ML18157A077

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Forwards LER 80-019/03X-1
ML18157A077
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/19/1981
From: Uderitz R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18085A925 List:
References
NUDOCS 8102270595
Download: ML18157A077 (3)


Text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark. N.J. 07101 Phone 201 430-7000 February 19, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. qrier Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-19/03X-l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting supple-mental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-19/03X-l.

Sincerely yours,

/~~j R. A. Uderit?

General Manager -

Nuclear Production

~

CC: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies) lftO:MH;'H t ~

{ U:ll{t\r 95-2001. (200'.'.* :.7,

Report Number: 80-19/03X-l Report Date: February 19, 1981 Occurrence Date: 8/20/80 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION.OF OCCURRENCE:

Inadvertent Equipment Starting of 2C SEC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 Prior to Initial Criticality DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During a cooldown, all safeguards equipment on the 2C SEC started three times with no testing in progress and no actuation signal present. At 1418 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.39549e-4 months <br />, to prevent excessive equipment starting,*

the SEC output cable plug was disconnected, cleared and tagged to prevent energizing the _circuits. In addition, Action Statement 3.3.2.1, Action 13, was entered which requires with the number of operable channels one less than the total number of channels, be

'in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Unknown ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

On all three occasions, no cause could be found. The Senior Reactor Operator declared the channels inoperable.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

To limit the starting of equipment, 2C SEC was de-energized, cleared and tagged. When the plant entered Mode 5, the Action Statement was tecminated at 2310 hours0.0267 days <br />0.642 hours <br />0.00382 weeks <br />8.78955e-4 months <br />.

Maintenance personnel nor the vendor representative could identify the origin of the transient signal. A design change, 2ET-0946, installed latching relays in parallel with XKl and XK2 relay coils to detect transients from the Solid State Protection System which could cause the SEC to operate.

LER 80-19/03X-l e February 19, 1981 The latching relays were installed on July 28, 1980 and were removed on September 3, 1980. During this time, no transients occurred. No further action is planned.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By W. J. Steele Manager - sareID Genera ting Station SORC Meeting No. 81-09