ML18153C483

LER 90-018-00:on 901203,unplanned Initiation of ESF & SI Occurred During Performance of Operations Periodic Test. Caused by Inadequate Test Procedure.Personnel Preparing & Reviewing Test Procedures Will Be cautioned.W/901227 Ltr

ML18153C483
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	12/27/1990
From:	Kansler M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-805, LER-90-018, LER-90-18, NUDOCS 9101030171
Download: ML18153C483 (6)

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Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station P.O.Box315 Surry, Virginia I

23883 December 27, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 90-805 Document Control Desk Docket No.: 50-280 Washington, D. C. 20555 License No.: DPR-32 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER 90-018-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Corporate Nuclear Safety.

Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator Suite2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 9101030171 901227 PDR ADOCK 05000280 S F'DR

NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(~91 APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-5301, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 12) I PAGE 131 TITLE 141 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 IO I 5 I o I O I O 12 I 81 0 1 IOF OI 5 Unplanned Engineered Safety Features Actuation Due to Inadequate Procedure TE 15) LER NUMBER CBI REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED llll T YEAR YEAR .}t SE~i~:~~AL (} ~~"4~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE Rl:OUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: /Ch<<:lt on* or mar* of th* following/ 1111 OPERATING MODE Ill N 20.402(b) 20.4Cll(cl X II0.73Call21li*I 73.71lbl 20.4Clll(all1 ,en II0.381cll1 I II0.73Call2lM 73.711c) 20.4Clllall1lllll II0.311lcll21 II0.73lall21lwiil OTHER (Sp<<:ify in Ab10-.ct IM/ow and in T*11t, NRC Form 20.4Clllall1 llilll II0.73lall21lll '

• II0.73lall21l*lllllAI 366A/

20.4CIIICall1 lllwl 20.4CIIICall1 IM - II0.73lall21llll II0.731all21lllil LICENSEE cbNTACT FOR THIS LER 1121 II0.731all2llwlllllBI .

II0.73Call21lxl NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. R. Kansler, Station Manager COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT _1131.

MANUFAC- MANUFAC-CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED

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SUBMISSION h YES (If yn, compt*r. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/ NO DATE 1151 I I I A9STRACT (Limit to 1400 ,p11cn, I.*.. appro1tim.r.ty fiftHn ling/Hpac* typa..,;imn /inn/ (111)

On December

• 3, 1990, at 0032 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, with Unit 1 at cold shutdown, an unplanned initiation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) and resulting Safety Injection (SI) occurred during performance of an Operations Periodic Test. The initiation occurred

• when Consequence Limiting Safeguards HI (HCLS) logic testing was being conducted and an installed jumper was not adequate to prevent associated relays from actuating. The cause of the unplanned initiation was an inadequate test procedure. Persqnnel preparing and -reviewing test procedures will be cautioned to exercise necessary attention to detail, and additional administrative actioni; as a result of the Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) review are under evaluation. This unplanned ESF actuation is being reported in compliance with 10CFRSO. 73a(2)iv.

NRC FMm 3IMI C~Bl

NRC FORM 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (IHl9) APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92

\. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS J TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 11) DOCKET NUMBER 12) LEA NUMBER (6) PAGE 13)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 0 1s101010121s10 910 -ol 1ls - 010 ol 2°F ols TEXT (If - . , , _ le -,ulted, ,,_ MltlitJoMI NRC Form 315&4'*1117)

1.0 DESCRIPTION

OF EVENT On December 3, 1990 at 0032 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, with Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown (CSD) and Unit 2 at 90% power, a spurious train "B" Consequence Limiting Safeguards-HI (HCLS) [EIIS-JE] and resulting Safety Injection (SI) [EIIS-BP,BQ] occurred during the performance of Operations Periodic Test 1-0PT-ZZ-001 (Unit 1 ESP Actuation With Instantaneous Undervoltage - lH Bus). The test was being performed to functionally test the sequencing of loads onto emergency bus lH following the injection of an Engineered Safeguards Function (ESP) signal with the simultaneous injection of an undervoltage signal. The test was intended to be limited to train "A" components by blocking CLS cross-trips to the "B" train activation relays. The procedure also performed 3/4 logic verification for HCLS and Consequence Limiting Safeguards-HI-HI (HHCLS) systems, as well as verification of time delay settings for ESP components.

The procedure manually initiated a HHCLS and HCLS signal coincident with a simultaneous undervoltage on the lH Emergency Bus to test the proper response of train "A" components. The train "B" HHCLS signal was successfully blocked by removing the fuses to the control circuit.

The train "B" HCLS was to be blocked by installing an electrical jumper across the CLS manual pushbutton and automatic initiation contacts.

This jumper was adequate to block train "B" activation due to manual HHCLS initiation. When HCLS logic testing was begun three minutes later, however, the installed jumper did not prevent automatic actuation of train "B" HCLS

• and SI.

