ML18054A877

Proposed Tech Specs Re Fire Protection,Including Control Rod & Power Distribution Limits,Power Distribution Instrumentation,Instrumentation & Control Sys,Iodine Removal Sys & Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)

ML18054A877
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/31/1989
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18054A875	List: ML18054A874 ML18054A876 ML18054A877
References
NUDOCS 8908030250
Download: ML18054A877 (172)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY (Palisades Plant)

DOCKET NO 50-255 PROVISIONAL OPERATING tICENSE License No DPR-20 Provisional Operating License No DPR-20, issued to the licensee for operation of the facility, on September 1, 1972, is hereby amended its entirety to read as follows:

1. Provisional Operating License No DPR-20 applies to the Palisades Plant, a pressurized, light water moderated and cooled reactor, and electric generating equipment (the facility). The facility is located in Covert Township on the Consumers Power site in Van Buren County, Michigan, and is described in the "Final Safety Analysis

-Report," as supplemented and amended.

2. Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Commission hereby licenses Consumers Power Company (the licensee):

A. Pursuant to Section 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to possess, use, and operate the facility as a utilization facility at the designated location; B. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordanc~ with the limitations for storage and amounts required for operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; C. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70 to receive, possess, and use at any time byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and

• radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; D. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required by any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; Proposed TSP0789-0001-NL04

.::90:30:30250 :::907:31 ----------..,

PDR ADOCK 05000255 p PDC

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• E. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

3. Thi~ license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations:

10 CFR Part 20, Section 30.34 of 10 CFR Part 30, Section 40.41 of 10 CFR Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 and*

Section 70.32 of 10 C.FR Part 70; and is subject to all applical:1le provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A. Maximum Power Levels The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady-state reactor core power leveis not in excess of 2530 megawatts thermal (100% of the rated power level of the facility).

B.

• Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. , are hereby incorporated I in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

C. Reports The licensee shall make certain reports in accordance with the requirements' of the Technical Specifications and the Interim Special Technical Specifications.

D. Records The licensee shall keep facility operating records in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

E. The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions I of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final I Safety Analysis report for the facility and as approved in the SER's I dated 09/01/78, 03/19/80, 02/10/81, 05/26/83, 07/12/85, I 01/29/86, 12/03/87 and 05/19/89 and subject to the following I provisions: I Proposed TSP0789-0001-NL04

.J '

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1. The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection I program without prior approval of the Commission only if those I changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and I maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. I

2. *The licensee may alter specific features of the approved fire I protection program provided. I A. Such changes do not otherwise involve a change in a license I condition or technical specification or result in an I unreviewed safety question (see 10 CFR 50.59) and I B. Such changes do not result in failure to complete the fire I protection program as approved by the Commission. The I licensee shall maintain in auditable form, a current record I of all such changes, including an anaiysis of the effects I of the change on the fire protection program and shall make I such records available to Nuclear Regulatory Commission I Inspectors upon request. All changes to the approved I program shall be reported annually, along with the FSAR I revision.

• I C. Temporary changes to specific fire protection features I which may be necessary to accomplish maintenance or I modifications are acceptable provided interim compensatory I measures are implemented. I F. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of.

of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "Palisades Plant Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through December 14, .1987, "Palisades Plant Suitability Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through April 22, 1987; and "Palisades Plant Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through May 2, 1985. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.

Proposed TSP0789-0001-NL04

4

4. This amended license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire on March 1, 1974, unless extended for a good cause shown, or upon the earlier issuance of a superseding operating license.

FOR THE ATOMIC REGULATORY COMMISSION A Giambusso (Signed)

A Giambusso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing

Attachment:

Appendix A - Technical Specifications Appendix B - Environmental Protection Plan Date of Issuance: October 16, 1972 NOTE: The following references have been added by Consumers Power Company for clarification only:

Amendment No. dated I FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Proposed TSP0789-0001-NL04

ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255

. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE CHANGES FIRE PROTECTION July 31, 1989 9 Pages OC0789-0001-NL02

PALISADES PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX A

• SECTION -

3.0 3.10 DESCRIPTION LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (Continued)

CONTROL ROD AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS PAGE NO 3-58 3.10.l Shutdown Margin Requirements 3-58 3.10.2 (Deleted) 3-58 3.10.3 Part-Length Control Rods 3-58 3.lQ.4 Misaligned or Inoperable Control Rod or Part-Length Rod 3-60 3 .10 .5 Regulating Group Insertion Limits 3-60 3.10.6 Shutdown Rod Limits 3-61 3.10.7 Low Power Physics Testing 3-61 3.10.8 Center Control Rod Misalignment 3-61 Figure 3-6 Control Rod Insertion Limits 3-62 3.11 POWER DISTRIBUTION INSTRUMENTATION 3-65 3.11.1 Incore Detectors 3-65 3.11.2 Excore Power Distribution Monitoring System 3-66a Figure 3.11-1 Axial Variation Bounding Condition 3-66d 3.12 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT OF REACTIVITY 3-67 3.13 CONTAINMENT BUILDING AND FUEL STORAGE BUILDING CRANES 3-69 3.14 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION 3-70 3.15 REACTOR PRIMARY SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM 3-70a 3.16 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM INITIATION INSTRUMENTATION SETTINGS 3-71 Table 3.16.1 Engineered Safety Features System Initiation Instrument Setting Limits 3-75 3.17 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 3-76 Table 3.17.1 Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Reactor Protective System 3-78 Table 3.17.2 Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Engineered Safety Feature Systems 3-79 Table 3.17.3 Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions 3-80 Table 3.17.4 Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Other Safety Feature Functions 3-81 3.18 (Deleted) 3-82 3.19 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM 3-84 3.20 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) 3-88 3.21 MOVEMENT OF SHIELDED SHIPPING CASK IN FUEL HANDLING AREAS 3-92 3.22 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (Deleted) 3-96 I 11 Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

PALISADES PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX A SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (Continued) 3.23 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3-103 3.23.1 Linear Heat Rate (LHR) 3-103 Table 3.23.1 Linear Heat Rate Limits 3-107 Table 3.23.2 Radial Peaking Factor Limits, F 3-107 Fig. 3.23-1 Allowable LHR as a Function of Peak Power Location 3-108 Fig. 3.23-2 Allowable LHR as a Function of Burnup 3-109 Fig. 3.23-3 Allowable LHR as a Function of Peak Power Locat~on for Interior and Narrow Water Gap Fuel Rods 3-110 3.23.2 Radial Peaking Factors 3-111 3.23.3 Quadrant Power Tilt - Tq 3-112 3.24 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASES 3-114 3.24.1 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3-114 Table 3.24-1 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3-115 Bases for 3.24.1 3-128 3.24.2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3-117 Table 3.24-2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3-118 Bases for 3.24.2 3-128 3.24.3 Liquid Effluents Concentration 3-120 Bases for 3.24.3 3-129 3.24.4 Liquid Effluent Dose 3-121 Bases for 3.24.4 3-129 3.24.5 Gaseous Effluents Dose 3-122 Bas*s for 3.24.5 3-130 3.24.5.1 Dose Rate 3-122 Bases for 3.24.5.1 3-130 3.24.5.2 Noble Gases 3-123 Bases for 3.24.5.2 3-131 3.24.5.3 Dose - Iodine-131, Iodine-133, Tritium and Radionuclides in Particulate Form 3-124 Bases for 3.24.5.3 3-131 3.24.6 Gaseous Waste Treatment System 3-125 Bases for 3.24.6 3-132 3.24.7 Solid Radioactive Waste 3-126 Bases for 3.24.7 3-132 3.24.8 Total Dose 3-127 Bases for 3.24.8 3-133 iii

. Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

PALISADES PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS - APPENDIX A SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

Table 4.11-3 Detection Capabilities for Environmental Sample Analysis 4-57 4.11.1 Bases for Monitoring Program 4-59a 4.11.3 Bases for Land Use Census 4-59a 4.11.~ Bases for Interlaboratory Comparison Program 4-59a 4.12 AUGMENTED INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR HIGH ENERGY LINES OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT 4-60 Fig. 4.12 A Augmented Inservice Inspection Program - Main Steam Welds 4-63 Fig. 4.12 B Augmented Inservice Inspection Program - Feedwater Line Welds /

4-64 4.13 REACTOR INTERNALS VIBRATION MONITORING (DELETED) 4-65 4.14 AUGMENTED INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR STEAM GENERATORS 4-68 Table 4.14.1 Operating Allowances 4"."'68d Table 4.14.2 Maximum Allowable Degradation 4-69 4.15 PRIMARY SYSTEM FLOW MEASUREMENT 4-70 4.16 INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) 4-71 4.17 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (Deleted) 4-75 I 4.18 POWER DISTRIBUTION INSTRUMENTATION 4-81 4.18.1 Incore Detectors 4-81 4.18.2 Excore Monitoring System 4-82 4.19 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 4-83 4.19.1 Linear Heat Rate 4-83 4.19.2 Radial Peaking Factors 4-84 4.20 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) 4-85 4.21 (Intentionally Left Blank) 4-86 4.22 (Intentionally Left Blank) 4-87 4.23 (Intentionally Left Blank) 4-88 (Intentionally Left Blank) 4-89 4.24 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASES 4-90

4. 24 .1 Radiological Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation

• 4-90 4.24.2 Radiological Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 4-90 4.24.3 Liquid Effluent Concentration 4-90 4.24.4 Liquid Effluent Dose 4-90 4.24.5 Gaseous Effluent Dose 4-90 v

Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

• 3.22 Fire Protection System (Deleted) I Next Page is 3-103 I

• TSP0789-0002-NL04 3-96 Proposed

Table 4.2.2

• Minimum Frequencies for Equipment Tests FSAR Section Test Frequenc:l'.: Reference

1. Control Rods Drop Times of All Full- Each Re- 7.4.1.3 Length Rods fueling Shutdown

2. Control Rods Partial Movement of All Every Two 7.4.1.3 Rods (Minimum of 6 In) Weeks

3. Pressurizer Safety Set Point One Each 7.3.7 Valves Refueling Shutdown

4. Main Steam Safety Set Point Five Each 4.3.4 Valves Refueling Shutdown

5. Refueling System Functioning Prior to 9.11.3 Interlocks Refueling Operations

6. Service Water System Functioning Each Re- 9.1.2 Valve Actuation fueling (SIS-CHP) Operation

7. Primary System Evaluate Daily 4 I Leakage Amend 15, Ques 4.3.7

8. Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel Inventory Daily 8.4.1 I

9. Critical Headers 150 Psig Hydro- Every 9 .1. 2 I Service Water System static Test Five Years 4-15 Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

4.17 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (Deleted) I Next Page is 4-81

• TSP0789-0002-NL04 4-75 Proposed

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY 6.1.1 The Plant General Manager shall be responsible for overall plant operation and shall delegate in writing the succession for this responsibility during his absence.

6 .1.2 The Shift Supervisor or in his absence from the control room, the second licensed senior operator on duty shall be responsible for the shift command function. A directive to this effect shall be issued annually by the Vice President - Nuclear Operations.

6.2 ORGANIZATION 6.2.1 OFFSITE The offsite organization for plant management and technical support shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-1.

6.2.2 PLANT STAFF The plant organization shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-2 and:

a. Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.

b. At least one licensed senior operator shall be in the control room at all times during conditions other than cold shutdown or refueling. In addition to this senior operator, at least one licensed operator or senior operator shall be present at the controls at all times when fuel is in the reactor.

c. A radiation safety technician shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor.*

d. All core alterations, after the initial fuel loading, shall either be performed under the direct supervision of a licensed Senior Operator or Senior Operator holding a license limited to fuel handling. During this time no other responsibilities shall be assigned to .this individual.

e. (Deleted) I

• The radiation safety technician may be absent for a period of time not I to exceed two hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence provided I immediate action is taken to restore the minimum requirements. I 6-1 Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.4 TRAINING 6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the plant staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Executive Director of Energy Supply Planning, Training and Administration, and shall meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.5 of ANSI NlB.1-1971 and Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 55.

6.4.2 (Deleted) I 6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT 6.5.1 PLANT REVIEW COMMITTEE (PRC) 6.5.1.1 FUNCTION The Plant Review Committee (PRC) shall function to advise the Plant General Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

6.5.1. 2 COMPOSITION The PRC shall be composed of:

Chairman: Plant General Manager Member: Operations Manager*

Member: Engineering and Maintenance Manager*

Member: Radiological Services Manager*

Member: Plant Safety and Licensing Director*

Member: Reactor Engineering Superintendent Member: Operations Superintendent Member: Instrumentation and Control Superintendent Member: Shift Supervisor or Shift Engineer(s)(l)

• may serve as Designated Alternate for the Chairman 6.5.1.3 ALTERNATES Alternate members of the PRC shall be appointed in writing by the PRC Chairman to serve on a temporary basis. No more than two alternates shall participate as voting members at any one time in PRC activities. Members identified with a asterisk (*) above may function as the Designated Alternate for the Chairman, and in so doing, are not considered alternate members for voting purposes.

6-5 Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.5.2.4.1 REVIEW (Continued)

c. Proposed tesrs or experiments which involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

d. Proposed changes to Technical Specifications or the Operating License.

e. Violations of codes, regulations, orders, Technical Specifications, license requirements, or of internal procedures or instructions having nuclear safety significance.

f. Significant operating abnormalities or deviations from normal and expected performance of unit equipment that affects nuclear safety.

g. All reportable events having nuclear safety significance.

h. All recognized indications of an unanticipated deficiency in some aspect of design or operation of structures, systems, or components that could affect nuclear safety.

i. Reports and meeting minutes of the Plant Review Committee.

j. Fire Protection Program and Implementing Procedure Changes. I 6.5.2.4.2 AUDITS Audits of operafional nuclear safety-related facility activities shall be performed under the cognizance of NSSD.

These audits shall encompa_ss:

a. The conformance of plant operation to provisions contained within the Technical Specifications and applicable license conditions at least once per 12 months.

b. The performance, training and qualifications of the entire facility staff at least once per 12 months.

c. The performance of activities required by the Quality Assurance Program Description for Operational Nuclear Power Plants (CPC-2A) to meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B at least once per 24 months.

d. The Site Emergency Plan and implementing procedures at least once per 12 months.

e. The Site Security Plan and implementing procedures (as required by the Site Security Plan) at least once per 12 months.

6-7 Proposed TSP0789-0002-NL04

ATTACHMENT 3 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 PROPOSED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UPDATE FIRE PROTECTION July 31, 1989

• OC0789-0001-NL02 23 Pages

1.4.8 RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND RADIATION PROTECTION The radioactive waste treatment system was designed so that discharge of radioac~ivity to the environment is in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 20, and Appendix I to 10 CFR SO.

The Plant was provided with a centralized control room having adequate shielding to permit occupancy during all credible accident situations. The radiation shielding in the Plant, in combination with Plant radiation con-trol procedures, ensures that operating personnel do not receive radiation exposures in excess of the applicable limits of 10 CFR, Part 20, during normal operation and maintenance.

1.4.9 FUEL HANDLING AND STORAGE Fuel handling and storage facilities were provided for the safe handling, storage and shipment of fuel and will preclude accidental criticality.

1.4.10 FIRE PROTECTION A "Fire Protection Program" (FPP) consisting of Plant design considera-tions, fire detection and suppression equipme~t, and Plant procedures assures that the Plant can safely shutdown after a major fire. The FPP complies with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

1.4.11 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM In order to minimize the environmental impact associated with "hot water" discharges, the c~rculating water provides condenAer cooling water supplied from two mechanical draft evaporative cooling towers. Approximat=-Y 3% of the total flow is discharged as blowdown to be combined with a further tem-perature dilution flow before discharge to Lake Michigan. The discharges are within the Plant's NPDES Permit limitations.

1.4.12 SECURITY Access and egress to all "protected" areas of the Plant are monitored/con-trolled through the utilization of card readers. Access to the Plant is controlled at the security entrance via metal detectors, guards and card readers. A physical security force is always present. Details of confor-mance are* identified in the commission-approved physical security, safe-guards contingency, and guard training and qualification plans.

1.4.13 EMERGENCY PLANNING In the unlikely event of a Plant accident resulting in, or potentially ca-pable of allowing, offsite releases of radioactivity in excess of federal regulations, a system of emergency warning sirens is in place. Established "emergency implementing_procedures" in conjunction with the Plant's "Emer-gency Plans" have been developed to assure minimum risk to the general pub-lic in compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

FS0789-0360B-TM13-TMll 1.4-4 Rev 9

of these forces and the design bas-es derived therefrom is contained in Chapters 2 and S. In addition, design bases for the various structures, systems and components for natural phenomena are listed in individual chapters.

References:

Chapters 2, 3, 4, S, 6, 7, 8, 9 and SEP Topics II-2A, II-38, II-3Ci II-40, II-4F, III-2, III-3A, III-4A and III-6 S.l.2.3 Criterion 3 - Fire Protection This criterion is met by designing the Plant so that buildings containing critical portions of the Plant such as the containment building, control room and auxiliary building are constructed of noncombustible, flame re-tardant and heat resistant materials. Plant areas critical for a safe shutdown have been divided into fire areas such that a fire in any given area will not propagate to other areas and will not impair the Plant's ability to safely shut down.

Through a series of modifications including installation of fire stops, cable separation, addition of sprinklers, addition of designated fire bri-gade,. procedur~ changes and others, the Palisades Plant has established conformance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R.

Noncombustible and fire resistant or retardant materials are used through-out the balance of the Plant with minimal exceptions such as conventional applications of turbine generator lube and seal oil, generator hydrogen and outdoor transformer oil. Electric cable insulation has be~n considered as combustible material and appropriate measures have been taken to provide safe reactor shutdown in the event fires ir.volve electrical raceways.

Equipment and facilities for fire protection, including detection alarm and suppression, are provided in selected areas throughout the Plant.

Deluge and sprinkler systems are provided in areas containing potentially combustible materials, and where required to meet cable separation criteria.

Hose lines and portable extinguishers are located throughout the Plant.

Fire-fighting systems are designed with shutoff valves for isolation in case of rupture or inadvertent operation. The rooms are supplied with drain systems to prevent flooding, and the cabinet top openings are sealed to prevent water ingress during sprinkler system operation.

The Fire Protection System is designed in accordance with the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association.

References:

Chapters 7, 8, 9 and SEP Topic IX-6 S.1.2.4 Criterion 4 - Environmental and Missile Design Bases Structures, systems and components important to safety have been designed to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal

• operation, maintenance and testing. If they must remain functional to FS0789-03691-TM13-TM11 S.l-2 Rev 9

• 7.4 OTHER SAFETY-RELATED PROTECTION, CONTROL AND DISPLAY SYSTEMS While the Reactor Protective System protects against reactor core damage and the engineered safeguards controls protect against a loss of coolant incident, other safety-related (Class lE service) cont.rol and instrumenta-tion systems ensure a safe shutdown of the Plant, protection of primary coolant fluid boundaries, mitigation of anticipated events such as loss of feedwater and uncontrolled release of radioactive effluents. In addition, Plant *parameters critical to safety are monitored with Class -lE instruments to ensure the operator can act in a timely fashion during abnormal conditions.

7.4.1 REACTOR SHUTDOWN CONTROLS (DELETED) 7.4.2 PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARIES PROTECTION Leak detection from the Primary Coolant System is described in Chapter 4 and is considered as nonsafety related. The primary coolant safety valves are the protective devices with coolant at normal pressure. The following identifies and describes the safety-related control and instrumentation provided to protect primary coolant fluid system boundaries during off-normal anticipated condition.

7.4.2.1 Primary Coolant Overpressure Protection System

1. Design Bases Without a low temperature overpressure protection system, pressure transients in the Primary Coolant System initiated while operating at low temperatures are not protected against and there are no pressure relief devices to prevent these t*ransients from exceeding the Tech-nical Specifications limits as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G pressure-temperature limits. The reactor has a pressure limit in excess of 2,500 psia at 570°F, but has only a 700 psia limit at 200°F.

The code safety valves with settings in the 2,400 psia range would not be able to relieve a pressure transient at low Primary Coolant System temperature without the limits of the Technical Specifications being violated.

The Technical Specifications pressure limit drops off rapidly at lower temperatures because the reactor vessel material and welds have significantly less toughness at lower temperatures and are therefore more susceptible to flaw-induced failure. In addition, factors such as copper content in welds and neutron fluence levels affect the material toughness and contribute to the reduction in safety margin to vessel failure at low temperature conditions.

The Primary Coolant System overpressurization subsystem (OPS) has been designed to provide automatic pressure relief of the Primary Coolant

• System whenever the conditions of low temperature (250°F or lower) and high pressure (400 psia or ~igher) exist concurrently.

FS0789-0565E-TM13-TM11 7. 4-1 Rev 9

TABLE 7-2 Sheet 1 of 3 (REMOVED)

• Rev 9

APPENDIX 7B (Deleted)

• FS0789~0566H-TM13-TM11 Rev 9

• 9.6 9.6.l FIRE PROTECTION INTRODUCTION Following a fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Sta~ion in March 197S, the Nuclear*Regulatory Commission initiated an evaluation of the need for improving the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power plants. As part of this continuing evaluation, the NRC, in February 1976, published a report by a special review group entitled, "Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," NUREG-OOSO. This report recommended that improvements in the areas of fire prevention and fire control be made in most existing facilities and that consideration be given to design features that would increase the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand fires without the loss of important functions. To implement the report's recom-mendations, the NRC.initiated a program for reevaluation of 'the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power stations and for a comprehensive review of all new license applications.

The NRC issued guidelines for fire protection programs which reflect the recommendations of NUREG-OOSO in six documents released between 1976 and 1978.* The NRC issued 10 CFR SO, Appendix R guidelines in November 1980 for operating plants, reinforcing the requirements of 10 CFR SO, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 3. These series of guidelines and responding submittals are identified in Table 9-11.

As a result of these fire protection.program evaluations, CP Co has:

1. Made major Plant modifications

2. Written new procedures and administrative controls

3. Changed operating practices

4. Amended the Technical Specifications via Amendments 37, 42, 60 and 64 to the Operating License DRR-20 S. In accordance with NRC recommendations in Generic Letter 86-10, removed the fire protection Limiting Conditions for Operation and the fire protection surveillance requirements from the Technical Specifications and ipcluded them in this FSAR (Section 9.6.7)

6. Added a condition to the Palisades Operating License which requires implementation and maintenance of the Fire Protecti'on Program, as described in this FSAR.

Section 9.6 has been rewritten to be a part of the Palisades Fire Protec-tion Program.

Fire protection consists of fire suppression systems, equipment and proce-

• dures to provide protection to Plant equipment, structures and personnel from fire, explosions and the release of toxic vapors. Fire protection also provides a means of maintaining the integrity of safety-related

'FS0789-0S69G-TM13 9.6-1 Rev 9

• systems. Fire suppression systems consist of automatic sprinkler systems, automatic deluge systems, standpipe and hose systems and fire extinguishers located around the Plant site. Fire protection procedures consist of implementing procedures established to maintain, te_st, train and operate any of the safety-related systems and the fire suppression systems.

9.6.1.1 Other FSAR Sections Related To Fire Protection For a discussion of Palisades compliance with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.48 as it relates to reactor shutdown capability independent of damage caused by fire in a critical area ref er to the Fire Protection Program Report.

For a discussion on how the raceway and cabling system at Palisades meets NRC 8TP CMEB 9.5-1, Regulatory Guide 1.75 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, refer to FSAR Section 8.5.3.

For a discussion of Fire Protection Training refer to FSAR Sec-tion 12.2.1.12.

9.6Ll.2 Fire Protection Program Report The Fire Protection Program Report (FPPR) contains or references the analyses and procedures which are the basis for the Fire Protection Program as described in the Fire Protection Plan. The FPPR contains:

A. Fire Protection Plan The Palisades Plant Fire Protection Plan satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. The overall Fire Protection Program, identi-fies the various positions within the Palisades' organization that are responsible for the program; states the authorities that are delegated to each of these positions to implement those responsibilities; and outlines the plans for fire protection, fire detection and suppression capability and limitation of fire damage. The plan also describes specific features necessary to implement the program described above, such as administrative controls and personnel requirements for fire prevention and manual fire suppression activities; automatic and manually-operated fire detection and suppression systems, and the means to limit fire damage to structures, systems or components important to safety so that the capability to safely shut down the Plant is ensured.

B. The Fire Hazards Analysis Report The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) was performed by qualified fire protec-tion and reactor system engineers to:

1. Consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards;

2. Determine the consequences of fire in any location in the Plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environ-ment; and FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-2 Rev 9

• 3. Specify measure~ for fir~ prevention, fire detection, fire suppres~

sion, and fire containment and alternative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures, systems and components important to safety in accordance with NRC guidelines and regulations.

c. The Safe Shutdown Analysis The Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) describes shutdown methods which will not be affected by a worst case fire, and can in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements and postulated conditions be used to attain and maintain safe shutdown if a worst case fire occurs. A worst case fire assumes that all equipment located in an Appendix R defined fire area is destroyed and the worst credible combination of hot shorts, open circuits and fire-caused equipment failures takes place.

Applicable sections of SSA are referenced in the FHA for each fire area analysis.

