of THI-2 Mayor of Lancaster 120 N. Duke Street Lancaster, PA 17603
Dear Mayor Morris:
At the February 3,1984 meeting between the Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile Island and the Commission, you requested a status report on the NRC's staff review of the Office l
of Investigations (01) interim report on the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) allegations.
I told you at that time that the e
Commission had the staff!s. assessment under review and hoped to release the report in the near future.
l l
In your letter of May 9,1984, which provided your suggested discussion items for the upcoming May 30, 1984 Advisory Panel -
Commission Meeting here in Washington, D.C., you again inquired about the status of the NRC's staff review and response to the 01 i
inter.im report.
Since you and the Advisory. Pan.el_have. expressed l-continuing interest'in this subject, I am providing you with copies (Enclosures 1 through 5) of all the recent reports related to the NRC's investigation of allegations regarding administrative i
deficiencies in the cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2).
As you are aware, the NRC Office of Investigations (01) c6mpleted i
its interim report on the cleanup allegations on September 1 1983.
This report, entitled "Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Allegations Regarding Safety Related Modifica-tions, Quality Assurance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane..." was i
made publicly,available on September 13, 1983, and you and the i
other Panel Members have previously been provided a copy of this
\\
document.
The enclosed reports include the NRC staff review of, and response to, the September 1, 1983 OI report on THI-2 cleanup allegations, SECY-84-36, dated January 25, 1984 (Enclosure 1), a February 3, 1984 letter (Enclosure 2), from R. DeYoung, Director, Office of l
Inspection and Enforcement, to P. Clark, President, GPU Nuclear Corporation, transmitting the NRC staff enforcement action result-ing from the findings of the September 1, 1983 report on TMI-2 1984 memorandum (Enclosure 3) from cleanup allegations, a March 2,
- 8. Hayes, Director, 01, to W. Dircks, NRC Executive Director for Operations, which provided 01's review and comments on the NRC staff paper SECY-84-36, and an April 11, 1984 memorandum (Enclos-ure 4) from B. Snyder, Program Director, Three Mile Island Program Office, and the OI technical team members to W. Dircks, NRC Executive Director for Operations, which reflects resolution of T'w-1
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April 30,1984 (Enclosure 5)gs to the Commission by memorandum In transmitting these findin 1
"Both the TMIPO and the technical members of the OI team have concluded that the enforcement action issued on February 3,1984, was appropriate and properly addressed the issue of safety significance.
I have concluded that no further action is necessary."
The Commission has not yet fornelly concluded its own consideration of these natters.
Sincerely, (i/.$rA '
/
w Nunzio J. Palladino
Enclosures:
s:
1.
SECY-84-36 2.
Ltr. dtd. 2/3/84 from R.C. DeYoung to,GPU Nuclear Corp.
3.
Memo dtd. 3/2/84 from B.B. Hayes to W.J. Dircks 4.
Memo dtd. 4/11/84 from B. Snyder, et al. to W.J. Dircks 5.
Memo dtd. 4/30/84 from W. Dircks to Commission l
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4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565
./
March 2, 1984
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MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks. Executive Director for Operations FROM:
henB. Hayes, Dire ~ctor.
B ffice of Investigations Y
SUBJECT:
STAFF ACTIONS REGARDING OI--REPORT ON TMI CLEANUP ALLEGATIONS When I had an opportunity to review the enforcement action and SECY-84-36..it became clear to me that I needed to have the original authors of the technical portion of the OI report examine both documents so that I could gain a better understanding of the differing views, and arrive at an assessment of 01's findings. Accordingly. A. B. Beach, Senior Reactor Engineer, OIE, Rog.er Walker, Chief, ProjectsSection II C, RIII, and Walter Rogers, Resident Inspector, RIII, (telephonically coordinat'ed), of your staff, carefully reviewed SECY-84-36 with the assistance of Eugene Gallagher of OPE. They documented their observations in a memorandum to me on February 24, 1984, which I am including for your information (Attachment).
They have provided a rebuttal in some areas and agreement with some points.
