ML17226A137

5 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 6, Tables 6.1-1 Through 6.7-1

ML17226A137
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	07/28/2017
From:	Entergy Operations
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Shared Package
ML17226A087	List: ML17226A095 ML17226A097 ML17226A098 ML17226A099 ML17226A100 ML17226A101 ML17226A102 ML17226A103 ML17226A104 ML17226A107 ML17226A108 ML17226A109 ML17226A111 ML17226A112 ML17226A113 ML17226A114 ML17226A116 ML17226A117 ML17226A118 ML17226A119 ML17226A120 ML17226A121 ML17226A122 ML17226A125 ML17226A126 ML17226A127 ML17226A129 ML17226A130 ML17226A131 ML17226A133 ML17226A134 ML17226A135 ML17226A137 ML17226A138 ML17226A139 ML17226A140 ML17226A141 ML17226A143 ML17226A144 ML17226A146 ML18188A001 ML18188A002 ML18188A003 ML18188A004 ML18188A005 RBG-47776, 5 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Index
References
RBG-47776, RBF1-17-0089
Download: ML17226A137 (134)

Text

RBS USAR TABLE 6.1-1 PRINCIPAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT MATERIALS (NON-NSSS SCOPE OF SUPPLY) 1 of 1 August 1987 Specification Component Form Material (ASTM/ASME)

ECCS Piping Pipe Carbon steel SA-106, Gr. B Pipe Stainless steel SA-312, Gr. TP304 Fittings Forgings Carbon steel SA-234, Gr. WPB Forgings Stainless steel SA-403, WP304 Valves Castings Carbon steel SA-216, Gr. WCB Castings Stainless steel SA-351, Gr. CF8 Containment Containment Plate Carbon steel SA-264 made shell around with stainless from SA-240, suppression clad Type 304L and pool SA-516, Gr. 70 Containment Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 70 shell Floor liner Plate Stainless steel SA-240, Type 304L for suppres-sion pool Balance of Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 60 floor liner Penetrations Forgings Carbon steel SA-508, Class 1 (Code Case 1332-6) carbon limited to 0.30% max Forgings Stainless steel SA-182, Gr. F304 Pipe Stainless steel SA-312, Gr. TP304 Pipe Carbon steel SA-333, Gr. 6 Standby Pipe Stainless steel SA-312, Gr. TP304L liquid or TP 316L control injection line

RBS USAR 1 of 2 August 1987 TABLE 6-1.2 PRINCIPAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT MATERIALS (NSSS SCOPE OF SUPPLY)

Specification Component Form Material (ASTM/ASME)

RHR heat exchanger Shell, head and channel Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 70 Tubesheet Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 70 Tubesheet-cladding on Cladding Weld deposit 7030 Cu-Ni channel side Nozzles - shell inlet Forgings Carbon steel SA-350, Gr. LF2 and outlet Nozzles-channel inlet Forgings Carbon steel SA-105 and outlet Flanges - shell side Forgings Carbon steel SA-350, Gr. LF2 Flanges - channel side Forgings Carbon steel SA-105 Tubes Tubing 7030 Cu-Ni SB-395, Alloy 715 Bolts Bar Low alloy steel SA-193, Gr. B7 Nuts Forgings Low alloy steel SA-194, Gr. 7 RHR, HPCS, and LPCS pumps Bowl assembly Casting Carbon steel SA-216, Gr. WCB Discharge head shell Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 70 Discharge head cover Forging Carbon steel SA-105 Suction barrel shell Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 70 and dished head Flanges Forging Carbon steel SA-105 Pipe (RHR, LPCS pumps)

Pipe Carbon steel SA-106, Gr. B Pipe (HPCS pump)

Plate Carbon steel SA-516, Gr. 70 Shaft Bar Stainless steel A-276, Type 410, Cond. H Impeller Casting Stainless steel A-351, Gr. CA6NM Studs Bar Low alloy steel SA-193, Gr. B7 Nuts Forgings Low alloy steel SA-194, Gr. 7 Cyclone separator body Bar Stainless steel SA-479, Type 304 and cover HPCS valves Body, bonnet, and disc Casting Carbon steel SA-216, Gr. WCB Stem Bar Stainless steel A-479, Type 410 Studs Bar Alloy steel SA-193, Gr. B7 Nuts Forgings Carbon steel SA-194, Gr. 2H Standby liquid control pump Fluid cylinder Forging Stainless steel SA-182, Gr. F304

RBS USAR TABLE 6.1-2 (Cont) 2 of 2 August 1987 Specification Component Form Material (ASTM/ASME)

Cylinder head, valve Plate Stainless steel SA-240, Type 304 cover, and stuffing box flange plate Cylinder head exten-Bar Stainless steel SA-479, Type 304 sion, valve stop, and stuffing box Stuffing box gland Forging Nickel Alloy SA-564, Type 630, Cond. 1100 Plungers Forgings Nickel Alloy A-564, Type 630, Cond. 1100 Studs Bar Alloy steel SA-193, Gr. B7 Nuts Forging Alloy steel SA-194, Gr. 7 Discharge and Forgings Alloy steel SA-193, Gr. B7 suction flange head capscrews Standby liquid control storage tank Tank Plate Stainless steel SA-240, Type 304 Fittings Forgings Stainless steel SA-182, Type F304 Pipe Pipe Stainless steel SA-312, Gr. TP 304 Welds Elect-Stainless steel SFA 5.4 & 5.9, rodes Types 308, 308L, 316, 316L Control rod velocity limiter Casting Stainless steel A351, Gr. CF8

RBS USAR TABLE 6.1-3 COATINGS USED WITHIN THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Revision 7 1 of 2 January 1995 A.

Qualified Approximate Amount(4)

Substrate Type of Coating (lb)

Carbon steel surfaces Prime coat Inorganic zinc primer(1) 10,435(2)

Seal coat Catalyzed epoxy enamel(3) 1,200 Finish coat Catalyzed epoxy enamel 21,921 Concrete - Flat surfaces 2 Finish coats Catalyzed epoxy enamel 2,545 Concrete - formed surfaces Rebinder Epoxy curing compound 517 Surfacer Catalyzed epoxy surfacer 18,010 Finish coat Catalyzed epoxy enamel 6,053 B.

Unqualified Square Footage Item Type of Coating (ft 2)

Miscellaneous Epoxy enamel; 8,000 equipment surfaces other(5) with 2 mil such as electrical DFT maximum cabinets, etc Miscellaneous Epoxy base 1,800 embedments, (primer only) with 6 mil structural steel, DFT maximum piping, etc Polar crane Inorganic Zinc 200 scissors lift with 6 mil platform DFT maximum

• 7 Drywell Ceiling(6)

Epoxy primer, 4000 Liner Plate and Epoxy topcoat Drywell Head Lower Barrel 7*

RBS USAR TABLE TABLE 6.1-3 (Cont)

Revision 8 1a of 2 August 1996 8*

Square Footage Item Type of Coating (ft 2)

Miscellaneous site Epoxy and other 2,000 applied and vendor polyurethane supplied surfaces primers and such as structural topcoats steel, piping, electrical cabinets, and other equipment(7) 8*

RBS USAR TABLE TABLE 6.1-3 (Cont)

Revision 8 2 of 2 August 1996 (1) Carbon steel inside drywell and polar crane is primed with catalyzed epoxy primer.

(2) Includes only epoxy primer.

(3) Seal coat is applied on inorganic zinc primer only.

(4) These amounts are conservative estimates since they are based on maximum dry film thickness (DFT).

(5) See discussion in Section 6.1.2.2.

• 7 (6) Protective coatings covering the Drywell Ceiling Liner Plate and Drywell Head Lower Barrel are unqualified.

7* *8 (7) Protective coatings under this heading are added inside containment after construction.

Any single installation is limited to 500 square feet.

8*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.1-4 OTHER ORGANIC MATERIALS USED WITHIN THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 1 of 1 August 1987 Approximate No.

Item Material Amount 1.

Inside Drywell Motor electrical Polyester varnish 158 lb insulation Penetration sealing Silicon foam 1,431 lb compound Hydraulic oil Petroleum base 80 gal Lubricating oil Petroleum base 60 gal 2.

Outside Drywell Motor electrical Polyester varnish 143 lb insulation 3.

Electrical cable insulation and jacket EPR, Hypalon, 37,419 lb material (approximate-cross-linked ly 10 percent inside polyethylene, drywell and 90 percent neoprene outside drywell)

RBS USAR TABLE 6.1-5 INFORMATION ON ORGANIC CABLE INSULATION MATERIAL INSIDE THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT(1)

Cable Surface Organic Representative Material(2)

Area Volume Organic Cable Insulation/Jacket (ft)

(ft)

Weight (lb)

Diameter(in)

(1) Quantities are approximate.

(2) EPR -

Ethylene Propylene Rubber HYP -

Hypalon XLPE - Cross-linked Polyethylene NEOP - Neoprene 1 of 1 August 1987 EPR/HYP 19,890 227 22,810 0.70 XLPE/NEOP 17,240 132 11,810 0.40 XLPE/HYP 2,830 33 2,800 0.55

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-1 CONTAINMENT DESIGN PARAMETERS

11 (1) The values used for containment portion volume (versus the drywell portion) of the suppression pool in the containment analyses did not have an allowance for water displacement due to submerged equipment (e.g., structure, strainers, quenchers, etc.). The minimum/maximum values should be 122,614 ft3/127,854 ft3 corresponding to total suppression pool volumes of 135,500 ft3/141,000 ft3 which bound the as-built minimum/maximum suppression pool volumes.

11

Revision 17 1 of 1 A. Drywell

14 Internal (positive) pressure differential (psid) 25 External (negative) pressure differential (psid) 20 Maximum temperature (°F) 330 Net-free volume, min (cu ft) 236,196 Suppression pool volume including vents, min/max (ft) 12,654/13,066 B. Containment

11 Internal (positive) pressure (psig) 15 External (negative) pressure differential (psig) 0.60 Maximum temperature (°F) 185 Net-free volume, including wetwell air, min (cu ft) 1,191,590 Wetwell air volume, min (cu ft) 128,160 Suppression pool volume, min/max (cu ft) 122,846/127,930(1)

Suppression pool makeup volume (cu ft) 0 Suppression pool surface area (sq ft) 6,408 Suppression pool depth, min/max (ft) 19.5/20.0 Leak rate, L (%/day @ psig) 0.325/7.6 Hydraulic control unit floor flow restriction

(% restricted) 75 11

C. Vent System Number of vents (per row/total) 43/129 Vent diameter (ft) 2.2917 Net-free vent area (sq ft) 532 Vent centerline submergence, min/max (ft)

Top row 7.28/7.28 Middle row 12.28/12.78 Bottom row 17.28/17.78 Vent loss coefficients (fl/d)

Vent clearing Top row 2.5 Middle row 2.0 Bottom row 1.5 Vent flow 3.5 Drywell wall to weir wall distance (ft) 2.5 Net drywell weir annulus cross-sectional area (sq ft) 522.3 14

Revision 9 1 of 1 November 1997 RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-2 ENGINEERED SAFTY FEATURES SYSTEMS INFORMATION Value Used in Design Containment Analysis Value Normal ESF Minimum ESF A. Suppression Pool Cooling Mode (RHR)

Number of RHR pumps 2

2 1

Capacity per pump (gpm) 5,050 5,050 5,050 Number of heat exchangers 2

2 1

Heat exchanger type Inverted U-tube, single-pass shell, multi-pass tube, vertical mounting Heat transfer "K" factor per heat exchanger (Btu/sec-°F) 390 390 390

• 9 Standby service water flow rate (tube side) per heat exchanger (gpm)*

5,800 5,800 5,800 9*

Standby service water temperature (min/max) (°F) 40/95 95 95 Initiation time after LOCA (sec)

Manual 1,800 1,800 B. Containment Unit (Fan) Coolers Number of safety-related containment unit coolers 2

2 1

Air-side flow rate per containment unit cooler (cfm) 50,000 50,000 50,000 Standby service water flow rate (tube side) per containment unit cooler (gpm) 540 540 540 Standby service water temperature (min/max) (°F) 40/95 95 95 Heat transfer area (inside tube) per containment unit cooler (sq ft) 1,752 1,752 1,752 Initiation time after LOCA (sec)

Automatic 1,800 1,800 Heat transfer coefficient Btu/hr-sq ft-°F 120 120 295 365 400 410 410 Steam mole fraction 0.0 0.025 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 1.0

• 9

• The SSW flow through the RHR Heat Exchangers will be throttled to 3000 gpm when the SCT water level drops to an elevation of 90 ft following a LOP-LOCA 9*

RBS USAR High Water Level (HWL) and Low Water Level (LWL)

11

• • The values used for containment portion volume (versus the drywell portion) of the suppression pool in the containment analyses did not have an allowance for water displacement due to submerged equipment (e.g., structure, strainers, quenchers, etc.). The minimum/maximum values should be 122,614 ft 3/127,854 ft 3 corresponding to total suppression pool volumes of 135,500 ft 3/141,000 ft 3 which bound the as-built minimum/maximum suppression pool volumes.

14

• • • For the Short-term DBA-LOCA analysis with the M3CPT code, the containment initial airspace temperature is assumed to be equal to the initial suppression pool temperature of 100 F. This is since the M3CPT calculation assumes thermal equilibrium conditions in the containment.

11 14

Revision 17 1 of 1 TABLE 6.2-3 INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSES A.

Reactor Coolant System

14 Reactor power level, 100.3% rated thermal (MWt) 3,100 Average coolant pressure (psia) 1,072 Average coolant temperature (°F) 553 Total Mass of reactor coolant system liquid (lbm) 441,400 Total Mass of reactor coolant system steam (lbm) 18,360 Total Volume of liquid in reactor coolant system (cu ft) 9,644 Total Volume of steam in reactor coolant system (cu ft) 7,758 Volume of liquid in recirculation loops (cu ft) 580 Volume of steam in steam lines (cu ft) 1,221 B.

Drywell Pressure (psig) 0 Air temperature (°F) 145 Relative humidity (%)

50 C.

Containment

11 Pressure (psig) 0 Air temperature (°F) 90 ***

Relative humidity (%)

50 Suppression pool water temperature (°F) 100 Suppression pool water volume (cu ft)**

HWL* for maximum short-term response 127,934 LWL* for maximum long-term response 122,846 Top vent centerline submergence, HWL/LWL (ft) 7.78/7.28 11 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-3a ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1 of 1 August 1987 Drywell Pressure (psig) 0.0 to 1.5 Pressure Differential(1) (psid)

-0.3 to 1.2 Average Air Temperature (°F) 100 to 145 Relative Humidity (%)

8(2) to 100 Dew Point Temperature (°F) 60 to 145 Containment Pressure (psig)

-0.3 to

+0.3 Average Air Temperature (°F) 70 to 100 Relative Humidity (%)

27(2) to 100 Dew Point Temperature (°F) 60 to 100 (1) Drywel1 pressure differential is defined as drywell pressure minus containment pressure (2) Minimum relative humidity corresponds to minimum dew point temperature and maximum average air temperature

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-4

• 14 BLOWDOWN DATA MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (SHORT-TERM, 0-30 SEC, M3CPT)

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 Reactor Coolant Blowdown Mass Blowdown System Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Pressure (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(Btu/lbm)

(psia) 0 8516 1190.0 1072 0.003906 8513 1190.0 1072 0.005 9937 1190.0 1072 0.113 9857 1191.0 1064 0.204 9799 1191.0 1058 0.205 7074 1191.0 1057 0.501 6970 1191.0 1043 0.704 6898 1192.0 1033 0.919 6824 1192.0 1022 0.997 6796 1192.0 1018 1.005 23915 568.6 1017 1.036 23909 568.7 1017 1.249 23838 568.9 1015 1.499 23751 569.2 1012 2.019 23560 569.6 1004 2.597 23341 570.0 996 3.003 23207 570.5 991 4.003 22871 572.7 982 5.065 19920 576.2 980 5.097 19774 576.3 980 6.097 17749 580.7 985 8.347 17303 591.6 995 10.347 16773 601.0 996 12.347 16104 610.4 987 16.347 14355 628.1 937 20.097 12362 642.4 849 25.097 9367 661.0 693 30.097 6518 683.1 525 14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-4a

• 14 BLOWDOWN DATA MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (0-1800, MINIMUM ESF, WITH FEEDWATER, SHEX)

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 Reactor Coolant Blowdown Blowdown System Time Mass Flow Rate Enthalpy Pressure (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(Btu/lbm)

(psia) 0 10040 1190.0 1072 0.171 7444 1191.0 1055 0.483 7013 1192.0 1033 0.952 6774 1193.0 999 1.09 23891 567.1 994 4.46 21777 569.5 950 6.09 17791 573.8 948 8.59 17315 580.3 942 11.1 16681 586.0 926 13.6 15905 590.0 897 20.8 13071 590.4 747 27.0 10438 575.9 581 36.7 7262 514.5 339 40.5 6456 488.9 277 106.0 4803 304.6 79.7 209.0 3120 222.1 30.2 218.0 3087 221.9 30.1 286.0 0

0.0 21.1 599.0 0

0.0 17.8 675.0 2396 201.9 22.1 777.0 2059 200.1 21.4 880.0 1489 197.9 20.5 974.0 0

0.0 19.2 1086.0 0

0.0 19.0 1166.0 1324 196.6 20.1 1242.0 1945 198.3 20.7 1354.0 1934 198.3 20.7 1473.0 2089 199.0 21.0 1593.0 1820 198.1 20.6 1718.0 1375 196.7 20.1 1800.0 1740 197.7 20.5 14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-4b BLOWDOWN DATA MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (LONG TERM, MINIMUM ESF, WITH FEEDWATER < SHEX)

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 Reactor Coolant Blowdown Mass Blowdown System Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Pressure (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(Btu/lbm)

(psia) 0 10040 1190.0 1072 10 3803 1202.0 712 103 650 1190.0 120 320 172 1164.0 30.5 401 99 1159.0 23.2 1800 2112 156.0 8.9 2014 791 166.5 11.2 4028 706 191.7 18.4 6101 676 190.1 17.8 8040 662 187.6 17.0 10017 695 186.1 16.5 20462 665 181.1 15.0 40781 677 169.1 11.8 60455 670 159.8 9.7 93699 677 147.7 7.5 200931 675 130.4 5.0 217223 690 129.0 4.9 400733 677 121.9 4.1 600712 670 115.2 3.5 1000000 678 102.3 2.5

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-5

• 14 BLOWDOWN DATA RECIRCULATION LINE BREAK (SHORT-TERM, 0-30 SEC, M3CPT)

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 Reactor Blowdown Mass Blowdown Coolant System Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Pressure (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(Btu/lbm)

(psia) 0 16210 531.4 1072 0.001953 16210 531.4 1072 0.002441 24360 531.4 1072 0.502 24350 531.4 1072 1.000 24290 531.4 1071 1.002 24290 531.4 1071 1.203 24270 531.4 1070 1.400 24250 531.4 1070 1.596 24230 531.4 1069 2.002 17840 553.0 1069 2.502 17830 552.7 1067 3.002 17840 553.0 1069 4.064 17950 555.0 1082 5.064 18060 557.2 1097 7.064 18280 561.6 1127 9.064 18490 565.6 1154 12.064 18730 570.4 1189 14.377 18870 573.1 1207 17.244 12164 733.0 1219 20.049 10682 745.2 1112 30.018 5481 786.1 644 14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-5a

• 14 BLOWDOWN DATA RECIRCULATION LINE BREAK (LONG-TERM, MINIMUM ESF, WITH FEEDWATER, SHEX)

Reactor Coolant Mass Blowdown System Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Pressure (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(Btu/lbm)

(psia)

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 0.0 21870 553.3 1072 11.2 17900 555.7 1087 37.5 10840 419.4 383 40.4 10410 410.8 353 109.7 6474 323.3 137 596 2122 165.7 11.0 1810 861 150.6 7.9 3568 667 194.8 19.5 6077 686 189.9 17.8 7181 687 188.3 17.2 9938 670 186.1 16.5 10058 667 186.0 16.5 19848 646 181.4 15.1 40396 676 168.9 11.7 98946 685 146.1 7.2 100149 666 145.8 7.2 123462 676 141.2 6.5 124697 683 141.0 6.4 200486 636 130.4 5.0 307304 691 122.3 4.1 308682 677 122.2 4.1 390000 697 117.2 3.7 14*

RBS USAR Revision 21 1 of 3 TABLE 6.2-6 PASSIVE HEAT SINKS 14 A.

Drywell Heat Sinks Sink No.

Sink Description Total Exposed Surface Area(ft 2)

Material(s)

Total Thickness Exposure A.

Steel beams and miscellaneous equipment 20,867 Paint Carbon Steel Paint 0.016 in.

1.248 in.

0.016 in.

1 1

B.

Gratings, handrails, ductworks 25,453 Paint Carbon Steel 0.016 in.

0.0784 in.

1 3

C.

Drywell roof 3,022 Paint Carbon Steel Air Gap Concrete 0.016 in.

0.375 in.

0.016 in.

5.0 ft.

1 3

D.

Drywell wall 2,322 Paint Carbon Steel Air Gap Concrete 0.016 in.

0.375 in.

0.016 in.

5.0 ft.

1 3

E.

Drywell wall 10,809 Paint Carbon Steel Air Gap Concrete Paint 0.016 in.

0.375 in.

0.016 in.

5.0 ft.

0.016 in.

1 2

F.

Primary shield wall 3,685 Paint Carbon Steel Air Gap Concrete 0.016 in.

0.375 in.

0.016 in.

2.0 ft.

1 1

G.

Reactor pedestal 2,328 Paint Carbon Steel Air Gap Concrete 0.016 in.

0.375 in.

0.016 in.

4.6041 ft 1

1

• Exposure 1 = Drywell atmosphere 2 = Containment atmosphere 3 = Insulated boundary 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-6 (Cont)

Revision 21 2 of 3 14 B.

Containment Heat Sinks Sink No.

Sink Description Total Exposed Surface Area(ft

2)

Material(s)

Total Thickness Exposure A.

Miscellaneous steel 4,942 Paint Carbon Steel Paint 0.016 in.

1.5 in.

0.016 in.

2 2

B.

Miscellaneous steel 247,692 Paint Carbon Steel 0.016 in.

0.221 in.

2 3

C.

Steel Containment 63,718 Paint Carbon Steel Paint 0.016 in.

1.5 in.

0.016 in.

2 3

D.

Interior wall and floors 4,325 Paint Concrete 0.016 in.

0.5 ft.

2 3

E.

Interior walls and floors 1,517 Paint Concrete 0.016 in.

.75 ft.

2 3

F.

Interior walls and floors 21,472 Paint Concrete 0.016 in.

1.0 ft.

2 3

G.

Interior walls and floors 9,357 Paint Concrete 0.016 in.

1.5 ft 2

3 H.

Interior walls and floors 7,232 Paint Concrete 0.016 in.

2.0 ft.

2 3

I.

Interior walls and floors 2,994 Paint Concrete 0.016 in.

2.5 ft.

2 3

• Exposure 1 = Drywell atmosphere 2 = Containment atmosphere 3 = Insulated boundary 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-6 (Cont)

Revision 14 3 of 3 September 2001 14 C.

Thermophysical Properties of Passive Heat Sink Materials Material Density (lbm/ft

3)

Specific Heat (BTU/lbm_F)

Thermal Conductivity (BTU/hr-ft_F)

Carbon Steel 490 0.11 26 Concrete 144 0.20 0.54 Paint 208 0.35 0.1667 Air 0.716 0.25 0.0155 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-7

• 14 *11 RESULTS OF CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS*

11*

NOTE:

The above results are combined results of the short-term and long-term minimum ESF analyses.

• 11 11* *14 (1) 20.68 psid at Technical Specification allowable initial conditions as described in Section 6.2.1.1.1.

(2) 9.3 psig at Technical Specification allowable initial conditions as described in Section 6.2.1.1.1.

(3) 21.34 psig at Technical Specification allowable initial conditions as described in Section 6.2.1.1.1 (4)

Drywell structural temperatures are significantly lower than atmosphere temperatures, and therefore, are within the design structural design limit of 330 °F. In addition, whereas the original USAR calculations of the calculated peak drywell temperatures modeled heat sinks, the values shown with current methods were determined with the GE M3CPTO5V computer code which does not model drywell structural heat sinks. With heat sinks modeled the peak drywell airspace temperature would also not exceed the design limit of 330 °F.

