ML16256A319
| ML16256A319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2016 |
| From: | Entergy Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16256A115 | List:
|
| References | |
| W3F1-2016-0053 | |
| Download: ML16256A319 (27) | |
Text
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-1Revision 7 (10/94)7.4SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWNThis section describes the instrumentation and control systems that are required to establish and maintaina safe shutdown condition for the reactor. In many cases these instrumentation and control systems are utilized in the performance of normal and emergency plant operations and as such are not exclusively utilized for the safe shutdown functions. Two kinds of shutdown conditions are addressed in this section:
hot shutdown and cold shutdown. A hot shutdown is a condition in which the reactor is subcritical and the reactor and its cooling system are at or near power operating temperature. A cold shutdown is a condition in which the reactor is subcritical and the reactor and its cooling system cooled to or near temperatures convenient for major maintenance. In either case the reactivity control systems maintain a subcriticalcondition of the core. Technical Specifications give further details on both hot and cold shutdown conditions of the plant.The instrumentation and control functions, which are required to be aligned for maintaining safe shutdownof the reactor, are also discussed in this section. These functions permit the necessary operations that:a)Prevent the reactor from achieving unplanned criticality in violation of the Technical Specifications.b)Provide an adequate heat sink such that design and safety limits are not exceeded.7.
4.1DESCRIPTION
In order to achieve safe plant shutdown, controls and instrumentation are provided to allow the operator toactuate, control and monitor operation of systems and components necessary to bring the unit from full power operation to cold shutdown. Indications and controls required to monitor shutdown are provided onthe Auxiliary Control Panel (LCP-43), located outside the control room. These indications and controls areduplicates of those found in the control room, and are shown in Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-3. Process instrumentation available to the operator in the main control room which can be used to assist in assessing post-LOCA conditions is shown in Section 7.5, Table 7.5-1.The following systems and equipment are the minimum required for safe shutdown of the reactor:-Emergency Feedwater System (EFS)-Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves-Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS)-Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), Boron addition portion-Emergency shutdown from outside of the main control roomThe following ESF support systems are also required to function:-Component Cooling Water System WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-2Revision 10 (10/99)-Onsite Power System, including diesel generator system-Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems (HVAC) for areascontaining systems and equipment required for safe shutdown.-Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transport SystemDescriptions of the systems required for safe shutdown of the reactor are described in the subsectionswhich follow. A description of the ESF support systems is provided in Section 7.3.Instrumentation and control requirements for systems required for safe shutdown are identified in Tables7.4-1 and 7.4-3.The systems required for safe shutdown are not protective systems as defined by IEEE-279. Therefore,the design basis (Section 3) of IEEE-279 do not apply. Nevertheless, the system conforms to many of the requirements of IEEE-279 as described in Subsection 7.4.2.The instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown as described in this section meet thefollowing design criteria:a)The systems conform to the provisions of IEEE-308 (1971), "Criteria for Class 1E ElectricSystems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations".b)Any single failure will not prevent safe plant shutdown.
c)Channel independence is maintained by electrical and physical separation between redundantchannels.d)The systems are designed to withstand design basis earthquake loads in combination with otherloads as specified in Section 3.10 without loss of their safety functions.e)Those systems which cannot be tested with the plant in normal operation can be tested duringplant shutdown. A further discussion is presented in Section 7.1.f)Equipment is provided in appropriate locations outside the main control room to bring the plant toa hot standby condition with potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown.7.4.1.1Emergency Feedwater System (EFS)The Emergency Feedwater System (EFS) is described in Subsection 10.4-9. Automatic initiation of theEmergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS) is described in Section 7.3.7.4.1.2Atmospheric Dump Valves The atmospheric dump valves (2MS-PM629A, 630B) are discussed in Section 10.3. The valves arelocated outside the containment upstream of the main steam isolation valves.The valves are used to remove reactor decay heat from the steam generator in the event of WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.4-3 Revision 307 (07/13)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)loss of condenser cooling. They are also credited wi th reducing RCS pressure during certain small break LOCA scenarios, but not actuated by any ESFAS ac tuation signal. The decay heat is dissipated by venting steam to the atmosphere. In this way t he reactor coolant system can be maintained at hot standby conditions or cooled down to 350°F. The des ign features of these valves are as follows: (DRN 03-2061, R14) a) Initiating Circuits and Logic (DRN 03-1275, R13) The valves are electro-pneumatically operated and ar e controlled automatically or manually from either the main control room by means of hand/auto indicating controllers (MS IPIC 0303 A1 &
B1) located on the control panel, or from the aux iliary control panel (MS IPIC 0303 A11 & B11).
