ML16256A318
| ML16256A318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2016 |
| From: | Entergy Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16256A115 | List:
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| References | |
| W3F1-2016-0053 | |
| Download: ML16256A318 (70) | |
Text
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-1 Revision 14 (12/05) 7.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMS The safety related instrumentation and controls of the Engineered Safety Feature Systems (ESFS) include (1) the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) which consists of the electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry (from sensors to actuation device input terminals) involved in generating those signals that actuate the required ESF systems, and (2) the arrangement of components that perform protective actions after receiving a signal from either the ESFAS or the operator. (Sensing parameters are listed in Table 7.3-2).
The following actuation signals are generated by the ESFAS when the monitored variables reach the levels that are indicative of conditions which require protective action:
a)
Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)
NSSS) b)
Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS)
(NSSS) c)
Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS)
(NSSS) d)
Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS)
(NSSS) e)
Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS)
(NSSS) f)
Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)
(NSSS)
The ESF system device actuation circuitry receives (1) actuation signals from the ESFAS or the operator, and (2) permissive signals from sensors which monitor conditions that affect ESF system performance. The signals from the ESFAS actuate the ESF system equipment. The permissive signals provide additional interlocks, blocks and sequencing necessary to provide Proper ESF system operation.
The ESF systems components automatically actuated by signals from the ESFAS are identified in Tables 7.3-5 thru 7.3-11.
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
Automatic ADV operation is required for SBLOCA mitigation. ADVs are addressed in Section 7.4.
(DRN 03-2061, R14) 7.
3.1 DESCRIPTION
The actuation circuits for the ESFAS (as identified in Section 7.3) are all similar except for specific inputs, operating bypasses, and actuation devices. The SIAS described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1, is typical of all ESFAS. The specific instruments and controls associated with each system are discussed separately in the appropriate Subsection of 7.3.1.1.
The actuation systems consist of the sensors, logic, and actuation circuits that monitor selected plant parameters and provide an actuation signal to each individual actuated component in the ESF system if these plant parameters reach preselected setpoints. Each actuation system is identical except that specific inputs (and blocks where provided) vary from system to system and the actuated devices are different. Figures 7.3-1 SH. 1, 2 & 3 show the ESFAS simplified functional diagram.
Two-out-of-four coincidence of like initiating trip signals from four independent measurement channels is required to actuate any ESF system. Each actuation system logic, including testing features, is similar to the logic for the Reactor Protective System, and is contained in the same physical enclosure. The combination of the ESFAS and Reactor Protective System (RPS) is designated Plant Protection System (PPS).
These same features include the capability of the ESFAS to operate, if need be, with up to two channels out of service (one bypassed and another tripped) and still meet the single failure criteria. The only operating restriction while in this condition (effectively one-out-of-two logic) is that no provision is made to bypass another channel for periodic maintenance. The system logic must be restored to at least a two-out-of-three condition prior to removing another channel for maintenance.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-2 Revision 11 (05/01) 7.3.1.1
System Description
7.3.1.1.1 Safety Injection System Refer to Section 6.3, Emergency Core Cooling System, for a description of the Safety Injection System (SIS). The safety related display information which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions is described in Section 7.5.
The SIS is composed of redundant trains A and B. The instrumentation and controls for the components and equipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls for the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events listed in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the SIS.
The SIS is automatically actuated by a SIAS from the ESFAS. The SIAS is initiated by either two-out-of-four low pressurizer pressure signals or two-out-of-four high containment pressure signals, as shown in Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. Automatic safety injection system operation is actuated at a pressurizer pressure of 1684 psia during power operation. During startup and shutdown operations a variable setpoint is used as described in Subsection 7.2.1.1.1.6.
The measurement channels which generate low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure signals for the SIAS also provide signals to the CIAS and CSAS. The system is designed to correlate with a two-battery power distribution system in the plant. The loss of one battery may entail the loss of two of four power feeders to the system. However in that case, the power distribution within the system is able to sustain the logic in partially energized condition so as to prevent inadvertent initiation of SIAS. The loss of any combination of two of four power feeders that emanate from two different batteries will result in deenergized condition for a portion of logic and a consequent initiation of SIAS.
Manual initiation of the SIS is provided in the main control room.
The operating mode of the SIS is automatically changed by an RAS from the ESFAS. Generation of the RAS is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.2. The RAS is generated by two-out-of-four low refueling water tank level signals, as shown on Figure 7.3-4.
The RAS automatically stops the low pressure safety injection pumps, and transfers the high pressure safety injection pump suction from the refueling water storage pool to the Safety Injection System sump.
A list of equipment that is actuated by the SIAS is given in Table 7.3-5.
System drawings are listed in Subsection 7.3.1.3.
Initiation setpoints are given in Table 7.3-2.
7.3.1.1.1.1 Initiating Circuits Process measurement channels similar to those described in Subsection 7.2.1.1.2.1 are utilized to perform the following functions:
a)
Continuously monitor pressurizer pressure and containment pressure b)
Provide indication of operational availability of each sensor to the operator c)
Transmit analog signals to bistables within the ESFAS initiating logic The parameters are measured with four independent process instrument channels.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-3 A typical protective measurement channel functional diagram is shown on Figure 7.2-1. The measurement channels consist of instrument sensing lines, sensors, transmitters, power supplies, isolation devices, indicators, computer inputs, current loop resistors, and interconnecting wiring.
Each measurement channel is separated from other like measurement channels to provide physical and electrical isolation of the signals to the ESFAS initiating logic. The output of each transmitter is a current loop. Signal isolation is provided for computer inputs. Each channel is powered by a redundant 120 volt vital ac distribution bus.
Display information, which provides the operator with the operational availability of each measurement channel, is described and tabulated for all ESFAS circuits in section 7.5.
7.3.1.1.1.2 Logic 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 SIAS Initiating Logic The SIAS initiating logic:
a)
Compares the analog signals received from the protective measurement channels with preset levels; b)
Provides a variable setpoint for plant start-up, shutdown, and low power testing; c)
Forms two-out-of-four coincidence of like signals which have reached preset levels; d)
Provides a means for manual blocking of pressurizer pressure signals if permissive conditions are met; e)
Provides channel and signal status information to the operator, and f)
Provides four SIAS initiation signals for each actuation signal to the SIAS actuating logic.
The SIAS initiating logic is similar to that shown on Figure 7.2-7, and consists of bistables, bistable output relays, trip relays, matrix relays, initiation channel output relays, manual block controls, block relays, manual testing controls, indicating lights, power supplies, and interconnecting wiring.
The SIAS initiating logic is physically located in the PPS cabinet.
Signals from the protective measurement channels are sent to voltage comparator circuits (bistables) where the input signals are compared to predetermined setpoints. Whenever a channel parameter reaches the predetermined setpoint, the channel bistable deenergizes the bistable output relay. The bistable output relay deenergizes the trip relays. Contacts of the trip relays form the SIAS initiating logic. Each set of trip relays (i.e., each channel) is powered from a redundant 120 volt vital ac distribution bus. The bistable setpoints are adjustable from the front of the PPS cabinet. Access is limited by means of a key operated cover, with an annunciator indicating cabinet access. All bistable setpoints are capable of being read out on a meter located on the PPS cabinet and are sent to the plant monitoring computer.
The SIAS initiation signals are generated in four channels, designated A, B, C and D. Two-out-of-four coincidence of initiating signals from the four protective measurement channels generates all four SIAS initiation signals. (See Figures 7.3-1 and 7.3-2)
Tripping of a bistable results in a channel trip characterized by the deenergization of three trip relays.
The contacts of the four sets of three trip relays have been arranged in six logic ANDs designated AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD, which represent all possible two-out-of-four combinations for the four protective measurement channels. To form an AND circuit the trip relay contacts of two redundant
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-4 protective measurement channels are connected in parallel (i.e., one from A and one from B). This process is continued until all combinations have been formed. Since more than one plant parameter can initiate a trip signal, the parallel pairs of trip relay contacts, each pair representing a monitored plant parameter, are connected in series (Logic OR) to form six logic matrices. The six matrices are also designated AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD. (see Figures 7.3-1 and 7.3-2)
Each logic matrix is connected in series with a set of four parallel logic matrix output relays (matrix relays). Each logic matrix is powered from two separate 120 volt vital ac distribution buses through dual dc power supplies as shown on Figure 7.3-1.