(5) 5.0 psid at Technical Specification allowable initial conditions as described in Section 6.2.1.1.1.

14*

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 Recirculation Line Break Main Steam Line Break Peak Drywell Pressure (psig) 20.55 20.69(3)

Peak Drywell Internal Pressure Differential (psid) 20.29 20.45(1)

Time of Peak Drywell Pressures (sec) 1.596 1.25 Peak Drywell Atmosphere Temperature (°F) 247.2 332.8(4)

Peak Containment Pressure(psig) 3.6 3.6(5)

Time of Peak Containment Pressure (sec) 11.7 13.7 Peak Wetwell Pressure (psig) 4.59 7.87(2)

Time of Peak Wetwell Pressure (sec) 2.50 2.47 Peak Containment Atmosphere Temperature (°F) 123.8 123.8 Time of Peak Containment Atmosphere Temperature (sec) 11.7 11.3 Peak Suppression Pool Temperature

(°F) 170.5 170.7 Time of Peak Suppression Pool Temperature (sec) 19772 19922 14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-8 Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 ENERGY BALANCE FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK 14 SHEX ENERGY DISTRIBUTION (Millions of Btus)

Time 0.0 sec 1.0849 sec 286 sec 1800 sec 20462 sec 100463 sec Heat Sources

1. Reactor Coolant 262.70 252.40 64.77 161.10 137.50 112.50

2. Stored Heat 2A. Core 11.88 11.84 4.54 4.49 4.12 3.33 2B. Vessel Wall (Total) 82.20 82.20 80.64 54.68 32.44 23.53 2C. Internals/Piping (Total) 74.16 74.16 71.04 38.73 39.82 30.07 Heat Sinks

3. Drywell Air 1.36 1.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03

4. Drywell Water Vapor 1.16 9.16 13.02 11.55 8.95 3.87 4A. Drywell Liquid Water Suspended in DW Airspace 0.00 0.13 0.29 1.11 0.47 0.33

5. Drywell Water on Floor 0.00 0.00 132.67 234.98 221.25 343.11

6. Containment Air 7.70 8.11 9.23 9.01 9.03 9.03

7. Containment Water Vapor 2.80 2.94 2.69 2.79 2.97 3.21

8. Suppression Pool Water in Containment 517.89 547.99 879.97 819.32 944.97 615.41

9. Drywell and Containment Passive Heat Sinks 198.50 198.54 205.11 210.39 215.03 217.94

10. Suppression Pool Water in Drywell-Weir Annulus and vents 42.21 13.89 43.77 59.20 113.92 154.61 Heat Inputs

11. Coast Down Heat (includes Fission Coastdown power, fuel relaxation energy, metal-water reaction, and fission product decay energy) 0.00 2.57 58.37 154.30 762.80 2406.00

12. Feedwater 0.00 1.58 253.60 253.60 253.60 253.60 Heat Outputs

13. Main Steam Line 0.00 4.44 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60

14. Containment Unit Coolers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 4.05

15. RHR-SPCM Heat Exchangers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 523.90 2554.00 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-9 Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 ENERGY BALANCE FOR RECIRCULATION LINE BREAK 14 SHEX ENERGY DISTRIBUTION (Million of Btus)

Time 0.0 sec 1.124 sec 302 sec 1809 sec 19848 sec 124692 sec Heat Sources

1.

Reactor Coolant 262.70 248.80 66.92 51.84 60.76 47.68

2.

Stored Heat 2A. Core 11.88 11.87 4.53 3.42 4.13 3.21 2B. Vessel Wall (Total) 82.20 82.20 77.72 60.17 36.57 22.94 2C. Internals/Piping (Total) 74.16 74.16 72.19 62.06 53.89 36.00 Heat Sinks

3.

Drywell Air 1.36 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

4.

Drywell Water Vapor 1.16 10.48 12.98 5.28 8.98 3.35 Suspended in DW Airspace 0.00 2.24 1.54 0.45 0.46 0.27

5.

Drywell Water on Floor 0.00 0.11 133.26 321.35 221.62 378.70

6.

Containment Air 7.70 8.01 9.22 9.00 9.03 9.03

7.

Containment Water Vapor 7.70 2.91 2.68 2.76 2.94 3.21

8.

Suppression Pool Water in 517.89 547.92 877.47 723.58 997.86 596.58 Containment

9.

Drywell and Containment 198.50 198.53 204.97 207.59 214.77 214.77 Passive Heat Sines

10. Suppression Pool Water in Drywell-Weir Annulus and Vents 42.21 14.06 42.21 158.39 119.68 160.75 Heat Inputs

11. Coast Down Heat (Includes) 0.00 2.65 59.63 154.80 746.80 2811.00 Fission Coastdown power, fuel relaxation energy, metal-water reaction, and fission product decay

12. Feedwater 0.00 1.63 253.60 253.60 253.60 253.60 Heat Outputs

13. Main Steam Line 0.00 4.72 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00

14. Containment Unit Coolers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 4.33

15. RHR SPCM Heat Exchanger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 503.60 3046.00 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-10 TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK NOTE:

The above results are combined results of the short-term and long-term minimum ESF analyses.

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001

• 14 Time Event (sec) 1.

Top row of vents clears 0.92 2.

Blowdown changes to two-phase 1.0 3.

Middle row of vents clears 1.23 4.

Maximum drywell peak pressure 1.25 5.

Maximum drywell internal pressure differential 1.25 6.

Suppression pool bubble break through 1.36 7.

Bottom row of vents clear 1.64 8.

MSIV closure starts restricting blowdown flow from the main steam header (Fig. 6.2-2) 4.5 9.

MSIVs are closed 5.5 10.

Containment peak pressure 13.3 11.

Initiation of HPCS 27 12.

Initiation of LPCI 37 13.

Initiation of LPCS 40 14.

Feedwater depleted 212 15.

End of blowdown 288 16.

Vessel is reflooded 492 17.

Weir annulus water level recovers above top row of vents 671 18.

LPCS and LPCI are terminated 1800 19.

Initiation of RHR-suppression pool cooling mode and one containment unit cooler 1800 20.

Suppression pool peak temperature 19922 21.

Maximum drywell-to-containment negative pressure differential 93000 14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-11 TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR RECIRCULATION LINE BREAK Time Event (sec)

NOTE: The above results are combined results of the short-term and long-term minimum ESF analyses.

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001

• 14 1.

Top row of vents clears 1.0 2.

Middle row of vents clears 1.33 3.

Peak drywell internal pressure differential 1.40 4.

Suppression pool bubble break through 1.43 5.

Drywell peak pressure 1.596 6.

Bottom row of vents clear 1.72 7.

Containment peak pressure 11.7 8.

Initiation of HPCS 27 9.

Initiation of LPCI 37 10.

Initiation of LPCS 40 11.

Feedwater depleted 212 12.

End of blowdown 300 13.

Weir annulus water level recovers above top row of vents 377 14.

LPCS and LPCI are terminated 1800 15.

Initiation of RHR-Suppression pool cooling mode and one containment unit cooler 1800 16.

Suppression pool peak temperature 19772 17.

Maximum drywell-to-containment negative pressure differential 125000 14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-12 BLOWDOWN DATA 4-IN RWCU PUMP DISCHARGE LINE BREAK CONTAINMENT HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS Revision 22 1 of 2 Upstream Side Of Break Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/s)

Blowdown Enthalpy (BTU/lbm) 0.0000 0.00 534.94 0.0001 555.75 534.94 0.6982 555.75 534.94 0.6983 248.99 534.94 9.9983 248.99 534.94 11.6137 0.00 534.94 Downstream Side Of Break Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/s)

Blowdown Enthalpy (BTU/lbm) 0.0000 0.00 477.19 0.0001 615.35 477.19 0.5934 615.35 477.19 0.5935 615.35 422.97 0.6538 615.35 422.97 0.6539 615.35 370.96 1.3002 615.35 370.96 1.3003 615.35 320.43 1.3683 615.35 320.43 1.3684 615.35 270.95 2.0555 615.35 270.95 2.0556 615.35 222.21 2.1543 615.35 222.21 2.1544 615.35 192.01 3.2603 615.35 192.01 3.2604 615.35 161.97 3.3379 615.35 161.97 3.3380 615.35 132.03 4.4691 615.35 132.03 4.4692 615.35 102.17 5.3928 615.35 102.17 5.3929 615.35 102.17 5.7522 615.35 102.17 5.7523 615.35 102.17 20.2489 615.35 102.17 20.2490 615.35 102.17 21.0381 615.35 102.17 21.0382 615.35 102.17 22.2143 615.35 102.17 22.2144 615.35 152.64 23.6307 615.35 152.64 23.6308 615.35 203.40 23.7158 615.35 203.40 23.7159 615.35 254.63 25.0702 615.35 254.63 25.0703 615.35 306.60 25.1509 615.35 306.60

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-12 BLOWDOWN DATA 4-IN RWCU PUMP DISCHARGE LINE BREAK CONTAINMENT HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS Revision 22 2 of 2 Downstream Side Of Break Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/s)

Blowdown Enthalpy (BTU/lbm) 25.1510 615.35 359.62 26.4239 615.35 359.62 26.4240 615.35 414.17 27.0482 615.35 414.17 27.0483 615.35 414.17 28.0213 615.35 414.17 28.0214 615.35 414.17 28.8546 615.35 414.17 28.8547 0.00 414.17

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-13 CONTAINMENT SUBCOMPARTMENT ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

(1) Model of complete (360) annulus (2) Model of half (180) of annulus due to summary (3) The RCIC head spray line has been deleted and the associated high energy line breaks are no longer possible. However this failure and information is being provided as the bounding conditions that were established as part of the original plant design and licensing basis.

Revision 21 1 of 1 Subcompartment Model Design Basis Line Break Tables Figures Analysis Program Nodal Description Vent Path Description Blowdown Data Nodalization Diagram Nodal Pressures Nodal Pressure Differentials RPV - Shield Wall Annulus 27 Node (1)

Feedwater 6.2-14 6.2-15 6.2-16C 6.2-38 6.2-39 6.2-40 THREED RPV - Shield Wall Annulus 25 Node (1)

Feedwater 6.2-17 6.2-18 6.2-19 6.2-41 6.2-42 6.2-43 THREED RPV - Shield Wall Annulus 26 Node (2)

Recirculation water outlet 6.2-20 6.2-21 6.2-22 6.2-44 6.2-45 6.2-46 THREED Drywell Head 2 Node RCIC head spray (3) 6.2-23 6.2-24 6.2-25 6.2-47 6.2-48 6.2-49 THREED RWCU Heat Exchanger Room 4 Node RWCU 6.2-26 6.2-27 6.2-28 6.2-50 6.2-51 6.2-52 GOTHIC RWCU Filter/

Demineralizer Rooms 4 Node RWCU 6.2-29 6.2-30 6.2-31 6.2-53 6.2-54 N/A GOTHIC

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-14 SUBCOMPARTMENT NODAL DESCRIPTION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 27 NODE MODEL (1)Nodal peak pressure minus pressure in Node 25 (Pi-P25)

(2)Assumed value to maximize pressure differential across the primary shield wall.

1 of 1 August 1987 Volume No.

Volume (cu ft)

Initial Conditions DBA Break Conditions Calculated (1)

Peak Pressure Difference (psid)

Temp.

(

oF)

Pressure (psia)

Humidity

(%)

% Break in Vol.

Break Line Break Area (sq ft)

Break Type Feedwater line 0.706 DER 1

131.16 135 15.7 35 0

3.40 2

102.88 135 15.7 35 0

11.88 3

102.88 135 15.7 35 0

11.90 4

131.16 135 15.7 35 0

3.29 5

132.4 135 15.7 35 0

5.51 6

104.56 135 15.7 35 0

16.65 7

102.33 135 15.7 35 0

16.57 8

130.17 135 15.7 35 0

5.27 9

519.93 135 15.7 35 0

4.25 10 519.93 135 15.7 35 0

4.75 11 521.87 135 15.7 35 0

4.54 12 521.87 135 15.7 35 0

4.11 13 155.37 135 15.7 35 0

4.08 14 155.37 135 15.7 35 0

4.14 15 157.32 135 15.7 35 0

3.88 16 156.76 135 15.7 35 0

3.89 17 522.66 135 15.7 35 0

2.56 18 1,043.74 135 15.7 35 0

3.27 19 314.07 135 15.7 35 0

3.81 20 944.50 135 15.7 35 0

4.15 21 533.14 135 15.7 35 0

2.28 22 1,050.07 135 15.7 35 0

3.13 23 310.73 135 15.7 35 0

3.65 24 944.50 135 15.7 35 0

3.93 25 237,629.0 (2) 135 15.7 35 0

0.0 26 57.01 135 15.7 35 50 34.60 27 57.01 135 15.7 35 50 34.60

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-15 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 27 NODE MODEL 1 of 2 August 1987 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description Of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Total Friction Turning Expansion Contraction 1

1 17 Unchoked 13.21 0.577 0.0302 0.0464 0.317 0.02 0.414 2

1 25 Unchoked 25.39 0.103 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.026 3

2 1

Unchoked 15.11 0.515 0.0235 0.0379 0

0 0.0614 4

2 25 Unchoked 19.75 0.132 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.0206 5

3 4

Unchoked 15.11 0.515 0.0235 0.0379 0

0 0.0614 6

3 25 Unchoked 19.75 0.132 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.0206 7

4 21 Unchoked 13.2 0.577 0.0302 0.0464 0.317 0.02 0.414 8

4 25 Unchoked 25.39 0.103 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.026 9

5 1

Unchoked 23.48 0.207 0.0209 0

0.00566 0.015 0.0416 10 5

9 Unchoked 17.51 0.512 0.0209 0

0.0963 0.07 0.187 11 5

17 Unchoked 11.81 0.573 0.0386 0.0409 0.371 0.05 0.501 12 6

5 Unchoked 15.11 0.515 0.03 0.0277 0

0 0.0577 13 6

10 Unchoked 14.89 0.542 0.0209 0

0.0493 0

0.0702 14 7

8 Unchoked 11.28 0.515 0.03 0.0277 0.0642 0.06 0.182 15 7

11 Unchoked 13.45 0.542 0.0209 0

0.22 0.2 0.441 16 8

4 Unchoked 23.48 0.207 0.0206 0

0.00566 0.015 0.0413 17 8

12 Unchoked 15.6 0.512 0.0209 0

0.149 0.14 0.310 18 8

21 Unchoked 11.81 0.573 0.0386 0.0409 0.378 0.05 0.508 19 9

13 Unchoked 19.16 0.532 0.082 0

0.0602 0.18 0.322 20 9

18 Unchoked 58.44 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0

0.01 0.0981 21 10 9

Unchoked 57.06 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0.00249 0.01 0.101 22 10 14 Unchoked 19.16 0.532 0.082 0

0.0602 0.05 0.192 23 11 12 Unchoked 56.53 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0.00345 0.01 0.102 24 11 15 Unchoked 20.54 0.532 0.082 0

0.0365 0.04 0.159 25 12 16 Unchoked 19.19 0.532 0.082 0

0.0596 0.05 0.192 26 12 22 Unchoked 58.44 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0

0.01 0.0981 27 13 19 Unchoked 18.24 0.720 0.0373 0.0346 0

0 0.0719 28 13 20 Unchoked 12.90 0.170 0.0249 0

0.388 0.21 0.623 29 14 13 Unchoked 12.24 0.480 0.0373 0.0346 0.108 0.12 0.3 30 14 20 Unchoked 12.90 0.170 0.0249 0

0.762 0.21 0.9969 31 15 16 Unchoked 15.01 0.480 0.0373 0.0346 0.0314 0.04 0.143 32 15 24 Unchoked 14.28 0.170 0.0249 0

0.739 0.18 0.944 33 16 23 Unchoked 18.24 0.720 0.0373 0.0346 0

0 0.0719 34 16 24 Unchoked 14.28 0.170 0.0249 0

0.739 0.18 0.944 35 17 18 Unchoked 31.21 0.307 0.0416 0

0.147 0.14 0.329 36 17 25 Unchoked 50.78 0.103 0.0416 0

1.0 0

1.042 37 18 19 Unchoked 39.74 0.266 0.082 0

0.0473 0.05 0.179

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-15 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 27 NODE MODEL 2 of 2 August 1987 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description Of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Total Friction Turning Expansion Contraction 38 19 20 Unchoked 38.27 0.108 0.0249 0

0.388 0.06 0.473 39 21 22 Unchoked 35.04 0.307 0.0416 0

0.0961 0.07 0.208 40 21 25 Unchoked 50.78 0.103 0.0416 0

1.0 0

1.042 41 22 23 Unchoked 38.32 0.266 0.082 0

0.0602 0.06 0.202 42 23 24 Unchoked 38.27 0.108 0.0249 0

0.388 0.06 0.473 43 26 2

Unchoked 15.11 0.291 0.0067 0.0379 0

0 0.0446 44 27 3

Unchoked 15.11 0.291 0.0067 0.0379 0

0 0.0446 45 26 6

Unchoked 15.11 0.291 0.0086 0.0277 0

0 0.0363 46 27 7

Unchoked 15.11 0.291 0.0086 0.0277 0

0 0.0363 47 26 25 Unchoked 5.64 0.462 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.026 48 27 25 Unchoked 5.64 0.462 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.026 49 26 10 Unchoked 3.03 2.242 0.0209 0

0.776 0.2 0.997 50 27 11 Unchoked 3.03 2.242 0.0209 0

0.776 0.2 0.997 51 6

2 Unchoked 19.75 0.266 0.0209 0

0 0

0.0209 52 7

3 Unchoked 19.75 0.266 0.0209 0

0 0

0.0209

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-16 BLOWDOWN DATA FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 27 NODE MODEL

• Due to symmetry in the nodalization, one-half of the tabulated blowdown mass and energy is considered in Nodes 26 and 27, respectively.

1 of 1 August 1987 Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/sec)

Blowdown Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)

Blowdown Energy Release Rate (Btu/sec)*

0 15,080 398 6.0 x 106 0.0138 15,080 398 6.0 x 106 0.01381 9,302 422.8 3.932 x 106 0.0198 9,302 422.8 3.932 x 106 0.0199 16,842 411.7 6.934 x 106

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-17 SUBCOMPARTMENT NODAL DESCRIPTION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 25 NODE MODEL (1)Nodal peak pressure minus pressure in Node 25 (Pi-P25)

(2)Assumed value to maximize pressure differential across the primary shield wall 1 of 1 August 1987 Volume No.

Volume (cu ft)

Initial Conditions DBA Break Conditions Calculated (1)

Peak Pressure Difference (psid)

Temp.

(

oF)

Pressure (psia)

Humidity

(%)

% Break in Vol.

Line Break Break Area (sq ft)

Break Type Feedwater line 0.706 DER 1

131.16 135 15.7 35 0

2.53 2

131.16 135 15.7 35 25 10.94 3

131.16 135 15.7 35 25 10.94 4

131.16 135 15.7 35 0

2.55 5

132.4 135 15.7 35 0

5.68 6

132.4 135 15.7 35 25 19.04 7

130.17 135 15.7 35 25 18.89 8

130.17 135 15.7 35 0

5.47 9

519.93 135 15.7 35 0

4.58 10 519.93 135 15.7 35 0

5.77 11 521.87 135 15.7 35 0

5.50 12 521.87 135 15.7 35 0

4.42 13 155.37 135 15.7 35 0

4.88 14 155.37 135 15.7 35 0

4.91 15 157.32 135 15.7 35 0

4.85 16 156.76 135 15.7 35 0

4.75 17 522.66 135 15.7 35 0

2.64 18 1,043.74 135 15.7 35 0

3.87 19 314.07 135 15.7 35 0

4.95 20 944.50 135 15.7 35 0

5.20 21 533.14 135 15.7 35 0

1.48 22 1,050.07 135 15.7 35 0

3.71 23 310.73 135 15.7 35 0

4.68 24 944.50 135 15.7 35 0

5.02 25 237,629.0 (2) 135 15.7 35 0

0.0

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-18 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 25 NODE MODEL 1 of 2 August 1987 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description Of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Total Friction Turning Expansion Contraction 1

1 17 Unchoked 13.2 0.577 0.0302 0.0464 0.317 0.02 0.414 2

1 25 Unchoked 25.39 0.103 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.026 3

2 1

Unchoked 15.11 0.575 0.0302 0.0464 0

0 0.0766 4

2 25 Unchoked 25.39 0.103 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.026 5

3 4

Unchoked 15.11 0.579 0.0302 0.0464 0

0 0.0766 6

3 25 Unchoked 25.39 0.103 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.021 7

4 21 Unchoked 13.2 0.577 0.0302 0.0464 0.317 0.02 0.414 8

4 25 Unchoked 25.39 0.103 0.0206 0

1.0 0

1.021 9

5 1

Unchoked 23.48 0.207 0.0209 0

0.00566 0.015 0.0416 10 5

9 Unchoked 17.51 0.512 0.0209 0

0.0963 0.07 0.187 11 5

17 Unchoked 11.81 0.573 0.0386 0.0409 0.371 0.05 0.501 12 6

5 Unchoked 15.34 0.570 0.0386 0.0409 0

0.0 0.0795 13 6

10 Unchoked 17.51 0.512 0.0209 0

0.0963 0.07 0.187 14 7

8 Unchoked 11.51 0.570 0.0386 0.0409 0.0623 0.05 0.192 15 7

11 Unchoked 15.60 0.512 0.0209 0

0.149 0.14 0.310 16 8

4 Unchoked 23.48 0.207 0.0206 0

0.00566 0.015 0.0413 17 8

12 Unchoked 15.6 0.512 0.0209 0

0.149 0.14 0.310 18 8

21 Unchoked 11.81 0.573 0.0386 0.0409 0.378 0.05 0.508 19 9

13 Unchoked 19.16 0.532 0.082 0

0.0602 0.18 0.322 20 9

18 Unchoked 58.44 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0

0.01 0.0981 21 10 9

Unchoked 57.06 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0.00249 0.01 0.101 22 10 14 Unchoked 19.16 0.532 0.082 0

0.0602 0.05 0.192 23 11 12 Unchoked 56.53 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0.00345 0.01 0.102 24 11 15 Unchoked 20.54 0.532 0.082 0

0.0365 0.04 0.159 25 12 16 Unchoked 19.19 0.532 0.082 0

0.0596 0.05 0.192 26 12 22 Unchoked 58.44 0.219 0.0324 0.0557 0

0.01 0.0981 27 13 19 Unchoked 18.24 0.720 0.0373 0.0346 0

0 0.0719 28 13 20 Unchoked 12.90 0.170 0.0249 0

0.388 0.21 0.623 29 14 13 Unchoked 12.24 0.480 0.0373 0.0346 0.108 0.12 0.3 30 14 20 Unchoked 12.90 0.170 0.0249 0

0.762 0.21 0.997 31 15 16 Unchoked 15.01 0.480 0.0373 0.0346 0.0314 0.04 0.143 32 15 24 Unchoked 14.28 0.170 0.0249 0

0.739 0.18 0.944 33 16 23 Unchoked 18.24 0.720 0.0373 0.0346 0

0 0.0719 34 16 24 Unchoked 14.28 0.170 0.0249 0

0.739 0.18 0.944 35 17 18 Unchoked 31.21 0.307 0.0416 0

0.147 0.14 0.329 36 17 25 Unchoked 50.78 0.103 0.0416 0

1.0 0

1.042 37 18 19 Unchoked 39.74 0.266 0.082 0

0.0473 0.05 0.179

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-18 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 25 NODE MODEL 2 of 2 August 1987 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description Of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Total Friction Turning Expansion Contraction 38 19 20 Unchoked 38.27 0.108 0.0249 0

0.388 0.06 0.473 39 21 22 Unchoked 35.04 0.307 0.0416 0

0.0961 0.07 0.208 40 21 25 Unchoked 50.78 0.103 0.0416 0

1.0 0

1.042 41 22 23 Unchoked 38.32 0.266 0.082 0

0.0602 0.06 0.202 42 23 24 Unchoked 38.27 0.108 0.0249 0

0.388 0.06 0.473

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-19 BLOWDOWN DATA FEEDWATER LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 25 NODE MODEL Blowdown Blowdown Mass Blowdown Energy Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Release Rate (sec)

(lbm/sec)*

(Btu/lbm)

(Btu/sec)*

• Due to symmetry in the nodalization, one-quarter of the tabulated blowdown mass and energy is considered in Nodes 2, 3, 6, and 7, respectively.