An electro-pneumatic transducer converts the electronic control signal to a corresponding pneumatic pressure. The valves are designed to fail closed on loss of instrument air. (DRN 03-1275, R13) The hand/auto indicating controllers also i ndicate the value of their valve position control signals.
b) Bypasses, Interlocks and Sequencing No bypasses or interlocks are provided for atmospheric dump valves.
c) Redundancy and Diversity (DRN 99-0459, R9;01-367, R10; EC-41355, R307) The atmospheric dump valves are sized su ch that the reactor can be brought to hot standby assuming the loss of one valve. The control of these valves are safety related. In the event of loss of the non-safety related Instrum ent Air System, cooldown of the reactor to 350 F can then be accomplished through manual operation of the atmospheric dump valves. Each atmospheric dump valve has a handwheel which can be operated locally to override the actuator spring. Procedures are established for oper ating manual handwheel overrides or lining up backup air supplies for continued safety function after the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> mission time of the safety related Nitrogen Accumulator. (DRN 99-0459, R9;01-367, R10; EC-41355, R307) (DRN 03-2061, R14)d) IEEE 279 and GDC Compliance Because of the SBLOCA mitigation function, the ADVs meet the requirements of section 3 of IEEE 279-1971, and the applicable requirements of se ction 4 of IEEE 279-1971. In addition, they comply with the GDCs applicable to the ESFAS, includi ng criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 29." (DRN 03-2061, R14) 7.4.1.3 Shutdown Cooling System The SDCS is discussed in Subsection 9.3.6. The system instrumentation and controls necessary to achieve plant shutdown are discussed below.
a) Initiating Circuits and Logic (EC-14765, R305) The SDCS is designed to be manually initia ted when the RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to 350 F and 377 psig. The shutdown cool inte rlocks prevent overpressurizing of the low-pressure portions of the SDCS as di scussed in Section 7.6. The shutdown cooling suction line isolation valves (ISI-V1503A , V1504A, V1501B, V1502B, SI-4052A, SI-4052B) arrangement ensures that a single failure of an is olation valve will not preclude positive isolation at the boundary of the low pressure portion S DCS from the high pressure of the RCS. (EC-14765, R305) The shutdown cooling flow indicator controller maintains a constant shutdown cooling rate of the core by adjusting the shutdown heat exchanger bypass flow, thus regulating the flow rate through the heat exchangers.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-4Revision 10 (10/99)During abnormal or accident conditions the SDCS system will require a local/manualmode of operation. Refer to Subsection 9.3.6 for additional details.Control board mounted process instrumentation is provided to enable the operator todetermine system status and evaluate system performance. Control board mounted control switches and valve position indicating lights are provided for the shutdown cooling heat exchanger outlet and bypass valves. See Table 7.4-1 for a listing of instruments required to monitor safe shutdown.b)Interlocks, Sequencing and BypassesThe Shutdown Cooling System is provided with electrical interlocks to prevent thepossibility of overpressurizing the low pressure portions of the system. An independent interlockis provided for each of the four shutdown cooling suction line isolation valves inside the containment. Pressurizer pressure is utilized to provide RCS pressure as an input to the interlock circuits. Each interlock prevents opening of its associated valve whenever RCS pressure equals or exceeds 377 psig. An audible alarm is sounded in the main control room when any SDCSisolation valve inside containment is not in the fully closed position when RCS pressure equals or exceeds 392 psia. The interlocks are discussed in Section 7.6.c)Redundancy and DiversityThere are two SDCS suction lines, each possessing two isolation valves as shown inFigure 7.4-1.There are four separate control circuits for these valves, two are associated withChannel A and the other two are associated with Channel B.There are four power supplies for these valves, two ac and two dc divided into tworedundant channels.Power supplies to the SDCS suction line isolation valves are so arranged that theymeet the following objectives, assuming single failure as discussed in Table 7.4-2:1)Both lines are closed above a set pressurizer pressure thus protecting the lowpressure side of the lines.2)At least one line can be opened manually below a set (377 psig) pressurizerpressure.d)Supporting SystemsThe SDCS uses the low pressure safety injection pumps to maintain flow and rejects heat to theCCWS through the shutdown heat exchanger. The Class IE onsite power system provides power to the various electrical devices needed to support these systems. Either of the two LPSI Pumps in combination with the associated shutdown heat exchanger is sufficient for proper system operation.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-5Revision 10 (10/99)7.4.1.4Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS),Boron Addition PortionThe boron addition portion of the CVCS is used in the shutdown and cooldown process. It may also beautomatically started by SIAS. The CVCS is discussed in Subsection 9.3.4. The CVCS instrumentation and controls that are utilized to achieve plant shutdown are delineated below:a)Initiating Circuits, Logic and Actuated DevicesTo help achieve a safe shutdown, the system component actuation steps required are:1)Safe cooldown requires coordinated control of the charging pumps to adjust andmaintain the correct pressurizer water level and also requires periodic sampling and adjustment of the boron concentration to compensate for the temperature decrease and other variables until shutdown concentration is reached.The charging pumps are used to inject demineralized water and concentrated boric acid into theRCS as required. With one pump normally in operation, the other charging pumps are auto-matically started by the pressurizer level control system as needed.The boric acid concentration is controlled during shutdown and cooldown to compensate forreactivity changes associated with a decreasing coolant temperature or other variables to ensure that a sufficient shutdown margin is maintained. Concentrated boric acid is mixed with demineralized water and injected into the RCS to achieve the desired coolant concentration by means of feed and bleed via the charging and letdown systems. In an emergency condition, only the charging portion of the CVCS is required for safety injection or to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition. Sufficient volume exists in the pressurizer at the time of initiation of reactor coolant system boration and cooldown. During cooldown, the shrinkage within the reactor coolant system will permit sufficient boration to ensure an adequate shutdown margin under cold conditions without the requirement for letdown.Control board mounted instrumentation is provided to enable the operator to evaluate systemperformance and control system operation.b)Interlocks, Sequencing and BypassesSystem operation is achieved by the coordinated operation of the charging pump and boric acidpump control circuits. The charging pump control circuit sequences charging pump operation in response to pressurizer water level control circuit requirements. The CVCS boration controlcircuits sequence the boric acid pumps and valves required to achieve the desired boric acidconcentration. System bypasses are discussed in Subsection 9.3.4.If automatic control is lost, pressurizer level can be maintained by manual control of the levelcontrol system. Manual control of any portion of these systems can be achieved while allowingthe remainder to continue functioning in automatic.