ML18139A368

LER 80-034/03L-0:on 800603,w/unit Critical at 0% Power,Amp Readings for Circuit 24D,Panel 2 Found Below Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Excessive Heat.Initiated Design Mod to Change Manner by Which Borated Lines Are Heat Traced

ML18139A368
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	06/23/1980
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A367	List: ML18139A366 ML18139A368 ML18139A371
References
LER-80-034-03L, LER-80-34-3L, NUDOCS 8006270287
Download: ML18139A368 (2)

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1With Unit 4H critical at zero percent power PT-27A revealed that the amp readr

[£ID I ings for circuit 24D(Boron Injection Tank recirc return & cross connect)Panel I

~ 2 were below the Acceptance Criteria Stipulated in the PT.Repair of the defecr 1

[QJ}J Jtive circuit was initiated innnediately. This event is a degraded mode of

[£I£) !operation as specified in T.S. 3.3.b.5 and is reportable in accordance

~ with T.S. 6.6.2.b.2. Because the redundant heat tracing circuit was operable, 1 1

((II] the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

The Heat Tracing Tape failed because of excessive heat. A design change 1

D:J:IJ 1has been initiated to change the manner by which these borated lines are

[JJJ] !heat traced. Repairs were initiated on the failed tape.

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ATTACHMENT 1 e

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-280 REPORT NO. 80-035/031-0 EVENT DATE: 6-3-80 TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. Description of Event:

With Unit I critical at 0% power PT-27Arevealeq_ that the amp readings for circuit 22A (Boron Injection Tank Inlet) Panel 2 was below the Acceptance Criteria Stipulated in the PT. Repair of the defective circuit was initiated immediately. This event is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with T.S.

6.6.2.b.2.

2. Probable Consequences & Status of Redundant Systems:

The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was verified operable, which meant heat was being supplied to the Boric Acid Piping. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause:

Since this tape has recently been replaced the specific reason for failure is not presently known.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to replace the defective heat tracing tapeand to provide this information on to the task force studying the Heat Tracing System for further evaluation. After replacing the heat tracing tape, operability of the affected Heat Tracing Circuit was verified.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Since the subject circuit is continously monitored, no subsequent action is required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional actions were deemed necess.ary.

7. Generic Implications:

A task force has been established to study the total spectrum of th.e heat tracing system in an ttempt to discern present problems. and recommend solutions which will eliminate sporadic failures experienced.