1 of 1 August 1987 0

15,080 398 6.0 x 106 0.0138 15,080 398 6.0 x 106 0.01381 9,302 422.8 3.932 x 106 0.0198 9,302 422.8 3.932 x 106 0.0199 16,842 411.7 6.934 x 106

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-20 SUBCOMPARTMENT NODAL DESCRIPTION RECIRCULATION OUTLET LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 26 NODE MODEL (1)Nodal peak pressure minus pressure in Node 25 (Pi-P25)

(2)Assumed value to maximize pressure differential across the primary shield wall.

1 of 1 August 1987 Volume No.

Volume (cu ft)

Initial Conditions DBA Break Conditions Calculated (1)

Peak Pressure Difference (psid)

Temp.

(

oF)

Pressure (psia)

Humidity

(%)

% Break in Vol.

Break Line Break Area (sq ft)

Break Type Recirc Water outlet line (See Table 6.2-22)

DER 1

94.0 150 15.7 20 15 12.39 2

104.62 150 15.7 20 0

4.34 3

104.07 150 15.7 20 0

4.87 4

104.62 150 15.7 20 0

3.58 5

104.62 150 15.7 20 0

5.19 6

93.97 150 15.7 20 0

5.69 7

157.04 150 15.7 20 0

5.69 8

157.04 150 15.7 20 0

5.18 9

157.04 150 15.7 20 0

5.63 10 157.04 150 15.7 20 0

4.1 11 157.04 150 15.7 20 0

4.43 12 157.04 150 15.7 20 0

5.36 13 294.25 150 15.7 20 0

4.41 14 344.45 150 15.7 20 0

3.98 15 347.6 150 15.7 20 0

3.70 16 347.6 150 15.7 20 0

2.79 17 344.45 150 15.7 20 0

3.1 18 345.61 150 15.7 20 0

3.68 19 177.12 150 15.7 20 0

1.13 20 172.84 150 15.7 20 0

1.51 21 175.06 150 15.7 20 0

1.41 22 175.06 150 15.7 20 0

1.57 23 172.84 150 15.7 20 0

2.06 24 177.23 150 15.7 20 0

2.38 25 118,824.0 (2) 150 15.7 20 85 0

26 51.327 150 15.7 20 0

11.11

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-21 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION RECIRCULATION OUTLET LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 26 NODE MODEL 1 of 2 August 1987 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description Of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Total Friction Turning Expansion Contraction 1

1 2

Unchoked 7.804 1.067 0.0201 0.0660 0.32 0.02 0.4261 2

1 13 Unchoked 16.884 0.613 0.0258 0

0 0

0.0258 3

1 14 Unchoked 7.804 1.36 0.0201 0.0660 0.75 0.02 0.8561 4

1 26 Unchoked 16.884 0.282 0.0258 0

0 0

0.0258 5

2 3

Unchoked 16.607 0.351 0.0248 0.0550 0.01 0.01 0.0998 6

2 8

Unchoked 12.172 0.641 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 7

2 14 Unchoked 13.670 0.987 0.0249 0

0.03 0.03 0.0849 8

3 4

Unchoked 15.262 0.382 0.0248 0.0550 0.02 0.02 0.1198 9

3 9

Unchoked 12.172 0.641 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 10 3

15 Unchoked 12.325 1.095 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 11 4

5 Unchoked 16.607 0.351 0.0248 0.0550 0.01 0.01 0.0998 12 4

10 Unchoked 12.172 0.641 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 13 4

16 Unchoked 13.670 0.987 0.0249 0

0.03 0.03 0.0849 14 5

6 Unchoked 16.607 0.351 0.0248 0.0550 0.01 0.01 0.0998 15 5

11 Unchoked 12.172 0.641 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 16 5

17 Unchoked 13.670 0.987 0.0249 0

0.03 0.03 0.0849 17 6

12 Unchoked 12.172 0.641 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 18 6

18 Unchoked 12.288 1.098 0.0249 0

0.05 0.05 0.1249 19 7

8 Unchoked 27.617 0.215 0.0264 0.0474 0

0 0.0738 20 8

9 Unchoked 27.617 0.215 0.0264 0.0474 0

0 0.0738 21 9

10 Unchoked 27.617 0.215 0.0264 0.0474 0

0 0.0738 22 10 11 Unchoked 27.617 0.215 0.0264 0.0474 0

0 0.0738 23 11 12 Unchoked 27.617 0.215 0.0264 0.0474 0

0 0.0738 24 13 14 Unchoked 50.167 0.116 0.0218 0.0716 0.01 0.01 0.1134 25 13 19 Unchoked 11.779 1.186 0.0693 0

0.07 0.07 0.2093 26 14 15 Unchoked 55.151 0.105 0.0215 0.0762 0.01 0.01 0.1177 27 14 20 Unchoked 8.95 1.741 0.0822 0

0.22 0.2 0.5022 28 15 16 Unchoked 58.365 0.099 0.0215 0.0762 0.01 0.01 0.1177 29 15 21 Unchoked 12.172 1.281 0.0822 0

0.05 0.05 0.1822 30 16 17 Unchoked 58.365 0.099 0.0215 0.0762 0.01 0.01 0.1177 31 16 22 Unchoked 12.172 1.281 0.0822 0

0.05 0.05 0.1822 32 17 18 Unchoked 55.151 0.105 0.0215 0.0762 0.01 0.01 0.1177 33 17 23 Unchoked 8.958 1.741 0.0822 0

0.22 0.2 0.5022 34 18 24 Unchoked 11.779 1.324 0.0822 0

0.07 0.07 0.2222 35 19 20 Unchoked 30.012 0.194 0.0229 0.0532 0.01 0.01 0.0961 36 19 25 Unchoked 16.491 0.636 0.0417 0

0.75 0.01 0.8017 37 20 21 Unchoked 26.593 0.219 0.0229 0.0532 0.02 0.02 0.1161

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-21 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION RECIRCULATION OUTLET LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 26 NODE MODEL 2 of 2 August 1987 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description Of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Total Friction Turning Expansion Contraction 38 20 25 Unchoked 13.072 0.803 0.0417 0

0.81 0.04 0.8917 39 21 22 Unchoked 26.593 0.219 0.0229 0.0532 0.02 0.02 0.1161 40 21 25 Unchoked 16.884 0.621 0.0417 0

0.8 0

0.8417 41 22 23 Unchoked 30.405 0.191 0.0229 0.0532 0

0 0.0761 42 22 25 Unchoked 16.884 0.621 0.0417 0

0.8 0

0.8417 43 23 24 Unchoked 26.593 0.219 0.0229 0.0532 0.02 0.02 0.1161 44 23 25 Unchoked 13.072 0.803 0.0417 0

0.81 0.04 0.8917 45 24 25 Unchoked 16.491 0.636 0.0417 0

0.75 0.01 0.8017 46 26 2

Unchoked 8.803 0.662 0.0297 0.1082 0

0 0.1379 47 26 7

Unchoked 12.172 0.507 0.012 0

0.05 0.05 0.1120

RSB USAR TABLE 6.2-22 BLOWDOWN DATA RECIRCULATION OUTLET LINE BREAK RPV-SHIELD WALL ANNULUS 26 NODE HALF MODEL Blowdown Blowdown Total Mass Blowdown Energy Effective Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Release Rate Break Area (sec)

(lbm/sec)*

(Btu/lbm)

(Btu/sec)*

(sq ft)

• Due to symmetry in the nodalization, tabulated blowdown represents one-half of the total blowdown.

15% of the tabulated blowdown is directed to Node 1 and 85% to Node 25 by the flow diverter door.

1 of 1 August 1987 0.0 12,129 528.0 6.404 x 10 6

2.675 1.6 12,129 528.0 6.404 x 10 6

2.675 1.61 10,146 528.0 5.357 x 10 6

2.238 2.0 10,146 528.0 5.357 x 10 6

2.238

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-23 (1)

SUBCOMPARTMENT NODAL DESCRIPTION 6-IN RCIC HEAD SPRAY LINE BREAK DRYWELL HEAD SUBCOMPARTMENT

• Nodal peak pressure minus pressure in Node 2 (Pi -P25)

Revision 12 1 of 1 December 1999 Volume No.

Volume (cu ft)

Initial Conditions Humidity

(%)

DBA Break Conditions Break Area (sq ft)

Break Type Calculated*

Peak Pressure Difference (psid)

Temp

(~F)

Pressure (psia)

% Break Vol. No.

Break Line 1

4629 150 14.7 50 100 RCIC 0.181 DER 7.96 2

231567 150 14.7 50 0

0.0 (1) The RCIC head spray line has been deleted and the associated high energy line breaks are no longer possible. However this failure and information is being provided as the bounding conditions that were established as part of the original plant design and licensing basis.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-24 (1)

SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION 6-IN RCIC HEAD SPRAY LINE BREAK DRYWELL HEAD SUBCOMPARTMENT Revision 12 1 of 1 December 1999 Vent Path No.

From Vol.

Node No.

To Vol.

Node No.

Description of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Vent Area (sq ft)

L/A (ft

-1)

Head Loss Coefficient Contraction Total Friction Turning Expansion 1

1 2

Unchoked 1.07 0.1267 0.001 1.29 0.999 0.492 2.78 2

1 2

Unchoked 2.64 0.1160 0.001 1.27 0.998 0.464 2.74 3

1 2

Unchoked 2.64 0.09 0.001 1.29 0.998 0.476 2.77 4

1 2

Unchoked 2.64 0.0848 0.001 1.29 0.998 0.478 2.77 5

1 2

Unchoked 2.64 0.077 0.001 1.29 0.998 0.482 2.77 (1) The RCIC head spray line has been deleted and the associated high energy line breaks are no longer possible. However this failure and information is being provided as the bounding conditions that were established as part of the original plant design and licensing basis.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-25 (1) (2)

BLOWDOWN DATA 6-IN RCIC HEAD SPRAY LINE BREAK DRYWELL HEAD SUBCOMPARTMENT NOTE:

(1)For this case, the mass and energy release is assumed constant until after the occurrence of the peak pressure difference between Nodes 1 and 2.

(2)The RCIC head spray line has been deleted and the associated high energy line breaks are no longer possible. However this failure and information is being provided as the bounding conditions that were established as part of the original plant design and licensing basis.

Revision 12 1 of 1 December 1999 Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/sec)

Blowdown Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)

Blowdown Energy Release Rate (Btu/sec) 0.0 407.25 1,191.0 4.85 x 10 5

10.0 407.25 1,191.0 4.85 x 10 5

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-26 SUBCOMPARTMENT NODAL DESCRIPTION 6-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM (1)Nodal peak pressure minus pressure in node 4 (Pi - P4)

Revision 21 1 of 1 Volume No.

Volume (cu ft)

Initial Conditions DBA Break Conditions Calculated (1)

Peak Pressure Difference (psid)

Temp.

(F)

Pres.

(psia)

Humidity

(%)

% Break in Vol.

Break Line Break Area (sq ft)

Break Type 1

13,250.00 103 14.7 0

100 RWCU (See Table 6.2-28)

DER 1.80 2

7,058.48 90 14.7 0

0 0.43 3

5,900.52 90 14.7 0

0 0.36 4

1,165,381.01 90 14.7 0

0 0.00

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-27 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION 6-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM Revision 21 1 of 1 Flow Path Flow Path Description Control Volume Description of Vent Path Flow (Choked/Unchoked)

Flow Area (ft

2)

Inertia Length (ft)

Loss Coefficient From To Forward Reverse 1

Horizontal Vent -

East 1

2 Unchoked 28.17 49.30 3.31 3.26 2

Horizontal Vent -

West 1

2 Unchoked 28.17 49.30 5.66 4.64 3

Gate RC147-G1 1

4 Unchoked 23.33 66.72 7.70 7.70 4

CV2 to CV3 2

3 Unchoked 192.26 34.15 0.61 0.42 5

CV2 to CV4 - East 2

4 Unchoked 162.83 44.78 1.68 1.68 6

CV2 to CV4 - East 2

4 Unchoked 162.83 44.78 1.68 1.68 7

CV2 to CV4 - Top 2

4 Unchoked 14.98 43.79 1.55 1.55 8

CV3 to CV4 - East 3

4 Unchoked 166.69 42.00 1.00 0.50 9

CV3 to CV4 - East 3

4 Unchoked 166.69 42.00 1.00 0.50

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-28 BLOWDOWN DATA 6-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM Revision 22 1 of 2 Upstream Side Of Break Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/s)

Blowdown Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)

Blowdown Energy Release Rate (BTU/sec)

Total Effective Break Area (sq. ft.)

0.0000 0.00 414.17 0

0.0000 0.0001 869.92 414.17 360,299 0.1810 0.9005 869.92 414.17 360,299 0.1810 0.9006 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 1.0299 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 1.0300 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 3.2021 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 3.2022 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 3.3385 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 3.3386 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 5.6101 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 5.6102 1111.50 414.17 460,353 0.0798 6.2612 1111.50 414.17 460,353 0.0798 6.2613 1111.50 414.17 460,353 0.0798 6.6982 1111.50 414.17 460,353 0.0798 6.6983 1111.50 414.17 460,353 0.0798 9.2591 1111.50 414.17 460,353 0.0798 9.2592 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 14.7241 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 14.7242 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 14.9231 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 14.9232 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 15.4345 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 15.4346 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.0609 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.0610 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.1039 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.1040 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.7162 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.7163 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.7710 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 16.7711 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.1514 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.1515 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.1892 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.1893 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.5471 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.5472 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.5806 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.5807 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.9092 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 17.9093 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 18.2583 1111.50 102.17 113,562 0.0798 18.2584 248.99 102.17 25,439 0.0207 27.5584 248.99 102.17 25,439 0.0207 29.1738 0.00 102.17 0

0.0000

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-28 BLOWDOWN DATA 6-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM Revision 22 2 of 2 Downstream Side Of Break Time (sec)

Blowdown Mass Flow Rate (lbm/s)

Blowdown Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)

Blowdown Energy Release Rate (BTU/sec)

Total Effective Break Area (sq. ft.)

0.0000 0.00 414.17 0

0.0000 0.0001 434.96 414.17 180,149 0.1810 0.8831 434.96 414.17 180,149 0.1810 0.8832 434.96 414.17 180,149 0.1810 2.2598 434.96 414.17 180,149 0.1810 2.2599 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 3.5962 383.68 414.17 158,912 0.0798 3.5963 0.00 414.17 0

0.0000

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-29 SUBCOMPARTMENT NODAL DESCRIPTION 8-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU FILTER/DEMINERALIZER ROOM Initial Conditions DBA Break Conditions Peak Relative

% Break Pressure Volume Volume Temp.

Pressure Humidity in Break Area Break Differential (1)

No.

(ft

3)

(°F)

(psia)

(%)

Volume Line (ft

2)

Type (psid)

(1) Maximum of either nodal peak pressure minus pressure in Node 3 (Pi-P3) or nodal peak pressure minus pressure in Node 4 (Pi-P4).

(2) Assumed value to maximize pressure differential across RWCU filter/demineralizer room.

Revision 19 1 of 1 xo6 1

2,163.2 105 14.66 0

100 RWCU (See DER 10.03 Table 6.2-31) 2 2,163.2 105 14.66 0

0 0.0 3

8,085.0 100 14.66 0

0 0.0 4

1,120,000(2) 90 14.66 0

0 0.0 6mx

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-30 SUBCOMPARTMENT VENT PATH DESCRIPTION 8-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU FILTER/DEMINERALIZER ROOM From To Description Vent Volume Volume of Vent Vent Inertia Forward Reverse Path Node Node Path Flow (1)

Area Length Loss Loss No.

No.

No.

(Choked/Unchoked)

(sq ft)

(ft)

Coefficient Coefficient (1) Indicates that the HEM critical flow model was enabled. Logic within the GOTHIC program determines if flow is to be limited to critical flow.

Revision 19 1 of 1 1

1 3

HEM Model Enabled 0.2500 13.665 1.953 1.927 2

3 2

HEM Model Enabled 0.2500 13.665 1.953 1.953 3

3 4

HEM Model Enabled 0.2500 14.125 1.500 1.500 4

3 4

HEM Model Enabled 31.500 31.917 4.742 3.642 5

1 2

HEM Model Enabled 0.1670 21.167 2.000 1.500 6

1 2

HEM Model Enabled 0.1670 19.917 1.500 1.500 7

2 3

HEM Model Enabled 0.2500 43.125 2.954 2.954 8

1 3

HEM Model Enabled 0.0884 15.110 1.800 1.800 9

2 3

HEM Model Enabled 0.0884 15.110 1.800 1.800 10 1

4 HEM Model Enabled 2.9200 24.710 5.480 5.480 11 2

4 HEM Model Enabled 2.9200 24.710 5.480 5.480

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-31 BLOWDOWN DATA 8-IN RWCU LINE BREAK RWCU FILTER/DEMINERALIZER ROOM Upstream Side Of Break Blowdown Blowdown Mass Blowdown Energy Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Release Rate (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(BTU/lbm)

(BTU/sec)

Revision 19 1 of 2 0.0000 0.00 102.1706 0.000 0.0001 2207.33 102.1706 2.255 x 10 5

0.0007 2207.33 102.1706 2.255 x 10 5

0.0008 4414.67 102.1706 4.510 x 10 5

1.0201 4414.67 102.1706 4.510 x 10 5

1.0202 1045.63 102.1706 1.068 x 10 5

6.1325 1045.63 102.1706 1.068 x 10 5

6.1326 713.76 102.1706 7.293 x 10 4

7.1970 713.76 102.1706 7.293 x 10 4

7.1971 713.76 145.9710 1.042 x 10 5

8.9932 713.76 145.9710 1.042 x 10 5

8.9933 713.76 159.4738 1.138 x 10 5

9.8319 713.76 159.4738 1.138 x 10 5

9.8320 461.87 222.0390 1.026 x 10 5

11.7308 461.87 222.0390 1.026 x 10 5

11.7309 417.23 271.0479 1.131 x 10 5

13.8693 417.23 271.0479 1.131 x 10 5

13.9133 371.91 310.5604 1.155 x 10 5

13.9134 371.91 362.9217 1.350 x 10 5

16.3242 371.91 362.9217 1.350 x 10 5

16.3243 371.91 391.0243 1.454 x 10 5

18.1178 371.91 391.0243 1.454 x 10 5

18.1179 266.05 333.7631 8.880 x 10 4

18.6180 266.05 333.7631 8.880 x 10 4

18.6181 266.05 409.1153 1.088 x 10 5

23.0400 266.05 409.1153 1.088 x 10 5

23.0401 266.05 448.2669 1.193 x 10 5

29.3749 266.05 448.2669 1.193 x 10 5

29.3750 75.11 534.9414 4.018 x 10 4

33.6048 75.11 534.9414 4.018 x 10 4

36.9679 0.00 534.9414 0.000

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-31 (Cont.)

Downstream Side Of Break Blowdown Blowdown Mass Blowdown Energy Time Flow Rate Enthalpy Release Rate (sec)

(lbm/sec)

(BTU/lbm)

(BTU/sec)

Revision 19 2 of 2 0.0000 0.00 102.17 0.00 0.0001 806.18 102.17 8.237 x 10 4

0.0098 806.18 102.17 8.237 x 10 4

0.0099 1612.35 102.17 1.647 x 10 5

0.1994 1612.35 102.17 1.647 x 10 5

0.1995 0.00 102.17 0.00 1.0 x 10 6

0.00 102.17 0.00

RBS USAR (1) A pressure up to -14.0 W. G. may result with two SGTS trains operating.

(2) A pressure up to -9.0 W. G. may result with two SGTS trains operating.

(3) A pressure up to -2.0 W.G. may result with two Fuel Building charcoal filter trains operating.

1213 Revision 14 1 of 3 September 2001 TABLE 6.2-32 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AND FUEL BUILDING I.

Secondary Containment Design 14 13 A.

Free Volume (ft)

1.

Annulus 357,400

2.

Auxiliary Building 1,160,000 12 B.

Pressure, inches of water gauge

1.

Normal Operation

a. Annulus

-3 to -14 (1)

b. Auxiliary Building Atmospheric to -9 (2)

2.

Post-Accident

a. Annulus

-1/2 to -14 (1)

b. Auxiliary Building

-1/4 to -9 (2) 1213 C.

Leak Rate Normal (cfm)

1.

Annulus 2,000

2.

Auxiliary Building 0

D.

Exhaust Fans SGTS ABVS APCS FBVS FBCFS

1.

Number

a.

Annulus (normal operation) 1 (post-accident) 1*

b.

Auxiliary Building (normal) 1**

(post-accident) 1*

2.

Type Centrifugal & Vaneaxial E.

Filters

1.

Number 1

2.

Type Charcoal adsorber (see Sections 6.5.1 & 6.5.3)

II. Fuel Building A.

Free Volume 742,000 B.

Pressure, inches of water gauge

1.

Normal Operation

-1/4 to Atmospheric****

2.

Post-Accident

-1/4 to -2 (3) 14 12

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-32 (CONT) 12 (1) A pressure up to -14.0 W. G. may result with two SGTS trains operating.

(2) A pressure up to -9.0 W. G. may result with two SGTS trains operating.

(3) A pressure up to -2.0 W.G. may result with two Fuel Building charcoal filter trains operating.

1213 Revision 14 2 of 3 September 2001 14 C.

Exhaust Fans SGTS ABVS APCS FBVS FBCFS

1.

Number Normal operation 1***

Post-accident 1*

2.

Type Centrifugal & Vaneaxial D.

Filters

1.

Number 1

2.

Type Charcoal adsorbers (see Sections 6.5.1

& 6.5.3)

III. Transient Analysis Shield 13 Building Auxiliary Fuel A.

Initial Conditions Annulus Building Building

1.

Pressure (in W.G.)

-3 0

NA

2.

Temperature (

oF) 120 122 NA

3.

Outside air temperature (

oF) 25 25 NA

4.

Thickness of shield building wall (dome is 2 ft) 2-6 NA NA

5.

Thickness of primary containment wall, nominal 1.50 NA NA B.

Thermal Characteristics

1.

Primary Containment Wall

a.

Coefficient of linear expansion (in/in oF) 8.4x10

-6 NA NA

b.

Modulus of elasticity (psi) 3.0x10 7

NA NA

c.

Density (lbm/ft

3) 490 NA NA

d.

Specific heat (Btu/lbm-oF) 0.10 NA NA

2.

Heat Transfer Coefficients

a.

Primary containment atmosphere to primary containment wall (Btu/hr-ft 2-°F) 307 NA NA

b.

Primary containment wall to annulus atmosphere (Btu/hr-ft 2-°F) 5.0 NA NA 14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-32 (CONT) 12 (1) A pressure up to -14.0 W. G. may result with two SGTS trains operating.

(2) A pressure up to -9.0 W. G. may result with two SGTS trains operating.

(3) A pressure up to -2.0 W.G. may result with two Fuel Building charcoal filter trains operating.

1213 Revision 14 3 of 3 September 2001 14 Shield Building Auxiliary Fuel 12 Annulus Building Building

3.

Net heat addition rate including heat removal 12 from safety-related unit coolers (Btu/hr)

a.

0 t 10 seconds 0

1.213x10 5

NA

b.

10 < t 12 seconds 0

1.309x10 6

NA

c.

12 < t 17 seconds 0

1.833x10 6

NA

d.

17 < t 30 seconds 0

2.273x10 6

NA

e.

30 < t 34 seconds 0

2.688x10 6

NA

f.

34 < t 40 seconds 0

2.750x10 6

NA

g.

40 < t 45 seconds 0

2.778x10 6

NA t > 45 seconds 0

0.0 NA

• On ESF or high radiation signal two trains are available; one is required for system operation.

• • During normal operation two trains are available; one is required for system operation.

• • • The Fuel Building analysis assumed an outside temperature of 95F which clearly demonstrated that the post-LOCA pressure response of the Shield Building Annulus was bounding. However, use of 25F for the Annulus remains bounding.

• • • • Fuel building integrity is only required during movement of recently irradiated fuel.