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-6c)Redundancy and DiversityThree separate charging pumps are provided. Two charging pumps and supportinginstrumentation are powered from two separate Class IE buses. The third pump is powered from AB bus as described in Section 8.3. The charging pumps can take a suction from either the volume control tank, the boric acid makeup tank, or the refueling water storage pool to supply borated water to the RCS.d)Supporting SystemThe boron addition and charging subsystems use portions of the CVCS as described inSubsection 9.3.4.7.4.1.5Emergency Shutdown from Outside the Control RoomIn the event of a required evacuation of the main control room, the operator trips the reactor manuallybefore he leaves. Selected controls and instrumentation for shutdown of the reactor are provided at the auxiliary control panel (LPC-43) located at elevation +21.00 ft. MSL outside of the main control room.The transfer of control stations from the main control board to the auxiliary control panel is done manuallyby the means of transfer switches mounted on auxiliary panels. The auxiliary panels are located outside of the main control room, at elevation +35.00 ft. MSL.When not in use, the auxiliary control panel is deenergized and isolated from the 120V AC/DC controlcircuits by means of open contacts of the transfer switches located on auxiliary panels.An alarm will be initiated in the main control room whenever any one of the transfer switches is operatedinto the transfer position.Sufficient instrumentation and controls are provided outside the main control room to:
a)Achieve prompt hot shutdown of the reactor.b)Maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown.c)Achieve cold shutdown of the reactor through the use of suitable procedures.The auxiliary control panel is designed to seismic Category I requirements and is located in a seismicCategory I area of the RAB. A list of indicators, and controls located on the auxiliary control panel is provided in Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-3. Figure 7.4-2 shows the general arrangement of the auxiliary control
panel.Postulated conditions and/or events which result in evacuation of the main control room are not defined.However, it is assumed that these circumstances are not attended by destruction of any equipment within the main control room, and are not accompanied by any other design basis accidents.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-7The indicators on Auxiliary Control panel are powered with low energy signals of 0 to 1OVDC and arepermanently connected to the primary measurement loops through electronic isolators. The electronic isolators along with the logic circuitry of the primary measurement loops are installed in the process analog control panels, which are located inside of the main control room.Any credible failure of circuits to indicators on auxiliary control panel, such as; an open circuit, a shortcircuit, a ground or an application of a stray 120 AC/DC volts signal, will have no effect on performance oftheir primary measuring loops.The auxiliary control panel (LCP-43) contains the minimum instrumentation and controls necessary tobring the plant to a cold shutdown condition.All safety and non-safety related channels of control and instrumentation components within the auxiliarycontrol panel are physically and electrically separated in accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.75.Failure of a component in one channel will not affect the operation of components in any other channel,and therefore will not prevent achieving and/or to maintain the plant in a safe Shutdown Condition.7.4.2ANALYSIS 7.4.2.1Conformance to IEEE Standard 279-1971IEEE Standard 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Station,establishes minimum requirements for the reactor protective and engineered safety features instrumentation and control systems. The instrumentation and controls associated with the systemsrequired for safe shutdown are not defined as a protective system in IEEE Standard 279, however, manycriteria of IEEE Standard 279 have been incorporated in the design of the instrumentation and controls for safe shutdown systems.Conformance with the applicable portions of IEEE Standard 279, Section 4, is discussed in the followingSubsections:a)4.1, General Functional RequirementsThe instrumentation and controls of the system required for safe shutdown enable the operator to:
1)Determine when a condition monitored by display instrumentation reaches apredetermined level requiring action, and2)Manually accomplish the appropriate safety actionsb)4.2, Single Failure CriterionThe instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown are designed and arranged so thatno single failure can prevent a safe shutdown, even in the event of loss of offsite power. Singlefailures considered include electrical faults (e.g., open, WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-8shorted, or grounded circuits) and physical events (e.g., fires, missiles). Compliance with thesingle failure criterion is accomplished by providing redundancy of power supplies and actuation circuits, and by separating the redundant elements electrically and physically to achieve the required independence. Each of the provisions is discussed below:1)RedundancyEach of the systems required for safe shutdown consists of redundantsubsystems and/or components for maximum system reliability. For suction isolation valves as shown in Figure 7.4-1 there are two 120 V ac motor operated valves and two hydraulically controlled valves, divided into two redundant channels SA and SB. Process cabinets are fed by four 120 V ac Class IE power supplies divided into four protectivechannels SMA, SHB, SMC, SMD. The redundancy provides assurance that the isolationof lines are not affected in case one complete channel is lost. Each of the redundant systems has automatic and/or manual actuation circuits that are separate from those provided for its redundant counterpart. Redundant instrumentation is provided to monitorReactor Coolant conditions.2)Electric Separation Electrical separation is achieved through the provision of independent powersupplies and the elimination of electrical interconnection between redundant elements.
