ML18139A366

Forwards LERs 80-034/03L-0 & 80-035/03L-0

ML18139A366
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	06/23/1980
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A367	List: ML18139A366 ML18139A368 ML18139A371
References
012, 12, NUDOCS 8006270279
Download: ML18139A366 (2)

Text

Vepco VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Surry Power Station P. 0. Box 315 Surry, VA 23883 Serial No: 012 JUN 2 3 1980 Docket Nos: 50-280 License Nos: DPR-32 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Reports for Surry Unit 1.

Report Number Applicable Technical Specification 80-034/031-0 3.3.B.5 80-035/031-0 3.3.B.5 These reports have been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours, w J)_s

. L. Wilson

fV\_..

tation Manager ENCLOSURES cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (3)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Mr. Norman Haller, Director (3)

Office of Management and Program Analysis US NRG c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

ATTACffMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 80-034/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 6-37"80 TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. Description of Event:

• With Unit ,4n,. critical at zer.o .percen.t: power*P*"f.-27A revealed that the amp 0

readings for.circuit* 24D,~ (°Boron. Injection *Tank Recirc return &

• cross connect)

Panel 2 were below .the Acceptance Criteria Stip{rlated in the PT. Repair of the defective circuit was initia-ted* imIPediately. This event is a degFaded mode of operation as specified in T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.2.

2. Probab-le *Consequences & Status of Redundant Systems:

The redundant Heat Tr2~ing Circuit was verified operable, which meant heat was being supplied to the Boric .Acid Piping. Therefore, the Health and Safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause:

The Heat Tracing Tape failed due to excessive heat.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to replace the defective Heat Tracing Tape, .and verify the operability of the affected Heat Tracing Circuit.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

A Design Change has been initiated to change the Heat Tracing Circuit 24D to prevent over heating.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional actions we~e deemed necessary.

7. Generic Implications:

A task force has been established to study the total spectrum of the heat tracing system in an attempt to discern present problems and recommend solutions which will eliminate sporadic failures experienced.