14

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-33 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OPERATION FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT Revision 17 1 of 1 General Type of Structure Steel vessel Internal Fission Product Removal System SGTS Free Volume of Primary Containment, cu ft 1,191,590 Mode of Hydrogen Purge To annulus (non-ESF backup system)

Time-Dependent Parameters Leak Rate of Primary Containment, Ld 0.325%/day before 24 hrs 0.179%/day after 24 hrs Effectiveness of Fission Product Removal Systems See Section 6.2.5 Initiation of Hydrogen Purge See Section 6.2.5 Hydrogen Purge Rate See Section 6.2.5

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-34

• 14 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AND FUEL BUILDING OPERATIONS FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 General Shield Bldg.

Aux. Bldg.

Fuel Bldg.1

• 13 Type of structure Reinforced Reinforced Reinforced Concrete Concrete Concrete Free volume (cu ft) 357,400 1,160,000 742,000 Annulus width (ft) 5 NA NA Location of fission product removal Aux. Bldg.

Aux. Bldg.

Fuel Bldg.

system El 141'-0" El 141'-0" El 148'-0" Time-Dependent Parameters Leak rate (cfm) 2,000 at 4,500 at 10,000 at (in. W.G.)

-3.0

-0.25

-0.55 Total recirculation flow (max) 50,000 NA NA Exhaust flow (cfm) 2,500 (max) 6,300(const.) 10,000 (max)

System pressure at exhaust flow (in W.G.)

21.5 21.5 18 Effectiveness of fission product removal systems Refer to Section 6.5 Refer to Section 9.4.2 Exhaust fan at full flow (sec) 48 48 18 13*

1The fuel building ventilation system is only credited in the mitigation of a FHA involving recently irradiated fuel.

The fuel building ventilation system is only required to operate during a DBA to maintain environmental conditions for safety related equipment in the building.

14*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-35 Revision 12 1 of 2 December 1999 CRITERION 55 - INFLUENT LINES, REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY(1)

Influent Lines Paragraph 1.

Feedwater 55.1 2.

HPCS 55.2 3.

RHR return to feedwater 55.3 4.

LPCS and LPCI

a. LPCI A line 55.4

b. LPCI B line 55.4

c. LPCI C line 55.4

d. LPCS line 55.4 5.

CRD system supply line 55.5

• 12 12*

(1)Refer to Fig. 6.2-63 and Table 6.2-40.

• 10 55.1 - The feedwater line is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary as it penetrates both the primary containment and the drywell to connect with the reactor pressure vessel.

It has three isolation valves and one guard pipe.

The isolation valve inside the drywell is a

simple check valve.

The guard pipe protects the primary containment from overpressurization in the event of a

pipe failure between the drywell and primary containment walls. Outside the primary containment is a testable (air-assisted to close) check valve.

Farther away from the primary containment is a

motor-operated gate valve.

Should a

break occur in the feedwater

line, the check valves prevent significant loss of inventory and offer immediate isolation.

During the postulated LOCA, it is desirable to maintain reactor coolant makeup from all sources of supply.

For this reason, the motor-operated valve does not automatically isolate upon signal from the reactor protection system.

However, this valve is capable of being remotely closed from the main control room to provide long-term leakage protection upon operator judgment that continued makeup from the feedwater source is unnecessary.

• 3 10*

55.2 - The HPCS line penetrates both the primary containment and the drywell to inject water directly into the RPV.

Isolation is provided by a

manually testable check valve located inside the drywell and a motor operated gate valve with remote manual 3*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-35 (cont.)

Revision 12 2 of 2 December 1999 actuation which is located as close as possible to the exterior wall of the shield building.

Long-term leakage control is maintained by this block valve.

If a

LOCA

occurred, this motor-operated block valve would receive an automatic signal to open.

During operation of the HPCS

system, the HPCS liquid temperature is low enough that primary containment overpressurization cannot exist if the line breaks between primary containment and drywell.

55.3 - The RHR return to feedwater is joined by the RWCU return line outside the primary containment to form a

common line with feedwater which penetrates the primary containment and the drywell to discharge into the RPV.

Inside the drywell is a

simple check valve.

For a

line break outside the primary containment, isolation is provided by this check valve and an automatically actuated motor-operated block valve located outside and as close to the primary containment as possible.

Long-term leakage control is ensured by this block valve.

A guard pipe between the primary containment and the drywell protects the primary containment from overpressurizing.

• 9 *3 55.4 - Satisfaction of isolation criteria for the LPCI mode of the RHR system and the LPCS system is accomplished by use of an automatic or remote manual motor-operated block valves and manually testable check valves where applicable.

These valves are normally closed with the block valve located outside the primary containment receiving an automatic signal to open at the appropriate time to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a LOCA.

Lines LPCI A and B each have a

normally closed motor-operated valve between the drywell and primary containment going to the refueling cavity sparger, and two normally closed manual valves on branch

lines, one going to the fuel pool cooling and purification

system, and the other coming from the condensate makeup and drawoff system.

RHR C and LPCS are equipped with pressure transmitters, E12-PTN058C and E21PTN050, which are located outside of the primary containment downstream of the outboard isolation valve.

The pressure transmitter instrument vent and drain valves are sealed closed.

3* 9*

55.5 - Isolation in the control rod drive supply line is provided by a

simple check valve on the line inside the primary containment and a

remote manual block valve (motor-operated valve) on the line outside the primary containment.

The supply line is not a part of the RCPB.

• 12*8 *3

• 3 *8 12*

RBS USAR 1 of 2 August 1987 TABLE 6.2-36 CRITERION 55 - EFFLUENT LINES, REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY (1)

Effluent Lines Paragraph 1.

Main steam 55.7 2.

Reactor water cleanup suction line 55.8 3.

RHR shutdown cooling supply 55.7 4.

Turbine plant miscellaneous drain 55.7 5.

RHR steam supply and RCIC steam supply 55.7 6.

Reactor water cleanup return line 55.9 (1)Refer to Fig. 6.2-63 and Table 6.2-40.

55.7 - The main steam line to the main turbine and condensate system penetrates both the primary containment and drywell and connects directly with the RPV.

The turbine plant miscellaneous drains connect to the main turbine and condensate system, penetrate both the primary containment and the drywell, and then inside the drywell, connect to the main steam lines.

The RHR steam supply line and RCIC steam supply line join together just prior to penetrating the primary containment.

For all of these lines, isolation is provided by an automatically actuated block valve inside the drywell and one just outside the primary containment.

For turbine plant miscellaneous drains inside the drywell, two motor-operated valves, one inside and one outside the primary containment, provide isolation, the latter capable of being supplied with air from the MS-PLCS during a LOCA.

Containment overpressurization is avoided by use of guard pipes around these lines between the primary containment and drywell.

For turbine plant miscellaneous drains outside the containment, a motor-operated valve and the MSIV inside containment provide isolation.

The RHR shutdown cooling supply line also utilizes the automatically actuated block valves and guard pipes.

55.8 - Since the RWCU is located between the primary containment and the drywell, the line taking suction from the recirculation system necessarily traverses the drywell wall.

An automatically actuated block valve inside the drywell and as close to the drywell as possible, and an automatically

RBS USAR 2 of 2 August 1987 TABLE 6.2-36 (Cont) actuated block valve inside the drywell and as close to the drywell as possible, and an automatically actuated block valve located outside the primary containment satisfy the isolation criteria.

55.9 - The reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) is located between the primary containment and the drywell.

The RWCU return line joins the RHR return line which then together inject into the feedwater system outside the primary containment.

Consequently, the reactor water cleanup return line penetrates the primary containment and is provided with an automatically actuated motor-operated block valve inside and outside the primary containment.

RBS USAR Revision 4 1 of 6 August 1991 TABLE 6.2-37 CRITERION 56 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PIPES THAT PENETRATE THE CONTAINMENT AND CONNECT TO THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE(1)

Paragraph I.

Influent Lines to Suppression Pool 1.

RHR Loop A test line 56.1

a. Test return line

b. RHR pump A min. flow bypass

c. RHR heat exchanger A dump

d. LPCS pump min. flow bypass

e. LPCS test return 2.

RHR Loop B test line 56.1

a. Test return line

b. RHR pump B min. flow bypass

c. RHR heat exchanger B dump 3.

RHR Loop C test line 56.1

a. Test return line

b. RHR pump C min. flow bypass 4.

Reactor core isolation cooling 56.2

a. Turbine exhaust

b. Minimum flow bypass line 5.

RHR heat exchanger A vent 56.3

a. Shutdown suction thermal relief

b. RHR A suction thermal relief

c. LPCI A discharge relief

• 4

d. RHR relief (2)

e. Vent line

f. RHR relief valve vacuum breaker

g. LPCS pump suction (RV)

h. LPCS pump discharge

i. RHR/RCIC condensate relief valve 6.

RHR heat exchanger B vent 56.3

a. RHR B suction thermal relief

b. RHR C suction thermal relief

c. RHR flush line thermal relief

d. LPCI B discharge relief

e. LPCI C discharge relief

f. RHR relief (2) 4*

g. Vent line

h. RHR relief valve vacuum breaker

i. Post-accident sampling liquid return

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont) 2 of 6 August 1987 Paragraph 7.

High pressure core spray 56.4

a. Test return line

b. Minimum flow bypass line

c. HPCS test return thermal relief

d. HPCS pump suction thermal relief

e. HPCS pump discharge thermal relief

f. Suppression pool pumpback system return line II.

Effluent Lines from Suppression Pool 1.

RHR pumps 56.5

a. Pump A suction

b. Pump B suction

c. Pump C suction 2.

RCIC pump 56.5 Pump suction 3.

LPCS pump 56.5 Pump suction 4.

HPCS pump 56.5 Pump suction III. Influent Lines to Primary Containment 1.

Reactor plant ventilation 56.6

a. Containment and drywell purge supply line

b. Containment hydrogen purge supply line 2.

Fuel pool cooling and cleanup discharge 56.7 3.

Containment and drywell H2 sample 56.10

a. Containment return IV.

Effluent Lines from Primary Containment 1.

Fuel pool cooling and cleanup 56.8

a. Suction line

b. Fuel transfer tube

c. Fuel pool purification suction

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont)

Revision 10 3 of 6 April 1998 2.

Equipment and floor drains 56.9

a. Equipment drain discharge

b. Floor drain discharge 3.

Reactor plant ventilation 56.6

a. Purge return line

b. Containment hydrogen purge outlet line 4.

Containment and drywell H2 sample A and B 56.10

b. Containment supply (1)Refer to Fig. 6.2-64 and Table 6.2-40.

• 10 56.1 - The LPCS and RHR lines have test isolation capabilities commensurate with the importance to safety of isolating these lines.

Each test return line with the exception of RHR loop C, has a normally closed motor-operated valve located outside the primary containment.

On lines having a

normally closed

valve, one isolation valve in addition to a water seal is adequate to meet the isolation requirements.

RHR loop C test return line has one normally open motor-operated valve and one normally open air-operated valve.

10*

The test return lines are also used for suppression pool return flow during other modes of operation.

Typically, pump minimum flow bypass lines join the test return lines downstream of the test return isolation valve.

The bypass lines are isolated by remote manual motor-operated valves.

The water dump line to the suppression pool for the steam condensing mode of the RHR system joins the RHR loops A and B test return lines.

These dump lines are isolated by normally closed automatic motor-operated valves.

The LPCS test return line and the minimum flow bypass lines combine prior to joining the RHR loop A test return line. The LPCS test return line is isolated by a

normally closed automatic motor-operated valve.

The bypass line is isolated by a normally open remote manual motor-operated valve.

56.2 - The RCIC turbine exhaust line which penetrates the primary containment and connects to the suppression pool for outboard isolation is equipped with a

normally

open, motor-operated, remote manual gate valve located as close to the primary containment as possible.

The gate valve in the

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont) 3a of 6 August 1987 RCIC turbine exhaust is designed to be normally open and is interlocked to preclude opening of the inlet steam valve to the turbine while the turbine exhaust valve is not in a full open position.

Inboard isolation is provided by the

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont)

Revision 9 4 of 6 August 1997 suppression pool water seal.

The RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line and the RHR relief valves vacuum breaker line have a

joint containment penetration and utilize the same motor-operated valve for outside containment isolation. Check valves are provided outside containment as vacuum breakers; no other device, such as motor-operated valves, can be used to provide containment isolation for the RHR relief valves because it defeats the purpose of the vacuum breaker (i.e.,

to ensure the operation of the RHR relief valves).

Additional outside containment isolation is provided for the RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line by a

second motor-operated valve.

• 9 The RCIC pump minimum flow bypass line is isolated outside containment by a

normally closed remote manual valve.

Inboard isolation is provided by the suppression pool water seal.

The valve remains closed unless signaled open on low RCIC flow plus high pump discharge pressure.

The valve will reclose on high RCIC

flow, closure of RCIC turbine steam supply valve or throttle trip valve, or manually from the MCR panel.

9*

56.3 - RHR heat exchanger vent lines to the suppression pool are also used to collect discharge from the thermal and pressure relief valves installed on the heat exchangers and various ECCS suction and discharge lines.

The vent lines are each isolated by a

normally

closed, remote manual motor-operated valve.

Connections to these lines from the various relief lines are isolated relief valves themselves.

The addition of block valves for isolation would defeat the purpose for which the relief valves are installed.

A connection to the RHR heat exchanger B vent line from the post-accident sampling liquid return is isolated outside containment by a

normally closed solenoid-operated valve.

Inboard isolation is provided by the suppression pool water seal.

56.4 - The HPCS test return line and the suppression pool pumpback system return line are isolated by a normally closed remote manual motor-operated block valve.

The HPCS pump minimum flow bypass line is isolated by a

normally

closed, remote manual motor-operated block valve. Connections to the test return line from various thermal relief lines are isolated by the thermal relief valves themselves.

The addition of block valves for isolation would defeat the purpose for which the relief valves are installed.

Inboard isolation is provided by the suppression pool water seal.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont)

Revision 10 5 of 6 August 1998 56.5 - These valves are remote

manual, motor-operated gate valves which provide assurance of isolating these lines in the event of a

break and also provide long-term leakage control.

In

addition, the suction piping from the suppression chamber is considered an extension of the primary containment since it must be available for long-term usage following a design basis LOCA, and is designed to the same standards as the primary containment.

• 10 The branch line from the RHR loop C suction piping to the SPC system is equipped with two automatically isolating air-operated valves.

These valves are considered containment isolation valves and are designed to ASME

III, class 2

requirements.

10*

56.6 - The containment and drywell purge supply line is isolated by automatic air-operated valves inside and outside primary containment, both of which are normally closed.

The purge exhaust lines have a similar valving arrangement with isolation valves inside and outside the primary containment.

The containment hydrogen purge supply line meets outside the containment just downstream of the containment and drywell purge supply line.

Isolation of this line outside the containment is by a solenoid-operated valve.

The containment hydrogen purge outlet line branches from the containment and drywell purge outlet line in the annulus.

This line is isolated by normally closed motor-operated valves.

56.7 - The fuel pool cooling and cleanup discharge line penetrates the primary containment and injects into the upper containment pool.

The influent line from the fuel pool purification subsystem also injects into the upper containment pool by meeting outside the primary containment with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup discharge line.

An automatic motor-operated block valve outside and as close as practical to the primary containment and a simple check valve inside the primary containment ensure containment isolation.

56.8 - The effluent line from the fuel pool cooling and cleanup and fuel pool purification systems originate from the upper containment pool and penetrate the primary containment.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont) 5a of 6 August 1987 Containment isolation is provided by motor-operated gate valves on either side of the primary containment.

The fuel transfer tube penetrates the primary containment from the fuel pool leading to the upper containment pool.

A containment isolation assembly containing a blind flange and a bellows which connects from the containment penetration to the assembly is provided to isolate containment.

A manual gate valve is provided to

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-37 (Cont) 6 of 6 August 1987 isolate the reactor building pool water from the transfer tube so the blind flange can be installed.

A guard pipe is also provided around this line from the containment pool through the primary containment.

A normally closed hydraulic-operated valve is used for isolation outside of the primary containment.

56.9 - Equipment and floor drains are collected in the drywell in sumps for both the drywell and containment drains.

The equipment drain discharge lines to radwaste are joined downstream of the drywell equipment drain sump and containment equipment drain sump.

The discharge lines penetrate both the drywell and primary containment and are isolated inside the primary containment and outside the primary containment with automatic air-operated valves.

The floor drain discharge lines are identically valved for isolation purposes.

56.10 - Hydrogen sample lines penetrate the primary containment boundary.

The four containment sample lines are isolated inside and outside the primary containment by solenoid-operated valves.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-38 CRITERION 56 - OTHER SYSTEMS NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE BUT DESIGNED TO GDC 56 CRITERIA (1) 1 of 3 August 1987 Paragraph I.

Influent 1.

Chilled water supply line 56.1.1 2.

Instrument air supply line 56.2.1 3.

Service air supply line 56.3.1 4.

Reactor plant component cooling water supply line 56.4.1 5.

Condensate makeup water supply line 56.5.1 6.

Reactor water cleanup pump discharge 56.6.1 7.

Fire protection header 56.7.1 8.

Service water supply line 56.9.1 9.

Main steam safety and relief valve air supply line 56.10.1 II.

Effluent 1.

Chilled water return line 56.1.1 2.

Reactor plant component cooling water return line 56.4.1 3.

Reactor water cleanup 56.8.1 a.

Discharge to main condenser b.

Backwash discharge 4.

Service water return line 56.9.1 5.

Post-accident sample supply line from recirc system 56.11.1 (1)Refer to Fig. 6.2-65 and Table 6.2-40

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-38(Cont)

Revision 10 2 of 3 April 1998

• 10 56.1.1 - The chilled water supply line to the containment unit coolers has one automatic motor-operated block valve and a check valve inside the primary containment.

The return line is isolated with one automatic motor-operated block valve inside and one automatic motor-operated block valve outside the primary containment.

56.2.1 - The instrument air supply to the primary containment is isolated outside the primary containment by one motor-operated block valve and a check valve inside the primary containment.

56.3.1 - The service air supply to the containment is isolated outside the primary containment by one motor-operated block valve and a check valve inside the primary containment.

56.4.1 - The reactor plant component cooling water supply line penetrating the primary containment is isolated by an automatic motor-operated valve and a check valve inside the primary containment.

Isolation of the reactor plant component cooling water return line is provided by two automatic motor-operated valves, one inside and one outside the primary containment.

56.5.1 - The condensate makeup supply line has one motor-operated valve located outside the primary containment and a check valve inside the primary containment.

56.6.1 - The reactor water cleanup pump discharge line to the primary containment is isolated outside the primary containment by one automatic motor-operated block valve and isolated inside by one automatic motor-operated block valve.

56.7.1 - The fire protection header to the containment is isolated by one motor-operated valve located outside the primary containment and a check valve inside the primary containment.

56.8.1 - The RWCU discharge line to the main condenser and the backwash discharge line are isolated by one automatic motor-operated block valve located inside the primary containment and one motor-operated block valve outside the primary containment.

10*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-38 (Cont) 3 of 3 August 1987 56.9.1 - The service water supply lines are isolated outside the primary containment by remote manual motor-operated valves and inside the primary containment by check valves.

The service water return lines are isolated by remote manual motor-operated valves inside and outside the primary containment.

56.10.1 - The main steam safety and relief valves air supply lines to the containment have one remote manual motor-operated valve for each line outside containment and a check valve inside the primary containment for each line.

56.11.1 - The post-accident sample supply line from the recirculation system is isolated by solenoid-operated valves inside and outside the primary containment.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-39 POSTULATED POST-LOCA LEAKAGE PATHS TO OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE (1)

Location of Bypass Interface with Name of Line Leakage Outside Atmosphere (1)See Section 6.2.6 for definition of outside atmosphere.

(2)The combined leakage rates for these lines are contained in the Technical Specifications.

Revision 10 1 of 1 April 1998

• 10 Feedwater (2)

Turbine building Service air supply (2)

Turbine building Condensate makeup water (2)

Outside Fire protection header (2)

Outside Instrument air supply (2)

Turbine building Reactor water cleanup (2)

Radwaste building system backwash Ventilation chilled water (2)

Radwaste building or supply turbine building Ventilation chilled water (2)

Radwaste building or return turbine building 10*

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES xo13 xo9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6)

ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE Revision 25 Page 1 of 12 xo16 xo12 IKJB*Z1A 55 MAIN STEAM LINE (21)

MAIN STEAM POSITIVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYS.

(21)

(21) TURBINE PLANT MISCELLANEOUS DRAINS STEAM STEAM CNDS/

AIR CNDS 24 24 2

1 1/2 YES YES YES YES N

N E

N MS-PLCS MS-PLCS SGTS MS-PLCS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1B21*AOV F022A 1B21*AOV F028A 1E33*MOVF008 1B21*MOV F067A INSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE NA NA NA 16-7 1/4 NA 4-4 11/18 GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE AOV(1)

AOV(1)

MOV MOV PISTON PISTON ELECT ELECT NA NA MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED FC FC FAI FAI AD, FG, H, RM AD, FG, H, RM Y, Z, RM AD, FG, H, RM 5

5 14.5 19.8 A, B A, B A

A 1KJB*Z1B 55 MAIN STEAM LINE (21)

MAIN STEAM POSITIVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYS.

(21)

(21) TURBINE PLANT MISCELLANEOUS DRAINS STEAM STEAM CNDS/

AIR CNDS 24 24 2

1 1/2 YES YES YES YES N

N E

N MS-PLCS MS-PLCS SGTS MS-PLCS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1B21*AOV F022B 1B21*AOV F028B 1E33*MOV F008 1B21*MOV F067B INSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE NA NA NA 17-5 1/8 NA 4-4 11/18 GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE AOV(1)

AOV(1)

MOV MOV PISTON PISTON ELECT ELECT NA NA MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED FC FC FAI FAI AD, FG, H, RM AD, FG, H, RM Y, Z, RM AD, FG, H, RM 5

5 5

19.8 A, B A, B A

A IKJB*Z1C 55 MAIN STEAM LINE (21)

MAIN STEAM POSITIVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYS.

(21)

TURBINE PLANT MISCELLANEOUS DRAINS (21)

STEAM STEAM CNDS/

AIR CNDS 24 24 2

1 1/2 YES YES YES YES N

N E

N MS-PLCS MS-PLCS SGTS MS-PLCS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1B21*AOV F022C 1B21*AOV F028C 1E33*MOV F008 1B21*MOV F067C INSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE NA NA NA 17-5 1/8 NA 4-4 11/18 GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE AOV(1)

AOV(1)

MOV MOV PISTON PISTON ELECT ELECT NA NA MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED FC FC FAI FAI AD, FG, H, RM AD, FG, H, RM Y, Z, RM AD, FG, H, RM 5

5 NA 19.8 A, B A, B A

A IKJB*Z1D xo14 55 MAIN STEAM LINE (21)

MAIN STEAM POSITIVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYS.