Control power for redundant circuits is fed from separate 125 V dc buses. Power for redundant pumps and valves is supplied from separate emergency diesel generators.
Components designated A are part of electrical load group A and components designated B are part of electrical load group B. There is a third load group AB which may be electrically tied to group A or B and is used only when equipment replacement on A or B group is required. Electrical separation between the electrical load groups is discussed in Subsection 8.2.3.2.The provision of separate power supplies and electrical connections forredundant circuits ensures that loss of power or electrical faults on any circuit cannot affect the redundant circuit.3)Physical Separation Protection against the possibility of mechanical damage to both redundantchannels of any instrumentation and control system required for safe shutdown has been achieved by spatial separation and/or the provision of physical barriers between redun-dant elements.Physical separation between redundant components within control panels isachieved by providing at least six in. of spatial separation or by providing a metal barrier.
This separation is provided between control switches, controllers, relays and wiring.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.4-9 Revision 14 (12/05) Cable trays and conduit for redundant components are physically separated as discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.2.19. The redundant cables associated with the instrumentation and control systems required for safe shutdown are marked and identified as described in Subsection 8.3.1.3. The physical arrangement drawings of instrumentation inside and outside the containment is shown in Section 1.7. c) 4.3, Quality Control of Components and Modules The quality control enforced during design, fabrication, shipment, field storage installation, and component checkout used for instrumentation and control components required for safe shutdown, and documentation of quality control is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guides 1.28 (6/7/72), 1.30 (8/11/72) and 1.38 (3/16/73). d) 4.4, Equipment Qualification The instrumentation and controls necessary to achieve safe shutdown are designed to operate in the design ambient conditions in the area in which they are located. Components located in the main control room, which is normally air conditioned, are designed to operate in the ambient conditions associated with loss of normal air conditioning for the time necessary to achieve safe shutdown. Environmental design and qualification of electrical and instrumentation equipment is
discussed in Section 3.11. Seismic qualification and testing are discussed in Section 3.10. e) 4.5, Channel Integrity Preoperational testing and inspection are performed to verify that all components, automatic and manual controls, and sequences of the integrated systems provided for safe shutdown accomplish the intended design function and maintain its integrity within each channel. f) 4.6, Channel Independence Safe shutdown system channel independence is achieved by electrical and physical separation as described in Subsection 7.4.2.1. g) 4.7, Control and Protection System Interaction (DRN 03-2061, R14) The ADV setpoint can be monitored by the plant computer. This is a monitoring system, not a control system. The connection to the non-safety related plant computer meets applicable
isolation requirements. (DRN 03-2061, R14)h) 4.8, Derivation of System Inputs The safe shutdown system monitoring signals are direct measures of the desired variables.
Refer to Table 7.4-1.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.4-10 Revision 14 (12/05)i) 4.9, Capability for Sensor Checks The safe shutdown system monitoring sensors are checked by comparing the monitored variables or by introducing and varying a substitute input to the sensor similar to the measured
variable.j) 4.10, Capability for Test and Calibration The instrumentation and control components required for safe shutdown which are not normally in operation will be periodically tested. This includes instrumentation and controls for the Emergency Feedwater System, atmospheric dump valves, and emergency power system. All automatic and manual actuation and control devices will be tested to verify their operability. k) 4.11, Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation This section is not applicable.
- 1) 4.12, Operating Bypass This section is not applicable.
m) 4.13, Indication of Bypasses A description of bypass indication is provided in Section 7.5.
n) 4.14, Access to Means for Bypassing This section is not applicable.
o) 4.15, Multiple Setpoints This section is not applicable.
p) 4.16, Completion of Protective Action Once it is Initiated This section is not applicable.
q) 4.17, Manual Initiation The safe shutdown systems are manually actuated. No single failure will prevent the safe shutdown.r) 4.18, Access to Setpoint Adjustments (DRN 03-2061, R14)Adjustment of the ADV setpoint is administratively controlled. Access to setpoint adjustments is not applicable to other systems addressed in Section 7.4. s) 4.19, Identification of Protective Actions For the ADVs, protective action is confirmed by monitoring of SG pressure to mitigate a SBLOCA.Identification of protective actions is not applicable to other systems addressed in Section 7.4. (DRN 03-2061, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.4-11 Revision 307 (07/13) t) 4.20, Information Readouts
All safe shutdown system monitoring and control channels are indicated in the main control room.
u) 4.21, System Repair
The safe shutdown systems are capable of being manually actuated; theref ore, replacement or repair of instrument and control components can be accomplished in reasonable time when the
systems are not actuated, or after shutdown as governed by adm inistrative procedures. Outage of system components for replacement or repair will be limited by the Technical Specifications.
v) 4.22, Identification
All safety equipment and cables associated with the systems required for safe shutdown are marked in order to facilitate identification.
7.4.2.2 Conformance to t he Requirements of AEC GDC 19
As described in Subsection 7.4.1.5 and Section 3.1 and auxiliary control panel is provided to achieve and maintain the plant in the hot standby condition in the event that the main control room must be abandoned. Adequate instrumentation is provided to enable operator control of equipment necessary to maintain Reactor Coolant System and secondar y system pressure, temperature and levels.
7.4.2.3 Loss of Inst rument Air Systems (EC-41355, R307)
Pneumatically operated valves in sy stems required for safe shutdown are designed to fail in the position required for safe system operation in the plant shut down mode, except for the atmospheric dump valves which are fail closed, and the CCW Cross-Connect Valves , which fail open. Valves which are in required flow paths will fail open on loss of instrument air. The atmospheric dump valves may be opened by local manual means in the event of loss of air.