D. The fire protection safe shutdown systems related analyses.

E. The fire protection material conditions, fire probability, fire damage and fire effect analyses.

F. The NRC-approved exemptions to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

G. A listing of Palisades procedures which implement the requirements of the Fire Protection Program.

H. The Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports for Palisades.

9.6.2 DESIGN BASIS Fire protection at the Palisades Plant uses a defense-in-depth concept of design, to provide a high degree of safety. The Plant is designed to prevent fires, detect and suppress quickly any fires that do occur, limit the damage and prevent safety-related functions and systems from being interrupted.

• Fire protection is designed in accordance with the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association, the American Insurance Association, NEPIA (now American Nuclear Insurers) and the applicable codes and regula-tions of the State of Michigan.

The fire system may also provide a backup water supply to the following:

1. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction

2. Critical Service Water Supply FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-3 Rev 9

3. Spent Fuel Pool Fill The diesel engine-driven fire pumps and the piping connecting the fire system to the Auxiliary Feedwater System are designed to GP Co Design Class 2 requirements (see Subsection 5.2.1.2). The remainder of the system is designed to GP Co Design Class 3 requirements. Appropriate valving is provided to separate the system, if required.

Administrative procedures (Fire Protection Implementing Procedure 7) have been developed and are used to monitor and control hazardous materials when required for use in safety-related areas and throughout the Plant. This ensures a minimum impact on Plant personnel and safety-related systems.

9.6.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 9.6.3.1 System Description The building structure has been designed and arranged to prevent the spread of fire and to ensure integrity of safety-related systems and areas. A complete description of fire areas, separations, and means of fire pro-tection is detailed in the Fire Protection Program Report (FPPR).

The fire system is shown on Figures 9-12, 13 and 14. Fire suppression is provided by fixed water spray systems, such as sprinkler systems and deluge systems, fire hose reels and cabinets, portable fire extinguishers, fire barriers and fire detection systems. These fire suppression provisions are found throughout the Plant site.

Fire hoses from fire hydrants and a standpipe system will provide pro-tection in accordance with NFPA 14, 20 and 24.

The fire hydrant piping system is designed, installed and tested in accord-ance with NFPA 24-1965, Outside Protection. The pumping supply system and fire pumps are designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 20-1959, Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.

The standpipe system is designed, installed and tested as a Class II system.

in accordance with NFPA 14-1963, Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems.

Fixed water spray systems, such as wet pipe fusible link sprinkler systems, dry pipe fusible link sprinkler systems, and fixed fog deluge spray systems are designed, installed and tested in accordance with NFPA 13-1968, Instal-lation of Sprinkler Systems, and NFPA 15-1966, Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection. Indication of individual systems in various areas is indicated on an annunciator panel in the main control room.

Fixed fog deluge systems protect the main, start-up, station auxiliary, and the spare station transformers. Each of these deluge systems are automat-ically actuated and annunciated by a general alarm in the main control FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-4 Rev 9

9.6.4 TESTS AND INSPECTION The Fire Protection System is provided with connections with test hose valves on the supply header for periodic testing. All equipment is acces-sible for periodic inspection.

Procedures are in effect to maintain and test in accordance with the requirements of Section 9.7 and established standards.

9.6.5 SAFETY EVALUATION 9.6.5.1 Fire Protection Program Report (FPPR)

Section VII of the Fire Protection Program Report, titled "Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report", contains a listing of the documents that com-prise the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for Palisades.

9.6.6 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING There is a five-man fire brigade onsite at all times. Procedures are in effect that provide fire brigade training and.actions required for the Emergency Response Plan. The Fire Protection Implementing Procedures cover the following topics:

Organization and Responsibility Fire Emergency Responsibility and Response Plant Fire erigade Fire Protection Equipment Inspection Maintenance and Testing Fire Suppression Training Fire Prevention Activities 9.6.7 GENERIC LETTER 88-12 Generic Letter 88-12 provides guidance for the preparation of a license amendment request to implement Generic Letter 86-10. Such an amendment (1) institutes the standard license condition for a Fire Protection Pro-gram, (2) removes requirements for fire protection systems from Technical Specification (TS), (3) removes fire brigade staffing requirements for TS and (4) adds administrative controls to TS that are consistent with those for other programs implemented by license condition.

This section of the FSAR contains the former Technical Specifications associated with fire detection systems, fire suppression systems, fire barriers and the administrative controls that address fir~ brigade staffing.

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-7 Rev 9

The Palisades Operating *License contains the following license conditions:

The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis report for the facility and as approved in the SERs dated 09/01/78, 03/19/80, 02/10/81, 05/26/83, 07/12/85, 01/29/86, 12/03/87 and 05/19/89 and subject to the following provisions:

A. The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

B. The licensee may alter specific features of the approved fire protec-tion program provided.

1. Such changes do not otherwise involve a change in a license condi-tion or technical specification or result in an unreviewed safety question (see 10 CFR 50.59) and 2~ Such changes do not result in failure to complete the fire protec-tion program as approved by the Conunission. The licensee shall maintain in auditable form, a current record of all such changes, including an analysis of the effects of the change on the fire protection program and shall make such records available to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspectors upon request. All changes to the approved program shall be reported annually, along 'with the FSAR revision.

3. Temporary changes to specific fire protection features which may be necessary to accomplish maintenance or modifications are acceptable provided interim compensatory measures are implemented.

Thus, changes can be made to the LCOs and SRs in Section 9.6.7 only if those changes do not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire, and if those changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

9.6.7.1 Requirements for Operation 9.6.7.1.l Fire Detection Instrumentation The fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 9.11 shall be OPERABLE.

Applicability - At all times when equipment in the fire detection zone is required, shall be OPERABLE.

Action - With the number of instruments OPERABLE, less than that required by Table 9.11.

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-8 Rev 9

A. Except the detectors* located inside containment, within one hour; establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone with the operable instrument(s) at least once per hour.

B. Restore the inoperable instrument(s) to an OPERABLE status within 14 days, or

c. In lieu of any other report required by Technical Specification 6.9.2, prepare and submit a special report to the Commission within.30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans to restore the instrument(s) to OPERABLE status, and D. When this Limiting Condition for Operation and/or associated action requirements cannot be satisfied, provisions relating to operating restrictions on the Plant are not applicable.

E. For detectors located inside containment, restore the inoperable detector(s} to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or within the next hour, and at least once per hour thereafter, view with the TV camera the zone containing the inoperable detector or view the zone located above the detector.

If a fire in containment is confirmed, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Basis - OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.

This capability is required to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility Fire Protection Program.

When a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the frequent fire patrols shall be established in the affected areas to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is returned to service.

(Formerly Technical Specification 3.22.1.}

9.6.7.1.2 Fire Suppression Water System The fire suppression water system required for fire sprinkler system and fire hose stations, as defined in Sections 9.7.1.3 and 9.7.1.4 of the FSAR, shall be OPERABLE with:

A. Two pumps, one of which is the south diesel pump, each with a capacity of at least 1,500 gpm with their discharge aligned to the fire suppres-sion header.

B. An automatic initiation logic for each fire pump.

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-9 Rev 9

Applicability - At all times.

Action A. With the diesel fire pump located south of the fire barrier (Room 136) or with two fire pumps inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within 7 days, or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.2, prepare and submit a special report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system.

B. With the fire suppression water supply system inoperable:

1. Establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and

2. Submit a special report:

a. By telephone with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />;

b. Confirmed by telegraph, mailgram of facsimile transmission ho later than the first working day following the even.t, and

c. In writing, within 14 days foliowing the event, outlining the action taken; the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule to restore the system to an operable status, or

3. If 1. and 2.a. above cannot be fulfilled, place the reactor in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30.hours.

Basis The operability of the fire suppression systems ensure that ade-quate fire suppression capab~lity is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equip-ment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, sprinklers and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression system is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility Fire Protection Program.

When portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.

When the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken as this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the Plant. The requirement for a 24-hour report to the Conunission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear Plant.

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-10 Rev 9

When that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is operable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

Those hose stations that are supplied by the service water system in conta.inment will be used primarily during normal refueling operations.

(Formerly Technical Specification 3.22.2.)

9.6.7.1.3 Fire Sprinkler System The sprinkler systems located in the following areas shall be OPERABLE:

A. CABLE SPREADING ROOM/SWITCHGEAR ROOM lC B. SWITCHGEAR ROOM lD C. DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-1 D. DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-2 E. SOUTHWEST CABLE PENETRATING ROOM F. CABLE WAY ROOM 328 G. INTAKE STRUCTURE ROOM 136 AND 136A H. NORTH CABLE PENETRATION ROOM I. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM J. CHARGING PUMP ROOMS 104, 104A and 104B Applicability - Whenever equipment in the sprinkler protected area is required to be operable.

Action A. With one or more of the above required sprinkler systems inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equip-ment in the unprotected area(s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Restore the system(s) to operable status within 14 days, or in lieu of any other report required by Technical Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a special report to the Commission with the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule to restore the system to operable status.

B. When this Limiting Condition for Operation and/or associated action requirements cannot be satisfied, any provisions relating to the operating restrictions on the Plant are not applicable.

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-11 Rev 9

Basis - Refer to Basis s*ection 9."6.7.1.2 (Formerly Technical Specification 3.22.3.)

9.6.7.1.4 Fire Hose Stations The fire hose stations in the following locations shall be OPERABLE:

A. CORRIDOR, ROOM 239 B. VIEWING GALLERY, ROOM 320 C. CORRIDOR, ROOM 106 D. CORRIDOR, ROOM 125 E. FIRE HOSE STATION #3 F. TURBINE BUILDING 590' COL Y-5 G. TURBINE BUILDING 590' COL Y-18 H. SPENT FUEL POOL, ROOM 220 I. TURBINE BUILDING 609' COL H-9.

J. NORTH STAIRWAY IN CONTAINMENT 612' LEVEL K. SOUTH STAIRWAY IN CONTAINMENT 612' LEVEL L. OUTSIDE FIRE HOSE STATION #5 Applicability - Whenever equipment in the area protected by the hose station is required to be operable.

Action A. With the hose station inoperable, provide an additional hose for the unprotected area at an OPERABLE hose station within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, except J.

and K~ listed above.

B. With the hose station inside containment (J. and K. above) inoperable:

1. When containment integrity is required, provide portable fire fighting equipment (eg, water fire extinguishers) at the entrance to containment within one hour.

2. When containment integrity is not required, provide portable fire fighting equipment (eg, water fire extinguishers) at the hose station within one hour.

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-12 Rev 9

c. When this Limiting Condition *for Operation and/or associated actions requirement cannot be satisfied, provisions relating to operating restrictions on the Plant are not applicable.

Basis - Refer to Basis Section 9.6.7.1.2.

(Formerly Technical Specification 3.22.4.)

9.6.7.1.5 Fire Rated and Fire Protection Assemblies All fire rated assemblies (walls, floors, ceilings, cable tray enclosures, cable wraps), fire protection assemblies (radiant heat shields) and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire dampers, cable, piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) which protect safety-related fire areas or separate portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area, shall be OPERABLE.

Applicability - At all times.

Action

1. With one or more of the above required fire rated assemblies or pene-tration sealing devices inoperable, a continuous fire watch shall be established on at least one side of the affected assembly within one hour, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire insp~ction.

2. With a fire protection assembly located outside containment rendered inoperable, within one hour establish an hourly fire inspection in that area.

3. With a fire protection assembly located inside containment rendered inoperable, restore the assembly to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next six (6) hours and in at least cold shutdown within the subsequent 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Basis - The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adja-cent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possi-bility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinghishment. The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility Fire Protection Program and are subject to periodic inspections.

(Formerly Technical Specification 3.22.5.)

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-13 Rev 9

• 9.6.7.2 9.6.7.2.l Testing Reguirements Fire Detection Instrumentation Fire detection instruments located inside containment and associated alarms identified in Table 9.11 shall be demonstrated operable at least once each refueling outage.

• Fire detection instruments located outside containment and associated alarms identified in Table 9.11 shall be demonstrated as operable'at least once semiannually.

(Formerly Technical Specification 4.17.1.)

9.6.7.2.2 Fire Suppression Water System The Fire suppression water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

A. At least monthly by starting each pump and operating it at least 15 minutes.

B. At least monthly by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position *

• c.

D.

At least annually by performance of a system flush of the fire water hydrants.

At least annually by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least ~ne complete cycle of full travel.

E. At least once each 18 months by performing a system functional test which includes simulated.automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence, and:

1. Verifying that each pump develops at least 1,500 gpm at 125 psig.

2. Verifying that each pump starts (sequentially) to maintain the fire suppression water system pressure +/-90 psig.

F. At least every 3 years by performing a flow test of the system in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11, of the Fire Protection Handbook, 14th edition, published by the National Fire Protection Association.

The (2) fire pump diesel engines and (2) starting 24-volt battery banks and charger shall be demonstrated operable:

A. At least every 7 days by verifying that:

1. The electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates, and

2. The overall battery voltage is +/-24 volts FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-14 Rev 9

B. At least every 3 mon~hs by ve~ifying that:

1. A sample of diesel fuel from the main storage tank (T-10) obtained in accordance with ASTM-0270-65, is within the acceptable limits with respect to viscosity, water content and sediment, as specified in Table 1 of ASTM-0975-74.

2. The specific gravity of the starting battery bank is appropriate for continued service of the battery.

c. At least every 18 months by verifying that:

1. The batteries, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indica-tion of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and

2. The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion and coated with anti-corrosive material.

D. At least every 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Subjecting the diesels to an inspection in accordance with pro~e dures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's recommenda-tions for the class of service.

The sprinkler systems defined in Section 9.6.7.1.3 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE to verify no blockage every 18 months by visual inspection of each accessible nozzle.

(Fc%merly Technical Specification 4.17.3.}

9.6.7.2.4 Fire Hose Stations Each fire hose station defined in Section 9.6.7.1.4 A. through I. shall be verified to be OPERABLE:

A. At least monthly by visual inspection of the station to assure all equipment is available; B. At least every 18 months by removing the hose for inspection and reracking and replacing all gaskets in the couplings, as required; C. At least every 3 years by:

1. Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve oper-ability and no flow blockage, and

2. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig greater than the maximum fire main operating pres-sure, which ever is greater.

Each fire hose station defined in Section 9.6.7.1.4, J. and K. shall be verified to be operable:

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-15 Rev 9

• A.

8.

At least monthly during norma1 refueling outage by visual inspection of the station to assure all e,quipment is available; At least each refueling outage by removing the hose for inspection and replacing all gaskets in the couplings, as required;

c. At least every 3 years by:

1. Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve oper-ability and no flow blockage, and

2. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure 150 psig or at least SO psig greater than the maximum fire main operating pres-sure, which ever is greater.

(Formerly Technical Specification 4.17.4.)

9.6.7.2.S Fire-Rated and Fire Protection Assemblies Fire-rated assemblies, fire protection assemblies and penetration sealing devices (except fire doors), shall be verified OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by performing an inspection of:

A. The exposed surfaces of each fire-rated assembly (visual).

B. The structural integrity of fire protection assemblies (visual).

C. All penetration sealing devices (visual).

D. Fire dampers and associated hardware (functional where practicable).

At least once per six months, all fire doors shall be verified OPERABLE by visually inspecting the structural integrity, automatic hold-open, release, closing mechanism and latches and by verifying:

• A. At le~st once per 31 days, the OPERABILITY of the fire door supervision system for each electrically supervised fire door.

B. At least once per seven days that each locked closed fire door is closed.

c. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, that doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms are free of obstructions.

D. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, that each unlocked fire door without electrical supervision is closed.

Basis - During periods when the barriers are not functional, a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier until the barrier is restored to a functional status *

(Formerly Technical Specification 4.17.S.)

FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-16 Rev 9

• 9.6.7.2.6 Emergency Lighting Each de light powered by station batteries outside of containment shall be verified OPERABLE at least once a year. These same type of lights inside of containment shall be verified OPERABLE prior to removal of the reactor head.

Each battery-powered Emergency Lighting Unit (ELU) shall be verified functional at least once per year. Demonstration of OPERABILITY shall be performed every 24 months to prove minimum lighting duration of eight hours.

9.6.7.3 Plant Staff A Fire Brigade of at least five members shall be maintained onsite at all times.* The Fire Brigade shall not include three members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown or any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency.

• The Fire Brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed two hour~ in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to restore the minimum requirements.

9.6.7.4 Training The Director of Property Protection is responsible for the development, revision, approval and implementation of the Fire Brigade training program.

This training shall, as practicable, meet or exceed the requirements of Section 27 of the NFPA Code-1975. Fire Brigade training drills shall be held at *least quarterly *

• FS0789-0569G-TM13 9.6-17 Rev 9

TABLE 9.11 (Sheet 1 of 3)° (FORMERLY TECHNICAi. ~PECIFICATION 3.22.1)

No of Minimum Instrument Location Detectors Type of DetecLors Instruments Operable

1. Cable Spreading Rm, Col H-28 1 Water Flow Sw 1

2. Switchgear Rm lD, Col G-28; Col G-22; Col G-22 3 Water Flow Sw 3

3. Diesel Generator Rm 1-1, Col J-28 1 Water Flow Sw 1

4. Diesel Generator Rm 1-2, Col M-28 1 Water Flow Sw 1

5. Turbine Bldg 590 I ' Col H-9 1 Water Flow Sw 1

6. Control Room and Room 325 7 Smoke 5

7. Control Room Adj Offices Rms 324 & 320 2 Smoke 1

8. Cable Spreading, Rm 224 area 8 Smoke 6

9. Refueling &*spent Fuel Area, Rm 220 4 Smoke 2

10. Switchgear Rm lD, Rm 223 4 Smoke 3

11. North Penetration, Rm 332 2 Smoke 1

12. Switchgear Rm lC, Rm 116A 2 Smoke 1

13. Southwesl Cable Penetration, Km 250 2 Smoke l FS0789-0570K-TM13-TM11 Rev 9

TABLE 9.11 (Sheet 2 of 3)

No of Minimum Instrument Location Detectors Type of Detectors Instruments Operable

14. Engineered Safeguards Panel Area 3 Smoke 2

15. Stairwell Outside Engineered Safe-guards Panel Area 1 Smoke 1

16. Component Cooling Pump, Rm 123 2 Smoke 1

17. Safeguard Area, Rm 4 3 Smoke 2

18. Safeguard Area, Rm 5 2 Smoke 1

19. Cor~idor 106 on 590 1 Elevation 6 Smoke 4

20. Charging Pump, Rm 104 2 Smoke 1

21. Containment, Interior North Pene-tration Area 3 Smoke 2

22. Containment, Interior SW Penetra-tion Area 3 Smoke 2

23. Containment Instrument Air Room 3* Smoke 2

24. Auxiliary Feed Pump Room, 570 1 Level of Turbine Building 1 Smoke 1

25. Battery Rm 225A 1 Smoke 1 FS0789-0570K-TM13-TM11 *. Rev 9

TABLE 9. 11 (Sheet 3 of 3)

No of Minimum Instrument Location Detectors Type of Detectors Instruments Operable

26. Battery Rm 225B 1 Smoke 1

27. HVAC Equipment Rooms & Chase West Mechanical Equipment Room 1 Smoke 1 East Mechanical Equipment Room 1 Smoke l Duct Chase 1 Smoke 1

28. Air Handling Units V-95 & V-96 Inlet Ducts 2 Smoke 2

29. Electrical Equipment Room 4 Smoke 3

30. Technical Support Center 2 Smoke l

31. Intake Structure, Rm 136 11 Ultraviolet 7 FS0789-0570K-TM13-TM11 Rev 9

ATTACHMENT 4 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT

• July 31, 1989 133 Pages OC0789-0001-NL02

• PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT

• FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT CFPPR)

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM I. INTRODUCTION II. FIRE PROTECTION PLAN 1.0 Scope 2 .O References 3.0 Organization 4.0 Implementation 5.0 Fire Protection Equipment

.6.0 Training 7.0 Fire Prevention Activities 8.0 Quality Assurance 9.0 Program Review 10.0 Documented Instruction 11.0 Conmitments and Modifications 12.0 Emergency Procedures 13 .o Records 14.0 Attachments III. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

IV. SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS V. REFERENCES VOLUME 2 LICENSING VI. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFRS0.48 AND APPENDIX R VII. FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT VOLUME 3 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS I VIII. FIRE EQUIPMENT & MATERIAL CONDITION ANALYSES VOLUME 4 ENGINEERING ANALYSES II IX. SYSTEMS ANALYSES FPPR-TC07

• PALfSADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION I INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 3, "Fire Protection," of Appendix A to 10'CFR50 requires that structures , systems, and components important to safety be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat resistant materials are required to be used whenever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and control room.

Criterion 3 also requires that fire detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effect of fires on structures, systems and components important to safety and that fire fighting systems be designed to ensure that their failure, rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, system, and components.

In March of 1975 a major fire damaging safe shutdown equipment occurred at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Station. Approximately 1~00 cables were damaged, some of which were for redundant safety equipment. Due to concerns resulting from this fire and other fires, Appendix R to 10CFR50 was issued in conjunction with 10CFR50.48 and made effective February 17, 1981. 10CRF50.48 l) requires licensees to have a fire protection plan, 2) specifies which sections of Appendix R licensees are required to comply with, and 3) provides the schedule for implementing Appendix R and closing SER open items existing prior to the effective date of Appendix R.

This document describes the fire protection program for the Palisades Plant.

It attempts to sumnarize and bring together in one location the various NRC commitments and analyses that make up the Fire Protection Program.

There are many documents associated with the Fire Protection Program at Palisades many of which are listed in the References section of this document.

This document was designed to be used by all plant departments to help assure that activities that are performed do .not degrade any of the existing fire protection provisions in the plant *

• FPPR-TC07

Copy Sumber Assigned co PALISADES PLANT Docket 50-2.55

• License DPR.-20 Fire Protection Plan

• MI1188-0001A-F015 Dat*

_PALISADES PLANT Fire Protection Plan 1.1 This document is Consumers Power Company's Fire Protection Plan for the Palisades Nuclear Plant.

1.2 The purpose of this Plan is to establish and define controls for fire protection activitie1 that affect safety-related and certain nonsafety-related structures, system* and components. This Plan applies to all personnel on site.

2. REFERENCES 2.1 BTP-APC 9.S-1, Appendix A - Guideline* for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants 2.2 10 CFI, Part 50, Appendix R - Guideline* for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plant*

2.3 NB.C Document - Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functioa.l Respon1i-bi li tie1, Administrative Control* and Quality A11urance 2.4 Palisades Plant Technical Specification*

2.5 Palisades Plant Administrative Procedure*

2.6 Palisade* Plant Operating Procedures 2.7 Palisade* Plant Fire Protection Plan Implementing Procedures 2.8 Corporate Fire Protection Standards 2.9 Corporate Nuclear Plant Fire Training Manual 2.10 Nuclear Mutual Limited (NML) Property Los1 Prevention Standards 2.11 NODS-A04, Preparation and Control of Procedures 2 .12. NODS-A20, a.cords Management 2.13 NODS-Pl2, Nuclear Operat in1 Pl anti Maintenance Program 2.14 A1set Protection Quality A11urance Procedures for Nuclear Fire Protection 2.15 Pali1ades FSAR 2.16 NFPA 27-197S-

• Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

2

3. ORGANIZATION 3.1 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

3. l. l The Vice President - Nuclear Operations is responsible for overall manage!D9nt of the Fire Protection Program.

3.1 2 The Plant General Manager is responsible for administration of the Plant operations and emergency plans which include the fire protection and prevention progr ..1. During routine working hours, the Plant General Manager or his de1ignee provides senior 111.tnagement direction, as appro-priate, or as requested by the Plant Operations Shift Supervisor.

3.1.2.1 Durins nonroutine working hours, the designated on-call Superintendent provides senior mana1ement direction, as appropriate, or as requested by the Plant Operatio~1 Shift Supervisor.

3.1.3 "nle Plant Property Protection Supervisor or de1ignee 1ball:

3.1.3.1 Direct and mana1* the development and impl*a-.

tation of Plant Fire Protection Imple11entin1 Procedures, a11ociated adaini1trative procedures and Technical Specifications.

3.1.3.2 Establish and maintain Plant compliance with corporate, federal, state, and local fire protec-tion requirement* and insurance company standards.

Plan and manage surveillance, maintenance and testing progr... for all fire protection sy1te1111 and equipment. Review and approve all completed fire protection te1t1 and surveillances of all fire protection equip11e11t.

3.1.3.3 Coordinate with Corporate A11et Pt-otection fi~e protection plannin1 and design review for system chan1*1 or modifications to Plant 1tructure1.

3.1.3.4 Maintain liaison with local fire department a1enciH.

l.1.3.5 Plan Plant fire train1n1 require*nt1 and offsite fire department involvement with Plant training pro1r.... Be *responsible for a11urin1 indoctri-nation in fire emer1ency procedures for employees, visitors, contractors and subcontractors.

3.1.3.6 Provide the Plant staff with technical infor-mation and ezperti** needed for developaent of fire prevention and protection procedures, includin1 mainte~nce.

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• 3 .1.4 3.l.3.7 Plan, coordinate and final critique unannounced Plant fire drills. Perform a final review on other fire drills.

The Plant Operations Shift Supervisor or his designee:

3.1.4". l Complies with those aspects of the Fire Protec-tion Plan which prevent adverse fire consequences upon the safe operation of the Pla~t.

