ML16256A318
| ML16256A318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2016 |
| From: | Entergy Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16256A115 | List:
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| References | |
| W3F1-2016-0053 | |
| Download: ML16256A318 (70) | |
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WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-1 Revision 14 (12/05)7.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMSThe safety related instrumentation and controls of the Engineered Safety Feature Systems (ESFS) include (1) the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) which consists of the electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry (from sensors to actuation device input terminals) involved in generating those signals that actuate the required ESF systems, and (2) the arrangement of components that perform protective actions after receiving a signal from either the ESFAS or the operator. (Sensing parameters are listed in Table 7.3-2). The following actuation signals are generated by the ESFAS when the monitored variables reach the levels that are indicative of conditions which require protective action: a) Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) NSSS) b) Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) (NSSS) c) Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) (NSSS) d) Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) (NSSS) e) Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) (NSSS) f) Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) (NSSS) The ESF system device actuation circuitry receives (1) actuation signals from the ESFAS or the operator, and (2) permissive signals from sensors which monitor conditions that affect ESF system performance. The signals from the ESFAS actuate the ESF system equipment. The permissive signals provide additional interlocks, blocks and sequencing necessary to provide Proper ESF system operation. The ESF systems components automatically actuated by signals from the ESFAS are identified in Tables 7.3-5 thru 7.3-11.(DRN 03-2061, R14) Automatic ADV operation is required for SBLOCA mitigation. ADVs are addressed in Section 7.4. (DRN 03-2061, R14) 7.
3.1 DESCRIPTION
The actuation circuits for the ESFAS (as identified in Section 7.3) are all similar except for specific inputs, operating bypasses, and actuation devices. The SIAS described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1, is typical of all ESFAS. The specific instruments and controls associated with each system are discussed separately in the appropriate Subsection of 7.3.1.1.The actuation systems consist of the sensors, logic, and actuation circuits that monitor selected plant parameters and provide an actuation signal to each individual actuated component in the ESF system if these plant parameters reach preselected setpoints. Each actuation system is identical except that specific inputs (and blocks where provided) vary from system to system and the actuated devices are different. Figures 7.3-1 SH. 1, 2 & 3 show the ESFAS simplified functional diagram. Two-out-of-four coincidence of like initiating trip signals from four independent measurement channels is required to actuate any ESF system. Each actuation system logic, including testing features, is similar to the logic for the Reactor Protective System, and is contained in the same physical enclosure. The combination of the ESFAS and Reactor Protective System (RPS) is designated Plant Protection System (PPS). These same features include the capability of the ESFAS to operate, if need be, with up to two channels out of service (one bypassed and another tripped) and still meet the single failure criteria. The only operating restriction while in this condition (effectively one-out-of-two logic) is that no provision is made to bypass another channel for periodic maintenance. The system logic must be restored to at least a two-out-of-three condition prior to removing another channel for maintenance.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-2Revision 11 (05/01)7.3.1.1System Description7.3.1.1.1Safety Injection SystemRefer to Section 6.3, Emergency Core Cooling System, for a description of the Safety Injection System (SIS). Thesafety related display information which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions is described in Section 7.5.The SIS is composed of redundant trains A and B. The instrumentation and controls for the components andequipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls for the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintainequipment functional capability following those design basis events listed in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the SIS.(DRN 99-0459;01-367)The SIS is automatically actuated by a SIAS from the ESFAS. The SIAS is initiated by either two-out-of-four lowpressurizer pressure signals or two-out-of-four high containment pressure signals, as shown in Figures 7.3-2 and7.3-3. Automatic safety injection system operation is actuated at a pressurizer pressure of 1684 psia during poweroperation. During startup and shutdown operations a variable setpoint is used as described in Subsection
7.2.1.1.1.6.(DRN 99-0459;01-367)The measurement channels which generate low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure signals for theSIAS also provide signals to the CIAS and CSAS. The system is designed to correlate with a two-battery powerdistribution system in the plant. The loss of one battery may entail the loss of two of four power feeders to thesystem. However in that case, the power distribution within the system is able to sustain the logic in partially energized condition so as to prevent inadvertent initiation of SIAS. The loss of any combination of two of four powerfeeders that emanate from two different batteries will result in deenergized condition for a portion of logic and a consequent initiation of SIAS.Manual initiation of the SIS is provided in the main control room.The operating mode of the SIS is automatically changed by an RAS from the ESFAS. Generation of the RAS isdescribed in Subsection 7.3.1.1.2. The RAS is generated by two-out-of-four low refueling water tank level signals, asshown on Figure 7.3-4.The RAS automatically stops the low pressure safety injection pumps, and transfers the high pressure safetyinjection pump suction from the refueling water storage pool to the Safety Injection System sump.A list of equipment that is actuated by the SIAS is given in Table 7.3-5.System drawings are listed in Subsection 7.3.1.3.Initiation setpoints are given in Table 7.3-2.7.3.1.1.1.1Initiating CircuitsProcess measurement channels similar to those described in Subsection 7.2.1.1.2.1 are utilized to perform thefollowing functions:a)Continuously monitor pressurizer pressure and containment pressure b)Provide indication of operational availability of each sensor to the operatorc)Transmit analog signals to bistables within the ESFAS initiating logicThe parameters are measured with four independent process instrument channels.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-3A typical protective measurement channel functional diagram is shown on Figure 7.2-1. The measurement channelsconsist of instrument sensing lines, sensors, transmitters, power supplies, isolation devices, indicators, computer inputs, current loop resistors, and interconnecting wiring.Each measurement channel is separated from other like measurement channels to provide physical and electricalisolation of the signals to the ESFAS initiating logic. The output of each transmitter is a current loop. Signal isolationis provided for computer inputs. Each channel is powered by a redundant 120 volt vital ac distribution bus.Display information, which provides the operator with the operational availability of each measurement channel, is described and tabulated for all ESFAS circuits in section 7.5.7.3.1.1.1.2Logic7.3.1.1.1.2.1SIAS Initiating LogicThe SIAS initiating logic:
a)Compares the analog signals received from the protective measurement channels with preset levels;b)Provides a variable setpoint for plant start-up, shutdown, and low power testing;c)Forms two-out-of-four coincidence of like signals which have reached preset levels; d)Provides a means for manual blocking of pressurizer pressure signals if permissive conditions are met;e)Provides channel and signal status information to the operator, andf)Provides four SIAS initiation signals for each actuation signal to the SIAS actuating logic.
The SIAS initiating logic is similar to that shown on Figure 7.2-7, and consists of bistables, bistable output relays, triprelays, matrix relays, initiation channel output relays, manual block controls, block relays, manual testing controls, indicating lights, power supplies, and interconnecting wiring.The SIAS initiating logic is physically located in the PPS cabinet.
Signals from the protective measurement channels are sent to voltage comparator circuits (bistables) where theinput signals are compared to predetermined setpoints. Whenever a channel parameter reaches the predetermined setpoint, the channel bistable deenergizes the bistable output relay. The bistable output relay deenergizes the triprelays. Contacts of the trip relays form the SIAS initiating logic. Each set of trip relays (i.e., each channel) ispowered from a redundant 120 volt vital ac distribution bus. The bistable setpoints are adjustable from the front of the PPS cabinet. Access is limited by means of a key operated cover, with an annunciator indicating cabinet access. All bistable setpoints are capable of being read out on a meter located on the PPS cabinet and are sent to the plant monitoring computer.The SIAS initiation signals are generated in four channels, designated A, B, C and D. Two-out-of-four coincidence ofinitiating signals from the four protective measurement channels generates all four SIAS initiation signals. (See
Figures 7.3-1 and 7.3-2)Tripping of a bistable results in a channel trip characterized by the deenergization of three trip relays.
The contacts of the four sets of three trip relays have been arranged in six logic ANDs designated AB, AC,AD, BC, BD, and CD, which represent all possible two-out-of-four combinations for the four protective measurement channels. To form an AND circuit the trip relay contacts of two redundant WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-4protective measurement channels are connected in parallel (i.e., one from A and one from B). This process iscontinued until all combinations have been formed. Since more than one plant parameter can initiate a trip signal, the parallel pairs of trip relay contacts, each pair representing a monitored plant parameter, are connected in series (Logic OR) to form six logic matrices. The six matrices are also designated AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD. (see
Figures 7.3-1 and 7.3-2)Each logic matrix is connected in series with a set of four parallel logic matrix output relays (matrix relays). Eachlogic matrix is powered from two separate 120 volt vital ac distribution buses through dual dc power supplies asshown on Figure 7.3-1.The output contacts of the matrix relays are combined into four trip paths.Each ESFAS trip path is formed by connecting six contacts, one matrix relay contact from each of the six logicmatrices, in series. The six series contacts are in series with the trip path output relay. The trip path output relay
contacts form the SIAS initiating logic.7.3.1.1.1.2.2Actuating Logic The SIAS actuating logic performs the following:
a)receives SIAS signal from the SIAS initiating logic;b)forms selective two-out-of-four coincidence logic for actuation of SIAS;c)provides a means for manual initiation of SIAS; d)provides status information to the operator.The SIAS actuating logic is physically located in two ESFAS auxiliary relay cabinets. One cabinet contains the logicfor ESF train A equipment, while the other cabinet contains the logic for ESF train B equipment.Four SIAS initiation signal contacts are arranged in a selective two-out-of-four coincidence logic. Each initiationsignal also deenergizes the seal-in relays of its associated channel. The seal-in relays assure that the signal is notautomatically removed once initiated. The selective two-out-of-four coincidence circuitry is shown typically on Figure 7.3-5. Receipt of two selective SIAS initiation signals, as shown on Figure 7.3-5, will deenergize the subgroup relays, which generate the actuation signals. This process is performed independently in both auxiliary relay cabinets, generating both train A and train B signals.Each leg of the selective two-out-of-four circuitry is powered by two (2) auctioneered dc power supplies as shown onFigure 7.3-5. The four power supplies in cabinet "A" are connected to 120 V ac vital buses A and B. The four powersupplies in cabinet "B" are connected to 120 V ac vital buses C and D. The two redundant power sources within each cabinet are physically separated from each other.Figure 7.3-6 is a simplified functional diagram of a typical ESFAS logic (MSIS). In this case there are only two initiating circuits in each channel (steam generator #1 and steam generator #2 pressure) and thus each matrixladder consists of only two AND circuits in series. The four matrix relay outputs from each logic matrix again formfour trip paths. Each trip path output relay, instead of controlling trip circuit breakers as in the RPS, controls a contact of the selective two-out-of-four circuit for the group actuation. Group actuation is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3.Testing of each ESF subgroup of actuating logic components is accomplished by use of a test module. Groups areselected such that testing may be accomplished without affecting normal plant operation (i.e., unwarranted
actuation).The testing of the logic and trip paths is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-5Revision 10 (10/99)7.3.1.1.1.3Group ActuationThe components in the safety injection system are placed into various groups. Selection is made such that actuationof a group will not affect normal plant operation. Components of each group are actuated by one (1) group relay.
Group relay contacts are in the power control circuit for the actuated components of each ESF system.The logic described in Section 7.3.1.1.1.2 causes the opening of a contact in a selective two-out-of-four circuitwhenever any one of the logic matrices is deenergized. The circuit is shown on Figure 7.3-5 for a typical ESF system. Upon opening of selective contacts in the two-out-of-four logic, the group relays deenergized and actuate the ESF system components. Sequencing of component actuation, where required, is accomplished in the power
control circuit of each actuated component. Sequencing is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.8.7.3.1.1.1.4Bypasses Trip channel bypasses are provided for all ESF systems as shown in Table 7.3-3. The trip channel bypass isidentical to the RPS trip channel bypass (Subsection 7.2.1.1.5) and is employed for maintenance and testing of a
channelThe RPS/ESFAS pressurizer pressure bypass, as outlined in Table 7.3-3 and as shown in Figure 7.3-2, is providedto allow plant depressurization below 400 psia without initiation of undesired safeguards action. The setpoint must be adjusted manually by controls in each protective channel.The RPS/ESFAS pressurizer pressure bypass is not possible if pressurizer pressure is above a setpoint (500 psia).Once the bypass has been initiated, it is automatically removed if pressure rises above the setpoint. All bypasses
are annunciated.7.3.1.1.1.5InterlocksAn interlock prevents the operator from bypassing more than one trip channel at a time. Different type trips may besimultaneously bypassed, however, either in one channel or in different channels.During system testing an electrical interlock will allow only one set of four matrix relays in one matrix to be held in thetest position at a time. The same circuit will allow only one process measurement loop signal to be perturbed at atime. The matrix relay hold and loop perturbation switches are interlocked so that only one test may be conducted at any one time. Figure 7.2-7 shows this interlock. The same circuit will allow only one process measurement loopsignal to be perturbed at a time. The matrix test and loop perturbation switches are interlocked so that only one orthe other may be done at any one time.7.3.1.1.1.6RedundancyRedundant features of the SIAS include:a)Four independent channels, from process sensor through and including channel trip relays; b)Six logic matrices which provide the two-out-of-four logic. Dual power supplies through an auctioneeringnetwork are provided for the matrix relays;c)Four trip paths are present for each actuation signal;d)Four independent bistables are utilized to provide block permissive signals for the pressurizer pressure actuation signal. See Figure 7.3-2; WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-6e)The actuation signal is generated in two output trains so that redundant system components may be actuated from separate trains;f)Two independent sets of two manual trip pushbuttons are provided at two locations on the main controlboard to initiate SIAS. Pushbuttons are also located on the ESFAS Auxiliary Relay Cabinets.g)AC power for the actuation system is provided from four separate buses. Power for control and operation ofredundant actuated components comes from separate buses. Power source for each bus is from a Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS). Loss of preferred offsite power does not interrupt power to these vital buses, as described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.1.c.The result of the redundant features is a system which meets the single failure criterion, can be tested during plantoperation, and can be shifted to two-out-of-three logic.The benefit of a system that includes four independent and redundant channels is that the system can be operatedwith up to two channels out of service (one bypassed, one tripped) and still meet the single failure criterion. The only operating restriction while in this condition (one-out-of-two logic) is that no provision is made to bypass another channel for periodic testing or maintenance. The system logic must be restored to at least a two-out-of-threecondition prior to removing another channel for maintenance.7.3.1.1.1.7DiversityThe system is designed to eliminate credible multiple channel failures originating from a common cause. The failuremodes of redundant channels and the conditions of operation that are common to them are analyzed to assure thata predictable common failure mode does not exist. The design provides reasonable assurance that:a)the monitored variables provide adequate information during the accidents;b)the equipment can perform as required; c)the interactions of protective actions, control actions and the environmental changes that cause, or arecaused by, the design basis events do not prevent mitigation of the consequences of the event, andd)the system will not be made inoperable by the inadvertent actions of operating and maintenance personnel.