(21)

TURBINE PLANT MISCELLANEOUS DRAINS (21)

STEAM STEAM CNDS/

AIR CNDS 24 24 2

1 1/2 YES YES YES YES N

N E

N MS-PLCS MS-PLCS SGTS MS-PLCS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1B21*AOV F022D 1B21*AOV F028D 1E33*MOVF008 1B21*MOV F067D INSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE NA NA NA 16-7 1/4 NA 4-4 11/18 GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE GLOBE AOV(1)

AOV(1)

MOV MOV PISTON PISTON ELECT ELECT NA NA MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED FC FC FAI FAI AD, FG, H, RM AD, FG, H, RM Y, Z, RM AD, FG, H, RM 5

5 NA 19.8 A, B A, B A

A 1KJB*Z2 16mx xo10 55 TURBINE PLANT MISCELLANEOUS DRAINS (21)

CNDS CNDS 3

3 YES YES N

N MS-PLCS MS-PLCS 6.2-63 6.2-63 1B21*MOVF016 1B21*MOVF019 INSIDE OUTSIDE NA NA NA 52 GATE GATE MOV MOV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI AD, FG, H, RM AD, FG, H, RM 16.5 17.6 B

A 1KJB*Z3A 10mx 12mx xo15 14mx 15mx 55 FEEDWATER LINE (26)

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL RETURN TO FEEDWATER FDW FDW FDW WATER WATER WATER 20 20 20 10 6

4 NO NO NO YES YES YES N

N N

N E

N SCB SCB/SGTS SCB/SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-64 6.2-63 1FWS*MOV7A 1B21*AOV F032A 1B21*VF010A 1E12*MOV F053A E51*MOVF013 E12-MOVF023 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE C

C C

C A,C A,C A-N A-N A-N A-N A-N A-N 64-2 NA NA 76-2 5/8 81-6 91-0 5/16 GATE AO CHECK CHECK GLOBE GATE GLOBE MOV PROCESS PROCESS ELECT MOV MANUAL ELECT PROCESS PROCESS ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL NA NA MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN/

CLOSED (11)

OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED FAI FC NA FAI FAI FAI RM NA NA C, L, R, RM RM N/A 152 NA NA 39 27 B

NA NA A

B N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 20 Page 2 of 12 x o14 x o12 x o10 1KJB*Z3B x o15 14mx 55 FEEDWATER LINE (26)

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL RETURN TO FEEDWATER FDW FDW FDW WATER 20 20 20 10 NO NO NO YES N

N N

N SCB SCB/SGTS SCB/SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1FWS*MOV7B 1B21*AOV F032B 1B21*V F010B 1E12*MOV F053B OUTSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE OUTSIDE C

C C

C A-N A-N A-N A-N 66-8 NA NA 73-8 GATE AO CHECK CHECK GLOBE MOV PROCESS PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS PROCESS ELECT MANUAL NA NA MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN/

CLOSED (11)

CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FC NA FAI RM NA NA C, L, R, RM 152 NA NA 39 B

NA NA B

1KJB*Z4 56 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP DISCHARGE TO MAIN CONDENSER (14)(13)(16)

WATER WATER WATER 4

4 3/4 NO NO NO N

N N

SCB SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 1G33*MOVF028 1G33*MOVF034 1WCS*RV-144 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C C

A-N A-N A-N NA 11-5 3/4 NA GATE GATE RV MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSDE FAI FAI NA B, H, O P, RM B, H, O P, RM NA 20.9 20.9 NA B

A NA IKJB*Z5 10mx 56 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP BACKWASH DISCHARGE (14)(13)(16)

WATER WATER WATER 2 1/2 2 1/2 3/4 NO NO NO N

N N

SCB SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 1WCS*MOV178 1WCS*MOV172 1WCS*RV154 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C C

A-N A-N A-N NA 11-4 3/4 NA GATE GATE RV MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI NA B, K, RM R, K, RM NA 12.1 12.6.99 NA B

A NA IKJB*Z6 56 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP RETURN TO FEEDWATER (16)

WATER WATER 6

6 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 1G33*MOVF040 1G33*MOVF039 INSIDE OUTSIDE A,C C

A-N A-N NA 12-7 1/4 GATE GATE MOV MOV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI B, H, O P, RM B, H, O P, RM 24.2 24.2 B

A 1KJB*Z7 12mx 15mx x o13 56 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PUMP SUCTION (16)

WATER WATER 6

6 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 1G33*MOVF001 1G33*MOVF004 INSIDE OUTSIDE A,C C

A-N A-N NA 13-6 5/16 GATE GATE MOV MOV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI B, H, O P, RM B, H, O P, RM 19.8 19.8 B

A 1KJB*Z8 56 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL(25)

WATER (S.P.)

20 YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E22*MOV F015 OUTSIDE N/A N/A 12-10 1/2 GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL CLOSED CLOSED OPEN FAI RM 20 C

IKJB*Z9 13mx 55 55 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY TO REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY TO REACTOR WATER WATER 10 10 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E22*MOVF004 1E22*AOVF005 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 15-2 3/8 NA GATE AO CHECK (2)

MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN FAI NA RM NA 17 NA C

C

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 22 Page 3 of 12 x o13 1KJB*Z11 56 HPCS TEST RETURN(25)

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS AND THERMAL RELIEF DISCHARGE TO SUPPRESSION POOL (19)

SUPPRESSION POOL PUMP-BACK SYSTEM RETURN LINE (25)

WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 10 4

1 1

1 4

4 4

YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES N

E E

E E

E E

E SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E22*MOV F023 1E22*MOV F012 1E22*RVF014 1E22*RVF035 1E22*RVF039 1DFR*V181 1DFR*V182 1DFR*MOV146 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 15-0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA GLOBE GATE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE CHECK CHECK GATE MOV MOV PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS MOV ELECT ELECT PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS ELECT MANUAL MANUAL NA NA NA NA NA MANUAL CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED (23)

CLOSED (23)

FAI FAI NA NA NA NA NA FAI B, K, RM RM NA NA NA NA NA NA 50 17 NA NA NA NA NA 20 C

C NA NA NA NA NA B

1KJB*Z12 56 LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL(25)

WATER (S.P.)

20 YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E21*MOV F001 OUTSIDE N/A N/A 11-0 7/8 GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI RM 125 A

1KJB*Z13 55 55 LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY TO REACTOR LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY TO REACTOR WATER WATER 10 10 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E21*MOV F005 1E21*AOV F006 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 13-1 5/8 NA GATE AO CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN FAI NA RM NA 28.8 NA A

A x o15 1KJB*Z15 55 RHR STEAM SUPPLY AND RCIC STEAM SUPPLY(16)

STEAM STEAM STEAM 8

3/4 8

YES YES YES E

E E

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E51*MOV F063 1E51*MOV F076 1E51*MOV F064 INSIDE INSIDE OUTSIDE A,C A,C C

A-N A-N A-N NA NA NA GATE GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MOV ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN FAI FAI FAI W.X.RM W.X.RM W.X.RM 9.9 13.4 11 B

A(30)

B A

1KJB*Z16 56 RCIC PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL(25)

WATER (S.P.)

6 YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E51*MOV F031 OUTSIDE N/A N/A 9-6 GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL CLOSED OPEN OPEN FAI W.X.RM 30.5 A

1KJB*17 x o14 56 RCIC TURBINE EXHAUST TO SUPPRESSION POOL (25)

STEAM 12 YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E51*MOV F068 OUTSIDE NA A-N NA GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI RM 70.6 A

1KJB*Z18A x o9 56 RCIC PUMP MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS TO SUPPRESSION POOL (25)

WATER 2

YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E51*MOV F019 OUTSIDE N/A N/A 13-1 5/8 GLOBW MOV ELECT MANUAL CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI RM 6

A 1KJB*Z18B/

C 9mx 14mx x o12 13mx 12mx 15mx 56 56 RCIC TURBINE EXHAUST VACUUM BREAKER FROM ABOVE SUPPRESSION POOL RCIC/RHR ISOLATION AIR AIR AIR 2 1/2 1 1/2 3/4 YES YES YES E

E E

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E51*MOV F078(17)

IE51*MOV F077 1E12-VF102 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE A,C A,C A,C A-N A-N A-N 13-7 1/4 13-6 GLOBE GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL N/A OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI N/A K,W,RM K,W,RM N/A 16.5 14.2 N/A B

A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 15 Page 4 of 12 May 2002 x o12 1KJB*Z19 55 RHR/RCIC SPARED 1KJB*Z20 55 RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUPPLY (SUCTION ISOLATION)

RX.

CLT.

RX.

CLT.

RX.

CLT.

18 18 3/4 YES YES YES N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E12*MOV F009 1E12*MOV F008 1RHS*

V240 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C C

A-N A-N A-N NA 13-0 9/16 NA GATE GATE CHECK MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI NA C.L.R.RM C.L.R.RM NA 25.3 29.7 NA B

A NA x o15 1KJB*Z21A x o14 55 LPCI A TO REACTOR (16)(17)

WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 10 10 10 8

4 YES YES YES YES YES E

E N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E12*MOV F027A 1E12*MOV F042A 1E12*MOV F037A E12*VF099A 1E12*

VF044A OUTSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE C

C C

C C

A-N A-N A-N A-N A-N 11-0 NA NA NA NA GATE GATE GLOBE GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MOV MV MV ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL NA NA OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED LC OPEN CLOSED OPEN/

CLOSED (1)

CLOSED LC OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED LC FAI FAI FAI NA NA RM RM C.K.R.RM NA NA 25.3 27.5 73.7 NA NA A

A A

NA NA 1KJB*Z21B 12mx 14mx 15mx 55 LPCI B TO REACTOR (16)(17)

WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 10 10 10 8

4 YES YES YES YES YES E

E N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E12*MOV F027B 1E12*MOV F042B 1E12*MOV F037B E12*VF099B 1E12*

VF044B OUTSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE C

C C

C C

A-N A-N A-N A-N A-N 11-0 NA NA NA NA GATE GATE GLOBE GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MOV MV MV ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL NA NA OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED LC OPEN CLOSED OPEN/

CLOSED (1)

CLOSED LC OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED LC FAI FAI FAI NA NA RM RM C.K.R.RM NA NA 26.4 28.6 74.8 NA NA B

B B

NA NA 1KJB*Z21C 55 LPCI C TO REACTOR WATER WATER 10 10 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-63 6.2-63 1E12*MOV F042C 1E12*AOV F041C OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 110 NA GATE AO CHECK (2)

MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN FAI NA RM NA 29.7 NA B

B

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 13 Page 5 of 12 September 2000 x o13 1KJB*Z23A x o10 10mx x o12 12mx 56 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A VENT AND RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGES TO SUPPRESSION POOL (19)(25)

WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 2

1 1/2 2

1 1

2 2

8 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO E

N E

N N

E N

N SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F073A RHS-RV67A 1E12*RV F025A 1E12*RV F017A 1E12*RV F005 1E21*RV F018 1E21*RV F031 1E12*RV F036 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA GLOBE RV RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE MOV PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS ELECT PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS MANUAL NA NA NA NA NA NA NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA RM NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 52 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA A

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z23B x o10 10mx 56 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B VENT AND RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGES TO SUPPRESSION POOL (19)(25)

WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 2

1 1/2 2

2 1

2 2

8 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO E

N E

N N

E N

N SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F073B RHS-RV67B 1E12*RV F025C 1E12*RV F025B 1E12*RV F030 1E12*RV F101 1E12*RV F017B 1SSR*SOV139 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA GLOBE RV RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE RV GLOBE MOV PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS ELECT PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS MANUAL NA NA NA NA NA NA NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA RM NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 52 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA B

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z24A 13mx 56 RHR A AND LPCS TEST RETURNS AND MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS AND HEAT EXCHANGER DUMP TO SUPPRESSION POOL (25)

WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 14 4

4 10 4

YES YES YES YES YES E

N E

N E

SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F024A 1E12*MOV F011A 1E12*MOV F064A E21*MOV F012 E21*MOV F011 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 18-1 NA NA NA NA BTRFLY GLOBE GATE GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MOV MOV MOV ELECT ELECT ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN FAI FAI FAI FAI FAI A.K.RM A.K.RM RM A.K.RM RM 63.8 34.1 8.0 57.2 20.9 A

A A

A A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 20 Page 6 of 12 x o13 1KJB*Z24B 56 RHR B AND LPCS TEST RETURNS AND MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS AND HEAT EXCHANGER DUMP TO SUPPRESSION POOL (25)

WATER WATER WATER 14 4

4 YES YES YES E

N E

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F024B 1E12*MOV F011B 1E12*MOV F064B OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 14-11 5/8 14-11 5/8 99-6 BTRFLY GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MOV ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI FAI A.K.RM A.K.RM RM 63.8 30.8 8

B B

B 1KJB*Z24C x o10 10mx 56 RHR RETURN C MINIMUM BYPASS TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL (25)

WATER WATER WATER WATER 14 4

10 3/4 YES YES YES YES N

E N

N SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F021 1E12*MOV F064C RHS-AOV64 RHS-RV-66 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 18-9 3/16 103-11 13/16 77-1 53-1/2 GLOBE GATE BTRFLY BTRFLY MOV MOV AOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PISTON PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA NA OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI FC NA A.K.RM RM A.C.K.R.RM NA 97.9 8.0 10 NA B

B A

NA 1KJB*Z25A 56 RHR PUMP A SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL(25)

WATER (S.P.)

20 YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F004A OUTSIDE N/A N/A 10-0 GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN CLOSED OPEN FAI RM 97.9 A

1KJB*Z25B 56 RHR PUMP B SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL(25)

WATER (S.P.)

20 YES E

SGTS 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F004B OUTSIDE N/A N/A 100 GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN CLOSED OPEN FAI RM 93.5 A

1KJB*Z25C x o10 x o12 10mx 12mx 13mx x o14 56 RHR PUMP C SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL(25)

WATER (S.P.)

20 10 10 3/4 YES YES YES YES E

N N

N SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1E12*MOV F105 RHS-AOV62 RHS-AOV63 RHS-RV65 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 26-9 44-3 31-9 GATE BTRFLY BTRFLY RV GLOBE MOV AOV AOV PROCESS ELECT PISTON PISTON PROCESS MANUAL NA NA NA OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FC FC NA RM A.C.K.R.

RM A.C.K.R.

RM NA 101.2 10 10 NA B

B A

NA 1KJB*Z26 56 FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP DISCHARGE(27)

WATER WATER 12 12 NO NO N

N SCB SCB 6.2-64 6.2.64 1SFC*MOV119 SFC-V101 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 100 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA NA B.K.RM 68 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z27 56 FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SUCTION LINE(27)

WATER WATER WATER 12 12 3/4 NO NO NO N

N N

SCB SCB SCB 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1SFC*MOV120 1SFC*MOV122 1SFC*V350 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE A,C C

A,C A-N A-N A-N NA 100 NA GATE GATE CHECK MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI NA B.K.RM B.K.RM NA 62.7 63.8 NA B

A NA 1KJB*Z28 x o13 13mx 56 FUEL POOL PURIFICATION SUCTION(27)

WATER WATER WATER 8

8 3/4 NO NO NO N

N N

SCB SCB SCB 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1SFC*MOV139 1SFC*MOV121 1SFC*V351 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE A,C C

A,C A-N A-N A-N NA 100 NA GATE GATE CHECK MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI NA B.K.RM B.K.RM NA 39.6 55 NA B

A NA 1KJB*Z29 14mx 55 CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM SUPPLY(27)

WATER WATER 2

2 NO NO N

N SCB SCB 6.2-63 6.2-63 1C11*MOV F083 1C11*

VF122 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 10-3 NA GLOBE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA RM NA 13.6 NA A

NA

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 15 Page 7 of 12 May 2002 1KJB*Z31 x o14 14mx 56 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL PURGE AND CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN PURGE SUPPLY LINES (15)

AIR AIR AIR 36 1

36 NO NO NO N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1HVR*

AOV165 CPP-SOV140 1HRV*AOV123 OUTSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C A,C A-N A-N A-N 11-0 NA NA BUTRFLY GATE BUTRFLY AOV SOV AOV PISTON ELECT PISTON NA NA NA OPEN LC OPEN OPEN LC OPEN CLOSED LC CLOSED FC FC FC BKTRM RM BKTRM 3

NA 3

A A

B x o15 1KJB*Z33 15mx 56 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL PURGE AND CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN PURGE OUTLET LINES (15)(16)

AIR AIR AIR AIR 36 3

3 36 NO NO NO NO N

N N

N SGT SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1HVR*AOV128 1CPP*MOV104 1CPP*MOV105 1HVR*AOV166 INSIDE INSIDE OUTSIDE OUTSIDE A,C A,C C

C A-N A-N A-N A-N NA NA NA 110 BTRFLY GATE GATE BTRFLY AOV MOV MOV AOV PISTON ELECT ELECT PISTON NA MANUAL MANUAL NA OPEN LC LC OPEN CLOSED LC LC CLOSED CLOSED LC LC CLOSED FC FAI FAI FC B.K.T.RM RM RM B.K.T.RM 3

16.5 16.5 3

B B

A A

1KJB*Z35 56 FLOOR DRAIN DISCHARGE WATER WATER WATER 4

4 1/2 NO NO NO N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1DFR*

AOV102 1DFR*

AOV101 1DFR*V180 OUTSIDE INSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A,C A-N A-N A-N 21-4 NA NA GLOBE GLOBE CHECK AOV AOV PROCESS PISTON PISTON PROCESS NA NA NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FC FC NA B.K.RM B.K.RM NA NA NA NA A

B NA 1KJB*Z38 x o12 12mx 56 EQUIPMENT DRAIN DISCHARGE WATER WATER WATER 4

4 1

NO NO NO N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 6.2-64 1DER*

AOV127 1DER*

AOV126 1DER*V4 OUTSIDE INSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A,C A-N A-N A-N 33-6 NA NA GLOBE GLOBE CHECK AOV AOV PROCESS PISTON PISTON PROCESS NA NA NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FC FC NA B.K.RM B.K.RM NA NA NA NA A

B NA x o10 1KJB*Z41 56 FIRE PROTECTION HEADER (14)

WATER 6

NO N

SCB 6.2-65 1FPW*

MOV121 OUTSIDE C

A-N 10-11 1/2 GATE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B.K.RM 34.1 A

10mx FIRE PROTECTION HEADER (14)

WATER 6

NO N

SCB 6.2-65 1FPW*V263 INSIDE C

A-N NA CHECK PROCESS PROCESS NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z42 SPARE 1KJB*Z43 SPARE x o10 1KJB*Z44 56 SERVICE AIR SUPPLY TO CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL (14)

AIR AIR 4

4 NO NO N

N SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SAS*MOV102 1SAS*V486 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C A-N A-N 11-3 1/16 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA B.K.RM NA 22 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z46 10mx x o13 56 INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL (14)

AIR AIR 3

3 NO NO N

N SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 1IAS*MOV106 1IAS*V80 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C A-N A-N 11-11 1/16 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA B.K.RM NA 18.7 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z48 56 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPPLY WATER WATER 10 10 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 1CCP*MOV138 1CCP*V118 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 9-0 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA B.K.RM NA 50 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z49 13mx 56 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER RETURN WATER WATER WATER 10 10 3/4 NO NO NO N

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 1CCP*MOV158 1CCP*MOV159 1CCP*V160 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE A,C C

A,C A-N A-N A-N NA 10-4 NA GATE GATE CHECK MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI NA B.K.RM B.K.RM NA 50 50 NA B

A NA

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 13 Page 8 of 12 September 2000 1KJB*Z52A 56 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY WATER WATER 12 12 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2.65 1SWP*

MOV507A 1SWP*V174 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 9-0 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI NA RM NA 62.7 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z52B 56 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY WATER WATER 12 12 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2.65 1SWP*

MOV507B 1SWP*V175 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 9-0 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI NA RM NA 59.4 NA B

NA 1KJB*Z53A 56 SERVICE WATER RETURN WATER WATER WATER AIR AIR 12 10 6

1 1

YES YES YES YES YES E

N E

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2.65 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SWP*

MOV81A 1SWP*

MOV5A 1SWP*

MOV503A 1SWP*

SOV522A 1SWP*

SOV522C OUTSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A,C A,C A,C A-N A-N A-N A-N A-N 9-0 NA NA NA NA GATE GATE GATE GLOBE GLOBE MOV MOV MOV SOV SOV ELECT ELECT ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL NA NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI FAI FAI OPEN OPEN RM B.K.RM RM RM RM 61.6 50.6 35.2 NA NA A

B A

A A

1KJB*Z53B 56 SERVICE WATER RETURN WATER WATER WATER AIR AIR 12 10 6

1 1

YES YES YES YES YES E

N E

N N

SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2.65 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SWP*

MOV81B 1SWP*

MOV5B 1SWP*

MOV503B 1SWP*

SOV522B 1SWP*

SOV522D OUTSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A,C A,C A,C A-N A-N A-N A-N A-N 9-0 NA NA NA NA GATE GATE GATE GLOBE GLOBE MOV MOV MOV SOV SOV ELECT ELECT ELECT ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL NA NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI FAI FAI OPEN OPEN RM B.K.RM RM RM RM 60.5 53.9 35.2 NA NA B

A B

B B

1KJB*Z101 SPARE 1KJB*Z102 56 AIR SUPPLY FOR MAIN STEAM SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE AIR AIR 1 1/2 1 1/2 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SVV*

MOV1B 1SVV*V9 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 13-6 NA GLOBE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED OPEN (12)

CLOSED FAI NA RM NA 17.8 NA B

NA 1KJB*Z103 56 AIR SUPPLY FOR MAIN STEAM SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE AIR AIR 1 1/2 1 1/2 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SVV*

MOV1A 1SVV*V31 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 19-3 NA GLOBE CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED OPEN (12)

CLOSED FAI NA RM NA 16.2 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z104 SPARE 1KJB*Z105 SPARE 1KJB*Z106 SPARE 1KJB*Z113 SPARE 1KJB*Z114 SPARE 1KJB*Z115 SPARE 1KJB*Z116 SPARE 1KJB*Z121 SPARE 1KJB*Z122 SPARE 1KJB*Z125 SPARE 1KJB*Z126 SPARE

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 17 Page 9 of 12 x o12 1KJB*Z129 12mx 56 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PUMP DISCHARGE(16)

WATER WATER 4

4 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 1G33*

MOVF054 1G33*

MOVF053 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

A,C A-N A-N 12-9 1/16 NA GATE GATE MOV MOV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI B.H.O.P.RM B.H.O.P.RM 6.5 6.5 A

B x o10 1KJB*Z131 x o12 56 VENTILATION CHILLED WATER RETURN (14)

WATER WATER WATER 8

8 3/4 NO NO NO N

N N

SCB SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 1HVN*

MOV102 1HVN*

MOV128 1HVN*V1316 INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C C

A-N A-N A-N NA 10-9 3/4 NA GATE GATE CHECK MOV MOV PROCESS ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI NA B.K.RM B.K.RM NA 31.9 28.6 NA B

A NA 1KJB*Z132 56 VENTILATION CHILLED WATER SUPPLY (14)

WATER WATER 8

8 NO NO N

N SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 1HVN*

MOV127 1HVN*V541 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C A-N A-N 11-0 3/4 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS MOV PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA B.K.TM NA 27.5 NA A

NA 1KJB*Z134 12mx 10mx 56 CONDENSATE MAKEUP SUPPLY (14)

WATER WATER 4

4 NO NO N

N SCB SCB 6.2-65 6.2-65 1CNS*

MOV125 1CNS*V86 OUTSIDE INSIDE C

C A-N A-N 10-8 NA GATE CHECK MOV PROCESS MOV PROCESS MANUAL NA OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FAI NA B.K.RM NA 22 NA A

NA 1KJB*601A SPARE 1KJB*Z601B x o14 56 REACTOR PLANT SAMPLING WATER WATER 1/2 1/2 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SSR*

SOV130 1SSR*

SOV131 INSIDE INSIDE A,C A,C A-N A-N NA LTR GLOBE GLOBE SOV SOV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED A.K.RM A.K.RM 3

3 B

B 1KJB*Z601C SPARE 1KJB*Z601 SPARE 1KJB*Z601E 56 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL H2 SAMPLE B SUPPLY LINE (8)

ATMOS ATMOS 3/4 3/4 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 CMS-SOV35D 1CMS*

SOV31B INSIDE OUTSIDE A

A A-N A-N NA

< 10-6 GLOBE GLOBE SOV SOV ELECT ELECT NA NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI FAI RM RM NA NA B

A 1KJB*Z601F 14mx 56 CONTIANMENT AND DRYWELL H2 SAMPLE B RETURN LINE (8)

ATMOS ATMOS 3/4 3/4 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CMS*

SOV31D 1CMS*

SOV35B OUTSIDE INSIDE A

A A-N A-N NA

< 10-6 GLOBE GLOBE SOV SOV ELECT ELECT NA NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI FAI RM RM NA NA A

B 1KJB*Z602A R.G.1.11 REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CELL (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1HVR*V8 OUTSIDE NA NA

< 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z602B R.G.1.11 REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CELL (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1HVR*V10 OUTSIDE NA NA

< 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z602C SPARE 1KJB*Z602D R.G.1.11 PVLCS PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1LSV*V64 OUTSIDE NA NA

< 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z602E SPARE 1KJB*Z602F R.G.1.11 REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CELL (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1HVR*V12 OUTSIDE NA NA

< 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z603A 56 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING PRESSURE SENSING LINE (18)

ATMOS ATMOS 3/4 3/4 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 1LMS*V14 1LMS*V12 INSIDE OUTSIDE A,C C

A-N A-N NA

< 10-6 GATE GATE MV MV MANUAL MANUAL NA NA LC LC LC LC LC LC NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES VALVE ACTUATION MODE POSITION (5,6) x o13 x o9 CONT.