3.1.4.2 Shall be responsible for implementation of procedures for:

3.1.4.2.1 Testing and availability of fire detection, suppression and extin-guishing system. at the Plant, including fire barriers, fire barrier pen*tration seals and all installed or portable equipment used in fight-ing or containing fires.

3.1.4.2.2 Ffr* prevention and protection requirements during*operating activi-tie~ which place a portion of th*

fire protection system out of service.

3.1.4.2.J Plan, coordinate and conduct a critique of regular fire drills.

3.1. 5 The Plant Engineering and Maintenance Manager or his designee:

3.1.5.1 Shall be-responsibl* for implementation of procedures for:

3.1.s.1.1 Fire prevention and p ,ion requiremmits during ma~~~enance .

activities which increase the possi-bility of a fire.

3.1.s.1.2 Assuring continued fire protection should maintenance activities impair fire protection systems or components.

3.2 OICAllIZATIOH FOR FIRE EMERGENCIES 3.2.l The Plant organization for resolving a sit* fire emergency is as follows:

3.2.l.l Site Emergency Director or his de1ignee is responsible for ensurin1 actions necessary to place the Plant in a safe condition, have been made or are being taken during a fire emergency.

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3. 2 *.1. 2 Property Protection Supervisor advises the ~ire Brigade :...eader in fire fighting activities, as neces1ary, when available.

3.2.1.3 Fire Brigade Leader is responsible for assessing the potential safety consequences of a fire and directing efforts of the Fire Brigade to minimize fire 1011. Following a fire or fire drills, the leader shall conduct a critique of the brigade's actions.

3.2.l.4 Fire Brigade - shall be at least five members

{Tech Specs allow less than five for periods up to two hours to acco1111odate uneJr:pected absences, a1 long as i1111ediate action is t*ken to restore full brigade. This is acceptable.) on each shift trained to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas containing structure*, system* or components important to safety.

3.2.1.5 Radiation Pt-otecdon Technician is responsible for determinina radiological hazard* at the fire seen* and coordinating with the fire brigade and offsite fire departaent.

3.3 SUPPORT SERVICES 3.3.1 The Corporate Asset Pt-otection Section is organized wholly independent of the Nuclear Operations Department and provides support services and technical assistance to the Vice President of Nuclear Operations and the Plant General Manaaer for all matters of fire protection.

3.3.l.l Under the supervision of the Supervisor of A11et Protection, a qualified fire protection engineer and a qualified fire training supervisor are .

re1pon1ible for developin1, maintainin1, review-ing and approvina the Palisades Plant Fire Pt-otection Plan, Fire Brigade trainina and providing technical a11istance and 1upport 1ervice1 for fire protection sy1teaa and equipcent.

4. IMPLEMEHTATIOH 4~1 FIRE PROTECTION PI.AB 4.1.l This fire plan shall be implemented in accordance with variou1 Company and Plant procedures as li1ted in the Reference Section. Special note 1hall be made of Reference 2.14.

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5 4.1 .* 2 The Palisades Plant Fire Protection Plan will be reviewed, revfsed, approved and distributed per the requirements found in Reference 2.14.

4.2 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 4.2.l Revisions to procedures involving fire protection require-ments shall be made in accordance with Plant administrative procedures. Procedures shall be written and revised according to References 2.5 and 2.11.

5. FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT 5* 1 PERMANENT 5.5.l Th* following permanent fire protection equipment is provided:

5.!.1.1 Lakcl Michigan is the fire water source. The lake i1 capable of 1upplyin1 water for over two hours.

5.1.l.2 Three (3) verticd turbine pump* (two diesel-driven and one electric-driven), each having a rated capacity of 1500 gpa at 125 psig discharge pressure.

5.1.1.3 Ten-inch underground water loop supplie1 the Plant complex with branches to fire hydrants.

Sectional isolation valve1 are installed to permit isolation of portion* of the main fire loop for maintenance or repair without inter-rupting th* entire water supply.

5.1.1.4 A main fire protection header supplies water to

• various manually and autOllatically initiated sprinkler and deluge sy1te...

5.1.1.5 Automatic smoke or fire detection devices are in1talled in area* of the Plant that contain or present an ezpo1ure fire hazard to safe shutdown, safety-related syst~mt or components and various other Plant area1. 'lbe1e detection system* are capable of operating with or without off site power and they annunciate in the Control Room.

5.1.1.6 Fir* ho*** in the Auxiliary Buildin1, Reactor Buildin1, Turbine Buildin1 and other buildings onsite are in1talled so one effective hose stream can reach any location that contain* or presents an exposure fire hazard to structures, systema or

• components important to safety *

• Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

6 5.Ll.7 of fire within the Plant complex and to protect redundant systems or components necessary for safe shutdown.

Fire barriers are installed to prevent the spread 5.1.l.8 Emergency lightin1 units with at least an eight-hour battery power supply are provided in areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in acce11 and egres1 routes thereto.

5.2 PORTABLE EQUIPMENT 5.2.1 The following portable fire protection equipme~t is provided:

5.2.1.1 Dry chemical, water and carbon dioxide extin-guishers are located throughout the Plant and other onsite building1.

5.3 USAGE 5.3.1 The Plant fir* protection equipment shall be operated in accordance with establi1h*d operatinc procedure1.

5.3.2 Permanent aAd portable fire protection equip. .nt shall not

. be used for purpo1e1 other than fire protection without prior approval of the Plant Property Protection Supervisor, the Plant Operations Shift Supervisor, or their desiguees.

5.4 EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT 5.4.1 The Corporate Asset Protection Section Fire Control Engineer-ing staff shall review all procurement documents for the purchase of fire protection equipment and components for Plant use. Procurement documents prepared for the purchase of Coapany approved fire hose, nozzles, dry chemicals and similar items used on a routine ba1i1 do not require a .

reviev.

5.5 MODIPICATIOllS 5.5.l Phy1ical modifications to installed -fire protection equip-ment, fire barriers, Plant structures or changes in fire loadin1 shall be in accordence witb Plant Procedures, Technical Specif ication1 and insurance require..nts.

Proposed modification* shall be reviewed by the Corporate A11et Protection Section Fire Protection Engineer and the Plant Property Protection Supervisor or their designees

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5.6 OUT-OF-SERVICE REQUIREMENTS 5.6.1 ~ixed fire protection equipment shall not be removed from service ezcept for routine tests, preventive maintenance, system calibration and emergency conditions without prior approval of the Plant Property Protection Supervisor or designee. In emergency situations, an in-line supervisor who is *senior to this position may grant approval. The Corporate Asset Protection Department shall be notified by the Plant Property Protection Supervisor or his designee of any out-of-service conditions in accordance with Corporate Fire Protection Standards.

5.6.1.1 The Plant Property Protection Supervisor, or designee, shall be notified of any and all fire protection equipment outages as soon a1 po11ible if the equip. .nt wa1 removed fro* service without prior approval.

5.7 SURVEILLANCE AND MAINTENANCE 5.7.1 Surveillance, maintenance and testing requirements for fire protection equipment are listed in the Technical Specifica-tions, Plant Fire Protection Plan, Implementing Procedures, Plant Administrative Procedures and Corporate Fire Protec-

• • 5.8 5.8.l tion Standards

• FIR! BRIGADE EQUIPMEvr The minilDWll equipment provided for the Fire Brigade shall consist of personal protective equipment such as turnout coats, glove1, hard hats, emergency comaunication1 equip-ment, portable ligtits, portable ventilation equipment, portable eztinguishers, and self-contained breathing apparatus u1ing full-face, po1itive-pre11ure masks approved by HIOSH. At lea1t two estra air/ozygen bottle1 will be located onlite for each Hlf-contained breathing unit *. In addition, a.a on1ite, siz-hour supply of reserve air/ozygen shall be provided and arranged to pe1'11it quick and cOtDplete replenishment of ezhausted supply air/ozygen bottle* as they are returned.

6* TRAI Hiii:

6.1 R!SPOHSIBILITIES 6.1.l The Plant Property Protection Department is responsible for the development, revision and in1truction of the fire training program.

6.1.1.1 In1truction will be provided by qualified indivi-duals who are knowledgeable, ezperienced and Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

suitably trained in fighting the types of fire that could occur and in using the types of equipment available in the Palisades Plant.

6.1.2 The Plant Property Protection Supervisor, or designee, has the responsibility for implemencina and a11uring Plane fire training requirements are met and coordinating offsite fire department involvement in Plant training programs.

6.1.3 The Plant Training Supervisor ha1 the responsibility for scheduling individual* and the Fire Brigade members for training. The Trainina Supervisor also k.eep1 and maintains all appropriate training records.

6.2 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS The Plant Fire Training Program shall ensure that the capability to fight potential fires i1 established and maintained. Reference 2.9 contain* a de1cription of the fire trainina proaram.

6.2.l Training and fire drill requirement* are contained in References 2.7 and 2.9, which meet the require.. nts of Reference 2.16.

7. FIR! PR!VEHTIOM ACTIVITIES 7.1 Fire prevention activitiei (ie, control of combu1tible1, transient fire loads, ignition source1, flammable ga1 and liquid storage) are conducted under the guidance of Plant Administrative Procedures, FSAI, Plant Fire Protection Implementing Procedures, Corporate Fire

• Protection Standard*, NML In1urance Standards and Fire Prevention and PTotection Procedures. Control* are established to:

7.1.1 Govern the handlin1 and lillit the u1e of ordinary combus-tible material1, c01tbu1tible and fl&1111&ble gase1 and liquid1, high efficiency particulate air and charcoal filter1, dry ion exchange re1in1 or other combu1tible 1upplie1 in safety-related area1.

7.1.2 Prohibit the 1torage of collbu1tible1 in safety-related area1.

7.1.3 Govern the handling of and limit tran1ient fire load1 such aa ca11bu1tible and flammable liquid* or ga1e1, wood and plastic products or other combu1tible materials in area1 of the Plant containina 1af ety-related 1y1t ..1 or equipment durina all pba1e1 of operatin1, and e1pecially during maintenance, modification or refuelin1 operations.

7.1.4 Govern the use of ignition source* 1ucb as welding, flame cutting, brazing or soldering. Procedure* that shall be followed governing cutting and welding will be found in Reference 2.7.

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• 7.1.5 7 .1. 6 Govenl the re~oval from the area of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or other combustibles resulting from the work activity immediately following completion of the activity.

Maintain periodic housekeeping inspections to ensure continued compliance with the above fire protection activi-ties. Minimum frequencies for inspections are: Monthly during operation - more frequently during major outages.

Housekeeping procedures that shall be followed will be found in Reference 2.7.

8. QUALITY ASSURANCE 8.1 Quality A1surance activities for the Palisade* Plant Fire Protec-tion System1 will be conducted in accordance with Nuclear Opera-tions Department Standardse 8.2 Monconfol"iilanees that are found are controlled according to Plant/

Dep&rtment Administrative Procedures which implement the require-ments of NODS-QOl, Corrective Action and Control of lonconforming Item1.

9. PROGRAM REVIEW 9.1 In addition to the review* conducted by the Plant Property Protec- -

tion Supervisor or designee, the Fire Protection Progr... is reviewed by the Corporate Asset Protection Section Fire Protection Engineer during fire insurance in1pections conducted by an outside consulting firm, and is also reviewed under the Quality Assurance program.

10. DOCUMEHTED INSTB.UCTIOHS 10.l Fire protection activities are controlled and car'f'ied out by documented in1tructions. 'lb*** activitie1 include in1pections, surveillance1, te1t1, fire drill1, maintenance, modification, operation and training. The preparation, review, approval, re-vi1ion, diatribution and control of th*** documents are accom-pli1hed accordin1 to Plant/Department Adainistrative Procedures.

Docueented in1truction1 ezist to control the action* to be taken by the a 10.1.1 Individual discoverin1 a fire.

10.l.2 Control Room Operator to determine the need for Brigade assistance and offsite fire department notification upon report of a fire or receipt of alarm on Control Ro<>11 Annunciator Panel.

10.1.l Fire Brigade after notification by the Control Room Oper-

• Rev 4 ator of a fire.

RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

10

11. COMMITMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS 11.1 The Company/Plant has made many connitments concerning fire protec-tion. Attachment 1 is an attempt to SWllDarize those commitments but is not considered all inclusive. All connitments must be adhered to unless an NRC approved ezemption is granted. In addi-tion, the Company is required by law to comply with three sections of Reference 2.2. Th*** sections ar* III.C. Fire Protection of Saf* Shutdown Capability, (III.L., Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability, is implied and naast also be followed), III.J.

Emergency Lighting, and III.O. Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump.

ll.2 Befor* any modifications ar* made, all coa1itm9Dts mu1t be reviewed and compliance with all that apply shall be a11ured.

11.3 The following separation criteria shall be followed. Redundant safety-related cabling or equipment shall 1119et one of the following criteria:

ll.3.l Separation by a three-hour fir* barrier.

ll.J.2 Separation by a mini11a1m of 20 fe*t with no intervenina combustible1. In addition, 1prinkler1 and det*ction shall be in the area.

11.3 .3 Separation by le1I than 20 fHt, hcv*ver, one train sb:

be covered by a fir* re1i1tant ..t*rial with a one-ho~~

rating. Ia addition, sprinklers and detection 1hall be in the area.

11.3.4 If 11.3.1 through 11.l.J are not done, then a separate third totally independent path separated from the first two by a three-hour fire barrier. (Alternate Shutdown Method) ll.4 Drawing M-216, Sheet* 4 tbrouah 18, detail the fire barriers, sprinkler sy1te.1 and detection sy1tea1 in the plant.

ll.4.1 Tb.e fir* barriers detailed on th* drawing* shall be treated a1 three-hour rated. A1 such, all penetration* through th.. will b9 1 . . led with either a fire door, fir* damper or P9D*tration seal equivalent in fir* ratin1 to three hours.

11.4.2 ?he sprinkl*r syst ..s and d*t*ctioa 1y1t ..s d*tailed on th*

drawin11 shall ree.in operational in tho** are***

12. EMEB.CEHCY PROCEDURES l2ol Emergency shutdown procedures shall be VTitten and implemented. The procedures shall describ* the action* to be used to safely shutdown

• th* plant in the event of a fire in a safety-related area.

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• .L

• 13. RECORDS 13.l Records which document compliance with the Fire Protection Plan shall be retained in accordance with Plant Records Management Procedures and Reference 2.12.

14. ATTACHMENT 14.l Attachment l - Commitment List.

,,I Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PPOJ-TP21

12 ATTACHMENT l COMMITMENT LIST CORRESPONDENCE ITEM COMMITMENT DAT!

1. Smoke detectors will be installed and maintained in 03-31-77 the following areas: 06-20-77 06-29-77 Control Room 05-15-78 Control Room Walk-in Cabinets 06-30-78 Cable Spreading Room 07-28-78 Switchgear room LC 09-01-78 Switchgear room lD North Penetration room SW Penetration room North end of refueling area Air rooa in containment Penetration areas of containment Engineered Safeguards Panel RoOll & stairwell outside 590' corridor of awi:iliary buildin1 between cbarsina pump* and Switchgear room lC Component cooling water rooe East and Weit Engineered Saf eguard1 iooe1 Charging Pump roOll Auziliary Feedwater Pump rooa Battery ro0111 All other detectors will be maintained

2. Automatic Sprinklers will be installed and maintained 03-31-77 in tne following areas: 06-10-77 09-01-78 Switchgear room lD and Electrical Equipment Rooa Switchgear rooa lC Conden1ate pump room Track. alley Screenhou**

Char1ia1 puap rooa SW penetration roo*

Nortb penetration rooa C.ble 1pntadin1 room Die1el loo.. l-1 & 1-2 All other sprinkler systems will be maintained

3. Fire protection valves will be sealed or locked. Key 03-31-77 valves will be locked.

4. Two hose stations will be installed and maintained in 09-01-78 containment Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

lJ

• 5.

6.

An additional length of hQse will be available so as to reach the East & West Engineered Safeguards Rooms.

It will be located on 590' level of the auxiliary building by the existing hose station.

There will be a 75' hose and a 50' spare hose 09-01-78 03-31-77

.located at the Control room hose station.

7. A six-hour air supply will be available for use by the 07-28-78 fire brigade 09-01-78

8. Eight-hour emergency lights will be provided for access 06-_30-78 and egress to and operation of safety-relat*d equipment 09-01-78 needed for saf* shutdown 03-19-81

9. A dedicated 6' ladder will be located insid* th* 03-31-77 Cabl* Spreading Room and guaranteed in place by a lead seal. (Plant has placed it outside, which is accopt.tble.)

10. There will be three-hour fire doors installed between 03-31-77 th* diesel generators.

11. Fire doors will be self closing and be.closed or close 07-28-78 automatically in the event of a fire in th* area 05-15-78 09-01-78

12. Fire dampers will be installed anywhere an HVAC duct 09-01-78 passes through a fire wall or fire barrier. The 03-31-77 following rooms are specifically included: 06-10-77 05-15-78 Switchgear Room lC 04-24-80 Switchgear Room lD 02-10-81 Central Stairs of Auxiliary building Control Room & Viewing Gallery

13. All penetration* through fire walls or fir* barriers 03-31-77 shall be sealed with a fire resistant material equal 06-10-77 in ratin1 to that of th* wall. lb* following rooa1 05-15-78 are specifically includ*d:

• 09-01-78 Control !loom Cable Spreadin1 Roa.

Svitchaear Roo* lD Svitcha*ar Rao* lC Engine*red Saf *guard1 Room1 Southwest Pen*tration Room Engineered Safeguard* Pan*l Rooa Battery Ro0111 Component Cooling Water RoOll

• Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

14

14. C*ble to conduit.openings will be sealed in the Battery Rooms and Southwest Penetration Room 03-J 1-77 09-01-78 15.

A splash shield wi 11 be installed over transformer II in the Cable Spreading Room 03-31-77 16.

There will be no tray covers in the North Penetration Room 03-31-77

17. B*rriers will be installed between the trays in the Engineered Safeguards Room B.

18.

Cable tray fire stops will be installed and maintained in three locations in containment 06-10-77 09-01-78 19.

A sill will be installed and maintained on the floor between the diesel generators 03-31-77 06-10-77 20.

A curb will be installed and maintained on the floor between Chargin1 Pumpa A and B 06-30-78 09-01-78

21. Flammable gases are not permitted to be stored in safety-related areas 03-31-77

22. Used Anti-C's will b* stored in metal contain*rs in the Charging Pump Room and Containment

• 03-31-77 09-29-77

23. All fire protection systems will b* tested and maintained in accordance with applicabl* reca.a.n- 03-31-77 dations and s.tandards.

24.

All fire protection .valves will be checked monthly.

05-15-78

25. Fire hydrants will be inspected 06-30-78

26. All "Hot Work" cuttin1 or Weldin1 will follow th*.

following procedurea: 06-19-78 Collbuatiblea within 35' are either covered or re110ved.

A fire watch will be established.

Eztiquishers or hoHa are nearby and available.

27. Fire Drills will b* conducted monthly.

03-31-77 06-19-78 03-01-79

28. '11le Plant shall maintain a trained five-man fire brigade. 02-01-80 Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

l. 5

29. Two DC distributin_n panell, supplied from the 10-13-80 batteries, will be located as follows:

DllA No. IA in Switchgear lC D21A No. 2A in Diesel 1-2

30. An oil collection system will be installed and 02-10-81 maintained on each reactor coolant pump to collect and contain any leakage or spills frOll the lift pu1D9, drain and fill plug1, oil level sight gla11e1, external oil coolers, flanged connections in oil lines and the upper and lower oil reservoirs

31. An alternate shutdown panel, C-150 and C-lSOA, will be 03-19-81 installed in the SW electrical penetration room. '11le 05-19-81 panel will be able to safely shutdown the plant in the event the Control ioOll i1 disabled fro* a fire.

Valve* CV0736A, CV0737A and CV05228 will be controlled froa C-1500 C-150 will indieat*i

~ After installation of th* third AFW puap, P-8C, the designation of CV-0727 and CV-0749. The same is t?'Ue for FT-0736 and FT-0737.

'nle1e flow indicator* are now designated FT-0727A and &'T-0749A. Valve*

and flow indicators in the flow path fro* P-8C are now designated FT-0736.A, CV-0737A, FT-0736 and F"l'-0737 *

• 32.

Auziliary/feedwater flow to both Steam Cenerator1 Pre11urizer Level Pressurizer Pre11ure Steam Generator Level The followin1 circuit* will remain out of Switchgear 03-19-81 Room lC:

CV0736A CV0737A CV05228 FT0736 FT0737 Se* Hot* in Item 31 above.

33. Nitro1911 bottle* will be in1talled and maintained in 03-19-81 th* auziliary feedv.ter pump roo* and component cooling v.ter room and will control valve1:

CV0522B PCV0521A CV0736A CV0737A See Note in Item 31 above.

Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

16 34.

35.

The service water pump motor feeder from Switchgear Bus 1-D will bypass switchgear room LC.

A component cooling water pump motor feeder will be 03-19-81 03-19-81 routed to bypass the 590' corridor of the auxiliary building.

36. A feeder circuit will be installed and maintained 03-19-81 between 480V Bus 13 and charging pump1 P-558 and P-55C.

37. The fuse between each battery and its bus will be 03-19-81 located in their respective battery room. A nonautomatic circuit breaker with a shunt trip. will be located in the circuit.

38. Distribution panels will be installed in Switchgear 03-19-81 room lC and DG 1-l to connect th.. to their respective batteries with a fu1e. The fu1e1 will be in the battery ro0111. Fro* these panels a new circuit for operatina and control power will be in1talled for each DC and 2400V Bu1. Routin1 will avoid the C..ble Spreadina loom, the Die1el Generator and switchaear ro0111 of the other channel.

39. The power source for the diesel.generator crankca1e 03-19-81 blowers will be the 2400V teminah of the DC.

40. The control and instrument circuits frOll D-G l-2 to 03-19-81 the Control Roem will bypass Switchgear Roca IC.

41. The, DC l-2 power cables, control and instrument 03-19-81 .

circuits to the 2400V Bus in Switchgear. lD will bypa11 DC 1-l room.

42. Spare fuse will be provided for the equipment operable 05-19-81 from C-150.

43. Procedure* will be prepared to check clo1ed Valve1 05-19-81 H0-301S and M0-3016 and the operating power disconnected fro* both before preuuriz.in1 the primary syst .. ar*ater than 360 p1ig.

44. The follovin1 will be indicated on C-150 or C-150A: 02-16-82 Kot leg reactor temperature Cold leg reactor temperature Low suction pre11ure for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump

45. Source Range Flux Monitor will be available on C-150 07-01-82 or C-150A.

Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

l7

• 46.

4 7.

An in*trument in.dicating SIRW level will be installed on C-150 or C-l50A.

Steam generator pressure will be indicated on C-150 or C-l50A.

07-01-82 04-14-83

48. Procedures will be written to allow safe shutdown of the plant in the event of fire anywhere in the plant which totally destroys everything in the area.

49. 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Sections IIIG., IIIJ., and III.O will be adhered to.

50. Combu.ci bl es are regularly removed from the 590' 7-25-83 corridor of the auxiliary building.

51. E*1ential equipment for safe shutdown po1t-fire 8-10-84 6-19-85

52. Fire Area Identification, Automatic Fire Suppre11ion 7-09-84 Coverage and Fire Detector Coverage 8-10-85

53. l!'.mergency Lighting Location* 7-16-84 10-01-84

. 6-19-85

54. '11le connection of the charging *pump1 to their 4-23-84 normal safety grade sources is assured by proper 7-16-84 administrative control. A system checklist is 8-10-84 performed to verify the position of the break.er*

prior to plant heatup1.

55. Adequ.te protection shall be provided in loo* lo4, 4-23-84 104A and 104b. 7-16-84 8-10-84

56. Reroute power feeds to P-55C and-P-558 seal 4-.23-84 penetration* into pipevay at elevation 602' from 7-16-84 char1ina pUltp roa11. 8-10-84 Add 1uppr***ion to chargin1 pump room. Fire brigade will reapond illllediately to chargin1 pump room upon receipt of the alarm.

5 7. Cover with.three-hour, fire-rated material the control 4-23-84 circuits for CV 0727 and CV 0749 ** they pa11 throu1h 7-16-84 the CCW room SC 84-043. 6-19-85

• Cover with one-hour material the control wire* for CV 0727 and CV 0749 H they pan through the IC swca roo* sc 84-043 *

• Rev 4 RP0l85-0061A-PP03-TP21

18 Cover with one~hour material the power leads to F-7A as they pa11 through the IC SWGR room SC 84-043.

Install sprinklers in the charging pump room FC-607.

Block off opening* between the chargina pump room and the 602' pipe chase above the corridor FC-407-13.

• Relocate the power lead* from the load center to charging pump* P-558 and P-55C. FC-608 Install breakers in the FOGG syste*. FC-516

• Add radiant energy shield to one train of instrument cables inside the containment air roo*

FC-Gll.

• Add emeraency li&hts. FC-407-15, FC-615 Install isolation 1witche1 and redundant fuses in the control circuit* of equipment wtiich is e***ntial for hot shutdown. FC-638

58. Administrative controls dictate that all loose material 7-16-84 be removed fro* containment prior to start-up. 12-28-84

59. A local charging pump flow indication requirin1 no 3-19-85 electrical power will be installed.

60. Sprinklers located in the intake structure will be 6-19-85 maintained free of interference in accordance with NFPA 13.

