ML19296F066

Responds to IE Bulletin 80-17 Re Failure of Control Rods to Insert During Scram at Bwr.Discusses Surveillance Testing or Safety Relief Valve Position.Surveillance Will Be Conducted Daily

ML19296F066
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	08/15/1980
From:	Pasternak R POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
IEB-80-17, JAFP-80-653, NUDOCS 8010010815
Download: ML19296F066 (11)

Text

to- +

.8 b

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FerzPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RAYMOND J. PAsTERNAK Re,; dent Meneger S P.O. BOX 41 Lycommg, N York 13093 315-342 3840 August 15, 1980 SERIAL:JAFP 80-653 Boyce H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA. 19406

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN NO. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 FAILURE OF 76 0F 185 CONTROL RODS TO FULLY INSERT DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR

Reference:

Letter from Raymond J. Pasternak to Boyce H. Grier Dated July 25, 1980 (Serial No. JAFP 80-605)

Dear Mr. Grier:

Following receipt of the subject Bulletin and Supplements and following startup of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant on August 9,1980, a number of the actions required by the subject Bulletin have been completed. The FitzPatrick Plant response to these actions is listed below. Please note that a number of the actions were not completed within the time frame required by the Bulletin.

In general, since the plant was shutdown for refueling and mainten-ance when the Bulletin was received, actions were taken consistent with minimizing the length of time which the plant remained out of service.

In addition, those action items requiring action within a few days on operating plants were completed prior to reactor starup where possible.

1) Ultrasonic Test (UT) of the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV), associated piping and the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV) were verified free of significant accumulations of water prior to startup. In addition, the SDV vent valves were verified operable and the vent system was verified free of obstructions. Further, in response to Supplement 2 of the Bulletin, the SDV vent lines were modified to provide a vent path continuously open to the reactor ouilding atmosphere as indicated in Reference 1.

8 010 0 3 0 FIS '

Q

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN NO. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Page 2) Following reactor startup on August 9, surveillance and preoperational testing of the safety relief valve position monitoring system was conducted. In addition, based on a verbal agreement with Region I I&E personnel, the plant's turbine generator was sychronized with the grid system and operated for approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the main generator was removed from service and turbine overspeed testing was conducted. Following this overspeed testing of the main turbine, a manual scram test, as required by the Bulletin, was conducted at 2210 hours0.0256 days <br />0.614 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.40905e-4 months <br /> on August 11, 1980. A second reactor startup was conducted and the automatic scram required by the Bulletin was conducted at 1012 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.85066e-4 months <br /> August 13, 1980. The data for each of the scrams is tabulated below:

a) All rod insert times (See Table A & B for individual insert times)

Manual Scram 3.57 seconds Automatic Scram 3.43 seconds b) Voltage at the scram solenoid valve buses Manual Scram Bus A - 115.94 volts prior to scram, 0.00 volts after scram.

Bus B - 117.57 volts prior to scram, 0.00 volts ef ter scram.

Automatic Scram Bus A - 115.4 volts prior to scram, 0.00 volts after scram.

Bus B - 117.7 volts prior to scram, 0.00 volts af ter scram.

c) Verification of backup scram valve operation (design of the valves does not permit verification that the backup scram valves are fully open)

Manual Scram Valves operated and air was relieved until air pressure was dissipated.

Automatic Scram Valves operated and air was relieved until air pressure was dissipated.

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN N0. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Page d) SDIV Instrument Data Manual Scram SDIV high level alarm - 43.5 seconds SDIV Rod Block - 53.4 seconds SDIV Scram - 65.6 seconds Automatic Scram SDIV high level alarm - 42.93 seconds SDIV Rod Block - 52.20 seconds SDIV Scram - 66.00 seconds e) SDV Vent Valve Data Manual Scram A side vent valve - Closed - 53.3 seconds Opened - 22.94 seconds B side vent valve - Closed - 65.0 seconds Opened - 23.64 seconds Automatic Scram A side vent valve - Closed - 52.9 seconds Opened - 36.83 seconds B side vent valve - Closed - 65.6 seconds Opened - 38.20 seconds f) SDIV Drain Valve Data Manual Scram Closed - 41.7 seconds Opened - 18.90 seconds Automatic Scram Closed - 41.27 seconds Opened - 28.27 seconds g) SDIV Water Sample Data Manual Scram 158 ppm total suspended solids Automatic Scram 155 ppm total suspended solids h) SDV Drain Time Data Manual Scram West side: 8 minutes 39 seconds East side: 9 mir.utes 25.4 seconds (determined by UT at point where 2" drain is connected to SDV)