PEN.

NUMBER 9mx 13mx GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OR REGULATORY GUIDE SYSTEM NAME FLUID LINE SIZE (INCH)

ESF SYSTEM ESSEN./

NON-ESS CLASS.

(22)

THROUGH LINE LEAKAGE CLASSIFI-CATION FSAR ARRGT.

FIGURE ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER LOC.

OF VALVE INSIDE/

OUTSIDE CONT.

TYPE TEST TYPE C TEST MEDIUM LENGTH OF PIPE FROM CONT. TO OUTER-MOST ISOLATION VALVE TYPE OPERATOR (4)

PRIMARY SECONDARY NORMAL SHUTDOWN POST-ACCIDENT POWER FAILURE ISOLATION SIGNAL CLOSURE TIME (SEC)

(7)

POWER SOURCE Revision 18 Page 10 of 12 1KJB*Z603B SPARE 1KJB*Z603C 56 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE MONITORING PRESSURE SENSING LINE (18)

ATMOS ATMOS 3/4 3/4 NO NO N

N SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 1LMS*V7 1LMS*V16 INSIDE OUTSIDE A,C C

A-N S-N NA

• 10-6 GATE GATE MV MV MANUAL MANUAL NA NA LC LC LC LC LC LC NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z603D SPARE 1KJB*Z603E SPARE 1KJB*Z603F SPARE 1KJB*Z604A SPARE 1KJB*Z604B SPARE 1KJB*604C SPARE 1KJB*Z604D SPARE 1KJB*Z604E SPARE 1KJB*Z604F SPARE 1KJB*Z605A R.G. 1.11 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PRESSURE (A) SENSING LINE (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1CMS*V2 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z605B R.G.1.11 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PRESSURE (A) SENSING LINE (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1CMS*V3 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z605C SPARE 1KJB*Z605D SPARE x o14 1KJB*Z605E 56 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL H2 SAMPLE A SUPPLY LINE (8)

ATMOS ATMOS 3/4 3/4 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CMS*

SOV35C 1CMS*

SOV31A INSIDE OUTSIDE A

A A-N A-N NA

• 10-6 GLOBE GLOBE SOV SOV ELECT ELECT NA NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI FAI RM RM NA NA B

A 1KJB*Z605F 14mx 56 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL H2 SAMPLE A SUPPLY LINE (8)

ATMOS ATMOS 3/4 3/4 YES YES E

E SGTS SGTS 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CMS*

SOV31C 1CMS*

SOV35A OUTSIDE INSIDE A

A A-N A-N

• 10-6 NA GLOBE GLOBE SOV SOV ELECT ELECT NA NA OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN FAI FAI RM RM NA NA A

B 1KJB*Z606A R.G.1.11 REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION PRESSURE CELL (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1HVR*V14 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z606B R.G.1.11 REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION PRESSURE CELL (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1HVR*V16 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z606C R.G. 1.11 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PRESSURE (B) SENSING LINE (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1CMS*V16 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z606D R.G.1.11 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PRESSURE (B) SENSING LINE (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1CMS*V15 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z606E R.G.1.11 PVLCS PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1LSV*V65 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA 1KJB*Z606F R.G.1.11 REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION PRESSURE CELL (20)

ATMOS 3/4 YES E

SGTS 1HVR*V18 OUTSIDE NA NA

• 10-6 GLOBE MV MANUAL NA LO LO LO NA NA NA NA R.G.1.11 x o15 1F42-G001 15mx (29)

INCLINE FUEL TRANSFER ATMOS 4

NO N

SCB 1F42-MOV F003(26)

OUTSIDE C

A-N BALL MOV ELECT MANUAL CLOSED OPEN CLOSED FAI N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 (CONT)

Revision 25 Page 11 of 12 NOTES:

1.

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES REQUIRE THAT BOTH SOLENOID PILOTS BE DE-ENERGIZED TO CLOSE VALVES. ACCUMULATOR AIR PRESSURE PLUS SPRING FORCE ACT TOGETHER TO CLOSE VALVES WHEN BOTH PILOTS ARE DE-ENERGIZED. VOLTAGE FAILURE AT ONLY ONE PILOT DOES NOT CAUSE CLOSURE.

2.

TESTABLE CHECK VALVES ARE DESIGNED FOR REMOTE OPENING WITH ZERO DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS THE VALVE SEAT, EXCEPT THE VALVES 1E12-AOVF041A, 1E12-AOVF041B, 1E12-AOVF041C, 1E22-AOVF005, 1E21-AOVF006, AND 1E51-AOVF065 ARE TO BE TESTED MANUALLY DURING REFUELING AND COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. THE VALVES CLOSE ON REVERSE FLOW EVEN THOUGH THE TEST SWITCHES MAY BE POSITIONED FOR OPEN. THE VALVES OPEN WHEN PUMP PRESSURE EXCEEDS REACTOR PRESSURE EVEN THOUGH TESET SWITCH MAY BE POSITIONED FOR CLOSE.

xo9 3.

DELETED.

9mx 4.

A-C MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES ARE POWERED FROM THE DESIGNATED A-C STANDBY BUS. D-C MOTOR-OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES ARE POWERED FROM THE DESIGNATED PLANT BATTERY.

5.

ALL MOTOR-OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES REMAIN IN THE LAST POSITION UPON FAILURE OF VALVE POWER. ALL AIR-OPERATED VALVES CLOSE ON MOTOVE AIR FAILURE. ALL AIR-OPERATED VALVES, EXCEPT MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES, CLOSE ON POWER FAILURE TO THE SOLENOID PILOTS.

xo15 6.

NORMAL STATUS POSITION OF VALVE OPEN OR CLOSED IS THE POSITION DURING NORMAL POWER OPERATION OF HTE REACTOR (SEE POSITION - NORMAL COLUMN).

xo9 7.

SOME CLOSING TIMES ARE NOMINAL VALUES BASED ON ORIGINAL VALVE CLOSURE RATE AND LINE SIZE. FOR LICENSING BASIS CLOSURE TIMES, SEE THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL IN THE OPERATING LICENSE MANUAL.

9mx xo14 xo10 8.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FOR HYDROGEN ANALYZERS REMAIN OPEN DURING ALL CONDITIONS. OPERATOR ACTION IS REQUIRED TO ISOLATE THESE LINES.

10mx 9.

VALVES OPEN ONLY DURING INITIAL STAGES OF RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING (FIRST 12 HOURS) WITH RETURN TO RPV.

10.

VALVES OPEN DURING CONTINUATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING AFTER 20 HOURS WITH RETURN TO UPPER CONTAINMENT POOL.

11.

VALVES OPEN ONLY DURING FIRST 24 HOURS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING WITH RETURN TO RPV.

12.

ADS AND LOW-LOW SET VALVES AIR SUPPLY ISOLATED ON LOCA ONLY IF AIR LINE HEADER PRESSURE FALLS BELOW DRYWELL DESIGN PRESUSRE.

13.

THE RELIEF VALVE IS TESTED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION. THIS IS CONSERVATIVE SINCE IT TENDS TO UNSEAT THE DISC.

xo10 14.

LEAKAGE FROM THESE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS VALVES/PENETRATIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE 0.60LA TYPE B AND C TEST TOTALS.

10mx 15.

THE INBOARD BUTTERFLY VALVE IS TESTED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION. LEAKAGE CHARACTERISTICS ARE THE SAME IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

16.

THE INBOARD GATE VALVE MAY BE TESTED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION. IT IS A FLEX-WEDGE GATE VALVE, THE LOW VALUES OF THE ACCIDENT AND TEST PRESSURES DO NOT DEFLECT THE DISC FROM THE SEAT AND EITHER SEATING SURFACE MAY BE USED AS THE POST-ACCIDENT SEATING SURFACE. SINCE IT IS LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT, THE PACKING IS NOT PART OF THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY.

17.

THE GLOBE VALVE IS TESTED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION. THIS IS A CONSERVATIVE TEST SINCE IT TENDS TO UNSEAT THE DISC.

18.

THESE VALVES ARE REQUIRED TO BE OPEN DURING THE CONDUCTING OF THE TYPE A TEST.

xo13 19.

THESE ARE RELIEF VALVES FOR WHICH DOWNSTREAM PIPING TERMINATES AT A POINT BELOW THE SUPPRESSION POOL MINIMUM WATER LEVEL AND ARE THUS PROVIDED WITH A WATER SEAL. TYPE A, C TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED. ASME SECTION III, DIVISION I, SUBSECTION NC-7153 REQUIRES THAT NO OTHER STOP VALVE OR DEVICE MAY BE PLACED RELATIVE TO A PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE WHICH COULD REDUCE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION.

15mx 20.

THESE ARE INSTRUMENT ISOLATION VALVES THAT ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN OPEN DURING A LOCA, AND WILL NOT BE TYPE C TESTED.

21.

VALVES/PENETRATIONS SEALED BY THE MS-PLCS (INCLUDING MSIVS) ARE TESTED TO VERIFY THAT LEAKAGE OF SEALING AIR INTO THE CONTAINMENT DOES NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS IS A CONSERVATIVE TEST SINCE: (1) PRESSURE IS APPLIED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION FOR THE MSIVS, WHICH TENDS TO UNSEAT THE VALVE DISC. (2) THE TEST PRESSURE SPECIFIED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS GREATER THAN THE TYPE C TEST PRESSURE. (3) FOR GATE VALVES, THE TEST IS CONSERVATIVE BECAUSE PRESSURE IS APPLIED AND MEASURED ACROSS BOTH SEATS AS WELL TO THE PACKING GLAND VERSUS A CHECK OF EITHER THE UPSTREAM OR DOWNSTREAM SEAT. THIS LEAKAGE IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE 0.6LA TYPE B AND C TEST TOTAL. PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF THE VALVES BEING TESTED ARE DEPRESSURIZED DURING THE TEST IN A FASHION SIMILAR TO A TYPE C TEST.

22.

SEE SECTION 6.2.4.3.7 FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ESSENTIAL/NON-ESSENTIAL CLASSIFICATION.

23.

VALVE IS OPEN POST-ACCIDENT IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL OR TO PROTECT EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING CRESCENT AREA AT EL. 70-0 FROM FLOODING.

24.

DELETED 25.

THESE VALVES ARE PROVIDED WITH A WATER SEAL BY THE SUPPRESION POOL. TYPE A, C TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED.

13mx 26.

THE LEAKAGE THROUGH PENETRATIONS KJB-Z3A AND -Z3B HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE EITHER SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS (SCB) LEAKAGE OR CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE (LA). VALVES B21-VF010A(B) AND B21-AOVF032(B) ARE COMMON ALONG ALL PATHS. THE LEAKAGE THROUGH FWS-MOVF7A(B) IS PART OF SCB LEAKAGE, AND THUS, IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE 0.60LA TYPE B AND C TEST TOTALS. THE REMAINING LEAKAGE PATHS ARE CONSIDERED IN THE 0.60LA TYPE B AND C TOTAL. AS SUCH, THE LEAKAGE IS TREATED BY SGTS.

27.

THE FUEL BUILDING IS NO LONGER CREDITED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOCA PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT 113 (SEE USAR SECTION 15.6.5 FOR DETAILS). THIS PENETRATION IS CLASSIFIED AS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAK PATH (SCB) PER ALTERNATE SOURCE TERM (AST).

14mx xo15 28.

THIS VALUE ONLY PROVIDES CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DURING MODES 1, 2, AND 3 WHILE THE BLIND FLANGE IS REMOVED.

29.

WITH THE BLIND FLANGE REMOVED, THIS PENETRATION DOES NOT MEET GDC 56 REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER THIS CONFIGURATION HAS BEEN APPROVED VIA AMENDMENT 116.

15mx

30. AN ALTERNATE DIVISION I POWER FEED IS PROVIDED FOR COPING WITH A MAIN CONTROL ROOM FIRE EVENT FOR APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-40 (CONT)

Revision 16 Page 12 of 12 March 2003 ISOLATION SIGNAL CODES A.

REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 1 B.

REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 C.

REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 3 D.

HIGH MAIN STEAM LINE FLOW E.

NOT USED.

F.

MAIN STEAM LINE LOW PRESSURE (REACTOR MODE SWITCH IN RUN ONLY)

G.

LOW MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM H.

HIGH MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL AMBIENT TEMPERATURE xo2 I.

DELETED 12mx xo16 J.

DELETED 16mx K.

HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE L.

HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE M.

STANDBY LIQUID CONTORL SYSTEM ACTUATED N.

HIGH NON-REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET TEMPERATURE (RWCU SYSTEM)

O.

RWCU SYSTEM HIGH DIFFERENTIAL FLOW P.

RWCU SYSTEM EQUIPMENT AREA HIGH AMBIENT TEMPERATURE xo 12 Q.

DELETED 12mx R.

RHR SYSTEM EQUIPMENT AREA HIGH AMBIENT TEMPERATURE xo 12 S.

DELETED 12mx T.

CONTAINMENT HIGH GASEOUS RADIATION U.

REACTOR BUILDING ANNULUS VENTILATION RADIATION HIGH V.

FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION EXHAUST W.

REACTOR PRESSURE LOW X.

RCIC ISOLATION SIGNALS:

(A) PIPE ROUTE AREA HIGH TEMPERATURE, (B) EQUIPMENT AREA HIGH TEMPERATURE, (C) TURBINE EXHAUST DIAPHRAGM HIGH PRESSURE, (D) STEAM LINE HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OR INSTRUMENT LINE BREAK.

Y.

MS-PLCS AIR LINE HEADER FLOW HIGH Z. MS-PLCS AIR LINE HEADER AND STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE LOW xo 13 RM Remote Manual Operation is Appropriate 13mx W - WATER N/A - NOT APPLICABLE A-N - AIR OR NITROGEN N - NON-ESSENTIAL E - ESSENTIAL SGTS - STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM FBCFS - FUEL BUILDING CHARCOAL FILTRATION SYSTEM RV - RELIEF VALVE AOV - AIR-OPERATED VALVE CV - CHECK VALVE MOV - MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE MV - MANUAL VALVE TCV - TESTABLE CHECK VALVE SOV - SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ESF - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE F.C. - FAIL CLOSED F.A.I. - FAIL AS IS F.O. - FAIL OPEN L.C. - LOCKED CLOSED L.O. - LOCKED OPEN HYV - HYDRAULIC-OPERATED VALVE x o10 SCB - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS 10mx

1 RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-41 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1 of 1 August 1987 Hydrogen Mixing Fans Quantity 2 - 100% capacity units Fan type Centrifugal Capacity, cfm (each) 600 @ 160F Drive Direct Discharge Horizontal Manufacturer Buffalo Forge Company Hydrogen Recombiners Type Thermal Quantity 2 - 100% capacity units Capacity, scfm - air (each) 100 Process rate, scfm - hydrogen 4 (approx.)

Power required, kW 75 each Manufacturer Westinghouse Containment Hydrogen Purge Fan Fan type Centrifugal Capacity, cfm 30 Drive type Direct Manufacturer Buffalo Forge Company Hydrogen Igniters Quantity, total 104 each division 9 in drywell 43 in containment Voltage 120-V ac, 60 Hz Minimum surface temp 1,700°F Manufacturer Power System Division of Morrison-Knudson Model No.

6043

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-42 CORROSION RATES FOR ALUMINUM AND ZINC

• Where temperature (T) is in degrees Rankine 1 of 1 August 1987 Corrodible Temperature Corrosion Rate Surface

(°F)

(lb-mole/sq ft-hr)

Aluminum 414 1.19 x 10

-7 Zinc 1.282 x 10 3 exp

-13140.0*

T

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-43 SURFACE AREA AND MASS OF CORRODIBLES

• 1.5 moles of H2 are produced for each mole of Aluminum reacting.

• • 1 mole of H2 is produced for each mole of Zinc reacting.

Revision 23 1 of 1 x o15 Source Source Surface Area in Drywell (sq ft)

Total Mass (lbm)

Aluminum*

39,392 30,966 Zinc**

68,825 22,944 15mx

RBS USAR

• In the analysis, controls are initiated when the hydrogen concentration reached 3.5 volume percent.

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 TABLE 6.2-44 GENERAL PARAMETERS USED IN CALCULATING POST-DBA HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS

• 14 Extent of metal-water reaction A core wide average depth of 0.00023 in into original active fuel cladding, or five times the calculated amount, whichever amount is greater, in 2 min 14*

Fission product distribution model:

Halogens 50% released from core Noble gases 100% released from core Other fission products 1% of solids released from core and intimately mixed with the coolant Fraction of fission product energy absorbed by coolant:

Beta Beta from fission products 0.0 in fuel rods Beta from fission products 1.0 intimately mixed with suppression pool water Gamma Gamma from fission products 0.1 in fuel rods absorbed by coolant in core region Gamma from fission products 1.0 intimately mixed with suppression pool water Hydrogen Radiolytic Generation 0.5 molecule/100 eV Rate Oxygen Radiolytic Generation 0.25 molecule/100 eV Rate Hydrogen concentration limit* 4 volume percent

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-45 PLANT PARAMETERS USED IN POST-DBA HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION ANALYSIS

• This volume accounts for the fluid stored within the weir wall on the drywell floor in the long term.

• 14

• • This value bounds the reacting zr weight for operation at uprated power.

14*

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001

• 14 Reactor power 3,100 MW Drywell free volume 208,094 cu ft*

Containment free volume 1,191,590 cu ft Initial drywell pressure 14.7 psia

• 8 Initial drywell temperature 145.0°F 8*

Initial drywell dew point 109.8°F Initial containment pressure 14.7 psia Initial containment temperature 90°F Initial containment dew point 68.9°F

• 8 Weight of Zircaloy that would react (lbm) 589 lb**

(based on 5 times the value calculated for core-wide hydrogen generation in ECCS analyses) 8*

Hydrogen mixing fan flow rate (assuming 510 cfm failure of other fan and temperature of 70°F)

Fraction suppression pool water in drywell 0.278 Thermal hydrogen recombiner capacity 100 scfm (assuming failure of other recombiner) 14*

RBS USAR

• 6 TABLE 6.2-46 6*

Revision 6 1 of 1 August 1993 DELETED

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-47 SINGLE FAILURES AND CONSEQUENCES CONSIDERED IN CONTAINMENT EXTERNAL (NEGATIVE) PRESSURE ANALYSIS (1)The postulated initiating event is the failure of one automatic temperature control valve (TV5A, 5B or 122) to reduce chilled water flow to one unit cooler under normal operating, minimum heat load conditions.

(2)The postulated initiating event is a LOCA with standby service water at the minimum temperature of 60qF.

(3)See the discussion provided in Section 6.2.1.1.3.3.2.

Revision 23 1 of 1 Event Single Failure Consequences (1)

One containment-annulus diff. pressure transmitter Only 2 of 3 required to develop isolation signal. Cooldown terminated at -12 in W.G.

(1)

Division I containment-annulus diff. pressure signal (relay)

Division II signal isolates chilled water to all coolers via MOVs 129, 130, and 102. Cooldown terminated at -12 in W.G.

(1)

Division II containment-annulus diff. pressure signal (relay)

Division I signal isolates chilled water to all coolers via MOVs 127 and 128. Cooldown terminated at -12 in W.G.

(1)

Operator fails to isolate chilled water or unit cooler fan based on -5 in W.G. alarms Automatic signals isolate chilled water and stop fans at -12 in W.G.

(2)

Division I containment-annulus diff. pressure signal (relay)

Safety-related unit coolers UC-1A and UC-1B continue running until Division II signal isolates standby service water flow to UC-1B and the operator isolates UC-1A.

(3)

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-48 PROJECTED AREAS AND MOMENT ARMS FOR FORCE AND MOMENT CALCULATION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK, 27-NODE MODEL NOTES: See Figure 6.2-74 for load definition.

(1)Arx = -9.6875 (Hi) Sin(i-45)-Sin (i i)

(2)Asx = 12.583 (Hi) Sin(i-45)-Sin (i i) 1 of 1 August 1987 Node No.

i Height (ft) Hi Azimuth (deg) i Span (deg) i Projected Areas (ft)

Moment Arm (ft) Li Arx (1)

Asx (2) 1 5.21 0

45

- 14.788

+ 19.208 44.225 2

5.21 35 35

- 26.901

+ 34.941 44.225 3

5.21 90 35

- 26.901

+ 34.941 44.225 4

5.21 135 45

- 14.788

+ 19.208 44.225 5

5.29 0

45

-15.015

+ 19.503 38.975 6

5.29 35 35

- 27.314

+ 35.478 38.975 7

5.29 90 35

- 27.314

+ 35.478 38.975 8

5.29 135 45

- 15.015

+ 19.503 38.975 9

20.71 0

45

- 58.784

+ 76.354 25.975 10 20.71 45 45

-141.844

+184.240 25.975 11 20.71 90 45

-141.844

+184.240 25.975 12 20.71 135 45

- 58.784

+ 76.354 25.975 13 6.29 0

45

- 17.854

+ 23.190 12.475 14 6.29 45 45

- 43.080

+ 55.956 12.475 15 6.29 90 45

- 43.080

+ 55.956 12.475 16 6.29 135 45

- 17.854

+ 23.190 12.475 17 10.50 315 90

+101.719

-132.122 41.850 18 20.71 315 90

+200.628

-260.594 25.975 19 6.29 315 90

+ 60.934

- 79.146 12.475 20 9.33 45 180 0.0 0.0 4.665 21 10.50 225 90

+101.719

-132.122 41.580 22 20.71 225 90

+200.628

-260.594 25.975 23 6.29 225 90

+ 60.934

- 79.146 12.475 24 9.33 225 180 0.0 0.0 4.665 25 0.0 0

0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26 10.50 45 10

- 17.699

+ 22.989 41.580 27 10.50 55 10

- 17.699

+ 22.989 41.580

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-49 PROJECTED AREAS AND MOMENT ARMS FOR FORCE AND MOMENT CALCULATION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK, 25-NODE MODEL NOTES: See Figure 6.2-74 for load definition.

(1)Arx = -9.6875 (Hi) Sin (I -45)-Sin (i i)

(2)Asx = 12.583 (Hi) Sin (I -45)-Sin (i i) 1 of 1 August 1987 Node No.

i Height (ft) Hi Azimuth (deg) i Span (deg) i Projected Areas (ft)

Moment Arm (ft) Li Arx (1)

Asx (2) 1 5.21 0

45

- 14.788

+ 19.208 44.225 2

5.21 45 45

- 35.684

+ 46.350 44.225 3

5.21 90 45

- 35.684

+ 46.350 44.225 4

5.21 135 45

- 14.788

+ 19.208 44.225 5

5.29 0

45

- 15.015

+ 19.503 38.975 6

5.29 45 45

- 36.231

+ 47.060 38.975 7

5.29 90 45

- 36.231

+ 47.060 38.975 8

5.29 135 45

- 15.015

+ 19.503 38.975 9

20.71 0

45

- 58.784

+ 76.354 25.975 10 20.71 45 45

-141.844

+184.240 25.975 11 20.71 90 45

-141.844

+184.240 25.975 12 20.71 135 45

- 58.784

+ 76.354 25.975 13 6.29 0

45

- 17.854

+ 23.190 12.475 14 6.29 45 45

-43.080

+ 55.956 12.475 15 6.29 90 45

- 43.080

+ 55.956 12.475 16 6.29 135 45

- 17.854

+ 23.190 12.475 17 10.50 315 90

+101.719

-132.122 41.850 18 20.71 315 90

+200.628

-260.594 25.975 19 6.29 315 90

+ 60.934

- 79.146 12.475 20 9.33 45 180 0.0 0.0 4.665 21 10.50 225 90

+101.719

-132.122 41.580 22 20.71 225 90

+200.628

-260.594 25.975 23 6.29 225 90

+ 60.934

- 79.146 12.475 24 9.33 225 180 0.0 0.0 4.665 25 0.0 0

0 0.0 0.0 0.0

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-50 MAXIMUM FORCES AND MOMENTS RESULTING FROM ANNULUS PRESSURIZATION FEEDWATER LINE BREAK 25 AND 27 NODE MODELS NOTE:

The net force acting in the z-direction is zero due to symmetry with respect to the feedwater line axis (x-direction as shown on Figure 6.2-74).

