Text

Proposed Tech Specs 3.7, Electrical Power Systems.
	ML18065A911
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	09/04/1996
From:	; CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18065A910	List: ML18065A909; ML18065A911;
References
	NUDOCS 9609130158
	Download: ML18065A911 (185)
	v • d • e

- ATTACHMENT 1 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 ELECTRICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE - ADDITIONAL CHANGES Proposed Technical Specifications Pages

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9609130158 960904* 26 Pages DR ADOCK 05000255

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PALISADES PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO 1.0 DEFINITIONS . . . . 1-1 1.1 OPERATING DEFINITIONS . . . . 1-1 1.2 MISCELLANEOUS DEFINITIONS . 1-5 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS . . . . 2-1 2 .1 SAFETY UM ITS - REACTOR CORE . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.2 SAFETY LIMITS - PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE .. 2-1 2.3 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS - RPS * . * . . . . . . . * . 2-1 Table 2.3.1 Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits . . . 2-2 B 2.1 Basis - Reactor Core Safety Limit . . * * . B 2-1 B 2.2 Basis - Primary Coolant System Safety Limit B 2-2 B 2.3 Basis - Limiting Safety System Settings B 2-3

3. 0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION . . . . 3-1 3.0 APPLICABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3 .1 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM . . . * . . . . . . 3-lb 3 .1.1 Operable Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-lb 3.1.2 Heatup and Cooldown Rates . * . w * * * * * * . 3-4 Figure 3-1 Pressure - Temperature Limits for Heatup . . . 3-5 Figure 3-2 Pressure - Temperature Limits for Cooldown .. . 3-6 3.1.3 Minimum Conditions for Criticality . . . . . . 3-12 3.1.4 Maximum Primary Coolant Radioactivity . . . . . . 3-17 3.1.5 Primary Coolant System Leakage Limits . . . . 3-20 3 .. 1.6 Maximum PCS Oxygen and Halogen Concentration . 3-23 3.1.7 Prfmary and Secondary Safety Valves . . . 3-24a 3.1.8 Over Pressure Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . 3-25a Figure 3-4 LTOP Limit Curve * . . . . . . . . . . 3-25c 3 .1. 9 Shutdown Cool i ng . . . . * .

0 . . . . . 3-25h 3.2 CHEMICAL AND V.OLUME CONTROL SYSTEM . 3-26 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM * . . . . . 3-29 3.4 CONTAINMENT COOLING . * . . . . . . . . . . 3-34 3.5 STEAM AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS . * * . . . . . 3-38 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM . * . . * . . . . . . * . . . 3-40 Table 3.6.1 Containment Penetrations and Valves . 3-40b 3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . 3-41 B3.7 B~ses - El~ctrical fower Systems . B 3.7.1-1 3.8 REFUELING OPERATIONS . . . . 3-46 3.9 Deleted . . . . . . . . 3-49 i

Amendment No.

PALISADES PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . 4-1 4.1 OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTS . . . 4-6 4.2 EQUIPMENT AND SAMPLING TESTS . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . 4-7 Table 4.2.1 Minimum Frequencies for Sampling Tests . . . . . . . 4-9 Table 4.2.2 Minimum Frequencies for Equipment Tests 4-11 Table 4.2.3 HEPA Filter and Charcoal Adsorber Systems . . . . 4-14 4.3 SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16 Table 4.3.l Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves . 4-19 Table 4.3.2 Miscellanea.us Surveillance Items . 4-23

4. 4 Oe.l eted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* . . . . . . 4- 24 4.5 CONTAINMENT TESTS * * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-25

4. 5.1 Integrated Leakage Rate Tests . . . . . . 4-25 4.5.2 Local Leak Detection Tests . . . . . . . . 4-27

. 4.5.3 Recirculation Heat Removal Systems . . . . . . . . . 4-28a 4.5.4 Surveillance for Prestressing System . . . . . 4-29 4.5.5 End Anchorage Concrete Surveillance . . . . . . . . 4-32 4.5.6 Containment Isolation Valves . . . . . . ... 4-32 4.5.7 Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 4-32a 4.5.8 nome Delamination Surveillance . . . . . ... 4-32a

4.6 SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS TESTS . 4-39 4.6.1 *Safety Injection System . . . . . 4-39 4.. 6. 2 Containment Spray System . . . . 4-39 4.6.3 Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-40 4.6~4 Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-39 4.6.5 Containment Air Cooling System 4-40 4.7 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM TESTS . . . . . . . 4-42 4.8 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVES*. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44

4. 9 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-45 4.10 REACTI VITV AN OMA LI ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-46 4.11 *Deleted . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-46 4.12 AUGMENTED ISi PROGRAM FOR HIGH ENERGY LINES . . . . . . . . . 4-60 4.13 Deleted . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-65 4.14 AUGMENTED ISi PROGRAM FOR STEAM GENERATORS . 4-66 4.15 PRIMARY SYSTEM FLOW MEASUREMENT . . . . . . . 4-70 4.16 lSI PROGRAM FOR SHJ)CK SUPPRESSORS (Snubbers) . 4-71 4.17 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-75 Table 4.17.1 Surveillance for the RPS . . . . . . . . . . 4-76 Table 4-17.2 Surveillance for ESF Functions . . . 4-77 Table 4-17.3 Surveillance for Isolation Functions. . . . . 4-78 Table 4-17.4 Surveillance for Accident Monitoring . . . . . . . 4-79 Table 4-17.~ Surveillance for Alternate Shutdown . . . . . 4-80 Table 4-17.6 Surveillance for Other Safety Functions . . . 4-81 84.17 Basis - Instrumentation Systems Surveillance B 4.17-1 iii Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.1 AC Sources - Operating

Specifi cat i.ons The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the -0nsite Class lE AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and

b. Two Diesel Generators (DGs) each capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class lE AC Electrical Power Distribution System.

App licabtl i ty Specification 3.7.l applies when the plant is above COLD SHUTDOWN.

Action 3.7.I.A With one required offsite circuit inoperable:

1. Perform surveillance 4.7.1.1 (Offsite Source Check) for the required OPERABLE offsite circuit; within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter, and

2. Restore required offsite circuits to OPERABLE status; within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

3.7.I.B With one DG inoperable:

1. Perform surveillance 4.7.1.l (Offsite Source Check) for the required offsite ci~cuits; within I hour and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter,

2. Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG to be inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable; within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of an inoperable DG concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s),

3. Determine that the OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or Perform surveillance 4.7.1.2 (DG start test) for the OPERABLE DG; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and

4. Restore the DG to OPERABLE status; such that the total time when any required DG is inoperable does not exceed 7 days (total for both) in any calendar month .

3-41 Amendment No. -l-53-, l&l,

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.1 AC Sources - Ooerating Action (continued}

3.7.1.C With two required offsite circuits inoperable:

1. Declare required feature(s} inoperable when the redundant required feature(s} is inoperable; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from discovery of two inoperable required offsite circuits concurrent with the inoperability of redundant required feature(s}, and

2. Restore one required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.7.1.D With one required offsite circuit inoperable and one DG inoperable:

1. Restore required offsite circuits to OPERABLE status; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , or

2. Restore DGs to OPERABLE status; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.7.1.E With two DGs inoperable:

1. Restore one DG to OPERABLE status; within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

3.7.1.F With one or both automatic load sequencers inoperable:

1. Declare the affected DGs inoperable; immediately .

3.7.1.G With Fuel Transfer Pump P-18A inoperable:

1. Declare DG 1-2 inoperable; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 3.7.1.H With Fuel Transfer Pump P-18B inoperable:

1. Restore P-18B to OPERABLE status; within 7 days.

3.7.1.I With both Fuel Transfer Pumps inoperable:

1. Restore one Fuel Transfer Pumprto operable status; within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.7.1.J If any action required by 3.7.1.A through 3.7.1.I is not met and the associated completion time has expired:

1. The reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and

2. The reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.7.1.K With three or more required AC sources inoperable:

1. Enter Specification 3.0.3 immediately .

3-42 Amendment No. 88,

3.7 ELECTRICAL.POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.2 AC Sources - Shutdown

Spectftcations The followlng AC electrica*l power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualifi-ed circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC £l~ctrical Ppwer Distribution Systems required by Speciffcation 3.*7.JO, "Distribution Systems -

Shutdown"; and

b. One Diesel Generator {DG) capable of supplying one train of the

-0nsite Cl~ss IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by Specification 3.7.IO.

Applicability Specification 3.7.2 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel iri the reactor, and-during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Acti.on 3.7.2.A With the required off site circuit inoperable, immediately tniti'ate action to:

I. Declare affected required features with no offsite power available to be inoperable, or:

2. I Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.2 Suspend' movement of i*rradiated fuel assemblies, and 2~l Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4 Restore the required offsi.te source to OPERABLE status.

3.7.2.B With the required OG i*noperable, immediately initiate action to:

I. Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2~ Suspend.movement of irradiated fuel assembiies, and

3. Suspend operati.ons involvi.ng positive reactivity additions, and

4. Restore the required DG to OPERABLE status.

3, 7. 2. C W*i th one or both automatic load sequencers inoperable:

L Declare the affected DGs i:noperable; immediately.

3-43 Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.3 DG Fuel Oil and Lube Oil

Speci fi cations The stored DG fuel oil and DG lube oil shall be within limits.

Applicability Specification 3.7.3 applies when any DG is required to be OPERABLE.

Action 3.7.3.A With stored fuel oil inventory< 23,700 and ~ 20,110 gallons:

1. Restore stored fuel oil inventory to within limits; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.7.3.B With stored lube oil inventory< 175 and~ 150 gallons:

1. Restore the lube oil inventory to within limits; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.7.3.C With stored fuel oil viscosity, or water and sediment not within limits:

1. Declare both DGs inoperable, immediately.

3.7.3.D With stored fuel oil properties other than viscosity, and water and

3.7.3.E sediment not within limits:

1. Restore stored fuel oil properties to within limits; within 30 days.

If any action required by 3.7.3.A through 3.7.3.D is not met and the a-ssociated completion time has expired, or if Specification 3.7.3 is not met for reasons other than those addressed in 3.7.3.A, through 3.7.3.D:

1. Declare both DGs inoperable; immediately.

3-44 Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SY.STEMS 3.7.5 DC Sources - Shutdown

Specifications DC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystems required by Specification 3.7.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

Appl i cabi l Uy Specification 3.7.5 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTD.OWN. with fuel in the reactor, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Action 3.7.5.A With one or more required DC source inoperable, immediately initiate acti-0n tb:

I. Declare* affected required features to be inoperable, or:

2.1 Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.t Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and 2.3 Suspend operations involving positiv~ reactivity additions, and 2.4 Restore the required DC sources to OPERABLE status.

3-45a Amendment No. +/-6-1-,

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.4 DC Sources - Operating Specifications The following DC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Station Battery ED-01 and Charger ED-15, and

b. Station Battery ED-02 and Charger ED-16.

Applicability Specification 3.7.4 applies when the plant is above COLD SHUTDOWN.

Action 3.7.4.A With one required charger inoperable:

I. Place the cross-connected charger for the affected battery in service; immediately, and

2. Restore the required charger to OPERABLE status; within 7 days.

3.7.4.B With one battery inoperable:

1. Place both chargers in service for the affected battery; immediately, and

3.7.4.C

2. Restore the battery to OPERABLE status; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If any action required by 3.7.4.A or 3.7.4.B is not met and the associated completion time has expired:

I. The reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and

2. The reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3-45 Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Battery Cell Parameters Speci-fi cat ions Battery cell parameters for Station Batteries ED-01 and ED-02 shall be within the limits of Table 3.7.6-1 and average electrolyte temperature of representative cells shall be ~ 70°F.

Applicability Specification 3.7.6 applies when associated DC electrical power source is required to be OPERABLE.

Action 3.7.6.A With one or more batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Category A or B limits:

1. Verify pilot cells electrolyte level and float voltage meet Table 3.7.6-1 Category C limits; within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ; and

2. Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.7.6-1 Category C limits; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and once per 7 days thereafter; and

3. Restore battery cell parameters to Category A and B limits of Table 3.7.6-1; within 31 days.

3.7.6.B With any action required by 3.7.6.A not met and the associated completion time expired; or With one or more batteries with average electrolyte temperature of representative cells < 70°F, or With one or more batteries with one or more battery cell parameters not within Category C limits:

1. Declare the affected battery inoperable; immediately.

3-45b Amendment No. 6+,

3.7 ELECtRlCAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Battery -Cel 1 Par-ameters ( contfoued)

Table 3.7.6-'l Battery Surveillance Requirements CATEGORY A: CATEGORY B: CATEGORY C:

PARAMETER NORMAL CHARGE NORMAL CHARGE MINIMUM CHARGE LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS FOR EACH

.PILOT CELL CONNECTED CELL CONNECTED CELL Electrolyte . > Minimum s % inch mark, and above

> Minimu~ mark, and .

s %inch above Above top of plates, and not Level maximum mark1111 maximum mark 1111 overflowing Float ~ 2.13 v ~ 2.13. V. > 2.07 v Voltage No cell more than 0.020 below the

~ 1.200 average of all

~1.205 AND connected cells Specific . '

Gravitylbllcl AND Average of connected cells The average of all

~ 1.205 connected cells

~ 1.195 (a} It is acceptable for the electrolyte level to temporarily increase above the specified maximum during equaJ izing charges provided it is not overflowing.

(b} Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level. Level correction is not requ*i red, however, when battery chargi.ng is < 2 amps when on fl oat charge.

(c} A battery charging current of < 2 amps when on float charge is acceptable for meeting specHic gravity limits.

~ 3-45c Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Inverters - Ope~atinq

Specif i cat i ans Inverters ED-06, ED-07, ED-08, and ED-09 shall be OPERABLE.

Appl icabil Hy Specif i cat i,on 3. 7. 7 app 1i es when the p1ant is above COLD SHUTDOWN.

Action 3.7.7.A One inverter in~perabla,

1. Complete the applicable actions of Specification 3.7.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating" if any Preferred AC bus is de-energized, and

2. - Restore the inverter to OPERABLE status; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.7.7.B If any action required by 3.7.7.A is not met and the associated completion time has expired:

1. The reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and

2. The reactor sh~ll be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3-45d Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Inverters - Shutdown Speci fi.cat ions Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the Preferred AC Buses required by Specification 3.7.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

Applicability Specification 3.7.8 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in the reactor, and during moveme.nt of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Action 3.7.8.A With one or more required inverters inoperable, immediately initiate action to:

I. Declare affected required features to be inoperable, or:

2.1 Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and 2.3 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4 Restore the required inverters to OPERABLE status .

3-45e Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Distribution Systems - Operating

Specifications The left and right trains of AC, DC, and Preferred AC power distribution subsystems listed i.n Table 3.7.9-1 shall be OPERABLE.

Applicability Specification 3.7.9 applies when the PCS is above COLD SHUTDOWN.

Action 3.7.9.A With one or more subsystems of one AC electrical power distribution train inoperable:

1. Comply with 3~7;9.E, if applicable, and

2. Restore the electrical power distribution train to OPERABLE status; within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.7.9.B With one Preferred AC bus inoperable:

1. Comply with 3.7.9.E, if applicable, and

2. Restore the Preferred AC bus to OPERABLE status; within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.7.9.C Wtth one or more subsystems of one DC electrical power distribution train inoperable:

I. Comply with 3. 7. 9. E, if appJ icabl e, and

2. Restore the DC electrical power distribution train to OPERABLE status; within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.7.9.D If the action required by 3.7.9.A, through 3.7.9.C is not met and the associated completion time has expired:

1. The reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and

2. The reactor shall b.e placed in COLD SHUTDOWN: within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.7.9.E With any inoperab1~ dtstribution subsystem that results in a loss of a safety function:

I. Enter Specifi-cation 3.0.3; immediately.

3-45f Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown Specifi.cat ions The necessary portion of AC, DC, and Preferred AC electrical power distribution subsystems listed in Table 3.7.9-1 shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

Applicability Specification 3.7.10 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in the reactor, and during movement of irrad.iated fuel assemblies.

Action 3.7.10.A With one or more required AC, DC, or. Preferred AC electrical power distributio.n subsystems inoperable, immediately initiate action to:

I. DeC'lare affected required features supplied by an inoperable distribution subsystem to be inoperable, or: *

2. L Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.;2. Su.spend movement o:f irrad.iated fuel assemblies, and 2.3. Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4. Restore the required AC, DC, and Preferred AC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status, and 2.5. Declare affected required shutdown cooling trains i.noperable.

3-45h Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Distribution Systems - Operating (continued)

Table 3.7.9-1 Required Electrical Distribution Trains TYPE VOLTAGE* LEFT TRAIN RIGHT TRAIN AC Power 2400 Bus lC Bus 10 Distribution Subsystems 480 Bus 11 Bus 12 480 Bus 19 Bus 20 480 MCC 1 MCC 2 480 MCC 7 MCC 8 480 MCC 21 MCC 22 480 MCC 23 MCC 24 480 MCC 25 MCC 26 DC Power 125 Bus DlO-L Bus D20-L Distribution 125 Bus DlO-R Bus D20-R Subsystems 125 Pnl DllA Pnl D21A 125 Pnl Dll-1 Pnl D21-1 125 Pnl Dll-2 Pnl D21-2 Pref erred AC 120 Bus Y-10 Bus Y-20 Subsystems 120 Bus Y-30 Bus Y-40

3-45g Amendment No.

3 .17 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS Specification 3.17.2 The Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) logic channels and associated instrumentation for the functions listed in Table 3.17.2 shall be OPERABLE except as allowed by the permissible operational bypasses column.

Appl i.cabil ity Specification 3.17.2 applies when the PCS temperature is ~ 300°F.

Action 3.17.2:1 With one ESF manual control channel or ESF logic channel inoperable for one or more functions:

a.) Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.17.2.2 With one ESF instrument channel inoperable for one or more functions, except SIRWT Level:

a) Place the. trip unit for each affected ESF function in the tripped condition within 7 days.

3.17.2.3 With two ESF instrument channels inoperable for one or more functions, except SIRWT Level:

a) Place one channel trip unit for each affected ESF function in the trtpped condition within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , and b) Restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

3.17.2.4 With one SlRWT Level channel inoperable:

a) Bypass the level switch within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , and b) Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

3.17.2.5 If any action required by 3.17.2 is not met AND the associated completion time has exp1red, or if the number of OPERABLE channels is less than specified in the "Minimum OPERABLE Channels":

a) The reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and b) The reactor shall be placed in a condition where the affected equipment is not required, within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3-66 Amendment No. ~'

I

3.17 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS Table 3.17.2

Functional Unit Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Engineered Safety Features Required ESF Channels Minimum OPERABLE Channels Permissible Operational Bypasses

1. Safety Injection Signal (SIS)

a. Manual Initiation 2 1 None.

b. SIS Logic 2 1 None.

(Initiation, Actuation, and low pressure block auto reset)

c. CHP Signal SIS Initiation 2 1 None.

(SP Relay Output)

d. Pressurizer Pressure 4 2 ~ 1700 psi a Instrument Channels PCS pressure.

2. Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)

a. Manual Initiation 2 I None.

b. RAS Logic 2 1 None.

c. SIRWT Level Switches 4 3 None.

3. Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS)

a. Manual Initiation 2 1 None.

b. AFAS Logic 2 1 None.

c. "A" Steam Generator Level 4 2 None.

d. "B" Steam Generator Level 4 2 None.

3-67 Amendment No. ~'

4.2 EQUIPMENT SAMPLING AND TESTS Table 4.2.2 Minimum Freguencies for Eguigment Tests FSAR Section Test Freguency REFERENCE

1. CONTROL RODS Drop Times of All Refueling 7.6.1.3 Full Length Rods

2. CONTROL RODS Partial Movement Every 92 Days 7.6.1.3 of all Rods (Minimum of 6 In)

3. Pressurizer Set Point One Each 4.3.7 Safety Valves Refueling

4. Main Steam Set Point Five Each 4.3.4 Safety Valves Refueling

5. Refueling System Functioning Prior to 9.11.4 Interlocks Refueling Operations

6. Service Water Functioning Refueling 9.1.2 System Valve

Actuation on SIS and RAS

7. Primary System Leakage Evaluate Daily 4.7.1

8. Deleted

9. Boric Acid Verify proper Daily Heat Tracing temperature readings.

10. Safety Injection Verify that level and Each Shift Tank Level and pressure indication Pressure is between independent high high/low alarms for level and pressure .

Amendment No. 2-, 8-l-, 33, 4-11

~' §.§., &7, ~'

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.1 AC Power Source Tests - Operating

4.7.1.1 Verify each AC source required by Specification 3.7.1 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance. Momentary transients outside the specified range do not invalidate a DG load test. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy a surveillance requirement.

Verify correct alignment and voltage for each required offsite circuit; each 7 days.

4.7.1.2 Verify each DG starts from standby conditions and is ready for loading in ~ 10 seconds, and achieves steady state voltage ~ 2280 and ~ 2520 V, and frequency ~ 59.5 and ~ 61.2 Hz; each 31 days.

4.7.1.3 Verify; each 31 days; that each DG operates for ~ 60 minutes;

a. For ~ 15 minutes loaded above its peak accident loading, and

b. For the remainder of the test loaded ~ 2300 kW and ~ 2500 kW.

4.7.1.4 Verify each DG starting air tank pressure is ~ 200 psig; each 31 days.

4.7.1.5 Verify each DG day tank contains~ 2500 gallons of fuel oil; each 31 days.

4.7.1.6 Verify each fuel oil transfer pump and the fuel oil transfer system controls operate to transfer fuel oil from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank to each DG day tank and engine mounted tank; each 92 days.

4.7.1.7 Verify; each 18 months; that each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its largest single post-accident load, and:

a. Following load rejection, the frequency is ~ 68 Hz;

b. Within 3 seconds following load rejectiDn, the voltage is ~ 2280 and ~ 2640 V; and

c. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the frequency is

~ 59.5 and ~ 61.5 Hz .

4-42 Amendment No. ~' 92-, 92-,

_ _ _ _J

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.1 AC Power Sources - Operating (continued) 4.7.1.8 Verify that each DG, operating at a power factor ~ 0.9, does not trip, and voltage is maintained ~ 4000 V during and following a load rejection of ~ 2300 and ~ 2500 kW; each 18 months.

4.7.1.9* Verify; each 18 months; on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power:

a. De-energization of emergency buses;

b. Load shedding from emergency buses;

c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

1. Energizes permanently connected loads in ~ 10 seconds,

2. Energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through the automatic load sequencer,

3. Maintains steady state voltage ~ 2280 and ~ 2520 V,

4. Maintains steady state frequency~ 59.5 and ~ 61.2 Hz, and

5. Supplies permanently connected loads for~ 5 minutes.

4.7.1.10 Verify, each 18 months, that each DG operates at a power factor~ 0.9 for ~ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s:

a.

b.

For ~ 100 minutes loaded above its peak accident loading, and For the remainder of the test loaded 4.7.1.11* Verify; each 18 months; *that each DG:

~ 2300 and ~ 2500 kW.

a. Can be synchronized with offsite power while supplying its associated 2400 volt bus upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;

b. Can transfer loads to an offsite power source; and

c. Can be returned to ready-to-load operation.

4.7.1.12* Verify the time of each sequenced load is within +/- 0.3 seconds of the design timing for each automatic load sequencer; each 18 months.

These tests must be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

4-43 Amendment No. 66, :/-ft, ~, 2-5-,

4. 7 .ELECTRICAL .POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.1 AC J>ower Sources - Ope.rating (continued) 4.7.1.13* Verify; each 18 months; that on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power signal i n conjunction with an actual or simulated Safety Injection 1

Signal:

1. De-energization of emergency buses;

2. Load shedding from emergency buses;

3.

DG auto""starts from standby condition and:

a) Energizes permanently connected loads in s 10 seconds, b) Energizes auto-connected emergency loads through its automatic load sequencer, c) Achieves steady state voltage ~* 2280 and s 2520 V, d) Achi:eves steady state frequency ~ 59. 5 and s 61. 2 Hz, and e) Supplies permanently connected ioads for~ 5 minutes.

The.se tests must be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

4-43a Amendment No.

~.7 fLECTRICAL.POWER SYSTEMS TESTS

4. 7. 2 AC Rower Source Tests. - Shutdown 4.* 7. 2.1 Ve.rify each AC power source required by Speci fi cation 3. 7. 2 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy_ a surveil 1ance requirement.

4.7.l.l, Offsite source check 4.7.1.2, DG starting test 4.7.1.4, DG starting air check 4.7.l.5, DG day tank level check 4.7.1~6, Fuel transfer check 4.7.3 DG Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Verify that the fuel oil and lube oil for each required DG is adequate by the following surveillance:

4.7.3.1 Verify that the Fuel Oil Storage Tank contains~ 23,700 gallons of fuel; each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

4.7.3.2 Verify stored lube oil inventory is ~ 175 gallons; each 31 days.

4.7.3.3 Verify properties of new fuel oil and stored fuel oil are tested in ac*cordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Fuel Oil Testing Program, Specification 6.8.4c.

4.7.3.4 Check for and remove e~cess accumulated water from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank; each 92 days .

4-43b Amendment No.

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.4 DC _Power Sources - Operating

Verify each DC source required by Specification 3.7.4 is OPERABLE by the fo.l lo.wing surve i 11 ance.

4.7.4.1 Verify battery terminal voltage is~ 125 Von float charge; each 7 days.

4.7.4.2 Ver*ify no vi.sible corroston at battery terminals and connectors, or veri-fy each battery connection resistance is s 50 µohm for inter-cell connections, s 360 µohm for inter-rack connections; and s 360 µohm for i nte.r-t i er connections; each 92 days.

4.7.4.3 Inspect battery cells, cell plates, and racks for visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration; each 12 months.

4.7.4.4 Remove visible terminal corrosion and verify cell to cell and terminal connections are coated with anti~corrosion material; each 12 months.

4.7.4.5 Verify each battery connection resistance is s 50 µohm for inter-cell connections, s 360 µohm for inter-rack connections; and s 360 µohm for inter-tier connections; each 12 months.

4.7.4.6 Verify each battery charger, ED-15, ED-16, ED-17, and ED-18, supplies

~ 180 amps at ~ 125 volts for ~ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; each 18 months.

4.7.4.7* Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery*service test; each 18 months. (The modified performance d,i scharge test of survei 11 ance 4. 7. 4. 8 may be performed in lieu of this test.)

4.7.4.8* Verify battery capacity is ~ 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a perforJ11ance discharge test or a modified performance discharge tes~; each 60 months. This test shall be performed each 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of the

~~pected life with capacity< 100% of manufacturer's rating, or each 24 months when battery has reached 85%of the expected life with capacity ~ 100% of manufacturer's rating.

These te.sts must be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

4.7.5 DC Power Sources - Shutdown

4. 7. 5 .1 Verify each DC source required by Speci fi cat i*on 3. 7. 5 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance:

4.7.4.1, Float voltage check, 4.7.4.2, Connector condition check, 4.7.4.3, Battery physical inspection, 4.7 .4.4, Battery connector cleaning and coating, 4.7.4.5, Battery connector resistance check, and 4.7.4.6, Battery charger check.

4-43c Amendment No.

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.6 Battery Cell Parameters Verify that the cell parameters of each required battery are within limits by the following surveillance:

4.7.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.7.6-1 Category A limits; each 31 days.