Automatic Scram West side: 8 minutes 29 seconds East side: 9 minutes 30 seconds (determined by UT at point where 2" drain is connected to SDV)

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

fiRC I&E BULLETIf4 fi0. 80-17 and SUPPLEMEf1TS 1 and 2 Page 1) Post-scram Monitoring for Residual Water Manual Scram &

Automatic Scram SDV and SDIV contained no residual water. A loop seal containing residual water was found in the 2" line connecting the east SDV to the SDIV. See Appendix A for additional details.

j) Scram Reset Time Delay Data Manual Scram Relay SA-K22A - 12.4 seconds Relay 5A-K22B - 12.4 seconds Automatic Scram Relay SA-K22A - 12.04 seconds Relay 5A-K22B - 12.06 seconds k) Comparison of Data Comparison of Data from the Manual and Automatic Scrams does not indicate that any significant problem or deficiency (except as noted in 1) above) exists in the as-built condition of the SDV, SDIV, associated piping, vents, drains and controls.

3) Following the manual scram test, a loop seal containing residual water was found in the 2" line connecting the east SDV to the SDIV. The significance of the deficiency was evaluated prior to startup to permit conduct of the automatic scram. Following the automatic scram, the loop seal and its affect on draining of the SDV was evaluated. This evaluation determined that the loop seal does not appear to cause a significant delay in the draining of the east side SDV and does not impair scram capability.

Following both the manual and automatic scrams, the vent lines on the SDV were verified functional. See Appendix A for additional details.

4) The actions required by Item 4. a) through 4. e) were completed prior to startup with the exception that those licensed operators which were absent from the plant due to vacation or similar reasons, were not trained in the procedures provided to recognize and mitigate an event similar to that described in the Bulletin. Those personnel which were not trained prior to startup will be trained as soon as practicable following their return to the plant.

5) The FitzPatrick Plant has initiated surveillance of the SDV, SDIV and associated piping utilizing ultrasonic examination. This surveillance will be conducted on a daily basis until a continuous monitoring system is installed and operational as required by Item A. 5. of Supplement 1 to the Bulletin.

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

fiRC I&E BULLETIf4 f40. 80-17 and SUPPLEMEflTS 1 and 2 Page 6) The FitzPatrick Plant has written and implemented a Standing Order which provides guidance relating to the prompt notifications required by Item 6. a) of the subject Bulletin. In addition, the Standing Order directs operations personnel to operate all available suppression pool cooling whenever the suppression poci temperature exceeds the normal operating limit as specified in Technical Specifications. Further, a 10CFR60.59 review to determine the acceptability of operating both SLCS pumps at the same time has been initiated. This review and the extent of modifications to the SLC System, if any, has not been completed at this time.

7) Since the FitzPatrick Plant design includes a Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) for mitigation of ATWS events, no further action of this item is required.

SUPPLEMErlT ff0.1.

A) 1) Appendix A contains an analysis of the adequacy of the as-built SDV, SDIV and associated piping vent and drain systems at the FitzPatrick Plant. Included in the Appendix is an evaluation of the identified design or construction deficiency which was noted in the responses to Items 2) i) and 3) above. Attached ara copies of verified as-built isometric drawings which have been verified to be correct.

2) The FitzPatrick Plant has implemented changes to the normal and emergency operating procedures associated with the SLC System to provide clear guidance to the operating shift personnel regarding the initiation of the SLC System without obtaining supervisory approval. These changes include contingencies which describe the conditions presented in item 4. b) 1) and 2) of the Bulletin (original issue). The procedure revision includes guidance in determining whether the failure of full control rod insertion is due to malfunction of the electrical, hydraulic or air systems associated with the CRD System and provides instructions for initiations of the SLC System when other measures fail to cause insertion of the control rods in excess of the guide lines provided by the Bulletin.

3) The FitzPatrick Plant has written and implemented a Standing Order specifying remedial action to be taken if water is found in the SDV at times when it should be free of water. This Standing Order requires that the reactor be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the results of surveillance indicates presence of water when water should not be present.

4) The FitzPatrick Plant has initiated and implemented a Standing Order to insure that the SLC System control switch key is readily available at all times to the licensed operator in the control room. This Standing Order specifically requires that the key be located on the control panel adjacent to the control switch.

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC !aE BULLETIN N0. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Page 5) The FitzPatrick Plant has initiated daily ultrasonic surveillance of the SDV which will remain in effect until a continuous monitoring system is installed and operational.