The output contacts of the matrix relays are combined into four trip paths.
Each ESFAS trip path is formed by connecting six contacts, one matrix relay contact from each of the six logic matrices, in series. The six series contacts are in series with the trip path output relay. The trip path output relay contacts form the SIAS initiating logic.
7.3.1.1.1.2.2 Actuating Logic The SIAS actuating logic performs the following:
a) receives SIAS signal from the SIAS initiating logic; b) forms selective two-out-of-four coincidence logic for actuation of SIAS; c) provides a means for manual initiation of SIAS; d) provides status information to the operator.
The SIAS actuating logic is physically located in two ESFAS auxiliary relay cabinets. One cabinet contains the logic for ESF train A equipment, while the other cabinet contains the logic for ESF train B equipment.
Four SIAS initiation signal contacts are arranged in a selective two-out-of-four coincidence logic. Each initiation signal also deenergizes the seal-in relays of its associated channel. The seal-in relays assure that the signal is not automatically removed once initiated. The selective two-out-of-four coincidence circuitry is shown typically on Figure 7.3-5. Receipt of two selective SIAS initiation signals, as shown on Figure 7.3-5, will deenergize the subgroup relays, which generate the actuation signals. This process is performed independently in both auxiliary relay cabinets, generating both train A and train B signals.
Each leg of the selective two-out-of-four circuitry is powered by two (2) auctioneered dc power supplies as shown on Figure 7.3-5. The four power supplies in cabinet "A" are connected to 120 V ac vital buses A and B. The four power supplies in cabinet "B" are connected to 120 V ac vital buses C and D. The two redundant power sources within each cabinet are physically separated from each other.
Figure 7.3-6 is a simplified functional diagram of a typical ESFAS logic (MSIS). In this case there are only two initiating circuits in each channel (steam generator #1 and steam generator #2 pressure) and thus each matrix ladder consists of only two AND circuits in series. The four matrix relay outputs from each logic matrix again form four trip paths. Each trip path output relay, instead of controlling trip circuit breakers as in the RPS, controls a contact of the selective two-out-of-four circuit for the group actuation. Group actuation is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3.
Testing of each ESF subgroup of actuating logic components is accomplished by use of a test module. Groups are selected such that testing may be accomplished without affecting normal plant operation (i.e., unwarranted actuation).
The testing of the logic and trip paths is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-5 Revision 10 (10/99) 7.3.1.1.1.3 Group Actuation The components in the safety injection system are placed into various groups. Selection is made such that actuation of a group will not affect normal plant operation. Components of each group are actuated by one (1) group relay.
Group relay contacts are in the power control circuit for the actuated components of each ESF system.
The logic described in Section 7.3.1.1.1.2 causes the opening of a contact in a selective two-out-of-four circuit whenever any one of the logic matrices is deenergized. The circuit is shown on Figure 7.3-5 for a typical ESF system. Upon opening of selective contacts in the two-out-of-four logic, the group relays deenergized and actuate the ESF system components. Sequencing of component actuation, where required, is accomplished in the power control circuit of each actuated component. Sequencing is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.8.
7.3.1.1.1.4 Bypasses Trip channel bypasses are provided for all ESF systems as shown in Table 7.3-3. The trip channel bypass is identical to the RPS trip channel bypass (Subsection 7.2.1.1.5) and is employed for maintenance and testing of a channel The RPS/ESFAS pressurizer pressure bypass, as outlined in Table 7.3-3 and as shown in Figure 7.3-2, is provided to allow plant depressurization below 400 psia without initiation of undesired safeguards action. The setpoint must be adjusted manually by controls in each protective channel.
The RPS/ESFAS pressurizer pressure bypass is not possible if pressurizer pressure is above a setpoint (500 psia).
Once the bypass has been initiated, it is automatically removed if pressure rises above the setpoint. All bypasses are annunciated.
7.3.1.1.1.5 Interlocks An interlock prevents the operator from bypassing more than one trip channel at a time. Different type trips may be simultaneously bypassed, however, either in one channel or in different channels.
During system testing an electrical interlock will allow only one set of four matrix relays in one matrix to be held in the test position at a time. The same circuit will allow only one process measurement loop signal to be perturbed at a time. The matrix relay hold and loop perturbation switches are interlocked so that only one test may be conducted at any one time. Figure 7.2-7 shows this interlock. The same circuit will allow only one process measurement loop signal to be perturbed at a time. The matrix test and loop perturbation switches are interlocked so that only one or the other may be done at any one time.
7.3.1.1.1.6 Redundancy Redundant features of the SIAS include:
a)
Four independent channels, from process sensor through and including channel trip relays; b)
Six logic matrices which provide the two-out-of-four logic. Dual power supplies through an auctioneering network are provided for the matrix relays; c)
Four trip paths are present for each actuation signal; d)
Four independent bistables are utilized to provide block permissive signals for the pressurizer pressure actuation signal. See Figure 7.3-2;
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-6 e)
The actuation signal is generated in two output trains so that redundant system components may be actuated from separate trains; f)
Two independent sets of two manual trip pushbuttons are provided at two locations on the main control board to initiate SIAS. Pushbuttons are also located on the ESFAS Auxiliary Relay Cabinets.
g)
AC power for the actuation system is provided from four separate buses. Power for control and operation of redundant actuated components comes from separate buses. Power source for each bus is from a Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS). Loss of preferred offsite power does not interrupt power to these vital buses, as described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.1.c.
The result of the redundant features is a system which meets the single failure criterion, can be tested during plant operation, and can be shifted to two-out-of-three logic.
The benefit of a system that includes four independent and redundant channels is that the system can be operated with up to two channels out of service (one bypassed, one tripped) and still meet the single failure criterion. The only operating restriction while in this condition (one-out-of-two logic) is that no provision is made to bypass another channel for periodic testing or maintenance. The system logic must be restored to at least a two-out-of-three condition prior to removing another channel for maintenance.
7.3.1.1.1.7 Diversity The system is designed to eliminate credible multiple channel failures originating from a common cause. The failure modes of redundant channels and the conditions of operation that are common to them are analyzed to assure that a predictable common failure mode does not exist. The design provides reasonable assurance that:
a) the monitored variables provide adequate information during the accidents; b) the equipment can perform as required; c) the interactions of protective actions, control actions and the environmental changes that cause, or are caused by, the design basis events do not prevent mitigation of the consequences of the event, and d) the system will not be made inoperable by the inadvertent actions of operating and maintenance personnel.
In addition, the design is not encumbered with additional components or channels without reasonable assurance that such additions are beneficial.
The system incorporates functional diversity to accommodate the unlikely event of a common mode failure with any of the accident conditions listed in Subsection 7.2.2.1.2.
7.3.1.1.1.8 Sequencing Sequencing equipment is provided to the time sequence of loading the safety injection equipment. The sequencing function is performed by the use of time delay relays associated with the equipment. Component sequencing is listed in Table 8.3-1 for ac loads and Tables 8.3-3, 8.3-4 and 8.3-5 for dc loads.
7.3.1.1.1.9 Testing Provisions are made to permit periodic testing of the complete SIAS. These tests cover the trip actions from sensor input through the protection system and the actuation devices. The system test does not
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-7 interfere with the protective function of the system. The testing system complies with General Design Criterion 21 in that the protection system as defined by IEEE Standard 279-1971, "Proposed IEEE Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems," IEEE Standard 338-1971, "IEEE Trial-Use Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection System," and Regulatory Guide 1.22, "Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuator Functions "(February, 1972) is designed to permit testing (up to the input to the 2 actuation devices) per Regulatory Guide 1.22. Certain subgroup relays cannot be tested without adverse consequences for plant safety and/or operability and therefore do not fully comply with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and IEEE Standard 338.
These excepted subgroup relays are tested in accordance with the Technical Specifications. Jumpers or other temporary forms of bypassing are not used during testing.
The individual tests are described below. Overlap between individual partial tests exists so that the entire SIAS can be tested without gaps. Frequency of accomplishing a complete succession of these partial tests is listed in the Technical Specifications.