Their technical qualifications are well known to you as they are members of your staff who were highly reconnended by you.
The OI report and the subsequent. review of SECY-84-36 was reviewed on the basis that TMI-2 Unit is, in fact, classified as an operating facility.
Even though the current conditions at TMI-2 represent a unique situation which may require changes in various regulatory requirements to cite this unique condition.
There is one point I wish to highlight in the attached report and that is the last statement made on page 9:
"One final comment that we wish to make with respect to the staff's
, response to the OI report's findings is that the staff appears to minimize the safety implications of each finding.
We may agree that'taken, individually the findings may be minimized. However, we are convinced that these findings when taken collectively, did represent significant weaknesses in the licensee's management program and as esuch are, overall, of safety significance."
William J. Dircks 2
March 2,1984 As you and I have previously discussed, it may be worthwhile for members of NRR and the technical members who assisted 0I to meet to discuss their differ-ences.
Attachment:
As stated Distribution:
L'DI s/f Case H-83-002 01 c/f DW/19840I/StaffActions/TMI I
e 1
I-I Office :
I Surname:
8.'
es:d1 Date 2 05/84 i
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UNITED STATES s 4lg -[')a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ei wassiucTow. o. c.20sss
%, $N/
February 24, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Ben B. Hayes, Director, 01 -
I.
FROM:
.R. D. Walker, Chief, Projects Section 2C, RIII
' A. B. Beach, Sr. Reactor Engineer, OIE
SUBJECT:
ASSESSMENT OF THE STAFF REVIkW kND RESPONSE TO OI
~
REPORT ON TMI-2 CLEANUP ALLEGATION On January 25, 1984 the staff Office of Investigations' (OI)provided the Commission its review of the NRC interim report entitled, "Three. Mile Island Huclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Allegations Regarding Safety Modifica-tions, Quality Assurance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane," dated September 1, 1983.
Per your request, this memorandum provides to you our assessment of the staff response and corrective actions to 0I findings.
W. R. Rogers, another technical member of the OI Investigation Team, was also consulted in the review of the matter involving containment penetrations.
.If you need additional information, please contact us.
Enclosure:
As stated W
R. D. Walker, Chief, RIII jb eer d i
A. B. Beach,'5r. Reactor Engineer, OIE 4
s I.
Sumary of NRC Staff Review and Conclusions The staff conducted a detailed review of the specific findings in the Office of Investigations (01) report that were the bases for their.overall conclu-sions.
The following summarizes the: staff's findings as presented in SECY-84-36 pertaining to the broad categories of procedural control' violations and onsite management deficiencies that were. identified in the 01 report:
1)
The staff agreed with the OI report finding that there had been instances of GPUNC using procedural controls that differed from GPUNC administrative requirements.
2)
The staff found that there were ceses'of quality assurance misclassifications, but the extent of the problem was less than that indicated in the OI report.
3)
The staff agreed with the OI report finding that the administra-tive procedures training program was not adequate, and problems in communication between various licensee organizations existed.
4)
The staff agreed with the OI report finding that the licensee's QA/QC Department had not received proper management support to ensure adequate and timely resolution of QA-identified problems during 1981 and early 1982.
5)
The staff detennined that the position requirements for plant manager and the assignment of responsibilities in the licensee's Organizational Plan were in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
6)
The staff found that actions on the part of the NRC onsite personnel facilitated the safety and promptness of the cleanup effort and did not contribute in any significant way to the licensee's management problems.
7)
The staff determined that modifications to containment penetra-tions were appropriately made in accordance with the TMI-2 Tech-nical Specifica ions and NRC requirements.
II.
Assessment of Staff Co.. lusions The following provides our review of the staff characterization of the 01 findings as presented in the September 1,1983 report.,
1)
The staff agreed with the 01 report finding that there had been instances of GPUNC ~using procedural controls that dif fered f rom GPUNC administrative requirements but felt that none of these violations were safety-significant.
Assessmen -
~ -
Any matters involving safety were brought to the attention of TMIPO during the investigation by the 01 Team.