1 of 1 August 1987 Annulus Nodal Maximum Force Maximum Moment Model Fx Time Mz Time Structure (nodes)

(kips)

(sec)

(ft-kips)

(sec)

Shield wall 25 521.8 0.015

-1.879x10 4

0.014 27 536.1 0.014

-2.011x10 4

0.014 RPV 25

-401.7 0.015 1.446x10 4

0.014 27

-412.8 0.014 1.549x10 4

0.014

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolation Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure Revision 12 page 1 of 10 December 1999

12 1DRB*Z22A LPCI A TO REACTOR WATER 10 YES SGTS 6.2-63 1E12*AOVF041A X

AO CHECK (1)

PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z22B 12

LPCI B TO REACTOR WATER 10 YES SGTS 6.2-63 1E12*AOVF041B X

AO CHECK (1)

PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z30 SPARE 1DRB*Z32 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL PURGE SUPPLY TO DRYWELL AIR AIR 24 42 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-64 6.2-64 1HVR*AOV125 1HVR*AOV147 X

X BUTTERFLY BUTTERFLY AOV AOV PISTON PISTON N/A N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FC FC B,K,RM B,K,RM 3

3 A

B 1DRB*Z34 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL PURGE OUTLET FROM DRYWELL AIR AIR 24 24 YES YES CONT CONT 6.2-64 6.2-64 1HVR*AOV148 1HVR*AOV146 X

X BUTTERFLY BUTTERFLY AOV AOV PISTON PISTON N/A N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED FC FC B,K,RM B,K,RM 3

3 B

A 1DRB*Z37A REACTOR BUILDING FLOOR DRAIN HEADER TO DRYWELL WATER WATER 8

8 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-64 6.2-64 1DFR*V4 1DFR*V3 X

X CHECK CHECK PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS N/A N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z37B REACTOR BUILDING FLOOR DRAIN HEADER TO DRYWELL WATER WATER 8

8 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-64 6.2-64 1DFR*V1 1DFR*V2 X

X CHECK CHECK PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS N/A N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z40A REACTOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT DRAIN HEADER TO DRYWELL WATER WATER 8

8 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-64 6.2-64 1DER*V14 1DER*V15 X

X CHECK CHECK PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS N/A N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z40B REACTOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT DRAIN HEADER TO DRYWELL WATER WATER 8

8 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-64 6.2-64 1DER*V17 1DER*V16 X

X CHECK CHECK PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS N/A N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure Revision 12 page 2 of 10 December 1999 1DRB*Z45 SERVICE AIR SUPPLY TO DRYWELL AIR AIR 4

4 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-65 6.2-65 1SAS*V489 1SAS*V487 X

X GATE CHECK MV PROCESS MANUAL PROCESS N/A N/A LC CLOSED LC CLOSED LC CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z47 INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO DRYWELL AIR AIR 3

3 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-65 6.2-65 1IAS*V79 1IAS*V78 X

X GATE CHECK MV PROCESS MANUAL PROCESS N/A N/A OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z50 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATYER SUPPLY TO DRYWELL WATER WATER 6

6 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-65 6.2-65 1CCP*MOV142 1CCO*V119 X

X BUTTERFLY CHECK MOV PROCESS ELECT PROCESS MANUAL N/A OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI N/A B,K,RM N/A 30 N/A A

N/A 1DRB*Z51 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER RETURN FROM DRYWELL WATER WATER 6

6 NO NO CONT CONT 6.2-65 6.2-65 1CCP-MOV144 1CCP*MOV143 X

X BUTTERFLY BUTTERFLY MOV MOV ELECT ELECT MANUAL MANUAL OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FAI FAI B,K,RM B,K,RM 30 30 B

A 1DRB*Z54 SERVICE WATER SUPPLY TO DRYWELL WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 10 10 8

3/4 10 NO NO NO NO NO SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 N/A N/A 6.2-65 1SWP*MOV4A 1SWP*MOV4B 1HVN*V542 1SWP*RV119 1SWPV205 X

X X

X X

GATE GATE GATE RV GLOBE GATE MOV MOV MV PROCESS MV ELECT ELECT MANUAL PROCESS MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL N/A N/A N/A OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED LO OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED LO CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED LO FAI FAI N/A N/A N/A B,K,RM B,K,RM N/A N/A N/A 52.8 51.7 N/A N/A N/A A

B N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z55

3 3

SERVICE WATER RETURN FROM DRYWELL WATER WATER WATER WATER WATER 10 10 10 3/4 8

NO NO NO NO NO SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS 6.2-65 6.2-65 6.2-65 N/A N/A 1SWP*V206 1SWP*MOV5A 1SWP*MOV5B 1SWP*RV140 1HVN*V543 X

X X

X X

GATE GATE GATE RV GLOBE GATE MV MOV MOV PROCESS MV MANUAL ELECT ELECT PROCESS MANUAL N/A MANUAL MANUAL N/A N/A LO OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED LO OPEN OPEN CLOSED OPEN LO CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A FAI FAI N/A N/A N/A B,K,RM B,K,RM N/A N/A N/A 50.6 53.9 N/A N/A N/A A

B N/A N/A 1DRB*Z56

12 12

SLC SYSTEM INJECTION SOLENOID (8) 1 1/2 NO CONT 6.2-63 1C41*VEX F004A X

GATE EXPLOSIVE ELECT N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN (ACTUATED)

N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondar y

Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure Revision 7 page 3 of 10 January 1995 Inj Soln (13) 1 1/2 No Cont 6.2-63 1C41*VEX F004B X

Gate Explosive Elect N/A Closed Closed Open (Actuated)

N/A N/A N/A N/A Inj Soln (13) 1 1/2 No Cont 6.2-63 1C41*V F006 X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Process N/A N/A N/A N/A Inj Soln (13) 1 1/2 No Cont 6.2-63 1C41*v F007 X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Process N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z57A Hydrogen mixing system Air Air 6

6 Yes Yes Cont Cont 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CPM*MOV2A 1CPM*MOV4A X

X Butterfly Butterfly MOV MOV Elect Elect Manual Manual Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open FAI FAI A, K, RM A, K, RM 33 33 A

A 1DRB*Z57B Hydrogen mixing system Air Air 6

6 Yes Yes Cont Cont 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CPM*MOV2B 1CPM*MOV4B X

X Butterfly Butterfly MOV MOV Elect Elect Manual Manual Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open FAI FAI A, K, RM A, K, RM 33 33 B

B 1DRB*Z58A Hydrogen mixing system Air Air 6

6 Yes Yes Cont Cont 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CPM*MOV3A 1CPM*MOV1A X

X Butterfly Butterfly MOV MOV Elect Elect Manual Manual Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open FAI FAI A, K, RM A, K, RM 33 33 A

A 1DRB*Z58B Hydrogen mixing system Air Air 6

6 Yes Yes Cont Cont 6.2-64 6.2-64 1CPM*MOV3B 1CPM*MOV1B X

X Butterfly Butterfly MOV MOV Elect Elect Manual Manual Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open FAI FAI A, K, RM A, K, RM 33 33 B

B

7 1DRB-Z67A 1DRB-Z67B 1DRB-Z67C 1DRB-Z67D 7

Tip Drives N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB-Z107 Air Supply for main steam safety and relief valves systems Air Air Air Air 1 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 No No No No SGTS SGTS SGTS SGTS N/A N/A N/A N/A 1SVV*V50 1B21*VF036A 1B21*VF036F 1B21*VF036G X

X X

X Globe Check Check Check MV Process Process Process Manual Process Process Process N/A N/A N/A N/A Open Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondar y

Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure page 4 of 10 August 1987 Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF036P X

Check Process Process N/A Close d

Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air supply for main steam safety and relief valve system.

Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039C X

Check Process Process N/A Close d

Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039H X

Check Process Process N/A Close d

Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039K X

Check Process Process N/A Close d

Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039S X

Check Process Process N/A Close d

Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z108 Spare 1DRB*Z109 Spare 1DRB*Z110 Spare 1DRB*Z111 Spare 1DRB*Z112 Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1SYV*V53 X

Globe MV Process N/A Open Open Open N/A N/A N/A N/A Air supply for main steam safety and relief valve system Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VP036J X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF036L X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF036M X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF036N X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VP036R X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039B X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 1/2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039D X

Check Process Process N/A Cloned Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A Air 1 /2 No SGTS N/A 1B21*VF039E X

Check Process Process N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure page 5 of 10 August 1987 1DRB*Z117 SPARE 1DRB*Z118 SPARE 1DRB*Z119 SPARE 1DRB*Z120 SPARE 1DRB*Z123 SPARE 1DRB*Z124 SPARE 1DRB*Z127 SPARE 1DRB*Z128 SPARE WATER 3/4 NO CONT 6.2-65 1B33*VF017A X

CHECK PROCESS PROCESS N/A OPEN CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z133 RECIRCULATION PUMP Pump SEAL SUPPLY WATER 3/4 NO CONT 6.2-65 1B33*VF013A X

CHECK PROCESS PROCESS N/A OPEN CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A WATER 3/4 NO CONT 6.2-65 1B33*VF017B X

CHECK PROCESS PROCESS N/A OPEN CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z135 RECIRCULATION PUMP SEAL SUPPLY WATER 3/4 NO CONT 6.265 1B33*VF013B X

CHECK PROCESS PROCESS N/A OPEN CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z136 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF047A X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z137 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041A X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z130 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF051G X

RY GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure page 6 of 10 August 1987



1DRB*Z139 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041L X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z140 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF047C X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z141 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041G X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z142 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF051C X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z143 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041C X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1SBP*Z144 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF047B X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z145 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041B X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z146 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF051B X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z147 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041F X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z148 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF047F X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z149 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF041D X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z150 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF047D X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z151 (S/R PEN.)

SRV DISCHARGE STEAM 10 YES CONT N/A 1B21*RVF051D X

RV GLOBE PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure Revision 18 page 7 of 10 1DRB*Z152 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 1

NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV58A X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A A

1DRB*Z153 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 1

NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV59A X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A A

1DRB*Z154 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 1/2 NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV60A X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A A

1DRB*Z155 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 3/4 NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV61A X

GLOBE NOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A A

1DRB*Z156 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 1

NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV58B X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A B

1DRB*Z157 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 1

NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV59B X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A B

1DRB*Z158 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 1/2 NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV60B X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A B

1DRB*Z159 RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL HYDRAULICS (9) (10)

HYD 3/4 NO CONT N/A 1RCS*MOV61B X

GLOBE MOV ELECT MANUAL OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI B, K, RM N/A B

1DRB*Z160 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

WIDE RANGE LEVEL CONTROL WATER 1

NO CONT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z161 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

VENT LINE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure

 



 







1DRB*Z162 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

BULKHEAD DRAIN N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z163 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

BULKHEAD DRAIN N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z164 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z165 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z166 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z170 (TYPE SEAL SUPPORT)

REACTOR BUILDING EQIPMENT DRAINS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z301 THROUGH 1RB*Z332 INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATION THROUGH DRYWELL WALL(6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z333 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES CONT N/A 1CMS*SOV32A X

GLOBE SOV ELECT N/A OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI RM N/A A

1DRB*Z334 INSTRUMENTATION PENE-TRATIONS THROUGH DRYWELL WALL(6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

DRYWELL ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR FLUID LINES Drywell Pen.

Number System Fluid Line Size (inch)

ESF System Through Line Leakage Classi-fication FSAR Arrgt Figure Isolation Valve Number Location of Valve Valve Type Operator Actuation Mode Position Isolatio n Signal Closure Time (sec)

Power Source Inside/

Drywell Outside Drywell Primary Secondary Normal Shutdown Post-Accident Power Failure Revision 19

page 9 of 10 1DRB*Z335 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES CONT N/A 1CMS*SOV32G X

GLOBE SOV ELECT N/A OPEN OPEN CLOSED FAI RM N/A A

1DRB*Z336 THROUGH 1DRB*Z426 INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATIONS THROUGH DRYWELL WALL (6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z427 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES SGTS N/A 1CMS*V41 X

CHECK PROCESS PROCESS N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z428 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES SGTS N/A 1CMS*SOV34D X

GLOBE SOV ELECT N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN FAI RM N/A B

1DRB*Z429 INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATIONS THROUGH DRYWELL WALL (6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z430 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES SGTS N/A 1CMS*SOV34B X

GLOBE SOV ELECT N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN FAI RM N/A B

1DRB*Z431 THROUGH 1DRB*Z448 INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATIONS THROUGH DRYWELL WALL (6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1DRB*Z449 REACTOR PLANT SAMPLINE WATER WATER 3/4 3/4 NO NO CONT CONT N/A N/A 1B33*AOVF019 1B33*AOVF020 X

X GLOBE GLOBE AOV AOV PISTON PISTON N/A N/A OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED FC FC E,B,RM E,B,RM 5

5 B

A 1DRB*Z450 THROUGH 1DRB*Z498 INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATIONS THROUGH DRYWELL WALL (6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

6 1DRB*Z504 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES SGTS N/A 1CMS*SOV34C X

GLOBE SOV ELECT N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN FAI RM N/A A

1DRB*Z502 6

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING PROBE AIR 3/4 YES SGTS N/A 1CMS*SOV34A X

GLOBE SOV ELECT N/A CLOSED CLOSED OPEN FAI RM N/A A

12 12

6 1DRB *Z499, 500, 503, 505 THROUGH 1DRB*Z534 6

INSTRUMENTATION PENETRATIONS THROUGH DRYWELL WALL (6)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-51 (CONT)

Revision 21 page 10 of 10 NOTES (1) Testable check valves are designed for remote opening with zero differential pressure across the seat. The valves close on reverse flow even though the test switches may be positioned for open.

The valves open when pump pressure exceeds reactor pressure even though test switch may be positioned for close.

(2) The ac motor-operated valves are powered from the designated ac standby bus. Dc motoroperated isolation valves are powered from the designated plant battery.

(3) All motoroperated isolation valves remain in the last position upon failure of valve power. All air-operated valves close on motive air failure. All airoperated valves close on power failure to the solenoid pilots.

(4) Normal status position of valve (open or close) is the position during normal power operation of the reactor (see PositionNormal column.)

(5) Closing time is based upon valve closure rate and line size.

(6) These are instrument isolation valves that are required to remain open during a LOCA.

(7) Some valves located within the drywell serve as containment isolation valves. These valves are located in Table 6.2-40, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Lines.

(8) Injection solution is sodium pentaborate.

(9) A single failure of one division of electrical power could result in the failure to isolate four recirculation flow control hydraulics penetrations. However, the potential drywell bypass leakage through these four penetrations would be only a small fraction (~2 percent) of the total calculated allowable bypass leakage capacity of A/K of 0.81 ft2.

(10) Due to NRC Generic Letter 96-06 concerns, associated penetration integrity is no longer assumed (Ref. ER 99-0741). For this reason, valve has no safety functions.

Isolation Signal Codes B - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 2 SGTS - Standby Gas Treatment System K - High Drywell Pressure Cont - Containment RM - Remote Manual Operation as Appropriate AOV - Air-Operated Valve E - Main Steam Line Radiation High MOV - MotorOperated Valve A - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1 FC - Fail Close SOY - SolenoidOperated Valve FAI - Fail As Is LO - Locked Open MY - Manual Valve LC - Locked Close

Revision 8 1 of 4 August 1996 TABLE 6.2-52

SUMMARY

OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE OPERABILITY DEMONSTRATION Consideration RBS Analysis

1. Valve closure rate Valve closure is within 3 sec. This is ensured in Reference 27.

The 3-sec closure ensures worst-case differential pressure of 3

psi or less (see Item 2).

2. Flow direction Flow direction evaluation Reference through valve and

27. 1HVR*AOV165 and 166 are in pre-P across the valve ferred direction for

closure, and 1HVR*AOV123 and 128 are in non preferred direction.

The maximum differential pressure is less than 3 psi based on various accidents outlined on Fig. 6.2-4 through 6.2-7.

Isolation occurs based on drywell pressure.

See logic description, Fig. 7.3-9, sheet 14.

3. Single valve closure In performing the LOCA analysis, it vs simultaneous was assumed that the valves close valve closure individually.

This assumption is considered more conservative because if both valves closed simultaneously, the resistance in the system would be

greater, and consequently, the flow and the aerodynamic torque would be less.

4. Containment back-The backpressure effect on venting pressure effect on pilot air to the containment is closing torque margins conservatively addressed in Refer-of the air-operated ence 27 (i.e., assumed psi contain-valves which vent pilot ment backpressure).

air inside containment

5. Adequacy of accumulator Accumulator not required.

Valves close by spring force on release of air from operator.

6. Adequacy of torque-No torque-limiting devices are limiting devices required because of the valves design.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-52 (Cont)

Consideration RBS Analysis Revision 8 2 of 4 August 1996

7. Effect of upstream and The effect of the piping system down-stream piping system was addressed in Reference 27.

Only one

valve, 1HVR*AOV123, required that the effects of an elbow be addressed.

An investigation by Posi-Seal could not develop conclusive results about the effects of elbows on the flow stream.

For this reason Posi-Seal made estimates about effects on the flow stream through the bend and added this to the LOCA-developed torques through a straight run of pipe.

Posi-Seal's analysis, outlined in Reference 27, indicated that the valve actuator would develop enough torque to close the valve.

After reviewing the effects of a

3 psi pressure differential across the

valve, the LOCA-developed torque was doubled through a

straight run of pipe in accordance with the NRC concern outlined in to the letter from A.

Schwencer (NRC) to W.J. Cahill (GSU) dated December 21, 1982.

Doubling of this torque did not exceed the available actuator closing torque thus indicating that the valves would close.

8. Effects of butterfly valve The effect of the valves' disc and disc and shaft orientation shaft orientation was addressed in on valve operation Reference 27.

The

analysis, assuming a

9 psi pressure drop across the

valves, indicated that valve 1HVR*AOV123 be restricted at 65 deg open.

To be conservative, all four valves will be restricted to 65 deg open.

When restricted to this size

opening, and considering the valve design, flow will tend to close the valve.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-52 (Cont)

Consideration RBS Analysis Revision 12 3 of 4 December 1999 9.

Seismic and stress loading

Valves, solenoids, and limit switches were seismically analyzed and qualified for stress conditions developed by a LOCA.

• 8 *6

10. Effects of environmental The RBS environmental qualification conditions on valves (i.e.,

program demonstrates qualification radiation temperatures, of valve appurtenances such as containment sprays, etc) actuators, limit

switches, and solenoid valves.

As applicable, a

qualified life based on environ-mental conditions is specified for each component.

• 12

11. Seal integrity after Valves were pressure leak tested closure of valves by the vendor to a minimum of 75 psig using the halogen diode detector effects method outlined in accordance with ASME Section V,

Article 10, Paragraph T-1040. During plant operation, the valves will be subject to the integrated leak rate test in accordance with

10CFR50, Appendix J.

The valves seals will be tested to demonstrate their integrity in accordance with Plant Technical Specifications.

6* *8 *12

12. Debris screens Debris screens have been installed in accordance with NRC requests in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 (see Section 9.4.6.2.5).

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-52 (Cont)

Consideration RBS Analysis Revision 12 4 of 4 December 1999

13. Scope of operational and Valves have been hydrostatically leak tests performed on tested by the the seller for adher-valves ence to requirements of Paragraph NC-6000,Code Class 2, ASME III.

The valves have been leak tested to requirements outlined in Item 11 of this table.

The valves have been cycled by the seller to indicate that they open against a

maximum differential pressure of 15 psi.

Valve 1HVR*AOV128 has been tested for operability with a

simulated static load of 3.0 g placed on the valve.

• 12 During plant operation, the valves' seals will be demonstrated operable in accordance with Plant Technical Specifications.

• 12 Hydrodynamic testing was performed by Posi-Seal on valves up to 14 in.

in diameter.

An analysis was also performed to demonstrate that the hydrodynamic test data can be applied to develop aerodynamic torque coefficients for the subject valves.

The applicability is attributed to the low flow mach number and a

flow compressibility factor approaching unity.

The results of this combination of testing and analysis were applied to RBS's design conditions to verify that valves 1HVR*AOV123,

128, 165, and 166 will isolate the containment during the postulated LOCA.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-53 HYDROGEN IGNITERS AND LOCATIONS (1)All igniter numbers are prefixed with 1HCS*IGN.

(2)Radius in feet from reactor centerline.

(3)Inaccessible areas are defined as areas that have high radiation levels during the entire refueling outage period.

These areas are the heat exchanger, filter demineralizer, backwash, and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system.

5 Revision 5 1 of 4 August 1992 Igniter (1)

Division Elevation (ft-in)

Radius (2)

Azimuth (deg)

Area (3) 1A I

255-0 20.0 0.0 Containment 1B II 255-0 20.0 90.0 Containment 2A I

255-0 20.0 180.0 Containment 2B II 255-0 20.0 270.0 Containment 3A I

250-0 38.0 337.5 Containment 3B II 250-0 38.0 22.5 Containment 4A I

250-0 38.0 67.5 Containment 4B II 250-0 38.0 112.5 Containment 5A I

250-0 38.0 157.5 Containment 5B II 250-0 38.0 202.5 Containment 6A I

250-0 38.0 247.5 Containment 6B II 250-0 38.0 292.5 Containment 7A I

239-0 56.0 315.0 Containment 7B II 239-0 56.0 0.0 Containment 8A I

239-0 56.0 45.0 Containment 8B II 239-0 56.0 90.0 Containment 9A I

239-0 56.0 135.0 Containment 9B II 239-0 56.0 180.0 Containment 10A I

239-0 56.0 225.0 Containment 10B II 239-0 56.0 270.0 Containment 11A I

166-6 50.5 20.8 RWCU Heat Exchanger Room 11B II 173-0 48.3 27.0 Containment 12A I

173-6 57.0 64.0 Containment 12B II 176-6 53.0 88.9 Containment 13A I

167-3 29.2 52.1 Contaminated Equipment Store Room 13B II 167-3 32.4 123.6 Contaminated Equipment Store Room 14A I

173-0 60.0 115.0 Containment 14B II 169-9 52.3 153.9 Containment 15A I

183-6 56.6 238.0 Containment 15B II 183-6 56.6 212.0 Containment 16A I

173-0 53.5 249.3 Containment 16B II 172-0 53.0 290.9 Containment

RBS USAR TABLE 6.2-53 (Cont)

(1)All igniter numbers are prefixed with 1HCS*IGN.

(2)Radius in feet from reactor centerline.

(3)Inaccessible areas are defined as areas that have high radiation levels during the entire refueling outage period. These areas are the heat exchanger, filter demineralizer, backwash, and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system.

5 Revision 5 2 of 4 August 1992 Igniter (1)

Division Elevation (ft-in)

Radius (2)

Azimuth (deg)

Area (3) 17A I

170-6 40.0 298.4 RWCU Valve Nest and Pump Room 17B II 172-0 38.5 240.5 RWCU Valve Nest and Pump Room 18A I

173-0 31.6 235.3 RWCU Filter Demin A Room 18B II 173-0 23.3 260.1 RWCU Filter Demin A Room 19A I

175-6 31.3 303.9 RWCU Filter Demin B Room 19B II 174-6 23.5 282.3 RWCU Filter Demin B Room 20A I

168-0 54.1 293.9 Containment 20B II 170-0 50.8 319.0 Containment 21A I

167-4 48.0 338.1 RWCU Heat Exchanger Room 21B II 167-6 43.4 4.0 RWCU Heat Exchanger Room 22A I

150-0 51.4 21.7 Containment 22B II 154-0 60.0 63.0 Containment 23A I

159-6 60.0 84.0 Containment 23B II 152-0 60.0 115.0 Containment 24A I

154-0 60.0 153.0 Containment 24B II 128-0 51.1 145.0 Containment 25A I

159-6 50.0 210.0 Containment 25B II 151-0 60.0 238.0 Containment

RBS USAR 5

TABLE 6.2-53 (Cont)

(1)All igniter numbers are prefixed with 1HCS*IGN.

(2)Radius in feet from reactor centerline.