B) 1) The FitzPatrick Plant issued a Purchase Order on August 15, 1980 for the purchase of certain comronents of a continuous ultrasonic monitoring system for installation on SDV and SDIV components. The purchased components are described in a proprietary General Electric Company document which is available for review by personnel of your office at the plant site. The quoted earliest possible delivery dates for this system are as follows: Software - 2 weeks after receipt or' order; Hardware - 6 weeks after receipt of order. In view of these delivery dates, installation by September 1,1980 is not possible. Additional information relating to our inability to complete installation by September 1,1980, is listed below:

a) The only quote for a continuous monitoring system received by the FitzPatrick Plant was received on August 12, 1980. This quote is limited to the supply of software (interconnection and similar drawings) and hardware components such as alarm and monitor units and ultrasonic detectors.

Since the software has not yet been received by the FitzPatrick Plant, the design and engineering of a number of other portions of the system cannot be completed et this time. These additional items include power supply requirements, size and number of electrical cables, junction boxes and similar materials. In addition, the six week delivery quoted for the hardware is based on a first-come, first-serve basis. The FitzPatrick Plant's relative position on the list of plants purchasing the equipment is unknown at this time and General Electric has further indicated that they can supply the equipment at a maximum rate of two sets of components per week. In view of this, the delivery of hardware will require a minimum of 6 weeks, as noted above, and could potentially require as long as 18 weeks.

b) In view of a) above, the FitzPatrick Plant cannot commit to a firm schedule for installation at this time.

c) The FitzPatrick Plant is committed to those equipment changes and/or surveillance requirements which are necessary to provide adequate assurance of SDV operability as indicated in Item A) 5), Supplement No.1 above.

2) The FitzPatrick Plant is currently conducting a study of potential designs for improving the venting o' the SDV. Additional inform 7 tion relating to this study will be provided at a later date.

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN NO. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Page SUPPLEMENT NO. 2

1. As noteu in Reference 1, the FitzPatrick Plant modified the SDV vent system to provide a path continuously open to the reactor building atmosphere on the side of the vent valve piping away from the SDV. This modification was completed prior to reactor startup on August 9, 1980.

2. A response confirming the action required by Item 1. above was transmitted to the Region I of fice by Reference 1.

Very truly yours, b8.v %U ,

cv VC:brp RAYM0ND J. PASTERNAK Attachments RESIDENT MANAGER DISTRIBUTION: Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 15% day '

NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement of August, 1980 Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, D.C. 20555 i George T. Berry, PASNY, NY0 NgaryPublic G. M. Wilverding, PASNY, NY0 BEVERLYit.PRUCNAL. f 4628499 J. P. Bayne, PASNY, NY0 Notary Public- State ef New Ycrk M. C. Cosgrove, PASNY, JAF Appointed in oswego ccunty R. J Converse, PASNY, JAF My Ccenmission Expires March 30.19.12s R. Baker, PASNY, JAF NRCB 80-17 File Document Control Center

Boyce H. Grier, Dirt.ctor August 15, 19Lu U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

f4RC I&E BULLETIN fi0. 80-17 and SUPFLEMEf4TS 1 and 2 Page ~8-ATTACHMENTS fable A Individual Control Rod Insertion Times - Manual Scram Table B Individual Control Rod Insertion Times - Automatic Scram Appendix A Evaluation of Adequacy of the As-Built System and Drawings

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U,5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN NO. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Attachment TABLE A CONTROL ROD INSERT TDIES -- MANUAL SCRAM

• CONTROL TIME CONTROL TDIE CONTROL TIME CONTROL TDiE ROD (Sec) R0D (Sec) ROD (Sec) ROD (Sec) 22-51 2.83 30-51 2.80 34-51 2.90 10-47 3.03 18-47 3.03 26-47 3.23 34-47 2.93 42-47 3.03 06-43 2.87 22-43 3.17 30-43 3.23 38-43 3.03 46-43 3.00 10-39 2.87 18-39 2.93 26-39 3.10 34-39 3.13 42-39 3.13 02-35 2.93 06-35 2.83 14-35 3.07 22-35 3.20 30-35 3.20 38-35 3.07 46-35 3.10 50-35 2.90 02-31 2.97 10-31 3.00 18-31 3.13 26-31 3.03 34-31 2.93 42-31 3.13 06-27 3.00 14-27 3.20 22-27 3.30 30-27 3.03 38-27 2.93 46-27 2.93 02-23 3.07 10-23 2.90 18-23 3.10 26-23 3.27 34-23 3.33 42-23 3.07 50-23 2.80 02-19 2.83 06-19 2.87 14-19 3.33 22-19 3.23 30-19 3.17 38-19 3.23 46-19 2.97 50-19 18-15 3.57 26-15 3.10 34-15 3.27