In addition, the design is not encumbered with additional components or channels without reasonable assurance that such additions are beneficial.The system incorporates functional diversity to accommodate the unlikely event of a common mode failure with any of the accident conditions listed in Subsection 7.2.2.1.2.7.3.1.1.1.8SequencingSequencing equipment is provided to the time sequence of loading the safety injection equipment. The sequencingfunction is performed by the use of time delay relays associated with the equipment. Component sequencing islisted in Table 8.3-1 for ac loads and Tables 8.3-3, 8.3-4 and 8.3-5 for dc loads.7.3.1.1.1.9TestingProvisions are made to permit periodic testing of the complete SIAS. These tests cover the trip actionsfrom sensor input through the protection system and the actuation devices. The system test does not WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-7interfere with the protective function of the system. The testing system complies with General Design Criterion 21 inthat the protection system as defined by IEEE Standard 279-1971, "Proposed IEEE Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems," IEEE Standard 338-1971, "IEEE Trial-Use Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection System," and Regulatory Guide 1.22, "Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuator Functions "(February, 1972) is designed to permit testing (up to the input to the 2 actuation devices) per Regulatory Guide 1.22. Certain subgroup relays cannot be tested without adverse consequences for plant safety and/or operability and therefore do not fully comply with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and IEEE Standard 338.
These excepted subgroup relays are tested in accordance with the Technical Specifications. Jumpers or other temporary forms of bypassing are not used during testing.The individual tests are described below. Overlap between individual partial tests exists so that the entire SIAS canbe tested without gaps. Frequency of accomplishing a complete succession of these partial tests is listed in theTechnical Specifications.7.3.1.1.1.9.1Sensor ChecksDuring reactor operation, the four redundant measurement channels providing an input to the SIAS (pressurizerpressure and containment pressure) are checked by comparing the output indicators of similar channels and cross-checking with related measurements.During extended shutdown periods or refueling, these measurement channels (where possible) are checked andcalibrated against known standards.7.3.1.1.1.9.2Trip Bistable Tests Testing of the trip bistable is accomplished by manually varying the input signal to the trip setpoint level on onebistable at a time and observing the trip action.Varying the input signal is accomplished by means of a trip test circuit which consists of a digital voltmeter and a testcircuit used to vary the magnitude of the signal supplied by the measurement channel to the bistable signal input.The trip test circuit is interlocked electrically so that it can be used in only one channel at a time. A switch isprovided to select the measurement channel and a pushbutton is provided to apply the test signal. The digital voltmeter indicates the value of the test signal.Trip action (deenergizing) of each of the bistable trip relays is indicated by individual lights on the front of the cabinet,indicating that the bistable trip unit and the trip relays operate as required for a trip condition.When one of the four trip bistables is in the tripped condition, a channel trip exists and is annunciated on the controlroom annunciator panel. In this condition, an actuation signal would take place upon receipt of a trip signal in one of the other three like trip channels. In addition, the trip channel under test is bypassed for the test, converting the PPSto a two-out-of-three logic and still meeting the single failure criterion for the particular trip parameter. In either case, full protection is maintained.7.3.1.1.1.9.3Logic Matrix TestsThis test is carried out to verify proper operation of the six two-out-of-four logic matrices, any of which will initiate abona-fide system trip for any possible two-out-of-four trip condition from the signal inputs from each measurementchannel. The matrix output relay hold pushbutton switch permits only one of the two-out-of-four logic matrices to be
tested at a time.Only one set of four matrix relays in one of the six logic matrices can be held in the energized position during tests.If, for example, the A-B logic matrix hold pushbutton is held depressed, actuation of the other matrix hold pushbuttons will have no effect upon their respective logic matrices.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-8Actuation of a matrix hold pushbutton will apply a test voltage to the test system hold coils of the selected fourdouble coil matrix relays. This voltage will provide the power necessary to hold the matrix relays in their energized position when the bistable trip relay contacts in the matrix ladder being tested open, thus causing deenergization of the primary matrix relay coils.While holding the matrix hold pushbutton in its actuated position, rotating the channel trip select switch will releaseonly those bistable trip relays that have operating contacts in the logic matrix under test. The bistable trip relays are double coil relays. The channel trip select switch applies a test voltage of opposite polarity to the bistable trip relaytest coils so that the magnetic flux generated by these coils opposes that of the primary coil of the relay. Theresulting flux will be zero, and the relays will release.Trip action can be observed by illumination of the trip relay indication lights located on the front panel and by loss ofvoltage to the four matrix relays which is indicated by extinguishing indicator lights connected across each matrix relay coil.During this test, the matrix relay "hold" lights will remain on, indicating that a test voltage has been applied to theholding coils of the four matrix relays of the logic matrix under test.The test is repeated for all six matrices. This test will verify that the logic matrix relays will deenergize if the matrixcontinuity is violated and that the trip relay output contacts function correctly. The opening of the matrix relays is tested in the trip path tests described in the following subsections.7.3.1.1.1.9.4Trip Path/Initiation Channel Tests Each trip path is tested individually by depressing a matrix hold pushbutton (holding four matrix relays), selecting anytrip position on the channel trip select switch (opening the matrix), and selecting a position on the matrix relay trip select switch (deenergizing one of the four matrix relays). This causes one, and only one, of the initiation channelsto deenergize. Proper operation of both initiation channel output relay coils and contacts is verified by monitoring thecurrent through the appropriate leg of the actuation logic selective two-out-of-four circuit.The matrix relay trip select switch is turned to the next position, deenergizing the tested matrix relay and initiationchannel relays.This sequence is repeated for the other three trip paths from the selected matrix. The entire test sequence isrepeated for the remaining five matrices. Upon completion of testing, all six matrices, all 24 matrix relay contacts and all eight initiation channel output relays have been tested.7.3.1.1.1.9.5Actuating Logic Tests The selective two-out-of-four logic circuit is tested in a manner identical to the RPS trip breaker system (Subsection7.2.1.1.9.5). One current path of the selective two-out-of-four logic matrix is interrupted by opening one of the path contacts and loss of path current is verified. Every contact in both current paths is checked in this manner.The manual trips are checked one at a time from their remote locations; the lockout contacts are checked via thegroup relay test system (Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.6) and the PPS initiation relay contacts are checked as described in
the preceding Subsections.This test verifies the proper operation of the Actuating Logic circuits.7.3.1.1.1.9.6Actuating Device TestProper operation of the Group Relays (see Figure 7.3-5) is accomplished by deenergizing the group relaysone at a time via a test relay contact and verifying proper operation of all actuated components in WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-9 Revision 14 (12/05)that group. The test system is interlocked such that one and only one group relay may be deenergized at one time. The test switch must be positioned to the group to be tested; selection of more than one group is impossible. The test circuit is electrically locked out upon actuation of a particular test group and another test group cannot be actuated for one minute after selecting another switch position. This time delay feature is a stop and think. Since this test causes the ESF components to actuate by interrupting the normal safety signal current to individual group relays, the propagation of a valid trip during testing will not be impeded, and the system will proceed to full
actuation.This test verifies the operation of the group relays and the individual safety injection component actuation devices.
a) Response Time Tests (DRN 03-2061, R14) Response time tests of the ESFAS are conducted at refueling intervals as given in the Technical Specifications. ESFAS response times are listed in the TRM. These tests include the sensors for each ESFAS channel and are based on the criteria defined in Subsection 7.3.2.1.3. (DRN 03-2061, R14)The hardware design includes test connections on the instrument lines going to pressure and differential pressure transmitters, and test points wired out to convenient test jacks or terminal strips where test equipment may be connected to various portions of the system. (DRN 99-1063, R11)The design of ESFAS complies with RG 1.22. In general, the engineered safety feature systems can be tested from the sensor signal through the actuation devices. The sensors can be checked during reactor operation by comparison with similar channels. Some engineered safety feature systems (e.g. main feedwater isolation valves) cannot be practicably designed such that the actuated equipment could be tested during reactor operation without adversely affecting safety or operation of the plant. In all such cases, the protection system design is highly reliable and the actuated equipment is tested when the reactor is shutdown to assure they are capable of performing the safety function. (DRN 99-1063, R11)7.3.1.1.1.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10. 7.3.1.1.2 Recirculation System Refer to section 6.2 for a description of the Containment Spray System (CSS), and Section 6.3 Safety Injection System. The RAS is automatically initiated by two-out-of-four low refueling water storage pool level signals, as shown in Figure 7.3-4.The system is composed of redundant load groups, train A and train B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the SIS and the CSS. The system automatically changes the mode of operation of the CSS and the SIS. The RAS automatically stops the low pressure safety injection pumps and changes the containment spray and high pressure safety injection pump suction from the refueling water storage pool to the Safety Injection System sump. There is no system level manual actuation provided from the main control room. A list of actuated devices is provided in Table 7.3-6, and final system drawings are listed in Subsection 7.3.1.3. Initiation setpoints are given in Table 7.3-2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-107.3.1.1.2.1Initiating CircuitsInitiating circuits are similar to the initiating circuits described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIS except that refuelingwater storage pool is the only parameter monitored.7.3.1.1.2.2Logic7.3.1.1.2.2.1Initiating LogicThe initiating logic for RAS is similar to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIS except that there are novariable setpoints, blocking multiple initiating signal provisions, or system level manual operation from the main control room.7.3.1.1.2.2.2Actuating LogicThe actuating logic for RAS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.2.3Group ActuationGroup actuation for RAS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.7.3-1-1.2.4Bypasses Bypasses for RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4 for SIS.7.3.1.1.2.5InterlocksInterlock provisions for RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.6Redundancy Redundancy features for RAS are similar to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS, except that there are no manual trip pushbuttons in the control room.7.3.1.1.2.7DiversityDiversity aspects for RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.7.3.1.1.2.8Sequencing There is no sequencing of equipment in association with RAS.7.3.1.1.2.9TestingAll provisions for testing RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.10Auxiliary Supporting Systems RequiredNo auxiliary supporting systems required.7.3.1.1.3Containment Spray System Refer to Section 6.2.2, Containment Heat Removal Systems, for a description of the CSS.
The CSS is automatically actuated by a CSAS from the ESFAS. The CSAS is initiated by coincidence of two-out-of-four-high-high containment pressure signals and an SIAS as shown in Figure 7.3-4.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-11Revision 10 (10/99)The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components andequipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence in adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the
CSS.The operating mode of the CSS is automatically changed following receipt of an RAS from the ESFAS. The RAS isgenerated by two-out-of-four low refueling water storage pool level signals, as shown in Figure 7.3-4.Control switches are provided to manually operate the SIS sump and the refueling water storage pool isolationvalves.The SIS and RAS signals override the control switches and position the SIS sump and the refueling water storagepool isolation valves automatically to allow a proper operation of CSS. However, RWSP isolation valves are required to close manually from the control room after RAS.The design is such that loss of electric power of two of the four like channels in the measurement channels orinitiating logic or to the selective two-out-of-four actuating logic would actuate the CSS.Manual initiation of the CSS is provided in the control room. The safety-related display instrumentation for the CSSwhich provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions is
described in section 7.5.Instrumentation location layout drawings present the location of the pressurizer pressure, containment pressure, andrefueling water tank level sensors which actuate the CSS and are listed in Subsection 7.3.1.3.7.3.1.1.3.1Initiating Circuits
Initiating circuits are identical to the initiating circuits described in Subsection7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIS except that the parameter monitored is containment pressure only. An SIAS signal will allow
initiation of the CSS.The SIAS and high-high containment pressure signals are combined in four AND circuits within the ESFAS initiatinglogic. The AND circuits prevent inadvertent operation of the containment spray system upon generation of an SIAS only.7.3.1.1.3.2Logic 7.3.1.1.3.2.1Initiating Logic The initiating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 except that there are no variable setpointor blocking of signal provisions, for either the high-high containment pressure signal or the high containment pressure signal, nor are there provisions for multiple initiating signals.7.3.1.1.3.2.2Actuating Logic The actuating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS.7.3.1.1.3.3Group ActuationGroup Actuation is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.4Bypasses WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-12Bypasses for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4 for SIS.7.3.1.1.3.5InterlocksInterlock provisions for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.7.3.1.1.3.6Redundancy Redundancy features for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS.7.3.1.1.3.7DiversityDiversity aspects for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.8SequencingSequencing equipment and functions for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.8 for SIS.7.3.1.1.3.9Testing All provisions for testing the CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.10Auxiliary Supporting Systems RequiredThe auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10.7.3.1.1.4Containment Isolation System Refer to Subsection 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System, (CIS) for a description of this system.The CIAS is initiated by two-out-of-four high containment pressure or low pressurizer pressure signals as shown inFigure 7.3-3. The measurement channels which generate the CIAS also provide signals to the SIAS. The system isdesigned to correlate with a two-battery power distribution system in the plant. The loss of one battery may entail the loss of two of four power feeders to the system. However in that case, the power distribution within the system isable to sustain the logic in partially energized condition so as to prevent inadvertent initiation of CIAS. The loss ofany combination of two of four power feeders that emanate from two different batteries will result in deenergized condition for a portion of logic and a consequent initiation of CIAS.The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components andequipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintainequipment functional capability necessary to isolate the containment following those design basis events shown inTable 7.3-1 which require containment isolation.The CIS is automatically actuated by the CIAS from the ESFAS. Manual initiation of the CIS is provided in the main control room.A list of actuated equipment is provided in Table 7.3-8.