4.7.6.2 Verify average electrolyte temperature of representative cells is

~ 1o*F; each 31 days.

4.7.6.3 Verify battery cell parameters meet Table 3.7.6-1 Category B limits; each 92 days.

4.7.7 Inverters - Operating Verify that each inverter required by Specification 3.7.7 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance:

4.7.7.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency, and alignment to Preferred AC buses; each 7 days.

4.7.8 Inverters - Shutdown Verify that each inverter required by Specification 3.7.8 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance:

4.7.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency, and alignment to Preferred AC buses; each 7 days.

4.7.9 Distribution Subsystems - Operating Verify that the power distribution subsystems required by Specification 3.7.9 are OPERABLE by the following surveillance:

4.7.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC, DC, and Preferred AC electrical power distribution subsystems; each 7 days.

4.7.10 Distribution Subsystems - Shutdown Verify that the power distribution subsystems required by Specification

3. 7.10 are OPERABLE by the following surveillance:

4.7.10.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC, DC, and Preferred AC electrical power distribution subsystems; each 7 days.

4-43d Amendment No.

4.17 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS -TESTS Table 4.17.2 Instrumentation Surveillance Reguirements for

Engineered Safety Features CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL Functi.onal Unit CHECK TEST CALIBRATION

1. Safety InJection Signal (SIS)

a. Manual Initiation NA 18 months NA

b. SIS Logic NA (a} NA (Initiation, Actuation, and low pressure block auto reset)

c. CHP Signal SIS initiation NA 18 months NA (SP Relay Output)

d. *Pressurizer Pressure 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 31 days 18 months Instrument Channels

2. Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)

a. Manual Initiation NA 18 months NA

b. RAS Logic NA 18 months NA.

c. SlRWT Level Switches NA 18 months 18 months

3. AuxHi.a_ry Feedwater ActuatiOn Signal (AFAS)

a. Manual Initiation NA 18 months NA

b. AFAS Logic NA 92 days NA

c. "A" SG Level 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 31 days 18 months

d. "B" SG Level 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 31 days 18 months (a) Test normal and emergency power functions using test circuits each 92 days.

Verify all au-tomat*ic actuations and automatic resetting of low pressure block each 18 months.

Amendment No. ~' ~' -l-7-1-;-

4-77

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.8.4 (continued)

b. Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program A program shall be provided to monitor the radiation and radionuclides in the environs of the plant. The program shall provide (1) representative measurements of radioactivity in the highest potential exposure pathways, and (2) verifications of the accuracy of the effluent monitoring program and modeling of environmental exposure pathways. The program shall (1) be contained in the ODCM, (2) conform to the guidance of Appendix I to 10 CFR 50, and (3) including the following:

I.. Monitoring, sampling, analysis, and reporting of radiation and radionuclides in the environment in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

2. A Land Use Census to ensure that changes in the use of areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are identified and that modifications to the monitoring program are made if required by the results of this census, ~nd

3. Participation in a Interlaboratory Comparison Program to ensure that independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materials in environmental sample matrices are performed as part of the quality assurance program for environmental monitoring.

c. Fuel Oil Testing Program A fuel oil testing program to implement required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established. The program shall include sampling requirements, testing requirements, and acceptance criteria, based on the diesel manufacturer's specifications and applicable ASTM Standards. The program shall establish the following:

1. Acceptability of new fuel oil prior to addition to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank, and acceptability of fuel oil stored in the Fuel Oil Storage Tank, by determining that the fuel oil has the following properties within limits:

a) API gravity or an absolute specific gravity, b) Kinematic viscosity, and c) Water and sediment content.

2. Other properties of fuel oil stored in the Fuel Oil Storage Tank, specified by the diesel manufacturers or specified for grade 2D fuel oil in ASTM D 975, are within limits .

6-13 Amendment No. ~' §4,

ATTACHMENT 2 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT .

DOCKET 50-255 ELECTRICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE - ADDITIONAL CHANGES Bases for Proposed Electrical Technical Specifications 61 Pages

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.l and 4.J.l: AC Sources - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The plant Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources, and the onsite standby power sources, Diesel Generate.rs 1-1 and 1-2 (DGs)'. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (E$F} systems.

The AC power system at Palisades consists of a 345 kV switchyard, three circuits connecting the plant with off-site power (station power, startup, and safeguards transformers}, the on-site distributi-0n system, and two DGs. The on-site distribution system is divided into safety related (Class 1-E} and non-safety related portions.

The switchyard interconnects six transmission lines from the off-site transmission system and the output line from the Palisades main generator.

These lines are connected in a "breaker and a half" scheme between the Front (F} and Rear (R) buses such that any single off-site line may supply the

Palisades station loads when the plant is shutdown.

Two circuits supplying Palisades 2400 volt buses from off-site are fed directly from a switchyard bus through the startup and safeguards transformers. They are available both during operation and during shutdown.

The third circuit supplies the plant loads by 11 back feeding 11 through the main generator output circuit and station power transformers after the generator has been disconnected by a motor operated disconnect.

The station power transformers are connected into the main generator output circuit. Station power transformers 1-1 and 1-2 connect to the generator 22 kV output bus. Station power transformer 1-3 connects to the generator output ltne on the high voltage side of the main transformer. Station power transformers 1-1 and 1-3 supply non-safety related 4160 volt loads during plant power operation and during backfeeding operations. Station power transformer 1-2 can supply both safety related and non-safety related 2400 volt l-0ads during plant power operation or backfeeding operation.

The three startup transformers are connected to a common 345 kV overhead line from the switchyard R b.us. Startup transformers 1-1 and 1-3 supply 4160 volt non-safety related statton loads; Startup Transformer 1-2 can supply both safety related and non-safety related 2400 volt loads. The startup transformers are avai1abl.e during operation and shutdown .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-1 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.I and 4.7.I BASES Safeguard:s Transformer I-1 is connected to the switchya*rd F bus. It feeds station 2400 volt loads through an underground line. It is available to supply ~hese l~ads during operation and shutdown.

The onsite distribution system consists of seven main distribution buses (4I60 volt buses IA, lB, lF~ and lG, and 2400 volt buses IC, ID, and IE) and supported lower voltage buses, motor control*centers (MCCs), and lighting panels. The 4I60 volt buses and 2400 volt bus IE are not safely related.

Buses IC and ID and their supported buses and MCCs form two independent,

redundant, safety related distribution trains. Each distribution train supplies one train of engineered safety features equipment.

ln the event of a generator trip, all loads supplied by the station power transformers are automatically transferred to the startup transformers.

Loads supplied by the safeguards transformer areunaffected by a plant trip.

If power is lost to the safeguards transformer, *the 2400 volt loads will automatically transfer to startup transformer I-2. If the startup transformers are not energized when these transfers occur, their output breakers win be bl ocke.d from closing and the 2400 volt safety related buses will be energized by the DGs.

The two DGs each supply one 2400 volt bus. They provide backup power i'n the event of loss of off-site power, or loss of power to the ass.ociated 2400 volt bus. The continuous rating of the DGs. is 2500 kw, with IIO percent overload permissible for 2 hotirs ifl any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period. The required fuel in the Fuel Oil Storage Tank and DG Day Tank will supply one DG for a minimum period of 7 days assuming accident loading conditions and fuel conservation practices.

If either 2400 volt bus, IC or ID, experiences a sustained undervoltage, the associated DG is started, the affected bus is sepa~ated from its offsite power sources, major loads are stripped from that.bus and its supported buses, the DGs are connected to the bus, and ECCS or shutdown loads are started by an automatic load sequencer.

The. DGs share a co.mmon fuel oil storage and transfer system. A single buried Fuel Oil Storage Tank is used to maintain the required fuel oil inventory.

Two fuel transfer pumps are provided. The fuel transfer pumps are necessary for long term operatlon Qf the DGs. Testing has shown that each DG consumes about 2.6 gallons of fuel oil per minute at 2400 kW. Each day tank is required to contain at least 2500 gallons. Therefo.te, each fuel oil day tank contains suffi.cient fuel for more than I5 hours .of full load {2500 kW) op.er at ;,on. Beyond that ti me, a fuel tr an sfer pump is required for continued DG operatton.

Either fuel transfer pump is capable of supplying either DG. However, each fuel transfer pump i*s not capable, with norma-lly ava'ilable switching, of being powered from either DG. DG I-I tan power either fuel transfer pump, but DG I-2 can only power P-18A. The fuel oil pumps share a common fuel oil storage tank, and common p.i p*i ng.

PALISADES B 3.7.I-2 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.I and 4.7.I BASES

Fuel transfer pump P-18A is powered from MCC-8, ~hi~h is normally connected to Bus ID (DG 1-2) through Station Power Transformer I2 and Load Center I2. In an emergency, P-I8A can be powered from Bus IC (DG I-1) by cross connecting Load Centers 11 and I2.

Fuel transfer pump P-I8B is powered from MCC-1, *which is normally connected to Bus lC (DG I-I) through Station Power Transformer I9 and Load Center I9.

P-188 cannot be powered, using installed equipment, from Bus ID (DG I-2).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The safety analyses do not explicitly address AC electrical power. They do, however, ass~me that the Engineered Safety Featur~s (ESF) are available. The OPERABILITY of the ESF functions is supported by the AC Power Sources.

The design requirements are for each assumed safety function to be available under the following conditions:

a. The occurrence of an accident or transient,

b. The resultant consequential failures,

c. A worst case single active failure,

d. Loss of all offsite or all onsite AC power, and

e. The most reactive control rod fails to insert.

One proposed mechanism for the loss of off-site power is a perturbation of the transmission grid because of the loss of the plant's generating capacity. A loss of off-site power as a result of a generator trip can only occur during POWER OPERATION with the generator connected to the grid. However, it is also assumed .i~ analysis for events in HOT STANDBY, such as a steam line break or control rod ejection at zero power. No specific mechanism for initiating a loss of off-site power when the plant is not on the line is discussed in the FSAR.

In most cases, it is conservative to assume that off-site power is lost concurrent with the accident and that the single failure is that of a DG.

That would leave only one train of safeguards equipment to cope with the accident, the other being disabled by the loss of AC power. Those analyses which assume that a loss of off-site power and failure of a single DG accompany the accident also assume IO seconds for the DG to start and connect to the bus, and additi-0nal time for the sequencer to start each safeguards load .

PALISADES B 3.7.I-3 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

The same assumptions are analyzing the effects of condensate and feedwater a loss of .off-site power not conservative for all accident analyses. When a steam or feed line break, the loss of the pumps would reduce the steam generator inventory, so is not assumed.

In COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN, loss of off-site power is treated as an initiati*ng event.

LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System and an independent DG for each safeguards train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the react.or and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated -

operational occurrence or a postulated OBA.

General Design Criterion 17 requires, in part, that: "Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically i:ndependent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and l o.cated so as to minimize to the extent pr act i cal the li~elthood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated acctdent and environmental conditions."

The qualified. offsite circuits available* are Safeguards Transformer 1-1 and Startup Trans.former J..:.2. Station Power Transforme.r 1-2 is not qualified as a required source for LCO 3.7.1 since it ts not independent of the other two offstte circuits. This LCO does not prohibit use of Station Power Transformer to power the 2400 safety related buses, but the two qualified sources must be OPERABLE.

Each offsite circuit must be capable o.f maintaining acceptable frequency and voltage, and .accepting required loads during .an accident, while s1,1pplying the 24.00 volt safety related buses.

Following a loss of offsite power, each DG must be capable of starting and connecting to its respective 240.0 volt bus. This will be accomplished within 10 seconds after -receipt of a DG start signal. Each DG must also be capable of accepti-ng requ-ired loads wHhin the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to -Operate until offsite power can be restored to the 2400 volt safety re 1ated bus.es.

Proper sequencing of loads and tripping pf nonessential loads are required functions for DG OPERABILITY *

PALISADES B 3.7.1-4 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

APPLI CAB IL ITV The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that redundant sources of off-site and on-site AC power are available to support engineered safeguards equipment in the event of an accident or transient. The AC sources also support the equipment necessary for power operation, plant heatups and cooldowns, and shutdown operation.

The AC source requirements for COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are addressed in LCO 3.7.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS 3.7.1.A.l To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 4.7.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 4.7.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

3.7.1.A.2 According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (RG} 1.93, operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss -0f offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

3.7.1.B.1 To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable DG, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 4.7.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 4.7.1.1, it is inoperable.

Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered~

PALISADES B 3.7.1-5 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES 3 ..7.1. B. 2 The requiremen.t to declare required features inoperable carries with it the requirement to take those actions required by the LCO for that required equipment.

Requi*red Ac ti on B. 2 is intended to pro vi de assurance that a 1oss of offs i te power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains. Redundant required feature fa.ilures consist of i-noperable features with a train redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG.

The Complet4on Time for Required Action B~2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the Co~pletion Time "clock." In this Required-Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery_ that both:

a. An inoperable DG exists; and

b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the exi.stence of. this Condition {one DG inoperable) a redundant required feature subseqtiently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins t.o be tracked.

O:iscovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one* or more inoperable required supporting or supported features, or both; that are associated with the -OPERABLE DG, results in start1ng the Completion Time for Required Action B.-2. Four hours from the di*scovery of these events existing concurrently, is acceptable be.cause it.minimizes risk whHe allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite circuits are adequate -

to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single fail~re protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lOst.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the OPERABlLITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a OBA occurring .during th.is peri.od .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-6 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

3.7.1.B.3 Required Action B.3 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of the OPERABLE DG. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 4.7.1.2 (test starting of the OPERABLE DG) does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DGs, the other DGs would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.7.1 would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed to not exist on the remaining DGs, performance of SR 4.7.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG.

In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing 3.7.1.B.3 the corrective action system would normally continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months constraint imposed while in Condition B.

According to Generic Letter 84-15, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

3.7.1.B.4 In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite circuits are adequate to

supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System for a limited period.

The Completion Time, which limits the time when any required DG is not OPERABLE to 7 days (total for both DGs) in any calendar m.onth, is a feature of the original Palisades licensing basis.

3.7.1.C.1 The requirement to declare required features inoperable carries with it the requirement to take those actions required by the LCO for that required equipment.

Required Action C.l, which applies when two required offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is that RG 1.93 recommends a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-7 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Ti*me also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the Completion Time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begin*s on- discovery that both:

a. All requfred offsite circuits are inoperable; and

b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any ti.me during the existence of Condition C (two offsite circuits inoperable), a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins_ to be tracked.

3.7.1.C.2 According to the recommendations of RG 1.93, operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This level of degradation means t~at the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to accomplish a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC

sources are available to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a OBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

3.7.1.0.1 and 0.2 In Condition 0, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, ~reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a OBA occurring during this period.

Accardi ng to the recommendations of RG 1. 93, operation may continue in Condition 0 for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-8 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

3.7.1.E.1 With both DGs inoperable, there are no rema1n1ng standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, no AC source would be available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power}. Since an inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to the recommendations of RG 1.93, with both DGs inoperable,.

operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

3.7.1.F.1 The sequencer is an essential support system to the DG. w*i th the sequencer inoperable, the associated DG is unable to perform its specified function, and must thereby be immediately declared to be inoperable .

3.7.1.G.1. H.l, and I.I Since DG 1-2 cannot power fuel transfer pump P-18B, without P-18A, DG 1-2 becomes dependant on offsite power or DG 1-1 for its fuel supply (beyond the 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months it will operate on the day tank}, and does not meet the LCO requirement for independence. Since the condition is not as severe as the DG itself being inoperable, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed to restore the fuel transfer pump to operable status prior to declaring the DG inoperable.

Without P-18B, either DG can still provide power to the remaining fuel transfer pump, neither DG is directly affected. Continued operation with a single remaining fuel transfer pump, however, must be limited since an additional single active failure (P-18A} could disable the onsite power system. Because the loss of P-18B is less severe than the loss of one DG, a 7 day Completion Time is allowed.

If both fuel transfer pumps are inoperable, the onsite AC sources are limited to about 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months duration. Since this condition is not as severe as both DGs being inoperable, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months is allowed to restore one fuel transfer pump to OPERABLE status .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-9 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

3.7.1.J.1 and J.2 If the inoperable AC power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withi~ the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

3.7.1.K.1 Condition K corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justifted for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important

areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18. Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.9 and RG 1.137.

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances for the DGs operated in the "Unit" mode, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 2280 volts is 95% of the nominal 2400 volt generator rating. This value is above the setting of the primary undervoltage relays (127-1 and 127-2) and above the minimum analyzed acceptable bus voltage. It also allows for voltage*drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 volt level. The $pecified maximum steady state output voltage of 2520 volts is 105% of the nominal generator rating of 2400 volts. It is below the maximum voltage rating of the safeguards motors, 2530 volts. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 59.5 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. The minimum value assures that ESF pumps provide sufficient flow to meet the accident analyses. The maximum value is equal to 102% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and is derived from the recommendations given in RG I. 9 .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-10 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES Higher maximum tolerances are specified for final steady stat~ voltage and frequency following a loss of load test, because that test must be performed with the DG controls in the "Parallel" mode. Since "Parallel" mode operation introduces both voltage and speed droop, the DG final conditions will not return to the nominal "Unit" mode settings.

These SRs are modified by two notes. One note states that momentary transients outside the required band do not invalidate this test. This is to assure that a minor change in grid conditions and the resultant change in DG load, or a similar event, does not result in a surveillance being unnecessarily repeated. The other allows taking credit for unplanned events which satisfy the SR. Several SRs carry a limitation against performance d~ring specified plant conditions. If an unplanned event should occur, during these specified conditions, which satisfy the requirements of the SR, it may be documented as completion of the SR.

SR 4.7.1.1 {Offsite Source check)

This SR assures that the required offsite circuits are OPERABLE. Each offsite circuit must be energized from associated switchyard bus through its di sconne.ct switch to be OPERABLE.

S1nce each required offsite circuit transformer has only one possible source of power, the associated switchyard bus, and since loss of voltage to either the switchyard bus or the transformer is alarmed in the control room, correct alignment and voltage may be verified by* the absence of these alarms.

The 7 day Frequency is adequate because disconnect switch positions cannot change without operator action and because their status is displayed in the control room.

SR 4.7.1.2 {DG starting test)

This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-11 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES The month:lY testtng starting of the DG provides assurance that the DG would start and be ready for loading in the time period assumed in the safety analyses. The monthly test, however does not, and is not intended to, test all portions of the circuitry necessary for automatic starting and loading.

The operation of the bus undervo ltage relays and their auxiliary relays which initiate DG starting, the control relay which initiates DG breaker closure, and the DG breaker closure itself are not verified by this test. Verification of automatic operation of these components requires de-energizing the associated 2400 volt bus and cannot be done during plant operation. For this test, the 10 second timing is started when the DG receives a start signal, and ends when the DG voltage sensing relays actuate.

For the purposes of SR 4.7.1.2, the DGs are manually started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean the diesel engine is not running, but its coolant and oil temperatures are being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

/ .*,

Three relays sense the terminal voltage on each DG. These relays, in conjunction with a load shedding relay actuated by bus un<liervoltage, initiate automatic closing of the DG breaker. During monthly testing, the actuation of the three voltage sensing relays is used as the timi-ng point to determine when the DG is ready for loading.

The 31 day Frequency for performance of SR 4.7.1.2 agrees with the original licensing basis for the Palisades plant, and is consistent w-ith the testing

frequency recommendation of Generic Letter 94-01.

SR.4.7.1.3 (DG loading test)

This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads for at least 15 minutes. A minimum total run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures.

During the period when the DG is paralleled to the grid, it must be considered inoperable. This is because the load shedding ci'rcuits, which are actuated by the 2*400 bus undervoltage relays and which must function to initiate automatic DG loading, are blocked when the DG breaker is closed. This load shed block assures that a spurious undervoltage will not tause load shedding while a DG is the.sole source for accident loads, but it prevents automatic DG actuation while the DG is paralleled to the grid.

The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with the 'original Palisades licensing basis and with the testing frequency recommendation of Generic Letter 94-01 .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-12 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES SR 4.7.1.4 (.DG starting air pressure check)

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which successful starts can be accomplished.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications availab1e in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 4. 7 .1. 5 * (DG day tank 1evel check)

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The specified level is adequate for a minimum of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months of DG operation at full load.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and plant operators would be aware of any uses of the DG during this period.

SR 4.7.1.6 (Fuel Transfer system check~)

This SR demonstrates that each fuel transfer pump and the fuel transfer system controls operate and control transfer of fuel from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank to each day tank and engine mounted tank. This is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources.

This SR provides assurance that the following portions of the fuel transfer system is OPERABLE:

Fuel Transfer Pumps Day ~nd engine mounted tank filling solenoid valves Day and engine mounted tank automatic level controls The 92 day Frequency corresponds to the testing requirements for pumps in the ASME Code,Section XI. Additional assurance of fuel transfer system OPERABILITY is provided during the monthly starting and loading tests for each DG when the fuel oil system will function to maintain level in the day and engine mounted tanks.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-13 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES SR 4.7.1.7 (DG largest load rejection test)

Each DG is *provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. The loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. This Surveillance may be accomplished with the DG in the "Parallel" mode.

An acceptable method is to parallel the DG with the grid and load the DG to a load equal to or greater than its single largest post-accident load. The DG breaker is tripped while its voltage and frequency (or speed) are being*

recorded. The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances spe~ified in this SR are derived from the_ recommendations of RG 1.9, Revision 3 (RG 1.9).

RG 1.9 recommends that the increase in diesel speed during the transient does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed tri.p setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. The Palisades DGs have a synchronous speed of 900 rpm and an overspeed trip setting range of 1060 to 1105 rpm. Therefore, the maximum acceptable transient frequency for this SR is 68 Hz.

The minimum steady state voltage is specified to provide adequate margin for the switchgear and for both the 2400 and 480 volt safeguards motors; the maximum steady state voltage is 2400 +10% volts as recommended by RG 1.9.

The minimum acceptable frequency is specified to assure that the safeguards pumps powered from the DG would supply adequate flow to meet the safety analyses. The maximum acceptable steady state frequency is slightly higher than the +2% (61.2 Hz) recommended by RG 1.9 because the test must be performed with the DG controls in the Parallel mode. The increased frequency allowance of 0.3 Hz is based on the expected speed differential associated with performance of the test while in the "Parallel" mode.

The 18 month surveillance Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of RG 1. 9 .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-14 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASIS

SR 4.7.1.8 (DG f~ll load rejection test)

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine and generator load response under a complete loss of load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. The 4000 volt limitation is based on generator rating of 2400/4160 volts and the ratings of those components (connecting cables and switchgear) which would experience the voltage transient. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continue to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including re-connection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, yet still provide adequate testing margin between the specified power factor limit and the DG design power factor limit of 0.8, testing must be performed using a power factor

~ 0.9. This is consistent with RG 1.9.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of RG 1.9 and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 4.7.1.9 (Loss of off-site power without SIS test)

As recommended by RG 1.9 this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source.

This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and re-energizing of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG.

The requirement to energize permanently connected loads is met when the DG breaker closes,. energizing its associated 2400 volt bus. Permanently connected loads are those which are not disconnected from the bus by load shedding relays. They are energized when the DG breaker closes. It is not necessary to monitor each permanently connected load. The DG auto-start and breaker closure time of 10 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. For this test, the 10 second timing is started when the DG receives a start signal, and ends .when the DG breaker closes. The safety analyses assume 11 seconds from the l~ss of power until the bus is re-energized.

The requirement to verify that auto-connected shutdown loads are energized refers to those loads which are actuated by the Normal Shutdown Sequencer.

Each load should be started to assure that the DG is capable of acceler.ating these loads at the intervals programmed for the Normal Shutdown Sequence. The sequenced pumps may be operating on recirculation flow .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-15 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES The ~equirements to maintain steady state voltage and frequency apply to the "steady state" period after all sequenced loads have been started. This period need only be long enough to achieve and measure steady voltage and frequency.

The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved. Jhe requirement to supply permanently connected loads for

~ 5 minutes, refers *to the duration of the DG connection to the associated safeguards bus. It is not intended to require that sequenced loads be operated throughout the 5 minute period. It is not necessary to monitor each permanently connected load.

The requirement to verify the connection and supply of perman-ently and automatically connected loads is i!'ltended to demonstrate the DG loading logic.

This testing may be accomplished in any series of sequential, overlapping, or.

total steps so that the required connettion and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.9.

This SR i:s modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance woul~ remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electri.cal distribution system, and challenge safety systems. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR .

SR 4.7.1.10 (DG 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months load test)

RG 1.9 recommends demons.trati.on once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , ~ 100 minutes of which is at a load above its analyzed peak accident loading and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating of the DG. The 100 minutes required by the SR satisfies the intent of the recommendations of the RG, but allows some tolerance between the time requirement and the DG rating. Without this tolerance, the load would have to be reduced at precisely 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to satisfy the SR without exceeding the manufacturer's rating of the DG.

The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions.

In order to en-sure that the DG is tested under load cond it i ans that are as close to design conditions as possible, yet still provide adequate testing margin between the specified power factor limit and the DG design power factor limit of 0.8, testing must be performed using a*.power factor of :S 0.9. The load band is provided to avoid routine ove.rloading of the DG. Routine overloading m~y result in more frequent insp.ections in accordance with vendor

recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-16 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES During the period when the DG is paralleled to the grid, it must be considered inoperable. This is because the load shedding circuits, which are actuated by the 2400 Volt bus undervoltage relays and which must function to initiate automatic DG loading, are blocked when the DG breaker is closed. This load shed block assures that a spurious undervoltage will not cause load shedding while a DG is the sole source for accident loads, but it prevents automatic DG actuation while the DG is paralleled to the grid.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.9.

SR 4.7.1.11 (DG load transfer to offsite)

As recommended by RG I.9, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready to load status when offsite power is restored. The test is performed while the DG is supplying its associated 2400 volt bus, but not necessarily carrying the sequenced accident 1oads. *. The DG is considered to be in ready to 1oad status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open, the* automatic load sequencer is* reset, and the DG controls are returned to "Unit".

During the period when the DG is paralleled to the grid, it must be considered inoperable. This is because the load shedding circuits, which are actuated by the 2044 bus undervoltage relays and which must function to initiate automatic DG loading, are blocked when the DG breaker is closed. This load shed block assures that a spurious undervoltage will not cause load shedding while a DG is the sole source for accident loads, but it prevents automatic DG actuation while the DG is paralleled to the grid.