It was our intent not to assess the safety significance of the procedural
f L-
+
2 violations, but rather to determine whether procedure violations in fact, occurred. We are in agreement with the staff discussio'n regarding GPUN violations of administrative procedures that is contained in staff report Sections II.A.1, II.A.2, and II.D.
Regarding Section II.B.1, the staff maintains that use of GPUN
- , work packages did not violate administrative procedure AP-1001, paragraph 3.2.1 because it applied only to, activities that have an effect'on plant operations and maintenance.
We disagree with the staff conclusion for theifol. wing, reasons:
s AP-1001, paragraph 3.2.1 makes the procedure specificpily a.
applicable to operations and maintenance in all respects, and in general, to all procedures which are nuclear safety related, involve radiation exposure to personnel and involve potential or actual release of radioactivity, b.
The operations and maintenance activities at TMI-2 include the work being perfonned inside the containment.
We are in agreement with the staff that the new procedural.
requirements and other controls, now being implemented shoul'd be adequate to minimize safety concerns for in-containment activi -
ties.
However, we disagree with the staff that "CDPI-11 was purely an instructional and informational document for BNoC and did not identify specific activities that may (or may not) require GPU formal reviews," as stated in Sections II.B.2 and II.B.3.d of the staff's response.
In fact, the staff, beginning on page 11-23 states that a procedure (AP 4300-ADM-3240.01); in conjunction with BNoC CDPI-11, entitled " Work Package Program for In-Containment Work" established GPUN approval for all activities conducted under procedures / work packages as required by TMI-2 Technical Specifi-cations...."
These statements are contradictory in that CDPI-11 was used as a procedure for activities that did require GPU formal.
reviews as required by Technical Specifications.
The use of CDPI-11 in this manner was clearly much more than as an infonnational document.
Regarding the use of these Construction Department Project Instructions (CDPIs), we maintain that thes'e procedures circumvented the licensee's review and approval process.
The staff, in its discussion of the 01 finding in Section II.C.
regarding the approval of CDPI-20, states "i CDPI-20 for controlling work on the polar cr.f_ procedures, such as ane had received proper revi' w including QA review (either Bechtel or GPUN), then the e
administrative handling of the polar'. crane refurbishment would have been acedptable"-(emphasis supplied). The fact remains that these procedurelwere n'ot approved.
a Relatedly, the staff's response asserts that CDPIs are purely instructional and informational documents." We were also told this by several Bechtel personnel during interviews conducted at the 4
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site.
It is evident both by the staff's contradictory statements in their response, and by the results of the discussions on site, that the intended use of CDPIs was unclear to the parties involved.
However, whether deliberate or not, CDPIs did circumvent the licensee's review and approval pro. cess.
Approved procedures did, in fact, exist for the work activities involved; however, they were not followed.
In conclusion, 01 1.dentified a number of procedural violations relevant to work activities in Unit 21 The OI report identified what appeared to the OI Team to be " practices" of procedural violations, rather than " instances." While no problems were discovered resulting from these violations that may have an imediate impact on the health and safety of the public, the manner in which the work was being conducted may have resulted in an undesirable situation if corrective actions had not been taken.
2)
The staff found that there were cases of quality assurance misclassifications, but the extent of the problem was less than that indicated in the 01 report.
Assessment Regarding Quality Assurance for Work Packages, the staff's evaluation conce~htrated exclusively on quality assurance involve-ment as being limited to items classified as "Important to Safety."
. The licensee's approved Quality Assurance Manual also required quality assurance involvement on items classified as " Benefits Reactor Shutdcwn" and "Important to Recovery" as well as "Important to Safety."
It is difficult for 'us to understand how the items addressed in the OI report do not fall into one of the three safety classifications above.
In addition the staff, in Section II.B.4., indicates that with the exception of the polar crane inspection / testing, QA/QC was con-ducted on all the subject work packages.
The 01 Team was provided no such evidence of this even when specific inquiries were made.
Beyond that,.the work packages themselves did not indicate such quality assurance involvement.
~
If the staff has established alternate meth6ds of documenting that proper quality assurance was applied to these items, then these alternate methods should be procedurally identified and controlled by the licensee.