The safety-related display instrumentation for the containment isolation system which provides the operator withsufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions is described in Section 7.5.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-13Instrumentation location layout drawings present the location of the sensors which actuate the containment isolationsystem and are described in Subsection 7.3.1.3.7.3.1.1.4.1Initiating Circuits The initiating circuits for the CIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for the SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.2Logic 7.3.1.1.4.2.1Initiating Logic The initiating logic for CIS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.2.2Actuating Logic The actuating logic for CIS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.3Group Actuation Group actuation for CIS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.4Bypasses CIS bypasses are identical to those described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4.
7.3.1.1.4.5Interlocks CIS interlocks are identical to those described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5.
7.3.1.1.4.6Redundancy CIS redundancy is identical to that described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6.
7.3.1.1.4.7Diversity CIS diversity is identical to that described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7.
7.3.1.1.4.8Sequencing There is no sequencing of equipment in association with CIS.
7.3.1.1.4.9Testing CIS testing is identical to that described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.
7.3.1.1.4.10Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10.
7.3.1.1.5Main Steam Isolation Refer to Section 10.3, Main Steam Supply System (MS) for a description of main steam isolation. Refer toSubsection 10.4.7, Condensate and Feedwater System, for a description of feedwater isolation.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-14 Revision 14 (12/05)The Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) is initiated by two-out-of-four low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure signals, as shown in Figures 7.3-6 and 7.3-7. The two-out-of-four logic is provided for each steam generator. The system is designed to correlate with a two-battery power distribution system in the plant. The loss of one battery may entail the loss of two of four power feeders to the system. However in that case, the power distribution within the system is able to sustain the logic in partially energized condition so as to prevent inadvertent initiation of MSIS. The loss of any combination of two of four power feeders that emanate from two different batteries will result in deenergized condition for a portion of logic and a consequent initiation of MSIS. The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the valves in train A, are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the valves in train B.
Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability necessary to prevent blowdown of both steam generators following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which require
main steam isolation. The MSIS provides for both main steam isolation and isolation of the main feedwater supply. Main steam isolation is achieved by actuating the main steam isolation valves (MSIV). Isolation of the normal feedwater supply is achieved by actuating the feedwater isolation valves. Manual initiation of main steam isolation is provided in the main control room. (DRN 05-130, R14) Automatic main steam and feedwater isolation is initiated at a pressure setpoint of 666 psia during normal operation.A variable setpoint is implemented to allow controlled pressure reductions such as shutdown depressurization without initiating a MSIS signal. The pressure setpoint is automatically increased as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached. (DRN 05-130, R14) The safety-related display instrumentation for main steam and normal feedwater isolation, which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions, is described in Section 7.5. Instrumentation location layout drawings which show the location of the steam generator pressure sensors which actuate the main steam isolation system are discussed in Subsection 7.3.1.3. The actuated equipment is listed in Table 7.3-9. Initiation setpoints are listed in Table 7.3-2. 7.3.1.1.5.1 Initiating Circuits Initiating circuits are identical to the initiating circuits described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIAS except that the parameters monitored are steam generator pressure and containment pressure. 7.3.1.1.5.2 Logic 7.3.1.1.5.2.1Initiating Logic The initiating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIAS. 7.3.1.1.5.2.2Actuating Logic Actuating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS. Refer to Figure 7.3-8 for typical actuation logic circuits. 7.3.1.1.5.3Group Actuation Group actuation is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3-1-1.1.3 for SIS. 7.3.1.1.5.4 Bypasses WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-15 Revision 307 (07/13)
Bypasses for MSIS are identical to those de scribed in Subsection 7.
3.1.1.1.4 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.5 Interlocks
Interlock provisions for MSIS are identical to those described in Subsecti on 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.6 Redundancy
Redundancy features for MSIS are identical to thos e described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.7 Diversity
Diversity aspects for MSIS are identical to t hose described in Subsecti on 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.8 Sequencing
There is no sequencing of equipment in association with MSIS.
7.3.1.1.5.9 Testing
All provisions for testing the MSIS are identical to those described in Subsec tion 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required
The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsec tion 7.3.1.1.10.
7.3.1.1.6 Emergency Feedwater System 7.3.1.1.6.1 General Information Refer to Subsection 10.4.9, for a description of this Emergency Feedwater System (EFS).
(EC-33720, R307)
Reference to Appendix 10.4.9B. (EC-33720, R307)
The Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) is initiated to steam generator 1 either by a low steam generator level coincident with no low pressure trip present on steam generator 1 or by a low st eam generator level coincident with a differential pressure between the two generators with the higher pressure in steam generator 1. (An identical EFAS is generated for steam generator 2.) This logic is shown in Figure 7.3-9. The two-out-of-four logic is provided for each steam generator. The system is designed such that loss of electric power to two of the four like channels in the measurement channels or initiating logic, or to the selective two-out-o f-four actuating logic, would actuate the EFS.
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and cont rols of the components and equipment in train A, are physically and electrically s eparate and independent of the instrumentati on and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability necessary to automatically actuate the EFS following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which require emergency feedwater.
The EFS instrumentation and controls are designed for automatic operation during emergency situations such as steam pipe rupture, loss of no rmal feed, and plant blackout.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-16 Revision 307 (07/13)
The EFAS performs the following functions:
a) Starts the emergency feedwater pumps;
b) Opens the emergency feedwat er shut-off valves to the steam generators. The control valves respond to the automatic signals as described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.2.
(EC-41355, R307) Manual control switches for the emergency feedwater pumps and emergency feedwater valves are provided in the main control room. Procedures are established for operating manual handwheel overrides or lining up backup air supplies for continued safety function after the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> mission time of the safety related Nitrogen Accumulator. (EC-41355, R307)
Automatic emergency feedwater act uation is initiated at the setpoints listed in Table 7.3-2.
The safety-related display instrumentation for the EFS, which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety f unctions, is described in Section 7.5.
Instrumentation location layout drawings showing the location of the steam generator pressure and level sensors which actuate the emergency feedwater system are discussed in Subsection 7.3.1.3. The actuat ed equipment is listed in Table 7.3-10.
The emergency feedwater control valves may be operated by operator manually or may be left in automatic mode of control.
In automatic mode, the control valves are positioned by the signals derived from the emergency feedwater flow and steam generator wide range level meas urement instrumentation loops.
The control logic for one steam generator is outlined below, the control logi c for the other steam generator being identical.
Figure 7.3-12 identifies the valves, flow meters , and the level setpoints in the steam generator.
7.3.1.1.6.2 Automatic Control (DRN 07-43, R15)
The following is a description of the automatic EFW Control system operation on regulating the flow of EFW to the steam generators so as to minimize adverse effects on the Reactor Coolant System. The automatic EFW control system as described below is credited in applicable FSAR Chapter 15 analyses and is discussed in Subsection
10.4.9.3.6. (DRN 07-43, R15)
- 1. Emergency Feedwater Actuation is Reset
Plant being in normal operation, the administrative procedures will call for the emergency feedwater shut-off valves to be in closed position and the c ontrol valves to be in automatic mode.
The automatic mode will drive the control valves into a fully closed position due to a relative high water level that is normally maintai ned in the steam generators.
The emergency feedwater pumps are off.
The shut-off valves are opened, and t he modulating control valves remain in the fully closed position.
The shut-off valves are not available for the operator's manual control unless EFAS is reset.
However, the modulating control valves are available for the operator's manual control.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-17The emergency feedwater pumps are started.3.Steam Generator Level Falls to the "Critical Level"The shut-off valves remain fully open.
Control valve "B" opens to a fixed predetermined position equivalent to 200 gpm flow of emergencyfeedwater to the steam generator.Flow meter FA inputs to a flow controller demanding 175 gpm. Control valve "A" moves to satisfy thatdemand. If the positioning of control valve "B" fails to produce at least 175 gpm, control valve "A" will be automatically controlled to satisfy the controller demand.The modulating control valves are available for the operator's manual control.
If the level trend reverses, at this point, and starts to rise, the control valves remain in this mode ofoperation until level setpoints "X" and "Y" are reached and the control valves are switched to the level control mode of operation (see 6 below).
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-18 Revision 15 (03/07)
- 4. Steam Generator Level Falls to "Lo Level" The shut-off valves remain fully open.
Control valve "B" remains in a fixed predetermined position equivalent to 200 gpm flow of emergency feedwater to the steam generator.
The flow controller set point increases to 400 gpm. Flow meter FA measures the flow and the controller automatically controls valve "A" to maintain 400 gpm.
The logic operates a "Steam Generator Emergency Level Lo" alarm in the main control room.
The modulating control valves are available for the operator's manual control.
If the level trend reverses, at this point, and starts to rise, the control valves remain in this mode of operation until level setpoints "X" and "Y" are reached and the control valves are switched to the level control mode of operation (see 6 below).
- 5. Steam Generator Falls to the "Lo-Lo Level" The shut-off valves remain fully open.
(DRN 07-43, R15)
The control valves "A" and "B" are driven to the fully open position (priority open - see Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.4). (DRN 07-43, R15)
If the level trend reverses, at this point, and starts to rise, the control valves will remain in the fully open position until the Lo-Lo level is reached. Above Lo-Lo level the control valves will go into the mode of
operation as described above in 4.
- 6. Steam Generator Level Rises to Level "X" (Automatic Mode)
The shut-off valves remain fully open.
Control valve "A" transfers from flow control to level control with Level "Y" as the setpoint.
Control valve "B" is transferred from the fixed position to level control with level "X" as the setpoint.
The valves will remain in the level control mode unless the steam generator level falls to the Critical Level, in this case the Control reference will return to step No. 3.
The modulating control valves are available for operator's manual control.
- 7. SIAS is Actuated The operation of the shut-off valves is not affected by actuation of SIAS and remains as described in steps 1 thru 6 above.
The modulating control valves will remain closed, if the level in the steam generator is above the "Critical Level." The modulating control valves will be switched immediately to the level control mode of operation, if the level in the steam generator is below the "Critical Level."
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-19The modulating control valves remain available for operator's manual control as described in steps 1 thru 6above.7.3.1.1.6.3Isolation of a Ruptured Steam Generator In the case of a MSLB, inside containment (either as the initiating event or after EFW actuation) it becomesnecessary to isolate the ruptured steam generator. The detection and isolation of the ruptured steam generator is performed by an interface between EFAS and MSIS.The EFAS-MSIS interface as shown on Figure 7.3-13 is implemented in the Plant Protection System (PPS) Cabinetand at the actuated components (i.e., valves). Only the PPS interface is discussed herein with respect to single failure.MSIS is initiated by low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure.EFAS is initiated to steam generator 1 either by low steam generator water level coincident with no low pressure trippresent for steam generator 1 or by low steam generator water level coincident with differential pressure between thetwo generators with the higher pressure in generator 1. This EFAS logic is provided for each steam generator.The low steam generator pressure signal is provided to the EFAS and MSIS logic from a single bistable comparatoroutput in each PPS channel. A single channel failure of this signal would have no effect on EFAS or MSISoperation. This is the only EFAS-MSIS interface present on the PPS.The interrelationship between EFAS and MSIS operation is described by the following scenario assuming a ruptured steam generator:EFAS logic permits emergency feedwater to be supplied to each steam generator upon receipt of a valid low steamgenerator water level condition.Upon receipt of a low steam generator pressure condition, EFAS and MSIS logic will terminate emergency feedwaterby causing the emergency feedwater valves to close by resetting EFAS and tripping MSIS. This isolation of theEFW valves will not effect the operation of the EFW pumps. MSIS logic will isolate the steam generators by causing main feedwater and main steam isolation valves to close, thus allowing steam generator pressures to vary in-dependently. The ruptured steam generator pressure will decrease while the intact steam generator pressure willremain constant or increase, thereby causing a differential pressure condition to exist. EFAS logic will permit emergency feedwater to be supplied to the intact steam generator while maintaining isolation of the ruptured steam generator.7.3.1.1.6.4Priority SignalsThe EFW control system utilizes two signals (priority open, priority close) that override all other automatic or manualcontrols to the EFW valves.Priority close is generated when the system is determining which steam generator is ruptured (Subsection7.3.1.1.6.3). Once this determination is made the priority close signal is deactivated to the intact steam generator only. Upon deactivation of the signal, control of the EFW will return to the status (automatic or manual) that existed prior to the generation of the priority close signal.Priority open is generated when the water level reaches "Lo-Lo Level" (Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.2, Item 5). Once thewater level rises above the "Lo-Lo Level", control of the EFW will return to the status (automatic or manual) that existed prior to the generation of the priority open signal.In the case of the ruptured steam generator, the EFAS command that generates the priority close signal will preventa priority open signal.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-207.3.1.1.6.5Initiating CircuitsThe initiating circuits are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIS except that the parametersmonitored are steam generator level and pressure.7.3.1.1.6.6Logic7.6.1.1.6.6.1Initiating LogicThe initiating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIS except that the provision formultiple initiating signals does not apply.7.3.1.1.6.6.2Actuating Logic Actuating logic is similar to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS. Refer to Figure 7.3-10.7.3.1.1.6.7Group ActuationGroup Actuation is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.8BypassesBypasses are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3 1.1.1.4 for SIS.7.3.1.1.6.9Interlocks Interlock provisions are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.7.3.1.1.6.10RedundancyRedundancy features are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.11DiversityDiversity aspects are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.7.3.1.1.6.12Sequencing
Sequencing equipment and functions are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1 1.1.8 for SIS.7.3.1.1.6.13TestingAll provisions for testing the EFS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.14Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1-1.10.7.3.1.1.7Containment Cooling SystemRefer to Subsection 6.2.2, for a description of the Containment Cooling System (CCS).