The CCW Cross-Connect valves may be gagged closed by local manual means in the event of loss of air.
Procedures are established for operating manual handwheel overrides or lining up backup air supplies for continued safety function after 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> mission time of the safety related motive gas accumulator.
Valves which isolate nonessential portions of the system from portions required for safe shutdown are designed to fail close. Valve failure positions are shown on the systems P&I diagrams. (EC-41355, R307)
The pressurizer spray valves and auxiliary spray valves fail closed on loss of instrument air. Pressurizer pressure is controlled by operation of the electric pressurizer heaters, and over pressure is relieved by pressurizer safety valves. The valves in the charging line of the CVCS fail open.
The loss of instrument air system will not preclude the safe shutdown of the plant.
7.4.2.4 Loss of Cooling Water to Vital Equipment
None of the instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown rely on cooling water for operation.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.4-12Revision 13 (04/04) 7.4.2.5 Plant Load Rejection, Turbine Trip and Loss of Offsite Power(DRN 03-2155, R13)
The control systems described in Section 7.6 and 7.7 are designed to preclude reactor trip under these conditions with the exception th at there is a probability that the reactor may trip at power levels between 50% and 70% at certain times in core life (a trip is more probable at 70% power at Beginning of Cycle).
However, in the event of loss of offsite power, power for safe shutdown may be provided by the onsite Standby (Emergency) Power System. The description and analysis of the Standby (Emergency) Power
System are discussed fully in Section 8.3. The standby (emergency) diesel generators provide power for operation of pumps and valves. The station batteries provide DC power for operation of control and instrumentation systems required to actuate and control essential components.(DRN 03-2155, R13)
The standby (emergency) diesel generators automatically start and begin supplying pow er to components necessary to achieve safe shutdown. The station batteries maintain continuity of DC control power if offsite power is lost. The standby (emergency) power system is designed to meet the single failure criterion and
withstand design basis natural phenomena. Adequate onsite emergency power is available to safely shutdown the plant under all plant design conditions assuming a single failure, in the event of loss of offsite
power.The consequences of a loss of offsite power env elope the con sequences expected from plant load rejection and turbine trip. Therefore, analyses for these two postulated occurrences are not presented.
7.4.2.6 Diagrams Logic diagrams, elementary wiring diagrams and instrument arrangement drawings for shutdown sys tems are included in Section 1.7.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 3) Revision 10 (10/99)INDICATORS ON AUXILIARY CONTROL PANEL LCP-43 Shutdown Item No.Channel Service Range Hot Cold C1SMASteam Gen. No. 1 Pressure0 - 1200 PSIA X XSMASteam Gen. No. 2 Pressure0 - 1200 PSIA X X C2SMASteam Gen. No. 1 Level0 - 100% XSMASteam Gen. No. 2 Level0 - 100% X C3SMAPZR Pressure (Wide Range)0 - 3000 PSIA X X C4SMANeutron Flux2x10 200% (log) X X C5SMAPressurizer Level0 - 100% X X C11SMBSteam Gen. No. 1 Pressure0 - 1200 PSIA X XSMBSteam Gen. No. 2 Pressure0 - 1200 PSIA X X C12SMBSteam Gen. No. 1 Level0 - 100% X(Narrow Range)SMBSteam Gen. No. 2 Level0 - 100% X(Narrow Range) C13SMBPressurizer Pressure0 - 3000 PSIA X X(Wide Range) C14SMBNeutron Flux2x10 200% (log) X X C15SMBPressurizer Level0 - 100% X X C42SASteam Gen. No. 1 Pressure0 - 1200 PSIA X C43SACCW Sys "A" Temp50 - 130
°F X XSAWet Tower "A" Basin Temp30 - 110
°F X X C51SBSteam Gen. No. 2 Pressure0 - 1200 PSIA X C53SBCCW System "B" Temp50 - 130
°F X XSBWet Tower "B" Basin Temp30 - 110
°F X X WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 3) Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.Channel Service Range Hot Cold C63NSLetdown Temp Regen Heat Exch100 - 500
°F X XShell Outlet C64NSLetdown Temp50 -200
°F X XNSLetdown Flow0 - 150 GPM X X C65NSVolume Control Tank Level0 - 100% X X C66NSRCS Loop 1A Cold Leg Temp500 - 650
°F X XNSRCS Loop 2B Cold Leg Temp500 - 650