61. Procedure* which ensure the espeditiou1 replac ..ant 6-19-85 of a f ire-d&ma1ed 1ervice water puap llOtor will be prepared and it1ued.

62. A_1pare CCV motor with required power cable is 1tored 6-19-85 on 1ite and identified for u1e durin1 an e. . r1eacy.

Procedure* to install thi* spare motor will be prepared and i11ued.

63. Install i1olation/tran1fer switch** in the remote 10-29-85 control circuits of 0-C l-1 voltage and speed control*, breakers 152-103, 152-107 and 152-110.

FC-639 64.

Rev 4 Test fire hose at 50 p1i above fire main pre11ure.

RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21 11-21-85

65. Viev containment with TV camera hourly if two fire 11-21-85 detector a in. one containment zone are inoperable. 11-21-85

66. Procedures will be revised to include guidance for 12-20-85 the operator to manually operate breaker 52-106 in the event of a fire.

. 67. Revised list of e11ential shutdown equip..nt 7-21-86

68. HPSI/Chargin1 Pwa1J Redundancy Analy1i1 ia ezpecced co be 10-14-86 completed in November 1986.

69. Analy1i1 of the effect of no powered HVAC in roo.. 10-14-86 containin1 safe shutdown equip..nt due July 1, 1987

70. Tak.a immediate interi* corrective actioa if condition1 10-14-86 adver** to 1afety are di1covered durin1 the lack of powered HVAC aaaly1i1.

71. EOP1 10.l and 10.2 ta inclwlo thQ l=D S"~Ci ** requirin1 10-14-86 alternate 1butdovn. Due before 1tart*up fro*

pre1ent outaa*.

72. The Auociated Circuit A.naly1i1 will be completed by 10-14-86 December 1, 1987.

73. Durin1 the A11ociated Circuit Analy1i1, if condition* 10-14 adver1e co 1afety are discovered, i ...diat* interi*

corrective action will be impl...ated.

74. Analy1i1 of hi/lo pre11ure interface* will be included 10-14-86 in th* revi1ed Fire ~otection Proaraa Report.

7S. In1tall fire detector* in the intake structure before 10-14-86 start-up fro* pre1eat outa1**

76. Cover P-41 control cable* and annunciator cable* on 10-14-$6 the SW 1ide of radiant 1bield and above the radiant shield before March 1, 1987.

77. Iaatall additional 1prinkler1 at fuel traa1f er puap1 10-14-86 before Marc:b 1, 1917.

78. Subllit aA 1a..ption Request for the dieael fuel line* 10-14-86 in the Intake Structure before January 1, 1987~

79. Teat the daapera in the control roOll HVAC durin1 the 10-14-86 neat REFOUT.

80. After control roa11 HVAC dallper1 are ce1ted, i*pl.-.nt 10-14-86 surveillance requir...nt1 covered by Admini1trative Procedur***

Rev 4

• RP018S-0061A-PP03-TP21

20

81. Remove the foam insulation behind the panelling in the 10-14-8 TSC and instat'l fiber-glau before April 1, 1987.

82. Install Emer1ency Lightina Unita (ELU) at the VCT, BAST . 10-14-86 and fast makeup valve before start-up frat1 present outage.

. 83. Continue to require the uae of portable li1ht1 while 10-14-86 performina EOP 10.2 until proble* of the lack of an ELU at CV 2001 i1 re1olved.

84. Test ELU bulb1 every siz month1. Keep record of 10-14-86 failure* for two year1.

85. Take appropriate correction action if !LU i ...diate 10-14-86 bulb burnout i1 detenained to be a 1eaeric probl ...

86. Complete analy1i1, before October 16, 1986, of the 10-14-86 effect of eztendin1 the radiant 1bield in the Screenbou1e one bay to the ve1t.

87. Complete analy1i1, before October 16, 1986, of the 10-14*16 need for an additional drain at the fuel tran1fer pump.

88. Seal cable to conduit openin11 in J Bazaa and Pull 12-12-86 BazH in 4" or **ll*r conduit vbea the bozea are within 60" of a fiH barrier.

89. Chana* conduit seal requir--.nt1 to confor11 vitb 12-12-86

• rt*.88 above.

90. Inatall !LU* where they are required. 12-12-86

91. Continue to require the u1e of portable liabt* vbi.le 12*12-86 perforain1 !OP 10.2.

Rev 4 RP0185-0061A-PP03-TP21

EXPLANATIONS AND ERRATA Palisades Fire Hazard Analysis, Revision 2, February 1, 1989

1. Paragraph H, Analysis~ in each fire area description is a brief descrip-tion of existing engineering analyses. These analyses describe various fire ~rotection features that were felt to need this additional analysis.

These analyses are filed in Document.Control at the Plant and with the Corporate Fire Protection Engineer.

2. Paragraph I, Exemption Requests, in each fire area description is a brief description of existing exemption requests that have been submitted to the NRC. The exemption requests and their disposition can be found in various ~ubmittals to the NRC. A review of the correspondence file will be necessary to find these requests.

3. Page_ 14, Fire Area 3, Zone B, Cableway-North Penetration Room, Paragraph F. Add as the second sentence "A fire in this area would only affect Right channel equipment with the exception that the Auxiliary Feed Water low suction pressure trip circuit could affect AFW pumps P-8A, 8 and C. Use of P-88 and C can be restored by controlling it from the Alternate Shutdown Panel."

4. *a. Page 16, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1 11

b. Page 18, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1 11

c. Page 20, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2 11 to "ONP 25.1 11

d. Page 22, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" co* "ONP 25.1"

e. Page 25, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2 11 to "ONP 25.1"

f. Page 27, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1 11

g. Page 33, Paragraph F~ change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1 11

h. *Page 35, Pa.ragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1" lo Page 37, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2 11 to "ONP 25.1 11

j. Page 39' Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25*1"

k. Page 46, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.l"

1. Page 49, Paragraph*F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.l"

m. Page 51, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.l"

n. Page 55, Paragraph.F, change "ONP 25.2 11 to "ONP 25.1"

o. Page 59, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1" P* Page 61, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1"

q. Page 63, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2 11 to "ONP 25.1"

r. Page 67, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2 11 to "ONP 25.1 11

s. Page 72, Paragraph F, change "ONP 25.2" to "ONP 25.1 11 MI0189-0081A-TP01

ERRATA P3lisades Fire Hazard Analysis, Revision 2, February 1, 1989 5 Page *28, Fire Area 13, Zone A, Auxiliary Building 590' Corridor, Paragraph B. The sentence should read "See Fire Areas 4, 15, 16 and 20 and Fire

. Zones 13B, 13C, 130, 13E and 13F."

6 Page 29, Fire Area 13, Zone A, Auxiliary Building 590' Corridor, Paragraph E. The first sentence should read "Many of th* same circuits that are found in Fire Areas 4 and 15 and Fire Zone 13B are in this 'area."

7 Page 29, Fire Area 13, Zona A, Auxiliary Building 590 1 Corridor, Paragraph F. The first sentence should read "Same a* Fire Area* 1, 4 and 15 and Fire Zone 138."

MI0389-0004A-F006

EXPLANATIONS AND ERRATA Palisades Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 2, February 1, 1989

8. Page 24, Fire Area 10, Zone A, East Engineered Safeg~ards Area, Para-graph. B. Add new sentences to the end reading 11 An open shaft connects Zo~e A on t.he 570' elevation to the 602' elevation pipeway. Fire doors acd walls cut off the 590' elevation from the shaft. Lack of combustibles in the. shaft, minimal fire loading in Zone A and distance act as an effective barrier from Zone A to the 602 1 pipeway. 11 MI0689-0161A-TP15

Fire Hazard1 Analy1i1 Pali1ade1 Nuclear Pow.r Plant Ccnaumrs Power C011pany Revision 2 February 1, 1989

• P10388-0026A-TP21

• Title TABLE OF CONTENTS Fire Area Fire Zone Control Room Office &11d Viewing Area 1 A 1 1 North Office Section B 4 Cable Spreadin1 ioo* 1 c 2

6

.Switchgear ioa. 1-D 8 l A Cable Way - Horth Penetration Room ,3 11 Switchgear Roa. 1~ B 13 4

Diesel Generators 1-1, 1-2 15 Diesel Day Tanks 1-1, 1-2 5 and 6 17 Intake Structure 7 and 8 9 19 Engineered Safe1uards Room - East 10 21 En1ineered Safeguards Room - West A 24 Battery Rooa A 10 8 24 Battery Rooa B 11 12 26 Auziliary Building 590' Corridor 13 26 Chargin1 Puap Rooa A 28 Waite Cai Decoy Rooa 13 B 13 30 Decontamination iooa c 32 Waite Gas Processing ioom 13 D 34 Boric Acid !quipaent ioa.

Reactor Containment Building 13 13 14

! 36 38 Engineered Safeguards Panel Room 15 40 Component Cooling Pump Rooa 43 16 Refueling and Spent Fuel Pool Rooa 17 45 Demineralizer Rooa 47 18 Compactor - Area Track Alley 19 so Spent Fuel Pool Equip*nt Room 20 52 Electric !quipaent iooa 54 Turbine Lube Oil Rooa 21 22 56 Condensate Pump Rooa 58 23 A Steam Generator Feed Puap Area 23 60 Hain Generator - Seal Oil System Area 8 62 23 c Turbine Buildin1 - General 64 Auziliary r ..dvater Pump Rooa 23 D 24 66 Boiler Room* 69 25 A and 8 71 Southt.Mst c.ble Penetration Room 26 iadwa1te Addition - VIS 73 27 75

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

?age 1 of 2 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS This report i* the Fire Hazards Analy*i* by Fire Area for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.

I. INTRODUCTIOH This analysis is based on a physical evaluation of plant sy1tem*, struc-tures, coaponents and fire detection and suppre11ion provisions, coupled with plant design and construction documentation by a fire protection engineer with the assistance of plant system specialists. In this evalu-ation, fire areas and fire zones within each fire area have been identi-fied and are documented on plant plan and elevation viev1. Each fire area

~* been evaluated with respect to the followin1:

- General area description

- Fire detection and suppression provisions

- Combustible materials. and fire loading .in the area

- F.mergency safe shutdown equipment which could be affected by a fire in the area

• - Safe shutdown capability after a fire in the area

- Potential for radiological release

- Summary of analyses

- Ezemption requests The results of this evaluation are presented by Fire Area in the following pages II. GEHIUL A. nu LOA.DillG For purpo1e1 of this analy1i1, fire loadin1 i1 broken into four c.te1orie1 of equivalent pounds of ordinary combu1tible1 evenly distributed over the area under con1ideration a1 follows:

Minimal 0-2 paf; light 3-7 p1f; moderate 8-20 p1f; heavy over 20 psf -

flash fire potential

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 2 of 2 B. PREPAllATION OF THE FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS Thi* Fire.Hazard Analysis was prepared by a licen1ed Fire Protection Engineer. Data wa* obtained from plant system specialists, engineers and documents on file. 'nte analy*is ha1 been reviewed by appropriate personnel and Consumers Power Company believe1 this to be an accurate pre1entation of the condition1 at the Palisades Plant. If errors are found or conditions chan1e, this analysis will be revised.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page l of 76

• FIRE AREA l Zone A Control Roca Vital Auziliary Building !l 625 1 Ref Drawin1 M-216, Sheet 7 Room Number 325 A. GDIDAL The control rooa provide* a centralized location for operatin1 controls and in1trumentation for the variou1 vital and noavital 1y1tea1 a11ociated with plant operation. Major equip..at in the control rooa include* the main operator control console, the indicatin1 panel .1nd variou* ia1trument and control panel1, all of enclosed de1i1n. Fire loadin1 i1 considered light.

The Control Rooa is occupied coatinuou1ly.

B. FI!! BA!!I!!S DD'UIUIG T"dE AiEA The fire area, compo1ed of Zones A, I and C, i1 bounded by a vast wall with a ainimua fire ratio1 of-three hours and a three-hour ace*** door out to the turbine area. the north wall, vbicb i* poured concrete, is judaed to have a fire ratin1 in ezce11 af four houri. A three-hour double door leads to tha TSC. the ea1t boundary enclo1e1 a 1taircaH with a three-hour rated-fire door. ~ wall i1 jud1*d to have a three-hour ratin1. Th* south wall is rated in ezce11 of thr.. houri and has 1ubatantial bullet re1i1tant and thrH-hour rated double entry door1 to the corridor. These barrier* are adequ.t* ba1ed on the haaard1.

Zone A i1 the control rooa proper. Zone 8 i1 the vievina 1all*ry and east office zone and Zone C i1 the north office zone. One-hour walh with approzi .. tely 30% ordinary 1la11 vi1ioa panels 1eparat* Zone1 8 and C from Zone A. Ace*** door1 to adjacent aone1 have 1la11 viadov1.

C. FIRE DETECTIOI AID SUPPllSSIOI

1. Fire Detection Detection i1 provided by di1covery and saok* detector1.

2. Fir* Supp-re11ion Tva_portable C02 fire eztinsui1ber1 are available in th* control rooa.

A vater eztinsui1ber and hose 1tatioa are available in the adjacent vievio1 area, lone B. Two 1elf-contained breatbins apparatu* are provided for operator's use a1ain1t smoke inhalation in Zone 8 *

• PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

Page 2 of 76 D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. Ia Situ Combu1tibles Combustible materials in this area include electrical w1r1ng in1ula-tion contained within enclo1ed panel1. Small quantities of ordinary c011bu1tible1, namely paper, alto exist in various areas of the control roo*.

2. Transient Co.bustibles Tranaient ca.bu1tible1 are minimal con1i1tin1 aainly of Cla11 A materiala.

3. Radioactive Materials Hone Fire loadin1 for the area is liaht *.

E. EMDC!llCY SAFI SBUTDOWlf EQUIPM!HT WHICH COULD Bl AFFECTED BY A FIU II THIS illi All ayat ... required for no~l plant 1hutdown are represented in the ccmtrol roo*. Control of the plant . .qency 1af e *hutdowa syateu can be accomplished from the remote en1ineered 1af ..u.1rd panel uaina e1tablisbed e... raency procedures in the event that control roe11 evacuation beco.. 1 neces1ary for rea1on1 which do not effect e11ential safe 1hutdown equipment power and control circuits. The auziliary shutdown panel (C-150) CAD be used for controllin1 safe shutdown vben essential safe shutdown equipment circuitry in the control roe. *i* affected. Refer to 01IP 25.1 for a list of emer1ency safe shutdown equipment that could be affected by a fire.

F. SAFE SBUTDOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASI Fiii DI THIS Al!A Safe plant shutdown .., be accomplished fro* the remote en1ineered safe-guard panel or auziliary shutdown panel. Refer to OIP 25.2.

G. POTllTUL roa UDIOLOGICAL UL!AS! DUI '1'0 Fii!

The plant can be 1afaly 1hut down in the event of a fire. lladvaate proc-

• • • • • can be controlled locally preventin1-c'lllea1a. .119 radiolo1ir.~*

materials are in th* control room.

If

• AMALYSI S Conduit and cable are attached to Pali1ade1 bullet-re1i1tant doors.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 3 of 76

• I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS Suppre11ion in control room PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 4 of 7 6 .

FIRE AREA l Zone B Office and Viewing Area E.at of Control Room Nonvital Auziliary Building El 625' Ref Drawin1 H-216, Sheet 7 Room Numbers 320, 321, 322 and 323 A. GFliEIAL The office and viewing areas adjacent to the control ro011 provide apace for variou1 adllini1trative function1 and observation of activities relating to plant operation. There are minor a1110unts of combu1tible materials in the vievin1 area. Office1 are equipped witb normal office furnisbin1s bavin1 a light-fire loading.

B. Fii! BAUI!RS DEFUIING THE AiEA The ea1t, 1outh and north sides of the office and vievin1 area baV9 a miniaum three-hour fire*wall. A one-hour wall vitb JOZ ordinary 1la11 vision panel1 is provided between the control roo* (Zone A) and the viewing area. Entrance i1 via three separate thr..-bour door1. 'l'll.e three-hour door to the north lead1 to the Technical Support Center, the ea1t door -

• lead1 to th* ID svitchaear room and the south door lead1 to a hallway.

Acce1s door1 to adjacent zones are not fire rated.

C. FIRE D!TECTIOH AJID SUPPRESSIO!I

l. Fire Detection Detection is provided by smoke detector1.

2. Fire Suppress.ion A portable water eztinguisher and hose station are available in the area.

D. COHBUmBL& MATDIALS

1. In Situ Combu1tibles C011bu1tible material1 in this area include normal office furni1hing1 and some paper 11111t*-; .:is.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles are minimal consisting mainly of Class A materials.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 5 of 76

• 3.

4.

R.adio.active Materials None Fire Loading Fire lo.ading is light.

E. EHERCEHCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMEHT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN nus AREA None (see Zone A).

F. SAii SHUTDOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASI Fiii IJI THIS All&l S.afe pl.ant 1butdown may be .accompli1bed froa the !D1ineered Safe1uard1 P.anel or the Au~ili.ary Shutdown Panel in the unlikaly event that Control Rooa evacuation becoce1 aece11.ary. Refer to OllP 25.2.

G. POT!HTIAL FOi RADIOLOGICAL UL!AS! DU! TO FIB.I saae .. for Zone A l;I. A.HALYSIS See Zone A*

• I. EXEMPTIOY REQUESTS See Zone A*

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

?age 6 of 76 FIRE AREA 1 Zone C North Office Section (Control Room)

Nonvital Auziliary Building !1 625' Ref Drawin1 H-216, Sheet 7 Roo* Yuaber 324 A. GENERAL The office section adjacent to the control room area provide* apace for variou1 adllini1trative function1 a11ociated with plant operation1. Normal office furni1hin11 are provided. Overall fire loadin1 i1 con1idered light.

B. Fiii BAUIEIS DD'IllIMG THE AIU The partition between this office section and the control rooa is a one-hour fire wall with 30% ordinary glass vision panela. Adjacent walla have a minimum one-hour ratin1. The north wall ha1 a three-hour ratina. Accesa door1 froa the office area to adjacent &one1 are not fire rated. The barriers are con1idered adequate for the hazard1 involved.

C. Fiii DETECTIOI AllD SUPPIESSIOll 1.

- 2.

Fire Detection Detection ia provided by s110ke detector1.

Fire Suppres1ion Variou1 eztinguishers and a hoae station are available in the adjacent zone1.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MAT!B.IALS

1. In Situ Coabu1tibles Combu1tible ..terials in thi1 area include nol'!lal off ice furnishings with 10.. wall partition carpeting.

2. Tranaieat Ca.bu1tible1 Tran1ieat ca.bu1tible1 are minimal coa1istin1 mainly of Cla11 A materiah.

3. Radioactive Materials None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 7 ui 76

4. Fire Loading*

Fire loadin1 is light.

!::. EMEiGEHCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A PIRE IN THIS AREA None (see Zone A).

F. SAFE SHtrrDOW CAPABILITY AFTEI A WOllST CASE FIIE IH THIS AB.EA Safe plant shutdown may be accomplished from the reaote engineered safe-guard* panel or froa the auziliary shutdown panel in the unlikely event that control rooe evacuation beco.. 1 nece11ary. lefer to OHP 25.2.

G POTENTIAL FOi IADIOLOCICAL ULEAS! DU~ TO FIIB Same ** for Zone A H. A.HALYSES SH Zone A.

I. EXEHPTIOH IEQUESTS See Zone A*

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 8 of 76 FIR! Ai!A 2 Cable Spreading RoOCI Vital Auziliary Buildin1 !l 607' 6" Ref Dravin1 H-216, Sheet 6 ioo* Humber 224 A. CDIDAL The cable apreadina roo*, located in the auziliary buildin1, provides routin1 of power, instruaentation and plant control virin1 for both vital and noavital ay1t** ad also acc~datu varioui electrical equip*nt a11ociated vith tba plant safety-related ac and de po¥9r 1upplie1. Primary power to thi1 equipment ia derived from redundant 2.4-kY Bu*** 1-C and 1-D.

r ..der circuit* to variou1 aafety-ioelated equi.,..nt aaaociated with Bua l-D are al10 routed throuah the cable apreadin1 roo*.

Equipment inatallation i1 on curb* to protect a1ain1t water floodin1. All electrical equipment ia 1ealed where the electrical cable* enter. Kaziaia utilisation i1 ..d* of available *pace for aeparation of redundant ay1t ....

Cable runs are via. horizontally atack9d cable trays, with 1a.. individu.l conduit a.* *

• B. FIU BAllIIU D!FDIIHG THE Ai!A A three-hour fire wall i1 provided betv..n the cable apreadin1 roa. and the turbine buildin1. Ace*** between the** two area* ia via a double three-hour rated bullet-resiatant door. A three-hour fire*barrier ia provided betwieen the cable apreadin1 roo* and adjacent Switchgear Room 1-D. Access between th*** two area* ia via a three-hour door. Three-hour wall* and door aeparate the cable spreading rco* frOll the battery roo... With the moderate fire loadins, thi* i1 conaidered adequate. All cable penetrations are sealed.

C. FIRE DET!CTIOI AllD SUPPR!SSIOll

1. Fire Detection

• Smaka detector* vith alar1m1 to the control room are in1talled.

2. fire Suppn11ion AutOllatic aprinkler* are inatalled. In addition, portable estin1ui-

• h*r* and ace*** to a ho** atation in the adjacent tur~~-* room and in the vievin1 area above, at the 625' level, are provided. Protection

• Th* prozimity of inatalled safety-related cablin1 to the 480-V load centers and tranaformera repreaenta a potential co.-On llOd* failure of all 480-V

• power to aafety-related equipment. See analyaia in It .. F.

PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

Page 9 of 76

• against the flooding effects of fire protection system actuation is provided by mounting all 480-volt switchgear equipment on curbs.

o. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include electrical wiring insulation in stacked cable trays.

2. Tran1ient Combustibles Tran1ient combu1tible1 are minimal and are strictly controlled.

~ran1ient1 would consist mainly of Cla11 A material*.

3. Radioactive Materials None

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is moderate.

E. EMERCDICY SAF! SHUTDOWN EQUIPHEHT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIR! IN THIS AB.EA

• F.

!ueatially all safety-rela*ted. circuits pa11 through thi1 area.

Refer to ONP 2.5 .1 for a llst of emergency aafe shutdown equip*nt th.t could be affected by a fire.

SAFE SBUTDOW CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASI Fiii IB THIS AHA Cable tray location will concentrate heat at th* ceiling and cau1e a po1tulated fire to progress downward and involve mo1t of the cable trays.

A po1tulated fire without protection will re1ult in a 1011 of all 480-volt safety-related power and all ac control power. Remote control circuitry and operatin1 de power for Buses 1-C, 1-D, 11 and 12 are routed through the cable 1preadin1 roo*. The control of safety-related equipment fed from th*** bua** will be lo1t. The plant can be safely shut down using ONP 25.2 and the aqziliary 1hutdown panel.

Tb* plant baa the capability of goina into a hot shutdown condition using the 1te..-driven auziliary feed pwap and the auziliary sbutdotil'll panel (OMP 2.5.l and OllP 2.5.2).* This condition can be safely maintained for an eztended peziod of time. U1in1 local control of de power, safety-related Bus 1-C and its as1ociated diesel generator can supply the required power for boron injection with an HP safety injection pump or a charging pump.

• The steam-driven auziliary feed pump can be controlled from the Control Room, locally at the pump or from the auxiliary shutdown panel.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 10 of 76 Bu* 1-C can also power service water, component cooling and shut down coolin1 puap* a* required. Isolation switch** in tbe control circuits for essential safe shutdown equipment are available to in*ure Bu* 1-C i*

available. Refer to OIP 25.2.

G. POTEHTIAL FOi llADIOLOCICAL ULEASE DU! TO FIRE The plant can be safely shut down in the event of a fire. R.tdwaate proc-euH can be control.led locally preventin1 releaH. Ho radiological materials are.in the cable spreadin1 roce.

H. ANALYSES

l. Fire door between cable spreadin1 rooa and battery room

2. Conduit and cable attached to Palisades bullet-resistant door1

3. Helson penetration seal - percent fill I* EXEMPTl OH llEQUISTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 11 of 76 FIRE AREA 3 Zone A Switchgear Room 10 Vital Auxiliary Building El 607 1 611 Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 6 Room Number 223 A. GENDAL The switchgear room houses the 2.4-kV electrical equipment associated with safety-related Bu* 1-D. (Redundant Bu* 1-C i1 in a separate roOlll on the 590' elevation. See Fire Area 4.) Major equipmiant ia floor mounted without curbing. Two three-inch floor drain* are provided a1ain1t flooding.

Electrical cabling a11ociated with the switchgear is routed through the switchgear rooe in 1tacked cable tray1.

B. FIR! BAaRIERS DEFIHIMC TH! AREA A three-hour fi~e barrier is provided between the switchge.r room and the cable spreadin; roo** Acce11 between th*H .two area* i1 via a three-hour door. A three-hour rated door to the electric equipment room is available for access. There is an open stairway leadin1 to th* 625' level with a three-hour rated door providing acce11 to the vievin1 gallery (Fire Area 1,-

Zone 8). Open acce11 also ezi1t1 through the cablevay room to the north -

• c.

containment penetration roo* located on the 625' le'V91 (Fire Area 3, Zone B). Thea* barriers are considered adequate ba1ed on the fire loading.