The CCS is automatically actuated by a SIAS from the ESFAS. The SIAS is initiated by either two-out-of-four lowpressurizer pressure signals or two-out-of-four high containment pressure signals, as shown in Figures 7.3-2 and
7.3-3.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-21 Revision 14-B (06/06)The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment of train A, are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of
the components and equipment in train B. 7.3.1.1.8 Shield Building Ventilation System Refer to Subsection 9.4.5 for a description of the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS). The SBVS is automatically initiated upon receipt of-SIAS as shown in Figure 7.3-11. The SIAS is generated as shown in Figure 7.3-2. The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the equipment and components in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the equipment and components in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the SBVS.Both trains of the SBVS are automatically placed in operation upon receipt of the SAIS. One train may be placed in standby by the operator following verification of operation of both trains. The standby system will be automatically restarted if the operating system should fail. Manual initiation of the SBVS is provided in the control room. The safety-related display instrumentation for the SBVS which provides the operator with sufficient information of monitor and perform the required safety functions is
described in Section 7.5. 7.3.1.1.9 Combustible Gas Control System The Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) consists of the following: a) Hydrogen Recombiner System (HRS) b) Hydrogen Analyzer c) Containment Atmosphere Release system (CARS) (DRN 05-1382, R14-B)10CFR50.44 no longer defines a design basis LOCA hydrogen release and eliminates requirements for hydrogen control systems to mitigate such a release. The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems formerly required by 10CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design basis LOCA. Engineered safety features are provided in nuclear plants to mitigate the consequences of design-basis loss of coolant accident, even though the occurrence of these accidents is very unlikely. The basis of revision to 10CFR50.44 is the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the onset of core damage. In addition, combustible gas control systems are ineffective at mitigating hydrogen releases from risk-significant beyond design-basis accidents. As a result, the CGCS no longer meets any of the four criteria in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) and no longer performs the functions of an engineered safety feature. The CGCS is described below and is relegated to non design basis, severe accident management functions only. Refer to FSAR section 7.5 for further discussion of the post accident function of the hydrogen analyzers. (DRN 05-1382, R14-B)7.3.1.1.9.1 Hydrogen Recombiner System The dual-train HRS will be under manual administrative control. The hydrogen concentration in the containment following a LOCA will be limited to a maximum of four percent by volume. The operator will initiate the recombiner system when a high concentration of hydrogen is monitored. No automatic actuation signals are provided in the control of combustible gases. The time at which these systems must be initiated is of sufficient duration so that automatic initiation is unnecessary.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-22 Revision 14-B (06/06)The hydrogen recombiners as described in Subsection 6.2.5 are located within the containment. When started remotely from the control room the combustible gas and air mixture, following a LOCA, will be processed through either or both recombiners to remove the hydrogen by reacting with oxygen to form water. The recombiner is provided with electric heating coils which are powered from separate emergency power supplies. Failure of any recombiner will be indicated in the main control room. The instrumentation and control associated with the recombiners are located in the main control room. Each recombiner train will have a manual control switch to "start"/"stop" the recombiner train. When the recombiner is started, the system will continue to operate automatically. Indicating lights will indicate the status of the recombiners.Temperature elements will detect and maintain the required temperature. 7.3.1.1.9.2 Hydrogen Analyzer Refer to Subsection 6.2.5 for description of this system. The hydrogen analyzer has the capability of sampling and measuring the hydrogen concentration at points where hydrogen may accumulate in the containment during all modes of operation. The system is operated from the main control room, see Subsection 6.2.5.5.3 for additional details. The sample is analyzed in the hydrogen analyzer which determines the percentage of hydrogen in the containment and enables the rate of change of hydrogen concentration calculation to be made. The hydrogen analyzer is independent of any other engineered safety feature operation or signal. Instrumentation layout drawings which present the location of the hydrogen analyzer sensors are referenced in Section 1.7. 7.3.1.1.9.3 Containment Atmosphere Release System (CARS) CARS is described in Subsection 6.2.5.2.3. The system will be under manual control in the main control room. No automatic actuation signals are provided to control the purging of the Containment. The system will contain indication of each fan and each valve and also contain annunciation of a malfunction in the system. Each fan and its associated valves will have completely independent logic from the other fans with their respective valves.The sensors and logics of the containment atmosphere release system are not used for variable control of the system process; thus malfunction and failures in the controls have no direct effect on the operation of the pertinent systems of the combustible gas control system. CARS will have redundant electrical components.
Figure 9.4-7 indicates CARS schematic diagram for train A and train B. 7.3.1.1.10 ESF Supporting Systems The ESF supporting systems listed below are described in the referenced Sections. a) Component Cooling Water System (Subsection 9.2.1) b) Standby (Emergency) Power and Distribution System (Section 8.3) c) HVAC Systems for ESF Systems Areas (Section 6.4 and 9.4) d) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System (Subsection 9.5.4) e) Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System (Subsection 9.2.2.)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-237.3.1.2Design Basis InformationThe design bases for all of the ESF system controls are essentially the same. Where differences exist, they areexplained in the text or accompanying tables.7.3.1.2.1Design Basis Information For ESF System Equipment The design of each of the ESF Systems, including design bases and evaluation, is discussed in Chapter 6. Thefollowing analyses address the ESFAS and instrumentation.The ESFAS is designed to provide initiating signals for components which require automatic actuation followingrupture of a primary or secondary pressure boundary.The systems are designed on the following bases to assure adequate performance of their protective functions:a)The system is designed in compliance with the applicable criteria of the NRC, General Design Criteria forNuclear Power Plants, (Appendix A of 1OCFR50, 1971).b)System testing conforms to the requirements of IEEE Standard 338-1971, Trial Use Criteria for PeriodicTesting of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (Feb. 1972)c)IEEE Standard 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,establishes specific protection system design bases. The following Subsections describe how these design bases listed in Section 3 of IEEE Standard 279 are implemented.1)The design basis events which require protective action are listed in Table 7.3-1.2)The ESF system is designed to monitor the parameters related to design basisevents listed in Table 7.3-1 to provide protective actions.3)The number and identification of the sensors required to adequately monitor,for protective function purposes, the variables listed in Section 3(2) having spatial dependence are listed in Table 7.3-2.4)Prudent operation limits for each variable listed in Section 3(2) are listedin Table 7.3-2.5)The margin, with appropriate interpretive information, between eachoperational limit and the level considered to mark the onset of unsafe conditions are given in Table7.3-2. Interpretive information is given in Subsection 7.3.2.1, Criterion 10.6)The setpoints that, when reached, will require protective action are listed inTable 7.3-2.7)The range of transient and steady-state conditions of both the energysupply and the environment (for example, voltage, frequency, temperature, humidity, pressure,vibration, etc.) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the system
must perform:
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-24 Revision 14 (12/05) (a) Voltage and Frequency The class 1E 12OV-ac vital instrumentation and control power supplies are described in Section 8.3. (b) Temperature, humidity, pressure, radiation, chemical spray and nonseismic vibration. The design environment for the equipment is stated in Section 3.11. 8) The malfunctions, accidents, or other unusual events (for example, fire, explosion, missiles, lightning, flood, earthquake, wind, etc.) which could physically damage protection system components or could cause environmental changes leading to functional degradation of system performance, and for which provisions must be incorporated to retain necessary protective action: (a) Fire The fire protection system is described in Subsection 9.5.1. (b) Missiles Missile protection is described in Section 3.5.
(c) Flood Water level (flood) design is described in Section 3.4. (d) Earthquake Seismic qualification of instrumentation and electrical equipment is described in Section 3.10. Seismic design is described in Section 3.7. (e) Wind Wind and tornado loadings are described in Section 3.3. (f) Pipe Whip Protection against pipe whip is described in Section 3.6.
- 9) Minimum performance requirements including the following: (DRN 03-2061, R14) (a) System response time (see TRM and Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2) (DRN 03-2061, R14) (b) System accuracies (see Table 7.3-2) (c) Ranges normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) of the magnitudes and rates of change of sensed variables to be accommodated until proper conclusion of the protective action is assured. (see Table 7.3-2) 7.3.1.2.2 Design Basis for the Instrumentation and Controls Of The Auxiliary Supporting Systems The auxiliary supporting systems conform to the design bases given in Subsection 7.1.2.1 and as further described below.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-25Revision 10 (10/99)The systems are designed on the following bases to assure adequate performance of their protective functions:a)The system is designed in compliance with the applicable criteria of the NRC General Design Criteria forNuclear Power Plants (Appendix A. 10CFR50, 1971). For further details see Subsection 7.3.2.2.1.b)System testing conforms to the requirements of IEEE Standard 338-1971. Trial Use Criteria for PeriodicTesting of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.22. Feb. 1972)
Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions. For further details see Subsection 7.3.2.2.3.7.3.1.3Final Systems DrawingsElectrical wiring diagrams, block diagrams, final logic diagrams, and location layout drawings are listed and providedby reference in Section 1.7.7.3.1.3.1Onsite Power System Drawings for the onsite power system are listed in section 8.3.7.3.1.3.2Drawing ComparisonA comparison between the final logic diagrams and the logic diagrams furnished with the PSAR is provided in Table 7.3-12.7.3.2ANALYSIS7.3.2.1Engineered Safety Feature Actuation SystemsThe design of each of the ESF System, including design bases and evaluation, is discussed in Chapter 6. Thefollowing analyses address the ESFAS and instrumentation.7.3.2.1.1Design As previously described, the major portion of the ESFAS is functionally identical to the RPS. The logics for theESFAS and RPS, in fact, are located in the same enclosures and share a common logic testing scheme. Because of this, many of the responses to the requirements of the NRC General Design Criteria, IEEE Standard 279-1971and IEEE standard 338-1971 are identical to the responses for the RPS. Where responses for the two systems are identical, reference is made to the appropriate section.Appendix A of 10CFR50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum requirements forthe principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants.Section 3.1 provides a detailed discussion of all General Design Criteria. This section describes how the requirements that are applicable to the ESFAS are satisfied.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-26Criterion 1:Quality Standards and RecordsThe requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.30 (8/11/72), and 1.38 (3/16/73) were met. Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.The quality assurance for the design of equipment and components is described in the QA Program Manual.Criterion 2:Design Bases For Protection Against Natural PhenomenaThe design bases for protection against natural phenomena are described in Sections 3.10, 3.11 and Subsection 7.2.2.Criterion 3:Fire ProtectionThe design bases for fire protection are described in Subsections 9.5.1 and 7.2.2.
Criterion 4:Environmental and Missile Design BasesEnvironmental design bases are described in Section 3.11. Missile design bases are described in Section 3.5, and Subsection 7.2.2.Criterion 5:Sharing of Structures, Systems and ComponentsNo ESFAS components are shared with future or existing reactor facilities.
