ML18139A366
| ML18139A366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1980 |
| From: | Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139A367 | List:
|
| References | |
| 012, 12, NUDOCS 8006270279 | |
| Download: ML18139A366 (2) | |
Text
Vepco JUN 2 3 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Surry Power Station P. 0. Box 315 Surry, VA Serial No:
Docket Nos:
23883 012 50-280 License Nos: DPR-32 Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Reports for Surry Unit 1.
Report Number 80-034/031-0 80-035/031-0 Applicable Technical Specification 3.3.B.5 3.3.B.5 These reports have been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.
ENCLOSURES cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (3)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Mr. Norman Haller, Director (3)
Office of Management and Program Analysis US NRG c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C. 20555 Very truly yours, w J)_s ;fV\\_..
. L. Wilson tation Manager
ATTACffMENT 1 SURRY POWER DOCKET NO:
REPORT NO:
EVENT DATE:
STATION, UNIT 1 50-280 80-034/03L-0 6-37"80 TITLE OF REPORT:
- 1.
Description of Event:
HEAT TRACING FAILURE
- With Unit,4n,. critical at zer.o.percen.t:0power*P*"f.-27A revealed that the amp readings for.circuit* 24D,~ (°Boron. Injection *Tank Recirc return &
- cross connect)
Panel 2 were below.the Acceptance Criteria Stip{rlated in the PT. Repair of the defective circuit was initia-ted* imIPediately. This event is a degFaded mode of operation as specified in T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.2.
- 2.
Probab-le *Consequences & Status of Redundant Systems:
The redundant Heat Tr2~ing Circuit was verified operable, which meant heat was being supplied to the Boric.Acid Piping. Therefore, the Health and Safety of the public were not affected.
- 3.
Cause:
The Heat Tracing Tape failed due to excessive heat.
- 4.
Immediate Corrective Action:
The immediate corrective action was to replace the defective Heat Tracing Tape,.and verify the operability of the affected Heat Tracing Circuit.
- 5.
Subsequent Corrective Action:
A Design Change has been initiated to change the Heat Tracing Circuit 24D to prevent over heating.
- 6.
Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
No additional actions we~e deemed necessary.
- 7.
Generic Implications:
A task force has been established to study the total spectrum of the heat tracing system in an attempt to discern present problems and recommend solutions which will eliminate sporadic failures experienced.