7.3.1.1.1.9.1 Sensor Checks During reactor operation, the four redundant measurement channels providing an input to the SIAS (pressurizer pressure and containment pressure) are checked by comparing the output indicators of similar channels and cross-checking with related measurements.
During extended shutdown periods or refueling, these measurement channels (where possible) are checked and calibrated against known standards.
7.3.1.1.1.9.2 Trip Bistable Tests Testing of the trip bistable is accomplished by manually varying the input signal to the trip setpoint level on one bistable at a time and observing the trip action.
Varying the input signal is accomplished by means of a trip test circuit which consists of a digital voltmeter and a test circuit used to vary the magnitude of the signal supplied by the measurement channel to the bistable signal input.
The trip test circuit is interlocked electrically so that it can be used in only one channel at a time. A switch is provided to select the measurement channel and a pushbutton is provided to apply the test signal. The digital voltmeter indicates the value of the test signal.
Trip action (deenergizing) of each of the bistable trip relays is indicated by individual lights on the front of the cabinet, indicating that the bistable trip unit and the trip relays operate as required for a trip condition.
When one of the four trip bistables is in the tripped condition, a channel trip exists and is annunciated on the control room annunciator panel. In this condition, an actuation signal would take place upon receipt of a trip signal in one of the other three like trip channels. In addition, the trip channel under test is bypassed for the test, converting the PPS to a two-out-of-three logic and still meeting the single failure criterion for the particular trip parameter. In either case, full protection is maintained.
7.3.1.1.1.9.3 Logic Matrix Tests This test is carried out to verify proper operation of the six two-out-of-four logic matrices, any of which will initiate a bona-fide system trip for any possible two-out-of-four trip condition from the signal inputs from each measurement channel. The matrix output relay hold pushbutton switch permits only one of the two-out-of-four logic matrices to be tested at a time.
Only one set of four matrix relays in one of the six logic matrices can be held in the energized position during tests.
If, for example, the A-B logic matrix hold pushbutton is held depressed, actuation of the other matrix hold pushbuttons will have no effect upon their respective logic matrices.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-8 Actuation of a matrix hold pushbutton will apply a test voltage to the test system hold coils of the selected four double coil matrix relays. This voltage will provide the power necessary to hold the matrix relays in their energized position when the bistable trip relay contacts in the matrix ladder being tested open, thus causing deenergization of the primary matrix relay coils.
While holding the matrix hold pushbutton in its actuated position, rotating the channel trip select switch will release only those bistable trip relays that have operating contacts in the logic matrix under test. The bistable trip relays are double coil relays. The channel trip select switch applies a test voltage of opposite polarity to the bistable trip relay test coils so that the magnetic flux generated by these coils opposes that of the primary coil of the relay. The resulting flux will be zero, and the relays will release.
Trip action can be observed by illumination of the trip relay indication lights located on the front panel and by loss of voltage to the four matrix relays which is indicated by extinguishing indicator lights connected across each matrix relay coil.
During this test, the matrix relay "hold" lights will remain on, indicating that a test voltage has been applied to the holding coils of the four matrix relays of the logic matrix under test.
The test is repeated for all six matrices. This test will verify that the logic matrix relays will deenergize if the matrix continuity is violated and that the trip relay output contacts function correctly. The opening of the matrix relays is tested in the trip path tests described in the following subsections.
7.3.1.1.1.9.4 Trip Path/Initiation Channel Tests Each trip path is tested individually by depressing a matrix hold pushbutton (holding four matrix relays), selecting any trip position on the channel trip select switch (opening the matrix), and selecting a position on the matrix relay trip select switch (deenergizing one of the four matrix relays). This causes one, and only one, of the initiation channels to deenergize. Proper operation of both initiation channel output relay coils and contacts is verified by monitoring the current through the appropriate leg of the actuation logic selective two-out-of-four circuit.
The matrix relay trip select switch is turned to the next position, deenergizing the tested matrix relay and initiation channel relays.
This sequence is repeated for the other three trip paths from the selected matrix. The entire test sequence is repeated for the remaining five matrices. Upon completion of testing, all six matrices, all 24 matrix relay contacts and all eight initiation channel output relays have been tested.
7.3.1.1.1.9.5 Actuating Logic Tests The selective two-out-of-four logic circuit is tested in a manner identical to the RPS trip breaker system (Subsection 7.2.1.1.9.5). One current path of the selective two-out-of-four logic matrix is interrupted by opening one of the path contacts and loss of path current is verified. Every contact in both current paths is checked in this manner.
The manual trips are checked one at a time from their remote locations; the lockout contacts are checked via the group relay test system (Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.6) and the PPS initiation relay contacts are checked as described in the preceding Subsections.
This test verifies the proper operation of the Actuating Logic circuits.
7.3.1.1.1.9.6 Actuating Device Test Proper operation of the Group Relays (see Figure 7.3-5) is accomplished by deenergizing the group relays one at a time via a test relay contact and verifying proper operation of all actuated components in
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-9 Revision 14 (12/05) that group. The test system is interlocked such that one and only one group relay may be deenergized at one time.
The test switch must be positioned to the group to be tested; selection of more than one group is impossible. The test circuit is electrically locked out upon actuation of a particular test group and another test group cannot be actuated for one minute after selecting another switch position. This time delay feature is a stop and think.
Since this test causes the ESF components to actuate by interrupting the normal safety signal current to individual group relays, the propagation of a valid trip during testing will not be impeded, and the system will proceed to full actuation.
This test verifies the operation of the group relays and the individual safety injection component actuation devices.
a)
Response Time Tests
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
Response time tests of the ESFAS are conducted at refueling intervals as given in the Technical Specifications. ESFAS response times are listed in the TRM. These tests include the sensors for each ESFAS channel and are based on the criteria defined in Subsection 7.3.2.1.3.
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
The hardware design includes test connections on the instrument lines going to pressure and differential pressure transmitters, and test points wired out to convenient test jacks or terminal strips where test equipment may be connected to various portions of the system.
(DRN 99-1063, R11)
The design of ESFAS complies with RG 1.22. In general, the engineered safety feature systems can be tested from the sensor signal through the actuation devices. The sensors can be checked during reactor operation by comparison with similar channels. Some engineered safety feature systems (e.g. main feedwater isolation valves) cannot be practicably designed such that the actuated equipment could be tested during reactor operation without adversely affecting safety or operation of the plant. In all such cases, the protection system design is highly reliable and the actuated equipment is tested when the reactor is shutdown to assure they are capable of performing the safety function.
(DRN 99-1063, R11) 7.3.1.1.1.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10.
7.3.1.1.2 Recirculation System Refer to section 6.2 for a description of the Containment Spray System (CSS), and Section 6.3 Safety Injection System.
The RAS is automatically initiated by two-out-of-four low refueling water storage pool level signals, as shown in Figure 7.3-4.
The system is composed of redundant load groups, train A and train B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the SIS and the CSS.
The system automatically changes the mode of operation of the CSS and the SIS. The RAS automatically stops the low pressure safety injection pumps and changes the containment spray and high pressure safety injection pump suction from the refueling water storage pool to the Safety Injection System sump.
There is no system level manual actuation provided from the main control room.
A list of actuated devices is provided in Table 7.3-6, and final system drawings are listed in Subsection 7.3.1.3.
Initiation setpoints are given in Table 7.3-2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-10 7.3.1.1.2.1 Initiating Circuits Initiating circuits are similar to the initiating circuits described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIS except that refueling water storage pool is the only parameter monitored.
7.3.1.1.2.2 Logic 7.3.1.1.2.2.1 Initiating Logic The initiating logic for RAS is similar to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIS except that there are no variable setpoints, blocking multiple initiating signal provisions, or system level manual operation from the main control room.
7.3.1.1.2.2.2 Actuating Logic The actuating logic for RAS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.2.3 Group Actuation Group actuation for RAS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3-1-1.2.4 Bypasses Bypasses for RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.5 Interlocks Interlock provisions for RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.6 Redundancy Redundancy features for RAS are similar to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS, except that there are no manual trip pushbuttons in the control room.