Criterion 10:Reactor DesignThe ESFAS in conjunction with the plant control systems and Technical Specification requirements, providesufficient margin to trip setpoints so that, (1) during normal operation protective action will not be initiated, and (2)during anticipated operational occurrences, fuel design limits will not be exceeded. Typical margins for each trip parameter are shown in Table 7.3-2.Criterion 13:Instrumentation and Control Sensor ranges are sufficient to monitor all pertinent plant variables over the expected range of plant operation innormal and transient conditions. Variables that affect plant safety limits are monitored by the PPS. The safety-
related information readout for plant monitoring is described in Section 7.5. Also refer to Subsection 7.2.2.Criterion 19:Main Control Room The main control room layout is presented in Section 7.5. Emergency shutdown from outside the main control room is described in Section 7.4.Criterion 20:Protection System FunctionsThe ESFAS monitor all plant variables that affect plant design limits. These limits are given in Table7.3-2. ESF systems will be initiated to prevent these limits from being exceeded for all the anticipated operationaloccurrences that are listed in Table 7.3-1.Criterion 21:Protection System Reliability and TestabilityFunctional reliability is ensured by compliance with the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971, as described inSubsection 7.1.2.4. Testing is in compliance with IEEE Standard 338-1971, and consistent with the recommenda-tions of Regulatory Guide 1.22 (February, 1972), as described in Subsection 7.3.2.1.3. Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-27Criterion 22:Protection System IndependenceThe ESFAS independence is assured through redundancy and diversity as described in Subsections 7.3.1.1.1.6 and 7.3.1.1.1.7. Also refer to Subsection 7.2.2.Criterion 23:Protection System Failure ModesFailure modes of the ESFAS components are discussed in Subsection 7.3.2.1.4 for each individual system.Where protective action is required under adverse environmental conditions during postulated accidents the ESFAS components are designed to function under such conditions.Criterion 24:Separation of Protection and Control Systems The protection system is separated from the control systems as described in Subsection 7.3.2.1.2. Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.Criterion 29:Protection Against Anticipated Operational OccurrencesRefer to Subsection 7.2.2.Criterion 54, 55, 56, 57:
The instrument sensing lines for monitoring containment pressure are discussed in Section 3.1.7.3.2.1.2Equipment Design CriteriaIEEE Standard 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, establishesminimum requirements for safety-related functional performance and reliability of the ESFAS. This section describeshow the requirements listed in Section 4 of IEEE Standard 279-1971 are satisfied.4.1 "General Functional Requirement"The ESFAS is designed to automatically actuate the appropriate ESF systems, when required, and to mitigate theeffects of certain accidents. Instrument performance characteristics, response time, and accuracy are selected forcompatibility with and adequacy for the particular function. Trip set points are established by analysis of the systemparameters. Factors such as instrument inaccuracies, bistable trip times, valve travel time, and pump starting times are considered in establishing the margin between the trip setpoints and the safety limits. The time response of thesensors and protective systems are evaluated for abnormal conditions. Since all uncertainty factors are consideredas cumulative for the derivation of these times, the actual response time may be more rapid. However, even at the maximum times, the system provides conservative protection.There are no ESFAS sensors for which the trip setpoints are within five percent of the high or low and of the calibrated range.4.2 "Single Failure Criterion"The ESFAS is designed so that any single failure within the system shall not prevent proper protective action at thesystem level. No single failure will defeat more than one of the four protective channels associated with any one trip
function.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-28The effect of single faults in the RPS is discussed in Section 7.2.2. The same analysis is applicable for the ESFASwith the modifications appropriate to redundant actuation trains instead of control element drive mechanisms (CEDM) power supply circuits.Single faults of actuation relays or actuation relay buses have no effect as a selective two-out-of-four logic isrequired for actuation. Single faults of the actuation (or control) circuitry will cause, at worst, only a failure of acomponent or components within one of the two redundant actuation trains; actuation of the remaining trains' components are sufficient for the protective action.4.3 "Quality Control of Components and Modules"The quality assurance program is described in the QA Program Manual. This program includes appropriaterequirements for design review procurement, inspection and testing to ensure that the system components shall beof a quality consistent with minimum maintenance requirements and low failure rates.4.4 "Equipment Qualification"The ESFAS meets the equipment requirements described in Sections 3.10 and 3.11.4.5 "Channel Integrity"Type testing of components, separation of sensors and channels, and qualification of cabling are utilized to ensurethat the channels will maintain the functional capability required under applicable extremes of conditions relating toenvironment, energy supply, malfunctions and accidents.Loss of or damage to any one path will not prevent the protective action. Sensors are piped so that blockage orfailure of any one connection does not prevent protective system action. The process transducers located in thecontainment building are specified and rated for the intended service.Components which must operate during or after the LOCA are rated for the LOCA environment. Results of type testare used to verify these ratings. In the control room protective system trip paths are located in four compartments.
Mechanical and thermal barriers between these compartments reduce the possibility of common event failure.Outputs from the components in this area to the control boards are isolated so that shorting, grounding, or theapplication of the highest available local voltage does not cause channel malfunction. Where signals originating in the PPS feed the computer, signal isolation is provided; where the ESFAS is feeding annunciators, isolation is ensured through the use of relay contacts.4.6 "Channel Independence"The locations of the sensors and the points at which the sensing lines are connected to the process loop have beenselected to provide physical separation of the channels, thereby precluding a situation in which a single event couldremove or negate a protective function. The routing of cables from protective system transmitters is arranged so thatthe cables are separated from each other and from power cabling to minimize the likelihood of common event failures. This includes separation at the containment penetration areas. In the control room, protective system trip channels are located in individual compartments. Mechanical and thermal barriers between these compartmentsminimize the possibility of common event failure. Outputs from the components in this area to the control boards areisolated so that shorting, grounding, or the application of the highest available local voltages (120 VAC, 125 VAC) do
not cause channel malfunction.4.7 "Control and Protection System Interaction"No portion of the ESFAS is used for both control and protection functions.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-294.8 "Deviation of Systems Inputs"ESFAS inputs are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables. Variables which aremeasured directly include pressurizer, steam generator, and containment pressure. Refueling water storage poollevel and steam generator level are derived from differential pressure measurements.4.9 "Capability for Sensor Checks"ESFAS sensors are checked by cross-checking between channels. These channels bear a known relationship toeach other, and this method ensures the operability of each sensor during reactor operation.4.10 "Capability for Test and Calibration"Testing is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 and is in compliance with IEEE standard 338-1971 as discussed in Subsection 7.3.2.1.3 as amended by Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.4.11 "Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation"Any one of the four protective system channels may be tested, calibrated, or repaired without detrimental effects onthe system. Individual trip channels may be bypassed to effect a two-out-of-three logic on remaining channels forsystems. The single failure criterion is met during this condition.4.12 "Operating Bypasses"Operating bypasses are provided as shown in Table 7.3-3. The operating bypasses are automatically removed whenthe permissive conditions are not met. The circuitry and devices which function to remove these inhibits aredesigned in accordance with IEEE Standard 279-1971.4.13 "Indication of Bypasses"Indication of test or bypass conditions or removal of any channel from service is given by lights and annunciation.Bypasses are automatically removed at fixed setpoints.4.14 "Access to Means for Bypassing"A key is required to gain access to the means for bypassing a protective system channel. An interlock prevents theplant operator from bypassing more than one of the four channels of any one type trip at any one time. All bypassesare visually and audibly annunciated.4.15 "Multiple Setpoints"Manual reduction of setpoints for MSIS and SIAS is allowed for the controlled reduction of pressurizer pressure andsteam generator pressure as discussed in Subsections 7.3.1.1.1.4 and 7.3.1.1.1.5. The setpoint reductions are initiated by a control board mounted pushbutton, which upon actuation, adjusts the setpoints to a value a preselected distance below the operating pressure which exists at the time the pushbutton is actuated. A separate pushbutton is provided for each protection channel. This method of setpoint reduction provides positive assurancethat the setpoint is never decreased below the existing pressure by more than a predetermined amount.The setpoint will be automatically increased by the PPS as the measured pressure is increased.4.16 "Completion of Protective Action Once it is Initiated WSES-FSAR-UNIT-37.3-30The system is designed to ensure that protective action will go to completion once initiated. With the exception of EFAS, operator action is required to clear the actuation signal and return to operation. EFAS resets automatically when the low steam generator water level signal clears.4.17 "Manual Initiation"For each ESF system manual actuation is effected by depressing two sets of two trip pushbuttons (one set per loadgroup) at the ESF Auxiliary Relay Cabinets. Two remote sets of trip pushbuttons (switches for EFAS) at different locations on the RTG board are provided to actuate each ESF system with the exception of the RAS. For the remote pushbuttons, one set of two is sufficient to actuate both load groups.4.18 "Access to Setpoint Adjustments, Calibration and Test Points"A key is required for access to setpoint adjustments, calibration and test points. Access is also visually and audibly annunciated.4.19 "Identification of Protective Action"Indication lights are provided for all protective actions, including identification of channel trips.4.20 "Information Readout"Means are provided to allow the operator to monitor all trip system inputs and outputs. The specification displaysthat are provided for continuous monitoring are described in Section 7.5. System status displays are provided.4.21 "System Repair"Identification of a defective channel will be accomplished by observationof system status lights or by testing as described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9. Replacement or repair of components isaccomplished with the affected channel bypassed. The affected trip function then operates in a two-out-of-three trip logic.4.22 "Identification"All equipment, including panels, modules, and cables associated with the actuation system, are marked in order to facilitate identification.7.3.2.1.3Testing Criteria IEEE Standard 338-1971, Trial Use Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Generating Station ProtectionSystems, and Safety Guide 22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (February, 1972), provide guidance for development of procedures, equipment, and documentation of periodic testing. The basis for the scopeand means of testing are described in this section. Test intervals and their bases are included in the TechnicalSpecifications. Since operation of the ESF system is not expected, the systems are periodically tested to verify operability. Complete channels can be individually tested without initiating protective action, without violating the single failure criterion, and without inhibiting the operation of the systems. The organization for testing and fordocumentation is described in Chapter 13.The system can be checked from the sensor signal through the actuation devices. The sensors can be checkedduring reactor operation by comparison with similar channels.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-31 Revision 14 (12/05)Those actuated devices, which are not tested during reactor operation (e.g., main feedwater isolation valves), will be tested during scheduled reactor shutdown to assure that they are capable of performing the safety functions. Minimum frequencies for checks, calibration and testing of the ESFAS instrumentation are given in the Technical Specifications. Overlap in the checking and testing is provided to assure that the entire channel is functional. The use of individual trip and ground detection lights, in conjunction with those provided at the supply bus, assure that possible grounds or shorts to another source of voltage will be detected. (DRN 03-2061, R14)The response time from an input signal to protection system trip bistables through the opening of the actuation relays is verified by measurement during plant startup testing. ESFAS response times are listed in the TRM. Sensor responses are measured during factory acceptance tests. (DRN 03-2061, R14)7.3.2.1.4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Failure modes and effects analyses for the ESFAS are provided in Table 7.2-5. The ESFAS are identified in Section 7.3.7.3.2.1.5 Consideration of Selected Plant Contingencies a) Loss of Instrument Air Systems None of the essential control or monitoring instrumentation is pneumatic. Electrical instrumentation is powered from the emergency power system. Therefore, the loss of instrument air will not degrade instrumentation and control systems required for shutdown of the plant. b) Loss of Cooling Water to Vital Equipment None of the instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown rely on cooling water for operation. Air conditioning systems required to maintain the environment within the instrument design parameters are redundant and described in sections 6.4 and 9.4. 7.3.2.2 Instrumentation and Controls for Auxiliary Supporting System7.3.2.2.1 General Design Criteria The general design criteria for the instrumentation and controls of the components in auxiliary supporting systems that are actuated by ESFAS are identical to those for the instrumentation and controls of the ESF systems. See Subsection 7.3.2.1.1. The process instrumentation and controls, of the auxiliary supporting systems are described in Section 7.5 under Plant Process Display Instrumentation and listed in Table 7.5-1. 7.3.2.2.2 Equipment Design Criteria The equipment design of the instrumentation and controls of the components in the auxiliary supporting systems that provide a safety function is described in the Subsection applicable. The process instrumentation and controls of the auxiliary supporting systems that do not provide a protective function, provide the operator with sufficient information to maintain the system within its design limits.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-1Revision 10 (10/99)DESIGN BASIS EVENTS REQUIRING ESF SYSTEM ACTIONSystemsContainmentContainmentContainmentRecirculationMain SteamSafetyEmergencyShieldCoolingIsolationSprayActuationIsolationInjectionFeedwaterBuildingDesign Basis EventsSystemSystemSystemSystemSystemSystemSystemVent SystemLoss of Reactor Coolant - Large Break******
Loss of Reactor Coolant - Small Break (1)*******Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- (2)**Steamline or Feedwater Line Break (Inside Containment)*****
(3)**Steamline or Feedwater Line Break (Outside Containment)
- (3)*(1) Includes CEA Ejection(2) Manual Actuation (3) Steamline Break Only* Denotes Action Required WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-2 Revision 307 (07/13)
ESFAS SENSORS AND SETPOINTS (DRN 06-884, R15)
Actuation Signal Sensor (1) Nominal Values Analytical Limit Tag Number Full Power and and Range Normal Oper. Limits (DRN 99-0459; 03-2061, R14)
CIAS, SIAS Pressurizer RCIP-102 A,B,C,D 2250 psia 1560 psia Pressure Low 0-3000 psia 2125-2275 psia (DRN 99-0459; 03-2061, R14) (DRN 02-1730, R12-A)
CIAS, MSIS, SIAS CBIP-SMA,SMB, Containment SMC, SMD 14.7 psia 19.7 psia Pressure High 0.30 psia 14.275-15.7 psia CSAS CBIP-SMA,SMB Containment SMC, SMD Pressure High-High 14.7 psi 19.7 psia 0-30 psia 14.275-15.7 psia (DRN 02-1730, R12-A)
(DRN 00-1044, R11-A; 03-2061, R 14;05-130, R14; EC-8460, R307) MSIS and EFAS SGIP-1013A,B,C,D (2)
Steam Generator PT-1023A,B,C,D 832 psia 576 psia Pressure Low 0-1200 psi 970 - 800 psia (DRN 00-1044, R11-A; 03-2061, R 14;05-130, R14; EC-8460, R307) RAS SGIIL-305A,B,C,D Refueling Water Storage 0-100% 94% 7% Pool Level Low 91-100% (EC-8460, R307)
EFAS SGIL-1113A,B,C,D Steam Generator LT-1123A,B,C,D 64.4% 5% (5) Level Low 0-100% 59.4-69.4% (EC-8460, R307)
EFAS Differential 0 psid 230 psid Between Steam N/A (3) Gen's Press (DRN 06-884, R15)
(1) Four Sensors for each variable parameter.
(2) Setpoint can be manually decreased as pressure is reduced during a plant cooldown. The setpoint is automatically increased as steam generator pressure increases. (3) The differential steam generator pressure signal is produced by a bistable utilizing signals from bother generators' pressu re sensors. (DRN 06-884, R15)
(4) The analytical limits correspond to those used in the safety analysis. The actual equipment setpoints are determined to ens ure that the specified protective action is initiated at or before the monitored parameter reaches the nom inal values. The equipment setpoi nts are listed in the Technical Specifications. (DRN 06-884, R15)
(5) % of this distance between steam generator upper and lower level instrument nozzles.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-3Revision 10 (10/99)
ESFAS BYPASSES Title Function Initiated ByRemoved By NotesTrip Channel BypassDisables any given tripManually by controlledSame switchInterlocks allowchannelaccess switchone channel for anytype trip to be bypassedat one time.RPS/ESFASDisables low pressurizer Key Operator switchAutomatic ifAllows plant depressurization Pressurizertrip and SIAS(1 per channel)pressurizerbelow 400 psia withoutPressureif pressurizer Pres-pressure isinitiating SIAS or lowBypasssure is < 400 psia> 500 psiapressurizer trip WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 7.3-4AUXILIARY SUPPORTING SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning EngineeredSafety Features SystemsAuxiliary Component Cooling Water SystemCooling Water SystemDiesel Generatotor Systems Charging PumpRoomsBoric Acid Make-up PumpRoomsDiesel Generator RoomsChiller Rooms ESF Swgr.