FIRE DETECTION AJID SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Smoke detectors with alarm.. to the control room.

2. Fire Suppres1ion Automatic sprinklers are installed. In addition, portable eztin-1uilh*r* and acces1 to hose stations on the floor above and in the turbine buildin1 through the cable spreading room are provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLI MAT!IIALS

1. In Situ Coebu1tible1 Combu1tible materials in this area include electrical wiring in1ulation in stacked cable tray1.

2. Tranaient Combustibles Tran1ient combustibles are minimal and strictly controlled. Transients would consist mainly of Class A materials.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 12 of

3. Radioactive Materials None

4. Fire loadin1 Fire loadin1 is li1ht.

E. EMERCDICY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPHEHT WHICH COULD 8! AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AllA All safety-related equipment associated with Bua 1-D. Major items that could be affected include one LP safety injection puap, two service water puapa, one HP safety injection pump, one component coolin1 pump, one containment apray pUllp and one ausiliary feed water PUllP* lladundant equip*nt uaoeiated with safety-related Bua 1-C re.. in1 available. Refer to OllP 25.l for a list of equip..nt and cable1 that could be effected by a fire.

F. SAFE SBUTDOWI CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE Ill THIS AREA Redundant 1af ety-related Bua 1-C and a1sociated load* should provide the nece11ary backup sy1t ..1 required. If neces1ary, the ausiliary shutdown c.

panel i1 available in order to safely shut dova the plant uain1 ONP 25.l and OllP 25.2. Refer to OllP 25.2.

POTEllTIAL FOil IADIOLOCICAL B.!L!ASI DUI '1'0 Fiii The plant can be safely shutdown in the event of a fire. Radvaste proc-esse1 can be controlled locally preventin1 releaae. Yo radiological

~terials ar* in the switchgear roo*.

H. ANALYSES None I. EXEKPTIOll REQUISTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 13 of 76

• FIRE AREA 3 Zone B C.blevay - North Penetration Room Vital Auziliary Building El 615' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheets 6 and 7 Room Yuaber 328 A. CDIEUL Cables are routed into the cable penetration roe. area using a horizontally stacked cable tray arranaement. Th* cables enterina containment are considered safety related and include both vital and nonvital loads.

Redundant *Y*t ... required for 1af* reactor abutdovn ar* aCCOIBodated via cable* routed throuah the southwest cable penetration roo* on the 607'6" level (see Fire Area 26).

B. FIRE IWiiIEIS DD'IMIHC THE AIU The cable penetration roo* is separated f~om the adjacent clean resin transfer and 1tora1* area by a lli.ni . . . three-hour fire wall. The accH1 ia throuah a thr ..-bour bullet re1i1tant door. Open accea1 ezi1ta between the cable penetration roo* and the cablevay leading to Switchaear B.oo* 1-D. A steel plate on part of the floor of.the cablevay provide* separation from .

the 590 1 elevation of the auziliary buildin1 *

• C. FIU DETEC?IOll .WO SUPPRISSIOM

1. Fire Detection Autocaatic smoke detectors with alar.. to the control roe..

2. Fire Suppre11ioa Automatic sprinkler coverage of the cable penetration and cableway rooa. Portable utinguish*ers and acce11 to an outside hose house are provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLI HAT!IIALS

1. Ia Situ Combu1tible1 Combustible lllaterial1 in thi1 area include electrical cable insulation.

Cable trays are horizontally stacked, 4-5 level1.

2. Tran1ient Cocabu1tible1 Tran1ient combustibles are minimal and strictly controlled. Transients would conai1t mainly of Cla11 A materials *

• PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP0l

Page 14 of 7

3. Radioactive Materials None

4. Fire Loading Fire loading tration roo11. in th* cableway is heavy, and light in the cable pene-E. EMERCDICY SAF! SHllrDOWM EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD AR.EA BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS There is no in1talled equip..at in the cable penetration ro011. Principal load1 s*rved by cabl** routed tbrou&h this area include the reactor protec-tion syat .. and control for varioua aotor-operated valves bouaed inside containment. Redundant loads are served by cables in the southwest cable penetration room. Refer to ONP 25.1 for a list of equipment and cables in this area that could be affected by a fire.

F. SAF! SHtrl'DOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FYR! IM THIS AIU Redundant syate.. bavin1 cables routed via.the aoutbveat cable penetration rooa r ... in available. Refer to OllP 25.2.

C. POT!llTIAI. FOR liDIOLOCICAL DI.EASE DU! TO Fiii The plant can be safely shut down in the event of a fire. &.dwaste proc-esses can be controlled locally prav*ntin1 release. Ho radiological material* are in th* switchgear roo*.

H. ANALYSES

1. An.lysis - Metal plate in cableway floor

2. Adequacy af the steel plate in th* 1-D switchgear cableway I. EXEMPnOH REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page lS of 76 FIRE AREA 4 Switchgear Room 1-C Vital Auxiliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing H216, Sheet S Room Number 116A A. GENERAL Th* switchgear roam houses the 2.4-kV electrical equipment associated with safety-related Bua 1-C. (Redundant Bua 1-D is in a aeparate room on the 607 1 6 11 elevation (see Fire Area 3, ZonH A and B). Electrical cabling asaociated with the switchgear is routed throuah th* switchgear room in stacked cable tray1.

B. Fiii BAllIEIS DUIHIHG TH! AJl!A Enclosure for th* switchaear rooe i1 providod by thre.-hour fire walls.

Acce11 to adjacent diesel generator rooa (Fire Ar. . 5) ia via a three-hour door aid ace*** to th* ea1t corridor i1 via two three-hour doors. Ace***

to the turbine rooa ia'via a three-hour door which is al10 watertight.

One-hour fire resistant material has been applied to one cable tray and one junction boz an~ conduit containing circuit* of the redundant train.

C. Fiil! Dl!TECTIOH AllD SUPPR.ESSIOH

• l.

2.

Fire Detection Automatic smoke detectors which alar11 to the control room Fire Suppre11ion Auta&atic sprinkler** are provided. Portable estinguisbers 4Dd accesa to hose stations approzimately 40 feet free tlM east door and in the turbine building near the west door are provided.

D. COHBUSTIBLI MAl'DIALS

l. Ia Situ Coaba1tibles Com1N1tibl* ..terials in this area include electrical wirin1 insulation in 1tact.d cable trays.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient cOC1bustibles are minimal and strictly controlled. Transients would con1i1t mainly of Class A material1.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page l6 of 76

3. Radioactive Materials A contaminated pit located below a heavy steel place in the floor is Ln the room.

4. Fire Loading Fire loadin1 is moderate.

E. EMERCDICY SAi! SHUTDOWH EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFEcrED BY A FillE IN nus Aili All safety-related equipment a*1ociated with Bua 1-C. Major item1 that could be affected include one ausiliary feed water pwsp, one LP safety injection pUllp, one aervice water puap, one HP *afety injection puap, two component coolina pump* and two contaift9ent *pray pWlpa. Redundant equip-ment a**ociated with safety-related Bu* 1-D remain* available. Refer to OHP 25.1 for a list of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE UI THIS Al!.\

Redundant safety-related Bua 1-D and a*sociated load* can provide the neceaaary backup ay1teaa required.* Refer to OllP 25.2.

G. POTEHTIAL FOil IW>IOLOCICAL ULEASE DUI TO Fiii Possibility of floodia1 the pit aad water spreadina in the room. Water will re.. in in the rooa.

H. ANALYSES

1. Analy*is - Sprinkler system in Switchgear Room l*C

2. Analysis - Door between Switchgear iooa 1-C and 590' corridor I. EXEMPTIOH REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 17 of 76 FIRE AREAS 5 AHO 6 Diesel Generators Area 5 Diesel Room 1-1 Area 6 Diesel Room 1-2 Vital Auxiliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 5 Room Numbers 116 and 1168 A. GEHDAL The two elD9rgency diesel generators are housed in separate adjacent enclo-sures defined by three-hour fire walls. Both enclo1ure1 1hare a co1111ton south wall with safety-related Switchgear 1-C. Hain acce11 to individual roo.. i1 via a three-hour door from Switchgear 1-C. Separate day tank roo.. (Fire Area* 7 and 8) for each die1el are located at the north end of each die1el 1enerator rooa.

B. FIRS BilllI!IS D!PIHillC 'IHE Ai!A Hinimua three-hour fire walls with three-hour doors. Acce11 to roo.. via a cOClllllOn ve1tibule u1e1 three-hour doors. Die1el Generator Room 1-1 baa a three-hour door leading to adjacent Switchgear Room 1-C. Three-hour walls and doors lead- to the respective day tank roo... In the vestibule is a double watertight door that leada outside.

C. FIRE DETECTION AllD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by automatic water flow alarm using fusible link sprinklers.

2. Fire Suppre11ion In addition to automatic sprinklers above, portable eztinguishers and acce11 to an interior hose station (60' distance) a1 w.11 &I an outside ho1e bou1e (100 1 frOll either diesel rooa) are provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLI MA'l'EIIALS

1. In Situ C011bu1tible1 Combustible aaterials in this area include ~~all quantities of diesel and lubricatin1 oil a1 well &I variou1 electrical insulating materials.

The likelihood of a potential fire is minimized by proper housekeeping; ie, guardin1 again1t liquid spills, mini*izina collbu1tible1 storage, etc *

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 18 of 76

2. Tran*ient Combustibles Tran*ient combu*tible1 are minimal and strictly controlled~ Transients would con1ist mainly of Clas1 A and some Class B materials.

3. Radioactive Material*

4. Fire Loadin1 Fire loading is li&ht.

E. EMDCDICY SAFE SHUTDOWH !QUIPM!Vl" WHICH COULD Bl AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS Aili All equip..nt and 1y1tems normally a*sociated with Bu1e1 1-C and l-0.

Diesel 1-1 feed* Bua 1-C and Diesel 1-2 feeds Bus 1-D. One die1el and it1 bus will be affected by a fire. Pover will remain available from the redundant diesel* generator and its bus or fro* the offsite 1ource. Refer to OllP 2S.l for a list of equip..nt that could be affected by a fire.

F. SAFE SHUTDOW CAPABILITY AFTD A WOUT CASE Fiii Ill THIS Aa!A Shutdown 1y1t ..1 a11ociated with the redundant die1el 1enerator t~t will-not be affected by fire, will be available. llafer to O!iP 2S.2.

G. POTENTIAL FOi RADIOLOCICAL RELEASE DU! 10 FIU The plant can be safely shut down in the event of a fire. 8adwa1te proc-es1es can be powered by the unaffected diesel. No radiological materials are in th* diesel roo...

H. ANALYSES None I. UEMPTIOll UQUISTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 19 of 76

• FIRE AREAS 7 AND 8 Diesel Generator Day Tanks Area 7 Day Tank 1-1 Area 8 Day Tank 1-2 Vital Auxiliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet S Room Number* 146 and 147 A. G!llBI&

Each GI the two 2,700-gallon day tank* serving the emergency die1el1 is hou1edin an individual, diked enclo1ure de1igned to re1trict the spread of fuel *11illa1** The tank area* are defined by thrn-bour fire walh.

B. FIB.I -IEU DU'UIIllG THE AJlEA Mini.=&a three-hour fire walls with a three-hour door between the day tank area ... related diesel roo** Dikin1 is provided to en1ure again1t spread of fud 1pill*1**

C. Fii! lm!CTIOM AHD SUPPllESSIOM

l. Fi111 detection o.r.ction i1 by discovery *. The day tank area is not normally occupied.

2. F~ Suppre11ion Fi.a eztinguishers and manual ho** line* (see Areas S and 6) are a111ilable for u1e as required. No automatic fire protection equipment ha9 been provided.

D. COHeutnBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Ca11bu1tibles D~l fuel (2,700 gallons each tank)

2. T~ient Ca11bu1tibles Tra111ient ca11bu1tible1 are minimal and strictly controlled. Tran1ients vCllll&t con1i1t mainly of Cla11 A and Cla11 B materials.

J. lajioactive Materials Ficw loading.is heavy.

PR0388-002'&-TP2l

Page 20 of 76 E. EMERCDCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE Illl THIS AREA The associated diesel would be unavailable due to lack of fuel. Refer to OYP 25.l for a list of equipment that could be affected.

F. SAFE SHUTOOWH CAPABILITY AFT!I. A WORST CASI Fii! Iii THIS AB.EA A po1tulated fire in either day tank roOll would be confined by the enclo-sure. Lo11 of a day tank would re1ult in a con1equent 1011 of the a1soci-ated die1el. If a 1011 of either die1el wa1 to occur, shutdown power remain* available fro* the redundant di***l or frOll the off1ite source.

Refer to OllP 25.2.

G. Par!ll'rI.U. FOil IADIOLOCICAL UL!ASI DUI TO FIU The plant can be 1afely shut down in the event of a fire. ladva1te proc-e11e1 can be powered by th* uii.ffected die1el. Ho radioloaical ..terial1 are in the die1el roo...

H. .UW.YSIS Hone I. EDMPTIOll REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01 *

!?age 21 of 76 FIRE AR.EA 9 Intake Structure Vital Turbine Building .El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 136 A* G.ENERAL Major itelllll of equipment housed in the pump room include the three safety-related service water pump1, two dilution pump1, two diesel engine-driven fire pump1, two 480-V HCC1 providin1 electrical power to miscellaneous non1afety-related equip..nt, including a 110tor-driveo fire pump.

B. FIR.! BAIUUERS DEFIMIHC TH! AREA The pump roa. ea1t wall adjacent to the turbine building bas a three-hour fire ratin1 with a 1in1la three-hour fire door in1tallad. All other walls and acce11 have outdoor ezpo1ure with a ... 11 1action common with the diesel pump day tank roe.. iatin1 i1 in ezce11 of three houri. A radiant energy shield wall and a horizontal distance of at laa1t 20 1 separate* one die1al fire pump frCll the other* and the service water PWDP** Control cable* for P-41 have been wrapped in* one-hour fire-resistant material.

C. FIRS: DET!CTIOll AHD SUPPllESSIOll

1. Fire Detection Provided by ultraviolet 1en1ing fire detectors with an alarm to the control room

2. Fire Suppre11ion Automatic sprinklers and portable aztinguishar1 are provided in the pump area. Further protection is available from a hose station in the turbine buildin1 (approzimately 20' distant) a1 well a1 two outdoor ho** hou1e1 approzimately 100 feet from each end of the pump roOll.

D. COHBUSTIBLI MA?D.IALS

1. In Situ Combu1tible1 Combu1tibla materials in thi1 area include 11aall amounts of electrical in1ulatin1 materials in cable tray1 overhead.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient c011bu1tibles are minimal and 1trictly controlled. Transient would consi1t of mainly Clas1 A with 10.. Cla11 B materials *

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 22 of 76

3. Radioactive Materials Noa*

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is light.

. E. EHEllCDICY SAP! SHtrrDOW EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIU IM THIS All!A Equipment used for **f* sh~tdown includes the safety-related service water puaps and the Diesel Fir* Puap P-41. A 1011 of the service water pump1 requires that one of the fire puaps be available for crosstie to provide coolin1 to an ... rgency diesel generator. B.efer to OHP 25.1 for a list of equipment that could be affected.

F. SAFE SHUTOOWI CAPABILITY AFTER A WORSE CASE Fii! II THIS AREA A po1tulated fire involvin& the unlikely event of a Lari* a110unt of spilled diesel fuel and 1iaultaneous i1nition with 1ub1equent spre&d to the cable tray are& would re1ult*in loss of the service water puaps, two fire pumps and dilution pw1p1. One die1el fire pump (P-41) would r ... ia. available.

The plant can go to hot shutdown with one of the auziliary feed puaps but-.

service water or it1 fire water backup i1 required to back up the conden-sate storage tank a1 a source of supply to the auziliary feed water pump and to cool the ... raency diesel generator. For further plant cooldown to cold 1hutdown, either the fire water pump or service water pump is adeqU.tte, althouab tb* spare service water puap motor should be installed before using the shutdovn cooling sy1tem. The radiant shield in1ure1 that one or the other i1 available. Boration of the pri.. ry sy1tea is available.

Refer to OHP 25.2.

G. POTEHTIAL FOi IW>IOLOOICAL OLEA.SI DUI 'l'O Fii!

Radioloaical proce1se1 would not be affected by a fire in this area.

1:1. AMAl.YSIS

l. ladiaat !Deray Shield - Screenhou1e and contain-.nt

2. ScrHnbouH

3. Ho d~~~ction in screenbou** - Not applicable

4. Heed for another drain at the fuel tran1fer puapa

5. Screenhoua* - Eztension of radiant shield

6. Screenhou1e - Additional sprinklers at fuel tranafer pwnps PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 23 of 76

• I.

7.

8.

Screenhouse - Need for sprinklers along west wall Break in diesel fuel line in intake structure EXEMPnON B.EQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 24 of 76 FIR! AR.EA 10 Engineered Safeguards Area East - Zone .A West - Zone 8 Vital Auziliary Building El 570' Ref Drawin1 M-216, Sheet 4 Rooa Humber* 4 and 5 A. CEBEIAL Th* plant safe1uards area, located in th* auziliary buildin1, i1 divided into two separate adjacent fire zones; each zone house* aajor ite., of safety-related equipment used to accoarpli1b plant 1afe shutdown. The east safeguard* room contain* *only Divi*ion I (ri1ht channel) equipment. The wHt safe111ard1 room contain* Di via ion II (left channel) and so* Div-ision I equip..nt.

B. FIRE SAUIEIS DUIMIHG THE AIEA The safe1uards area, includin1 zone separation, is defined by a wall having a minimull tbree-bour fire ratin1. Acce11 to the 1afesuard1 area from the 590' elevation is via a three-hour door aa4 a vatertiaht door. The wall separatiaa both aone1 ha1 a steel watertiaht door, a 1ub1tantial steel plate and i1 judaed equal to a three-hour fire ratin1. Concrete plua* in th* ceilin1 and a 1teel batch in the ceilin1 of Zone 8 provide acce11 to equip..nt fro* above.

C. Fii! DETECTIOll AH1> SUPPRESSION

l. Fire Detection Detection is provided by smoke detectors witb ala11111 to the control roo*.

2. Fire Suppre11ion lo auco.. tic fire protection i1 provided owina to the minimal fire h&aar4 in thia area and the redundant backup 1y1t ..* providedo Por-table fire eztinauishers are available locally with acce11 to a ho1e 1tatioa located on the 590' elevation above.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATDIALS

1. In Situ C011bu1tibles COlllbustible materials in this area include lubricant* and electrical wiring insulation and some anti-C clothin1.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 25 of 76

• 2.

3.

Tranaient Combustibles Tranaient combustibles are minimal and are strictly controlled.

Transients would conaiat mainly of used anti-C clothing.

Radioactive Materials Contaminated anti-C clothing may be in the area. The piping and pumps contain radioactive fluids.

4. Fire Loading Fir* loadiaa is minimal.

!. EMDCEHCY SAF! SHtrl'DOW EQUIPMDT WHICH COULD BB AJ'F!Cf!D BY A FIR! HI THIS Aili Zone A contain* Division I, HP and LP aafety injection puap1, contairunent spray puap1 aad a1eociated miscQllanaou1 equip11ient. Zone B contain*

Di vi lion II equip*nt, is similar to Zone A above and also contain* the third auailiary feedwater puap. Refer to OIP 25.1 for ~ li1t of equipment.

Redundancy ia provided by each of the two *diviaiona.

F. SAFE SHUIDOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WQIST CASE Fiii Ill THIS AIU Redundancy ia provided by equipment as1ociated with the unaffected zone, ()t' by *dditional backup syste1H, ie, the conuinmnt spray pUllp is a backup to the LP safety injection pump. 'nle HP safety injection puap1 in thi1 location are part of the diverse sy1c .. for injectina boron into the core in ca1e of a failure of all three charging pilap1. Refer to OHP 25.2.

G. POTEJITIAL FOi IADIOLOCICAL ULEAS! DUI M FIRE The plant can be safely shut down using redundant equipment. Pos1ible airborne relea1e if contaminated anti-Ci are involved. Contaminated fluids may be relea1ed. l.adioactivity would remain in the ausiliary building.

H. ANALYSIS None I. illllP'l'lOll REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 26 of FI RE AREAS 11 AHD 12 Battery Rooe*

Area 11 Battery loom A Area 12 Battery Rooe B Vital Auziliary Buildins El 607'~"

Ref Dravin1 M-216, Sh 6 RoOll lumber* 225 and 2251 A. GEHEIAL Two redundant battery 1y1tems are available for 1upplyin1 control power to the varioua plant vital loada. !acb 1y1t .. i1 pby1ically 1eparace and electrically i1olated fro* the other, havin1 it* own battery, battery charier and di1tribution bu1. Batteriea are hou1ed in individual enclo-1ure1, 1eparated by a cOlllmOn wall, located adjacent to the cable 1preading roo* area. A continuou1ly operatin1 ventilation 1y1t .. cOSJllOn to both room1 provide* protection a1ain1t hydroaen aa* accumalatioa fro* the batterie1, thereby *iniaizin1 the collbu1tible hazard in thia area.

8. Fiii BAUIW DUUIIHC 'l'BI All&

Battery roo* enclo1ure1 have a three-hour fire ratina.* Entry into Battery loo* a i1 via a 1in1le-acce11, three-hour fire door fro* the cable spread~

roo*. the ace*** door.betvffn Battery lo0111 A and Bia a thrH-hour door.

c. Fiii DETECTIOll AHD SUPPUSSIOM

1. Fire Detection Detection i1 provided by smoke detector1.

2. Fire Suppre11ioa Fire fightina equip... nt includes portable eztinguishers and ho1e 1tation1 located in the adjacent cable spreading roa. and turbine buildin1.

D. COMBUSTIILI MATll.IALS

~. Ia Situ Ca.bu1tible1 Combuatibl* aaterial1 include hydrogen ga1 ventilated fro* the bat-terie1, a11orted plastic material* 111-..1 ~*1r battery cell con1truction and a s.. 11 quantity of electrical wirin1 in1ulation.

2. Tran1ient Combu1tibles Transient cocabu1tible1 are minimal and consist mainly of Cla11 A materials.

PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

Page 27 of 76

• 3.

4.

Radioactive Materials Fire Loading Fir* loading is light.

E. EMEiCEHCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD B! AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS Aili The two-battery systems provide control power to redundant safety-related syate.. required for shutdown. Lo11 of a 1in1le-batter7 by fire would leave the r ... inin1 supply ayatem* as well as the second battery 1y1tem available for powerin1 the safety loads required for plant shutdown. Refer to OHP 25.l for a list of equipment.

F. SA.F! SHUTOOW CAPABILITY AFTEi A WORST CAS! P'Iil Ill THU ill!

Required safety syatema have power available from the r ... ining battery charger and associated equipment. Redundancy ia provided by the aecond battery sy*t... Refer to ONP 25.2.

C. POTDITIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DU! 'l'O FIRE The plant can be safely shut down using the redundant battery. Radio-logical processes would not be affected by a fire in this area.

H. AHALYSES Fire door between cable spreading room and battery room I. EXEMPTION RF.QUESTS None

• 125-V de control center, battery charger, de distribution panel, inverters and preferred ac buses. Upon automatic isolation of the failed battery frOlll the battery bua, power continues to be provided by the battery charger, provided 480-V supply power to the charger remains available.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 28 of 76 FI9.E AREA 13 Zone A Auziliary Building 590' Corridor Vital Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 5

!loom Humber 106 A. GDIEIAL Thi1 area ce11prise1 the 590' elevation con:idor of the auziliary building and radwa1te buildin1. The corridor i1 "W" 1haped. The corridor is con1tructed of reinforced concrete with ICIN concrete block wall1. The corridor provide* acce11 to the variou1 roo.. on thi1 elevation.

B. FIR! BA.lllIEIS DUIHHIG TH! AREA See Fire Zone1 4, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.

C. FIR! DIT!CTIOI AllD SUPPUSSIOll

l. Fire Detection Detectioa i1 provided by saok* detector* in about one-half of the area.

2. Fire Suppre11ion Portable estin1ui1her1 are provided throuahout the con:idor. Several ho1e 1tation1 are available in the con:idor.

D. COMBUSTIBLE HATDIALS

1. In Situ Caabu1tible1 Immediately out1ide Switchgear lloomi lC, fire loadin1 i1 moderate and con1i1t1 of cable in1ulation. Other section* of the con:idor have ne1li1ible a110unt1 of cable.

2. Trall9iUt Combu1tiblH Sam. radva1te tra1h ba11 may b9 pre1ent. In addition, so.. Cla11 B

. .cerial1 . ., be pre1ent.

3. Radioactive Material*

Low-level contaminated radwa1te may be pre1ent.

4. Fire Loadin1 Fire loadin1 varies from minimal to moderate.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 29 of 76

• E. EMERGENCY SAF! SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD SE AFFECTED SY A FIRE IN THIS AUA Many of the same circuits that are found in Zones 4, 9 and 15 are in this area. Refer to OHP 25.1 for a list of equipment.

• F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA Saae as Zones 1, 4, 9 and 15. An alternate method of shutdown totally independent and separate from this area is available. 'lbe auziliary shutdown panel i1 available. OHP 25.2 would be used to shut down the plant.