°F X X C67NSCond B Vacuum Wide0 - 30 IN HG. X C68NSBoric Acid Tank A Level0 - 100% X XNSBoric Acid Tank B Level0 - 100% X X C69NSCharging Header Pressure0 - 3000 PSIG X XNSCharging Header Flow0 - 150 GPM X X C70NSNeutron Flux (Startup Channel)1 - 10 5 Counts/ X X Sec (Logarithmic Scale) C71SASteam Gen. No. 1 Level0 - 100% X(Wide Range)SASteam Gen. No. 2 Level0 - 100% X(Wide Range) C72SAShutdown A (Loop 2) Temp0 - 400
°F XSAShutdown A (Loop 2) Flow0 - 5500 GPM X C73SASaturation Margin Temp200 - 50
°F X X (Subcooled-Superheat) C74SAHot Leg No. 2 Temp50 - 750
°F X XSACold Leg No. 2A Temp50 - 750
°F X X WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.4-1 (Sheet 3 of 3) Shutdown Item No.Channel Service Range Hot Cold C75SAHot Leg No. 1 Pressure0 - 3000 PSIA X XSAPressurizer Level0 - 100% X X C76SBHot Leg No. 1 Temp50 - 750
°F X XSBCold Leg No. 1B Temp50 - 750
°F X X C77SBSaturation Margin Temp200 - 50
°F X X (Subcool Superheat) C78SBShutdown B (Loop 1) Temp0 - 400
°FSBShutdown B (Loop 1) Flow0 - 5500 GPM C79SBSteam Gen. No. 1 Level0 - 100% X(Wide Range)SBSteam Gen. No. 2 Level0 - 100% X(Wide Range) C80NSPressurizer Pressure100 - 750 PSIA X XNSPressurizer Pressure100 - 750 PSIA X X C81NSPressurizer Pressure0 - 3000 PSIA X XNSPressurizer Pressure0 - 3000 PSIA X X C82NSNeutron Flux2x10 200% (Log) X XNSNeutron Flux2x10 200% (Log) X X C83SACond. Storage Pool Level0 - 100% XSASteam Gen. No. 1 Emergency0 - 800 GPM XFeedwater Flow C84SBCond. Storage Pool Level0 - 100% XSBSteam Gen. No. 2 Emergency0 - 800 GPM XFeedwater Flow WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-2 Revision 305 (11/11)
SDCS SUCTION LINE VALVES ACTION ON LOSS OF POWER SUPPLY (DRN 99-0459; EC -14765, R305)
Channel SI-651 & SI-4052A SI-652 SI-665 & SI-4052B SI -666 (EC-14765, R305)
(EC-935, R302)
Loss of 480 VAC Channel SA (EC-935, R302)
Not Affected
Fails as is
Not Affected
Not Affected
Loss of 125 VDC
Channel SA
Automatically
Closes Not Affected Not Affected Not Affected (EC-935, R302)
Loss of 480 VAC
Not Affected Not Affected Not Affected Fails as is Loss of 125 VDC
Channel SB
Not Affected Not Affected Automatically Closes Not Affected Loss of 125 VAC
Channel MA
Not Affected Fails as is Not Affected Not Affected Loss of 125 VAC
Channel MB
Not Affected Not Affected Not Affected Fails as is Loss of 125 VAC
Channel MC
Fails as is(2) Not Affected Not Affected Not Affected Loss of 125 VAC
Channel MD
Not Affected Not Affected Fails as is(2) Not Affected (EC-935, R302)
(1) Deleted. (EC-935, R302)
(2) The valve will continue to full open position if loss of 125 VAC power occurs during the opening cycle.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 1 of 11)CONTROL STATIONS ON AUXILIARY CONTROL PANEL LCP-43 Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA1 SMASTEAM GEN PRESS PRETRIP X(CH-A)A2 SMASTEAM GEN PRESS TRIP SET XPOINT RESET (CH-A)A3 SMARPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER XPRESS PRETRIP (CH-A)A4 SMARPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER XTRIP SET POINT, RESET (CH-A)A5 SMARPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XPRESS TRIP BYPASS (CH-A)A6 SMARPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XTRIP BYPASS KEY SW(CH-A)A11 SMBSTEAM GEN PRESS PRETRIP X(CH-B)A12 SMBSTEAM GEN PRESS TRIP SET XPOINT RESET (CH-B)A13 SMBRPS/ESFAS PESSURIZER XPRESS PRETRIP (CH-B)A14 SMBRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER XTRIP SET POINT RESET (CH-B)A15 SMBRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XPRESS TRIP BYPASS (CH-B)A16 SMBRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XTRIP BYPASS KEY SW (CH-B)A21 SMCSTEAM GEN PRESS PRETRIP X (CH-C)A22 SMCSTEAM GEN PRESS TRIP SET XPOINT RESET (CH-C)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 2 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA23 SMCRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER XTRIP SET POINT RESET (CH-C)A25 SMCRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XPRESS TRIP BYHPASS (CH-C)A26 SMCRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XTRIP CYPASS KEY SW (CH-C)A31 SMDSTEAM GEN PRESS PRETRIP X (CH-D)A32 SMDSTEAM GEN PRESS TRIP SET XPOINT RESET (CH-D)A33 SMDRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER XPRESS PRETRIP (CH-D)A34 SMDRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER XTRIP SET POINT RESET (CH-D)A35 SMDRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XPRESS TRIP BYPASS (CH-D)A36 SMDRPS/ESFAS PRESSURIZER X XTRIP BYPASS KEY SW (CH-D)A41 SAS I TNK 1A ISOL VA X1SI-V1505 TK 1A (SI-614)A42 SAS I TNK 2A ISOL VA X1SI-V1507 TK 2A (SI-634)A43 SAREFUELING WATER STORAGE XPOOL OUTLET VA 2SI-L103A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 3 of 11) Revision 305 (11/11)