RoomsBattery Rooms ESF Pump Rooms CCW Pump RoomsStandby Power Distribution SystemsSafety Injection X X X X X X X X X X X XContainment Spray X X X X X X X X X X Containment Isolation X X X X X X X X XMain Steam Isolation X X X X X X X X XEmergency Feedwater X X X X X X X X X Containment Cooling X X X X X X X X X Shield BuildingVentilation System X X X X XCombustible GasControl System X X X X X WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 1 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON SIASActuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartShield Bldg VentE-17 (3ASA)XSystem FanSBVMFAN0001AOpen(10)Shield Bldg Vent2HV-B160A(1)Fan E-17 (3ASA)SBVMVAAA101A Train A Inlet ValveOpen (10)Shield Bldg Vent2HV-B158A(1)Fan E-17 (3ASA)SBVMVAAA110A Train A Outlet ValveOpen/Shield Bldg Vent Fan2HV-B162A(1)Close (10)E-17 (3ASA) MainSBVMVAAA114ADischarge to Stack
ValveClose/Shield Bldg Vent2HV-B164A(1)Open (10)Fan E-17 (3ASA)SBVMVAAA113ARecirc Valve to
AnnulusStartShield Bldg VentE-17 (3BSB)XSystem FanSBVMFAN0001BOpen (10)Shield Bldg Vent Fan2HV-B161B(1)E-17 (3BSB) Train BSBVMVAAA101B
Inlet ValveOpen (10)Shield Bldg Vent Fan2HV-B159B(1)E-17 (3BSB) Train BSBVMVAAA110B Outlet ValveOpen/Shield Bldg Vent Fan2HV-B163B(1)Close (10)E-17 (3BSB) MainSBVMVAAA114BDischarge to Stack
ValveStopCEDM Cooling UnitE16(3A)X CDCMFAN0002AStopCEDM Cooling UnitE16(3C)XCDCMFAN0002C WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 2 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStopCEDM Cooling UnitE16(3B)X CDCMFAN0002BStopCEDM Cooling UnitE16(3D)X CDCMFAN0002DClose/Shield Bldg Vent Fan2HV-B165B(1)Open (10)E-17 (3BSB) RecircSBVMVAAA113B Valve to AnnulusStops (3)Control Rm ToiletE-34 (3ASA)XExhaust FanHVCMFAN0011AStops (3)Control RM ToiletE-34 (3BSB)XExhaust FanHVCMFAN0011BCloseControl Rm Toilet3HV-B177AXExhaust Fan E-34 (3ASA)HVCMVAAA307& E-34 (3BSB) IsolationDischarge ValveCloseControl Rm Toilet3HV-B178BXExhaust Fan E-34 (3ASA)HVCMVAAA306
& E-34 (3BSB) Isolation Discharge ValveOpenControl Rm ToiletD-18 (SA)XExhaust Fan E-34 (3ASA)HVCMVAAA304A By-pass DamperOpenControl Rm ToiletD-18 (SB)XExhaust Fan E-34 (3BSB)HVCMVAAA304BBy-pass DamperStopControl Rm Kitchen &E-42 (3)(1)(1)Conference Rm ExhaustHVCMFAN0012 Fan (Not connected toemergency DG bus)CloseControl Rm Kitchen &3HV-B171AXConference Rm ExhaustHVCMVAAA314Fan E-42 (3)Isolation DischargeValve WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 3 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseControl Rm Kitchen &3HV-B172BXConference Rm ExhaustHVCMVAAA313 Fan E-42 (3) IsolationDischarge DamperOpenControl Rm Kitchen &D-19 (SA)XConference Rm ExhaustHVCMVAAA312A Fan E-42 (3) By-pass DamperOpenControl Rm Kitchen &D-19 (SB)XConference Rm ExhaustHVCMVAAA312B Fan E-42 (3) By-pass DamperStart (4)Control Rm EmergencyS-8 (3ASA)XFiltration System FanHVCMFAN0010AOpenControl Rm EmergencyD-17 (SA)(1)Filtration System FanHVCMVAAA205A S-8 (3ASA) Inlet DamperOpenControl Rm EmergencyD-41 (SA)(1)Filtration System FanHVCMVAAA213A S-8 (3ASA) Return Air DamperStartSafeguard PumpAH-2 (3ASA)(1)Rm A CoolerHVRMAHU0034AStartSafeguard PumpAH-2 (3CSA)(1)Rm A CoolerHVRMAHU0036AStartSafeguard PumpAH-2 (3BSB)(1)Rm B CoolerHVRMAHU0034BStartSafeguard PumpAH-2 (3DSB)(1)Rm B CoolerHVRMAHU0036BStartSafeguard PumpAH-21 (3SAB)(1)Rm A CoolerHVRMAHU0034ABStartEquipment Rm CoolerAH-26(3ASA)(1)HVCMAHU0013A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 4 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartEquipment Rm CoolerAH-26(EBSB)(1)
HVCMAHU0013BStart (4)Control Rm EmergencyS-8 (3BSB)XFiltration System FanHVCMFAN0010BOpenControl Rm EmergencyD-17 (SB)(1)Filtration System FanHVCMVAAA205BS-8 (3BSB) Inlet DamperOpenControl Rm EmergencyD-41 (SB)(1)Filtration System FanHVCMVAAA213B S-8 (3BSB) Return Air DamperStartControl Rm Air Handling UnitAH-12 (3ASA)X(Continuously running ifHVCMAHU0001A selected)StartControl Rm Air Handling UnitAH-12 (3BSB)X(Continuously runningHVCMAHU0001B if selected)CloseControl Rm Supply FanD-40 (SA)XAH-12 (3ASA) IntakeHVCMVAAA103A DamperCloseControl Rm Supply FanD-40 (SB)XAH-12 (3BSB) Intake HVCMVAAA103B DamperOpenAH-25(3ASA)D-48 (SA)XRecirc. DamperSVSMVAAA105AOpenAH-25(3BSB)D-48 (SB)XRecirc. DamperSVSMVAAA105B WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 5 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BOpenAH-25(3ASA)D-49 (SA)XRecirc. DamperSVSMVAAA106AOpenAH-25(3BSB)D-49 (SB)XRecirc. DamperSVSMVAAA106BAuto AH-25(3ASA) EHC CHLD 3AC-TM188A(1)ControlWTR CONTR VACHWMVAAA591AutoAH-25(3BSB) EHC CHLD3AC-TM189B(1)ControlWTR CONTR VACHWMVAAA900OpenControl Rm Supply FanD-39(SA)(1)AH-12(3ASA) Return AirHVCMVAAA105ADamperOpenControl Rm Supply FanD-39(SB)(1)AH-12(3BSB) Return Air HVCMVAAA105B DamperCloseControl Rm Supply Fan3HV-B169AXAH-12 (3ASA) & AH-12 (3BSB)HVCMVAAA102 Outside Intake Air ValveCloseControl Rm Supply Fan3HV-B170BXAH-12 (3ASA) & AH-12HVCMVAAA101 (3BSB) Outside IntakeAir ValveStart (4)CVAS FanE-23 (3ASA)X HVRMFAN0021AStart (4)CVAS FanE-23 (3BSB)X HVRMFAN0021BOpenCVAS Fan E-23 (3ASA)3HV-B210AXTransfer ValveHVRMVAAA302Open (10)CVAS Filter Train A3HV-B208A(1)Inlet ValveHVRMVAAA304AOpen (10)CVAS Filter Train A3HV-B206A(1)Outlet ValveHVRMVAAA313A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 6 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseReactor Aux Bldg3HV-B218AXNormal VentilationHVRMVAAA108 System Isolation ValveCloseReactor Aux Bldg3HV-B217BXNormal VentilationHVRMVAAA109 System Isolation ValveOpenReactor Aux Bldg3HV-B225BXVentilation System FanHVRMVAAA301 E-23 (3BSB) Transfer ValveOpen (10)CVAS Filter Train B3HV-B209BXInlet ValveHVRMVAAA304BOpen (10)CVAS Filter Train B3HV-B207B(1)Outlet ValveHVRMVAAA313BCloseReactor Aux Bldg3HV-B226AXNormal VentilationHVRMVAAA106 System Isolation ValveStatus DisplayQSPDS-2X Enable AlarmRAB Neg PressANN WindowXLost AlarmCP18-915ARAB Neg PressANN WindowXLost AlarmCP18-915BCloseReactor Aux Bldg Normal3HV-B227BXVentilation System HVRMVAAA107 Isolation ValveCloseReactor Aux Bldg Normal3HV-B224AXVentilation System SupplyHVRMVAAA104to Pipe Penetration Area ValveCloseReactor Aux Bldg Normal3HV-B223BXVentilation System Supply toHVRMVAAA105 Pipe Penetration Area ValveCloseReactor Aux Bldg Normal3HV-B216AXVentilation System ExhaustHVRMVAAA111from Pipe Chase Area Valve WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 7 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseReactor Aux Bldg Normal3HV-B215BXVentilation System ExhaustHVRMVAAA110 from Pipe Chase Area ValveStopComputer Room SupplementalAH-31(3)(7)(7)Air Handling UnitHVCMAHU0007StopAnnulus Neg. PressureE-19(3A)(7)(7)Exhaust FanANPMFAN0001AStopAnnulus Neg. PressureE-19(3B)(7)(7)Exhaust FanANPMFAN0001BStopCable Vault AreaE-49(3)(7)(7)Exhaust FanSVSMFAN0009CloseAnnulus Negative Pressure3HV-B175AXSystem Isolation ValveANPMVAAA101CloseAnnulus Negative Pressure3HV-B176BXSystem Isolation ValveANPMVAAA102StopReactor Aux Bldg NormalS-6 (3A)(7)Ventilation System Supply FanHVRMFAN0002AStopReactor Aux Bldg NormalS-6 (3B)(7)Ventilation System Supply FanHV4MFAN0002BStopReactor Aux Bldg NormalE-22 (3A)XVentilation System Exhaust FanHVRMFAN0009AStopReactor Aux Bldg NormalE-22 (3B)XVentilation System Exhaust FanHVRMFAN0009BCloseReactor Aux Bldg NormalD-4 (A)(1)Ventilation System ExhaustHVRMVAAA121AFan E-22 (3A) Inlet DamperCloseReactor Aux Bldg NormalD-5 (A)(1)Ventilation System ExhaustHVRMVAAA122A Fan E-22 (3A) Outlet DamperCloseReactor Aux Bldg NormalD-4 (B)(1)Ventilation System ExhaustHVRMVAAA121BFan E-22 (3B) Inlet Damper WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 8 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseReactor Aux Bldg NormalD-5 (B)(1)Ventilation System ExhaustHVRMVAAA122B Fan E-22 (3B) Outlet DamperStartSwitchgear Area AirAH-25 (ASA)XHandling UnitSVSMAHU0001AStartSwitchgear Area AirAH-30 (3ASA)XHandling UnitSVSMAHU0002AOpenAH-30 (3ASA)D-50 (SA)(1)Inlet DamperSVSMVAAA201AStartSwitchgear Area AirAH-25 (3BSB)XHandling UnitSVSMAHU0001BStartSwitchgear Area AirAH-30 (3BSB)XHandling UnitSVSMAHU0002BClose to min.Switchgear Area Air HandlingD-65 (SA)Xopen positionUnit AH-25(3ASA) Outside DamperSVSMVAAA101Close to min.Switchgear Area Air HandlingD-65 (SB)Xopen positionUnit AH-25 (3BSB) Outside DamperSVSMVAAA102OpenSwitchgear Area Air Handling D-8 (SA)(1)Unit AH-25 (3ASA) Return AirSVSMVAAA103A DamperOpenSwitchgear Area Air HandlingD-8 (SB)(1)Unit AH-25 (3BSB) Return AirSVSMVAAA103BDamperStartBattery Room A Exhaust FanE-29 (3A-SA)XSVSMFAN0006AStartBattery Room A Exhaust FanE-29 (3B-SB)XSVSMFAN0006BStartBattery Room B Exhaust FanE-30 (3A-SA)XSVSMFAN0005AStartBattery Room B Exhaust FanE-30 (3B-SB)XSVSMFAN0005B WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 9 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartBattery Room AB Exhaust FanE-31 (3A-SA)XSVSMFAN0004AStartBattery Room AB Exhaust FanE-31 (3B-SB)XSVSMFAN0004BOpenAH-30 (3BSB)D-50 (SB)(1)Inlet DamperSVSMVAAA201BStart (2)RAB H&V Equipment RoomAH-13 (3ASA)XSupply FanHVRMAHU0022AStart (2)RAB H&V Equipment RoomAH-13 (3BSB)XSupply FanHVRMAHU0022BStart (2)RAB H&V Equipment RoomE-41 (3ASA)(1)Exhaust FanHVRMFAN0024AStart (2)RAB H&V Equipment RoomE-41 (3BSB)(1)Exhaust FanHVRMFAN0024BStartComputer Battery Room E-46 (3A-SA)XExhaust FanSVSMFAN0003AStartComputer Battery RoomE-46 (3B-SB)XExhaust FanSVSMFAN0003BStart (6)Water ChillerWC-1 (3ASA)X RFRMCHL0001AStart (6)Water ChillerWC-1 (3BSB)X RFRMCHL0001BStart (6)(9)Water ChillerWC-1 (3CSAB)XX RFRMCHL0001CCloseAnnulus NegativeD-25(3)(1)(1)Pressure SystemANPMVAAA103 Inlet DamperCloseAnnulus NegativeD-26(3)(1)(1)Pressure SystemANPMVAAA106Exhaust Damper WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 10 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartChilled Water PumpP-1 (3A-SA)(1)CHWMPMP0001AStartChilled Water PumpP-1 (3B-SB)(1)CHWMPMP0001BStartChilled Water PumpP-1 (3C-SAB)(1)(1)CHWMPMP001ABStartDiesel Gen A RoomE-28 (3A-SA)(1)Exhaust FanHVRMFAN0025AStartDiesel Gen B RoomE-28 (3B-SB)(1)Exhaust FanHVRMFAN0025BStartComponent Cooling WaterAH-10 (3ASA)(1)Pump A Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0028aStartComponent Cooling WaterAH-20 (3ASAB)(1)A/B Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0028ABStartPump B Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0028BStartComponent Cooling WaterAH-20 (3BSAB)(1)Pump A/B Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0030StartCharging Pump AAH-18 (3ASA)(1)Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0040AStartCharging Pump A/BAH-22 (3ASAB)(1)Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0040ABStartCharging Pump BAH-18 (3BSB)(1)Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0040BStartCharging Pump A/BAH-22 (3BSAB)(1)Air Handling UnitHVRMAHU0042AB WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 11 of 19)Revision 12-A (01/03)Actuation Channel Action ComponentTag Number A BStartLow Pressure Safety AX Injection PumpSIMPMP00001AStartLow Pressure Safety BX Injection Pump SIMPMP0001BStartHigh Pressure Safety AX Injection Pump SIMPMP0002AStartHigh Pressure Safety BX Injection Pump SIMPMP0002B Start (9)High Pressure SafetyA/BXXInjection PumpSIM PMP0002ABOpen (10)LPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1549A1to Loop 1A(SI-615)X SIMVAAA139BOpen (10)LPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1539B1Xto Loop 1B(SI-625)