7.3.1.1.2.7 Diversity Diversity aspects for RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.8 Sequencing There is no sequencing of equipment in association with RAS.
7.3.1.1.2.9 Testing All provisions for testing RAS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.2.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required No auxiliary supporting systems required.
7.3.1.1.3 Containment Spray System Refer to Section 6.2.2, Containment Heat Removal Systems, for a description of the CSS.
The CSS is automatically actuated by a CSAS from the ESFAS. The CSAS is initiated by coincidence of two-out-of-four-high-high containment pressure signals and an SIAS as shown in Figure 7.3-4.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-11 Revision 10 (10/99)
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence in adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the CSS.
The operating mode of the CSS is automatically changed following receipt of an RAS from the ESFAS. The RAS is generated by two-out-of-four low refueling water storage pool level signals, as shown in Figure 7.3-4.
Control switches are provided to manually operate the SIS sump and the refueling water storage pool isolation valves.
The SIS and RAS signals override the control switches and position the SIS sump and the refueling water storage pool isolation valves automatically to allow a proper operation of CSS. However, RWSP isolation valves are required to close manually from the control room after RAS.
The design is such that loss of electric power of two of the four like channels in the measurement channels or initiating logic or to the selective two-out-of-four actuating logic would actuate the CSS.
Manual initiation of the CSS is provided in the control room. The safety-related display instrumentation for the CSS which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions is described in section 7.5.
Instrumentation location layout drawings present the location of the pressurizer pressure, containment pressure, and refueling water tank level sensors which actuate the CSS and are listed in Subsection 7.3.1.3.
7.3.1.1.3.1 Initiating Circuits Initiating circuits are identical to the initiating circuits described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIS except that the parameter monitored is containment pressure only. An SIAS signal will allow initiation of the CSS.
The SIAS and high-high containment pressure signals are combined in four AND circuits within the ESFAS initiating logic. The AND circuits prevent inadvertent operation of the containment spray system upon generation of an SIAS only.
7.3.1.1.3.2 Logic 7.3.1.1.3.2.1 Initiating Logic The initiating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 except that there are no variable setpoint or blocking of signal provisions, for either the high-high containment pressure signal or the high containment pressure signal, nor are there provisions for multiple initiating signals.
7.3.1.1.3.2.2 Actuating Logic The actuating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.3 Group Actuation Group Actuation is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.4 Bypasses
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-12 Bypasses for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.5 Interlocks Interlock provisions for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.6 Redundancy Redundancy features for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.7 Diversity Diversity aspects for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.8 Sequencing Sequencing equipment and functions for CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.8 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.9 Testing All provisions for testing the CSS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.3.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10.
7.3.1.1.4 Containment Isolation System Refer to Subsection 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System, (CIS) for a description of this system.
The CIAS is initiated by two-out-of-four high containment pressure or low pressurizer pressure signals as shown in Figure 7.3-3. The measurement channels which generate the CIAS also provide signals to the SIAS. The system is designed to correlate with a two-battery power distribution system in the plant. The loss of one battery may entail the loss of two of four power feeders to the system. However in that case, the power distribution within the system is able to sustain the logic in partially energized condition so as to prevent inadvertent initiation of CIAS. The loss of any combination of two of four power feeders that emanate from two different batteries will result in deenergized condition for a portion of logic and a consequent initiation of CIAS.
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability necessary to isolate the containment following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which require containment isolation.
The CIS is automatically actuated by the CIAS from the ESFAS. Manual initiation of the CIS is provided in the main control room.
A list of actuated equipment is provided in Table 7.3-8.
The safety-related display instrumentation for the containment isolation system which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions is described in Section 7.5.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-13 Instrumentation location layout drawings present the location of the sensors which actuate the containment isolation system and are described in Subsection 7.3.1.3.
7.3.1.1.4.1 Initiating Circuits The initiating circuits for the CIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for the SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.2 Logic 7.3.1.1.4.2.1 Initiating Logic The initiating logic for CIS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.2.2 Actuating Logic The actuating logic for CIS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.3 Group Actuation Group actuation for CIS is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.4.4 Bypasses CIS bypasses are identical to those described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4.
7.3.1.1.4.5 Interlocks CIS interlocks are identical to those described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5.
7.3.1.1.4.6 Redundancy CIS redundancy is identical to that described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6.
7.3.1.1.4.7 Diversity CIS diversity is identical to that described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7.
7.3.1.1.4.8 Sequencing There is no sequencing of equipment in association with CIS.
7.3.1.1.4.9 Testing CIS testing is identical to that described for SIS in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.
7.3.1.1.4.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10.
7.3.1.1.5 Main Steam Isolation Refer to Section 10.3, Main Steam Supply System (MS) for a description of main steam isolation. Refer to Subsection 10.4.7, Condensate and Feedwater System, for a description of feedwater isolation.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-14 Revision 14 (12/05)
The Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) is initiated by two-out-of-four low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure signals, as shown in Figures 7.3-6 and 7.3-7. The two-out-of-four logic is provided for each steam generator. The system is designed to correlate with a two-battery power distribution system in the plant. The loss of one battery may entail the loss of two of four power feeders to the system. However in that case, the power distribution within the system is able to sustain the logic in partially energized condition so as to prevent inadvertent initiation of MSIS. The loss of any combination of two of four power feeders that emanate from two different batteries will result in deenergized condition for a portion of logic and a consequent initiation of MSIS.
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the valves in train A, are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the valves in train B.
Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability necessary to prevent blowdown of both steam generators following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which require main steam isolation.
The MSIS provides for both main steam isolation and isolation of the main feedwater supply. Main steam isolation is achieved by actuating the main steam isolation valves (MSIV). Isolation of the normal feedwater supply is achieved by actuating the feedwater isolation valves.
Manual initiation of main steam isolation is provided in the main control room.
(DRN 05-130, R14)
Automatic main steam and feedwater isolation is initiated at a pressure setpoint of 666 psia during normal operation.
A variable setpoint is implemented to allow controlled pressure reductions such as shutdown depressurization without initiating a MSIS signal. The pressure setpoint is automatically increased as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.
(DRN 05-130, R14)
The safety-related display instrumentation for main steam and normal feedwater isolation, which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions, is described in Section 7.5.
Instrumentation location layout drawings which show the location of the steam generator pressure sensors which actuate the main steam isolation system are discussed in Subsection 7.3.1.3. The actuated equipment is listed in Table 7.3-9.
Initiation setpoints are listed in Table 7.3-2.
7.3.1.1.5.1 Initiating Circuits Initiating circuits are identical to the initiating circuits described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIAS except that the parameters monitored are steam generator pressure and containment pressure.
7.3.1.1.5.2 Logic 7.3.1.1.5.2.1 Initiating Logic The initiating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIAS.
7.3.1.1.5.2.2 Actuating Logic Actuating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS. Refer to Figure 7.3-8 for typical actuation logic circuits.
7.3.1.1.5.3 Group Actuation Group actuation is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3-1-1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.4 Bypasses
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-15 Revision 307 (07/13)
Bypasses for MSIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.4 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.5 Interlocks Interlock provisions for MSIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.6 Redundancy Redundancy features for MSIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.7 Diversity Diversity aspects for MSIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.8 Sequencing There is no sequencing of equipment in association with MSIS.
7.3.1.1.5.9 Testing All provisions for testing the MSIS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.5.10 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.10.
7.3.1.1.6 Emergency Feedwater System 7.3.1.1.6.1 General Information Refer to Subsection 10.4.9, for a description of this Emergency Feedwater System (EFS).
(EC-33720, R307)
Reference to Appendix 10.4.9B.
(EC-33720, R307)
The Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) is initiated to steam generator 1 either by a low steam generator level coincident with no low pressure trip present on steam generator 1 or by a low steam generator level coincident with a differential pressure between the two generators with the higher pressure in steam generator 1. (An identical EFAS is generated for steam generator 2.) This logic is shown in Figure 7.3-9. The two-out-of-four logic is provided for each steam generator. The system is designed such that loss of electric power to two of the four like channels in the measurement channels or initiating logic, or to the selective two-out-of-four actuating logic, would actuate the EFS.