The Frequency of IS months is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.9.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 4.7.I.I2 (Sequencer timing check)

If power is lost to bus IC or ID, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to.prevent overloading of the DGs by concurrent motor starting currents. The 0.3 second load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and ensures that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are met. Logic Drawing E-17 Sheet 4 provides a summary of the automatic loading of safety related buses.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-17 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.9, takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution sy~tem, and challenge safety systems. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 4.7.1.13 (Loss of offsite power with SIS test) ln the event of a OBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required* to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, PCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The requirement to energize permanently connected loads is met when the DG breaker closes, ene.rgizi.ng its associated 2400 volt bus. Permanently connected loads are those which are not disconnected from the bus by load shedding relays. They are energized when the DG breaker closes. It is not necessary to monitor each permanently connected load. The DG auto-start -and breaker closure time of 10 seconds is derived from requirements of the acciden~ analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. For this test, the 10 second timing i.s started wheh the DG receives. a start signal, and ends when the DG breaker closes. The safety analyses assume 11 seconds from the loss of power until the bus is re-energized.

lhe requirement to verify that auto-connected shutdown loads are energized refers to those loads which are actuated by the OBA Sequencer. Each load should ~e ~tarted to assure that the DG i~ capable of accelerating these loads at the* intervals programmed for the OBA Sequence. The sequenced pumps .may be operating on recirculation* flow of in other testing mode. The requirements to maintain steady state voltage and frequency apply to the "steady state" period after all sequenced loads have been started. This period need only be long enough to achieve and measure steady voltage and frequency.

The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that a11 starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved. The requirement to supply permanently connected loads for

~ 5 minutes, refers to the duration of the DG connection to the associated 24.00 volt bus. It is not intended to require that sequenced loads be operated throughout the 5 mi.nute period. It is not necessary to monitor each permanently connected load.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions fequired to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-18 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note i_s that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17

2. Regulatory Guide* 1.93, December 1974

3. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984

4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18

6. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, July 1993

7. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979

8. Generic Letter 94-01, May 31, 1994

9. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI

10. IEEE Standard 308-1978

11. Palisades Logic Drawing E-17, Sheet 4 PALISADES B 3.7.1-19 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3. 7. 2 and 4 .7. 2: AC Sour*ces - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The safet~ analyses do not explicitly address electrical power. They do, however, assume that various electrically powered and controlled equipment is available. Electrical power is necessary to terminate and mitigate the effects of many postulated events which could occur in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

Analyzed events which might occur during.COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN are Loss of PCS inventory or Loss of PCS Flow, (which in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN would be grouped as a Loss of Shutdown Cooling event), and radioactive releases (Fuel Handling Accident, Cask Drop, Radioactive Gas RelE:iase, Etc.).

In general~ when the plant is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the plant has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The ratlonale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in above COLD SHUTDOWN have no specific analyses in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credi.bl e in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN because the primary coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced, and in minimal consequences.

LCO This LCO requires that one offsite circuit to be OPERABLE. One OPERABLE offsite circuit ensures that all required loads may be powered from offsite power. Since only one offsite AC source is req~ired, independence is not a criterion. Any of the three offsite supplies, Safeguards Transformer 1-1, Station Power Transformer 1-2, or Startup Transformer 1-2 is acceptable as a qualified circuit .

PALISADES B 3.7.2-1 Amendment No.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 BASES An OPERAS.LE DG, associated. with a distribution subsystem required to be OPERABLE by 160 3.7.10, ensures *a diverse power source is available to provide electri-cal power support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents and loss of shutdown cooling).

The DG must* be capable of starting., accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecting to its respective 2400 volt bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. Proper 11 Norm_1iil Shutdown" loading sequence, and tripping of nonessential loads, is a requtred function for DG OPERABILITY. A Servh~e Water Pump must be started soon after the DG

to assure continued DG operability. The OBA loading s~quence is not required to be OPERABLE since the Safety Injection Signal is disabled during COLD SHUTDOWN.

APPLlCABlllTY The AC sources .required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and duri*ng movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that equ*i pment and instrumentation is avai 1 able to:

a. Provide coolant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling ~ccident,

c. Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to .core damage,

d. Monitoring and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

This LCO is applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies even if the plant is in a condition other than COLD ~HUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

This LCO provides the necessary ACTIONS i-f the AC electrical power sources required by th.is l.CO become unavailable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

The AC source requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN a.re addressed in LCO 3. 7.1, "AC Sources - Operating".

PALISADES B 3.7.2-2 Amendment No.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 BASES ACTIONS 3.7.2.A.l An offsite circuit would. be considered inoperable if it were not available to supply the 2400 volt safety related bus or buses required by LCO 3.7.10.

Since the required offsite AC source is only required to support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those required features with no offsite power available to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

3.7.2.A.2.l, A.2.2., A.2.3, A.2.4, B.l, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 ACTION A.I may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts, therefore, ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 provide alternate, but sufficiently conservative, ACTIONs.

With tha required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available.

ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 and B.1 through 8.4 require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operat.ions involving positive reactivity additions. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

3.7.2.C.l The sequencer is an essential support system to the DG. With the sequencer inoperable, there is no assurance that a service water pump will be started to provide cooling for the DG. The associated DG is unable to perform its specified function, and must thereby be immediately declared to be inoperable .

PALISADES 8 3.7.2-3 Amendment No.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.2.1 (Shutdown AC power surveillance)

SR 4. 7. 2.1 requi*res the SRs from LCO 3. 7.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

The SRs from LCO 3.7.1 which are required are those which both support a feature required in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN and can which be performed without effecting the OPERABILITY or reliability of the required sources.

With only one DG available, many tests cannot be performed since their performance would render that DG inoperable during the test. This is the case for tests which require DG loading: SRs 4.7.1.3, *4.7.1.7, 4.7.1.8, 4.7.1.9, 4.7.1.10, 4.7.1.11, 4.7.1.12, and 4.7.1.13.

REFERENCES None PALISADES B 3.7.2-4 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3: Diesel Fuel Oil and Lube Oil BASES BACKGROUND The diesel generators (DGs) are provided with a storage tank having a required fuel oil inventory sufficient to operate one diesel for a period of 7 days, while the DG is supplying maximum post-accident loads. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DG for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from offsite sources.

Fuel oil is transferred from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank to either day tank by either of two Fuel Transfer Pumps.

For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.137 addresses the recommended fuel oil practices as supplemented by ANSI Nl95-1976.

The DG lubrication system is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated DG under all loading conditions.

The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during operation.

The onsite storage in addition to the engine oil sump is sufficient to ensure 7 days of continuous operation. This supply is sufficient supply to allow the operator to replenish lube oil from offsite sources. Implicit in this LCO is the requirement to assure, though not necessarily by testing, the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG oil sump, while the DG is running.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3;7.1 "AC Sources - Operating"; during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN, in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown" .

PALISADES B 3.7.3-1 Amendment No.

Diesel fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES LOO Stored diesel fuel oil is required to have sufficient supply for 7 days of full accident load operation. It is also required to meet specific standards for quality. The specified 7 day requirement and the 6 day quantity listed in Condition 3.7.3.A are taken from the Engineering Analysis associated with Event Report E-PAL-93-026B.Additionally, sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate at full accident load for 7 days. This requirement is in addition to the lube oil contained in the engine sump. The specified 7 day requirement and the 6 day quantity listed in Condition 3.7.3.B are based on an assumed lube oil consumption of 1 gallon per hour.

These requirements, in conjunction with an ability to obtain replacement supplies within 7 days, support the availability *of the DGs. DG day tank fuel requirements, and fuel transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tanks, are addressed in LCOs 3.7.1, and 3.7.2.

APPLICABILITY DG OPERABILITY is required by LCOs 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 to ensure the availability

of the required AC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition following a loss of off-site power. Since diesel fuel oil and lube oil support LCOs 3.7.1 and 3.7.2, stored diesel fuel oil and lube oil are required to be within limits when either DG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS 3.7.3.A.l In this Condition, the available DG fuel oil supply is less than the required 7 day supply, but enough for at least 6 days. This condition allows sufficient time to obtain additional fuel and to perform the sampling and analys~s required prior to additton of fuel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoratiqn of the required inventory prior to declaring the DGs inoperable.

3.7.3.B .. 1 In this Condition, the available DG lube oil supply is less than the required 7 day supply, but enough for at least 6 days. This condition allows sufficient time to ~btain additional lube oil. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required inventory prior to declaring the DGs inoperable .

PALISADES B 3.7.3-2 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES 3.7.3.Cl Di~sel fuel oil with viscosity, or water and sediment out of limits is unacceptable for even short term DG operation. Viscosity is important primarily because of its effect on the handling of the fuel by the pump and injector system; water and sediment provides an indication of fuel contamination. When the fuel oil stored in the Fuel Oil Storage Tank is determined to be out of viscosity, or water and sediment limits, the DGs must be declared inoperable, immediately.

3.7.3.D.l With the stored fuel oil properties, other than viscosity or water and sediment, defined in the Fuel oil Testing Program not within the required limits, but acceptable for short term DG operati-0n, a period of 30 days is allowed for restortng the sto~ed fuel oil properties. The most likely cause of stored fuel oil becoming out of limits is the addition of new fuel oil with properties that do not meet all of the limits. This 30 day period provides sufficient time to determine if new fuel oil, when mixed with stored fuel oil, will produce an acceptable mixture, or if other methods to restore the stored fuel oil properties are required. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combinations of these procedures. Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the DG would st il 1. be cap ab 1e of performing its intended function.

3.7.3.E.l With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or with diesel fuel oil or lube oil not within 1imits for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through D, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.3.l (Fuel oil quantity check)

This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the storage tank to support either DG's operation for 7 days at full post-accident load. The 7 day period is sufficient time to place the plant in a safe shutdown cond.ition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is specified to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since the Fuel Oil Storage Tank is the fuel oil supply for the diesel fire pumps, heating boilers, and rad waste evaporators, in addition to the DGs. SR 4. 7. 3. 2 (Lube oil quantity check)

PALISADES B 3.7.3-3 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lube oil inventory is available to support at least 7 days of full accident load operation for one DG. The 175 gallons requirement is based on an estimated consumption of 1 gallon per hour.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since DG starts and run times are closely monitored by the plant staff.

SR 4.7.3.3 (Fuel oil quality check}

The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new fuel oil and stored fuel oil are of the appropriate grade and have not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate, detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion.

Testing for viscosity, specific gravity, and water and sediment is completed for fuel oil delivered to the plant prior to its being added to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank. Fuel oil which fails the test, but has not been added to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank does not imply failure of this SR and requires no specific action. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil may be added to the storage tank without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tank.

Fuel oil is tested for other of the parameters specified in ASTM 0975 in accordance with the Fuel Oil Testing Program required by Specification 6.8.4c.

Fuel oil determined to have one or more measured parameters, other than viscosity or water and sediment, outside acceptable limits will be evaluated for its effect on DG operation. Fuel oil which is determined to be acceptable for short term DG operation, but outside limits will be resto~ed to within limits in accordance with Condition D.

PALISADES B 3.7.3-4 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES SR 4.7.3.4 (Fuel Oil Storage Tank water check)

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank once every 92 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it reduces the potential for water entrainment ;,n the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, ratn water, and contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria.

Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies and acceptance criteria are established in the Fuel .

O.il Testing Program based, in* part, on those recommended.by RG l.137. This SR is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent fa i.l ure of this SR provided the accumulated water is removed in accordance with the requirements of the Fuel Oil Testing Program.

REFERENCES

1. Regu.l atory Guide 1.137

2. ANSI N195-1976, Appendix B

3. ASTM Standards, 0975, Table 1 PALISADES B 3.7.3-5 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B ~.7.4 and 4.7.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4: DC Sources - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The station DC electrical power system provides the AC power system with tontrol power. It also provides control power to selected safety related equipment and power to the preferred AC Buses (via inverters). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, the DC electrical power system. is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure.

The 125 volt DC electrical power system consists of two independent and redundant safety related Class IE DC power sources. Each DC source consists of one 125 battery, two battery chargers, and the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling.

Each station battery has two associated battery chargers, one powered by the associated AC power distribution system (the directly connected chargers) and one powered from the opposite AC power distribution system (the cross connected chargers). The battery chargers are normally operated in pairs, either both direct connected chargers or both cross connected chargers, to assure a.diverse AC supply.

During normal operation, the 125 volt DC load is powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power from the battery charger, the DC load continues to be powered from the station batteries.

The DC power distribution system is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.9, "Distributions System Operating".

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load conti~uously for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and to perform three complete cycles of intermittent loads discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8.

Each 125 volt battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each DC source is separated physically and electrically from the other DC source to ensure that a single failure in one source does not cause a failure in a redundant source.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-1 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES The batteri~s for the DC power sources are sized to produce required capacity at 803 of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity* at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. The voltage limit is 2.13 volts per cell, which corresponds to a total minimum voltage output of 125.7 volts per battery discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8. The criteria for sizing large lead storage batteries are defined in IEEE-485.

Each DC electrical power source has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads during normal op~ration, while at the same time maintaining its battery fully charged. Each battery charger also has suffi*cient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum ch;irge to its fully charged state within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating".

LCD The DC power sources, each consisting of one battery, one directly connected battery charger and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the train are required to be* OPERABLE to ensure the availability of DC control power and Preferred AC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.

An OPERABLE DC electrical power source requires its battery to be OPERABLE and connected to the associated DC bus. In order for the battery to remain OPERABLE, one charger must be in service.

The LCO specifies chargers ED-15 and ED-16 because those chargers are powered by the AC p.ower di stri but ion system and DG associated with the battery they supply. If only the cross connected chargers were OPERABLE, and a loss of off-site power should occur concurrently with the loss of one DG, both safeguards trains would eventually become disabled. One train would be disabled by the lack of AC motive power; the other would become disabled when the battery, whose only OPERABLE charger is fed by the. fa,il ed DG, became depleted. *

PALISADES B 3.7.4-2 Amendment No;

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES The required chargers, ED-15 and ED-16, must be OPERABLE, but need not actually be in service because the probability of a concutrent loss of offsite power and loss of one DG is low, battery charging current is not needed invnediately after an accident, and the standby chargers may be placed in service quickly.

APPLICABILITY The DC sources are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that re*dundant sources of DC power are available to support engineered safeguards equipment and plant instrumentation in the event of an accident or transient.

The DC sources also support the equipment and instrumentation necessary for power operation, plant heatups and cooldowns, and shutdown operation.

The DC source requirements for COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are addressed in LCO 3.7.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS 3.7.4.A.l and A.2 With one of the required chargers (ED-15 or ED-16) inoperable, the cross connected charger must be immediately placed in service, if it is not already in service, to maintain the battery in OPERABLE status. In order to limit the time when the DC source is not capable of continuously meeting the single failure criterion, the required charger must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

The 7 day completion time was chosen to allow trouble shooting, location of parts, and repair.

3.7.4.B.1 and B.2 With one battery inoperable, the associated DC system cannot meet its design.

It lacks both the surge capacity and the independence from AC power sources which the battery provides if offsite power is lost. Placing the second battery charger in service provides two benefits: 1) restoration of the capacity to supply a sudden DC power demand, and 2) restoration of adequate DC power in the affected train as soon as either AC power distribution system is re-energized following a loss of offsite power .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-3 Amendment No.

l DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4 BASES In order to restore the DC source to its design capability, the battery must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is a feature of the original Palisades licensing basis and reflects the availability to provide two trains of DC power from either AC distribution system. Furthermore, it provides a reasonable time to assess plant status as a function of the i.noperable DC electrical power source and, if the battery is not restored to OPERABLE status*, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe plant shutdown.

3.. 7. 4.. C. l and C. 2 If the inoperable DC electrical power source cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withi*n the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power condftions in an orderly manner and.without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.4.1 (Float voltage check)

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge helps to ensure the effect i venes~ of the charg.i ng system and the ability of the batteries to P.erform thetr intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplyi.ng the continuous current required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state. The spec.ifled voltage is the nominal rating of the battery. At that terminal voltage, the battery has sufficient charge to provide the analyzed capacity for eHher accident loading or station blackout loading. The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer and IEEE-450 recommendations.

SR 4.* 7.4 .. 2 (Terminal and connector condition check)

Visual inspect.ton to detect corrosion of the battery terminals and connectors, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell and termtnal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The specified-limits of s 5.0 µohm for inter-cell connections and terminal connections, and s 360 µohms fof inter~tier and, inter~rack connections are in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-4 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES The 50 µohm value is based on the minimum battery design voltage. Battery sizi.ng calculations show the first minute load on the ED-02 battery as the load that determines battery size, hence, battery voltage will be at its lowest value while the battery supplies this current. Calculations also show that at* a minimum temperature and end of life (80% battery performance),

battery voltage during this first minute load will be about 1.815 volts per cell, assuming nominal connection resistance. But if all the connections were at the ceiling value of 50 µohms, the additional voltage drop would result in a battery voltage of about 1.79 volts per cell, which is still above the minimum design voltage.

The 360 µohm value is based on 120% of the nominal cumulative resistance of the components which make up the connections: resistance of the connecting cable, and for each end of the cable, the battery post to cable lug connection, the cable lug itself, and the lug to cable connection.

The resistance values determined during initial battery installation are recorded with the battery replacement specifications, FES 95-206-ED-01 and FES 95-206-ED-02.

The Surveillance Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to

detecting corrosion trends.

SR 4.7.4.3 (Battery inspection)

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The 12 month Frequency for this SR is consistent with IEEE-450, which recommends detailed visual inspection of cell condition and rack integrity on a yearly basis.

SR 4.*7.4.4 and SR 4.7.4.5 (Cleaning and resistance)

Visual inspection and resistance measurements of inter-cell and terminal connections provide an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anticorrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection. The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of SR 4.7.4.4 .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-5 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4 BASES The specified limits for connection resistance are discussed in the bases for SR 4.7.4.2.

The Surveillance Frequencies of 12 months is consistent with IEEE-450, which recommends cell to cell and terminal connection resistance measurement on a yearly basis.

SR 4.7.4.6 (Charger test}

This SR requi*res that each battery charger be capable of supplying 180 amps at 125 volts for ~ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . These requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers. The chargers are rated at 200 amps; the specified 180 amps provides margin between the charger rating and the test requirement.

The specified Frequency requires each battery charger to be tested each 18 monthi. The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 18 month intervals.

In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 4.7.4.7 (Service test}

A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle} of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in FSAR Chapter 8.

The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of RG I. 32 and RG 1.129, which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations, or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 18 months.

Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 4.7.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 4.7.4.8 while satisfying the requirements of SR 4.7.4.7 at the same time.

The reason for the restriction that the plant be tn COLD SHUTDOWN or RE~UELING SHUTDOWN is that performing the Surveillance requires disconnecting the battery from the DC distribution buses and connecting it to a test load resistor bank. This action makes the battery inoperable and completely unavailable for use.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-6 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4 BASES SR 4.7.4~8 (P~rformance test)

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the "as found" condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates; the one minute rate published for the battery or the 1argest current 1a.ad of the duty cycle, foll owed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Si nee the ampere-hours removed by a rated one *m,i.nute discharge represents a very sma 11 portion of the battery capac*ity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A mod-if.ied discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.

Either the battery performance.discharge test or the modified performance d-ischarge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 4.7.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 4.7.4.8 while satisfying the requirements of SR 4.7.4.7 at the same time.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with the recommendations of IEEE-450 and IEEE-485. These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer rating.

A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if th~re is ample capacity to meet the load requirements .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-7 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4~7.4 BASES The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is< 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency h reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity

~ 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450, when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is ~ 10% below the manufactur~r's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450. -

The reason fo.r the restriction that the plant be in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN is that p.erforming the Surveillance requires disconnecting the battery from the DC distribution buses and connecting it to a test load resistor bank. This action makes the battery inoperable and completely unavatlable for use.

REFERENCES l~ 10 CFR.50, Appendix A, GDC 17

2. FSAR, Chapter 8

3. IfEE-485-1983, June 1983

4. Regulatory *Guide 1.93, December 1974

5. IEEE-450-1995

6. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977

7. Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974

8. Letter; Graham Walker, C&D Charter Power Systems, Inc to John Slinkard,

Consumers Power Company, 12 July 1996.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-8 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.& and 4.7.5~ DC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCO This LCO requires those, and only those, DC power sources which supply the DC d*istribution subsystems required by LCO 3.7.10, to be OPERABLE. Each DC so.urce consists of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling. This ensures the availability of suffi-ci.ent DC power sources to maintai*n the pl ant in a safe manner and to mi ti.gate the consequences o.f postulated events during shutdown (e.g. , fuel handling accidents and loss of shutdown cooling).

APPLICABILITY The DC power sources required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that equipment and instrumentation is available to:

a.. Provide cool ant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling accident,

c. Mitigate shutdown events that can.lead to core damage,

d. Monitoring and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

PALISADES B 3.7.5-1 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5 This LCO is applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies even if the plant is in a condition other than COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

This LCO provides the necessary ACTIONS if the DC electrical power sources required by this LCO become unavailable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

The DC source requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.4, "DC sources - Operating".

ACTIONS 3.7.5.A.1 Since the required DC source is only required to support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those required features with no DC power available to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

3.7.5.A.2.l, A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 ACTION A.I may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts, therefore, ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 provide alternate, but sufficiently conservative, ACTIONs.

ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place *a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC sources (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the necessary DC power to the plant safety systems.

The Gompletion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient control and Preferred AC power .

PALISADES B 3.7.5-2 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4*.7 *.5..1 (Shutdown DC power surveillance)

SR 4.7.5.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.7.4 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

The SRs from LCO 3.7.4 which are required are those which can be performed without effecting the OPERABILITY or reliability of the required DC source.

With only one battery available, loading tests cannot be performed since their performance would render that battery inoperable during the .test. This is the case for SRs 4.7.4.7 and 4.7.4.8.

REFERENCES None PALISADES B 3.7.5-3 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6 ELECTRlCAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6: Battery Cell Parameters BASES BACKGROUND This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC power source batteries. A discussion of these batteries is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.4, "DC Sources -

Operating".

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating"; during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN, .in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCO Battery cell parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anti~ipated-operational occurrence or a postulated OBA. Battery cell limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC electrical system function even when Category A and B limits are not met.

The*req~irement to maintain the average temperature of representative cells above 70°F assures that the battery temperature is within the design band.

Battery capacity is a function of battery temperature.

APPLICABILITY The battery cell parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC power sources. Therefore, they are only required when the DC power source is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in the Bases for LCO 3.7.4, "DC Sources - Operating" and LCO 3.7.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown".

PALISADES B 3.7.6-1 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6 BASES ACTIONS 3.7.6~A.l. A.2. and A.3 With one or more cells in one or more batteries not within Category A or B limits but within the Category C limits, the battery is not fully charged but there is still sufficient capacity to perform the intended function.

Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be declared to be inoperable and continued operation is p.ermitted for a 1imited period.

The pilot tell electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C limits within I hour (Required Action A.I). This check will provide a qukk indication of the status of the remainder of the battery.

One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyta level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cells.

Verification that all cells meet the Category C limits (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits, the battery will still be capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed to complete the initial verification because specific gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters are not severely degraded, this time is considered reasonable. The veri fi cation is repeated at 7 day i nterva 1s until the parameters are restored to Category A and B 1imits.

Battery cell parameters must be restored to Category A and B limits within 31 days.

3 .7 .6 .. B.1 With the temperature of representative cells below the design temperature, or with one or more battery cells with parameters outside the Category C limits, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not assured and the corresponding battery must be declared inoperable.

Additionally, i.f battery cells cannot be restored to meeting Category A or B limits within 31 days, a serious d.ifficulty with the battery is indicated and the battery*must be declared to be inoperable.

PALISADES B 3.7.6-2 Amendment No.

Battery Cell.Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.6.1 (Pilot cell checks)

This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450, which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte temperature of pilot cells.

SR 4.7.6.2 (Temperature checks)

This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is > 70°F is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE:-450, which states that the temperature of electrolytes in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis. The monthly frequency specified is a feature of the initial Palisades license, and. is the same as those other pilot cell tests specified in Surveillance 4.7.6.1.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity.

This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on manufacturer recommendations.

SR 4.7.6.3 (Connected cell checks)

The quarterly inspection of specific gravity and voltage is consistent with the recommendations of IEEE-450.

Table 3.7.6-1 This table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three d.ifferent categories. Each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the fully charged parameter limit for each designated pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage and specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected ce11*. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category A and B limits for the Palisades batteries are the same. The two Categories are maintained in the table to be consistent with IEEE-450 terminology and with the Standard Technical Specifications.

PALISADES B 3.7.6-3 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6

BASES The Category A and B limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450, with the extra % inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperatures and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote {a} to Table 3.7.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE~450 recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Category A and B limit specifted for fl oat voltage is ~ 2.13 volts p_er cell. This value is based on a recommendation of IEEE-450, which states that prolonged operation of cells< 2.13 volts can reduce their life expectancy.

The Category A limit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is

~ 1.205. This value is six points {0.006} below the average baseline specific gravity for fully charged cells when the battery was installed and is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected cell is ~ 1.200. Category B also requires that the Average of all cells be ~ 1.205 (0.006 below the baseline average of all cells}. This allows some cells to be slightly lower than the nominal requirement as long as others are sufficiently higher so as to maintain the average above the nominal full charged value. According to IEEE-450, specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F {25°C).

Category C defines the limit for each connected cell. These values, a1though reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limit specified for electrolyte level {above the top of the plates and not overflowing} ensures that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for float voltage is based on IEEE-450, which states that a cell *voltage of 2.07 volts or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C specific gravity limit that each connected cell must be no less than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells and that average be

~ 1.195 is based on manufacturer recommendations {0.020 below the manufacturer recommended fully:charged, nominal specific gravity). This limit ensures that the effect of a highly charged or new cell does not mask overall degradation of the battery.

PALISADES B 3.7.6-4 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6

BASES Footnote (a) allows for the normally observed level increase which occurs during sustained battery charging. Footnotes {b) and {c) to Table 3.7.6-1 are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity. Footnote {b) to Table 3.7.6-1 requi*res the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature, with the exception that level correction is not required when battery charging current is < 2 amps on float charge. This current provides, i!l general, an indication of overall battery condition.

Footnote (c) to Table 3.7.6-1 allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity readings. A stabilized charger current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450.

REFERENCES

1. lEEE-450-1995

PALISADES .B 3.7.6-5 Amendment No.

Inverters - Operating B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7: Inverters - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the normal source of power for the Preferred AC buses. The function of the inverter is to provide continuous AC electrical power to the Preferred AC buses, even in the event of an interruption to the normal AC power distribution system. A Preferred AC bus can be powered from the AC power d-i stri but ion system vi a the Bypass Regula tor if its associated inverter is o.u-t of service. An interlock prevents supplying more than one Preferred AC bus from the bypass regulator at any time. The station battery provides an uninterruptable power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protective System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Features (ESF).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is pr6vided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating".

LCD The inverters ensure the availability of Preferred AC power for the instrumentation required to shut down the re(lctor an_d maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated OBA.

Maintaining the inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the RPS and ESF instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four inverters ensure an uninterruptable supply of AC electrical power to the Preferred AC buses even if the 2400 volt *safety related buses are de-energized.

An inverter is consi~ered inoperable if it is not powering the associated Preferred AC bus, or if its output voltage or frequency is not within tolerances .

PALISADES B 3.7.7-1 Amendment No.

Inverters - Operating B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7

BASES APPLICABILITY The i.nverters are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that redundant sources of Preferred AC power for instrumentation and control are availabl~ to support engineered safeguards equipment in the event of an accident or transient and for power operation, plant heatups and cooldowns, and shutdown operation.

Inverter requirements for COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are addressed LCO 3.7.8, "Inverters - Shutdown".