C. POT!liTIAL FOil RADIOLOGICAL i!L!ASE DUE TO Fiii Low-level radioactive particulate matter could beco.. airborne aa a reault of a fire involvin1 tranaient materiala. The 1make would be contained within the auziliary buildin1.

H. ANALYSES

1. Analy1i1 - Mo dampers in ducts between chargin1 pump room and corridor

2. Analyaia - Door between Swi tch1ur lloo. 1-C and 590' corridor

3. Analy1i1 - Metal plate in cableway floor

4. Detection in the 590' elevation of Ausiliary Buildin1

5. Adequacy of the steel plate in the 1-D 1vitch1ear cablavay I.. EUMPTIOll REQUESTS Suppression in corTidor granted July 12, 1985 *

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 30 of 76 FIR! Ai.EA 13 Zone 8 Ch.argin1 Pump Room Vital Auxiliary Buildin1 El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 5 Room Numbers 104, 104A and 1048 A. GDIDAL The charging pump room, located in the .su.ziliary building, houses the three cbar1in1 pu11p1 uaed to inject boron into the core for cold shutdown and to provide PSC inventory and pressure control. Electrical power for each motor-driven P"8P i1 supplied fro* a safety-Telated 480-Y ac source. Pumps A and B are fed fro* 480-V Bua Ho 12 with cable routin1 provided via a .

c~n cabh tray. Pump C ii fed fro* 480-Y Bua Ila 11 via a Hparate cable tray and conduit syst*. Pumpa B and C can also be powered fro* I.CC 13.

Radiation shield wall barriers are provided between each puap area. Ace***

to the P"8P roo* area is via a re1tricted acce11 corridor.

B. FIB.£ IWUlI!U DIFillillC THB All!A Protective radiation shield wall* are provided around each **parate pump.-*

Each puaip area i1 open on one side to a com111Dn 1cce11 corridor. A three-hour barrier is provided betw..n the corridor and tbe 602' pipevay. A tunnel-like entrance to the area from the corridor provide* ace****

C. FIRE DETECTIOIJ AHD SUPPUSSIOH

l. Fire Detection Detection i1 provided by smoke detectors with 1lar111 to the control roo11.

2. Fire Suppression AutOllAtic sprinkler* are provided in the area. Portable e.ztinguishers aad a ho1e 1tation approximately 60' distant are provided for use 11 required.

D. COMBUSTIBLI MATDIALS

l. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include small quant1t1es of lubri-cant, electrical wirin1 insulation and cont ..inated articles of clothing

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 31 of 76

• 2. Tran'aient Combustibles Tranaient combuatibles would consist of used anti-C clothing, other Cla** A materials and minor amounts of Cla11 B materials.

3. Radioactive Materials Contaminated anti-C clothing. Radioactive fluid* are ~otally contained within pipin1 and pumpa.

4. Fire Loadin1 Fire loadin1 ia minimal.

E. EMERCEHCY SAFE SBtn'DOW EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD Bl AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA Char1in1 Pump* A, B and C. Functional diversity ia provided by the two HP safGty injection pumps. Refer to OHP 25.l for a liat of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOW CAPABILITY AFTEB. A WORST CASE FIB.i I1i THIS AB.EA A 1011 of all three pump* ia conaidered highly unlikely due to the minimal fire loadin1 and cable separation for the puap1. If a 1011 of all three char1in1 puap1 by fire is po1tulated, the HP injection pump P-668 can provide a diver** and redundant mean1 of injectina boron into the core.

Refer to OllP 25.2.

G. POT!HTIAL FOR llADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE 'l'O Fii!

The plant can be safely shut down uaing the HP inJection pump. Poasible airborne relea1e if contaminated anti-Ca are involved. Radioactive material would re.. in in the a~ziliary building.

H. ANALYSIS No dampers in duct* between charging pump room and corridor I. EXEMPTIOll HQUISTS Yone

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 32 of FIRE AREA 13 Zone C Waste Ga* Decay Room Nonvital Au.ziliary Building El 590' Ref Drawina H-216, Sheet 5 Room Numbers 101, 102 and 103 A. GEHEIAL The wa*t* ga* decay room contain* equipment ***etttial to the safe handling of fi1*ion ga*es removed froa the variou1 concaaiaated fluid* collected tbrouahout the plane. '111is room also contain* the controlled chemi1try laboratory and laundry drain pump* uHd in the proceuia1 of liquid WHte material*. Major equipment itelll9 de*cribed above include large steel tank enclo1ure*, coapre**ors, pwap1, valves and a11ociated piping.

8. FIJl! IWll.IERS DEFiliiliG THE AllEA providina a m1n1mua three-hour fire racina. AA:ce11 i1 frOll the *outh..1t corner of tba va1te SH co.preuor ro* via a **bad wire 1uard gate. The decay t.nkl, Ya1te ga1 compre11or*, and tbtl laundry aad controlled cb...

laboratory drain tank pump* are houaed in chr.. 1eparate compartaeac1.

• Acce11 to eacb 1eparate coaparc..nt i1 provided tbrouab a 1ub1tantial scee door.

i*t*

The va*te ga1 decay roo* is contained within a ti.avy radiation *bield wall C. FIJl! D!TECTIOll AHD SUPPRESSIOll

1. Fire Detection Detection i1 provided by discovery.

2. Fire Suppre11ion A portable dry ch. .ical extinguisher i* provided in tti. south corridor area, approai*tely 20 1 away. A boH 1tation is available.

D. COMBUSTIBLE ~IALS

1. ID Situ Ca11bu1tibles C011bu1tible .. cerials in chis area include electrical wiring insulation.

2. Tran1ient Combustibles Contaminated anti-C clothing

3. Radioactive Materials Contaminated anti-C clothing and the radioactive ga1es in the tank*

PR0388-0026A-TP21

?age JJ of 76

4. Fire Loadin8 Fire loading is minimal.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIR! IH THIS Ai.EA None of the 1y1te.. affected by a po1tulated fire are required for plant shutdown. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTEllTIAL- FOi RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DU! TO FIRE The plant can be safely shut down in the event of a fire in thi1 room. An overpre11urization and po11ible rupture of the decay tanks as a re1ult of firQ ar~ pr~veneed by automatic relievin1 to the va1te gaa 1ur1* tank.

Capability for va1te ga1 proce11in1 is not affected by a fire since a backup coapres1or and multiple decay tanks are available for use as required.

H. ANALYSIS None I* EXEMPTIOH REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 34 of 76 FIRE AREA 13 Zone D Decontamination Room Nonvital Ausiliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 5 Room Number 111 A. GENEllAL The deconcaai.nation room serves as a washdown and maintenance facility for concaai.nated plane equipment and tools used durin1 normal plant operation.

There is no plane operating equipment in chis roo*.

B. FIB.£ BA.UIEIS DEFIHINC THE AIEA The deconcaainacion room is enclosed by wall* for1111d by a short ti.11 and th* filtered waate monitor pump roo* co the east, the spent fuel equipment room to the vest, cbe bot inatruaent shop to the south and the north access corridor. Ace*** is via two ga1keted doora located opposite .. ch other in the north and south walls. A separate south wall entrance ~nto the hot inatrutl9Dt shop i1 provided. The wall* provide a miniaua two-hour rating overall. Acceas to the equipment ia throuah 1ub1tantial st .. l doers. The equipmnt va1bdown area is bounded by a 6" protective curb and drainage -

• syste9 for control of contaainated 11&terial.

C. FlllE DETECTIOll MID SUPPRESSIOH

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by discovery.

2. Fire Suppre11ion A portable dry chemical extinguisher and nearby hose station is provided outside the south entrance.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATDIALS

1. In Situ Coabustibles Ca.bu1tible materials in this area con1i1t of a11orted decont ..ination supplies, including polyethylene sheets used in handling contaminated item.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles consist mainly of Class A materials such as polyethylene bags.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 35 of 76

3. Radioaccive Materials Mo1c materials in che room can be assumed to be contaminated.

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is minimal.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN TIHS AREA Refer co ONP 25.1.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIKE Ill THIS AllEA The plant would be able to safely shut down in the event of a fire in this area. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTEl!TIAL FOR RADIOLOCICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIR!

Any airborne low-level radioactive materials relea1ed by combu1tion of contaminated mat~rials in the decontamination roo* will remain confined to the immediate area by the ventilation filterin1 1y1te* provided.

H. ANALYSIS

• I.

None EXEMPTION REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 36 of 76 FIRE AREA 13 Zone !

Waste Gas Processing Room Nonvital Auxiliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing M-216, Sheet 5 Room Number 120

. A. GENERAL The waste gas processing room contains miscellaneous mechanical equipment used in proces1in1 fission gases which are removed froa various contami-nated fluids collected throughout the plane. This roOll also includes equip.. nc used in the processing of liquid waste materials prior to dis-charge from the plane. Major hardware con1i1t1 of lar1* steel tank enclo-sures, pu11p1, valves and a1sociated pipin1.

8. FIR! BARRIERS DEFINING TH! AREA The roo* defined above is contained wit.hin a heavy radiation shield wall providin1 a ainimua three-hour fire ratin1. The tvo access doors serving the roo* are throu1h substantial steel doors.

C. FIB.! D!TECTIOH AH'D SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by discovery.

2. Fire Suppression A portable dry chemical extinguisher is available nearby. Additional extinguishers and a hose station are located approximately 60' away.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Combustibles COllbustibl* materials in this area include electrical wiring insulation.

2. Tran1ient Ca.bu1tibtes Transient combustibles are minimal.

3. Radioactive Materials Radioactive gases contained in tanks 4.. Fire Loading Fire loading is minimal.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page J 7 of 76 E. EMERCDICY SAFE *sHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA None of the systems affected by a postulated fire are required for plant shutdown. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTDITIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE All radioactive materials will be safely contained within the p1p1ng 1y1tem. Temporary los1 of wa1te proce11in1 capability may result.

H. ANALYSES None I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page J8 of 76 FIRE AR.EA 13 Zone F Boric Acid Equipment Room Vital Auziliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 5 Room Numbers 107, 108, 109 and 110 A. GENERAL The boric acid equipment room contains miscellaneous equipment associated with th* concentrated boric acid injection system u1ed in achieving plant cold 1hutdown. Other equipment in this roo*, not related to the above, include variou1 components of th* liquid radwaste system. Major hardware consists of larg* steel tank enclosures, pump1 and associated pipin1 and a control panel used for locally operatin1 the boric acid injection system.

B. FIRE BAlllIE~ DEFINING THE AB.EA The roo* is enclo1ed by a combination.concr*te and removable block wall havin1 an esti11ated two-hour fir* rating. Isolation of the.treated and filt*r*d wait* monitoring tanks and pump 11 provided by a separate walled enclo1ure, with access through a substantial steel dqor. Entrance into th boric acid tanks and puap room is open. Boric acid 1pills ar* confined a 20" removable plate d* acr~11 the entrance opening. Th* boric acid co~trol panel area is open to th* adjacent south corridor.

C. FIRE DETECTIOH AND SUPPRESSION 1 *. Fire Detection Detection is provided by discovery.

2. Fire Suppres1ion Portable ch ..ical extinguishers and a ho** station are available nearby.

• D. COMBUSTIBLI MATERIALS l~ In Situ Coabu1tibles C011bu1tible materials in this area include electrical wiring in1ulation.

2. Tran1ient C011bustibles Tran1ient combustibles are minimal con1isting of Cla11 A materials.

3. Radioactive Materials None PR0388-0026A-TP21

'. Page 39 of 76

• E.

4. Fir* Loading Fir* loadin1 i1 minimal.

EMERCEHCY SAFE SHtrrDOWll EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA Two boric acid pump* and associated filter unit and inventory from both boric acid storage tank* and sy1tem local control panel. Refer to ONP 25.l for a li1t of equipment.

F. SU! SHUTOOWH CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIB.! Ill THIS AREA Adequate provi1ion i1 mad* for en1urin1 that concentrated boric acid or borated water i1 available to the char1in1 pumps a1 required, u1in1 gravity feed fro. the two boric acid tarik1 or fro* the 1afety injection and re-fuelin1 water tank. Functional diver1ity ia provided by the two high-prHaur* 1afety injection pump* - lff aaalyli* fo?: Fire Ar=~ 10. Control of the puap1 and valve* a11ociatld with this 1y1te9 remain* available from the main control room in the event that the local control panel i1 lost in a fire. Refer to OHP 2S.2.

G. POTDITIAL FOi llADIOLOCICAL RELEASE DUE TO "fIR!

All radioactive materials a11ociated with the liquid radwaate 1y1tem will -

be 1afely contained within.the 1y1t .. pipin1. Te11porary 1011 of waste proce11iag capability may re1ult, however.

H. ANALYSIS None I. EXEMPnOlll B.EQUISTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

?age 40 of FIRE AREA 14

• Reactor Containment Building Vital Reactor Building El 570', 590', 607'6", 625' and 649' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 4-8 Room Numbers - Various A. GENERAL The reactor containment building is approzimately 120' in diameter and 190' tall. 'nle concrete walls are approzimately 4' thick. nie dome-sti.ped top is approzim.tely 3 1 thick concrete. 'nle reactor containaent buildin1 hou*** the nuclear steam supply sy1te* and varioua support equipment. The normal entryway i1 tbrou1h the per1onnel airlock. An e.. r1ency personnel

• acce11 i1 the 1econd acce11 and egre11 route. Alao, there is an equipment hatch which i1 clo1ed durin1 plant operation. 'l'be two electrical cable penetration area1 for oppo1ite divi1iona are separated froa each other by approzimately 70'. The reactor coolant puap1 are separated from each other by approzimately 25'.

B. FIRE IWUlIEIS DEFUIING THE AlEA The reactor containment building wall* have a fire re1istance rating in ezc*** of tbr.. hours. The equip..nt batch ia jud1ed to have a fire reaiatance in ezce11 of two houra. The peraoanel ace*** and emergency accea1 hatchea have double doors. Th*** double door* are judged to have a fire reaistance of three hours.

C. FIRE DETECTION AHO SUPPRESSION

l. Fire Detection Detection 'ia by discovery in mo1t sections or will be indicated by ambient temperature readouts in the control rooa if tbe burn rate is faater than the heat removal rate for containment cooling. The reactor coolant pump bearing teaqierature readout and motor winding teaqierature readout will give indication of a fire. Saoke detectors are installed in the air roa. and in the cable penetration area1 with alarms to the control roo*.

2. Fire Protection No automatic fire protection equipment is provided. Four portable C02 fire eztinguisbers are provided inside containaent. Two hose reels are provided near areas of combustibles.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

?age 41 of 76 D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Combustibles Combustible m.terial in the area includes lube oil for the reactor coolant pumps, 80 gallons each, grease in the polar crane gearbox and grease in the refueling bridge gearboz as well a1 cable inaulation.

The two cable penetration areas contain cable in trays.. The trays snake throughout containment.

2. Tranaient Combustibles No transient combuatibles are preaent when the plant ia in operation.

During shutdown, various Claas A and B materials rtl'/ be present. All tran1ients are removed before start-up.

3. Radioactive Materials Everythin1 in containment is considered to be contaminated or

-* radioactive.

4. Fire Loadin1 Fire loading overall is minim.l with small zones of moderate loading.

E. EMERGDICY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPHEHT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FU! IN TH!S AR.EA All pumps and motors associated with shutdown and cooldown are outside the*

containment buildin1. Only steam and feedwater piping associated with shutdown and cooldown are inside the containaent building. Safety injec-tion tank*, variou1 valves and pipes a11ociated with safety-related systems and electrical cable aa1ociated with motor-operated valves and with instru-mentation. Refer to ONP 25.1 for a list of equip...nt.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWll CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IM THIS AREA A postulated de1ign basis fire in either cable penetration area could envelop all cables of the one penetration area. '11lese cable penetration areaa an physically Hpara'ted by approzimately 70', thua a fire at one penetratioa area would not be expected to spread to the other. A postu-lated fire at any one of four reactor coolant pUllp motors would be confined to the area of that particular puap. The reactor coolant pump motor electrical cablea are on the opposite side of the lube oil sump and are routed from belov 10 a 'llO:or or lube oil fire would not be ezpected to spread back along the cables. An oil collection systea is provided on the reactor coolant pump motors and will prevent an oil fire. Refer to ONP 25.2.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 42 of 76 G. POTDITIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE All radioactivity will be contained within this area.

H. ANALYSES

1. Radiant energy shield - Screehouae and containment

2. Analy1ia - Detectors in cable penetration areaa of containment I. EXEHPnOlll UQUESTS

1. In1trum.nt separation in air room

2. Cable separation in air room PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 43 of 76 FIRE AREA 15 Engineered.Safeguard1 Panel Room Vital Auziliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing M-216, Sheet 5 Room Number 121

. A. GEHEILAL The en1ineered Safesuard1 Panel C-33 is located adjacent to the radwaste control panel on the S90' level and provides plane remote 1hutdown capabi-lity under 111ergency coadition1, ie, escre11e ca*** where control room evacuation bcco.. 1 nece11ary. The en;ineered 1afe1uard1 panel i1 cla11i-fied as 1afecy-related equipment. Ocher major equipment contained in this fire area include 1afecy-related 480-V MCC1, Ho 7 and Ho 8.

8. Fiii BADIEIS D!FIHIHC THE All!A The 1afeguard1 panel area is enclo1ed by three-hour fire wall1. Access i1 provided via three separate eotryvayi. The doors to the corridor are three-hour rated. The door to th* boronmeter rooa i1 unrated.

C. FIIE D!T!Cl'IOH AMD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection

• 2.

Detection is provided by smoke detectors. Thia area i1 operator patrolled at lea1t twice durin1 each 1hift.

Fire Suppreuioo No automatic fire protection has been provided for thi1 area *. A portable fire eztin1uisher is located within the de1ignated fire area.

Additional eztin1ui1her1 and a 50' hose station are located in th*

corridor area outside the rooa, approzi .. tely 30' distant.

D. COMBUSTIBLE HATEl.IALS

l. In Situ Coabu1tible1 Combustible materials in this area include electrical in1ulatin1

. .teriala io cable trays overhead.

2. Transient Coabu1tible1 Transient c011bu1tible1 consist of minor amount* of Cla11 A materials.

3. Radioactive Material*

Non*

PROJ88-0026A-TP21-TP01

Page 44 of 76

4. Fir* Loading Fir* loading ia moderate.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHtrrDOWll EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD B! AFFECTED BY' A FIRE IN THIS AREA The engineered safeguard* panel provides for emergency shutdown u a back.up syate* to the main control roet1. HCC* No 7 and No 8, adjacent co each other but separated f roa the safeguards panel by the radvast* control panel, provide 480-V power to redundant heater load* associated with the concentrated boric acid 1yste... Th*** heaters ensure that bi1b concen-tration boric acid remains in the liquid phase and is available to the chargin1 syat... Refer to OllP 25.1 for a list of equipment.

Various other 1afety- and nonaafety-related loads in addition to l and 2

• above derive power from MCCs 7 and a. Major equipment includes the control roo* air-bandlin1 systea, diesel generator room ventilation fans and the fuel-bandlin1 area ventilation syst ...

F. SAFE SHUTDOWll CAPABILITY AFTll A WOUT CA.SB Fiii !11 THIS Al&\

Loss of total M~ power would require backup fuel pool coolin1 via a temporary pipe connection to the shutdown cooliaa 1y1t... t.o.1 of power co

• heater load* noted in It .. C.l and ventilation equipment noted in It** C.3.

may require plant shutdown in accordance uitb Plant Technical Specifica-tion* require..nca. Lo11 of the radva1te control panel in a fire would not reault in inadvertent release of radioactive .. cerial1 free the plant. All gaseou1 .and liquid radioactive wait* would re. . in in their respective piping and tanka. Th* Auziliary Shutdown Panel C-150 would be used to safely shut down the plant. Refer to OllP 25.2.

G. POTDITIAL FOi RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUI TO Piii The plant can be safely ibut down u1in1 the auziliary ahutdown panel.

Radiological proc***** can be controlled locally.

e. AlW.YSES Analy1i* - Door bet ...en engineered safeguards panel roo* and boron.meter roo*

Analyli1 - Boundary cban1* enginHred aafe1uard1 panel room

• I. DEMPTIOll Rf.QUESTS Fire 1uppre1aion in roo* granted July 12, 1985.

PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

Elage 45 of 76 FIRE AREA 16 Component Cooling Pump Room Vital Auziliary Building !l 590', 607' 6", 625 1 Ref Drawings H-216, Sheets 5, 6 and 7 Room Numbers 123, 238 and 338 A. CEHEllAL The component cooling pump room provides a comnon enclosure for the three safety-related cooling pumpa. Electrical power for the puapa is derived from the 2.4-kV switchgear located on the 590' and 607'6" elevation* (see analy1is for Fire Areal 3 and 4). Power cables to each pump motor are routed via 1eparate conduit. Redundancy ia provided aince only one of the three puap* ia required for cold shutdown.

B. FIB.E BAllIEU DEFIHIHG THE AIEA The pump roe. enclosure is bounded by three-hour fire walls. Acces1 is provided to the north-end corridor via a waterti1ht door and an inner door and to the 607' 6" level above via an open atairway. Pump spacing ia 12' center to center. A pressure release openin1 ia located in the wall to the turbine building. The annuli around the main steaa pipea and feedwater pipea are not sealed. Theae opening* are negli1ible when compared co the pre11ure release opening.

c. FIR! DETECTIOH AND SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by smoke detectors on the first level.

2. Fire Suppression No auto.. tic fire protection is provided owing to the minimal fire hazard in this area and the redundant backup equipment provided.

Portable fire eztinguishers and a hose station are available nearby.

D. COMBUSTIBLE HAT!IIALS

l. In Situ C011bu1tible1 Co.bustible materials in this area include minimal anti-C clothing, lubricant* and electrical wiring insulation for three ~Ull'~s.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles are minimal and are strictly controlled.

Transients would consist mainly of Class A materials.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 46 of

3. Radioactive Materials Contami~ted anti-C clothing may be present.

4. Fire Loading

• Fire loading is mini~l.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AR.EA The three c011ponent coolin1 water pump1 are located in thi1 area. Refer co OHP 25.1 for a li1t of equipaenc.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE Fiii Ill THIS Aa!A Redundancy is provided by service water puap1 not affected by the fire. A spare motor and power cable can be installed, if nece11ary. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTEHTIAL FOi IADIOLOOICAL RELEASE DU! TO Fiii The plant can be safely shut down uain1 redund&at equip..nt. Po11ible airborne reha1* if contaminated clothin1. i1 involved. Radioactivity woul.

remain in the a&&ailiary buildin1. The flow of air i1 fro* the turbine .

buildin1 into the room. * .

• H. ANALYSIS Detection in the CCW roOlll I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None .

PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 47 of 76 FI RE AR.EA l 7 Refueling and Spent ~uel Pool Area Vital Au.ziliary Building El 649' Ref Drawings H-216, Sheet 8 and H-605 Room Numbers 220, 221, 222 and 415

. A. GENEB.AL Plant refueling and fuel storage areas are located on th* auziliary building operating floor level, adjacent to the containm.nt building. S~ce is provided for sp.nt fuel and shipping cask storal* as well as the various equip. .nt used during normal fuel-handling operations. Nev fuel storage is also contained within this general area.

B. FIRE BAUIERS DEFINING THE AREA Separation between the fuel storage area and adjacent ar*a* within the contain.ID9nt buildin1 is provided by a minimua three-hour fire wall. The remaining encloaure, having outdoor exposure, us*s convuitional noncombust-ible construction. Steel equipment hatch cov*rs do not hav* a three-hour fir* rating. Access to the 649' lev*l refueling and fuel storage areas is via elevator and stairway, both isolated from th* fire area by doors tulving a 1-1/2-hour fire rating. *.

C. FIR! DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION

l. Fir* Detection Detection is by discovery and smoke detectors in the north end with alarms to the control room.

2. Fire Suppression No automatic fire protection equipment is provided. Portable fire extinguishers are available as required. Access is provided to a hose station.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

l. Ia Situ Combustibles Ca.bustibl* materials in this area include various cont&11inated mainte-nance su~plies ~nd solvents includin1 rop*s, hoses, wood, paints, etc.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles would include more of that described in 1.

Contaminated anti-C clothing and trash may be present.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 48 of 76

3. Radioactiv* Materials Contaminated anti-C clothing and trash.

located in the storage pits.

Spent fuel and new fuel are

4. Fire Loading Fir* loading is moderate.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 49 af 76 E. EMERCEHCY SAFl!:°SHlrrOOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IH THIS AREA The ability to safely shut down the plant is not affected by a fire in this area. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTDITIAL FOi llADIOLOCICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE Contaminated clothing or trash may be involved in a fire. Slloke would remain in area. Nev and spent fuel would not be affected by a fire because they are located below the floor or under water.

H. ANALYSES Mo sprinklers in spent fuel pool area I. EXEKPTIOH REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 50 of FIRE AiEA 18 Demineralizer Area Nonvical Auxiliary Building El 607'~'

Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 6 Room Number 223 A* CElf EllAL The demineralizer area contain* mechanical equipaent and piping as1ociaced with the radva*te and reactor water cleanup sy*tem9. The radwa*te demine-ralizer* and purification filter* are u**d durin1 batch proc***in1 of plane wa*te* a* dictated by plant operation. The cheaical and volWlll control demineralizer* and purification filter* provide control of corro*ion and fis*ion product* in the reactor coolant througb a continuou1 feed and bleed stream to and from the reactor coolant 1y*tea.