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train A, are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability necessary to automatically actuate the EFS following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which require emergency feedwater.
The EFS instrumentation and controls are designed for automatic operation during emergency situations such as steam pipe rupture, loss of normal feed, and plant blackout.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-16 Revision 307 (07/13)
The EFAS performs the following functions:
a)
Starts the emergency feedwater pumps; b)
Opens the emergency feedwater shut-off valves to the steam generators. The control valves respond to the automatic signals as described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.2.
(EC-41355, R307)
Manual control switches for the emergency feedwater pumps and emergency feedwater valves are provided in the main control room. Procedures are established for operating manual handwheel overrides or lining up backup air supplies for continued safety function after the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> mission time of the safety related Nitrogen Accumulator.
(EC-41355, R307)
Automatic emergency feedwater actuation is initiated at the setpoints listed in Table 7.3-2.
The safety-related display instrumentation for the EFS, which provides the operator with sufficient information to monitor and perform the required safety functions, is described in Section 7.5.
Instrumentation location layout drawings showing the location of the steam generator pressure and level sensors which actuate the emergency feedwater system are discussed in Subsection 7.3.1.3. The actuated equipment is listed in Table 7.3-10.
The emergency feedwater control valves may be operated by operator manually or may be left in automatic mode of control.
In automatic mode, the control valves are positioned by the signals derived from the emergency feedwater flow and steam generator wide range level measurement instrumentation loops.
The control logic for one steam generator is outlined below, the control logic for the other steam generator being identical.
Figure 7.3-12 identifies the valves, flow meters, and the level setpoints in the steam generator.
7.3.1.1.6.2 Automatic Control (DRN 07-43, R15)
The following is a description of the automatic EFW Control system operation on regulating the flow of EFW to the steam generators so as to minimize adverse effects on the Reactor Coolant System. The automatic EFW control system as described below is credited in applicable FSAR Chapter 15 analyses and is discussed in Subsection 10.4.9.3.6.
(DRN 07-43, R15)
- 1.
Emergency Feedwater Actuation is Reset Plant being in normal operation, the administrative procedures will call for the emergency feedwater shut-off valves to be in closed position and the control valves to be in automatic mode.
The automatic mode will drive the control valves into a fully closed position due to a relative high water level that is normally maintained in the steam generators.
The emergency feedwater pumps are off.
- 2.
Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal is Generated by ESFAS The shut-off valves are opened, and the modulating control valves remain in the fully closed position.
The shut-off valves are not available for the operator's manual control unless EFAS is reset.
However, the modulating control valves are available for the operator's manual control.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-17 The emergency feedwater pumps are started.
3.
Steam Generator Level Falls to the "Critical Level" The shut-off valves remain fully open.
Control valve "B" opens to a fixed predetermined position equivalent to 200 gpm flow of emergency feedwater to the steam generator.
Flow meter FA inputs to a flow controller demanding 175 gpm. Control valve "A" moves to satisfy that demand. If the positioning of control valve "B" fails to produce at least 175 gpm, control valve "A" will be automatically controlled to satisfy the controller demand.
The modulating control valves are available for the operators manual control.
If the level trend reverses, at this point, and starts to rise, the control valves remain in this mode of operation until level setpoints "X" and "Y" are reached and the control valves are switched to the level control mode of operation (see 6 below).
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-18 Revision 15 (03/07)
- 4.
Steam Generator Level Falls to "Lo Level" The shut-off valves remain fully open.
Control valve "B" remains in a fixed predetermined position equivalent to 200 gpm flow of emergency feedwater to the steam generator.
The flow controller set point increases to 400 gpm. Flow meter FA measures the flow and the controller automatically controls valve "A" to maintain 400 gpm.
The logic operates a "Steam Generator Emergency Level Lo" alarm in the main control room.
The modulating control valves are available for the operator's manual control.
If the level trend reverses, at this point, and starts to rise, the control valves remain in this mode of operation until level setpoints "X" and "Y" are reached and the control valves are switched to the level control mode of operation (see 6 below).
- 5.
Steam Generator Falls to the "Lo-Lo Level" The shut-off valves remain fully open.
(DRN 07-43, R15)
The control valves "A" and "B" are driven to the fully open position (priority open - see Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.4).
(DRN 07-43, R15)
If the level trend reverses, at this point, and starts to rise, the control valves will remain in the fully open position until the Lo-Lo level is reached. Above Lo-Lo level the control valves will go into the mode of operation as described above in 4.
- 6.
Steam Generator Level Rises to Level "X" (Automatic Mode)
The shut-off valves remain fully open.
Control valve "A" transfers from flow control to level control with Level "Y" as the setpoint.
Control valve "B" is transferred from the fixed position to level control with level "X" as the setpoint.
The valves will remain in the level control mode unless the steam generator level falls to the Critical Level, in this case the Control reference will return to step No. 3.
The modulating control valves are available for operator's manual control.
- 7.
SIAS is Actuated The operation of the shut-off valves is not affected by actuation of SIAS and remains as described in steps 1 thru 6 above.
The modulating control valves will remain closed, if the level in the steam generator is above the "Critical Level."
The modulating control valves will be switched immediately to the level control mode of operation, if the level in the steam generator is below the "Critical Level."
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-19 The modulating control valves remain available for operators manual control as described in steps 1 thru 6 above.
7.3.1.1.6.3 Isolation of a Ruptured Steam Generator In the case of a MSLB, inside containment (either as the initiating event or after EFW actuation) it becomes necessary to isolate the ruptured steam generator. The detection and isolation of the ruptured steam generator is performed by an interface between EFAS and MSIS.
The EFAS-MSIS interface as shown on Figure 7.3-13 is implemented in the Plant Protection System (PPS) Cabinet and at the actuated components (i.e., valves). Only the PPS interface is discussed herein with respect to single failure.
MSIS is initiated by low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure.
EFAS is initiated to steam generator 1 either by low steam generator water level coincident with no low pressure trip present for steam generator 1 or by low steam generator water level coincident with differential pressure between the two generators with the higher pressure in generator 1. This EFAS logic is provided for each steam generator.
The low steam generator pressure signal is provided to the EFAS and MSIS logic from a single bistable comparator output in each PPS channel. A single channel failure of this signal would have no effect on EFAS or MSIS operation. This is the only EFAS-MSIS interface present on the PPS.
The interrelationship between EFAS and MSIS operation is described by the following scenario assuming a ruptured steam generator:
EFAS logic permits emergency feedwater to be supplied to each steam generator upon receipt of a valid low steam generator water level condition.
Upon receipt of a low steam generator pressure condition, EFAS and MSIS logic will terminate emergency feedwater by causing the emergency feedwater valves to close by resetting EFAS and tripping MSIS. This isolation of the EFW valves will not effect the operation of the EFW pumps. MSIS logic will isolate the steam generators by causing main feedwater and main steam isolation valves to close, thus allowing steam generator pressures to vary in-dependently. The ruptured steam generator pressure will decrease while the intact steam generator pressure will remain constant or increase, thereby causing a differential pressure condition to exist. EFAS logic will permit emergency feedwater to be supplied to the intact steam generator while maintaining isolation of the ruptured steam generator.
7.3.1.1.6.4 Priority Signals The EFW control system utilizes two signals (priority open, priority close) that override all other automatic or manual controls to the EFW valves.
Priority close is generated when the system is determining which steam generator is ruptured (Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.3). Once this determination is made the priority close signal is deactivated to the intact steam generator only. Upon deactivation of the signal, control of the EFW will return to the status (automatic or manual) that existed prior to the generation of the priority close signal.
Priority open is generated when the water level reaches "Lo-Lo Level" (Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.2, Item 5). Once the water level rises above the "Lo-Lo Level", control of the EFW will return to the status (automatic or manual) that existed prior to the generation of the priority open signal.
In the case of the ruptured steam generator, the EFAS command that generates the priority close signal will prevent a priority open signal.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-20 7.3.1.1.6.5 Initiating Circuits The initiating circuits are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.1 for SIS except that the parameters monitored are steam generator level and pressure.
7.3.1.1.6.6 Logic 7.6.1.1.6.6.1 Initiating Logic The initiating logic is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.1 for SIS except that the provision for multiple initiating signals does not apply.