ACTIONS 3.7.7.A.l and A.2 With an inverter inoperable, its associated Preferred AC bus becomes

inoperable until it is manually re-energized from the bypass regulator. An inoperable Preferred AC Bus is addressed in LCO 3.7.9.

Required Action A.I allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the plant is exposed because of the inverter inoperability.

This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail.

3.7.7.B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

PALISADES B 3.7.7-2 Amendment No.

Inverters - Operating B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7

BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.7.1 (Inverter checks)

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly and Preferred AC buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation of the RPS and ESF connected to the Preferred AC buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter ma l funct i ans.

REFERENCES None

PALISADES B 3.7.7-3 Amendment No.

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8: Inverters - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.7, "Inverters - Operating".

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7~2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCD This LCO requires those, and only those, inverters necessary to support to Preferred AC buses required by LCO 3.7.10, to be OPERABLE.

This ensures the avail~bility of sufficient Preferred AC. electrical power to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and loss of shutdown cooling).

An inverter is considered inoperable if it is not powering the associated Preferred AC bus, or it its voltage or frequency is not within tolerances.

APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that equipment and instrumentation is available to:

a. Provide coolant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling accident,

c. Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to core damage,

d. Monitoring and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

PALISADES B 3.7.8-1 Amendment No.

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8 BASES This LCO is app1 i cable duri-ng movement of irradiated fuel assemblies even if the plant is i~ a conditi-0n other than COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

This lCO provides the necessary ACTIONS if the i.nverters required by this LCO become unavailable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Inverter requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.7, "Inverters - Operating".

ACTIONS 3.7.8.A.-1 An inverter would be corisidered inoperable if it were not available to $Upply its associated Preferred AC bus. Since the inverter and its associated Preferred AC Bus is only required to support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those required features without inverter supplied Preferred AC power available to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

3.J.8.A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 ACTION A.1 may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts, therefore, ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 provide alternate, but sufficiently conservative, ACTIONs.

ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, movement of irradi_ated fuel assemblies~ and operations involving positive reactivity additions. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irrad-iated fuel a$sembl ies does -not preclude_ actions to place a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required tnverters (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the required inverter supplied Preferred AC power to the plant instrument and control systems.

The Completi:on Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attenti'on. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which t_he plant safety systems may be without inverter supplied Preferred AC power *

PALISADES B 3.7.8-2 Amendment No.

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8 BAS.ES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.8.l (Inverter checks)

A description of the basis for this SR is provided in the bases for SR 4. 7. 7 .1.

REFERENCES None PALISADES B 3.7.8-3 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9: Distribution Systems - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class IE AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution systems are divided into two redundant and independent electrical power distribution trains. Each electrical power distribution train is made up of several subsystems which include the safety related buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels shown in Table 3.7.9-I.

The Class IE 2400 volt safety related buses, Bus IC and Bus ID, are normally powered from offsite, but can be powered from the DGs, as explained in the Background section of the Bases for LCO 3.7.I, "AC Sources - Operating". Each 2400 volt safety related bus supplies one train of Class IE the 480 volt distribution system.

The I20 volt Preferred AC buses are normally powered from the inverters. The alternate power supply for the buses is a constant voltage transformer, called the Bypass Regulator. Use of the Bypass regulator is governed by LCO 3.7.7, "Inverters - Operating." The bypass regulator is powered from the non-Class IE instrument AC bus, Y-OI. The Instrument AC bus is normally powered through an automatic bus transfer switch, an instrument AC transformer, and isolation fuses. Its normal power source is MCC-I. Loss of power to MCC-I will cause automatic transfer of the Instrument AC bus to MCC-2.

There are two*independent I25 volt DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.I "AC Sources - Operating".

LCO The AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The required power distribution subsystems listed in Table 3.7.9-I ensure the availability of AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA .

PALISADES B 3.7.9-I Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES Maintaining both trains of AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the plant design is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any electrical power distribution subsystem will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE electrical power distribution subsystems require the buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels listed in Table 3.7.9-1 to be energized to their proper voltages. In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC power distribution subsystems must be open when a 2400 volt source is OPERABLE for each train. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem. If any tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical power distribution subsystems are considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety .related redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class IE 2400 volt buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit or preclude cross connecting Class IE 480 volt subsystems when 2400 volt power is available for only one train.

This LCO does not address the power source for the Preferred AC buses. The Preferred AC buses are normally powered from the associated inverter. An alternate source, the Bypass Regulator, is available to supply one Preferred bus at a time, to allow maintenance on an inverter. The proper alignment of the inverter output breakers is addressed under the inverter LCOs. Therefore a Preferred AC Bus may be considered operable when powered from either the associated inverter or the Bypass Regulator as long as the voltage and frequency of the supply is correct.

APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that AC, DC, and Preferred AC power is available to the redundant trains and channels of safeguards equipment, instrumentation and controls required to support engineered safeguards equipment in the event of an accident or transient.

The AC source requirements for COLD are addressed in LCO 3.7.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradi.ated fuel assemblies are addressed in LCO 3.7.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown" .

PA~ISADES. B 3.7.9-2 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES ACTIONS 3.7.9.A.l An inoperable AC distribution subsystem can cause engineered safety features to be inoperable. If a redundant safety feature in the other train is concurrently inoperable, a loss of safety function could occur. ACTION A.I requires compliance with Condition 3.7.9.E to assure that the plant is.

shutdown if a safety function is lost.

3.7.9.A.2 With one or more required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or distribution panels, except Preferred AC buses, in one train inoperable, the redundant AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because an additi~nal failure in the power distribution systems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.7.9.B.1 An inoperable Preferred AC bus can cause engineered safety features to be inoperable. If a redundant safety feature in the other train is concurrently inoperable, a loss of safety function could occur. ACTION B.l requires compliance with Condition 3.7.9.E to assure that the plant is shutdown if a safety function is lost.

3.7.9.B.2 With one Preferred AC bus inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE Preferred AC buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the plant and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the Preferred AC bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by powering it from the associated inverter or from the Bypass Regulator.

This 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate Preferred AC power and is a feature of the original Palisades licensing basis.

PALISADES B 3.7.9-3 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES 3.7.9.C.l An inoperable DC distribution subsystem can cause engineered safety features to be lnoperable. If a redundant safety feature in the other train is concurrently inoperable, a loss of safety function could occur. ACTION C.l requires compliance with Condition 3.7.9.E to assure that the plant is shutdown if a safety function is lost.

3*. 7. 9. c.. 2 With a DC bus in one train inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

This a hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components which would be without power and is a feature of the Qriginal Palisades licensing basis.

3.7.9.D.l and D.2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant i !

must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN *.I within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed tompletion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

3.7.9.E.1 Condition E corresponds to a degradation in the electrical distribution system that, together with another existing equipment failure, causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one LCO Condition is entered, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued* operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

PALISADES B 3.7.9-4 Amendment No.

---~----

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7:9.1 {AC bus alignment check)

This surveillance verifies that the required AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained.

For those buses which have undervoltage alarmed in the control room, correct voltage may be verified by the absence of an undervoltage alarm.

For those buses which have only one possible power source and have undervoltage alarmed in the control room, correct breaker alignment by the absence of an undervoltage alarm.

A Preferred AC Bus may be considered correctly aligned when powered from either the associated inverter or from the bypass regulator. A mechanical interlock prevents connecting two or more Preferred AC Buses to the Bypass Regulator. LCO 3.7.7 and SR 4.7.7.1 address the condition of supplying a Preferred AC Bus from the bypass regulator .

The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES None

PALISADES B 3.7.9-5 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.lO*and 4.7.10 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.7.10 and 4.7.10: Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating".

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCO This LCO requires those, and only those, AC, DC, and Preferred AC distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE which are necessary to support equipment required by other LCOs.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). I APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that equipment and instrumentation is available to:

a. Provide coolant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling accident,

c. Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to core damage,

d. Monitoring and maintaintng the plant in a COLD SHUTDOW~ or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition .

PALISADES B 3.7.10-1 Amendment No.

Distributton Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.lD and 4.7.10 BASES This LCO is applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies even if the plant i.s in a condition other than COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

This LCO provides the necessary ACTIONS if the electrical power distribution subsystems required by this LCO become unavailable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

The electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating".

ACTIONS 3.7.10.A.1 Since the distribution systems are only required to support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those affected required features to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

3.7.10.A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4, and A.2.5 ACTION A.1 may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts,

therefore, ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 provide alternate, but sufficiently conservative, ACTIONs.

ACTIONs A.2.1 through A.2.4 require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions, and declaration that affected shutdown cooling trains are inoperable. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required distribution subsystems (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the necessary electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions* requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power .

PALISADES B 3.7.10-2 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.10 and 4.7.10 BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.10.1 (AC bus alignment check)

A description of the basis for this SR is provided in the bases for SR 4. 7.9.1.

REFERENCES None

PALISADES B 3.7.10-3 Amendment No.

3.17 INSTRUMENTATiON SYSTEMS Basis: Action Statements 3.17.2 (continued)

Action 3.17.2.5 - Required action AND associated completion time not met -

If the required action cannot be met within the associated completion time, or if the number of OPERABLE channels is less than allowed, the plant must be placed in a condition where the inoperable equipment is not required.

Twelve hours are allowed to bring the plant to HOT SHUTDOWN, and 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to reach conditions where the affected *equipment is not required, to avoid unusual plant transients. Both the 12 and the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months time periods start when it is discovered that Action 3.17.2.5 is applicable.

Basis: Table 3.17.2

1. Safety Injection Signal (SIS) - SIS is actuated by manual initiation, by a CHP signal, or by 2 out of 4 Pressurizer Pressure channels decreasing below the setpoint. SIS initiates the following actions:

a) Start HPSI & LPSI pumps b) Enable Containment Spray Pump Start on CHP c) Initiate Safety Injection Valve operations Each Manual Actuation channel consists of one pushbutton which directly starts the SIS actuation*logic for the associated train.

The Low Pressurizer Pressure signal for each SIS train can be blocked when 3 out of 4 channels indicate below 1700 psia. This block prevents undesired actuation of SIS during a normal plant cooldown. The block signal is automatically removed when 2 out of 4 channels exceed the setpoint.

The Pressurizer Pressure instrument channels which provide input to SIS are the same channels which provide an input to the RPS. The RPS receives an analog signal from each Pressurizer Pressure channel; each SIS initiation logic train receives a binary signal from a group of four relays, each actuated by a bistable in one of the four instrument channels. The contacts of these relays are wired into a 2 out of 4 logic. It is the output of this pressurizer pressure 2 out of four logic circuit that is blocked during plant cooldowns. A similar arrangement of bistables and relays provide the pressurizer low pressure block permissive signal. The initiation and block circuits are illustrated in Reference 4.

Each SIS logic train is also actuated by a contact pair on one of the CHP initiation relays for the associated CHP train .

B 3.17-15 Amendment No. -l-6-2-,

3 .17 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS Basis: Table 3.17.2 {continued)

Each train of SIS actuation logic consists of a group of "SIS" relays which energize and seal in when the initiation logic is satisfied. These SIS relays actuate alarms and control functions. One of the _control functions selects between an immediate actuation circuit, if offsite power is available, and a time sequenced actuation circuit, if only diesel power is available. These actuation circuits initiate motor operated valve opening and pump starting. The SIS actuation logic is illustrated in Reference 5.

2. Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) - RAS is actuated by manually actuating the circuit "Test" switch or by two of the four level sensors in the SIRWT reaching their setpoints. RAS initiates the following actions:

a) Trip LPSI pumps {this trip can be manually bypassed) b) Switch HPSI &Spray suction from SIRWT to Containment Sump c) Adjust cooling water to Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers The four SIRWT level sensors each de-energize two relays, one per logic train, when tank level reaches the setpoint. Each channel of level sensor and associated output relays is powered from a different Preferred AC bus. Two Preferred AC buses are powered, through inverters, from each station battery. The manual RAS control for each train de-energizes two of these relays, initiating RAS through the logic train.

Each train of RAS logic consists of the output contacts of the relays actuated by the level switches arranged in a "l out of 2 taken twice" logic. The contacts are arranged so that at least one low level signal powered from each station battery is required to initiate RAS. Loss of a single battery, therefore, cannot either cause or prevent RAS initiation. When the logic is satisfied, two DC relays are energized to initiate RAS actions and alarms. The RAS logic is illustrated in Reference 6.

3. Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) - AFAS is actuated by manual action or by*2 out of 4 level sensors on either steam generator reaching thei.r setpoints. Manual actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater may be accomplfshed through pushbutton actuation of each AFAS channel or by use of individual pump and valve controls. Each AFAS channel starts the associated AFW pump{s) and opens the associated flow control valves.

The steam generator level instrument channels which provide input to AFAS are the same channels which provide an input to the RPS. Both the AFAS cabinets and the RPS receive analog signals from the instrument channel, and both have their own bistables to initiate actuation on low 1evel .

B 3.17-16 Amendment No. ~'

3.17 INSTRUMENTATION .SYSTEMS Each AFAS tra.i n conta.ins a 2 out of 4 logic for each steam generator.

One *AFAS logic train actuates motor driven AFW Pump P-'SA and turbine driven Pump P-88 and the associated flow control valves; the other actuates motor driven Pump P-8C and the associated valves. Each train provides flow to both steam generators. The AFAS logic uses solid state logi~ circuits. It is illustrated in reference 7 .

B 3.17-17 Amendment No. ~,

- -~ -

ATTACHMENT 3 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 ELECTRICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE -ADDITIONAL CHANGES Proposed TS Pages Marked to show changes from 12/27/95 Submittal 13 Pages

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.2 AC Sources - Shutdown Specifications The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC Electrical Power Distribution Systems required by Specification 3.7.IO, "Distribution Systems -

Shutdown"; and

b. One Diesel Generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by Specification 3.7.IO.

Apol icabil ity Specification 3.7.2 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in the reactor, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Action

3. 7. 2.A With the required off. ...~.H.~.... ~.i.:r..~.Y.H... ..i.D..9.P.~.r.~J>.1.~.,.... Jf!Jti ate the fell ewi Ag act i 0A S i Riffled i ate l Y iJifl!iPli~~:iJ:~::::rn::n:~m:1::~j,jtl:l~~:J::2v::::::m:!:

I. Declare affected required features with no offsite power available to be inoperable, or:

2.I Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and 2.3 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4 Restore the required offsite source to OPERABLE status.

3.7.2.B

~!!~d i~:er;qimii:1:il:1~:i:i:~:i1ii:i:lim:ilii:;:li:r:i2;he fell ewi Ag act i SAS I. Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and

2. Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and

3. Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and

4. Restore the required DG to OPERABLE status.

1::~::1:~:1::~;1,:::::1::::::::::::1;:1,D,:]11.1i::11::::::11111:::::1:1111mil!j::1::::i:1:19:11:::::::1:!1:i:1n!1:1~:::::::1::n111:11§:1::t:H::

1@::::1:::m1:1:m!1,~::111::1:1:1a11:1~11sil£fi::;~1]a:n:11!n111:1::~::I:::!:11!1:1::11!;:;x1:

3-43 Amendment No.

3. 7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.3 DG Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Spectfications The stored DG fuel oil and DG lube oil shall be within limits.

Applicability Specification 3.7.3 applies when any DG is required to be OPERABLE.

Action 3.7.3.A With stored fuel oil inventory< 23,700 and~ 20,110 gallons:

I. Restore stored fuel oil inventory to within limits; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.7.3.B With stored lube oil inventory< 175 and~ 150 gallons:

1. Restore the lube oil inventory to within limits; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

3.7.3.C With stored fuel oil viscosity, or water and sediment not within limits:

L Restel"e stel"ed f1:1el ail viscesity, and ~latel" and sediment te ~:ithin 1;:*r!iII:1:llii~::ii;;:i:iil;i:i~t::liiiin11i:1lrn:1:r111:~::1111:i:i:: ,

3. 7. 3. D With sto.red fuel oil properties other than viscosity, and water and sediment not within limits:

1. Restore stored fuel oil properties to within limits; within 3-1 ID.

days.

3.7.3.E If any action required by 3.7.3.A through 3.7.3.D is not met and the as,so.ciated completion time has expired, or if Specification 3.7.3 is not met for reasons ~ther than those addressed in 3.7.3.A, through 3.7.3.D:

I. Dech*re both OGs inoperable; immediately.

3-44 Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.5 DC Sources - Shutdown

Soecifications D.C el ectri.cal power sources shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystems required by Sp_ecification 3.7.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

Appl i cabil ity Specification 3.7.5 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in the reactor, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Act.i.on 3.7.5.A

1. Declare affected required features to be inoperable, or:

2.1 Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and 2.3 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4 Restore the required DC sources to OPERABLE status .

3-45a Amendment No. -l-6-1-,

l I

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Battery Cell Parameters (continued)

PARAMETER NORMAL CHARGE Table 3.7.6-1 Battery Surveillance Requirements CATEGORY A: CATEGORY B:

NORMAL CHARGE CATEGORY C:

MINIMUM CHARGE LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS FOR EACH PILOT CELL CONNECTED CELL CONNECTED CELL Electrolyte > Minimum mark, and > Minimum mark, and Above top of Level s %inch above s %inch above plates, and not maximum mark 101 maximum mark1111 overflowing Float ~ 2.13 v ~ 2.13 v > 2.07 v Voltage No cell more than 0.020 below the

~ 1.200 average of all

~ l. 200 connected cells Specific Im Gravitylbllcl ~;~::f,:1~~1

.. AND The average of all connected cells

~i::i:::~::~:il (a) It is acceptable for the electrolyte level to temporarily increase above the specified maximum during equalizing charges provided it is not overflowing.

(b) Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level. Level correction is not required, however, when battery charging is < 2 amps when on float charge.

(c) A battery charging current of < 2 amps when on float charge is acceptable for meeting specific gravity limits followiAg a battery recharge, for a maximum of 7 eays. Whefl chargiAg curreAt is usee to satisfy specific gravity re~uiremeAts, specific gravity of each coAAected cell shall be measured prior to expiratiofl of the 7 day allowaAce.

3-45c Amendment No .

3.7 ELECTRICAL .POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Inverters - Operating Speci fi cat ions Inverters IOf:06, ID:t-07, !IDlt:oa, and IP\tl09 sha 11 be OPERABLE.

Applicability Specification 3.7.7 applies when the plant is above COLD SHUTDOWN.

Action 3.7.7.A One inverter inoperable, I. Complete the applicable actions of Specification 3.7~9, "Distribution Systems - Operating" if any Preferred AC bus is de-energized, and

2. Restore the inverter to OPERABLE status; within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.7.7.B If any action required by 3.7.7.A is not met and the associated completion time has expired:

I. The reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN; within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and

2. The reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN; within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

~ 3-45d Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Inverters - Shutdown

Specifications Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the Preferred AC Buses required by Specification 3.7.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

Applicability Specification 3.7.8 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in the reactor, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Action

~!!~ e~~e i~~e:~~:er~q:~mll:!:iiiii:i:i,:i:i:~:~::ii~:iiiij::ij,1::l:i ~ti ate the ewi 3.7.8.A fell Ag

1. Declare affected required features to be inoperable, or:

2.1 Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and 2.3 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4 Restore the required inverters to OPERABLE status .

3-45e Amendment No.

3.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown Specifications The necessary portion of AC, DC, and Preferred AC electrical power distributi'on subsystems listed in Table 3.7.9-1 shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

Applicability Specification 3.7.10 applies when the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in the reactor, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Action 3.7.10.A With one or more required AC, DC, or Preferred AC electrical power 1!!!~~~~!~~n:1:m~l,~l~:iii]::~::i:il:!;iii~:::ii1:~::ii:l:li~e the fel 1owi acti Ag oAs

1. Declare affected required features supplied by an inoperable distribution subsystem to be inoperable, or:

2.1. Suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS, and 2.2. Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and 2.3. Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions, and 2.4. Restore the required AC, DC, and Preferred AC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status, and 2.5~ Declare affected required shutdown cooling trains inoperable .

3-45h Amendment No.

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.1 AC Power Source Tests - Operating

4.7.1.1 Verify each AC source required by Specification 3.7.1 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance. Momentary transients outside the specified range do not invalidate a DG load test. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy a surveillance requirement.

Verify correct alignment and voltage for each required offsite circuit; each 7 days.

4.7.1.2 Verify each DG starts from standby conditions i.nl is ready for loading in ~ 10 seconds, and achieves steady state voltj§e ~ 2280 and ~ 2520 V, and frequency ~ 59.5 and ~ 61.2 Hz; each 31 days.

4.7.1.3 Verify; each 31 days; that each DG operates for ~ 60 minutes;

a. For ~ 15 minutes loaded above its peak accident loading, and

b. For the remainder of the test loaded ~ 2300 kW and ~ 2500 kW.

4.7.1.4 Verify each DG starting air tank pressure is~ 200 psig; each 31 days.

4.7.1.5 Verify each DG day tank contains~ 2500 gallons of fuel oil; each 31 days.

4.7.1.6 Verify each fuel oil transfer pump and the fuel oil transfer system controls operate to transfer fuel oil from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank to

4.7.1.7 each DG day tank and. engine mounted tank; each 92 days.

'lel'i fy a1::Jtemati e tl'aAsfer ef safety l'el ated b1::Jses frem tl=te Aermal AG s01::Jt'ee te Stal'tl::J~ TraAsfermer 1 2; eael=t 18 meAtl=ts.

4.7.1.Sl:*:*:* Verify; each 18 months; that each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to its largest single post-accident load, and:

a. Following load rejection, the frequency is ~ 68 Hz;

b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is ~ 2280 and ~ 2640 V; and

c. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the frequency is

~ 59.5 and~ 61.5 Hz.

4-42 Amendment No. ~' 9-2-, .f-9.2.,

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.1 AC Power Sources - Operati.nq (continued)

4.. 7. I.'91

Verify that each. DG, operating at a power factor s O. 9, does not trip, 4.7.I.W:§i:

,.. and voltage is maintained s* 4000 V during and following a load rejection of ~ 2300 and s 2500 kW; each 18 months.

Verify; each 18 months; on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power:

a. De-energization of emergency buses;

b. Load shedd-i ng from emergency buses;

c. D.G auto-starts from standby condition and:

1. Energizes permanently connected loads in s 10 seconds,

2. Energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through the automatic load sequencer,

3. Maintains steady state voltage ~ 2280 and s 2520 V, *

4. Mai-ntai ns steady state frequency ~ 59. 5 and s 61. 2 Hz, and

5. Supplies permanently connected loads for~ 5 minutes.

4.7.1.-!fll *:*:*:*:*:*:*.

Verify, each 18 months, that each DG operates at a power factor s 0.9 for ~ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s:

a. For ~ 100 minutes loaded above its peak accident loading, and

b. For the remainder of the test loaded ~ 2300 and s 2500 kW.

4. 7 .1.~l:mt:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:

Verify; each 18 months; *that each DG:

a. Can be synchronized with offsite power while supplying its associated 2400 volt bus upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;

b. Can transfer loads to an offsite power source; and

c. Can be returned to ready-to-load operation.

4.7.I.~Ii:I Verify the time .of each sequenced load is within+/-~ 1::~11: seconds of

..... lhe design timing for each automatic load sequencer; each"TS. months.

4-43 Amendment No. ee, 16, ~' -l-2-S,

. 4. 7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.1 AC Power Sources - Operating (continued) 4.7.I.-1413:! Verify; each 18 months; that on an actual or simulated loss of offsite

.,.,.,.,.,.,.ii"ower signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated Safety Injection Signal:

1. De-energization of emergency buses;

2. Load shedding from emergency buses;

3. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

a) Energizes permanently connected loads in ~ 10 seconds, b) Ene~gizes auto-connected emergency loads through its automatic load sequencer, c) Achieves steady state voltage ~ 2280 and ~ 2520 v, d) Achieves steady state frequency ~ 59.5 and ~ 61. 2 Hz, and e) Supplies permanently connected loads for ~ 5 minutes.

4.7.1.1§ ¥erify, ey aAalytical meaAs, each 18 meAths that aiesel geAerater steaay state aijtematically ceAAectea electric leaas ae Aet exceea the ceAtfAij6ijS ratiAg ef 759 amp at 24QQ velts.

4-43a Amendment No.

4.7 ELECTRICAL .POWER SYSTEMS .TESTS 4.7.2 AC Power Source Tests - Shutdown Verify e.ac:h AC power source required by Specification 3.7.2 is OPERABLE by the following. surveillance. HomeRtary traRsieRts 01:1tsiEle the sp.eeifieEI t"aRge Elo Rot iRvaliElate a ElS load test. Credit may be taken for. unplanned events that satisfy a surveillance requirement.

4.7.1.1, Offsite source check 4.J.1.2, DG starting test 4.* 7.1.4, DG- starting air check 4~. 7 .1. 5, DG day tank level check 4.7.1.6, Fuel transfer check 4 ~ 7. l..15, El6 l oaEI veri fi eat i OR 4.7.3 DG Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Verify that the fuel oil and 1ube oil for each required DG is adequate by th.e following survei 11 ance:

4.7.3.1 Verify th.at the Fuel Oil Storage Tank contains ~ 23,700 gallons of fuel; each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . *

4.7.3,.2 Verify stored lube oil *inventory is ~ 175 ga Hons; each 31 days.

4. 7.3 .3 Verify properties of new fuel oil and stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Fuel Oil Testing. Program, Specification 6.8.4c.

4.7.3.4 Check for and remove excess accumulated water from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank; each 92 days.

4.7.~.5 Glean the F1:1el Oil Storage Tank, removing all water anEI sediment; each IQ years.

4-43b Amendment No.

4.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TESTS 4.7.4 DC Power Sources - Operating Verify each DC source required by Specification 3.7.4 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance.

4.7.4.1 Veri-fy battery terminal voltage is 7 days.

~ -la :iJll

.. . ..w......

V on float charge; each 4.7.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and connectors, or 4.7.4.3 Inspect battery cells, cell plates, and racks for visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration; each 12 months.

4.7.4.4 Remove visible terminal corrosion and verify cell to cell and terminal connecti-0ns are coated with anti-corrosion material; each 12 months.