B. FIRE BilllIEIS DEFINING THE AREA The demineralizer area i1 contained within a heavy radiation 1bield wall providing a ainiaua three-hour fire ratin1. CoDtrolled ace*** i* via a me*h*d wire 1uard 1ate. In1id** the deaineralizer* and filter unit* are further **parated fro* each other by radiation 1hield wall*. Acee** co t deaiaeralizer1 i* provided via removable *hield plus* located on the 625r level. The filter units are acces1ible fro* the central operating area on the 611' level through a sub*tantial steel door. The de11iaeralizer area is not noraally occupied.

C. FIRE DETECTIOH A!lD SUPPUSSIOH

1. Fire Detection Detection is by. discovery.

2. Fire Suppres1ion A portable dry chemical extinguisher is provided in the controlled corridor out*ide the demi.neralizer area entrance.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATDIALS

1. In Situ Caabu1tibles Combustible mar ... .,: .'l* in chis area include electrical in*ulation associated with a small num~r of in*truments.

2. Tran*ient COlllbu*tibles Tran*ient combustibles are minimal and consist mainly of Class A materials.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 51 of 76

• 3. Radioactive Materials Contami~ted anti-C clothing and radioactive fluids enclosed in pipes and filters.

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is minimal.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN TifIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA None of the equipment affected by a postulated fire is required for shut-down or control of radiological release. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTENTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE Radioactive water will remain the closed pipes and filters.

H. ANALYSIS None I.. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 52 of 76 FIR£ AREA 19 Compactor - Track Alley Area Nonvital Awr:iliary Building El 625' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 7 Room Number 329 A. *GENERAL The compactor area, located in the auziliary building, north end, serves as a depot for truck shipment to and from the plant, in addition to housing equipment used for the compaction of contaminated waste into drums, for subsequent di1po1al. This equipment is not safety related. Combustible materials in this area include a general accU11Ulation of low-level radio-active trash.

B. FIRE IWUlIEIS DEPUIUIC THE Aili The compaction roOll is bounded to the north, south and west sides by a concrete wall havin1 an estimated three-hour fire rating. The east wall ha* a metal roll door leading outside. Ace*** to the adjacent auziliary building boric acid tank area is via a substantial steel door. North wall access has substantial steel doors leading into the new radwa1te facilities

• building. A steel plate hatch cover is provided for overhead crane access -

to the refueling area.

C. FIRE DETEC'l'ION AllD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is by discovery.

2. Fire Suppression Automatic dry pipe sprinklers are provided. A portable water eztin-guisher (2-1/2-gallon) is available in the compactor area. An outdoor hose house i* available nearby for use as required. A fire system standpipe is also available just inside the new radwaste building.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATDIALS

1. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include a general accu1a1lation of low-level radioactive trash and a small amount of electrical wiring insulation.

PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

Page 53 of 76

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles consist of various amounts of low-level radio-active trash, mainly Class A materials. Amounts range from minimal to moderate.

3. Radioactive Materials Radioactive materials consist of various amounts of low-level, Class A trash.

4. Fire Loading Fire loading varies from minimal to moderate.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IH THIS AREA No effect G. POT!l:HTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE Low-level radioactive particulate matter could become airborne as a result of a fire involving accumulated trash materials.

H. ANALYSIS None I. EXEMPTIOH REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP2l

Page 54 of 76 nRE AREA 20 Spent fuel*. Pool Equipment Room Vital Auxiliary Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 5 Room Numbers 113, llJA, 114 and 115 A *. GENERAL The spent fuel pool equipment area houses equipment used to remove decay heat from the spent fuel pool which is generated by the stored spent fuel elements. Major items include heat exchangers, pump1, tanks, filters and as1ociated piping.

B. FIRE BARRIERS DEFINING THE AREA The spent fuel pool equipment area is contained within a heavy radiation sheild wall providing a minimwa three-hour fire rating. Inside, the pumps, filters and deminer.tizer tank are further isolated from each other and the heat ezchanger units by partitioning walli. Acce11 to the general area from the south side corridor is through a substantial steel door. Some negli1ible openings may exist in some penetration1.

C. FIRE DETECTIOH AND SUPPRESSIOH

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by discovery.

2. Fire Suppression A* portable dry chemical extinguisher and hose station is provided in the south corridor area, approximately 20' away.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

l. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include electrical wiring insulation.

2. *rran*ient Combu1tibles Tran1ient combustibles are minimal consisting mainly of Clas1 A materials.

3. Radioactive Materials Possible contaminated anti-C clothing. Radioactive water in pipes and pumps.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page SS of 76

• 4. Fire Loading Fire loading is minimal.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA Refer to ONP 25.l for a list of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA' No effect on plant shutdown or cooldown. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTENTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE Radioa~tive water will remain in the pipes and pump*.

H. ANALYSIS None I. . EXEMPTION REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21 I

____ij

Page 56 of 76 FIRE AREA 21 Electric Equipment Room Honvital Auxiliary Building El 607' 6" Ref Drawings H-216, Sheet 6, and H-3 A. GENERAL The electric equipment room provides a location for various nonsafety-related load centers and motor control centers. All panel1 are enclosed.

B. FIRE BARB.IERS DEFINING THE AREA The fire are. is bounded by three-hour rated concrete walls and floor. The ceiling is concrete on metal pan. The ceiling is ezpected to*withstand any fire in thi1 rooa due to the minimal fire loading. A three-hour rated fire door leads to Switchaear Room 1-D.

C. FIRE DETECTION AHD SUPPRESSION

• 1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by smoke detector* which alarm in the.control roo*.

2. Fire Suppres1ion Suppres1ion is provided by automatic sprinklers. Portable fire extin-guishers are located in the room.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATEB.IALS

1. In Situ C0111bu1tible1 Combustible materials in this area include electrical cable insulation in cable trays and enclosed panels.

2. Tran1ient Combustibles Traaaient combustibles are minimal and strictly controlled, consisting mainly of ClaH A materials.

3. Radioactive Materials Hone

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is light.

PR0388-0026A-TP21-TP01

Page 57 of 76 E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTOOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA No effect G. POTENTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE None H. ANALYSIS Ceiling in EER I. EXEHPTIOH REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 58 of 76 FIRE AR.EA 22 Turbine Lube Oil Room Nonvital Turbine Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 251 A. GENERAL The turbine lube oil room contains the oil reservoir and storage tanks, pumps, filtration units and piping system associated with the main turbine lubrication system. An approzimate total of 15,000 gallons of lubricating oil i1 1tored in the oil reservoir and storage tanks. None of the above equipment is safety related.

8. FIRE BARRIERS DEFINING THE AREA The turbine lube oil room is isolated from adjacent fire areas by three-hour fire walls. Two south wall access doors; each has a three-hour rating. Openings ezist between this room and the pipeway to the feedwater purity building. Curb* are provi_ded at each door to contain tank spillage within the designated fire area. The turbine lube oil roOll is phy1ically located approximately 50 feet from the auxiliary feedwater pump room and approximately 40' from the auxiliary building.

C. FIRE DET!C!IOH AHD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Automatic water flow alarm using fusible link sprinklers

2. Fire Suppression In addition to automatic sprinklers as above, portable dry chemical extinguishers and a hose station is provided at both east and west end entrances.

O. COMBUSTIBLE MATDIALS

1. In Situ C011bustibles Caabu1tible materials in this area include approximately 15,000 gallons of lubricating oil and a small amount of electrical wiring insulation.

2. Tran1ie ** ~ Combustibles Transient combustibles consist mainly of Class 8 materials.

3. Radioactive Materials None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 59 of 76

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is heavy.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHtrrDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHtrrDOWM CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA No effect. Equipment contained within the turbine lube oil room is not required for safe shutdown. Refer to OHP 25.2.

G. POTENTIAL FOil RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE No radiological processes are affected by this area.

H. ANALYSIS None I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP2l

Page 60 of 76 FIRE AREA 23 Zone A Condensate Pump Room Vital Turbine Building El 571' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 6 A. GENERAL The two condensate pumps, used in conjunction with the feed pumps to supply feedwater to the main steam generators, are located in an open pump pit on the 571' level, adjacent to the auxiliary feed pump room - see Fire Area 24. The condensate pumps are not considered safety related. Backup feedwater supply upon loss of the condensate pumps is provided by the three safety-related auxiliary feedwater pumps.

B. FIRE BABRIERS DEFINING THE AllEA.

The condensate pump area is defined by pit construction. Except for the open floor grating above the pumps, the enclosure is* judged to have a three-hour fire rating. 11\e two pumps are separated by a distance of approximately six feet.

C. FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is by discovery.

2. Fire Suppression Automatic sprinklers are provided. Portable extinguishers and hose stations are located nearby.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Coabustibles COllbustible materials in this area include electrical insulation materials, pump and motor bearing oil

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles consist mainly of Class A and B materials.

3. Radioactive Materials None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 61 of 76

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is light.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN *EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE* IN THIS AREA Backup feedwater supply is provided by the two safety-related awciliary feedwater pumpa located adjacent to the condensate pump area and one safety-related AFW pump located in the west engineered safeguards room.

Refer to CNP 25.l for a list of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IH THIS AREA No effect Backup feedwater supply is provided by the three auziliary feedwater pumpa; two motor driven, the other steam turbine drivene Refer to CNP 25.2.

G. POTENTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO* FIRE No radiological processes are affected by this area.

H. ANALYSIS None I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 62 of 76 FIRE AREA 23 Zone B Steam Generator Feed Pump Area Vital Turbine Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 131 A. GENERAL The two steam-driven feed pumps are used in conjunction with the condensate pump* (see Fire Area 23, Zone A) to supply feedwater to the main steam generators. The feed pumps are not safety related and use nonclass lE electrical power for operating various pump awdliary systeu.. Backup feedwater supply is available using the three redilndant safety-related auziliary feedwater pumps (see Fire Area 24).

B. FIRE BARllIERS DEFINING THE AREA There are no walls defining the feed pump area. Large open space ezists between the containment building, the ausiliary building and the location of the pumps. Physical spacing between pumps is approzi.111.ttely 20 feet.

There* is no safety-related equipment located nearby.

C. FIRE DETECTION AMD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Automatic water flow alarm using fusible link sprinklers

2. Fire Suppression In addition to automatic sprinklers as above, portable dry chemical extinguishers and access to a hose station at both north and south ends of the fire area is provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLE HATEB.IALS

1. In Situ Combustibles Ca1tbuatible materials in this area include reservoir-contained lubri-cating oil for th* feed pump turbine drivers. Other combustibles may include main turbine lube oil from a postulated pipe break and spills originating from the hydrogen seal oil unit locar.P.rl south of the feed pump area. There is a small amount of elec. .. dcal wiring in the area.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles would consist mainly of Class A and Class B materials.

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Page 63 of 76

3. Radioactive Materials None

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is moderate.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA Two steam generator feed pumps. Backup feedwater supply is available via three redundant safety-related auxiliary feedwater pump1. Refer to ONP 25.1 for a list of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA No effect. If both feed pumps are lost by fire, backup is provided by two motor-driven and one steam-driven auziliary feedwater pump. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTEliTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE No radiological processes are affected by this area.

H. ANALYSES None I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 64 of 76 FIRE AREA 23 Zone C Hain Generator Seal Oil System Area Nonvital

• Turbine Building El 590' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 133 A. GENERAL The hydrogen seal oil system provides a means for mainta1n1ng cooling of the hydrogen gas within the confines of the main generator during normal plant operation. Equipment associated with the seal 1ystem is not safety related. The major combustible material in thi1 area is oil inventory.

B. FIRE BAllRIERS DEFINING THE AREA There are no walls defining the hydrogen seal oil equipment area. 'nlere is a large open space surrounding installed equipment to limit potential fire spread. There is no safety-related equipment located nearby. Curbing is provided to contain accidental oil spillage and a drain sy1te* dispo1es of any oil leakage present during normal operation.

C. FIRE DETECTION AllD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Automatic water flow alarm using fusible link sprinklers.

2. Fire Suppression In addition to automatic sprinklers as above, portable dry chemic4l extinguishers and access to a nearby hose station are provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

l. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include reservoir-contained oil and 1 . . 11 amounts of electrical wiring insulation.

2. Transient Combu1tibles Transient combustibles would consist mainly of Class A and Class B m.. .. ..:r1a1s.

3. Radioactive Materials None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 65 of 76

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is heavy.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS. AREA-No effect. The generator seal oil.system is not safety related.

G. POTEHTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE 'l'O FIRE Yo radiological processes are affected by this area.

H. ANALYSES Hone I.*. EXEMPTIOH REQUESTS None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 66 of 76

&"IRE AREA 23 Zone D Turbine Building - General Nonvital Turbine Building El 590', 607'6", 625' Ref Drawing M-216, Sheets 14 Through 16 A. GENERAL This section considers the effect of fire on those nonspecific areas of the turbine building which contain equipment that is not safety related but which is, in some cases, physically located adjacent to or are near vital equipment required for achieving plant safe shutdown. Areas associated with the latter or those having special significance with regard to com-bustible materials or fire loading have been considered previously.

The equipment concerned includes miscellaneous items such as electrical switchgear and distribution hardware, various power conversion equipment, instrUllentation and assorted piping and cabling systema. The Fire S.zard Analysis relating to these systems is based on consideration of the main generator and turbine equipMnt as a source of fire which could adversely affect the above.

B. FIRE BAllB.IEiS DEFINING THE AREA Major equipment layout and.the various architectural barriers provided are shown on the turbine building plan drawings. The turbine/generator equip-ment is remotely located from other plant equipment. The turbine building is open between the various elevations shown.

c. FIRE DETECTION AND* SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Automatic water flow alarm using fusible link sprinklers strategically located in the turbine generator area.

2. Fire Suppress ion_

In addition to automatic sprinklers as above, portable eztinguishers

• and access to several nearby hose stations on the turbine floor are provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials associated with the turbine generator system include turbine lube oil, hydrogen gas in the main generator and various electrical insulating materials.

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Page 67 of 76

• 2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles would consist of various amounts and types of Class A and Class B materials. Local concentrations may be heavy.

3. Radioactive Materials None

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is moderate overall.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTOOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA Refer to ONP 25.1 for a list of equipment in turbine building.

F. SAFE SHUTOOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IH THIS AREA No effect. Refer to OHP 25.2.

A postulated fire originating in the turbine generator system is expected to be contained locally. The potential for fire in this area is mitigated by the following equipment and installation features:

• Hydrogen used for generator cooling is locally confined by the seal oil system.

'lbe generator casing is designed to withstand the effects of an internal hydrogen explosion and fire. Hydrogen combustibility resulting from air dilution is continuously monitored and a hazardous condition annunciated in the main control room to allow for appropriate operator action.

Fi re retardant oil is used in the turbine electroh.ydraulic control system. There is no danger of HP oil sprays resulting in ignition.

'lbe turbine lube oil system LP (30 psig) supply lines used guarded pipin1 to minimize the potential for oil spills caused by accident. Any oil leak would be detected either by observation or by the oil sump loW"-level alarm provided in the main control room.

The turbine lubricating oil has a high (700.F) ignition temperature.

Since the stea* supply system temperature does not normally exceed sso*r, the likelihood of an accidental oil spray onto a nearby steam line being ignited is remote.

G. POTENTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE No radiological processes are affected by this area *

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 68 of 76 H. ANALYSES None I* EXEMPTION REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP 2 l

• Page 69 o-f 76

• FIRE AREA 24 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Vital Turbine Building El 571' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 7 A. GENERAL The auxiliary feedwater pump room houses the two safety-related auxiliary feed pump1 used to supply feedwater makeup to the steam generators during hot shutdown. One of the pump* is steam driven; the second pump is powered from safety-related Bui 1-C. Redundant equipment ha1 a minimum 10' sepa-ration. A third AFW pump is located in the auxiliary building and is powered from safety-related Bus 1-D.

B. FIRE BARRIERS DEFIHIMC THE AREA The pump room is separated"° from adjacent plant area1 by a three-hour fire wall. Acceu to the adjac_ent condensate pump room is via a three-hour steel watertight door and a substantial steel inner door. A steel hatch is located in the ceiling. A ventilation pipe, open to the turbine building, run1 through the ceiling. No loss of barrier integrity is cau1ed by these due to the minimal fire loading

• C. FIB.! DETECTION AHD SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by smoke detectors with an alarm in the control room.

2. Fire Suppression Portable fire extinguishers are provided in the room and there is access to a nearby hose station on the 590' elevation.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Collbu1tibles Collbu1tible materials in this area include electrical wiring insulation and pump lubricating oil.

2. Transient Combustibles Transient combustibles are minimal and strictly controlled. Transients would consist mainly of Class A materials *

• PR0388-0026A-TP2l

Page 70 of 76

3. Radioactive Materials None

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is minimal.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHtrrDOWH EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AB.EA Redundant auziliary feedwater pumps. Backup capacity is provided by the main condensate and feedwater system using available offiste power and by a third AlW pump located in the auziliary building. Refer to ONP 25.1 for a list of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IH THIS AB.EA Safe plant shutdown could be accomplished using the redundant steam-driven auziliary feed~ater pump or the third AFW pump. If offsite power is available, additional backup is provided by the normal main conden1ate and feedvater system. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTENTIAL FOK RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE TO FIRE The plant can be safely shut down using the third redundant AFW pump.

Radiological processes would not be affected by a fire in this area.

H. AHALYSES

1. Analysis - Auziliary feed pump room detection location

2. Analysis - A.FW room ceiling I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 71 of 76 FIRE AREA 25 Zones A and B Boiler Room*

Nonvital Turbine Building El ~90' Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 14 Room Number 124 A. GENERAL The two steam boilers used to supply building heating and awi:iliary steam for the plant are located in separate enclosures adjacent to the machine shop, outside the turbine building - northwest corner. Each boiler room houses a fuel oil day tank and other miscellaneous auxiliary equipment aaaociated with boiler operation. 'nle boiler 1y1tea i1 not safety related.

B. FIRE BARRIERS DEFINING THE AREA Boiler room enclosure is provided by three-hour fire walls. Access to the adjacent machine shop area is via a single three-hour door. Inside, curbs are provided around each day tank to confine accidental spills of fuel oil.

The west walls are outside walls.

C. FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION

~ 1. Fire Detection Automatic water flow alarm using fusible link sprinklers is provided for both boiler rooms.

2. Fire Suppression In addition to automatic sprinklers as above, portable dry chemical extinguishers are provided in each room. 'nlere is nearby access to an outdoor hose station, if required.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Collbu*tibles Major colllbu1tible materials in the boiler room1 include stored fuel oil and *O. . electrical wiring insulation.

2. Tran1ient Combustibles Transient combustibles would consist mainly of Class A and Class B material*.

3. Radioactive Materials None PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 72 of 76

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is heavy.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED B'i A FIRE IN THIS AB.EA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IN THIS AREA No effect. Refer to CNP 25.2.

G. POTEHTIAL FOi RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE 'IO FIRE Nonradiological processes are affected by thi1 area.

H. ANALYSES None I. EXEMPTIOll REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

• Page 73 of 76

• FI RE AREA 26 Southwest Cable Penetration Room Vital Turbine Building El 607'6" Ref Drawing H-216, Sheet 15 Room Number 250 A. GENEllAL Cables are routed into the penetration room area u1ing a horizontally stacked cable tray arrangement. 'lbe cables entering containment are considered safety-related and include both vital and nonvital loads.

Redundant sy1tems required for safe reactor shutdown are accoamodated via cables routed through the north cable penetration room on the 625' level.

B. FIRE BAllllI!RS DEFIHING TH! AREA The cable penetration room is enclosed by three-hour fire walls. Openings exist into the turbine building where three-hour cable penetration sealing has been provided. A three-hour fire door to the turbine building is provided.

C. FIB.! DET!CTIOH AND SUPPRESSION 1.* Fire Detection Smoke detectors are provid~d.

2. Fire Suppression Automatic sprinklers are provided. Portable extinguishers and access to a hose station located iamediately outside the cable penetration room are provided.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

1. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include electrical cable insulation.

Cabla trays are horizontally stacked in 3-4 level1.

2. Transient Combustibles Tran1ient combu1tibles are minimal and strictly controlled~

3. Radioactive Materials None

• PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 74 of 76

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is moderate.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA Principal loads served by cables routed through this area include the reactor protection system and control for various motor-operated valves housed inside containment. Redundant loads are serviced by cables in the north cable penetration room. The auziliary shutdown panel is located in this room. Refer to ONP 2S.l for a list of equipment.

F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IH THIS AREA Redundant systems having cables routed via the north penetration room remain available. The auziliary shutdown panel would be inoperable.

Shutdown of the plant will be from the control room using the unaffected circuits in the redundant north penetration room. Refer to ONP 25.2.

G. POTEHTIAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL R!LEASE DU! TO FIRE The plant can be safely shut down in the event of a fire. Radwaste proc-esses can be controlled locally preventing release. Ho radiological

• materials are in the penetration room. -

H. AHALYSES Palisades Door No 47 - copper line through frame I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS Steam generator pressure indication PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 75 of 76 FIRE AREA 27 Radwaste Facilities Building VRS Rooms Nonvital Radwaste Building El 590', 607'6", 625 1 Ref Drawings H-216, Sheets 5 Through 7 and H-601 Through H-604 Room Numbers 701 Through 710 A. GENERAL The radwaste facilities building contains equipment used in the processing of radwaste materials produced during normal plant operation. Included is equipm11nt used for water cleanup and gas decay, radwaste evaporator, various holdup tanks, tran1fer pumps and control panels and the building HVAC system. None of the above equipment is considered safety related.

Volume reduction system is installed. System uses asphalt as a binder.

B. FIRE BAilIERS DEFIHIHG THE AREA Radwaste building walls and floors are of reinforced concrete construction judged to have a minimum three-hour fire rating. Concrete block radiation shield walls are provided in selected areas; these walls also serve as fire barriers where applicable.

C. FIRE DETECTIO!i AND SUPPRESSION

1. Fire Detection Detection is provided by smoke detectors.

2. Fire Suppression Automatic dry pipe sprinklers are provided. Portable ex'tinguishers are provided. Several hose stations are located in strategic areas through-out the building. There is convenient access to an outdoor hose house nearby.

D. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

l. In Situ Combustibles Combustible materials in this area include stored resin material and electrical wiring insulation as1ociated with various motor-driven equipment, instrumentation and control panels. Eztruder uses asphalt ir.

a totally enclo1ed system.

2. Transient Combustibles Transients may consist of small amounts of Class A and Class B materials.

PR0388-0026A-TP21

Page 76 of 76

3. Radioactive Materials Minor amounts of low-level, Class A materials

4. Fire Loading Fire loading is minimal.

E. EMERGENCY SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA None F. SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY AFTER A WORST CASE FIRE IR THIS AREA No effect.

shutdown. Equipment in the radwa*te building is not required for plant G. POTEHTIAL FOi RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DUE 'l'O FIRE In the event of fire, all radioactive materials are ezpected to be safely contained within the piping and tankage

• sy.ceu provided. .Any liquid spilh would be collected by _the drainage *y1tem for reproceuing. GH overpre11ure caused by high temperature is automatically relieved and, after proper filtering, released to the stack.

H. ANALYSES None I. EXEMPTION REQUESTS None PR0388-0026A-TP21

• POSTFIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS PALISADES PLANT Revision 4 July 31, 1989 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04

.. 2 PALISADES PLANT - POSTFIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS I.A. This analysis demonstrates that it is possible to sa~ely shutdown the plant if a fire occurs in any area of the plant. It was performed in the following manner.

1. The systems, equipment, or combination of systems capable of safely shutting down the plant were identified and classified as potential essential postfire safe shutdown equipment.

2. The systems, equipment and combinations of systems which are redundant were identified.

3. The locations of equipment and systems identified in Item 1 above and the location of the electrical control and power circuits necessary for their operation was identified.

4. A worst case fire that would destroy all electrical equipment not separated from the point of origin of the fire by the criteria of 10CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 was postulated to occur in each room, zone or area of the plant. The effect of each postulated fire on essential safe hot shutdown equipment was evaluated.

5. Then it was determined which redundant systems/equipment and/or electrical circuits identified in steps 1 and 2 were not separated by fire protection systems, barriers and/or distances meeting the separation criteria of 10CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.

6. The electrical power and control circuits which had to be modified and the locations where fire barriers, .shields, coverings, fire suppression systems and fire detection systems had to be installed to minimize the number of fire areas where redundant hot shutdown systems are not separated by Appendix R crit"eria were determined.

7. After the modifications and installations resulting from step 6 were completed five fire areas (Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, ID Switchgear Room, Engineered Safeguards Room and the corridor on the 590' level of the Auxiliary Building) were determined to contain power or control circuits for both redundant trains of essential safe shutdown equipment. In order to maintain the capability to safely shutdown after a worst case fire in one of those areas, Alternate Shutdown methods were implemented.

8. Steps 4 and 5 were repeated for essential equipment/systems used only for achieving cold shutdown. The requirements for spare materials to be stored onsite and for repair procedures were determined. Required spare motors and cables for equipment are stored on site except when the spare is being repaired *

• MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 Revision 4 7/31/89

.' 3 I.B. BASES 10CFR 50.48 and 10CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L are the source of the criteria which are met or exceeded by this analysis.