Shutdown Item No. Channel Service Hot Cold A44 SA RCS LOOP NO. 2 SHUTDOWN X COOLING ISOL VA 1SI-V154A
(SI-652)
A45 SA STM GEN 1 EMERG FEEDWATER X ISOL VA 2FW-V848A
A46 SA STM GEN 2 EMERG FEEDWATER X ISOL VA 2FW-V849A
A47 SA RCS LOOP NO. 2 SHUTDOWN X COOLING ISOL VA 2SI-V327A
(SI-440) (EC-14765, R305)
A48 SA RCS LOOP NO. 2 SHUTDOWN X COOLING ISOL VA 1SI-V1503A (SI-651 & BYPASS FILL VALVE (SI-4052A)) (EC-14765, R305)
A49 SA LETDOWN STOP VA X - 1CH-F1516A/B (CH-515)
A50 SA LETDOWN CONT ISOL VA X -
2CH-F1518A/B (CH-523)
A51 SA LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJ X PUMP A
A52 SA BORIC ACID PUMP A X X
A53 SA BORIC ACID PUMP B X X
A54 SA SHUTDOWN COOLING LINE A X FLOW CONTROL VA 2SI-FM317A
(SI-307)
A55 SA SHUTDOWN COOLING LINE A X TEMP CONTROL VA SI-FM318A
(SI-657)
A56 SA EMERGENCY BORATION X X VA 3CH-V112A/B (CH-514)
A57 SA VCT MAKEUP VA X X 3CH-F117A/B (CH-512)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 4 of 11) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA58 SALOOP 2A LPSI FLOW CONTROL XVA 2SI-V1541A2 (SI-635)A59 SALOOP 2B LPSI FLOW CONTROL XVA 2SI-V1543B2 (SI-645)A60 SACHARGING PUMP A X X A61 SACOMPONENT COOLANT WATER X X PUMP AA62 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 1 X X A63 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 2 X X A64 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 3 X XA65 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 4 X XA66 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 5 X X A67 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 6 X XA68 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 7 X XA69 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 8 X XA70 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 9 X X A71 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 10 X X A72 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 11 X XA73 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 12 X XA74 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 13 X XA75 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 14 X X A76 SADRY TOWER A FAN NO. 15 X XA77 SAAUX COMPONENT COOLANT X XWATER PUMP A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 5 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA78 SAWET TOWER A FAN NO. 1 X XTHRU FAN NO. 4A79 SAWET TOWER A FAN NO. 5 X XTHRU FAN NO. 8A80 SAEMERG FEEDWATER PUMP A X A81 SACOMPONENT COOLANT WATER X X MAKEUP PUMP AA82 SAEMERG FEEDWATER PUMP TURB XSHUTOFF VA 2M S-611AA83 SACEDM COOLING UNIT E-16 (3A) X -A84 SACEDM COOLING UNIT E-16 (3C) X -A85 SACONT FAN COOLER AH-1 X X(3A-SA)A86 SACONT FAN COOLER AH-1 X X(3C-SA)A87 SACVAS FILTRATION UNIT - -E-23 (3A-SA)A88 SACONTROL ROOM TOILET EXH - -FAN E-34 (3A-SA)A89 SACONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING - -UNIT AH-12 (3A-SA)A90 SASHUTDOWN HEAT EXCH A - -OUTLET VA 3CC-F130AA111 SABCOMPONENT COOLANT WATER X X PUMP A/BA112 SABCHARGING PUMP A/B X X A121 SBS I TNK 1B ISOL VA X1SI-V1506 TK 1B (SI-624)A122 SBS I TNK 2B ISOL VA X1SI-V1508 TK 2B (SI-644)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 6 of 11) Revision 305 (11/11)
Shutdown Item No. Channel Service Hot Cold A123 SB REFUELING WATER STORAGE - X POOL OUTPUT VA 2SI-L104B
A124 SB RCS LOOP NO. SHUTDOWN X COOLING ISOL VA 1SI-V1502B
(SI-666)
A125 SB STEAM GEN 1 BACKUP EMERG X FEEDWATER ISOL VA 2FW-V847B
A126 SB STEAM GEN 2 PRIMARY EMERG X FEEDWSATER ISOL VA 2FW-V850B
A127 SB RCS LOOP NO. 1 SHUTDOWN X COOLING ISOL VA 2SI-V326B
(SI-441) (EC-14765, R305)
A128 SB RCS LOOP NO. 1 SHUTDOWN X COOLING ISOL VA 1SI-V1501B (SI-665 & BYPASS FILL VALVE (SI-4052B)) (EC-14765, R305)
A129 SB LETDOWN CONT ISOL VA X - 1CH-F2501A/B (CH-516)
A130 SB LOW PRESS SAFETY INJ PUMP B X
A131 SB BORIC ACID GRAVITY FEED X X VA 3 CH-V106A (CH-509)
A132 SB BORIC ACID GRAVITY FEED X X VA 3CH-V107B (CH-508)
A133 SB SHUTDOWN COOLING LINE B X FLOW CONTROL VA 2SI-FM348B
(SI-306)
A134 SB SHUTDOWN COOLING TEMP- X LINE B CONR VAL 2SI-FM349B
(SI-656)
A135 SB VOLUME CONTROL TANK DISCH X -