7.3.1.1.6.6.2 Actuating Logic Actuating logic is similar to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.2.2 for SIS. Refer to Figure 7.3-10.
7.3.1.1.6.7 Group Actuation Group Actuation is identical to that described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.3 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.8 Bypasses Bypasses are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3 1.1.1.4 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.9 Interlocks Interlock provisions are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.5 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.10 Redundancy Redundancy features are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.6 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.11 Diversity Diversity aspects are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.7 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.12 Sequencing Sequencing equipment and functions are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1 1.1.8 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.13 Testing All provisions for testing the EFS are identical to those described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 for SIS.
7.3.1.1.6.14 Auxiliary Supporting Systems Required The auxiliary supporting systems required are identified in Table 7.3-4 and described in Subsection 7.3.1-1.10.
7.3.1.1.7 Containment Cooling System Refer to Subsection 6.2.2, for a description of the Containment Cooling System (CCS).
The CCS is automatically actuated by a SIAS from the ESFAS. The SIAS is initiated by either two-out-of-four low pressurizer pressure signals or two-out-of-four high containment pressure signals, as shown in Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-21 Revision 14-B (06/06)
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment of train A, are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the components and equipment in train B.
7.3.1.1.8 Shield Building Ventilation System Refer to Subsection 9.4.5 for a description of the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS).
The SBVS is automatically initiated upon receipt of-SIAS as shown in Figure 7.3-11. The SIAS is generated as shown in Figure 7.3-2.
The system is composed of redundant trains, A and B. The instrumentation and controls of the equipment and components in train A are physically and electrically separate and independent of the instrumentation and controls of the equipment and components in train B. Independence is adequate to retain the redundancy required to maintain equipment functional capability following those design basis events shown in Table 7.3-1 which are mitigated by the SBVS.
Both trains of the SBVS are automatically placed in operation upon receipt of the SAIS. One train may be placed in standby by the operator following verification of operation of both trains. The standby system will be automatically restarted if the operating system should fail.
Manual initiation of the SBVS is provided in the control room. The safety-related display instrumentation for the SBVS which provides the operator with sufficient information of monitor and perform the required safety functions is described in Section 7.5.
7.3.1.1.9 Combustible Gas Control System The Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) consists of the following:
a)
Hydrogen Recombiner System (HRS) b)
Hydrogen Analyzer c)
Containment Atmosphere Release system (CARS)
(DRN 05-1382, R14-B) 10CFR50.44 no longer defines a design basis LOCA hydrogen release and eliminates requirements for hydrogen control systems to mitigate such a release. The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems formerly required by 10CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design basis LOCA.
Engineered safety features are provided in nuclear plants to mitigate the consequences of design-basis loss of coolant accident, even though the occurrence of these accidents is very unlikely. The basis of revision to 10CFR50.44 is the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the onset of core damage. In addition, combustible gas control systems are ineffective at mitigating hydrogen releases from risk-significant beyond design-basis accidents. As a result, the CGCS no longer meets any of the four criteria in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) and no longer performs the functions of an engineered safety feature.
The CGCS is described below and is relegated to non design basis, severe accident management functions only.
Refer to FSAR section 7.5 for further discussion of the post accident function of the hydrogen analyzers.
(DRN 05-1382, R14-B) 7.3.1.1.9.1 Hydrogen Recombiner System The dual-train HRS will be under manual administrative control. The hydrogen concentration in the containment following a LOCA will be limited to a maximum of four percent by volume. The operator will initiate the recombiner system when a high concentration of hydrogen is monitored. No automatic actuation signals are provided in the control of combustible gases. The time at which these systems must be initiated is of sufficient duration so that automatic initiation is unnecessary.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-22 Revision 14-B (06/06)
The hydrogen recombiners as described in Subsection 6.2.5 are located within the containment. When started remotely from the control room the combustible gas and air mixture, following a LOCA, will be processed through either or both recombiners to remove the hydrogen by reacting with oxygen to form water. The recombiner is provided with electric heating coils which are powered from separate emergency power supplies. Failure of any recombiner will be indicated in the main control room.
The instrumentation and control associated with the recombiners are located in the main control room. Each recombiner train will have a manual control switch to "start"/"stop" the recombiner train. When the recombiner is started, the system will continue to operate automatically. Indicating lights will indicate the status of the recombiners.
Temperature elements will detect and maintain the required temperature.
7.3.1.1.9.2 Hydrogen Analyzer Refer to Subsection 6.2.5 for description of this system.
The hydrogen analyzer has the capability of sampling and measuring the hydrogen concentration at points where hydrogen may accumulate in the containment during all modes of operation.
The system is operated from the main control room, see Subsection 6.2.5.5.3 for additional details.
The sample is analyzed in the hydrogen analyzer which determines the percentage of hydrogen in the containment and enables the rate of change of hydrogen concentration calculation to be made.
The hydrogen analyzer is independent of any other engineered safety feature operation or signal.
Instrumentation layout drawings which present the location of the hydrogen analyzer sensors are referenced in Section 1.7.
7.3.1.1.9.3 Containment Atmosphere Release System (CARS)
CARS is described in Subsection 6.2.5.2.3. The system will be under manual control in the main control room. No automatic actuation signals are provided to control the purging of the Containment. The system will contain indication of each fan and each valve and also contain annunciation of a malfunction in the system.
Each fan and its associated valves will have completely independent logic from the other fans with their respective valves.
The sensors and logics of the containment atmosphere release system are not used for variable control of the system process; thus malfunction and failures in the controls have no direct effect on the operation of the pertinent systems of the combustible gas control system. CARS will have redundant electrical components.
Figure 9.4-7 indicates CARS schematic diagram for train A and train B.
7.3.1.1.10 ESF Supporting Systems The ESF supporting systems listed below are described in the referenced Sections.
a)
Component Cooling Water System (Subsection 9.2.1) b)
Standby (Emergency) Power and Distribution System (Section 8.3) c)
HVAC Systems for ESF Systems Areas (Section 6.4 and 9.4) d)
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System (Subsection 9.5.4) e)
Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System (Subsection 9.2.2.)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-23 7.3.1.2 Design Basis Information The design bases for all of the ESF system controls are essentially the same. Where differences exist, they are explained in the text or accompanying tables.
7.3.1.2.1 Design Basis Information For ESF System Equipment The design of each of the ESF Systems, including design bases and evaluation, is discussed in Chapter 6. The following analyses address the ESFAS and instrumentation.
The ESFAS is designed to provide initiating signals for components which require automatic actuation following rupture of a primary or secondary pressure boundary.
The systems are designed on the following bases to assure adequate performance of their protective functions:
a)
The system is designed in compliance with the applicable criteria of the NRC, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, (Appendix A of 10CFR50, 1971).
b)
System testing conforms to the requirements of IEEE Standard 338-1971, Trial Use Criteria for Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (Feb. 1972) c)
IEEE Standard 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, establishes specific protection system design bases. The following Subsections describe how these design bases listed in Section 3 of IEEE Standard 279 are implemented.
1)
The design basis events which require protective action are listed in Table 7.3-1.
2)
The ESF system is designed to monitor the parameters related to design basis events listed in Table 7.3-1 to provide protective actions.
3)
The number and identification of the sensors required to adequately monitor, for protective function purposes, the variables listed in Section 3(2) having spatial dependence are listed in Table 7.3-2.
4)
Prudent operation limits for each variable listed in Section 3(2) are listed in Table 7.3-2.
5)
The margin, with appropriate interpretive information, between each operational limit and the level considered to mark the onset of unsafe conditions are given in Table 7.3-2. Interpretive information is given in Subsection 7.3.2.1, Criterion 10.
6)
The setpoints that, when reached, will require protective action are listed in Table 7.3-2.
7)
The range of transient and steady-state conditions of both the energy supply and the environment (for example, voltage, frequency, temperature, humidity, pressure, vibration, etc.) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the system must perform:
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-24 Revision 14 (12/05)
(a)
Voltage and Frequency The class 1E 12OV-ac vital instrumentation and control power supplies are described in Section 8.3.
(b)
Temperature, humidity, pressure, radiation, chemical spray and nonseismic vibration. The design environment for the equipment is stated in Section 3.11.