4.7.4.5

~~

4.7.4.6

~~~~ f1e~a~h l;gq~~~~d a~a~ti~~ ~gf ~~ef~r,tillw%:~~1:t=:1:1:~:~:w:r::,:~:i::~:~:~'w:~~:tii!:1:i::

4.7.4.7* Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test; each 18 months. (The modified performance discharge test of surveillance 4.7.4.8 may be performed in lieu of this test.)

4.7.4.8* Verify battery capacity is ~ 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test; each 60 months. This test shall be performed each 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of the expected life with capacity< 100% of manufacturer's rating, or each 24 months when battery has reached 85% of the expected life with capacity~

100% of manufacturer's rating.

These tests must be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

4.7.5 DC Power Sources - Shutdown 1::*::1:~::11i::1: Verify each DC source required by Specification 3.7.5 is OPERABLE by the following surveillance:

4.7.4.1, Float voltage check, 4.7~4.2, Connector condition check, 4.7.4.3, Battery physical inspection, 4.7.4.4, Battery connector cleaning and coa_t..i...r.J..9. ~. -a-00 i:~:i::~1i:~;i~:~:::::::~i:i:llil:ti::~::l,fi:iiii:i:i:i1:fiii;:~;:s tan ce ch ec k'l:t:~nl 4-43c Amendment No.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6. 8. 4 (continued:)

b. Radfological Environmental. Monitoring Program A program shall be provided to monitor the radiatlon and radionuclides ifl the environs of the plant. The program shall provide (1) representative measurements of radi oact i vi ty in th.e highest potent i a1 exposure pathways, and (2) verifications of the accuracy of the effluent monitorin*g program and modeling of environmental exposure path~ays. The program shall (1) be contained in the ODCM, (2) conform to.the guidance o'f Appendix I to 10 CFR 50, and (3) including the following:

1. Monitoring, sampling, analysis, and reporting of radiation and radionuclides iri the environment in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

2. A Land Use Census to ensure that changes in the use of areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are identified and that modifications to the monitoring program are made if required by the results of this census, and

3. Participation in a Interlaboratory Comparison Program to ensure that independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materials in environmental sample matrices are performed as part of the quality assurance program for environmental monitoring.

c. Fue1 Oil Testing Program A fuel o*il testlng program to imple.ment required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established. The program shall

ptance

1. Acceptability of new fuel oil prior to addition to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank, and acceptability of fuel oil stored .tn. . . !.b..~t. ..E.H~.1. . . .Q.il Storage Tank,. by determining that the fuel oil has it.het::fomlb.W.lril 111~111~::11::::::w1:11:~:iu11::~:mm~:1 = * *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*>=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*:.;.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,., __ ,

a) Aft API gravity or an absolute specific gravity, b) A Kinematic viscosity, and c) Water and s.ediment content withiR 1imi ts fol" *ASTM 20 fl:lel oil.

2.

a:-

a:we:*:*:*wrfhTn limits fol" AsTM 20 f&:Jel oil.

6-13 Amendment No. ~' -l-64,

ATTACHMENT 4 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 ELECTRICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE - ADDITIONAL CHANGES Bases Pages Marked to show changes from 12/27/95 Submittal 58 Pages

~--i AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 ELECTR-ICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1: AC Sources - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The plant Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources, and the onsite standby power sources, Diesel Generators 1-1 and 1-2 (DGs). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The AC power system at Palisades consists of a 345 kV switchyard, three circuits connecting the plant with off-site power (station power, startup, and safeguards transformers), the on-site distribution system, and two DGs. The on-site distribution system is divided into safety related (Class 1-E) and non-safety related portions.

The switchyard interconnects six transmission lines from the off-site transmission system and the output line from the Palisades main generator.

These _lines are connected in a "breaker and a half" scheme between the Front (F) and Rear (R) buses such that any single off-site line may supply the Palisades station loads when the plant is shutdown .

Two circuits supplying Palisades 2400 volt buses from off-site are fed directly from a switchyard bus through the startup and safeguards transformers. They are available both during operation and during shutdown.

The third circuit supplies the plant loads by "bac:k feeding" through the main generator output circuit and station power transformers after the generator has been disconnected by a motor operated disconnect.

The station power transformers are connected into the main generator output cirtuit. Station power transformers 1-1 and 1-2 connect to the generator 22 kV output bus. Station power transformer 1-3 connects to the generator output line on the high voltage stde of the main transformer. Station power transformers 1-1 and 1-3 supply non-safety related 4160 volt loads during plant power operation and during backfeeding operations. Station power transformer 1-2 can supply both safety related and non-safety related 2400 volt loads during plant power operation or backfeeding operation.

The three startup transformers are connected to a common 345 kV overhead line from the switchyard R bus. Startup transformers 1-1 and 1-3 supply 4160 volt non-safety related station loads; Startup Transformer 1-2 can supply both safety related and non-safety related 2400 volt loads. The startup transformers are available during operation and shutdown.

Safeguards Transformer 1-1 is connected to the switchyard F bus. It feeds station 2400 volt loads through an underground line. It is available to supply these loads during operation and shutdown .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-1 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.I and 4.7.I BASES

The onsite distrtbution system consists of seven main distribution buses (4160 volt buses lA, lB, IF, and IG, and 2400 volt buses IC, 10, and IE) and supported lower voltage buses, motor control centers (MCCs), and lighting pjnels.

The 4160 volt bus~s and 2400 volt bus lE are not safely related.

Buses lC and ID and their supported buses and MCCs form two independent, redundant, safety related distribution trains. Each distribution train supplies one train of engineered safety features equipment.

In the event of a generator trip, all loads supplied by the station power.

transfo.rmers are automatically transferred to the startup transformers.

Loads supplied by the safeguards transformer are unaffected by a- pl ant trip.

If power is lost to the safeguards transformer, the 2400 volt loads will automatically transfer to startup transformer I-2. If the startup transformers are not energized when these transfers occur, their output breakers will be blocked from closing and the 2400 volt safety related buses will _be energized by the DGs. * ,;

The two DGs each -supply one 2400 volt bus. They provi.de backup power in the event of loss -o.f off-site power, or loss of power to the associated 2400 volt bus. The continuous rating of the DGs is 2500 kw, with 110 percent overload permissible for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period. The required fuel in the Fuel Oi 1 Storage Tank and DG Day Tank wi 11 supply one DG for a mini.mum period of 7 days assuming accident loading conditions and fuel conservation practices.

If e*ither 2400 volt bus, IC or ID, experiences a sustained undervoltage, the associated DG is started, the affected bus is separated from its offsite power sources, major loads are stripped from that bus and its supported buses, the DGs are connected to the bus, and ECCS or shutdown loads are started by an automatic load sequencer.

The DGs share a common fuel oil storage and transfer system. A single buried Fuel Oil Storage Tank is used to maintain the required fuel oil inventory.

Two fuel transfer pumps are provided. The fuel transfer pumps are necessary for long term operation of the DGs. Testing has shown that each DG consumes about 2.6 gallons of fuel oil per minute at 2400 kW. Each day tank is

required to contain at least 2500 gallons. Therefore, each fuel oil day tank contains sufficient fuel for more than 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months of full load (2500 kW) operation. Beyond that time, a fuel transfer pump is required for continued DG operation.

Either fuel transfer pump is capable of supplying either DG. However, each fuel transfer pump is not capable, with normally available switching, of being powered from either DG. DG I-I can power either fuel tr.~n.~.f.~.r pump, but DG I-2 can only power P-ISA. The fuel oil pumps Sl:!f.lf.llY !!l1=itil a common fuel oil storage t~nk, and common piping. ****************

Fuel transfer pump P-ISA is powered from MCC-8, which is normally connected to Bus ID (-DG I-2) through Station Power Transformer I2 and Load Center I2. In an emergency, P-I8A can be powered from Bus IC (DG I-I) by cross connecting Load Centers II and 12 *

PALISADES B 3.7.I-2 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES Fuel transfer pump P-18B is powered from MCC--1, which is normally connected to Bus l.C (DG 1-1) through Station Power Transformer 19 and load Center 19.

P-188 cannot be powered, using installed equipment, from Bus ID (DG 1-2).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The safety analyses do not explicitly address AC electrical power. They do, however, assume that the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) are available. The OPERABILITY of the ESF functions is supported by the AC Power Sources.

The design requirements are for each assumed safety function to be available under the following conditions:

a. The occurrence of an accident or transient, ,

b~ The resultant consequenttal failures,

c. A worst case single active failure,

d. Loss of all offsite or all onsite AC power, and

e. The most reactive control rod fails to insert.

One proposed mechanism for the loss of off-site power is a perturbation of the transmission grid because of the loss of the plant's generating capacity. A loss of off-site power as a result of a generator trip can only occur during POWER OPERATION with the generator connected to the grid. However, it is also assumed in analysis for events in HOT STANDBY, such as a steam line break or control rod ejection at zero power. No specific mechanism for initiating a loss of off-site power when the plant is not on the line is discussed in the FSAR.

In most cases, it is conservative to assume that off-site power is lost concurrent with the accident and that the single failure is that of a DG.

That would leave only one train of safeguards-equipment to cope with the accident, the other being disabled by the loss of AC power. Those analyses which assume that a loss of off-site power and failur~ of a single DG accompany the accident also assume 10 seconds for the DG to start and connect to the bus, and additional time for the sequencer to start each safeguards lo.ad.

The same assumptions are not conservative for all accident analyses. When analyzing the effects of a steam or feed line break, the loss of the condensate and feedwater pumps would reduce the steam generator inventory, so a 1os_s of off.,. site power is not assumed.

In COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN, loss of off-site power is treated as an initiating event.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-3 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System and an independent DG for each s_afeguards train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintatn it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated OBA.

General Design Criterion 17 requires, in part, that: "Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions."

The qualified offsite circuits available are Safeguards Transformer 1-1 and Startup Transformer 1-2. Station Power Transformer 1-2 is not qualified as a required source for LCO 3.7.1 since it is not independent of the other two offsite circuits. This LCO does not prohibit use of Station Power Transformer to power the 2400 safety related buses, but the two qualified sources must be OPERABLE.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining acceptable frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while supplying the

2400 volt safety related buses.

Following a loss of offsite power, each DG must be capable of starting and connecting to its respective 2400 volt bus. This will be accomplished within 10 seconds after receipt of a DG start signal. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 2400 volt safety related buses.

Proper sequencing of loads and tripping* of nonessential loads are required functions for DG OPERABILITY.

APP LI CAB IL ITV The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that redundant sources of off-site and on-site AC power are available to support engi"neered safeguards equipment in the event of an accident or transient. The AC sources also support the equipment necessary for power operation, plant heatups and cooldowns, and shutdown operation .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-4 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1

.BASES ACTIONS 1:~~1::i:!litA. I To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 4.7.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 4.7.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

l.ii'!i.¥1@A

2 According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.93, operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System. :

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable DG, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 4.J.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 4.7.1.1, it is inoperable.

Upon offsite circutt J.D.9.P.~.r.abil ity, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.BTl@'fWB.2 The requirement to declare required features inoperable carries with it the requirement to take those actions required by the LCO for that required equipment .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-5 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

Required Action B.2 is intended to p.rovide assurance that a loss of offsite power, .duri:ng the .period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are destgned with redundant safety related trains. Redundant required feature fail.ures consist of inoperable features with a train redundant to the train that has an inoperabl~ DG.

The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the Completion Time "clock. 11 In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. An inoperable DG exists; and b~ A requi-red feature on the other tra.in is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

D-i scoveri ng one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required supporting -0r supported features, or both~ that are associated with the OPERABLE OG, results in starting the Completion Time for Requi.red Action Q.2. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently, is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for th~ required feature's funct i.on may have been lost; however, function has not been lost.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Ti me takes into account the capac_ity and capabi l i ty of the rematni ng AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a OBA occurring during this peri-0d. -

1:~::1::~::11~iB. 3 Required Action. B.3 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of the OPERABLE DG. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 4.7.1.2 (test starti-ng of the OPERABLE DG) does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DGs, the other DGs would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E o-f LCO 3. 7.1 would be entered. Once the failure .. is repaired, the common cause failure no longer ex-ists and Required Action B.3a is satisfied. If the cause

-0f the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed to not exist on the remaining DGs, performance of SR 4.7.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-6 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

ln the event the i.noperab le D.G is restored to. OPERABLE status prior to completing 3.7.1.B.3 the corrective action system.would normally continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months constraint imposed whil~ in Condition B.

Accordtng to Genertc Letter 84-15, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

l:~iJ1i'.i'.fB. 4 In C.ondition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System for a limited period.

The Completion Time, which limits the time when any required DG is not OPERABLE to 7 days (total for both DGs) in any calendar month, is a feature of the ori9inal Palisades licensing basis.

1~r1m1~:1c .1 The requirement to declare requi.red features inoperable carries with it the.

requ*irement to take those actions required by the LCO for that required equ i pmen*t

Required Action C.l, which applies when two required offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundaht required feat~res is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from that allowed for one train without offsite .power {Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months i-s that RG 1.93 recommends a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two requi*red offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is appropriate. These features are powered .from redundant AC safety trains.

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal time zero" for beginning the 11 Completion Time "clock." In this Required Action, the Com~letion Time only beg-i-ns on discovery that both:

a. All requh*ed offsite circuits are inoperable; and

b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition C (two offsite circuits inoperable), a required feature becomes inoperable, this.Completion Time begins to be tracked .

PALISADES . B 3.7.1-7 Amendment No:

AC Sourc~s - -Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

lili!~iltfc ~ 2 According to the recommendations of RG 1.9.3, operation may contin.ue i.n Conditi-0n C for a pertod that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capabi 1i ty to accomp.l i sh a safe shutdown and to m*i ti gate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded .. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of.one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , unrestricted operation may continue. If on.ly one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

f,ij'.11'.ll'.:~:a. 1 and D. 2 In tondition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaint~g AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

According to the recommendations of RG 1.93, operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

With both DGs inoperable, there are no rema1n1ng standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, no AC source would be available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the off~ite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power}. Since an inadvertent generator trip could also r~sult in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued op~ration is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-8 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES According to the recommendations of RG 1. 93, with both DGs i noperab 1e, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

~':ili::1::~::1::~:F . 1 The sequencer is ~n essential support system to the DG. With the sequencer inoperable, the associated DG is unable to perform its specified function, and must thereby be immediately declared to be inoperable.

1:~:1::~i:J!fG. 1, H. 1, and I . 1 Since DG 1-2 cannot power fuel transfer pump P-188, without P-18A, DG 1-2 becomes dependant on offsite power or DG 1-1 for its fuel supply (beyond the 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months it will operate on the day tank), and does not meet the LCO requirement for independence. Since the condition is not as severe as the DG itself being inoperable, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed to restore the fuel transfer pump to operable status prior to declaring the DG inoperable. .

Without P-188, either DG can still provide power to the remaining fuel transfer pump, neither DG is directly affected. Continued operation with a single remaining fuel transfer pump, however, must be limited since an additional single active failure (P-18A) could disable the onsite power system. Because the loss of P-188 is less severe than the loss of one DG, a 7 day Completion Time is allowed. *

If both fuel transfer pumps are inoperable, the onsite AC sources are limited to about 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months duration. Since this condition is not as severe as both DGs being inoperable, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months is allowed to restore one fuel transfer pump to OPERABLE status.

li~i:J.mJ'!~!J .1 and J.2 If the inoperable AC power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in-an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

1:i:1m1mK. 1 Condition K corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of .function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled*

shutdown.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-9 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance ~ith 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18. Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages {under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating- the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.9 and RG 1.137.

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances for the DGs operated in the "Unit" mode, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 2280 volts is 95% of the nominal 2400 volt generator rating. Th*i s value is above the setting of the primary underv_o ltage relays (127-1 and 127-2) and above the minimum analyzed acceptable bus voltage. It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 volt level. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 2520 volts is 105% of the nominal generator rating of 2400 volts. It is below the maximum voltage rating of the safeguards motors, 2530 volts. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 59.5 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. The minimum value assures that ESF pumps provide sufficient flow to meet the accident analyses. The maximum value is equal to 102% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and is derived from the recommendations given in RG I. 9.

Higher maximum tolerances are specified for final steady state voltage and frequency following a loss of load test, because that test must be performed with the DG controls in the "Parallel" mode. Since "Parallel" mode operation introduces. both voltage and speed droop, the DG final conditions will not return to the nominal "Unit" mode settings.

These SRs are modified by two notes. One note states that momentary transients outside the required band do not invalidate this test. This is to assure that a minor change in grid conditions and the resultant change in DG load~ or a similar event, does not result in a surveillance being unnecessarily repeated. The other allows taking credit for unplanned events which satisfy the SR. Several SRs carry a limitation against performance during specified plant conditions. If an unplanned event should occur, during these specified conditions, which satisfy the requirements of the SR, it may be documented as completion of the SR.

SR t.J.1.1 {Offsite Source check)

This SR assures that the required offsite circuits are OPERABLE. Each offsite circuit must be energized from associated switchyard bus through its disconnect switch to be OPERABLE .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-10 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

Since each required offsite circuit transformer has only one possible source of power, the associated switchyard bus~ and since loss of voltage to either the switchyard bus or the transformer is alarmed in the control room, correct alignment and voltage may be verified by the absence of these alarms.

The 7 day Frequency is adequate because disconnect switch positions cannot change without operator action and because their status is displayed in the control room.

SR 4.7.1.2 (DG starting test)

This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

The monthly testing starting of the DG provides.assurance that the DG would start and be ready for loading in the time period assumed in the safety analyses. The monthly test, however does not, and is not intended to, test all portions of the circuitry necessary for automatic starting and loading.

The operation of the bus undervoltage relays and their auxiliary relays which initiate DG starting, the control relay which initiates DG breaker closure, and the DG breaker closure itself are not verified by this test. Verification of automatic operation rif these components requires de-energizing the associated 2400 volt bus and cannot be done during plant operation. For this test, the 10 second timing is started when the DG receives a start signal, and ends when the DG voltage sensing relays actuate.

For the purposes of SR 4.7.1.2, the DGs are manually started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean the diesel engine is not running, but its coolant and oil temperatures are being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

Three rel~ys sense the terminal voltage on each DG. These relays, in conjunction with a load shedding relay actuated by bus undervoltage, initiate automatic closing of the DG breaker. During monthly testing, the actuation of the three voltage sensing relays is used as the timing point to determine when the DG is ready for loading.

The 31 day Frequency for performance of SR 4. 7.1.2 agrees with the original licensing basis for the Palisades plant, and is consistent with the testing frequency recommendation of Generic Letter 94-01.

SR 4.7.1.3 (DG loading test)

This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads for at least 15 minutes. A minimum total run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-11 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with the original Palisades licensing ba-sis and with the testing frequency recommendation of Generic Letter 94-01.

SR 4.7.1.4 {DG starting afr pressure check)

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, suffici~nt air start capacity for each DG is available. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which successful starts can be accomplished.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 4.7.1.5 (DG day tank level check)

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil ln the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil i.s automatically added. The specified level is adequate for a minimum of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months of DG operation at full load.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and plant operators would be aware of any uses of the DG during this period.

SR 4.7.1.6 (Fuel Transfer system checks)

This SR demonstrates that each fuel transfer pump and the fuel transfer system controls op.erate and control transfer of fuel from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank to each day tank and engine mounted tank. This is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources.

This SR provides assurance that the following portions of the fuel transfer system is OPERABLE:

Fuel Transfer Pumps Day and engine mounted tank filling solenoid valves Day and engine mounted tank automatic level controls PALISADES B 3.7.1-12 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES The 92 day Frequency corresponds to the test i*ng requirements for pumps in the ASME Code,Section XI. Additional assurance of fuel transfer system OPERABILITY is provided duri'ng the monthly starting and loading tests for each DG when the fuel oi 1 system will function to maintain l e.ve l in the day and engine mounted tanks.

SR 4.7.1.7 (Fast t~aRsfer verifieatteR)

TraRs.fer ef the safety related euses frem the Rermal AG pewer seuree, that useEI Eluri.Rg p0~11er eperati eR, te the effsi te ei reui t whi eh meets the GDG 17 "immeEliately av.ailaele" eriterieR (Startup TraRsfermer 1 2) demeRstrates the OPERABILITY ef the 11 immeEli ately avail ael e" ei reuit aRd ef the fast traAsfer eireuitry fer use Hith that Aermal AG seuree.

The 18 meAth Freqt:1eRey ef the Sur*.*e i 11 aAee is easeEI eA eAgi Aeeri Ag j uelgmeAt, tak.iAg 'iRte eeAsi eleratieR the pl aAt eeAdi ti efls required te 13erferm the ,,

Sur*1eJll aRee, aRd is iflteAdeel te ee eeRS i steflt ~~i th expeeted fuel eyel e l eAgths. Operati Ag experi eAee has she~11A that these eempeReAts usually pass the SR wheR perfermeEI at the 18 mo.A th FrequeAey. Therefere, the Freq1.:.ieAey was eerrnluEleel te ee aeeeptaele from a reli ahil ity staAelpei At.

SR 4.7.I.81:~::1.::?i:M~ (DG largest load rejection test)

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trtp to prevent damage to the engine. The loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, mi.ght result in a t.rip o.f the engine. This Surveillance demon~trates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load withou.t exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while mai.ntaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. This Surveillance may be accomplished with the DG in the "Parallel" mode.

An acceptable method is to parall~l the DG with the grid and load the DG to a load equal to or greater than its single largest post-accident load. The DG breaker is tripped while its v.oltage and frequency {or speed) are being recorded. The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from the recommendations of RG 1.9, Revision 3 {RG 1.9).

RG 1.9 recommends that the increase in diesel speed during the transient does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. The Palisades DGs have a synchronous speed of 900 rpm ~nd an overspeed trip setting* range of 1060 to U05 rpm. Therefore, the maximum acceptable trans tent frequency fo.r thci s SR is 68 Hz.

Th.e m*inimum steady state voltage is specifi.ed to provide adequate margin for the switchgear and for both the 2400 and* 48.0 volt safeguards motors; the maximum steady state voltage is 2400 +10% volts as recommended by RG 1.9.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-13 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

The minimum acceptable frequency is specified to assure that the safeguards pumps powered from the DG would supply adequate flow to meet the safety analyses. The maximum acceptable steady state frequency is slightly higher than the +2% (61.2 Hz} recommended by RG 1.9 because the test must be performed with the DG controls in the Parallel mode. The increased frequency allowance of 0.3 Hz is based on the expected speed differential associated with performance of the test while in the "Parallel" mode.

The 18 month surveillance Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of RG I. 9.

SR 4.7.1.9 ~:i'.~'.~::1::~::1 (DG full load rejection test}'

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker ~

tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engfne and gener~tor load response under a complete loss of load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. The 4000 volt limitation is based on generator rating of 2400/4160 volts and the ratings of those components (connecting cables and switchgear} which would experience the voltage transient. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continue to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including re-connection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as

_.p.,,iJgp-

~::,.;:"6':::=9=>:::;:;.;:;:;:;.T'hl's~::::;.;::e~ie'r''f'

- f> a'C'f~'F~'= i s c1:t as eA ta be

. re f> res eAt at i ., ...............................................................

e af t 1:t e act 1:1a1 des i 9...... fl

i,l:i::l:~:i:rdl:fcti Ve l eadi Ag that the DG 'liBl:fl d experi eRCC. l[fij~::1:::::::J::§::::::5:~y:§jJ@:f::!i:Rlifljjjf:JJ The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of RG 1.9 and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 4.. 7.1.10 ~:~'.i:=~::!::~::! (Loss of off-site power without SIS test}

As recommended by RG 1.9 this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source.

This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and re-energizing of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-14 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

The requirement to energize permanently connected loads is met when the DG breaker cl.oses, energizing its associated 2400 volt bus. Permanently connected loads are those which are not disconnected from the bus by load shedding relays. They are energized when the DG breaker closes. It is not necessary to monitor each permanently connected .load. *The DG auto-start and breaker closure time of 10 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. For this test, the 10 second timing is st,~:r..t.~.<L.\th~m., . t.tl.~....PG....r..~.c:.~i.v.~s. ...Ci... s..t.~:r.t.. ..s.Jg.n~l..,, . Cind The requirement to verify that auto-connected shutdown loads are energized refers to those loads which are actuated by the Normal Shutdown Sequencer.

Ead load should be started to ass.ure that the DG is capable of accelerating these loads at the intervals programmed for the Normal Shutdown Sequence. The sequenced pumps may be operating on recirculation flow.The requirements to maintai:n steady state voltage and frequency apply to the "steady state" period after all sequenced loads have been started. This period need only be long en*ough to achieve and measure steady voltage and frequency.

The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transi*ents have decayed and stability has been achieved. The requirement to supply permanently connected loads for

~ 5 minutes, refers to the duration of the DG connection to the associated safeguards bus. It is not intended to require that sequenced 19ads be operated throughout the 5 minute period. It is not necessary to monitor each permanently con.nected lpad.

The requirement to verify the connection and supply of permanently and au.tomatka~lly connected lo.ads is intended to demonstrate the DG loading logic.

Th.is testing m~y be accomplished in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that th~ required connection and loading sequence is verified.

The F_reque,m:y of 18 months is consistent with the recommend at ions of RG 1..9.

PALISADES B 3.7.1-15 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

RG 1.9 recommends demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , ~ 100 minutes of which is at a load above its analyzed peak accident loading and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating of the DG .. The 100 minutes required by the SR satisfies the intent of the recommendations of the RG, but allows some tolerance between the time requirement and the DG rating. Without this tolerance, the load would have to be reduced at precisely 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to satisfy the SR without exceeding the manufacturer's rating of the DG.

The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as jio.\'l.eir. . . .fa-C-:fa*r*. **--rs ehoseA to be rq1reseAtati *1e of the actual desi gA basis iAdl:4eti ve l oadi Ag that the DG 'dOl:Jl d experi eAee. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY .

T~e 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.9.

SR 4.-7.1.12 1:~::IMJ::~'.::i::1.: (DG load transfer to offsite)

As recommended by RG 1.9, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronizati-0n and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready to load status when offsite power is restored. The test is performed while the DG is supplying its associated 2400 volt bus, but not necessarily carrying the sequenced accident loads. The DG is considered to be in ready to load status when the DG is at rated speed and ~oltage, the output breaker is open, the automatic load sequencer is reset, and the DG controls are returned to "Unit" .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-16 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.9.

SR 4 ..7. l.13 ~:~::~:@1@!~:;.: (Sequencer timing check)

If power is lost to bus IC or 10, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and startin*g signals to motor breakers to prey_~.n.t overloading of the DGs by concurrent motor starting currents. The G.l- Q![i! second load sequence ti me tnterval tolerance ensures that sufficient ti~~***exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and ensures that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are met. Logic Drawing E-17 Sheet 4*provides a summary of the automatic loading of safety related buses.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of RG l. 9, takes into consideration pl ant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 4.7.1.14 l.!~::z::~:[!g:!~: (Loss of offsite power with SIS test)

In the event of a OBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, PCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded .

PALISADES B 3.7.1-17 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES *

The requiY'.ement to energi.ze permanently connected loads is met when the DG breaker closes, energizi:ng its associated 2400 volt bus. Permanently connected loads are those which are not disconnected from the bus by load shedding. relays. They are energized when the PG breaker closes. It is* not necessary to monitor ea.ch permanently connec;ted load. The DG auto-start and breake:r closure time* of 10 seconds is derive~ from requirements *Of the accident anal,ysi's to respond to a des*ign bash large break LOCA. For this nd The requirement to verify that auto-connected shutdown loads are energized

refers to those loads which are actuated by the OBA Sequencer. Each load should be started to assure that the DG is capable of accelerating these loads at th.e intervals programmed for the OBA Sequence. The sequenced pumps. may be op.erattng on recirculatton flow of in other test:ing mode. The requirements to maintain steady state voltage .and frequency apply to the "steady state" period after al 1 sequenced loads have been st.arted. This period need only be long enough to achieve and measure steady voltilge and frequency.

The Surveillance should be continued for a m*i nimum of 5 minutes in order to demon.strate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved~ The requirement to supply permanently connected loads for

~ 5 ~inutes, refers to the duration of the DG connection to the associated

240.0 vol.t bus.. It is not intended to require that sequenced loads be operated throughout the 5 minute perioci. It is not necessary to monitor each pe.rmanent ly connected lo.ad.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is int~nded to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.

SRA.1~1..1.§* (DG le.ad *1er:i:.fi.eatieA)

T.h:i:s i telR i;s tAteA.ded te 13revi.de assuraA.ee th.at the el:eetrieal leads* '*IA i eh are aute1Ra.tJe.ally eeAAeeted. te the DG duPtflg .afl a.eetdeflt sequeAee de .Aet exeeed its <ee.AtlAueus ratiRg .. . The test 1Ray l:le . aeeempl i shed l:ly aAalyti cal 1ReaF1s rather th.afl. l:ly phy.s.i. eal test i fl.!j, a AB aeeresses l"Uflfl i fl!j eurreflt ef the 1eaes l'latheP thafl starti:Rg euPPeflt.. The requi remeAt te 13erfer1R the test each 1:8 .1ReRths ts l:lased efl. the Fequ ired frequeAey ef afl. equ i val eAt requ i reR1eRt i fl the* .ferRler* CE *ST.S, NUREG 9212 ..

PALlSADE.S B 3.7.1'-18 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Operating B 3.7.1 and 4.7.1 BASES

REFERENCES 1~ 10 CFR 50 1 Appendix A, GDC 17

2. Regulatory Guide 1. 93, December 197 4

3. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984

4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18

6. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, July 1993

7. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979

8. Generic letter 94-01, MiiY 31, 1994

9. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sect fan XI

10. IEEE Standard 308-1978

11. Palisades Logic Drawing E-17, Sheet 4 PALISADES B 3 . .7.1-19 Amendment No:

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2: AC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The safety analyses do not explicitly address electrical power. They do, however, assume that various electrically powered and controlled equipment is available. Electrical power is necessary to terminate and mitigate the effects of many postulated events which could occur in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

Analyzed events which might occur during COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN are Loss of PCS inventory or Loss of PCS Flow, (which in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHYTDOWN would be grouped as a Loss of Shutdown Cooling event), and radioactive-releases (Fuel Handling Accident, Cask Drop, Radioactive Gas

Rel ease, Etc. )

In general, when the plant is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the plant has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in above COLD SHUTDOWN have no specific analyses in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN because the primary coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced, and in minimal consequences.

LCO This LCO requires that one offsite circuit to be OPERABLE. One OPERABLE offsite circuit ensures that all required loads may be powered from offsite power. Stnce only one offsite AC source is required, independence is not a criterion. Any of the three offsite supplies, Safeguards Transformer 1-1, Station Power Transformer 1-2, or Startup Transformer 1-2 is acceptable as a qualified circuit .

PALISADES B 3.7.2-1 Amendment No.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 BASES An OPERABLE .DG, associated with a distribution subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.7.10, ensures a diverse power source is available to provide electrical power support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of suffici~nt AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents and loss of shutdown cooling}.

The DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecti,ng to its respective 2400 volt bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. Proper "Normal Shutdown" loading sequence, and tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. A Service Water Pump must be started soon after the DG to assure continued DG operability. The DBA loading sequence is not required to be OPERABLE s i nee the Safety Injection Signal is dis.abled during COLD SHUTDOWN.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that

equipment and instrumentation is available to:

a.

b.

c.

d.

Provide coolant inventory makeup, Mittgate a fuel handling accident, Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to core damage, Monitoring and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

The AC source requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.1, "AC Sources - Operating".

PALISADES B 3.7.2-2 Amendment No.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 BASES ACTIONS

~:~::i[::'.i'.11~A. I An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to supply the 2400 volt safety related bus or buses required by LCO *3.7.10.

Since the required offsite AC source is only required to. support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those required features with no offsite power available to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

ll~iJMl!fA. 2. I. A. 2. 2, A. 2. 3, A. 2. 4, B. I. B. 2, B. 3, and B. 4 ACTION A.1 may involve_Jff1g_~_~Jr.~~----~-~-~L.l:l.nnecessary. administrati_ve efforts, therefore, conservative, ACTIONs ACTIONSA. tl¥11J.b'.iqqgfit:A~!~i!HJ,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .v.*.-.........*.*.*.*.*..*.-.*.*.*.-.*.*.*.*.*.-.-...........*.*.*.*.*. provide alternate, but sufficiently With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources ts not available.

ACTIONs A.2Ml\!Ii.Jirii§:lfIIMIM4 and B.2:tU!1I!it!iiriUi!fill~!ll require suspension of REFUELING o*PtIDtftt)N*5*=:,*=*=*=*1i\'o'v'ement of fFFad'l'a'fe"d""***'f'U'e'r=*=*=assemb lies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

1:~:1:l:1:~::1::~:1

PALISADES B 3.7.2-3 Amendment No.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.2 and 4.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.2.1 (Shutdown AC power surveillance)

SR 4.7.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.7.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

The SRs from LCO 3.7.1 which are required are those which both support a feature required in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN and can which be performed without ef foct i ng the OPE RAB IL ITV or rel i abil ity of the required sources.

With only one DG available, many tests cannot be performed since their per.formance would render that DG inoperable duri ng .. ..t.h.~.... t.~.~t. This is the case for tests which require DG l oa_g..i..n9.: SRs 4. 7. 1. 3,

IMl!M~!:@lM!i~:::4. 7..1. a, 4. 7. I. 9, 4.7.1.10, 4.7.1.11, 4.7.1.12, i,p~g:A.7.1.13, aRd 4*;7~*r;11r:....

With eAly eRe DG aRd eRly eRe effsite eiPeHit available, SR 4.7.1.7 eaRRet be perfermed.

REFERENCES

None

PALISADES B 3.7.2-4 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3: Diesel Fuel Oil and Lube Oil BASES BACKGROUND The di~sel generators (DGs} are provided with a storage tank having .a required fuel oil inventory sufficient to operate one diesel for a period of 7 days, while the DG is supplying maximum post-accident loads. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DG for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from offsite sources.

Fuel oil is transferred from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank to either day tank by either of two Fuel Transfer Pumps.

For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. Regulatory Guide (RG} 1.137 addresses the recommended fuel oil practices as supplemented by ANSI Nl95-1976.

The DG lubrication system is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated DG under all loading conditions.

The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during operation .

The onsite storage in addition to the engine oil sump is sufficient to ensure 7 days of continuous operation. This supply is sufficient supply to allow the operator to replenish lube oil from offsite sources. Implicit in this LCO is the requirement to assure, though not necessarily by testing, the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG oil sump, while the DG is running.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A descripti.on of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating"; during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN, in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown"*.

LCO Stored diesel fuel oil is required to have sufficient supply for 7 days of full accident load operation. It is also required to meet specific standards for qtJality. The specified 7 day requirement and the 6 day quantity listed in Conditton 3~7.3.A are taken from the Engineering Analysis* associated with Event Report E-PAL-93-026B .

PALISADES B 3.7.3-1 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES Adcfitionally, sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate at full ace i dent load for 7 days. This requirement is in add-ition to the lube oil contained in the engine sump. The specified 7 day requirement and the 6 day quantity listed in Co.ndition 3.7.3.B are based o.n an as.sumed lube oil consumption of 1 gallon per hour.

These requi~ements, tn conjunction with an ability to obtain replacement supplies within 7 days, support the availability of the DGs. DG day tank fuel.

requirements, and fuel transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tanks, are addressed in LCOs 3.7.1, and 3.7.2.

APPLICABlLITY The DGs aFel§mg:ggB,~l:~ll!:m::1:!$.! required by LCOs 3_. 7 .1 and 3. 7. 2 to ensure the availability or the required AC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition following a loss of off.,site power. Since diesel fuel oil and lube oil support LCOs 3.7.l and 3.7.2, stored diesel fuel oil and lube oil are required to be within limits when either DG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS *

~@!!:~:!!'.~:~. 1 In thiS Condition, the available PG fuel oil supply is less than the required 7 day supp*ly, but enough for at least 6 days. This condition allows sufficient time to obtain additional fuel and to perform the sampling and analyse*s required .prior to addition of fuel o-il to t.he tank. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required inventory prior to declaring the DGs inoperable.

i!~i:l!i[i~f:B .1 In this Condition, the available DG lube oil supply ts less than the required 7 day supply, but enough for at least 6. days. This condition allows sufficient t:ime to obtain additional lube oil. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is consi,dered sufficient to complete restoration of the required inventory prior to. ded artng the DGs i nop.erab 1e. *

PALISADES B 3.7.3-2 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES Diesel fuel oil with viscosity_,_,__..QX water and sediment out of limits is ft&t.

Reeessat"ily unacceptable for ~i'=!tishort term DG operation. Viscosity is important primarily because of its effect on the handling of the fuel by the pump and inJector system; water and sediment provides an indication of fuel contamination. When the fuel oil stored in the Fuel Oil Storage Tank is determined to be out of viscosity, or water and sediment limits, bttt-aeee~tahle fat" shet"t term DG e~et"atieR, it will he restet"ed te.withiR limits wi thi R 7 days. (If the fl-!el ei l stared i R the Fl-!el Oil Sterage TaRk is determiRed te he l-!Raeee~tahle fer eveR shert term l-!sage, the affected DGs must be declared inoperable:~:M:!rnm@ll:iikl,i.t The 7 day Cemf)letieR Time allews fer fl-!rther evall-JatieR, re samf)l1Rg, aRd re aRalysis ef the DG fl-lel ail.

?.::~::i.M!:~::D *I

~:ii:~mi~l::~t~~~~~e~u~ ~ ~~! ~~~~e~r ~ e~:~::~:,~~:!1:~~:~:!~:~:!:1:~~:~1!;,~,:~:::::'~!:1~:!:!:~' red lfiiilts*~****but acceptable for short term DG operation, a P.~.r.J..Q.9.. . . .9.. f . .-.~-.-. .l!~.-. . 9.~Y...§. . . J.s iufffcfe.nl . llme***la***defe*r*mfne***rr***n*e*w.. "fU"eT . oiT~****when mi X"ea***wilh stored fuel oil ,

will produce an acceptable mixture, or if other methods to restore the stored fuel oil properties are required. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combinations of these procedures. Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or with diesel fuel oil or lube oil not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through D, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.3.1 (Fuel oil quantity check)

This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the storage tank to support either DG's operation for 7 days at full post-accident load. The 7 day period is sufficient time to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location .

PALISADES B 3.7.3-3 Amendment No.

Diesel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is specified to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel

-0il is available, since the Fuel Oil Storage Tank is the fuel oil supply for the diesel fire pumps, heating boilers, and rad waste evaporators, in addition 0

to the DGs.

SR 4.7.3 .* 2 {Lube oil quantity check)

TMs *Surveillance ensures that sufficient lube ofl inventory is available to support at least 7 days of full accident load operation for one DG. The 175 gallons requirement is based on an estimated consumption of 1 gallon per hour.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since DG starts and run times are closely monitored by the plant staff.

SR 4.7.3.3 (Fuel oil quality check)

The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new fuel oil and stored fuel oil are of the appropriate grade and have not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate, detrimental impact. on diesel engine combustion.

Testing for viscosity, specific.gravity, and water and sediment is completed for fuel oil delivered to the plant prior to its being added to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank. Fuel oil which fails the test, but has not been added to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank does not imply failure of this SR and requires no specific action. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil may be adde.d to the storage tank without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tank.

Fuel oil is tested for other of the parameters specified in ASTM D975 i.n accordance wHh the Fuel Oil Testing Program required by Specification 6.8.4c.

Fuel oil determined to have one or more measured parametersM!IiiniHiiHai

'!~i:,,:~~!~'i,,18i!i!:!:!;!,'=~~~:~i: ~~~~ i ~~ l a~~~~~a~!ed!~:;~~n:~*rr:h~:*e*~~~~~i:~ le for short term DG opetation, but outside limits will be restored to within l imits i.n accordance with Condition D. F1:Jel eil ~~hi.eh is Eietermi Aea te ee uAaeeeptael~ fer.eveA shert term DG ep~ratieA is eause fer the DGs te ee Eieelarea iAepe~aele *

PALISADES B 3.7.3-4 Amendment No.

Di*esel Fuel and Lube Oil B 3.7.3 and 4.7.3 BASES SR 4.7.3.4 (Fuel Oil Storage Tank water check)

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank once every 3-1 I.I. days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This ii . the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it reduces the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, and contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria.

Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight *integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies and acceptance criteria are established in the Fuel Oil Testing Program based, in part, on those recommended by RG 1.137. This SR is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR provided the accumulated water is removed in accordance with the requirements of the Fuel Oil Testing Program.

SR 4.7.3.5 (Fuel Oil Sterage TaAk cleaAiAg)

The Fuel.Oil Sterage TaAk sheuld be cleaAed at 10 year iAtervals iA accerdaAce with the Fuel Oil TestiAg Pregram. SiAce Palisades dees Aet have iAdividual fuel ail taAks fer each DG aAd the Fuel Oil Sterage TaAk caAAet be removed frem service fer draiAiAg; cleaAiAg may be performed by metheds 'rihich de Aet require remeviAg it frem service. This SR is fer preveAtative maiAteAaAce.

The preseAce ef sedimeAt dees Aet Aecessarily represeAt a failure ef this SR, previded that accumulated sedimeAt is remeved duriAg perfermaAce ef the Sur*1ei 11 aAce.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.137

2. ANSI Nl95-1976, Appendix B

3. ASTM Standards, 0975, Table 1

PALISADES B 3.7.3-5 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4: DC Sources - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The station DC electrical power system provides the AC power system with control power. It also provides control power to selected safety related equipment and power to the preferred AC Buses (via inverters}. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, the DC electrical power system is designed to have. sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure.

The 125 volt DC electrical power system consists of two independent and redundant safety related Class IE DC power sources. Each DC source consists of one 125 battery, two battery chargers, and the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabliflg.

Each stati-on battery has two associated battery chargers, one powered by the associated AC power diJtribution system (the directly connected chargers} and one powe.red from the opposite AC power distribution system (the cross connected chargers}. The battery chargers are normally operated in pairs, either both direct connected chargers or both cross connected chargers, to assure a d-iverse AC supply. -

During normal operation, the 125 volt DC load is p*owered from the battery chargers with the batteri-es floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power from the battery charger, the DC load continues to be powered from the station batteries.

The DC power distribution system is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.9, "Di stri.but i ans System Operating".

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and to perform three complete cycles of tntermittent loads discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8.

Each 125 volt battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each DC source is separated physically and electrically from the other DC source to ensure that a single failure in one sriurce does not cause a failure in a redundant source .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-1 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3~7.4 and 4.7.4 Th*e batteries for the DC power sources are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. The voltage limit is 2.13 volts per cell, which corresponds to a total minimum voltage output of 125.7 volts per battery discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8. The criteria for sizing large lead storage batteries are defined in IEEE-485.

Each DC electrical power source has ample power output capacity for. the steady state operation of connected loads during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 8.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES.

A descripti-0n of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating" .

LCO The DC power sources, each consisting of one battery, one directly connected battery charger and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the train are required to

.be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of DC control power and Preferred AC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.

An OPERABLE DC electrical power source requires its battery to be OPERABLE and connected to the associated DC bus. In order for the battery to remain OPERABLE, one charger must be in service.

The LCO specifies chargers ]ED!f,)5 and ID:f,)6 because those chargers are powered by the AC power di stri but i o*ri *5*ystem arid°". . DG associated with the battery they supply. If only the cross connected chargers were OPERABLE, and a loss of off-site power should occur concurrently with the l~ss of one DG, both safeguards trains would eventually become disabled. One train would be disabled by the lack of AC motive power; the other would become disabled when the battery, whose on.ly OPERAS.LE charger is fed by the failed DG, became depleted.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-2 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES The required chargers, j§Djj1s and 10:~16, must be OPERABLE, but need not actually be in service be~ause thi ~robability of a concurrent loss of offsite power and loss of one DG is low, battery charging current is not needed immediately after an accident, and the standby chargers may be placed in service *quickly.

APPLICABILITY The DC sources are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that redundant sources of DC power are available to support engineered safeguards equipment and plant instrumentation in the event of an accident or transient.

The DC sources also support the equipment and instrumentation necessary for power operation, plant heatups and cooldowns, and shutdown operation.

~ :! ~~~~~~!~~ ~~ur~gwm ACTIONS 1~:~;:1:~:~1:~!A . 1 and A. 2 With one of the required chargers (gDjj15 or ~IDlfjl6) inoperable, the cross connected charger must be immediatel.v" . placed ... iri service, if it is not already in service, to maintain the battery in OPERABLE status. In order to limit the time when the DC source is not capable of continuously meeting the single failure criterion, the required charger must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

The 7 day completion time was chosen to allow trouble shooting, location of parts, and repair.

1:~::1,::~!il!~!:B .1 and B. 2 With one battery inoperable, the associated DC system cannot meet its design.

It lacks both the surge capacity and the independence from AC power sources which the battery provides if offsite power is lost. Placing the second battery charger in service provides two benefits: 1) restoration of the capacity to supply a sudden DC power demand, and 2) restoration of adequate DC power in the affected train as soon as either AC power distribution system is re-energized following a loss of offsite power .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-3 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES In order to restore the DC source to its design capability, the battery must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is a feature of the original Palisades licensing basis and reflects the availability to provide two trains of DC power from either AC distribution system. Furthermore, it provides a reasonable time to assess plant status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power source and, if the battery is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe plant shutdown.

~g:i::~;~[~:c. 1 and c. 2 If the inoperable DC electrical power source cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.4.1 (Float voltage check)

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended funttion. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous current required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state. The specified voltage is the product of the Table 3.7.6 I Category C limit for aR i Adi vi dual cell aRd. the Rumber of cells i R the battery. It correspoR9.~ . ..t.t3... .t.he miRimum acce13table settiRg of the low voltage alarm OR the DC buses. niiii::Ham 1n1'.**:::.4*5'(f""re'C'ofoili"iihdat ions.

SR 4.7.4.2 (Terminal and connector condition check)

Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery terminals and connectors, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell and terminal connection, provi~es an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-4 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

~ _BA_.s_E_s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Surveillance Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience .related to detecting corrosion trends.

SR 4.7.4.3 (Battery inspection)

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The 12 month Frequency for this SR is consistent with IEEE-450, which recommends detailed visual inspection of cell condition and rack integrity on a yearly basis.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-5 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES SR 4.7.4.4 and SR 4.7.4.5 (Cleaning and resistance)

Vtsual inspection and resistance measurements of..: inter-cell and terminal connections provide an i.ndication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The antkorrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deteri-0ration. The visual i~spection for ~orrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection. The removal of vistble co.rrosi*on is a preventive maintenance *sR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure -0f this SR provided visible The Surveillance Frequencies of 12 months is c_onsistent with .IEEE-450, which recommends cell to cell and termi"nal connection resistance measurement on a yearly bas*i s.

SR 4.7.4.6 (Charger test)

Thh SR requires that each battery cha.rger be capable of supplying 180 amps at lZS volts for ~ 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months s~ These requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers. The chargers are rated at 200 amps; the specified 180 amps provides margfo between the charger rating and the test requirement.

1111*1111j~::,~!11~f~~,,~if=!~;~:!1;~:!if!!:~:!~i:,:1;1:!:~~!~,f~~~f!~1~:'!!~1::::11j~Ji~f!!!liI!~j!!!fi~fiflj' 8A S ie-~ii"fr.e"fl te peffefm the test aREI the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 18 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 4.I.4 .. 7 (Service test)

A battery s.ervi ce test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to s*atis.fy .the destgn. requirements {battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty eye le r~qu i-rements as spec i.f i ed in FSAR Chapte.r 8.

The S:urv.ei llance :Frequency of 18 months i.s consistent with the recommend at i ans of RG 1.32 and RG 1.129, which state that the battery service test should be performed duri-ng refueling operations, or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 18 months .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-6 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES lhe reason for the re:stric-tion that the plant be in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING

-sHUTDOWN is that performing the Survei Hance requ-i res disconnecting the battery from the DC distribution buses and connecting it to a test load resistor bank. This action makes the battery inoperable and completely unavailable for use.SR 4. 7 .4.8 (Performance test)

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the "as found" condition, after having been in s_ervice, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is i-ntended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

The .modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cy"cle consisting of just -two rates; the one mi:nute rate pub l i shed,_-for the battery or "the largest current load of the duty cycle, foll owed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both.of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since- the ampere-hours removed by a rated one minute discharge

.represents a very small portfon of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the perfo.rmance test without compromising the results of the per;formance d-ischarge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modifted performance d.ischarge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A- modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a*high rate, short duration load (usually tbe highest rate of the duty cycle). Th-is will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical peri-0d of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be -i dent i cal to those specified for a service test.

Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge te*st is acceptable for satisfying SR 4. 7 .4.8; however, only the modified perfo.rmance discharge test may be used,to satisfy SR 4.7-.4.8 wh-ile sat-is.fyi:ng th.e requi-rements of SR 4.7.4.7 at the"same time.

The acceptance criteria for thh Surveillance are con_sistent with the recommendations. of lEEE-450 and IEEE-485. These references recommend that the battery be .replaced if its capacity is _below 80% of the manufacturer rating.

A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the lo.ad requirements.

PALISADES B 3.7.4-7 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Operating B 3.7.4 and 4.7.4

BASES The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradati-0n but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity

~ 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450, when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is ~ 10% below the manufacturer's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450.

The reason for the restriction that the plant be in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN is that performing the Surveillance requires disconnecting the battery from the DC distribution buses and connecting it to a test load resistor bank. This action makes the battery inoperable* and completely unavailable for use.

REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

10 ~FR.50, Appendix A, GDC 17 FSAR, Chapter 8 IEEE-485-1983, June 1983

4. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974

5. IEEE-450--1-987]1§9.5

6. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977

7. Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974

8. Letter; Graham Walker, C&D Charter Power Systems, Inc to John Slinkard, Consumers Power Company, 12 July 1996 .

PALISADES B 3.7.4-8 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5: DC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCO This LCO requires those, and only those, DC power sources which supply the DC distribution subsystems required by LCO 3.7.10, to be OPERABLE. Each DC source consists of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling. This ensures the availability of sufficient DC power sources to maintain the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and loss of shutdown cooling).

APP LI CAB IL ITV The DC power sources required to* be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies proyide assurance that equipment and instrumentation is available to:

a. Provide coolant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling accident,

c. Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to core damage,

d. Monitoring and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

PALISADES B 3.7.5-1 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5

~ _BA_s_E_s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The DC source requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.4, "DC sources - Operating".

ACTIONS

§~!~!:~:~~::~:~:A i Since the required DC source is only required to support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those required features with no DC power available to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

l,j~j!JMl!i.A. 2. I. A. 2. 2, A. 2. 3, and A. 2. 4

ACTION A.I may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts,