A136 SB LOOP 1A LPSI FLOW CONTR X VA 2SI-V1549A1 (SI-615)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 7 of 11) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA137 SBLOOP 1B LPSI FLOW CONTR XVA 2SI-V1539B1 (SI-625)A138 SBCHARGING PUMP B X XA139 SBCOMPONENT COOLANT WATER X X PUMP BA140 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 1 X XA141 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 2 X X A142 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 3 X XA143 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 4 X XA144 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 5 X XA145 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 6 X X A146 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 7 X X A147 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 8 X X A148 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 9 X X A149 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 10 X XA150 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 11 X X A151 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 12 X X A152 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 13 X X A153 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 14 X X A154 SBDRY TOWER B FAN NO. 15 X X A155 SBAUX COMPONENT COOLANT X XWATER PUMP BA156 SBWET TOWER B FAN NO. 1 X XTHRU FAN NO. 4 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 8 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA157 SBWET TOWER B FAN NO. 5 X XTHRU FAN NO. 8A158 SBEMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP B XA159 SBCOMPONENT COOLING WATER X X MAKEUP PUMP BA160 SBEMERG FEEDWATER PUMP TURB XSHUTOFF VA 2MS-612BA161 SBCEDM COOLING UNIT E-16 (3B) X -A162 SBCEDM COOLING UNIT E-16 (3D) X -A163 SBCONT FAN COOLER AH-1 (3B-SB) X XA164 SBCONT FAN COOLER AH-1 (3D-SB) X X A165 SBCVAS FILTRATION UNIT E-23 - -(3B-SB)A166 SBCONTR FOOM TOILET EXHAUST - -FAN E-34 (3B-SB)A167 SBCONTR ROOM AIR HANDLING - -UNIT AH-12 (3B-SB)A168 SBSHUTDOWN HEAT EXCH B - -OUTLET VA 3CC-F131BA191 NSPRESSURIZER PROPORTIONAL XHEATER BAN - 1A192 NSPRESSURIZER PROPORTIONAL XHEATER BANK - 2A193 NSLETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVES X -2CH-FM1536A/B (CH-110P) &2CH-FM1535A/B (CH-110Q)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 9 of 11) Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA194 NSVOLUME CONTROL TANK VENT - -VA 2CH-F185A/B (CH-513)A195 NSBORIC ACID MAKEUP CONTROL X XVA 3CH-FM172A/B (CH-210Y)A196 NSLETDOWN BACK PRESS CONTROL X -VALVES 2CH-PM628A/B(CH-201P) &2CH-PM627A/B (CH-201Q)A198 NSREFUELING WATER TO CHARGING - -PUMP VA 3CH-V121A/B (CH-504)A202 NSCONTROL RM CONFERENCE/ - -KITCHEN EXH FAN E-42 (3)A203 NSCONDENSATE DUMP X XVA 6CD-V352A204 NSCONT RM NORM & PURGE - -
DAMPERS D-43, D-44, D-64 & D-67A205 NSCONT RM AREA NORM & PURGE - -
DAMPERS D-45, D-46 &
D-58A207 NSLETDOWN CONTROL VALVES X -POS INDICATION 2CH-FM1563A/B (CH-110P) &
2CH-FM1535A/B (CH-110Q)A208 NSLETDOWN CONTROL VALVES X -SEL POS INDICATION 2CH-FM1536A/B (CH-201P) &
2CH-FM1535A/B (CH-110Q)A209 NSLETDOWN BACK PRESS CONTROL X -VALVES POS INDICATION2CH-PM628A/B (CH-201P) &2CH-PM627A/B (CH-201Q)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 10 of 11)Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdA210 NSLETDOWN BACK PRESS CONTROL X -VALVES SEL POS INDICATION2CH-P 628A/B (CH-201P) &2CH-PM627A/B (CH-201Q)A211 SACHARGING LINE TO RCS LOOP X X1A SHUTOFF VA 1CH-E2503AA212 SAPRESSURIZER AUX SPRAY VA X1CH-E2505AA213 SBCHARGING LINE TO RCS LOOP X X2A SHUTOFF VA 1CH-E2504BA214 SBPRESSURIZER AUX SPRAY VA X1CH-E-2505BA215 SASHUTDOWN LINE "A" WARM UP XVA 2SI-V353AA216 SASHUTDOWN HEAT EXCH "A" XISOLATION VA'SA217 SBSHUTDOWN LINE "B" WARM UP X2SI-V346BA218 SBSHUTDOWN HEAT EXCH "B" XISOLATION VALVESA219 SALPSI PUMP A MINIFLOW XISOLATION VALVEA221 SBLPSI PUMP B MINIFLOW XISOLATION VALVEE1 SABACKUP EMERG FEEDWATER XTO STEAM GEN 1E2 SAPRIMARY EMERG FEEDWATER XTO STEAM GEN 2E3 SAMAIN STEAM ATM DUMP XVA (VA 2MS-PM629A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.4-3 (Sheet 11 of 11)Revision 10 (10/99) Shutdown Item No.ChannelService Hot ColdE4 SACCW TEMP CONTROL VA X X(TCV-CC7072A)E11 SBPRIMARY EMERG FEEDWATER XTO STEAM GEN 1E12 SBBACKUP EMERG FEEDWATER XTO STEAM GEN 2E13 SBMAIN STEAM ATM DUMP XVA (VA 2MS-PM630B)E14 SBCCW TEMP CONTROL X XVA (TCV-CC7072B)E21 NSPRESSURIZER PRESS CONTROL X -E22 NSPRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL X -
E23 NSLETDOWN BACKPRESSURE CONTROL X -