SIMVAAA138BOpen (10)LPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1541A2to Loop 2A(SI-635)X SIMVAAA139AOpen (10)LPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1543B2to Loop 2B(SI-645)X SIMVAAA138AOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1550A1to Loop 1A(SI-617)X SIMVAAA225A(DRN02-1017, R12)
CloseLPSI Header Auto VentSI-ISV-6011X Isolation Valve CloseLPSI Header Auto VentSI-ISV-6012X Isolation Valve(DRN02-1017, R12)(DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
CloseLPSI A to RC Loop 2B UpstrSI ISV 14023AX Auto Vent Containment Isolation CloseLPSI A to RC Loop 2B UpstrSI ISV 14024AX Auto Vent Auto Isolation(DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 12 of 19) Revision 10 (10/99)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1546A2to Loop 1B(SI-627)X SIMVAAA226AOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1547B3to Loop 2A(SI-636)X SIMVAAA227BOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1548A4to Loop 2B(SI-647)X SIMVAAA228AOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1540B2to Loop 1B(SI-626)X SIMVAAA226BOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1542A3to Loop 2A(SI-637)X SIMVAAA227AOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1544B4to Loop 2B(SI-646)X SIMVAAA228BOpen (10)HPSI Flow Control Valve2SI-V1545B1to Loop 1A(SI-616)X SIMVAAA225BOpen (10)S I Tank 1A Isolation1SI-V1505TK1AValve(SI-614)X SIMVAAA331ACloseS I Tank 1A Leakage1SI-F1551TK1AXDrain Valve(SI-618)
SIMVAAA303AOpen (10)S I Tank 1B Isolation1SI-V1506TK1BXValve(SI-624)
SIMVAAA331BCloseS I Tank 1B Leakage1SI-F1552TK1BXDrain Valve(SI-628)
SIMVAAA303B WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 13 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BOpen (10)S I Tank 2A Isolation1SI-V1507TK2AXValve(SI-634)
SIMVAAA332ACloseS I Tank 2A Leakage1SI-F1553TK2AXDrain Valve(SI-638)
SIMVAAA304AOpen (10)S I Tank 2B Isolation 1SI-V1508TK2BXValve(SI-644)
SIMVAAA332BCloseS I Tank 2B Leakage1SI-F1554TK2BXDrain Valve(SI-648)
SIMVAAA304BCloseRCS Loop 1 Hot Leg1SI-V2504XInj. Drain Valve(SI-301)
SIMVAAA301OpenRefueling Water2SI-L103AXStorage PoolSIMVAAA106A Outlet ValveOpenRefueling Water2SI-L104BXStorage PoolSIMVAAA106B Outlet ValveOpenSG No. 2 Emerg.2FW-V853A(1)PermissiveFW Control VAEFWMVAAA224BOpenSG No. 1 Emerg.2FW-V852A(1)PermissiveFW Control VAEFWMVAAA223AOpenSG No. 2 Emerg.2FW-V854B(1)PermissiveFW Control VAEEFWMVAAA223BOpenSG No. 1 Emerg.2FW-V851B(1)PermissiveFW Control VAEFWMVAAA224ACloseRCS Loop 2 Hot Leg Injection1SI-V2505XDrain VA(SI-302)
SIMVAAA302 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 14 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartDiesel Generator AXEGEGEN0001AStartDiesel Generator BXEGEGEN0001BStartCharging Pump AX CVCMPMP0001AStartCharging Pump BX CVCMPMP0001BStart (9)Charging Pump ABXX CVCMPMP0001ABStartBoric Acid Make-up Pump AX BAMMPMP0001AStartDiesel Generator A Sequence AX LoadingStartDiesel Generator B Sequence BX LoadingStartBoric Acid Make-up Pump BX BAMMPMP0001BOpen (10)Boric Acid Tank A Gravity Feed3CH-V106AXValve to Charging Pumps(CH-509)
BAMMVAAA113AOpen (10)Boric Acid Tank B Gravity3CH-V107BXFeed Valve to Charging Pumps(CH-508)
BAMMVAAA113BCloseBoric Acid Pump A Recirc Line3CH-F170AXValve(CH-510)
BAMMVAAA126ACloseBoric Acid Pump B Recirc Line3CH-F171BXValve(CH-511)
BAMMVAAA126BOpen (10)Reactor Make-up Bypass Valve3CH-V112AB(CH-514)XBAMMVAAA133 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 15 of 19) Revision 10 (10/99)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseReactor Make-up Stop Valve3CH-F117AB(CH-512)X CVCMVAAA510CloseLetdown Control Valve1CH-F2501A/BX (CH-516)
CVCMVAAA103CloseLetdown Stop Valve1CH-F1516A/B(CH-515)X CVCMVAAA101Close (10)VCT Discharge Valve2CH-V123A/B(CH-501)XTripDiesel Generator AEG-EBKR3A-14XPermissiveOutput BreakerTripDiesel Generator BEG-EBKR3B-15XPermissiveOutput BreakerStartComponent Cooling Water Pump AX CCMPMP0001AStartComponent Cooling Water Pump BX CCMPMP0001BStart (9)Component Cooling Water Pump A/BXX CCMPMP0001ABOpenCCW Outlet Valve from3CC-F131BXShutdown HX BCCMVAAA963BStartAux Component Cooling Water Pump AX ACCMPMP0001AStartAux Component Cooling Water Pump BX ACCMPMP0001BCloseCCW Pump A Discharge Header3CC-F109A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA126ACloseCCW Pump A Discharge Header3CC-RF110A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA127A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 16 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseCCW Pump B Discharge Header3CC-F112A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA126BCloseCCW Pump B Discharge Header3CC-F111A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA127BCloseCCW Pump A Suction Header3CC-F113A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA114ABlock Instrument Air Compressor AXAuto OperationIAMCMP0001ABlockInstrument Air Compressor BXAuto OperationIAMCMP0001BCloseCCW Pump A Suction Header3CC-F114A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA115ACloseCCW Pump B Suction Header3CC-F116A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA114BCloseCCW Pump B Suction Header3CC-F115A/BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA115BTrip &Station Service TransformerSSD-EBKR-3A-8XBlock Auto Close3A32 FDR BRKRTrip &Station Service TransformerSSD-EBKR-3B-9XBlock Auto Close3B32 FDR BRKRCloseCCW Train B Supply to NNS3CC-F123BXIsolation ValveCCMVAAA200BCloseCCW Supply to NNS Isolation3CC-F133A/BXValveCCMVAAA501CloseCCW Train B Return to CCW3CC-F121BXPumps Common Suction HdrCCMVAAA563 Isolation ValveCloseCCW Return from NNS to CCW3CC-F132A/BXPumps Common Suction HdrCCMVAAA562Isolation Valve WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 17 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BReset toCCW Heat Exchanger A3CC-TM290AXSIASTemperature ControlACCMVAAA126A operationalValve modeReset to CCW Heat Exchanger B3CC-TM291BXSIASTemperature ControlACCMVAAA126B operationalValve modeCloseFuel Pool Temp3CC-FM138A/BXControl ValveCCMVAAA620CloseLetdown Temperature3CC-TM169A/B(1)(1)Control ValveCCMVAAA636StartCharging Pump AB Seal AB(1)(1)Lube PumpCVCMPMP0012ABStartCharging Pump A Seal A(1)Lube PumpCVCMPMP0012ABStartCharging Pump B Seal B(1)Lube PumpCVC MPMP00012BClose (10)SIS Sump Isolation Valve2SI-L101AX SIMVAAA602AClose (10)SIS Sump Isolation Valve2SI-L102BX SIMVAAA602BStart (8)Containment Fan CoolerAH-1 (3ASA)X CCSMFAN0003AStart (8)Containment Fan CoolerAH-1 (3CSA)X CCSMFAN0003CStart (8)Containment Fan CoolerAH-1 (3BSB)X CCSMFAN0003BStart (8)Containment Fan CoolerAH-1 (3DSB)X CCSMFAN0003DOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F154A1X(3CSA) CCW Inlet ContainmentCCMVAAA807A Isolation ValveOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F158A1X(3CSA) CCW Outlet ContainmentCCMVAAA823AIsolation Valve WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 18 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F155A2X(3DSB) CCW Inlet ContainmentCCMVAAA808A Isolation ValveOpenContainment Fan Coolers3CC-TM 148AXSystem "A" CCW Flow Control ValveCCMVAAA835AOpenContainment Fan Cooler SafetyD-69 (SA)XDischarge DamperCCSMVAAA102AOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F159A2X(3ASA) CCW Outlet ContainmentCCMVAAA822A Isolation ValveOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F156B1X(3DSB) CCW Inlet ContainmentCCMVAAA808B Isolation ValveOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F160B1X(3DSB) CCW Outlet ContainmentCCMVAAA822B Isolation ValveOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F157B2X(3BSB) CCW Inlet ContainmentCCMVAAA807B Isolation ValveOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler3CC-TM 149BXSystem "B" CCW Flow Control ValveCCMVAAA835BOpenContainment Fan Cooler SafetyD-70 (SB)XDischarge DamperCCSMVAAA102BOpen (8)Containment Fan Cooler AH-12CC-F161B2X(3BSB) CCW Outlet ContainmentCCMVAAA823B Isolation ValveOpenDiesel Generator A Room ExhaustLD-2(SA)(1)Fan E-28 (3A-SA) Intake DamperHVRMVAAA501AAuto ControlDiesel Generator B Room ExhaustD-6(SB)(1)Fan E-28 (3B-SB) Pitch RotorHVRMVAAA502BOpenDiesel Generator B Room ExhaustD-7(SB)(1)Fan E-28 (3B-SB) Intake DamperHVRMVAAA501BAuto ControlDiesel Generator A Room ExhaustD-6(SA)(1)Fan E-28 (3A-SA) Pitch RotorHVRMVAAA502A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 19 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)NOTES:(1)Auxiliary equipment actuated through interlock with primary equipment. No separate actuation isprovided.(2)One selected fan is running during normal operation. On SIAS second fan is started (both fansrunning).(3)One selected fan is running during normal operation. On SIAS both fans are tripped and locked-out.(4)Neither fan is operated during normal operation. On SIAS both fans are started.