The following train "B" SI and containment isolation components actuated as designed upon the initiation of the spurious HCLS signal:

- #3 Emergency Diesel Generator [EIIS-DG] auto started CH-TV-1204B, letdown isolation t~p valve, [EIIS-ISV], closed CC-TV-109B, component cooling water trip valve to the residual heat removal (RHR) system [EIIS-ISV], closed SI-MOV-1867D, SI valve to RCS cold legs [EIIS-ISV], opened CH-LCV-1 llSD, charging pump suction from the refueling water storage tank, opened

NRC FORM 386A 16-891 e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD

\ COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS J TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-5301, U.S. NUCLEAR*

REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555, AND TO 1"HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-01041, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 PAGE (3)

LER NUMBER (61 YEAR  :::::::::: SEQUENTIAL ::::::::::: REVISION

NUMBER

;::::::: NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 1 0 1s I O I O I O I 2 1s I O 9 IO - 0 I 11 8 - 0 IO O 13 OF OI s CH-MOV-1289B, normal charging line [EIIS-ISV], closed RM-TV-lOOB, containment air and radiation monitoring isolation

[EIIS-ISV], closed CV-TV-150B, containment vacuum suction isolation [EIIS-ISV],

closed DA-TV-lOOB, containment sump pump isolation [EIIS-ISV], closed IA-TV-101B, containment instrument air isolation [EIIS-ISV], closed SS-TV-103B, residual heat removal system sample valve [EIIS-ISV],

closed VG-TV-109B, primary drain transfer tank vent [EIIS-ISV], closed CV-P-lB, containment vacuum pump [EIIS-P], tripped The train "B" bank of control room habitability air bottles began to dump Actuation of other train "B" SI components did not occur because they were either in their SI mode position or were out of service at the time of the event.

This event was reported on December 3, 1990 to the NRC in a four hour non-emergency report as an unplanned ESF actuation in accordance with 10CFR50. 72(b )(2)(ii).

2.0 SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The impact of the event was minimal since the unit was at CSD and a majority of the ESF components were removed from service.

Operators responded quickly to terminate the SI. Pressurizer level increased from 18 to 42%, and reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure increased from 320 to 365 psig. These parameters were maintained within a safe operating band during and following the event.

The plant was quickly returned to a stable condition, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

NRC p_, 366A (6-891

• NRC FORM 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IIMl9) APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD

't TEXT CONTINUATION COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1*HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13160-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 12) PAGE 13)

LER NUMBER 16)

YEAR .....-.... SEQUENTIAL ;:;:;:;:;:* REVISION

NUMBER

:::::::: NUMllER Surry Power Station, Unit 1 o 1s Io Io Io 12 Is 10 91 o _ o 11 I s _ o1o o 14 oF o I s TEXT (If - - * ,....,,, - additJoMI NRC Form .&.4'*1117) 3.0 CAUSE OF THE EVENT A Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) evaluation concluded that the spurious HCLS and SI were due to an inadequate test procedure. A step in the test procedure was inadvertently I changed during revision of some related procedures. This error was undetected because it was made between the time the procedure was reviewed for technical accuracy and when it received its final approval. The electrical jumper which was installed to prevent train "B" HCLS actuation was sufficient to block the manual pushbutton activation only. When logic testing was begun on HCLS bistables three minutes after start of test, train "B" activation occurred.

The HCLS system mitigates . the effects of small steam line or

• feed line break in containment. It is activated when three out of four containment pressure detectors indicate 17. 7 psia or greater. The bistable testing which resulted in the event was being done to determine if each combination of three out of four pressure detector circuits would activate relays and contacts needed for HHCLS and HCLS activation. HHCLS activation occurs when the same three out of four

. detectors indicate 23 psia or greater. When the bistable testing began, the activation relays operated as designed, but the inadequate HCLS

• jumper allowed train "B" components to activate.

4. O IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Operators terminated SI and returned the affected ESP components to their previous configuration. Personnel conducting the . test terminated the procedure.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The test procedure was corrected to include an adequate electrical jumper for the HCLS circuitry. The lH bus test did not have to be repeated because sufficient data was obtained during the test which caused the event. However, a corresponding test on the lJ bus and the train "B" components, which included an adequate HCLS jumper, was performed two days later satisfactorily and without complications.

6.0 ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Personnel preparing and reviewing test procedures will be cautioned to exercise necessary attention to detail, and additional administrative actions as a result of the HPES review are under evaluation.

NRC Fann 3118A 16-89)

.,. NRC FORM 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(~9) APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION ANO REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. OC 20555. ANO TO 1"HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET. WASHINGTON. OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 PAGE (31 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 0 I5 I O I O I O I 21 8 IO 91 0 - 0 11 I 8 - 0 IO OI 5 OF O I5 TEXT (H mote - * ,.,,,._:, . - HdltJaMI NRC Fonn 36&4~1 117) 7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS LER S 1-89-006: Spurious Safety Injection Due to Inadequate Special Test Procedure

• C LER Sl-87-030: Inadverterii Enginee~ed 's*afety Features *Actuation Due to**

Inadequate Procedure. ..

• ! 1 I 8.0 EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER NIA NRC Fonn 366A (6-89)