The staff is not part of the licensee's quality assurance organization and is not responsible for classifying safety aq'tivities.
Their review also does not constitute a quality N
assurance review for purposes of NRC requirements.
Also, in Section II.E.4., the staff does not agree with the 01 l
report's findings that the proper classification of ECM-1135, n
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4
" Reactor Gas Purge System Modification" is "Important to Safety."
The staff disagrees with the OI report for the two following reasons:
a.
Although the gas purge system was originally conceived to control the spread of contamination from the reactor vessel to the reactor building, prior to its implementation (but subsequent to the Classification of the ECM), it was found that the existi.ng in-place reactor building purge system provided for effect'ive. control of the spread of contamination 8
to the reactor building. :
b.
The gas purge system was not designed as an extention'of the reactor coolant system boundary.
We note the following with respect t'o the staff's statements:
a.
The staff does not take into account the fact that the licensee's safety classification of the ECM was assigned based on the original purpose of the gas purge system.
Its function was to control the spread of contamination from the reactor vessel to the reactor buil. ding.
This is clearly a safety function; therefore, the classification "not important to safety" is incorrect.
A subsequent staff determination that the system was not needed or used for its intended purpose does not justify its original misclassification.
b.
Notwithstanding the observations in a. above, it is only necessary to understand that the gas purge system modification in fact is part of the reactor coolant pressure system boundary as defined in 10 CFR 50.2(V)(2).
Relatedly, we would assume that the 66 control rod drive mechanisms remaining open to the environment that are referred to in the staff's response also.had their leadscrews ' removed under "Important to Safety" documents as classified by the licensee's Quality Assurance Manual inasmuch as these, too are clearly part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
Likewise, in Section II.E.5., the staff disagrees with the OI report conclusion that ECM 1131, " Reactor Water Level Monitoring System" should have been classified as "Important to Safety." The staff once again maintains that the system was not designed as an exten-tion of the reactor coolant system boundary and therefore it is not part of the reactor coolant system boundary. As stated above, the fact remains it is part of the reactor coolant
- system boundary as defined in 10 CFR 50.2(V)(2).
3)
The stafIagreed with the OI report finding that the administrative procedures training program was not aceouate ano problems in a
communication between various licensee organizations existed.
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5 Assessment We in general, agree with the staff's response in Sections III.F.
and II.C.
However, we disagree with the conclusion that the safety significance of this issue involvi.ng the training program is minimal.
An inadequate training program may be indicative of work not being performed correctly, or being performed by unqualified personnel.
Certainly the number of procedural violations identified in' the OI report is reflective of an inadequate training program. An ade-quate training program is fundamental to a basic quality assurance program.
While no " unsafe" activities took place as a result of this deficiency, to assess Its significance only on this basis is specious.
The staff in reaching this conclusion, does not allow for the enhancement of safety provided by an adequate training program.
4)
The staff agrees with the OI report finding that the licensee'd QA/0C Department had not received proper management support to ensure adequate and timely resolution of OA-identified problems during 1981 and early 1982.
Assessment The staff in thf5 sunnary statement fails to address the more important issue involving the effectiveness of the TMI-Unit 2 quality assurance program.
We are concerned about the apparent misconceptions of the importance of these issues as discussed in this section (Section III.E.) of the staff's response.
The following points need to be addressed and properly recognized as problems that have contributed to the findings identified in the THI-Unit 2 Recovery Program.
The staff agrees that the licensee's QA organization had not audited the current Recovery Programs Organization /BNoC, yet they state the offsite QA Audit group had audited the Gaithersburg Design Engineering office.
We do not equate audits of the BNoC's Gaithdrsburg. Design Engineering office to those audits that were required to be perfonned of the Recovery Program at the site.
Our concern is heightened by the staff's disregard of this issue's safety significance. Audits are a necessary element of.an effec-tive quality assurance program.
They in themselves may not be safety significant, but audits are certainly necessary to ensure an adequate level of assurance, and to satisfy Criterion XVIII of Appendix lB to 10 CFR 50.
s Thq' staff is incorrect when they state, on page 111-47, "Only the reactor building, polar crane structuri is classified as important to safety (ITS).