(5)Operator shall manually open one of the two emergency outside Air Intake System (no individualcontacts from SIAS required).(6)Selected number of water chillers are running during normal operation. On SIAS two waterchillers shall receive start signal.(7)Non-safety units are actuated through isolated contacts during emergency operation (no individualcontacts from SIAS).(8)Three selected fans are running at fast speed and their associated isolating CCW valves are openduring normal operation. On SIAS all four fans shall run at low speed with all associated isolatingCCW valves open.(9)Will start only if AB pump is selected for B pump and AB Bus aligned to B Bus or if AB pump isselected for A Pump and AB Bus aligned to A Bus.(10)Thermal overload contacts are bypassed on SIAS.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-6 Revision 9 (12/97)COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON RASActuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStopLPSI PumpAXSI-MPMP0001AStopLPSI PumpBXSI-MPMP0001BOpen-AlarmSIS Sump Outlet2SI-L101AXValve to Recirc(SI-653)SI-MVAAA602AOpen-AlarmSIS Sump Outlet2SI-L102BXValve to Recirc(SI-654)
Header BSI-MVAAA602BCloseRefueling Water2SI-L103AXPermissiveStorage PoolSI-MVAAA106AOutlet ValveCloseRefueling Water2SI-L104BXPermissiveStorage PoolSI-MVAAA106BOutlet ValveOverload BypassSafety Injection Pumps "A"2SI-V809AXOnlyMin. Flow Isol. VASIMVAAA121AOverload BypassSafety Injection Pumps "A"2SI-V810AXOnlyMin. Flow Isol. VASIMVAAA120AOverload BypassSafety Injection Pumps "B"2SI-V801BXOnlyMin. Flow Isol. VASIMVAAA121BOverload BypassSafety Injection Pumps "B"2SI-V802BXOnlyMin. Flow Isol. VASIMVAAA120B WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3.7 Revision 9 (12/97)COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON CSASActuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartContainment Spray Pump AXCS-MPMP0001AStartContainment Spray Pump BXCS-MPMP0001BOpenContainment Spray Isol 2CS-F305AXValveCS-MVAAA125AOpenContainment Spray Isol2CS-F306BXValveCS-MVAAA125BFail to startCont. Spray Pump A AlarmXFail to startCont. Spray Pump B AlarmXCloseRCP Cooling Water2CC-F146A/BXSupply Cont Isol ValveCC-MVAAA641CloseRCP Cooling Water2CC-F-243A/BXReturn Isol ValveCC-MVAAA710CloseRCP Cooling Water2CC-F147A/BXReturn Isol ValveCC-MVAAA713CloseCCW Train A Return to3CC-F120AXCCW Pumps CommonCC-MVAAA727Suction Hdr Isolation ValveCloseCCW Train A Supply to3CC-F122AXNNS Isolation ValveCC-MVAAA200AOpenCCW Outlet Valve from3CC-F130AXShutdown HX ACC-MVAAA963AStartSafeguard Pump Room AAH-2 (3A-SA)(1)CoolerHVRMAHU0034AStartSafeguard Pump Room AAH-2 (3C-SA) (1)CoolerHVRMAHU0036AStartSafeguard Pump Room BAH-2 (3B-SB)(1)CoolerHVRMAHU0034BStartSafeguard Pump Room BAH-2 (3D-SB)(1)CoolerHVRMAHU0036BNOTES: (1)Actuates through interlock with primary equipment.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 1 of 5)Revision 12 (10/02)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON CIAS Actuation Channel Action ComponentTag Number A B Trip OverrideContainmentAtmos Release SysS-3 (3A-SA)X Permis.Supply FanCAR MFAN 0001A Trip OverrideContainmentAtmos Release SysE18 (3A-SA)X Permis.Exhaust Fan CAR MFAN 0002AClose (2)ContainmentAtmos Release Sys2HV-B167A(1)
Disch Valve CAR MVAAA 204AClose (2)ContainmentAtmos Release Sys2HV-F253AX Suct Valve CAR MVAAA 201A Trip OverrideContainmentAtmos Release SysS-3 (3B-SB)X Permis.Supply Fan CAR MFAN 0001B Trip OverrideContainmentAtmos ReleaseE18 (3B-SB)XPermis.SysExh FanCAR MFAN 0002BClose (2)ContainmentAtmos Release2HV-B168B(1)SysDisch Valve CAR MVAAA 204BClose (2)ContainmentAtmos Release2HV-F254BX System Suct Valve CAR MVAAA 201B(DRN 02-1017)(DRN 02-1017)
Close Containment Pressure2HV-F228AXExhaust Valve CAR MVAAA 200B Close Containment Pressure2HV-F229BX Exhaust Valve CAR MVAAA 202B CloseLetdown Control Valve1CH-F2501A/BX (CH-516)
CVC MVAAA 103 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 2 of 5) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseLetdown Control Valve2CH-F1518A/BX(CH-523)CVC MVAAA 109CloseRCP Bleed Off Cont Isol Valve2CH-RF1512A/BX(CH-505)CVC MVAAA 401CloseRCP Bleed Off Cont Isol Valve2CH-F1513A/BX(CH-506)RC MVAAA 606CloseReactor Drain Tk Cont Isol Valve2BM-F108A/BX(BM-301)BM MVAAA 109CloseReactor Drain Tk Cont Isol Valve2BM-F109A/BX(BM-302)BM MVAAA 110CloseNitrogen Cont Isol Valve2NG-F604XNG MVAAA 157CloseWaste Gas Cont Isol Valve2WM-F157A/BX(WM-320)GWM MVAAA 104CloseWaste Gas Cont Isol Valve2WM-F158A/BX(WM-321)GWM MVAAA 105CloseCont Sump Pumps Isol Valve2WM-F104A/BXSP MVAAA 105CloseCont Sump Pumps Isol Valve2WM-F105A/BXSP MVAAA 106CloseCoolant Sampling Containment2SL-F1501A/BXIsol ValvePSL MVAAA 105CloseCoolant Sampling Containment2SL-F1504A/BXIsol ValvePSL MVAAA 107ClosePressurizer Surge Line Cont2SL-F1502A/BXIsol ValvePSL MVAAA 203ClosePressurizer Surge Line Cont2SL-F1505A/BXIsol ValvePSL MVAAA 204ClosePressurizer Stm Space Sampling2SL-F1503A/BXCont Isol ValvePSL MVAAA 303 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 3 of 5) Revision 10 (10/99)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BClosePressurizer Stm Space Sampling2SL-F1506A/BXCont Isol ValvePSL MVAAA 304CloseSteam Gen 1 Sampling Isol Valve2SL-F601XSSL MVAAA 8004ACloseSteam Gen 1 Sampling Isol Valve2SL-F602XSSL MVAAA 8006ACloseSteam Gen 2 Sampling Isol Valve2SL-F603XSSL MVAAA 8004BCloseSteam Gen 2 Sampling Isol Valve2SL-F604XSSL MVAAA 8006BCloseInstr Air Containment Isol Valve2IA-F601ABXIA MVAAA 909CloseFire Wtr Containment Isol Valve2FP-F129XFP MVAAA 601BCloseFire Wtr Containment Isol Valve2FP-F127XFP MVAAA 601ACloseSteam Gen No. 1 Blowdown Cont2BD-F603XIsol ValveBD MVAAA 102ACloseSteam Gen No. 1 Blowdown Cont2BD-F604XIsol ValveBD MVAAA 103ACloseSteam Gen No. 2 Blowdown Cont2BD-F605XIsol ValveBD MVAAA 102BCloseSteam Gen No. 2 Blowdown Cont2BD-F606XIsol ValveBD MVAAA 103BCloseStm Line 1 Upstream Normal2MS-V670XDrain ValveMS MVAAA 120ACloseStm Line 1 Upstream Emerg2MS-V671XDrain ValveMS MVAAA 119ACloseStm Line 2 Upstream Normal2MS-V663XDrain ValveMS MVAAA 120BCloseStm Line 2 Upstream Emerg2MS-V664XDrain ValveMS MVAAA 119B WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 4 of 5)Revision 12-A (01/03)
Actuation Channel Action ComponentTag Number A B CloseHydrogen Analyzer2HA-E609AX HRA ISV 0110A CloseSupply & Return Line Valves2HA-E608AX HRA ISV 0109AClose2HA-E610AX HRA ISV 0126AClose2HA-E629BX HRA ISV 0110BClose2HA-E628BX HRA ISV 0109BClose2HA-E630BX HRA ISV 0126BCloseContainment Purge2HV-B151AXAir Make-Up Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 103 CloseContainment Purge2HV-B150BXAir Make-Up Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 102 CloseContainment Purge2HV-B152AXAir Make-Up Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 104CloseContainment Purge2HV-B155AX Exhaust Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 205 CloseContainment Purge2HV-B154BX Exhaust Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 204 CloseContainment Purge2HV-B153BX Exhaust Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 203CloseSI Tank Drain to RWSP 2SI-F1561A/BX Control Isol Valve (SI-682)SIMVAAA343(DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
CloseLPSI A to RC Loop 2B UpstrSI ISV 14023AX Auto Vent Containment Isolation CloseLPSI A to RC Loop 2B UpstrSI ISV 14024AXAuto V ent Auto Isolation(DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
CloseContainment Atmosphere2CA-E604BX ARM ISV 0109 CloseRAD Monitoring Cont2CA-E605AX ARM ISV 0110 WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 5 of 5)Revision 12-A (01/03)
Actuation Channel Action ComponentTag Number A B CloseIsol Valves2CA-E606AX ARM ISV 0103(DRN00-531, R11-A;01-990, R11-B)Close Containment Pressure2HV-E633BX Instrumentation CVR ISV 0400 Isolation Valve Close Containment Pressure2HV-E634AX Instrumentation CVR ISV 0401 Isolation Valve(DRN00-531, R11-A;01-990, R11-B)
Close Letdown Temperature3CC-TM 169A/B(1)(1)Control ValveCC MVAAA 636 Status DisplayQSPDS-2X NOTES:(1)Actuates through interlock with primary equipment.
(2)Thermal Overload bypassed on CIAS.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-9 (Sheet 1 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON MSISActuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseSteam Generator No. 1Main Steam Isolation Valve2MS-V602AXX MS MVAAA 124ACloseSteam Generator No. 2Main Steam Isolation Valve2MS-V604BXX MS MVAAA 124BCloseSteam Generator No. 1Main Feedwater Isolation Valve2FW-V823AXXFW MVAAA 184ACloseSteam Generator No. 2Main Feedwater Isolation Valve2FW-V824BXXFW MVAAA 184BCloseSteam Generator No. 1Main Feedwater Control Valve5FW-FM833XXFW MVAAA 173ACloseSteam Generator No. 1Main Feedwater Control Bypass Valve5FW-FM835XXFW MVAAA 166ACloseSteam Generator No. 2Main Feedwater Control Valves5FW-FM834XXFW MVAAA 173BCloseSteam Generator No. 2Main Feedwater Control Bypass Valve5FW-FM836XXFW MVAAA 166BCloseMain Steam Line 1 Sample2MS-F714XIsolation ValveSSL MVAAA 301ACloseMain Steam Line 2 Sample2MS-F715XIsolation ValveSSL MVAAA 301BCloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V847BXEFW MVAAA 229ACloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V848AXEFW MVAAA 228A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-9 (Sheet 2 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V851BXEFW MVAAA 224ACloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-852AXEFW MVAAA 223ACloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V849AXEFW MVAAA 229BCloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V850BXEFW MVAAA 228BCloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V853AXEFW MVAA 224BCloseEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V854BXEFW MVAAA 223BStatus DisplayQSPDS-2X WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-10 (Sheet 1 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON EFASActuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BStartsEmergency Feedwater Pump AEFW MPMP 0001AXStartsEmergency Feedwater Pump BEFW MPMP 0001BXOpenEmergency Feedwater Pump Turbine2MS-V611AXSTM Shut Off ValveMS MVAAA 401AOverrideEmergency Feedwater Pump Turbine2MS-V611AXPermissiveSTM Shut Off ValveMS MVAAA 401AOpenEmergency Feedwater Pump Turbine2MS-V612BXSTM Shut Off ValveMS MVAAA 401BOverrideEmergency Feedwater Pump Turbine2MS-V612BXPermissiveSTM Shut Off ValveMS MVAAA 401BOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V847BXEFW MVAAA 229AOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V848AXEFW MVAAA 228AOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V851BXEFW MVAAA 224AOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #12FW-V852AXEFW MVAAA 223AOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V849AXEFW MVAAA 229BOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V850BXEFW MVAAA 228BOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V853AXEFW MVAAA 224BOpenEmergency Feedwater Valve to SG #22FW-V854BXEFW MVAAA 223BCloseSteam Generator No. 1 Blowdown2BD-F603XContainment Isolation ValveBD MVAAA 102A WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-10 (Sheet 2 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)Actuation ChannelAction Component Tag Number A BCloseSteam Generator No. 1 Blowdown2BD-F604XContainment Isolation ValveBD MVAAA 103ACloseSteam Generator No. 2 Blowdown2BD-F605XContainment Isolation ValveBD MVAAA 102BCloseSteam Generator No. 2 Blowdown2BD-F606XContainment Isolation ValveBD MVAAA 103BStartsEmergency FW Pump A CoolerAH-17 (3A-SA)(1)
HVR MAHU 0038AStartsEmergency FW Pump B CoolerAH-17 (3B-SB)(1)
HVR MAHU 0038BNOTE:(1)Actuates through interlock with primary equipment.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-11Revision 10 (10/99)MONITORED VARIABLES REQUIRED FOR ESF SYSTEM PROTECTIVE ACTIONSystem VariableContainment IsolationSystemContainment SpraySystemRecirculationSystemMain Steam IsolationSystem Safety InjectionSystem EmergencyFeedwaterSystemPressurizer Pressure***Containment Pressure****Steam Generator Pressure
- Refueling Water Storage Pool Level***Steam Generator Level** Denotes monitored variable is required.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 7.3-12DRAWING COMPARISONPSARFSAR System Reference Function/Description Reference Function/DescriptionEffect of SafetySafety Injection Figure 7.3-1Block enable signalFigure 7.3-2Bypass enable signalBypass and blockis derived from 2-is provided for eachfunctions are out-of-4 lowchannel from aequivalent operating pressurizer pressureseparate pressurizecontrols. There is signals.pressure measurementno effect on safety.channel.Safety Injection,Figure 7.3-1Only initiation logicFiguresSelective 2-out-of-4Provides more completecontainment spray,is shown.7.3-2, 7.3-3,actuation logic hasinformation. The containment isolation,7.3-4been added, with 2depicted systemcontainment coolingactuation trainsdescribes additionalhaving manualimproved safety actuation atfeatures; e.g.;
equipment level.manual actuation atequipment level, and remote manualactuation at systemlevel.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.3-13 (Sheet 1 of 3) Revision 14 (12/05)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
TABLE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.3-13 (Sheet 2 of 3) Revision 14 (12/05)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
TABLE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.3-13 (Sheet 3 of 3) Revision 14 (12/05)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
TABLE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED
(DRN 03-2061, R14)