(3)Inaccessible areas are defined as areas that have high radiation levels during the entire refueling outage period. These areas are the heat exchanger, filter demineralizer, backwash, and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system.

5 Revision 5 3 of 4 August 1992 Igniter (1)

Division Elevation (ft-in)

Radius (2)

Azimuth (deg)

Area (3) 26A I

157-6 49.6 247.5 RWCU Backwash Room 26B II 149-0 48.8 275.9 RWCU Backwash Room 27A I

153-4 46.2 321.1 Containment 27B II 152-7 52.3 294.8 Containment 28A I

156-0 24.8 0.0 Drywell 28B II 156-0 23.0 58.5 Drywell 29A I

156-0 21.5 125.0 Drywell 29B II 156-0 25.0 180.0 Drywell 30A I

156-0 22.0 233.0 Drywell 30B II 156-0 21.0 306.0 Drywell 31A I

126-0 51.5 341.9 Main Steam Tunnel 31B II 126-0 53.5 17.4 Main Steam Tunnel 32A I

130-0 60.0 69.0 Containment 32B II 126-0 60.0 30.0 Containment 33A I

124-0 60.0 115.0 Containment 33B II 126-0 60.0 90.0 Containment 34A I

126-0 47.0 180.0 Containment 34B II 139-4 54.2 209.9 Containment 35A I

136-0 46.6 155.1 Drywell Hatch Area 35B II 136-0 45.0 178.7 Drywell Hatch Area 36A I

136-0 56.4 166.3 SFC Piping and Valve Area 36B II 136-0 57.3 185.6 SFC Piping and Valve Area 37A I

135-0 39.9 202.1 Fuel Transfer Tube Area

RBS USAR 5

TABLE 6.2-53 (Cont)

(1)All igniter numbers are prefixed with 1HCS*IGN.

(2)Radius in feet from reactor centerline.

(3)Inaccessible areas are defined as areas that have high radiation levels during the entire refueling outage period. These areas are the heat exchanger, filter demineralizer, backwash, and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system.

5 Revision 5 4 of 4 August 1992 Igniter (1)

Division Elevation (ft-in)

Radius (2)

Azimuth (deg)

Area (3) 37B II 134-0 49.4 201.3 Fuel Transfer Tube Area 38A I

139-4 54.0 240.5 Containment 38B II 126-0 60.0 270.0 Containment 39A I

126-6 60.0 298.5 Containment 39B II 130-0 55.4 328.0 Containment 40A I

138-8 25.0 293.3 Drywell 40B II 133-1 18.8 359.2 Drywell 41A I

139-10 21.6 60.4 Drywell 41B II 133-5 21.8 129.9 Drywell 42A I

138-11 23.0 179.0 Drywell 42B II 135-10 22.0 240.0 Drywell 43A I

108-9 39.5 330.0 Containment 43B II 108-0 39.5 5.0 Containment 44A I

112-5 44.5 39.0 Containment 44B II 109-0 39.5 65.0 Containment 45A I

110-0 39.5 95.0 Containment 45B II 112-5 42.2 117.0 Containment 46A I

112-5 44.5 155.0 Containment 46B II 112-5 41.5 176.0 Containment 47A I

112-5 41.5 204.0 Containment 47B II 112-5 43.0 244.0 Containment 48A I

109-6 39.5 268.0 Containment 48B II 108-6 39.5 297.0 Containment 49A I

116-8 26.0 354.5 Drywell 49B II 116-6 20.9 66.8 Drywell 50A I

116-7 21.2 113.4 Drywell 50B II 116-7 21.0 180.0 Drywell 51A I

115-2 20.8 247.3 Drywell 51B II 116-6 21.2 292.9 Drywell 52A I

179-3 30.3 80.5 Upper Fuel Pool Valve Room 52B II 179-3 33.2 138.8 Upper Fuel Pool Valve Room

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-1 OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS FOR DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT (1)

GNF2 Analyses for Two Loop Operation (2)

Revision 24 1 of 1 Event Occurrences GNF2 Time (sec)

(1)

LOCA Occurs 0.00 Initiate Scram (on Level 3)

(3) 0.01 Low-Low (Level 2 level) 2.62 Low-Low-Low (Level 1 level) 4.15 Jet Pump Uncovers 4.84 Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero 5.00 TCVs Fully Closed 5.92 Lower Plenum Flashes 8.17 LPCS Valve Pressure Permissive LPCI Valve Pressure Permissive 30.87 LPCS Injection Occurs LPCI Injection Occurs 85.91 ADS Valves Open 125.91 PCT Occurs 178.30 (1) DBA is a LPCS-DG failure for GNF2 fuel; therefore, no LPCS injection.

(2) Peak cladding temperature (PCT) for single loop operation (SLO) is bounded by PCT for two loop operation.

(3) The initial water level is conservatively assumed to be at L3.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-2 Revision 24 1 of 5 PLANT PARAMETERS USED IN RBS GNF2 LOCA ANALYSES Plant Parameters Value Core Thermal Power (MWt)

(1) 3100.0 Vessel Steam Output (Mlbm/hr) 13.489 Core Flow (Mlbm/hr)

(2) 84.5 Vessel Steam Dome pressure (psia)

(3) 1093 Maximum Recirculation Line Break Area (ft 2)

(4) 2.2241

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-2 (Cont)

Revision 21 2 of 5

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System Variable Units Value

a. Maximum vessel pressure at which pumps can inject psid (vessel to drywell) 222.0

b. Minimum rated flow from three pumps at vessel pressure gpm 13410 psid (vessel to drywell) 20

c. Initiating signals Low water level (L1) or in. above vessel zero (AVZ) 354.98 High drywell pressure psid n/a (6)

d. Maximum allowable time delay from initiating signal to pumps at rated speed (including DG start time).

sec 68.75

e. Pressure at which LPCI injection valve may open psia 350

f. LPCI injection valve (IV) stroke time sec 47

g. Maximum allowed runout flow from three pumps gpm 13410

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-2 (Cont)

Revision 21 3 of 5

2. Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System Variable Units Value

a. Maximum vessel pressure at which pump can inject psid (vessel to drywell) 263.0

b. Minimum rated flow at vessel pressure gpm psid (vessel to drywell) 4410 113

c. Initiating signals Low water level (L1) or in. above vessel zero (AVZ) 354.98 High drywell pressure psid n/a (6)

d. Maximum allowable time delay from initiating signal to pumps at rated speed (including DG start time.)

sec 58.75

e. Pressure at which LPCS injection valve may open psia 350

f. LPCS injection valve (IV) stroke time sec 37

g. Maximum allowed runout flow gpm 4950

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-2 (Cont)

Revision 21 4 of 5

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Variable Units Value

a. Maximum vessel pressure at which pump can inject psid (vessel to drywell) 1177.0

b. Minimum rated flow at vessel pressure gpm / psid (vessel to source of suction) 0/1177 1260/1147 4410/ 200

c. Initiating signals Low water level (L2) or in. above vessel zero (AVZ) 454.82 High drywell pressure psid n/a (6)

d. Maximum allowable time delay from initiating signal to pumps at rated speed (including DG start time.)

sec 57

e. HPCS injection valve (IV) stroke time sec 37

f. Maximum allowed runout flow gpm 4900

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-2 (Cont)

Revision 21 5 of 5

4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) System Variable Units Value

a. Total number of valves installed 7

b. Number of valves used in analysis 4

(5)

c. Minimum flow capacity of 4 valves at vessel pressure Mlbm/hr psig 3.700 1241

d. Initiating signals Low water level (L2) or in. above vessel zero (AVZ) 354.95 High drywell pressure and psid 2.0 High drywell pressure bypass timer timed out in. above vessel zero (AVZ) 354.98

e. High drywell pressure bypass timer sec 360 Initiating signal:

Low water level (L1) in. above vessel zero (AVZ) 354.48

f. Delay time from all initiating signals complete to the time valves are open with confirmation that LPCI or LPCS is running.

sec 120 (1) This value is 0.3% greater than the licensed power level of 3091 MWt as permitted by the Appendix K Uprate as described in Section 1.1.

(2) Results bound increased core flow operation at 90.415 Mlbm/hr.

(3) Same for two and single loop operation.

(4) The recirculation line break area includes the vessel nozzle on the suction side of the recirculation pump and the recirculation piping which feeds the jet pump drive lines.

(5) The ECCS-LOCA evaluation justifies the use of four operable valves eliminating the need to evaluate the single failure of an ADS valve (SF-ADS) as a separate failure.

(6) No credit is taken for the initiation signal on high drywell pressure.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-3

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS OF LOCA ANALYSIS Revision 24 1 of 1 PCT

(

oF)

Break Size (Appendix K)

(1)

Single Failure GNF2 DBA LPCS-DG 1775 0.05 ft 2

HPCS-DG 1764 (1)DBA is defined as the break size type that produces the highest PCT for a given single failure. A detailed listing of the PCT for various break sizes and types is given in Reference 9 for GNF2, respectively.

The figures for Appendix K conditions from Reference 9 are provided in Figures 6.3-11c to 6.3-18c.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-4 KEY TO FIGURES Revision 10 1 of 1 April 1998 THIS TABLE HAS BEEN DELETED

Revision 10 1 of 1 April 1998 RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-5 THIS TABLE HAS BEEN DELETED

RBS USAR TABLE 6.3-6 SINGLE FAILURE EVALUATION

NOTES:

Other postulated failures are not specially considered because they all result in at least as much ECCS capacity as one of the above designed failures.

(1) Systems remaining, as identified in the table, are applicable to all non-ECCS line breaks.

For a

LOCA from an ECCS line break, the systems remaining are those listed, less the ECCS in which the break is assumed.

• 14 (2) Analysis performed with two nonfunctioning ADS valve in addition to the single failure.

See Section 6.3.3.3.

14*

Revision 14 1 of 1 September 2001 The following table shows the single, active failures considered in the ECCS performance evaluation.

Suction Break Assumed Failure Systems Remaining(1)

LPCI Emergency Diesel ADS(2), HPCS, LPCS, 1 LPCI Generator (D/G)

LPCS Emergency D/G ADS(2), HPCS, 2 LPCI HPCS Emergency D/G ADS(2), LPCS, 3 LPCI

RBS USAR 1 of 6 August 1987 TABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE FILTER SYSTEMS WITH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52 REQUIREMENTS Fuel Building Main Control Room Reg. Guide Charcoal Fil-Air-Conditioning Paragraph No.

SGTS tration System Subsystem C Environmental Design Criteria 1.a In compliance In compliance In compliance 1.b In compliance In compliance In compliance 1.c In compliance In compliance In compliance 1.d In compliance In compliance Not applicable 1.e In compliance In compliance Not applicable C System Design Criteria 2.a In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.b In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.c In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.d In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.e In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.f In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.g See Note 1 See Note 1 See Note 1 2.h See Note 2 See Note 2 See Note 2 2.i In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.j See Note 3 See Note 3 See Note 3 2.k In compliance In compliance In compliance 2.l See Note 13 See Note 13 See Note 13 C Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing 3.a In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.b In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.c In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.d In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.e See Note 5 See Note 5 See Note 5 3.f In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.g In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.h In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.i In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.j In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.k See Note 6 See Note 6 See Note 6 3.l See Note 7 See Note 7 See Note 7 3.m In compliance In compliance In compliance 3.n See Note 8 See Note 8 See Note 8 3.o In compliance In compliance In compliance

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-1 (Cont) 2 of 6 August 1987 Fuel Building Main Control Room Reg. Guide Charcoal Fil-Air-Conditioning Paragraph No.

SGTS tration System Subsystem 3.p See Note 9 See Note 9 See Note 9 C Maintenance 4.a See Note 10 See Note 10 See Note 10 4.b In compliance In compliance In compliance 4.c In compliance In compliance In compliance 4.d See Note 11 See Note 11 See Note 11 4.e In compliance In compliance In compliance C In-Place Testing Criteria 5.a In compliance In compliance In compliance 5.b In compliance In compliance In compliance 5.c In compliance In compliance In compliance 5.d In compliance In compliance In compliance C Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated Carbon 6.a See Note 12 See Note 12 See Note 12 6.b See Note 12 See Note 12 See Note 12 Note 1:

Abnormal pressure drop across all critical components (C-2.g) of SGTS, fuel building charcoal filtration system, and the main control room air-conditioning subsystem trains activates an alarm in the main control

room, and flow-through units are indicated in the main control room;

however, no facilities to record these readings are provided.

Computer input is provided to record high-pressure alarms across critical components.

The main control room air intake which is upstream of the control room (ESF) filter, the plant exhaust duct which is downstream of the standby gas treatment (ESF)

filter, and the fuel building exhaust plenum which is downstream of fuel building (ESF) filter, are each provided with safety grade radiation monitors for their respective flow paths.

Except for the monitors in the main control room

intakes, these monitors have the capability to indicate flow rate.

If a

low-flow condition is detected, the affected ESF filter can be isolated and the respective redundant filter placed in

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-1 (Cont) 3 of 6 August 1987 service from the main control room.

In addition, a safety grade flow switch is provided on the discharge side of each of the above filter fans to automatically start up the respective redundant ESF filter should a low-flow condition at filter fan discharge occur.

Note 2:

The following exceptions are made to the requirements that (C-2.h) all instrumentation and equipment controls should be designed to IEEE 279.

1.

All instruments and equipment controls that sense or process one or more variables and act to accomplish the protective function are designed in accordance with IEEE 279.

These include

sensors, signal conditioners,

logic, and actuation device control circuitry.

(The protective function with which the subject guide is concerned is secondary containment atmospheric cleanup to mitigate accident doses.)

2.

In addition, a very limited class of analog indicators may be designed in accordance with selected applicable paragraphs of IEEE 279.

The basis for selecting specific indicators to be designed is their significance to safety.

All paragraphs of IEEE 279 are applicable except 4.12, 4.13, 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17.

For this limited class of indicators, redundant analog channels are provided.

One channel is recorded.

The systems are designed to operate before and after, but not necessarily during, an SSE.

3.

Annunciator functions are incorporated in the overall system design.

Annunciators are not safety related; therefore, they are not designed in accordance with IEEE 279.

Note 3:

The charcoal filter banks are not designed to be removable (C-2.j) from the building as intact units.

The size of the banks precludes removal in one section.

The ESF filter systems are designed to be removed as a minimum number of segmented sections.

Individual filter components are removed prior to cutting the housing into segmented sections.

The guidelines of Regulatory

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-1 (Cont) 4 of 6 August 1987 Guide 8.8 have been considered in the physical design of the ESF filters.

The two redundant filter trains are physically separated into shielded cubicles so that maintenance on one filter train will not involve radiation exposure from the other train.

Removable concrete plugs are provided to remove filter components or housing segments.

Adequate maintenance space is provided within the filter cubicles for component changeout and use of auxiliary ventilation equipment to control airborne radioactivity during filter maintenance.

A decontamination spray is built into the filter housing with adequate housing floor drains for water and condensation removal.

Airtight access doors are provided on the housing for filter components.

Escape of airborne contamination from the system is prevented by use of a

totally enclosed filter train all welded steel

housing, and verified by surveillance requirements for leakage tests.

All controls and instrumentation necessary to operate the ESF filters are located outside the filter cubicles in low radiation areas.

Note 5:

Filter and adsorber mounting frames are constructed and (C-3.e) designed in accordance with the recommendations of Section 4.3 of ERDA 76-21(2) except for the frame tolerance guidelines in Table 4.2.

The tolerances selected for HEPA and adsorber mountings are sufficient to satisfy the bank leak test criteria of Paragraphs C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

Note 6:

When conservative calculations show that the maximum (C-3.k) decay heat generation from collected radioiodines is insufficient to raise the carbon bed temperature above 250°F with no system

airflow, small capacity ESF filter systems may be designed without an air bleed cooling mechanism.

Exception is taken to the requirements of any cooling mechanism satisfying single-failure criteria because a

backup mechanism is provided.

The decay heat produced by the radioactive material in the inactive charcoal adsorbers of the ESF filter units is removed by a

100-cfm capacity centrifugal fan (for main control room filter decay fans, see Fig. 9.4-1; for fuel building filter decay fans, see Fig. 9.4-2; and for SGTS filter decay

fans, see Fig. 6.2-58) which automatically starts when the main filter exhaust fan

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-1 (Cont) 5 of 6 August 1987 stops.

The decay fan takes air from the respective filter room and exhausts to the respective exhaust duct.

In the event that the 100-cfm decay fan

fails, the respective main filter exhaust fan can be started manually to remove decay

heat, since a

high temperature in the charcoal adsorbers will be alarmed in the main control room.

The temperature will not rise to the level where the adsorption capability of charcoal filter is reduced.

In

addition, a

water spray system is provided for the charcoal adsorber section of the filters which can be manually actuated in the event of failure of the decay and main filter exhaust fans to prevent self-ignition of the charcoal.

In

addition, exception is taken to providing humidity control for the decay heat removal system cooling air-flow, which uses room air of less than 70 percent relative humidity.

Note 7:

System resistances are determined in accordance with (C-3.l)

Section 5.7.1 of ANSI N509(5) except that fan inlet and outlet losses are not calculated in accordance with AMCA 201(8).

Exception is taken to Section 5.7.2 of ANSI N509.

Copies of fan ratings or test reports are not necessary when certified fan performance curves are furnished.

Exception is taken to the balancing technique defined in Section 5.7.3 of ANSI N509.

Displacement criteria following normal industry practice are used when the maximum vibration velocity method imposes unrealistic requirements at certain operating speeds.

Documentation is not furnished in accordance with Section 5.7.5 where AMCA certification ratings are submitted.

Note 8:

Exception is taken to Section 5.10.3.5 of ANSI (C-3.n)

N509.

Ductwork as a

structure has a resonant frequency above 25 Hz, but this may not be true for the unsupported plate or sheet sections.

Note 9:

Exception is taken to the provisions in Section 5.9 of (C-3.p)

ANSI N509 for designing dampers to ANSI B31.1 and to using butterfly valves.

Class B

dampers may be designed

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-1 (Cont)

Revision 17 6 of 6 and tested to meet the verification of strength and leaktightness necessary for use in a contaminated air stream. This exception does not pertain to containment penetrations.

In addition, exceptions are taken to the following:

1.

Class B leakage rates are determined for one damper of each type instead of every damper.

2.

Minimum diameter of the damper shaft length 24 in and under is 1/2 in, and 3/4 in for shafts between 25 and 48 inches in length.

Note 10:

Exception is taken to full compliance with Section 2.3.8 (C-4.a) of ERDA 76-21 (2). RBS does not use any communication system, decontaminated areas and showers are not nearby, filters are not used at duct inlets, and duct inspection hatches are not provided.

Note 11:

ESF filter systems are run a minimum of 10 hr per month.

(C-4.d)

However, if field data confirm that it is unnecessary to run the trains 10 hr per month to reduce the amount of moisture present on the filters, this decision will be reconsidered.

Note 12:

Exception is taken to the requirement that new activated (C-6.a) carbon meets the physical property specifications given (C-6.b) in Table 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976. The charcoal adsorbent now commercially available does not meet the requirements of ANSI N509-1976, but does meet those requirements of ANSI N509-1980.

xo14 Exception is taken to the requirement of conducting laboratory tests of representative samples as indicated in Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Representative samples will be tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 (9).

14mx Note 13:

Exception is taken to the amount of allowable air leakage (C-2.l) in HVAC ESF charcoal filtration systems set by ANSI N509-1980 (8). See Table 1.8-1, Regulatory Guide 1.52 position.

RBS USAR Revision 17 1 of 2 TABLE 6.5-2 DESIGN DATA FOR STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM Filtration Assembly Mark No.

1GTS*FLT1A&1B Moisture Separator Type Multiple bed Capacity 12,500 cfm xo

Media SS louvers and stainless steel pads

mx Pressure drop, clean 1.0 in W.G.

Face velocity 415 fpm Prefilter Type Medium efficiency, dry Quantity 15 Capacity, ea (max.)

2,000 cfm Filter media Fiberglass Efficiency 80% NBS dust spot Pressure drop, clean 0.45 in W.G.

Dust holding capacity 300 g Heater xo13 Type Electric, on-off Quantity 1

Capacity 85 kW Stages 3

Power supply 460 V, 3 phase, 60 Hz 13mx HEPA Filters Type High efficiency, dry Quantity 15 Capacity, ea (max.)

1,000 cfm Media Fiberglass UL Class I Efficiency, based on 99.97 with 0.3 micron DOP DOP test (MIL-STD-282) aerosol Pressure drop, clean 1 in W.G.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-2 (Cont)

Revision 17 2 of 2 Charcoal filters Type Deep Bed, rechargeable Quantity 1

Capacity 12,500 cfm Media Impregnated coconut shell charcoal Radioiodine removal 90% elemental iodine and 90% methyl iodide, test at 70% relative humidity Depth of each bed 4 in Face velocity 40 fpm Pressure drop, clean 1.0 in W.G.

Ignition temperature range 340°C Density 30 pcf (average packed)

Exhaust Fans Mark No.

1GTS*FN1A&1B Type Centrifugal Capacity 12,500 cfm Static pressure 21.5 in W.G.

Drive Direct Decay Heat Removal Exhaust Fan Mark No.

1GTS*FN2A&2B Type Centrifugal Capacity 100 cfm Drive Direct Static pressure 2.5 in W.G.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.5-3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OPERATION FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT Revision 20 1 of 1 Type of structure Cylindrical steel vessel with torispherical dome Internal fission product None removal system Free volume of primary 1,191,590 cu ft containment Hydrogen purge system See Section 6.2.5 operation Containment design leakage rate (L ), volume %/day 0.325 Initiation of hydrogen purge See Section 6.2.5 Hydrogen purge rate See Section 6.2.5

RBS USAR TABLE 6.7-1 1 of 3 August 1987 SINGLE-FAILURE ANALYSIS OF MAIN STEAM POSITIVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM Inasmuch as the MS-PLCS is constructed to withstand seismic Category I and LOCA accident loadings, no passive (i.e., structural) failures are considered. Consequences of single active component or system failures are as follows:

Components Malfunction Consequences

1. Main steam isolation valves, inboard Any one valve fails to close The inboard system is initiated, the system will isolate at timer set point due to excessive flow or low differential pressure.

Outboard system functions to prevent leakage.

2. Main steam isolation valves, outboard Any one valve fails to close Inboard and outboard systems remain functional. One of the two systems is adequate to prevent leakage.

3. Main steam-line shutoff valves Any one valve fails to close The outboard system is initiated, the system will isolate at timer set point due to excessive flow or low differential pressure.

Inboard system functions to prevent leakage.

4. Injection valve or check valve

a. Fails to open upon system initiation (stuck closed)

Drain valve will close.

Isolation valves open when the interlocks are cleared but the valves will reclose at timer set point due to low differential pressure.

The redundant system functions to prevent leakage.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.7-1 (Cont) 2 of 3 August 1987 Components Malfunction Consequences

b. Fails to close when tripped Air flow is cut off with the isolation valves reclosure coincident with the injection valve trip signal.

5. Drain valve Fails to close Isolation valves and injection valve remain closed. The redundant system functions to prevent leakage.

6. Bypass valve

a. Fails to open upon system initiation.

Failure at or within timer set point:

Same consequences as in item 4(a).

b. Local power loss to the valve (motor control center trouble)

Solenoid de-energized, valve fails closed by means of a return spring. Redundant system functions to prevent leakage.

c. Valve spring stuck Valve position indication is available for the operator to initiate system shutdown. Redundant system functions to prevent leakage.

7. PCV Fails to regulate pressure System isolates due to low differential pressure. The redundant system functions to prevent leakage.

RBS USAR TABLE 6.7-1 (Cont) 3 of 3 August 1987 Components Malfunction Consequences

8. MS-PLCS isolation valves

a. Fails to open upon system initiation.

System will isolate at timer set point due to low differential pressure. The redundant system functions to prevent leakage.

b. Fails to close when tripped One out of two valves satisfies isolation by virtue of single active failure criteria. Air flow is cut off with the injection valve reclosure, coinciding with the isolation valves trip signal.

9. Instrumentation Failure to any one component With the imposition of one active failure, the system is categorized as single-failure proof.

High flow and/or low differential pressure will bottle-up the system as required. In addition, surveillance can be maintained using system parameter indicators. The operator is relied upon to initiate appropriate action if necessary.

The redundant system functions to prevent leakage.