As a result, work that does not affect
7 6
the structure is classified as not important to safety (NITS)." As discussed earlier, there we.re 'four levels of quality classificaA tions as defined in the licens'ee's Quality Assurance Manual at the time of the 01 effort.
" Benefits Reactor Shutdown" and "Important to Recovery" are mid-level classifications which require some level of QA/QC relative to the importance of the task being performed.
The OI report never stated or even implied that all activities associated with the Polar Crane are "Important to Safety," but many of the' activities we,re at least "Important'to Recovery," requiring some level of QA/QC.
Thus,,QC inspectors should have had some involvement in these activities, arti this is not "over and above the requirements" but represents the licensee's commitment,.
This issue alone may be the core of the apparent misunderstandihg between the staff and us regarding many,0f these findings.
The staff concluded that the licensee's quality assurance depart-ment does not rely exclusively on the cognizant engineer to make a proper safety classification of the activity to be performed.
Nonetheless, interviews with the GPUN Quality Assurance Manager at TMI-Unit 2 in response to cancerns of the OI Team regarding the classification of safety systems revealed that neither he r)or his group had audited the Design Engineering Group.
He explic'itly stated he accepted whatever classification Design Engineering assigned to perform the task.
This would appear to contradict the staff's conclusion in this area.
We appreciate the QA improvements noted in the staff's response; we were not as aware as the staff of these improvements at the time of the 01 investigation regarding Quality Assura'nce Management Support.
However, we would note that we were not necessarily as concerned with the length of time it took to take adequate corrective actions to the issues involved, but rather were more concerned with the length of time it took to initiate corrective actions on rather significant findings.
Our concern at the time of the investigation involved those actions taken by management to defer correction of identified deficiencies.
5)
The staff determined that the position requirements for plant manager and the assignment of responsibilities in the licensee's Organizational Plan were in accordance with the Technical l
Specifications.
Assessment Regarding Section III. A. and III.B., the staff does not characterize the 01 Team's finding correctly.
The OI report did notstati;thatTechnicalSpecificationswereviolated,butrather it questi'oned whether the senior management structure at TMI Unit 2 has sufficient depth in the area of nucle _ar power plant operating i
experience.
r 7
The basis for our concern was that no one in the first three levels of' management at the facility met the requirements for plant mana-ger.
In particular the first two levels of management possess strong construction backgrounds with little or no reactor opera-o tions experience.
Neither of these two upper level positions are qualified to be a plant manager per current standards. We have not encountered a situation similar to TMI Unit 2 in ethis regard at currently licensed facilities.
We felt strongly that one of the problems at THI Unit 2 was that the organization at its top. levels is dominated by people whose background is not adequate to under-stand Technical Specifichtion and license requirements.
The methodology used and approved throughout the Polar Crane refur-bishment process is characteristic of people with construction backgrounds.
In essence, this methodology simply does not incor-porate the review and procedural adherence that is required by operating licensed facilities via the Technical Specifications.
We do not believe the staff has adequately addressed this issue.
6)
The staff found that actions on the part of the NRC onsite' personnel facilitated the safety and promptness of the cleanup effort and did not contribute in any significant way to the licensee's management problems.
I Assessment We stand by our conclusions in this area.
- We do not impugn the integrity of any of the NRC TMIPO staffi nor do we question their dedication to duty.
The intent of our comments was merely to point out areas in which the TMIPO organization, through their regulatory efforts,;did contribute to the problems manifested in the allega-tions.
We believe that TMIP0 personnel in no way intentionally contributed to these problems.
We remain convinced, however, that unless a more orthodox method of regulation is established for the TMIPO, the problems will remanifest themselves in part.
7)
The staff determined that modifications to containment penetrations were appropriately made in accordance with the TMI Unit 2 Technical Specifications and NRC requirements.
The staff does not agree with the OI report finding and finds that modifications to containment penetrations, defined by ECMs 963 and 954, were appropriately made in accordance with the TMI Unit 2 Technical Specifications and NRC requirements.