~~~~:~~~{*i v:~Tk~~~ ~; ~!f:1!!!ifili!llli§i.9.l!l!i!ilif:!ll!*!I provide alternate, but sufficiently 0

ACTIONs A.2))iJI1iifl.ft~tP~i1~l~~¥i~rnl require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, movement of ...frradfa'fi:i'd ... fUel* assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC sources (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the necessary DC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient control and Preferred AC power .

PALISADES B 3.7.5-2 Amendment No.

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.7.5 and 4.7.5

_BA_S_E_S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.5.1 (Shutdown DC power surveillance)

SR 4.7.5.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.7.4 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

The SRs from LCO 3.7.4 which are required are those which can be performed without effecting the OPERABILITY or reliability of the rPequ ired DC source.

With only one battery available, loading tests cannot be performed since their performance would render that battery inoperable during the test. This is the case for SRs 4.7.4.7 and 4.7.4.8.

REFERENCES None

PALISADES B 3.7.5-3 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7-.6 and 4.7.6: Battery Gell Parameters BASES BACKGROUND This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC power source batteries. A discussion of these batteries 15* provided in the Bases for LGO 3.7 .4, "DC Sources. -

0pera t*1ng II APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A descri*pt ion of the Safety Analyses app 1i cable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating"; during COLD SHUTDOWN ~nd REFUELING SHUTDOWN, in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCO Battery ce.11 parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a p.ostulated OBA. Battery cell limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC electrical system function even when Category A and B limits are not met.

The requirement to maintain the average temperature of representative cells above 70°F assures that the.battery temperature is within the design band.

Battery capacity is a function of battery temperature.

APPLICABILITY The battery cell .parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC power sources. Therefore, they are only required when the DC power source is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in the Bases for LCO 3.7.4, "DC Sources - Operating" and LCO 3.7.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown" .

PALISADES B 3.7.6-1 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6

_BA_s_.ES~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ACTIONS l:~'J!ll,i~j:A. I. A. 2, and A. 3 With one or more cells in one or more batteries not within Category A or B limits but within the Category C limits, the battery is not fully charged but there is still sufficient capacity to perform the intended function.

Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be declared to be inoperable and* continued operation is permitted for a limited period.

The pilot cell electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (Required Action A.I). This check will provide a quick indication of the status of the remainder of the battery.

One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyte level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cells.

Verification that all cells meet the Category C limits (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits, the battery will still be capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed to complete the initial verification because specific gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to

perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters are not severely degraded, this time is considered reasonable. The verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits.

Battery cell parameters must be restored to Category A and B limits within 31 days.

1:~:1::~::1:~::s .J With the temperature of representative cells below the design temperature, or with one or more battery cells with parameters outside the Category C limits, suffici-ent capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not assured and the corresponding battery must be declared* inoperable.

Additionally, if battery cells cannot be restored to meeting Category A or B limits within 31 days, a serious difficulty with the battery is indicated and the battery must be declared to be inoperable .

PALISADES B 3.7.6-2 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6

_BA_S_ES~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SURVE ILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7~6.l (Pilot cell checks)

This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450, which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte temperature of pilot cells.

SR 4.7.6.2 (Temperature checks)

This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is > 70°F is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450, which states.

that the temperature of electrolytes in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis. The monthly frequency specified is a feature of the initial Palisades license, and is the same as those other pilot cell tests specified in Surveillance 4.7.6.1.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity.

This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on manufacturer recommendations.

SR 4.7.6.3 (Connected cell checks)

The quarterly inspection of specific gravity and voltage is consistent with the recommendations of IEEE-450.

Table 3.7.6-1 This table delineates the limit~ on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. Each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the fully charged parameter limit for each designated pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage and specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category A and B limits for the Palisades batteries are the same. The two Categories are maintained in the table to be consistent with IEEE-450 terminology and with the Standard Technical Specifications .

PALISADES B 3.7.6-3 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.7.6 and 4.7.6 The Category A and B limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450, with the extra %inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperatures and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote (a) to Table 3.7.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at fl oat charge for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Category A and B limit specified for float voltage is ~ 2.13 volts per cell. This value is based on a recommendation of IEEE-450, which states that prolonged operation of cells < 2.13 volts can reduce their life expectancy.

lEEr.::4*5*o*~****specfffE . grivftj" . re*adTri"g*s****a*r*e***based" . "O"fr***a-* .. teiiWi"ifr,.atUre of 77 ° F ( 25 ° c)

Category C defines the limit for each connected cell. These values, although reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limit specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensures that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for float voltage is based on IEEE-450, which states that a cell voltage of 2.07 volts or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement *

PALISADES B 3.7.6-4 Amendment No.