Generic Letter 81-12 (including the April 7, 1982 GL 81-12 clarifica-tion letter from G C Lainus, NRC, to DJ VandeWalle, CPC), Generic Letter 83-33, IE Information Notice 84-09, and Generic Letter 86-10 provide accepted regulatory interpretations of those criteria.

The essential postfire safe shutdown equipment for a specified fire area listed in the various categories contained in this Postfire Safe Shutdown Analysis (PSSA) is equipment that theoretically could not be caused to malfunction by a fire in that specified area. That is, the separation criteria of Sections III.G would be adequate to prevent their malfunction. This is equipment which could be used to safely shutdown even if everytQing in the specified fire area were instantane-ously destroyed and all possible unfavorable hot shorts and circuit opens occurred.

Since a fire scenario will most likely evolve in its severity, the operators are trained to deal with postfire safe shutdown symptomat-ically and the use of equipment listed in this PSSA is not included in the Operating Procedures exactly as listed in the PSSA; but is suggested in those procedures as the result of an evolving fire damage scenario.

II. ~ Listing of Essential Safe Shutdown Equipment Specific equipment identification depends on the location of the fire and is identified in Section III.

Reactor Trip System Emergency Diesel Generator Battery Powered 125V DC System Fire Water System Service Water System Charging System High Pressure Safety Injection System (P-66B)

Containment Spray Pump P-54B And Flowpath To Suction Of P-66B Auxiliary Feedwater System Secondary System Safety Valves Atmospheric Dump Valves Service and Instrument Air System Component Cooling Water System Hogger (High Volume Air Ejector) System Shutdown Cooling System Fuel Oil Transfer Makeup System The above listed equipment and its associated flowpaths, fuel supplies and/or power and control circuits can be used to attain post fire safe shutdown as defined by 10CFR 50.48 and 10CFR 50, Appendix R.

Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

• , 4 PALISADES PLANT NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY The following information is presented to describe the process that could be used to maintain the plant in a hot shutdown condition and then cooldown to a cold shutdown condition. Palisades has two (2) principal postfire safe shutdown procedures for plant operators: ONP 25.1, "Fire Which Threatens Safety-related Equipment," and ONP 25.2; "Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure."

These procedures are designed to be used together for fires which affect the ability to maintain hot shutdown from the Control Room. For fires which affect safety-related equipment in areas which do not affect the ability to maintain hot shutdown from the Control Room, only ONP 25.1 and other appropriate Standard/Emergency/Offnormal Operating Procedures are needed.

Nine (9) major categories of fires are used to describe the Safe Shutdown Summary. As described below, the procedural direction which guides the operator to utilize various contingency equipment is an interplay of procedures ONP 25.1, ONP 25.2, and other Standard/Emergency/Offnormal procedures. The operator will respond symptomatically to equipment failures (where feasible) prior to initiating contingency actions. Contingency actions are marked with an "i)" sysbol.

The fire categories and Safe Shutdown Summaries are as follows:

• CATEGORY I: A worst case fire occurs in any area of the plant except the following areas: (FHA-2 indicates area number 2 in the Fire Hazard Analysis)

Control Room (FHA-1), See Category II Cable Spreading Room (FHA-2), See Category II Engineering Safeguards Panel C-33 Room (FHA-15), See Category II ID Switchgear Room (FHA-3A), See Category II Corridor 590 1 Elevation (FHA-13A), See Category III SW Penetration Room (FHA-26), See Category IV lC Switchgear Room (FHA-4), See Category IV 1-1 Diesel Room (FHA-5), See Category IV 1-1 Diesel Day Tank Room (FHA-7), See Category IV No 1 Battery Room (FHA-11), See Category IV AFW Pump Room (FHA-24), See Category V Traveling Screen Room (FHA-9), See Category VI West Engineering Safeguards Room' (FHA-lOB), See Category VII CCW Room (FHA-16), See Category VIII Containment (FHA-14), See Category IX For this category of fire, the following equipment can be operated to attain safe shutdown:

Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

• < 5 NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed will occur where described (e.g. "locally at value").

a. TRIP REACTOR i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 locally.

d. Operate Service Water (SW) Pump P-7B.

e. Start Diesel Fire Pump P-41.

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

g. Operate *Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

h. Operate Charging Pump P-55C to makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

i. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

j. Allow Secondary Code safeties to lift.

k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52A or C.

1. Use Hogging Air Ejector (locally).

m. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generators via Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps P-18B (locally).

i) Repair/Replace P-18B cable.

n. Operate LPSI Pump P-67B for shutdown cooling.

Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

6 CATEGORY II: A worst case fire occurs in any of the following areas:

Control Room Cable Spreading Room Engineering Safeguards Panel C-33 Room lD Switchgear For this category of fire, the following equipment can be operated to attain safe shutdown:

NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Alternate Shutdown Panel (C-150/C-lSOA) unless specified otherwise.

Contingency actions listed will occur where described (e.g. "locally at valve").

a. TRIP REACTOR FROM CONTROL ROOM i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine from Control Room.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 and energize Bus IC locally (isolate controls using local transfer switches).

d. Start Service Water (SW) Pump P-7B locally at breaker (isolate controls using local transfer switch).

i) Start Diesel Fire Pump locally.

e. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B with source of water from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

I

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves for flowpath from P-8B to Steam Generators.

g. Remove power from Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve M0-2087 and manually close it.

h. Operate Charging Pump P-55B or C locally via alternate (Bus 13) power supply (Isolate alternate power supply controls using local transfer switch).

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

i. Operate Main Steam Isolations Valves (MSIVs) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets

• Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

7

j. Allow Secondary Code Safeties to lift t'or PCS heat removal.

k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52A or C locally at breakers as required - perform local tending .first if required.

1. Use Hogging Air Ejector - locally.

m. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generator(s) via Fuel Transfer Pump P-18B - locally.

n. Operate LPSI Pump P-67B locally at breaker.

CATEGORY III: A worst case fire occurs in the following area:

Corridor 590' Elevation (includes Charging Pump Room, Spent Fuel Pool Equipment Room, Boric Acid Pump Room, Primary System Drain Tank Pump Room, Fan Room and VCT Room)

For this category of fire, the following equipment can be operated to attain safe shutdown:

NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Alternate Shutdown Panel (C-150/C-150A) unless specified otherwise.

Contingency actions listed will occur where described (e.g. "locally at valve").

a. Trip Reactor from Control Room.

i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine from Control Room.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 and energize Bus lC locally (isolate controls using local transfer switches).

d. Start Service Water (SW) Pump P-7B locally at breaker (isolate controls using local transfer switch).

i) Start Diesel Fire Pump locally.

e. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B with source of water from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves for flowpath from P-8B to Steam Generators *

• MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 Revision 4 7/31/89

8

g. Operate Containment Spray Pump P-54B at the breaker and align discharge to HPSI Pump P-66B suction locally at valve.

h. Ensure CV-3070 stays in the open position by manually aligning control air to local Nitrogen supply.

i. Remove power from Volume Control Tank outlet valve MO 2087 and manually close it.

j. Operate HPSI Pump P-66B and Containment Spray Pump P-54B at the breakers to maintain PCS level and pressure.

k. Operate Main Steam Isolations Valves (MSIVs) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

1. Allow Secondary Code Safeties to lift for PCS heat removal.

m. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52A locally at breakers as required.

n. Use Atmospheric Dump Valves locally.

o. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generator(s) via Fuel Transfer Pump P-18B - locally *

• p.

CATEGORY IV:

Operate LPSI Pump P-67B locally at breaker (required for shutdown cooling).

A worst case fire occurs in one of the following areas:

Southwest Penetration Room IC Switchgear Room 1-1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room 1-1 Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tank Room No I Battery Room For this category of fire, the following equipment can be operated to attain safe shutdown.

NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed occur where described (eg, "locally at valve").

a. Trip Reactor i) Open power supply br.eakers in Cable Spreading Room *

• MI0488-000IC-AN03-NL04 Revision 4 7/31/89

9

b. Trip Turbine.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 locally.

d. Operate Service Water (SW) Pump P-7A.

e. Start Diesel Fire Pump P-41.

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

g. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8C.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

h. Remove power from Volume Control Tank Valve M0-2087 and close it.

i. Operate Charging Pump P-55B to Makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally op~rate valves to establish flow path.

j. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

k. Allow Secondary Code Safeties to lift.

1. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52B.

m. Use Hogging Air Ejector (locally).

n. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generators via Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P-18A (locally).

i) Repair/Replace cable for P-18A motor.

o. Operate LPSI Pump P-67A for shutdown cooling.

)\

\

Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

...... 10 CATEGORY V: A worst case fire occurs in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed will occur where described; (eg, "locally at valve").

a. Trip Reactor i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine.*

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 locally.

d. Operate Service Water (SW) Pump P-7A or C.

e. Start Diesel Fire Pump P-41.

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

g. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8C.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

h. Operate Charging Pump P-55B ;o makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

i. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

j. Use Atmospheric Dump Valves.

k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52B.

1. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generators via Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P-18A (locally).

m. Operate LPSI Pump P-67A for shutdown cooling.

Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

- )

11 CATEGORY VI: A worst case fire occurs in the Traveling Screens Room.

NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed will occur where described (eg, "locally at valve").

The essential equipment in this room is comprised of the Diesel Fire Pump P-41 and the Service Water Pumps P-7A, B and C. Due to spatial separation and the presence of a radiant shield, it has been determined that both P-41 and the service water* pumps will not be rendered inoperable by the same fire-.-They are located in different fire zones which are designated the P-41 zone and the Service Water Pump zone.

1. For a worst case fire in the P-41 zone.

a. Trip Reactor i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 locally.

d. Operate Service Water (SW) Pump P-7A or C.

e. Cross tie ser-Vice water to fire water locally.

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps P-8C or B with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

g. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for pump P-8C or B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

h. Operate Charging Pump(s) (P-SSA or B) to Makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

i. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

j. Use Atmospheric Dump Valves *

• MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 Revision 4 7/31/89

12

k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52B.

1. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generators via F.uel Oil Transfer Pump P-18A (locally).

i) Repair/Replace P-18A motor.

m. Operate LPSI Pump P-67A for shutdown cooling.

2. For a worst case fire in the Service Water Pump zone.

a. Trip Reactor i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 locally.

d. Locally start Diesel Fire Pump P-41 and locally cross tie fire water to service water to cool EDG 1-1.

e. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8A or B with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8A or B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

g. Operate Charging Pump P-55C to Makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

h. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

i. Use Atmospheric Dump Valves.

j. Verify non-critical service water is isolated from critical service water.

k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52A or C.

Revision 4 MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 7/31/89

13

1. Replace Service Water Pump Motor.

m. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generator via Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P-18B (locally).

i) Repair/Replace P-18B motor.

n. Operate LPSI Pump P-67B for shutdown cooling.

CATEGORY VII: A worst case fire occurs in the West Engineered Safeguards Room.

NOTE: For this category of fire, the following equipment is operated from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed will occur where described; ( eg, "locally at valve") *

a. Trip Reactor i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 locally.

d. Operate Service Water (SW) Pump P-7A or C.

e. Start Diesel Fire Pump P-41.

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

g. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

h. Operate Charging Pump P-55B to makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

i. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

j. Use Atmospheric Dump Valves *

• k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52B.

MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 Revision 4 7/31/89

14

1. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generators via Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P-18A (locally).

m. Operate LPSI Pump P-67A for shutdown cooling.

CATEGORY VIII: A worst case fire occurs in the Component Cooling Water Room.

NOTE: For this category, the following equipment is operated from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed will occur where described, (eg, "locally at valve").

a. Trip Reactor i) Open power supply breakers in Cable Spreading Room.

b. Trip Turbine.

i) Manually trip at Turbine pedestal.

c. Verify or start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2.

i) Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 locally.

d. Operate Service Water (SW) Pump P-7C.

e. Start Diesel Fire Pump P-41.

f. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B with water source from Condensate Storage Tank (T-2).

g. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater Train Flow Control Valves for P-8B.

i) Locally operate Control Valves and/or motor operated Isolation Valves.

h. Operate Charging Pump P-55B to Makeup to PCS from SIRW Tank or concentrated Boric Acid Tanks.

i) Locally operate valves to establish flow path.

i. Operate Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) as required.

i) Trip solenoids at local cabinets.

j. Allow Secondary Code Safeties to lift.

k. Operate Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump P-52B.

i) Repair/replace CCW Pump P-52B motor if necessary *

• 1. Use Hogging Air Ejector (locally).

MI0488-0001C-AN03-NL04 Revision 4 7/31/89

IS

m. Makeup Fuel Oil to Emergency Diesel Generator via Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P-I8A (locally).

n. Operate LPSI Pump P-67A for shutdown cooling.

CATEGORY IX: A worst case fire occur in Containment.

For this category of fire, the following equipment can be operated to attain safe shutdown~

NOTE: All primary equipme~t operation is from the Control Room unless specified otherwise. Contingency actions listed will occur where described (eg, "locally at valve").

• Fire stops, radiant shields and distance prevent both redundant trains of indicators or valve operators from being affected by the same fire.

A. The equipment listed in Category I is used to attain safe shutdown if the right (Battery No 2, ID bus, etc) channel equipment is inoperable.

B. The equipment listed in Category IV is used to attain safe shutdown if the left (Battery No I, IC bus, etc) channel equipment is inoperable.

C. If pressurizer level or pressure indication and/or steam generator level or pressure indication is not available due to a fire in the Air Room zone of containment, use indication as suggested in Attachment G-I of Emergency Operating Procedure EOP 9.0.

Revision 4 MI0488-000IC-AN03-NL04 7/3I/89

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION V REFERENCES

1. Palisades Administrative Procedure 10.21, FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM

2. Palisades Fire Protection Implementing Procedure (FPIP) FPIP-1, ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

3. Palisades Procedure FPIP-2, FIRE EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSE

4. Palisades Procedure FPIP-3, PLANT FIRE BRIGADE

5. Palisades Procedure FP!P-4, FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

6. Palisades Procedure FPIP-5, INSPECTION MAINTENANCE AND TESTING

7. Palisades Procedure FPIP-6, FIRE SUPPRESSION TRAINING

8. Palisades Proc~dure FPIP-7, FIRE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

9. Palisades Off Normal Operating Procedure ONP-25.1, FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

10. Palisades Off Normal Operating Procedure ONP-25.2, ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE

11. Palisades System Operating Procedure SOP-21, FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM

12. Palisades Permanent Maintenance Procedure EPS-E-7, LOCAL TENDING OF 2.4 KV BUS lC SWITCHGEAR

13. Palisades Permanent Maintenance Procedure EPS-E-8, LOCAL TENDING OF DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (**K-68) and 2.4 KV BUS 10 SWITCHGEAR

14. Palisades Permanent Maintenance Procedure FPS-E-1, INSTALLATION OR REPAIR OF FIRE STOPS AND VEHTILATION SEALS ON ELECTRICAL AND PIPING PENETRATIONS

15. Palisades Permanent Maintenance Procedure FPS-M-2, INSPECTION AND TESTING OF PALISADES PLANT FIRE DAMPERS

16. Palisades Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

17. Palisades Vendor File E-49, Fire Protection Associated Circuits Analysis

18. Palisades Vendor File M-65, Fire Fighting Equipment

• FPPR-TC07

SECTION V REFERENCES (Continued)

19. Palisades Vendor File H-66, Fire Fighting Spray and Sprinkler Systems

20. Pali sades Vendor File H-66A, Fire Protection Deluge for Transformers

21. Pali sades Vendor File H-66C, Smoke Detector Panels

22. Palisades Vendor File H-660, Fire Protection Hiscellaneoua

23. Palisades Vendor File M-66E, UV Fire Detection System

24. Palisades Vendor File M-188, Fire Rated Dampers 25

• Palisades Drawing E-42, Sheets 26 through 30H, Fire Barriers

• FPPR-TC07

PALISADES NUCLEAR PI.ANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION VI INDEX OF EXEMPTIONS FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR50.48 AND 10CFR50, APPENDIX R

1. Exemption - Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 - Engineered Safeguards Panel Room (Original Submittal July ts, 1982 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984 - Approved July 12, 1985) 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3 requires that fire detection and fixed fire suppression be installed in fire areas, rooms or zones requiring alternative or dedicated shutdown capabilities. The Engineered Safeguards Panel Room is one of those rooms. This exemption deletes the requirement for a fixed fire suppression system in the Engineered Safeguards Panel Room.

2. Exemption - Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10CFRSO - Corridor Between Charging Pump Room and Switchgear Room 1-C (Original Submittal July 25, 1983 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984 - Approved July 12, 1985)

For the same reason as the Engineered Saf eguarda Panel Room in Item 1 above, 10CFR50; Appendix R,Section III.G.3 required the corridor (590' level) between the charging pump room and the 1-C switch room to have a fixed fire suppression system. This exemption deletes that requirement.

3. Exemption - Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 - Control Room (Original Submittal July l, 1982 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984 - Approved February 8, 1983)

For the same reason as the Engineered Safeguards Panel Room in Item 1 above; 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III .G.3 requires a fixed fire suppression system in the Control Room. This exemption deletes that requirement.

4. Exemption - Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 - Cable Separation Inside Containment (Original Submittal July 20, 1984 - Approved July 23, 1985) lOCFa50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2 requires that redundant cables inside containment be separated by more than 10' with no intervening combustibles; or, that fire detectors and a fixed fire suppression be installed; or, they be separated by a radiant shield. Those conditions do not exist inside the Palisades containment. This exemption approved the use of fire stops in lieu of the 20 1 separation with no intervening combustibles.

FPPR-TC07

SECTION VI REFERENCES (Continued)

S. Exemption Request - Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 - Instrument Separation Inside Containment (Original Submittal July 16, 1984 -

Revision l December 28, 1984 - Revision l October 4, 1985)

This exemption request is being held in abeyance by the NRC staff until Consumers Power Company assures the staff that the plant can attain safe shutdown without using the instruments located in the Containment Air Room *

• FPPR-TC07

'.,)

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION VII INDEX INDEX OF THE NRC FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

1. 09/01/78 - Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report

2. 03/19/80 - Sue2lement No l to Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report

3. 02/10/81 - Sup2lement No 2 to the Se2tember l z 1978 Fire Protection Safet;t Evaluation Report

4. 05/26/83 - Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Review in Accordance with Ae2endix Rz Sections III.G and III.L

5. 07/12/85 - Safety' Evaluation by the Office of NRR Relative to Aeeendix R Exemptions Requested for the Palisades Plant

6. 01/29/86 - Safety Evaluation by the Office of NRR - Installation of Switches for Ae2endix R

7. 12/03/87 - Safety Evaluation Regarding a Postulated Fire in the Charging Pump Room or Corridor

8. 05/19/89 - Safety Evaluation Related to Amendment No 122 to Provisional Oeerating License No DPR-20 The above items indicate NRC approval of the Palisades Fire Protection Program.

FPPR-TC07

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION VIII INDEX INDEX OF .FIRE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL CONDITION ANALYSES

1. Engineering Analysis of Penetration Seal Defects

2. Acceptance Criteria - Penetration Seal

3. Deleted

4. Deleted

5. Deleted

6. ICHS Cable Tray Fire Stop

7. Radiant Energy Shield - Screenhouse and Containment

8. Fire Door Frame Modification - Security Hardware

9. Fire Door Between Cable Spreading.Room and Battery Room

10. Essential Equipment Circuits Routings Through Areas Not Included in the FHA

11. NFPA Exceptions

12. Analysis - No Dampers in Ducts Between Charging Pump Room and Corridor

13. Analysis - Sprinkler System in Switchgear Room 1-C

14. Analysis - Door Between Switchgear Room lC and 590' Corridor

15. Analysis - Metal Plat in Cableway Floor

16. Analysis - Door Between Engineered Safeguards Panel Room and Boronmeter Room *

17. Analysis - Boundary Change Engineered Safeguards Panel Room

18. Analysis - Auxiliary Feed Pump Room Detection Location

19. Analysis - Detectors in Cable Penetration Areas of Containment

20. Deleted

• 21. Analysis - AFW Room Ceiling FPPR-TC07

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION VIII INDEX (Continued)

22. Access to Any Area Within One Hour

23. Fire Load Study

24. Screenhouse Sprinkler Calculations

25. Analysis - Palisades Door #47 Copper Line Through Frame

26. Analysis - Conduit and Cable Attached to Palisades Bullet Resistant Doors

27. Deleted

28. No Detection in Screenhouse

29. Analysis - Ceiling in EER

30. Detection in the CCW Room 31

• Detection in the 590 1 Elevation of Awi:iliary Building

32. Need for Another Drain at the Fuel Transfer Pumps

33. Adequacy of the Steel Plate in the 1-D SWCR Cableway

34. Analysis of the Need to Seal Conduit Ending in a Pullbox or Junction Box 60 Inches From a Fire Barrier

35. Nelson Penetration Seal - Percent Fill

36. Break in a Diesel Fuel Line in Intake Structure

37. Screenhouse - Extension of Radiant Shield

38. Screenhouse - Additional Sprinklers at Fuel Transfer Pumps

39. Screenhouse - Need for Sprinklers Along West Wall

40. Fire Door Between Cable Spreading Room and Battery Room - Palisades

41. No Sprinklers in Spent Fuel Pool Area

42. Analysis - Obstructed Sprinkler Heads

43. Detectors in Spent Fuel Pool Area

• FPPR-TC07

-*~)

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION VIII INDEX (Continued)

44. Use of Grout to Fill Penetrations in Fire Walls

45. Door Between Engineered Safeguards Panel Room and Boronmeter Room

46. Pipe Tunnel Between Turbine Building and Feedwater Purity Building and Associated Openings

47. West Wall of Component Cooling Pump Room

48. Smoke Detectors in Cableway Between 1-D Switchgear Room and North Cable Penetration Room FPPR-TC07

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION IX INDEX OF PALISADES SYSTEM ANALYSES FOR APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE

1. Fuel Pool Cooling if No AC for 72 Hours (Also See SAR on Rerack)

2. PCP Seal Leakage With No CCW and No AC

3. Adequacy of One Fire Pump to Bring Plant to Cold Shutdown

4. Adequacy of Diesel Day Tank Fuel Supply to Attain CSD in 72 Hours

5. Charging Pump Operation After Heat Tracing is Lost

6. Purposely Deleted

7. Purposely Deleted

8. Number of Spurious Starts Required to Remove Emergency Diesel Generator Power From the: Bua

9. Heat Dissipation Adequacy for a Right Channel Pull Box Located in the Left Channel Switchgear Room and Covered With a 3-Hour Fire Barrier (1-C Switch-gear Room)

10. Deleted

11. IE Notice 85-85 Effect on Palisades and Big Rock Point

12. Ability to Reach Cold Shutdown Within 72 Hours and the Redundancy of the HPSI System to the Charging System for.Safe Shutdown

13. Effect of a Main Steam Line Safety Valve Sticking Open After a Fire in the Cable Spreading Room

14. Time Required to Achieve Shutdown Margin Using One HPSI Pump

15. Duration of Time the PCS Will Remain 25°F Sub-Cooled With No AC Available

16. Deleted

17. Containment Cooling Requirement for Appendix R Compliance

18. Seven Watt ELU Analysis

19. Inadvertent Opening of Reactor Head Vent or PZR Vent FPPR-TC07

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION IX (Continued)

20. Index to ElecLrical Circuit Tracings

21. Deleted

22. Penetration Location for Rx Head Vent Valve Controls

23. Review of Adequacy of Remove Control Isolation Switches 23a. NRC SER on Isolation Switches System

24. Time for Shutdown Cooling to Bring PCS From 325.F to 210°F

25. Deleted (To Generic Book)

26. Deleted

27. Location of Core Exit Thermocouple Circuits

28. Feedwater Purity Building Air Compressor Circuit Routing

29. Locations of Sound Powered Telephone Jacks

30. Circuit Routings for Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps and Containment Air Cooler Fans

31. Hoving Screens; Traveling Screen Room

32. Purposely Deleted

33. Analysis of Redundant Valve Location When Not Separated by II.C.2 Criteria

34. Loss of All '11lree SW Pump1 Will Not Cause Plant to Go Off Line and Cause Grid to Fail

35. Purpo1ely Deleted

36. Possibility of Fire Caused Rod Withdrawal

37. P-8C Flow Rate - Draft

38. Plan Can Cool Down to Cold Shutdown in < 72 Houri U1ing Hogger and P-88 if Fuel Has Decayed < 35 Days. HPSI and Containment Spray in Series Will Maintain Subcooling. PZR Level Will Stay in Level Indication Range

• FPPR-TC07

• -- . )

PALISADES NUCLEAR PI.A.NT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT (FPPR)

SECTION IX (Continued)

39. Reduced CCW and SW Flow Capability, as it Exists in December 1986, Will Not Affect the Post-Fire Ability of the Plant, When Using Alternate Shut-down, to Reach Cold Shutdown Within 72 Hours

40. Not Covering Diesel Fire Pump Annunciator Cables in Intake Structure

41. High/Low Pressure Interface Analysis

42. Current Transformer Analysis, 1-C Switchgear, A-NL-88-34

• FPPR-TC07