Also the staff finds that ECMs'963 and 954 did not constitute an unreviewed safety question nor are they in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
The licensee,followed 10 CFR 50.59 requirements and performed the necessar$ safety evaluations in concluding that the subject ECMs were not an unreviewed safety question.
The TMIPO concurrently arr'ived at.the same conclusion as the licens_ee.
The staff position is that:
The modification proposed by ECM 963 changed the service air piping system attached to the penetration
. ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _, _
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8 such that it now does not " connect directly to the containment atmosphere" and therefore criterion.56 no longer applies while the system is in place.
Criterion 57 is then the applicable criterion
.for the air connection and this criterion has been complied with.
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Assessment In no way is criterion 57 the applicable criterion for this air connection.
Sketches A and B of the OI report clearly show the air line connected directly ~to the containment atmosphere, while in use or when isolated. This connection to the atmosphere occurs through the air hose in use, through the unqualified flexible hose.in the penetration, or through the rupture disk.
Criterion 56 is~and has to be, the correct General Design Criterion to be applied.
The staff does not provide a basis which identifies why the water penetration in the modification does not have to meet General Design Criterion 56; therefore we assume the staff agrees with.,us.
Thus, Criterion 56 applies to this penetration.
The staff further asserts that the modification is consistent with Section 3.6.1.1 of the TMI Unit 2 Technical Specification.
The containment integrity scheme innlemented by t1e modification is not dissimilar to containment spray systems at typical PWRs.
We do not understand the relation between the Technical Specifica-tion (as stated below) and any modification except to assure that proper procedures exist after the modification is implemented to maintain containment integrity.
Excerpt From Technical Specification "3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained and
.all containment penetrations, including at least two OPERABLE containment isolation valves or a double barrier in each pene; tration, shall be closed when not required open per procedures approved pursuant to Specification 6.8.2.
Purging or other treatment of the containment atmosphere shall be prohibited until approved by the NRC.
APPLICABILITY:
REC 0VERY MODE.
ACTION:
With one containment isolation valve,per containment penetration open or inoperable, maintain the affected penetration (s) closed with either:
9
i 9
a.
At least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or b.
At least one closed manual valve, or a blind flange."
This Technical Specification is no't dissimilar to Technical Specifications at other facilities.
No other residen.t or regional office has the authority to approve modifications that change the basis for a Technical Specification without a license amendment submittal per 10 CFR 50.59(c) on the basis of this Technical Specification.
The fact that the modifications as implemented are similar to containment spray systems at typical PWRs is not relevant.
The containment spray systems on PWRs are approved during the plant licensing. process and are described in the FSAR.
If this were not the case and a PWR licensee were contemplating installing the containment spray system, a 10 CFR 50.59(c) license submittal would be required.
We feel that our position is con-sistent with the views expressed by Mr. H. R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in his memorandum to Ben B.
Hayes, Director, Office of Investigations dated July 18, 1983. We do not dispute the Technical merits of these modifications--only the contrast between-the way they were implemented and what is required by the Code of Federal Regulations.
One final comment that we wish to make with respect to the staff's response to the OI report's findings is that the staff appears to minimize the safety implications of each finding. We may agree that taken individually the findings ray be minimized. However, we are convinced that these findings when taken collectively, did represent significant weaknesses in the licensee's management program and as such are, overall, of safety significance.
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LINK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- N JM 12 P2 :22 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 6FfL:,# :
50CnLl!% i "WCf G F M0' In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION
)
(Civil Penalty)
)
License No. DPR-73 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station
)
EA 84-137 Unit No. 2)
)
CERTWTCATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION'S FIRST SET OF INTER-ROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 9th day of January,1987
- Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
Administrative Law Judge Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge i
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2300 N Street, NW U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20037 Washington, DC 20555
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Steven L. Ilock, Esq.
Appeal Board Thelen, Marrin, Johnson, Bridges U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2 Embarcadero Center Washington, DC 20555 San Francisco, CA 94111
- Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l
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/ George E. (fohnspfn Counsel for NR0' Staff i
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