Battery Cell Parameters B* 3.7.6 and 4.7.6

_BA_S_ES~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

~!'d'~:~~'Q"':'ft~~{~!i~fi~8!~'h!'1 ~w the m'~'f:U'i'ac~~re~s~ec~~m~~~~d a~u~~~r charged, nominal specific gravity). IA additioA to that limit, it is reqijired that the specific gravity for each coRRected cell mijst be RO less thaR 0.020 below the average of all eoRAected cells. This limit ensures that the effect of a highly charged or new cell does not mask overall degradation of the battery.

7.6-1 Table 3.7.6-1 requires the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature, with the exception that level correction is not required when battery charging current is < 2 amps on float charge. This current provides, in general,*an indication of overall battery condition.

Becaijse of specifie gravity gradieRts that are prodijced dijriRg the rechargiRg process, delays of se*1eral days may occijr ~ihil c ~taiti Fig for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charger CijrreFlt is aA acceptable alterRative to specific gravity mcasijrcmeFlt for determiRiRg the state of charge. This pheAomeRoA is discijssed iR IEEE 460. Footnote (c) to

g gravity mijst be measijred to coRfirm the state of charge. FollowiRg a miRor battery recharge (sijch as eqijaliziRg charge that docs Rot follow a deep discharge) specific gravity gradieRts arc Rot sigRificaRt, aRd coF1firmiF1g measijremeRts may be made iR less thaA 7 days.

REFERENCES I. IEEE-450-~1§95 *:*:*:*:*:-:::*:*:*:*:*:*

PALISADES B 3.7.6-5 Amendment No.

Inverters - Operating B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7 ELECTRlCAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3~7.7 and 4.7.7: Inverters - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the normal source of power for the Preferred AC buses. The function of the inverter is to provide continuous AC electrical power to the Preferred AC buses, even in the event of an interruption to the normal AC power distribution system. A Preferred AC bus can be powered from the AC power distribution system via the Bypass Regulator if its associated inverter is out of service. An interlock prevents supplying more than one Preferred AC bus from the bypass regulator at any time. The station battery provides an uninterruptable power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protective System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Features (ESF).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable above COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1 "AC Sources - Operating".

LCO The inverters ensure the availability of Preferred AC power for the instrumentation required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA.

Maintaining the inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the RPS and ESF instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four inverters ensure an uninterruptable supply of AC elect~ical power to the Preferred AC buses even if the 2400 volt safety related buses are de-energized.

An inverter is considered inoperable if it is not powering the associated Preferred AC bus, or if its output voltage or frequency is not within tolerances .

PALISADES B 3.7.7-1 Amendment No.

Inverters - Operating B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7 BASES APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that redundant sources of Preferred AC power for instrumentation and control are available to support engineered safeguards equipment in the event of an accident or transient and for power operation, plant heatups and cooldowns,

-"f and shutdown operation.

r:"!d~~:~~~~N~cgH~:~~~~

ACTIONS g:~::z::~::z:~!A. 1 and A. 2 With an inverter inoperable, its associated Preferred AC bus becomes inoperable until it is manually re-energized from the bypass regulator. An inoperable Preferred AC Bus is addressed in LCO 3.7.9 .

Required Action A.I allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the plant is exposed because of the inverter inoperability.

This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail.

?.:!~!:f.::~::~:f.:B .1 and B. 2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which t~e LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT*SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

PALISADES B 3.7.7-2 Amendment No.

Inverters - Operating B 3.7.7 and 4.7.7

BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.7.1 {Inverter checks)

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly and Preferred AC buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is.readily available for the instrumentation of the RPS and ESF connected to the Preferred AC buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the reeijAeaAt capability ef the iA¥erters aAe ether indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES None

PALISADES B 3.7.7-3 Amendment No.

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 and 4~7.8: Inverters - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A descri pt i*on of the inverters is provided in the Bases for LCO 3. 7. 7, "Inverters - Operat i*ng".

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for lCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

~hutdown".

LCO This LCO requires those, and* on-ly those, inverters necessary to support to Preferred AC buses required by LCO 3.7.10, to be OPERABLE.

This ensures the avaHability of sufficient Preferred AC electrical power to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated event~ during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and loss of shutdown cooli,ng}.

An i:n.verter is considered inoperable if it is not powering the associated P*referred AC bus, or it its vo 1tage or frequency is not within to 1erances.

APPLICABILITY The inve.rters required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that equi,pment and instrumentati.on is available to: *

a. Provide coolant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling accident, c.. Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to core damage, .

d. Monitori:ng and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

PALISADES B 3.7.8-1 Amendment No.

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8 BASES Inverter requirements for above* COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.7, "Inverters - Operating".

ACTIONS l:f.:J~;~l§l~l;A *1 An inverter would be considered inoperable if it*,.were not available to supply its associated Preferred AC bus. Since the inverter and its associated Preferred AC Bus is only requ,ired to support features required by other LCOs, the option to declare those required features without inverter supplied Preferred AC power available to be inop~rable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCO~.

l.!~!!l.!:~:l:iiA. 2.1. A. 2. 2. A. 2.3, and A. 2. 4 ACTION A.I may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts, therefore, con serv at i veACTIONs, ACT IONA.2mm:t:tliEdU9~~=1iliiWl!lii

s. ~,,,.,,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,w,,,., __ ,,.,,.,.,.,.,.,,.,,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.

provide alternate, but sufficiently ACTIONs A.2MII\tb:Hjij~fi]IIJ:~::~rnl. require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, movement or*****~**r.hridlife"d*******rliel assemblies, and operations i nvol vi ng .positive reactivity additions. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place a fuel assembly in a safe location; the suspension of positive reacti*vity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the requ.ired SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the required inverter supplied Preferred AC power to the plant instrument and control systems.

The Completion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time duri*ng which the pl ant safety systems may be without inverter supplied Preferred AC power *

PALISADES B 3.7.8-2 Amendment No.

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.7.8 and 4.7.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.8.1 (Inverter checks)

A description of the basis for this SR is provided in the bases for SR 4. 7. 7.1.

REFERENCES None

PALISADES B 3.7.8-3 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 ELECTRlCAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9: Distributfon Systems - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Cl~ss IE AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution systems are d*i vi ded into two redundant and independent el ectri cal power distribution trains. Each electrical power distribution train is made up of se.veral subsystems which include the safety related buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels shown in Table 3.7.9-1.

The Class IE 2400 volt safety related .buses, Bus IC and Bus ID, are normally powered from offsite, but can be powered from the DGs, as explained in the Background section of the Bases for LCO 3.7.I, ~AC Sources - Operating". Each 2400 volt safety related bus supplies one train of Class IE the 480 volt distribution system.

The I20 volt Preferred AC buses are normally powered from the inverters. The alternate power supply f~r the buses is a constant voltage transformer, called the Bypass Regulator. Use of the Bypass regulator is governed by LCO 3.7.7, "Inverters - Operating." The bypass regulator *is powered from the non-Cl ass lE instrument AC bus, Y-01. The Instrument AC bus is normally powered through an automatic bus transfer switch, an instrument AC transformer, and isolation fuses. Its normal power source is MCC-I. Loss of power to MCC-I will cause automatic transfer of the Instrument AC bus to MCC-2.

There are two i:ndependent I25 volt DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable*(lbove COLD SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.I "AC Sources - Operating".

LCO The AC, DC~ and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The required power distribution subsystems listed in Table 3.7.9-I ensure the availability of AC, D'C, and Preferred AC bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the .reactor and ma-intain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated D.BA.

PALISADES B 3.7.9-I Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES Maintaining both trains of AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the plant design is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any electrical power distribution subsystem will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE electrical power distribution subsystems require the buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels listed in Table 3.7.9-1 to be energized to their proper voltages. In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC power distribution subsystems must be open when a 2400 volt source is OPERABLE for each train. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem. If any tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical power distribution subsystems are considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety ~elated redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class IE 2400 volt buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit or preclude cross connecting Class IE 480 volt subsystems when 2400 volt power is available for only one train.

This LCO does not address the power source for the Preferred AC buses. The Preferred AC buses are normally powered from the associated inverter. An alternate source, the Bypass Regulator, is available to supply one Preferred

bus at a time, to allow maintenance on an inverter. The proper alignment of the inverter output breakers is addressed under the inverter LCOs. Therefore a Preferred AC Bus may be considered operable when powered from either the associated inverter or the Bypass Regulator as long as the voltage and frequency of the supply is correct.

APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE above COLD SHUTDOWN to ensure that AC, DC, and Preferred AC power is available to the redundant trains and channels of safeguards equipment, instrumentation and controls required to support engineered safeguards equipment in the event of an accident or transient.

The AC source requtrements for COLD are addressed in LCO 3.7.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

PALISADES B 3.7.9-2 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES ACTIONS l!~!l!(~:!.{A *.J An inoperable AC distri-bution subsystem can cause engineered safety features to be inoperable. If a redundant safety feature in the other train is concurrently inoperable, a loss of safety function could occur. ACTION A.I

. requires compliance with Condition 3.7.9.E to assure that the plant is shutdown tf a safety function is lost.

l@~::~~l~. 2 WUh one or more requtred AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or di~tribution panels, except Preferred AC buses, in one train inoperable, the redundant AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because an additional failure tn the power distribution systems could result in the minimum required ESF*functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

1¥1!!~1.:~:s . I An fnoperable Preferred AC bus can cause engineered* s*a.fety features to be inoperable. If a redundant safety feature i.n the other train is concurrently i.nQperable, a loss of safety .function could occur. ACTION B.l requires compliance with Condition 3.7.9.E to assure that the plant is shutdown if a safety function is lost.

11:1:1:1ma . 2 With one Preferred AC bus i-noperable, the remaining OPERABLE Preferred AC buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut do.wn the plant and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition; Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could resu-lt in the minimum required _ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the Preferred AC bus must be restored to OPERABLE status w:ithin 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by poweri-ng it from the associated i nve.rter or from the Bypass Regula tor.

This 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit is more conservative than Completion Ti-mes allowed for the vast major-i ty of components that are without adequate Preferred AC power and is a featu-re of the original Palisades licensing basis.

-PALISADES B 3.7.9-3 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES An tnoperable DC d:i stri but ion subsystem can cause engineered safety features to be tnoperable. If a redundant safety feature in the other train is concurrently i.noperable, a loss of safety functi.on could occur. ACTION C.l requires compliance with Condition 3.7.9.E to assure that the plant is shutdown if a safety function is lost.

l!~~~:l.:~:!c .2 With* a DC bus in one train inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the requir~d DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

This j hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components whi-ch would be without power and is a feature of the ori9inal Palisades licensing basis.

1:~:!~!!~!:l!~!:O. I and D. 2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status w*ithtn the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to an operating condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLP SHUTDOWN withi*n 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach *the required plant conditions from* full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Condition E corresponds to a degradation in the electrical distribution system that, together with another existing equipment failure, causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one LCO Conditi-0n is entered, and this results in the loss of a required function,. the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional tiine is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0 .. 3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown .

PALISADES B 3.7.9-4 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - - Operating B 3.7.9 and 4.7.9 BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4. 7. 9_, 1 (AC bus alignment check)

Thissurve.illance verifies that the required AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with. the correct circu:i_t breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained.

For those buses which have undervoltage alarmed in the control room, correct voltage may be verified by the absence of an undervoltage al arm.

For those buses whith have only one possible power source and have undervoltage alarmed in the control room, correct-breaker alignment by the absence of an undervoltage alarm.

A Preferred-AC Bus may be considered correctly aligned when powered from either the associated inverter or from the -bypass regulator. A mechanical i nterlo,ck pre.vents connecting two or more Preferred AC Buses to the Bypass Regulator. LCO 3.7.7 and SR 4.7.7.1 address the condition of supplying a Preferred AC Bus from the bypass regulator .

The -1 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and Preferred. AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator. to subsystem malfunctio.ns.

REFERENCES None PALISADES B 3.7.9-5 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.10 and 4.7.10 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 and 4.7.10: Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC, and Preferred AC bus electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating".

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A description of the Safety Analyses applicable during_ COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING SHUTDOWN is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown".

LCO This LCO requires those, and only those, AC, DC, and Preferred AC distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE which are necessary to support equipment required by other LCOs.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).

APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in COLD SHUTDOWN, REFUELING SHUTDOWN, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that equipment and instrumentation is available to:

a. Provide coolant inventory makeup,

b. Mitigate a fuel handling accident,

c. Mitigate shutdown events that can lead to core damage,

d. Monitoring and maintaining the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN condition.

PALISADES B 3.7.10-1 Amendment No.

Distri:bution Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.10 and 4.7.10 BASES The eleatrical power distribution subsystem requirements for above COLD SHUTDOWN are addressed in LCO 3.7.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating".

Si-nee t:he distr*ibution systems are only required to support features *required by other LCOs, the opti<m to declare those affected required features to be inoperable, assures that appropriate ACTIONS will be implemented in accordance with the affected LCOs.

~:f!~@l~:~fA .. 2.I

A. 2. 2* A. 2. 3

A. 2. 4, and A. 2. 5 ACTION A.I may involve undesired and unnecessary administrative efforts, therefore, ACTIONs A.2@t:E~liiiillil1:~:1::~;1 provide alternate, but sufficiently conservative, ACTIONs.

ACTIONs A.2l:~iiltlftl.inpgglili:il),[*iii,l~iil require suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS, mo,vement of"Trradfaled ... fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions, and declaration that affected shutdown cooling trains are i-noperable. The suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS and movement of t~radiated fuel assemblies does not preclude actions to place a fuel assembly i*n a safe locati*on; the suspension of positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or in.crease reactor vessel inventory provided the requtred SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained.

These ACTIONS minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events.

It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required distributi-0n subsystems (and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished) in order to provide the necessary electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of "immediately" is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required di.stribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time duri.ng which the plant safety systems may be without su*ffi cient power.

PALISADES B 3.7.10-2 Amendment No.

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.10 and 4.7.10 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 4.7.10.l (AC bus alignment check)

A description of the basis for this SR is provided in the bases for SR 4. 7. 9 .1.

REFERENCES None PALISADES B 3.7.10-3 Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT 5 CONSUMERS-POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 ELECTRICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE - ADDITIONAL CHANGES Response to NRG Reviewers' Comments The following abbreviations have been used in the responses:

AOT Allowed Outage Time CTS Current Palisades Technical Specifications DG Diesel Generator EOP Emergency Operating Procedure ES FAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal LOOP Loss of Offsite Power P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram RG Regulatory Guide SIS Safety Injection Signal SR Surveillance Requirement STS Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 1432)

TS Technical Specifications 22 Pages

-~-------

Response to NRG Reviewers' Comments 1

Comment 1: (Actions 3.7.1.G, H, & I)

Fuel Oil transfer system piping arrangement, pump controls and tank level controls and pump power supply arrangements. Identify which power supplies are Class 1E.

Response 1:

The following drawings have been provided as part of the P&IDs supplied to the Palisades Project Manager:

Fuel Oil Transfer system P&ID, M-214 480 Volt Power Schematics E-1, Sh.A; E-5, Sh.1 & 4 Electrical Logic Drawing E-17, Sh.10 (Load Shedding & Etc.)

These drawings show the schematic arrangement of the Fuel Oil Storage Tank, T-10, the fuel oil pumps and transfer piping, and the DG fuel oil day tanks and belly tanks.

Fuel Oil Pump P-18A is powered from MCC-8 which is not a Class 1E bus.

Fuel Oil Pump P-188 is powered from MCC-1 which is a Class 1E bus.

The power arrangements for the two fuel oil pumps are not symmetric. In an emergency, P-18A could be powered from either DG; P-188 cannot. This makes the effect of loss of P-188 less severe. If P-18A is not available, DG 1-2 is limited to the approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months of fuel in its day tank. If P-188 is not available, P-18A could be used to supply either DG. The proposed Actions and AOTs are intended to reflect this difference. The proposed AOT for both fuel oil pumps being inoperable is intended to allow some maintenance to be completed on the system prior to requiring a plant shutdown. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months AOT was proposed because an approximate 15 hour1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months fuel supply would be available in the day tank for each DG. Also, these proposed TS and STS allow a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months AOT when both DGs themselves are inoperable.

P-18A can be powered from DG 1-1 by cross connecting Load Centers 11 and 12 through breakers 52-1118 and 52-1217. A three out of four interlock between breakers 52-1102, 52-1118, 52-1202, and 52-1217 prevents these breakers from cross tieing the 2400 volt buses 1C and 1D.

The Palisades Fuel Oil System is further described in Licensee Event Report 94-007-01, dated July 25, 1994; in a Justification for Continued Operation and supplemental correspondence dated May 23, 1994, June 3, 1994, and June 6, 1994; and in the NRG response to that Justification for Continued Operation, dated June 7, 1994.

There are no LCOs or Actions in CTS which explicitly address the fuel oil pumps; CTS SR 4.7.1.e requires that the operability of both fuel oil pumps be verified monthly.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 2

Comment 2: (Action 3.7.1.G)

With fuel transfer pump P-18A inoperable when the plant is above COLD SHUTDOWN, proposed TS 3.7.1.G.1 requires diesel generator, DG 1-2 to be declared inoperable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . However, the day tank for DG 1-2 only contains sufficient fuel oil for 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months of DG 1-2 operation, therefore, provide detailed justification for why DG 1-2 is not required to be declared inoperable within 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months .

Response 2:

The proposed 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months AOT was not based on the DG run time available in the day tank; it was based on a judgement of the relative severity of both DGs being inoperable (2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months AOT) or both offsite sources being inoperable (24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months AOT).

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months AOT was intended to allow a reasonable time for repair of P-18A prior to declaring DG 1-2 to be inoperable.

Comment 3: (Action 3. 7 .1. 8)

P-18A is normally powered from the non-Class 1E MCC-8. Following a Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA). Class 1E power for p.:.18A can only be supplied by DG 1-1 through Class 1E MCC-1 (by manually cross connecting Load Centers 11and12). Hence, following a LOCA, DG 1-1 is the only Class 1E power source available to both P-18A and P-188. Therefore, provide justification for why P-18A and P-188 are not required to be declared inoperable when DG 1-1 is inoperable.

Response 3:

Neither P-18A nor P-188 has Class 1E power all the way to the pump motor. The fuel oil transfer system was not des.igned as a Class 1 E system. The relatively large Day Tanks provide sufficient run time to allow operator action for initiation of fuel oil transfer to these Day Tanks, so automatic actuation of fuel makeup to the DG day tanks is not required*. Each pump depends on manual action, following a LOOP, to restore it to service; P-18A depends on operator action to restore MCC-8 which is separated from its source (Load Center 12 - which is Class 1E) by the load shedding relays, P-188 depends on operator action to start the pump (its control does not include any automatic mode).

The Palisades Fuel Oil System is further described in Licensee Event Report 94-007-01, dated July 25, 1994; in a Justification for Continued Operation and supplemental correspondence dated May 23, 1994, June 3, 1994, and June 6, 1994; and in the NRC response to that Justification for Continued Operation, dated June 7, 1994.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 3 Comment 4: (Action 3.7.1.H)

With fuel transfer pump P-18B inoperable when the plant is above COLD SHUTDOWN, proposed TS 3.7.1.H.1 required P-18B to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Since P-18B is the only fuel oil transfer pump which is automatically powered by DG 1-1 through Class 1E MCC-1 following a LOCA and the day tank for DG 1-1 only contains sufficient fuel for 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months DG operation, therefore, provide detailed justification for why P-18B is not required to be restored to OPERABLE status within 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months .

Response 4:

While the P-188 power supply bus is automatically connected to the Diesel Generator following a LOOP, P-188 would not be automatically available because its control is strictly manual. The proposed 7 day AOT was not based on the DG run time available in the day tank. As discussed in the response to Comment 3, while P-188 is powered from a Class 1E source, the power cabling to the pump motor is not Class 1E, and either P-18A or P-188 would require operator action to restore it to service following a LOOP. The 7 day AOT was proposed because P-18A could be powered from either DG if offsite power was lost while P-188 was unavailable. The 7 day AOT is the same period as is allowed for having one DG inoperable. , As proposed, failure to restore P-188 to operable status within 7 days would require a plant shutdown and cooldown in accordance with actions J.1 and J.2. The condition of having P-188 inoperable is less severe than the condition of having one DG inoperable. The proposed AOT for P-188 and the subsequent action if the repair is not completed within that AOT is essentially the same as for having one DG inoperable.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 4 Comment 5: (LCO 3.7.2)

When the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN with fuel in reactor, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, proposed TS 3. 7.2.b specifies that:

)

"One Diesel Generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by Specification 3. 7.10."

Since P-188 cannot be powered by DG 1-2 and only DG 1-1 can provide Class 1E to both P-1 BA and P-188, provide justification for why the above proposed TS is not more specific and is not limited to the use of only DG 1-1 to supply one train of the onsite Class 1EA C power during cold shutdown or refueling shutdown.

Response 5:

As discussed above, neither fuel oil pump power supply, when including connecting cables, is completely Class 1E. Proposed LCO 3.7.2 is worded like STS LCO 3.8.2. The requirement is to have one DG, which can supply power to the Class 1 E distribution subsystems required by LCO 3. 7.10. It does not require (nor does proposed LCO 3. 7.10) that all power to required support equipment be Class 1E. The CTS (and STS) definition of Operable clearly requires that necessary support equipment be capable of performing its related support function .

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 5 Comment 6: (Actions 3.7.1.G, H, & 1).

With regard to the engine mounted tank, provide the following information:

a. The capacity and usable volume of the tank.

b. The minimum fuel oil inventory to be maintained in the tank.

c. How the tank is filled (e.g. by gravity, etc.).

d. Why specification and surveillance are not required for this tank?

e. Are the instrumentation and controls (e.g. tank filling solenoid valves, automatic level control, etc.) for filling the tank powered by Class 1E sources? If yes, are the instrumentation and controls for each of the day tanks powered by different Class 1E source?

Response 6:

The DG engine mounted tank is bu.ilt into the engine bed mounting. It has three internally connected sections, two with a 12 314" depth and the third with a 22 718" depth.

a. The capacity of the engine mounted tank is approximately 800 gallons gross. All but about 50 gallons is usable. The tank is not kept filled to the top. At rated load, each DG consumes about 2. 7 gpm.

b&c. The minimum usable fuel oil inventory maintained in the engine mounted tank (the usable inventory at the level at the point where the fill valve opens) is approximately 390 gallons. At that level, a level switch actuates a solenoid valve to gravity fill the engine mounted tank from the day tank.

Maximum instrument setting error could reduce the usable inventory to about 340 gallons. When the tank level rises to approximately 530 usable gallons, a separate level switch closes the solenoid valve terminating the filling operation. During plant operation, the engine mounted tank inventory can be assumed to be between these two levels. High and low level alarms are provided to notify the operators in the event the automatic filling system should fail. The alarms annunciate locally and actuate a DG trouble alarm in the control room.

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d. The engine mounted tank has always been considered to be necessary support equipment for the DG. (The DG draws its fuel from this tank.)

Therefore the engine mounted tank is required by the CTS definition of an "OPERABLE" DG. The calculations which determined the required quantity of stored fuel oil did not take credit for the fuel oil contained in this tank.

The engine mounted tank is not explicitly specified in CTS and no explicit TS requirement has been proposed for this tank.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 6

e. The instrumentation and controls (e.g. tank filling solenoid valves, and level switches) for filling the tank are powered by Class 1E sources. The instrumentation and controls for each of the Day Tanks is powered by a different Class 1E source. These level controls are powered from the control power source for the associated DG.

Comment 7: (Action 3.7.1.1)

With both fuel transfer pumps inoperable when the plant is above COLD SHUTDOWN, proposed TS 3. 7.1.1.1 requires one fuel oil transfer pump to be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Since P-18B is the only fuel oil transfer pump which is automatically powered from the Class 1E MCC-1 and P-18A is manually loaded to MCC-1 following a LOCA, provide detailed justification why the TS cannot be more specific to require P-18B be restored to OPERABLE status first.

Response 7:

Neither P-18A nor P-188 would be automatically available following a LOOP.

While P-188 is automatically powered from a Class 1E source, its control is strictly manual. The control is not in the control room. Restoration of either pump, following a LOOP, requires operator action. Restoration of P-18A, however, is accomplished in a room directly below, and easily accessible from, the control room. Restoration of P-18A, which can provide automatic action to maintain the fuel supply to both DGs, is therefore somewhat more easily accomplished than the manual operation necessary for P-188. If both fuel oil pumps were simultaneously inoperable, it would most likely be due to a fault in the common portions of the system: If the problem were associated with the pumps, actions should be directed toward restoring the most easily repaired pump. It would be of little benefit to specify which pump should be restored first.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 7 Comment 8: (Actions 3.7.1.G, H, & I)

Page 8.4-6 of the Updated FSAR indicates that the fuel oil transfer pump motors and their power and control circuits are non-Class 1E. The arrangement of the fuel oil transfer pump power and control circuits requires operator action to establish fuel oil transfer during loss of off-site power. Provide the following information:

a. Do plant EOPs have provisions to requires operator actions to establish fuel oil transfer following a LOCA.

b. Since the power for control circuits are non-Class 1E, describe the indications/alarms for low fuel oil level in the day tank which the operators will have following a LOCA.

c. How often the operators are required to check on the day tank fuel oil level following a LOCA?

Response 8:

a. Plant EOPs do not include explicit provisions to requires operator actions to establish fuel oil transfer following a LOCA. The Alarm Response Procedure for DG Day Tank Low Level does direct operators to restore power to MCC-8 following a load shed, and provides direction to the DG operating procedure for guidance on shifting between inservice Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps and for guidance on alternate DG fuel oil supplies and transfer methods.

b. Control room analog level indicators and low level alarms are provided for each DG Day Tank. The low level alarm settings are currently being revised so that the alarm would occur before the Day Tank usable capacity dropped below the TS requirement of 2500 gallons. The settings on one Day Tank have been changed; those on the second Day Tank are scheduled to be revised before the start of the upcoming refueling outage.

(Existing practice has been to use the daily level verification to ensure that the TS requirement is met.)

c. Following the transient phase of an emergency, the operators would resume normal log taking. DG Day Tank levels are verified each day. The occurrence of a DG Day Tank low level alarm would cause the indicated level to be checked immediately .

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 8

Comment 9: (LCO 3.7.2)

An Action should be added to proposed LCO 3. 7.2 to address an inoperable sequencer.

Response 9:

Action 3.7.2.C has been added, requiring the associated DG to be declared inoperable if one or both of the associated sequencers becomes inoperable. This Action has been addressed in the bases. This requirement is more restrictive than CTS because the sequencers are not currently required to be operable when the plant is below 300°F. Above 300°F, CTS Action 3.17.2.5 requires this same action; Action 3.7.1 F of these proposed TS require that action whenever the plant is above Cold Shutdown (i.e., above 210°F).

Comment 10: (Action 3.7.3.C)

The proposed Actions for fuel oil water and sediment not being within limits are inappropriate. Excessive water and sediment is cause for immediately declaring the DGs to be inoperable.