3. 0_0 42-15 3.00 06-11 3.03 14-11 3.03 22-11 3.37 30-11 3.23 38-11 3.27 46-11 3.37 10-07 3.03 18-07 3.27 26-07 3.13 34-07 3.27 38-07 2.93 42-07 2.97 18-03 3.00 22-03 2.80 30-03 2.97 34-03, 3.07

• Insertion times derived from analysis of video tape recording of reactor centrol panel

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi;sion JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN NO. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Attachment TABLE B CONTROL ROD INSERT TIMES -- AUTOMATIC SCRAM

• CONTROL TIME CONTROL TIME CONTROL TIME CONTROL TIME ROD (Sec) ' ROD (Sec) ROD (Sec) ROD (Sec) 18-51 2.77 22-51 2.77 30-51 2.67 34-51 **

10-47 3.00 18-47 3.03 26-47 3.27 34-47 2.97 42-47 3.10 06-43 14-43 3.13 22-43 3.17 30-43 3.03 38-43 3.03 46-43 2.93 10-39 3.13 18-39 2.97 26-39 3.00 34-39 ** 42-39 3.00 02-35 3.03 06-35 2.80 14-35 2.93 22-35 3.03 30-33 3.13 38-35 3.00 46-35 3.07 50-35 2.97 02-31 2.87 10-31 2.97 18-31 3.20 26-31 2.97 34-31 2.87 42-31 3.00 06-27 3.17 14-27 3.13 22-27 2.93 30-27 2.77 38-27 2.93 46-27 2.83 02-23 3.00 10-23 2.83 18-23 3.10 26-23 3.23 34-23 3.27 42-23 3.10 50-23 ** 02-19 2.80 06-19 2.90 14-19 3.13 22.19 ** 30-19 3.00 3S-19 3.17 46-19 2.87 50-19 2.93 10-15 3.07 26-15 3.07 34-15 3.23 42-15 2.83 06-11 2.90 14-11 2.90 22-11 3.33 30-11 3.20 38-11 2.93 46-11 3.43 10-07 3.00 18-07 3.27 26-07 3.07 34-07 3.23 42-07 2.97 18-03 2.93 22-03 2.70 30-03 2.87 34-03 2.83 18-15 3.40

• Insertion times derived from analysis of video tape recording of reactor control panel

• • Insertion time not obtained due to failed indicator la=ps. ,

Boyce H. Grier, Director August 15, 1980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JAFP 80-653

SUBJECT:

NRC I&E BULLETIN N0. 80-17 and SUPPLEMENTS 1 and 2 Attachment APPENDIX A The FitzPatrick Plant staff has reviewed the design and as-built condition of the SDV, SDIV and associated piping, vents and drains. Included in this evaluation is the development of as-built drawings. As part of the actions required by NRC I&E Bulletin 80-17, a construction deficiency was discovered.

During ultrasonic examination of piping associated with the system following manual scram test required by the Bulletin, a residual volume of water was found in the 2" drain line between the east side SDV and the SDIV.

Measurement and additional ultrasonic examination reveals that a loop seal of between 5 and 6 inches in height is present in the 2" drain line as a result of improper pitch of a portion of the line. The improper pitch is believed to be the result of a construction deficiency. The time required for draining of the SDV, which was determined as part of the Bulletin require-ments, clearly shows that the presence of the loop seal does not prevent proper draining of the SDV nor does it significantly increase the duration of the draining evolution as shown by the comparison of the drain times notes in the response to Item 2. h).

The FitzPatrick Plant performed a 10CFR50.59 evaluation of the deficiency and determined that the existence of the loop seal does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The safety evaulation was reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and the deficiency was discussed with the Resident Inspector. To provide assurance that the loop seal will not effect the operability of the SDV System, daily ultrasonic examination of the section of pipe containing the loop seal will be conducted until modifications can be implemented to eliminate the loop seal. At this time, the nature of and schedule for modification is dependent on the results of the study noted in response to Item B) 2) of Supplement 1 of the subject Bulletin which has not been completed.

Listed below and enclosed herewith are the Drawings applicable to the SDV System and associated piping and components:

1. Scram Discharge Vents & Drains - SK-JAF-80-026

2. "A" Side Scram Discharge Volume Vent Line - SK-JAF-80-027

3. "B" Side Scram Discharge Volume Vent Line - SK-JAF-80-028

4. East Scram Discharge Header Drain - SK-JAF-80-029