- 8)
The malfunctions, accidents, or other unusual events (for example, fire, explosion, missiles, lightning, flood, earthquake, wind, etc.) which could physically damage protection system components or could cause environmental changes leading to functional degradation of system performance, and for which provisions must be incorporated to retain necessary protective action:
(a)
Fire The fire protection system is described in Subsection 9.5.1.
(b)
Missiles Missile protection is described in Section 3.5.
(c)
Flood Water level (flood) design is described in Section 3.4.
(d)
Earthquake Seismic qualification of instrumentation and electrical equipment is described in Section 3.10. Seismic design is described in Section 3.7.
(e)
Wind Wind and tornado loadings are described in Section 3.3.
(f)
Pipe Whip Protection against pipe whip is described in Section 3.6.
- 9)
Minimum performance requirements including the following:
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
(a)
System response time (see TRM and Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
(b)
System accuracies (see Table 7.3-2)
(c)
Ranges normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) of the magnitudes and rates of change of sensed variables to be accommodated until proper conclusion of the protective action is assured. (see Table 7.3-2) 7.3.1.2.2 Design Basis for the Instrumentation and Controls Of The Auxiliary Supporting Systems The auxiliary supporting systems conform to the design bases given in Subsection 7.1.2.1 and as further described below.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-25 Revision 10 (10/99)
The systems are designed on the following bases to assure adequate performance of their protective functions:
a)
The system is designed in compliance with the applicable criteria of the NRC General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (Appendix A. 10CFR50, 1971). For further details see Subsection 7.3.2.2.1.
b)
System testing conforms to the requirements of IEEE Standard 338-1971. Trial Use Criteria for Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.22. Feb. 1972)
Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions. For further details see Subsection 7.3.2.2.3.
7.3.1.3 Final Systems Drawings Electrical wiring diagrams, block diagrams, final logic diagrams, and location layout drawings are listed and provided by reference in Section 1.7.
7.3.1.3.1 Onsite Power System Drawings for the onsite power system are listed in section 8.3.
7.3.1.3.2 Drawing Comparison
A comparison between the final logic diagrams and the logic diagrams furnished with the PSAR is provided in Table 7.3-12.
7.3.2 ANALYSIS 7.3.2.1 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Systems The design of each of the ESF System, including design bases and evaluation, is discussed in Chapter 6. The following analyses address the ESFAS and instrumentation.
7.3.2.1.1 Design As previously described, the major portion of the ESFAS is functionally identical to the RPS. The logics for the ESFAS and RPS, in fact, are located in the same enclosures and share a common logic testing scheme. Because of this, many of the responses to the requirements of the NRC General Design Criteria, IEEE Standard 279-1971 and IEEE standard 338-1971 are identical to the responses for the RPS. Where responses for the two systems are identical, reference is made to the appropriate section.
Appendix A of 10CFR50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants.
Section 3.1 provides a detailed discussion of all General Design Criteria. This section describes how the requirements that are applicable to the ESFAS are satisfied.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-26 Criterion 1:
Quality Standards and Records The requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.30 (8/11/72), and 1.38 (3/16/73) were met. Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
The quality assurance for the design of equipment and components is described in the QA Program Manual.
Criterion 2:
Design Bases For Protection Against Natural Phenomena The design bases for protection against natural phenomena are described in Sections 3.10, 3.11 and Subsection 7.2.2.
Criterion 3:
Fire Protection The design bases for fire protection are described in Subsections 9.5.1 and 7.2.2.
Criterion 4:
Environmental and Missile Design Bases Environmental design bases are described in Section 3.11. Missile design bases are described in Section 3.5, and Subsection 7.2.2.
Criterion 5:
Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components No ESFAS components are shared with future or existing reactor facilities.
Criterion 10:
Reactor Design The ESFAS in conjunction with the plant control systems and Technical Specification requirements, provide sufficient margin to trip setpoints so that, (1) during normal operation protective action will not be initiated, and (2) during anticipated operational occurrences, fuel design limits will not be exceeded. Typical margins for each trip parameter are shown in Table 7.3-2.
Criterion 13:
Instrumentation and Control Sensor ranges are sufficient to monitor all pertinent plant variables over the expected range of plant operation in normal and transient conditions. Variables that affect plant safety limits are monitored by the PPS. The safety-related information readout for plant monitoring is described in Section 7.5. Also refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
Criterion 19:
Main Control Room The main control room layout is presented in Section 7.5. Emergency shutdown from outside the main control room is described in Section 7.4.
Criterion 20:
Protection System Functions The ESFAS monitor all plant variables that affect plant design limits. These limits are given in Table 7.3-2. ESF systems will be initiated to prevent these limits from being exceeded for all the anticipated operational occurrences that are listed in Table 7.3-1.
Criterion 21:
Protection System Reliability and Testability Functional reliability is ensured by compliance with the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971, as described in Subsection 7.1.2.4. Testing is in compliance with IEEE Standard 338-1971, and consistent with the recommenda-tions of Regulatory Guide 1.22 (February, 1972), as described in Subsection 7.3.2.1.3. Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-27 Criterion 22:
Protection System Independence The ESFAS independence is assured through redundancy and diversity as described in Subsections 7.3.1.1.1.6 and 7.3.1.1.1.7. Also refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
Criterion 23:
Protection System Failure Modes Failure modes of the ESFAS components are discussed in Subsection 7.3.2.1.4 for each individual system.
Where protective action is required under adverse environmental conditions during postulated accidents the ESFAS components are designed to function under such conditions.
Criterion 24:
Separation of Protection and Control Systems The protection system is separated from the control systems as described in Subsection 7.3.2.1.2. Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
Criterion 29:
Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences Refer to Subsection 7.2.2.
Criterion 54, 55, 56, 57:
The instrument sensing lines for monitoring containment pressure are discussed in Section 3.1.
7.3.2.1.2 Equipment Design Criteria IEEE Standard 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, establishes minimum requirements for safety-related functional performance and reliability of the ESFAS. This section describes how the requirements listed in Section 4 of IEEE Standard 279-1971 are satisfied.
4.1 "General Functional Requirement" The ESFAS is designed to automatically actuate the appropriate ESF systems, when required, and to mitigate the effects of certain accidents. Instrument performance characteristics, response time, and accuracy are selected for compatibility with and adequacy for the particular function. Trip set points are established by analysis of the system parameters. Factors such as instrument inaccuracies, bistable trip times, valve travel time, and pump starting times are considered in establishing the margin between the trip setpoints and the safety limits. The time response of the sensors and protective systems are evaluated for abnormal conditions. Since all uncertainty factors are considered as cumulative for the derivation of these times, the actual response time may be more rapid. However, even at the maximum times, the system provides conservative protection.
There are no ESFAS sensors for which the trip setpoints are within five percent of the high or low and of the calibrated range.
4.2 "Single Failure Criterion" The ESFAS is designed so that any single failure within the system shall not prevent proper protective action at the system level. No single failure will defeat more than one of the four protective channels associated with any one trip function.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-28 The effect of single faults in the RPS is discussed in Section 7.2.2. The same analysis is applicable for the ESFAS with the modifications appropriate to redundant actuation trains instead of control element drive mechanisms (CEDM) power supply circuits.
Single faults of actuation relays or actuation relay buses have no effect as a selective two-out-of-four logic is required for actuation. Single faults of the actuation (or control) circuitry will cause, at worst, only a failure of a component or components within one of the two redundant actuation trains; actuation of the remaining trains components are sufficient for the protective action.
4.3 "Quality Control of Components and Modules" The quality assurance program is described in the QA Program Manual. This program includes appropriate requirements for design review procurement, inspection and testing to ensure that the system components shall be of a quality consistent with minimum maintenance requirements and low failure rates.
4.4 "Equipment Qualification" The ESFAS meets the equipment requirements described in Sections 3.10 and 3.11.
4.5 "Channel Integrity" Type testing of components, separation of sensors and channels, and qualification of cabling are utilized to ensure that the channels will maintain the functional capability required under applicable extremes of conditions relating to environment, energy supply, malfunctions and accidents.