Response 10:

The Action for the condition where stored diesel fuel oil viscosity, or water and sediment, are not within limits has been changed to require declaring the DGs to be inoperable. This Action agrees with the STS and with the recommendations of RG 1.137; it is more restrictive than the requirements of CTS .

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 9 Comment 11: (LCO 3.7.3)

The proposed LCO does not address "New Fuel Oil".

Response 11 :

"New Fuel Oil" (that delivered by a vendor but not yet added to the storage tank) is not addressed in the LCO or Actions because it is not CPCo property, and has no effect on the functioning of the DGs until it is transferred from the vendor's truck to a CPCo storage tank.

This "New Fuel Oil" is addressed in the existing plant procedures and in the proposed Fuel Oil Testing Program Specification, 6.8.4.c. Those controls require sampling and analysis of the newly delivered fuel oil. The new fuel oil must be found to meet the acceptance criteria of the Fuel Oil Testing Program before it is allowed to be added to the storage *tank. New fuel oil is tested for specific gravity, for viscosity, and for water and sediment. Onc.e new fuel oil has been added to a storage tank, its properties are addressed under the Actions and program requirements for "Stored Fuel Oil".

Comment 12: (Proposed Diesel Fuel Oil Technical Specifications)

There are several departures in the submitted TS from the requirements of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for CE plants (NUREG-1432, Rev. 1) for which the licensee did not provide justifications. The following departures were identified:

Comment 12 a: Limiting Conditions of Operations - 3.7.3.C In the submittal it is specified that fuel oil viscosity and water sediments should be restored to within limits in 7 days. In the corresponding Standard Technical Specifications (STS - 3.8.3.C) this requirement applies to restoring fuel oil total particulates to within limits. Maintaining particulates concentration at a proper level is an important consideration and this is the reason why STS require to trend this parameter.

Comment 12 b: Administrative Controls - 6.8.4.c In the fuel oil testing program, described in the submittal, no mention is made of determining concentration of particulates. This requirement is specified in the STS (STS- 5.5.13) and is considered to be one of the more important parameters for trending fuel oil degradation. In STS it is specified that this measurement should

be performed in accordance with the ASTM D-2276 standard. However, it is admissible to depart from the standard and use 3 micron filter instead of o. 8 micron, specified in the standard.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 10 Response 12 a & b:

The proposed program requirements do not specify testing stored fuel oil for particulates, other than the water and sediment test. Particulates are of interest when monitoring fuel oil which is stored for an extended period of time. The

particulate content provides an indfcation of time related degradation. Since the fuel oil consumption, at Palisades, is high in relation to the stored quantity, time related degradation is not a concern. The fuel oil usage from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank (T-10) is typically about 9,000 gallons of fuel oil each month during the summer and higher during the winter due to heating boiler operation. T-10 is the supply for both diesel generators, the diesel driven fire pumps, the evaporators, '

and the plant heating boiler. The high turn over rate, and resultant short storage time, make time related degradation of fuel oil unlikely. Particulate testing is, therefore, not necessary. The Fuel Oil Testing Program requires periodic verification of other ASTM D 975 properties of fuel stored in T-10.

Comment 12 c: Surveillance Requirements - 4. 7.3.4 In the submittal it is specified that excess of accumulated water has to be removed from the fuel tank every 92 days. In the corresponding STS (STS - SR 3.8.3.5) this timing is 31 days. What is the.justification for specifying 92 days.

Response 12 c:

The frequency specified for removal of water from the Fuel Oil Storage Tank is 92 days because the tank concerned is not susceptible to water in-leakage. The bases for STS SR 3.8.3.5 ("Check for and remove accumulated water from each fuel oil storage tank, [31] days") states that the frequency (which the square brackets indicate is plant specific) is established by RG 1.137. RG 1.137 paragraph C.2.d states: "Accumulated condensate should be removed from storage tanks on a quarterly basis or on a monthly basis where it is suspected or known that the groundwater table is equal to or higher than the bottom of buried storage tanks.

The Palisades Fuel Oil Storage Tank (T-10) will be replaced with a new tank (T-10A) during the upcoming refueling outage. The replacement tank will be a double walled tank with monitoring provided for the space between the tank walls.

The tank will be installed inside a concrete enclosure for missile and environmental protection. This enclosure will ensure that the tank is not immersed in ground water. The new tan~ will be in service before the requested implementation date for these proposed TS. Therefore, the quarterly (92 day) frequency is appropriate. (An inconsistency between the proposed LCO frequency and that formerly stated in the bases has been corrected.)

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 11

Comment 12 d: Bases - B 3.7.3 Action C.1 In the fuel oil testing program, described in the submittal, this action addresses restoring viscosity, or water and sediment in stored fuel oil to within limits in 7 days. However, the tested fuel oil should be acceptable for short term DG operation. The corresponding STS (STS - B 3. 8. 3 Action C. 1) addresses the issue of restoring particulates concentration and not viscosity and sediments within 7 days, because the concentration of particulates and not viscosity or sediments has direct bearing on fuel oil degradation. What is a definition of "short term DG operation"?

Response 12 d:

The subject Action and its bases have been revised. The revised Action 3.7.3.C.1 requires both DGs (since both are fed from T-10) to be declared inoperable if stored fuel oil viscosity or water and sediment are not within limits.

This action is in agreement with the recommendations of RG 1.137 paragraph C.2.a. Particulates are not addressed for the reasons discussed in the response to Comment 12 a. The basis discussion using "short term operation" has been revised. Short term operation is intended to allow differentiation between fuel oil parameters which are specified because their being not within limits might cause immediate engine failure and those which are specified only to enhance engine life.

Comment 12 e: Bases - B 3.7.3 Action D.1 This action addresses restoring in 31 days the properties of stored oil to within the limits defined in the Fuel Oil Testing Program. However, these properties include viscosity and sediments which are required by Action C. 1 to be restored to within the limits in 7 days. There is, therefore, an inconsistency between these two action statements. The STS (STS - B 3. 8. 3 Action D. 1) addresses testing of the stored fuel oil after addition of the new oil and specifies 30 days period for this testing. The action in the submittal differs from the action specified in STS.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 12 Response 12 e:

Proposed Action addresses "stored fuel oil properties other than viscosity, and water and sediment", therefore there is no inconsistency between the two statements. The proposed Action addresses "stored fuel oil", rather than "new fuel oil" as addressed in STS Action 3.8.3.D.1, because of the configuration and operation of the Palisades fuel oil system.

The proposed Action and Fuel Oil Testing Program requirements replace "new fuel oil" requirements for ASTM 20 fuel oil properties other than viscosity, and water and sediment with requirements on the fuel oil in the Fuel Oil Storage Tank.

First, at Palisades, new fuel oil is added to an intermediate tank (T-926), mixes with the fuel oil in that tank, and is later transferred to the Fuel Oil Storage Tank (T-10). New fuel oil added to T-926 is typically diluted about 2 to 1 by the remaining fuel oil in T-926. Second, the fuel oil usage from T-10 is quite high.

Typically, about 9,000 gallons of fuel oil are added to T-926 each month during the summer. Fuel oil consumption is higher in winter than summer due to heating boiler operation. T-10 is the supply for both diesel generators, the diesel driven fire pumps, the evaporators, and the plant heating boiler. The high turn over rate, and the use of an intermediate tank make the use of new fuel oil sample information inappropriate for determination of diesel generator operability. Only the fuel oil in T-10 affects diesel ge_nerator operability. The program requirements specify that the properties of fuel oil stored in T-10 are within limits.

Currently, both fuel oil tanks, T-926 and T-10 are nominal 30,000 gallon tanks.

During the upcoming refueling outage, T-10 will be replaced with a 50,000 gallon tank, T-1 OA.

To more closely emulate the STS, the proposed TS have been revised to specify a 30 day AOT rather than the formerly proposed 31 day AOT.

Comment 12 f: Fuel Oil Testing Program, 6.4.8.c.

In the submittal it is specified that fuel oil has to be tested in accordance with the Fuel Oil Testing Program, specified in 6.4.8.c. This specification does not include testing for particulates. The corresponding STS (STS SR 3.8.3.3) specifically requests testing for particulates. It also specifies several other tests which are not included in the licensee's submittal.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 13 Response 12 f:

The proposed fuel oil testing program has been revised to more closely emulate the STS and to base fuel oil quality limits on manufacturers' recommendations as well as on the recommendations of ASTM D 975.

The proposed Fuel Oil Testing Program requirements differ from those of the STS program. These differences are appropriate because of the design of the Palisades fuel oil storage system, the relatively high turnover rate of stored fuel oil, and the fuel oil parameter limits specified by the manufacturers of our diesel engines.

The use of diesel manufacturer's specifications, rather than exclusively using those in ASTM D 975, will both avoid declaring a diesel to be inoperable when fuel oil properties are outside the limits specified by D 975, but within the limits specified by the manufacturer, and avoid accepting fuel oil with properties which are allowed by D 975, but outside the limits specified by the manufacturer.

The proposed program requirements do not specify testing new fuel oil flash point. Flash point, according to D 975 and information from our DG manufacturer, is not directly related to engine performance. Rather, it is of primary importance in connection with handling and storage safety requirements. Flash point can provide an indication that the fuel oil has been contaminated with gasoline or other higher volatility solvent, that indication of contamination would be provided by the required testing of new fuel oil for viscosity and specific gravity.

The proposed program requirements do not specify that new fuel oil has "A clear and bright appearance with proper color" as the STS requirements do. Instead, the proposed program requires that new fuel oil water and sediment content be within limits because that provides a quantified measurement of the fuel oil properties of concern rather than a visual judgement of those properties.

For additional discussion on the reasons for differences between the proposed program and that in STS, see the response to Comments 12 a, 12 d, and 12 e .

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Response to NRG Reviewers' Comments 14 Comment 13: (LCO 3.7.6)

Explain why the Table 3. 7.6-1 (battery cell parameters) values for Category Band Category C specific gravity differ from those in the STS.

Response 13:

The proposed entries in Table 3.7.6-1 have been revised to reflect recommendations from the battery manufacturer, C&D Charter Power Systems.

The proposed values are the same as, or more conservative than, the recommendations of STS Table 3.8.6-1. The CTS contain no specific gravity limits.

The STS Category A limit is "[~ 1.200]"; the proposed value is "~ 1.205". The proposed value is more conservative than that in STS.

The STS Category 8 limit is "[~ 1.195]"; the proposed value is "~ 1.200 AND Average of connected cells ~ 1.205". The proposed value is more conservative than that in STS.

The STS Category C limit is "No cell more than 0.020 below the average of a.II connected cells AND The average* of all connected ~- [1.195)1'; The proposed limit is the same as that in STS.

The proposed values were revised based on the guidance of the battery manufacturer that specific gravity limits be derived from the cell baseline values.

Rather than track separate baseline values for each cell, the "~ 1.205" Category A limit proposed will assure that no cell is more than 0.006 below the average baseline specific gravity for the battery. Similarly, the "~ 1.200" Category B limit proposed will assure that no cell is more than 0.011 below the average baseline value. An additional limit is proposed to assure that the average specific gravity is no more than 0.006 below the average baseline value. The Category C limit has been revised from that in our former submittal to agree with the recommendations of STS.

Footnote (c) has been revised to reflect the recommendations of the manufacturer and to allow battery float charging current to be an acceptable measure of the battery state of charge in lieu of specific gravity limits.

Response to NRG Reviewers' Comments 15 Comment 14: (Proposed SR 4.7.1.2)

The FSAR and the bases state that the DG voltage and frequency will reach rated values within 10 seconds, yet proposed SR 4. 7.1.2 only requires the DG to be "ready for loading" within 10 seconds and to achieve rated voltage and frequency as steady state values.

Response 14:

The wording of proposed SR 4.7.1.2 (Monthly DG Starting Test) requires the DG be verified "ready for loading in~ fa seconds"; the wording of CTS SR 4.7.1.a requires the DG to be demonstrated "to be ready for loading within 1O seconds."

Essentially, this part of the monthly testing requirement is unchanged and no revised wording is proposed. The proposed bases state that the DG will connect to the bus within 10 seconds; that is demonstrated by proposed SRs 4. 7 .1. 9 (LOOP w/o SIS) and 4.7.1.13 (LOOP w. SIS). These tests verify that the DG can support the miscellaneous 480 V loads listed in FSAR tables 8-6 and 8-7 as starting at 1O seconds. FSAR section 8.4.1.3 states: "The emergency generators are designed to reach required speed and voltage within 10 seconds after the receipt of a start signal." This statement describes a design feature, and does not constitute a testing requirement. In addition, the referred to "required speed and voltage" could be interpreted to be that speed and voltage necessary to actuate the voltage sensing relays or to be "rated speed and voltage."

The STS require that the each DG achieve a specified voltage and frequency within 1O seconds. That STS requirement was not proposed, and would constitute a new requirement for Palisades. As stated in the Bases for the proposed TS, DG start timing tests verify the time between the DG start signal and either the pickup of the voltag~ sensing relays (for monthly tests where automatic breaker closure does not occur) or between the DG start signal and breaker closure (for 18 month frequency LOOP and SIS tests where automatic breaker closure does occur). No installed instrumentation is available to determine the precise timing when voltage and frequency reach the band specified for steady state operation .

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 16 Comment 15: (Proposed SRs in Section 4. 7 .1, General)

The notes in the STS restricting the performance of certain SRs to shutdown conditions have been omitted. Please explain.

Response 15:

As noted below, a similar restriction was included for only two of the proposed SRs. The restriction exists in CTS for those SRs and was retained. Several of the SRs can only be performed when the plant is shutdown, and it was not considered necessary to include a restriction. Other SRs, which are not included in CTS, were felt to cause unnecessary or excessive operating limitations if the restriction were included in the proposed SR. Each STS Electrical Section SR containing a restriction against performance during operation is discussed below.

These notes appear on the following STS SRs:

SR 3.8.1.8, Automatic AC Power Transfer, SR 3.8.1.9, DG Largest Load Rejection, SR 3.8.1.10, DG Full Load Rejection, SR 3.8.1.11, Loss of Offsite Power, SR 3.8.1.12, DG Start on ESF Signal, SR 3.8.1.13, DG Auto Trip Bypass Verification, SR 3.8.1.14, DG 24 Hour Load Test, SR 3.8.1.16, DG Load Transfer to Offsite, SR 3.8.1.17, DG Auto Restoration from Test Mode, SR 3.8.1.18, Sequencer Timing Verification, SR 3.8.1.19, Loss of Offsite Power & ESFAS Actuation, SR 3.8.4.6, Battery Charger Test, SR 3.8.4.7, Battery Service Test, and SR 3.8.4.8, Battery Performance Test.

STS SRs 3.8.1.12 (DG Start on ESF Signal), 3.8.1.13 (DG Auto Trip Bypass Verification), and 3.8.1.17 (DG Auto Restoration from Test Mode) are not applicable to the Palisades plant because our design does.not include these features. These SRs are not included in the CTS, nor in those proposed.

STS SRs 3.8.1.8 (Automatic AC Power Transfer) is not included in the proposed TS for reasons discussed in the response to Comment 16.

STS SRs 3.8.4.7 (Battery Service Test) and 3.8.4.8 (Battery Performance Test) are included in the CTS as SRs 4.7.2.c and 4.7.2.d, and in the proposed TS as SRs 4.7.4.7 (Battery Service Test) and 4.7.4.8 (Battery Performance Test). The current SRs require these tests to be performed "during shutdown"; the SRs proposed in our December 27, 1995, change request included a note which states "These tests shall be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN."

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 17 STS SRs 3.8.1.11 (LOOP w/o SIS) 3.8.1.18 (Sequencer Timing Verification), and 3.8.1.19 (LOOP w. ESFAS) are included in the proposed TS as SRs 4.7.1.9 (LOOP w/o SIS) 4. 7.1.12 (Sequencer Timing Verification), and 4. 7.1.13 (LOOP w.

SIS), but since their performance involves actuating bus undervoltage relays, they would not be performed during plant operation. Similarly, STS SR 3.8.1.16 (DG Load Transfer to Offsite) (proposed SR 4. 7.1.11) involves disconnecting a 2400 volt safeguards bus from its offsite AC source, a test which would not be performed during plant operation. While the explicit restrictions are felt to be unnecessary, their inclusion will cause no operational difficulty. Therefore, they have been added to the proposed SRs to better emulate the STS.

STS SR 3.8.1.9 (DG Largest Load Rejection) and 3.8.1.10 (DG Full Load Rejection) (proposed SRs 4.7.1.7 and 4.7.1.8 respectively) involve DG load rejection testing. These SRs constitute new requirements for Palisades. The purpose of these SRs is to verify proper functioning of the DG governor and voltage regulator. If either of these components were repaired or replaced during online DG maintenance, the SRs would have to be performed to verify DG operability. If the subject restriction were added to the proposed TS, either replacement or major repair of one of these DG components would require a plant shutdown in order to perform the required post maintenance testing. Plant operating history includes occasions where the DG has tripped while paralleled to its 2400 volt bus which caused no significant disturbance to the plant distribution system. On September 17, 1991, the DG tripped, during testing, while loaded to 2400 kW, due to a intermittent voltage regulator response. The power factor. at the time of the breaker trip (on overcurrent) was less than 0.8. There was no disturbance caused to plant loads. The new SRs are proposed, but only without the restriction to limit the performance of these tests to shutdown periods.

STS SR 3.8.1.14 (DG 24 Hour Load Test) (proposed SR 4. 7.1.10) requires a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months load test of the DG. This SR constitutes a new requirement for Palisades.

At Palisades, a DG must be considered to be inoperable during periods when it is paralleled to the grid because there is no feature to restore the DG controls to the proper standby conditions. CTS allow making a DG inoperable for up to 7 days for performance of maintenance; there is far less impact due to paralleling the DG with the grid for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months than due to physically disabling a DG for maintenance for as much as a week. The new SR is proposed, but only without the restriction to limit the performance of this test to shutdown periods.

STS SR 3.8.4.6 (Battery Charger Test) (proposed SR 4.7.4.6) requires testing the station battery chargers. This SR constitutes a new requirement for Palisades.

The restriction on performance of this test during plant operation is not needed at Palisades, because the plant is equipped with two chargers for each battery, and only one charger for each battery is required to be operable. The test may be performed on the standby charger while the other charger is in service. The new SR is proposed, but only without restriction to limit the performance of this test to shutdown periods.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 18 Comment 16: (12/27/95 Proposed SR 4.7.1.7)

It was suggested that proposed SR 4. 7. 1. 7 be revised to require testing of manual transfer between AC sources as well as automatic transfer.

Response 16:

SR 4.7.1.7 was proposed to emulate STS SR 3.8.1.8 (Automatic AC Power Transfer). That STS SR encloses the functions to be tested in square brackets, indicating that the enclosed information is plant specific. The Palisades accident analyses does not take specific credit for either automatic or manual transfer of the safety related buses from one offsite source to the other. This STS SR, therefore, verifies a feature which, for Palisades, does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36 for retention in TS. The STS bases state that this test demonstrates transfer to the "immediately available" source ofoffsite power. In the Palisades design, power to the safety related buses is always provided by offsite power and fast transfer to a different offsite source is not relied upon.

There is no comparable requirement in CTS. Our current practice of testing the fast transfer to the Startup Transformer every third refueling outage has shown there to be no history of failures. There appears to be no reason to alter the current practice. The SR is therefore no longer proposed .

Comment 17: (Proposed 12/27/95 SRs 4.7.1.9 & 4.7.1.11) '

Proposed SRs 4. 7. 1. 9 (DG Full Load Rejection) and 4. 7. 1. 11 (DG 24 Hour Load Test) contain a power factor range of s 0.9. Does that value represent a bounding power factor for loads expected during DG accident loading? The specified value should bound the power factor expected during accident loading.

Response 17:

The proposed limiting power factor of 0.9 does not bound the calculated accident loading power factor. The minimum calculated power factor for each DG approaches 0.85. The proposed power factor has not been revised. The value proposed for the subject surveillance tests is in conformance with the recommendations of RG 1.9, Revision 3, which recommends a power factor of:-:;;

0.9 during the subject tests. In addition, a reduced power factor limit would be overly restrictive during testing; the DG rating limits the power factor to 0.8 and a testing requirement of :-:; 0.85, adjusted for instrument error bands, would restrict testing to a band of about 0.82 to 0.83. The DG load rejection tests and the DG 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months load tests constitute new requirements for Palisades. These new SRs are proposed, but only with the minimum power factor limit of 0.9.

The subject proposed SRs have been renumbered as SR 4.7.1.8 (DG Full Load Rejection) and SR 4. 7.1.1 O (DG 24 Hour Load Test).

Response to NRG Reviewers' Comments 19

Comment 18: (Proposed 12/27/95 SR4.7.1.9)

Proposed SR 4. 7. 1.9 (DG Full Load Rejection) contains a 4000 Volt upper limit for the voltage transient. This is a higher percentage increase than the +20% value suggested in the STS. Please justify this higher transient limit.

Response 18:

The greater than 120% of nominal (4000 Volt) limit is proposed because the subject full load rejection test must be performed with the DG paralleled to the grid. To achieve a specified power factor, the voltage regulator must be adjusted as the DG is loaded. Since Palisades has no feature to automatically return the voltage regulator control from parallel to isochronous, the voltage transient may (depending on grid voltage and power factor at the time of the test) be higher than a machine with such a feature. The proposed 4000 Volt transient limit is acceptable because the switch gear is rated at 4160 volts, the connecting cabling is rated at 5000 Volts, the DG is rated at 4160 Volts when we connected (and 2400 Volts delta), and the generator was wound with 5000 Volt insulation.

The subject proposed SR has been renumbered as SR 4.7.1.8.

Comment 19: (Proposed 12/27/95 SR 4. 7 .1.15)

Proposed SR 4. 7. 1. 15 limits the DG automatically connected loads to 750 amps at 2400 volts. This limitation is insufficient: without a specified power factor, to assure that the DG loads do not exceed the DG kW and horsepower ratings.

Response 19:

This SR was proposed to retain the intended meaning of CTS 4.7.1.d which states "Diesel generator electric loads shall not be increased beyond the continuous rating of 750 amp at 2400 volts." No surveillance frequency is provided. This item is included in the "EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTS" section of the CTS. It is believed that the intent was similar to that of the former CE STS (NUREG 0212) SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.9. The proposed wording was intended to clarify the intent of the SR without altering its numerical limits. There is no similar SR in the newer CE STS (NUREG 1432). It is proposed that this requirement be placed in the Palisades FSAR, and be deleted from the TS. The reference to SR 4.7.1.15 has also been deleted from the list of SRs required during shutdown in section 4.7.2, and in the Bases .

This change, deleting CTS SR 4.7.1.d, is classified as Less Restrictive.

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 20 Comment 20: (Proposed SRs 4.7.2)

The STS requirement of SR 3.8.2.1, that certain SRs from LCO 3.8.1 are applicable but do not have to be performed, has not been proposed. Please explain.

Response 20:

The CTS do not address the difference between an SR which is required to be met and an SR which is required to be performed. There are no instances within the CTS where that concept applies. The SRs which have been proposed for shutdown conditions are those which can be performed with only the required equipment available. For example, since paralleling a DG with the grid for load testing would make that DG inoperable, no DG load testing requirements have been proposed during shutdown periods (when one only DG is required to be operable, and the other DG might be disassembled for maintenance or inspection). If such a surveillance requirement were required, its performance would make the only operable DG become inoperable, therefore deviating from the requirements of the proposed LCO.

Comment 21: (Proposed SR 4. 7.4.1)

Proposed SR 4. 7.4. 1 (Battery Terminal Voltage Check) contains a minimum battery voltage limit of 123 Volts. Please review your battery information and provide justification for the proposed limit.

Response 21 :

The proposed value for minimum battery terminal voltage has been reviewed with our DC System Engineer. A revised value of 125 volts is proposed. That value is the nominal voltage for the battery, and an initial terminal voltage of 125 volts is sufficient for the battery to successfully complete the battery service testing and battery performance testing required by proposed SRs 4. 7.4. 7 and 4. 7.4.8 respectively (CTS SRs 4.7.2.c and 4.7.2.d).

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 21 Comment 22: (Proposed SRs 4.7.4.2 & 4.7.4.5)

Proposed SRs 4. 7.4.2 (Battery Connector Condition Check) and 4. 7.4.5 (Battery Connector Resistance Check) contain a maximum resistance limit of 120% of the value at initial installation. Specify, in the Bases, where these values are recorded.

Response 22:

The formerly proposed 120% of initial value limit was discussed with the manufacturer of the Palisades batteries. Their recommendation was that the 120% value be used as a maintenance guide rather than as a TS limit. If the TS limit is 120% of the initial value, as we had proposed, a connection which had an exceptionally low initial value might become unnecessarily limiting. Their recommendation was to use a maximum inter-cell battery connection resistance limit of 50 µohm and a 360 µohm limit for inter-tier and inter-rack connections.

The 50 µohm value is based on the minimum battery design voltage. Battery sizing calculations show the first minute load on the ED-02 battery as the load that determines battery size, hence, battery voltage will be at its lowest value while the battery supplies this current. Calculations also show that at a minimum temperature and end of life (80% battery performance), battery voltage during this first minute load will be about 1.815volts per cell, assuming nominal connection resistance. But if all the connections were at the ceiling value of 50 µohms, the additional voltage drop would result in a battery voltage of about 1. 79 volts per cell, which is still above the minimum design voltage.

The 360 µohm value is based on the nominal cumulative resistance of the components which make up the connections: resistance of the connecting cable, and for each end of the cable, the battery post to cable lug connection, the cable lug itself, and the lug to cable connection.

The Bases for each of these SRs has been revised to provide a discussion of the proposed resistance limits and a reference to the specifications under which the batteries were replaced (which contains records of the resistance readings measured during installation).

Response to NRC Reviewers' Comments 22

-* Comment 23: (Proposed SR 4.7.4.6)

Proposed SR 4. 7.4.6, Battery Charger Testing, only applies to the directly connected chargers required by the LCO, yet the proposed Actions take credit for the cross-connected chargers. How can the cross connected chargers be depended upon if they are not tested? Please propose appropriate testing requirements for all battery chargers.

Response 23:

The proposed SR has been revised to address each of the subject battery chargers. The proposed revision requires testing each charger each 18 months.

It is expected that the chargers will be tested using a resistor load bank. In addition, Charger testing has been added to the list of SRs required during shutdown by proposed SR 4. 7.5.1.

Comment 24: (Provided in response to another submittal, but pertinent to this TS change request as well.)

The classification of changes as "Relocated" should only be applied to those changes which move an entire LCO from TS to a licensee controlled document

under the guidance of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). For plants with "custom TS",

moving an entire LCO may be considered moving all requirements (LCO, Actions, and Surveillance) for the subject equipment. Changes which move only part of the TS requirements for the subject equipment to a licensee controlled document should be classified as Less Restrictive, and justified accordingly.

Response 24:

The classification of changes in the December 27, 1995, submittal was reviewed to determine if any changes had been inappropriately classified as Relocated.

These changes are listed on page 16 of the TS change request submitted on December 27, 1995. Changes 18 (Relocation of crane and heavy load requirements) and 23 (Relocation of the DG inspection requirements) were found to be inappropriately classified as Relocated, when using this new guidance.

These changes have been reclassified as Less Restrictive.

ML18065A911

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