Loss of or damage to any one path will not prevent the protective action. Sensors are piped so that blockage or failure of any one connection does not prevent protective system action. The process transducers located in the containment building are specified and rated for the intended service.
Components which must operate during or after the LOCA are rated for the LOCA environment. Results of type test are used to verify these ratings. In the control room protective system trip paths are located in four compartments.
Mechanical and thermal barriers between these compartments reduce the possibility of common event failure.
Outputs from the components in this area to the control boards are isolated so that shorting, grounding, or the application of the highest available local voltage does not cause channel malfunction. Where signals originating in the PPS feed the computer, signal isolation is provided; where the ESFAS is feeding annunciators, isolation is ensured through the use of relay contacts.
4.6 "Channel Independence" The locations of the sensors and the points at which the sensing lines are connected to the process loop have been selected to provide physical separation of the channels, thereby precluding a situation in which a single event could remove or negate a protective function. The routing of cables from protective system transmitters is arranged so that the cables are separated from each other and from power cabling to minimize the likelihood of common event failures. This includes separation at the containment penetration areas. In the control room, protective system trip channels are located in individual compartments. Mechanical and thermal barriers between these compartments minimize the possibility of common event failure. Outputs from the components in this area to the control boards are isolated so that shorting, grounding, or the application of the highest available local voltages (120 VAC, 125 VAC) do not cause channel malfunction.
4.7 "Control and Protection System Interaction" No portion of the ESFAS is used for both control and protection functions.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-29 4.8 "Deviation of Systems Inputs" ESFAS inputs are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables. Variables which are measured directly include pressurizer, steam generator, and containment pressure. Refueling water storage pool level and steam generator level are derived from differential pressure measurements.
4.9 "Capability for Sensor Checks" ESFAS sensors are checked by cross-checking between channels. These channels bear a known relationship to each other, and this method ensures the operability of each sensor during reactor operation.
4.10 "Capability for Test and Calibration" Testing is described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9 and is in compliance with IEEE standard 338-1971 as discussed in Subsection 7.3.2.1.3 as amended by Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9.
4.11 "Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation" Any one of the four protective system channels may be tested, calibrated, or repaired without detrimental effects on the system. Individual trip channels may be bypassed to effect a two-out-of-three logic on remaining channels for systems. The single failure criterion is met during this condition.
4.12 "Operating Bypasses" Operating bypasses are provided as shown in Table 7.3-3. The operating bypasses are automatically removed when the permissive conditions are not met. The circuitry and devices which function to remove these inhibits are designed in accordance with IEEE Standard 279-1971.
4.13 "Indication of Bypasses" Indication of test or bypass conditions or removal of any channel from service is given by lights and annunciation.
Bypasses are automatically removed at fixed setpoints.
4.14 "Access to Means for Bypassing" A key is required to gain access to the means for bypassing a protective system channel. An interlock prevents the plant operator from bypassing more than one of the four channels of any one type trip at any one time. All bypasses are visually and audibly annunciated.
4.15 "Multiple Setpoints" Manual reduction of setpoints for MSIS and SIAS is allowed for the controlled reduction of pressurizer pressure and steam generator pressure as discussed in Subsections 7.3.1.1.1.4 and 7.3.1.1.1.5. The setpoint reductions are initiated by a control board mounted pushbutton, which upon actuation, adjusts the setpoints to a value a preselected distance below the operating pressure which exists at the time the pushbutton is actuated. A separate pushbutton is provided for each protection channel. This method of setpoint reduction provides positive assurance that the setpoint is never decreased below the existing pressure by more than a predetermined amount.
The setpoint will be automatically increased by the PPS as the measured pressure is increased.
4.16 "Completion of Protective Action Once it is Initiated
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-30 The system is designed to ensure that protective action will go to completion once initiated. With the exception of EFAS, operator action is required to clear the actuation signal and return to operation. EFAS resets automatically when the low steam generator water level signal clears.
4.17 "Manual Initiation" For each ESF system manual actuation is effected by depressing two sets of two trip pushbuttons (one set per load group) at the ESF Auxiliary Relay Cabinets. Two remote sets of trip pushbuttons (switches for EFAS) at different locations on the RTG board are provided to actuate each ESF system with the exception of the RAS. For the remote pushbuttons, one set of two is sufficient to actuate both load groups.
4.18 "Access to Setpoint Adjustments, Calibration and Test Points" A key is required for access to setpoint adjustments, calibration and test points. Access is also visually and audibly annunciated.
4.19 "Identification of Protective Action" Indication lights are provided for all protective actions, including identification of channel trips.
4.20 "Information Readout" Means are provided to allow the operator to monitor all trip system inputs and outputs. The specification displays that are provided for continuous monitoring are described in Section 7.5. System status displays are provided.
4.21 "System Repair" Identification of a defective channel will be accomplished by observation of system status lights or by testing as described in Subsection 7.3.1.1.1.9. Replacement or repair of components is accomplished with the affected channel bypassed. The affected trip function then operates in a two-out-of-three trip logic.
4.22 "Identification" All equipment, including panels, modules, and cables associated with the actuation system, are marked in order to facilitate identification.
7.3.2.1.3 Testing Criteria IEEE Standard 338-1971, Trial Use Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Generating Station Protection Systems, and Safety Guide 22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (February, 1972), provide guidance for development of procedures, equipment, and documentation of periodic testing. The basis for the scope and means of testing are described in this section. Test intervals and their bases are included in the Technical Specifications. Since operation of the ESF system is not expected, the systems are periodically tested to verify operability. Complete channels can be individually tested without initiating protective action, without violating the single failure criterion, and without inhibiting the operation of the systems. The organization for testing and for documentation is described in Chapter 13.
The system can be checked from the sensor signal through the actuation devices. The sensors can be checked during reactor operation by comparison with similar channels.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 7.3-31 Revision 14 (12/05)
Those actuated devices, which are not tested during reactor operation (e.g., main feedwater isolation valves), will be tested during scheduled reactor shutdown to assure that they are capable of performing the safety functions.
Minimum frequencies for checks, calibration and testing of the ESFAS instrumentation are given in the Technical Specifications. Overlap in the checking and testing is provided to assure that the entire channel is functional. The use of individual trip and ground detection lights, in conjunction with those provided at the supply bus, assure that possible grounds or shorts to another source of voltage will be detected.
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
The response time from an input signal to protection system trip bistables through the opening of the actuation relays is verified by measurement during plant startup testing. ESFAS response times are listed in the TRM. Sensor responses are measured during factory acceptance tests.
(DRN 03-2061, R14) 7.3.2.1.4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Failure modes and effects analyses for the ESFAS are provided in Table 7.2-5. The ESFAS are identified in Section 7.3.
7.3.2.1.5 Consideration of Selected Plant Contingencies a)
Loss of Instrument Air Systems None of the essential control or monitoring instrumentation is pneumatic. Electrical instrumentation is powered from the emergency power system. Therefore, the loss of instrument air will not degrade instrumentation and control systems required for shutdown of the plant.
b)
Loss of Cooling Water to Vital Equipment None of the instrumentation and controls required for safe shutdown rely on cooling water for operation. Air conditioning systems required to maintain the environment within the instrument design parameters are redundant and described in sections 6.4 and 9.4.
7.3.2.2 Instrumentation and Controls for Auxiliary Supporting System 7.3.2.2.1 General Design Criteria The general design criteria for the instrumentation and controls of the components in auxiliary supporting systems that are actuated by ESFAS are identical to those for the instrumentation and controls of the ESF systems. See Subsection 7.3.2.1.1.
The process instrumentation and controls, of the auxiliary supporting systems are described in Section 7.5 under Plant Process Display Instrumentation and listed in Table 7.5-1.
7.3.2.2.2 Equipment Design Criteria The equipment design of the instrumentation and controls of the components in the auxiliary supporting systems that provide a safety function is described in the Subsection applicable.
The process instrumentation and controls of the auxiliary supporting systems that do not provide a protective function, provide the operator with sufficient information to maintain the system within its design limits.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-1 Revision 10 (10/99)
DESIGN BASIS EVENTS REQUIRING ESF SYSTEM ACTION Systems Containment Containment Containment Recirculation Main Steam Safety Emergency Shield Cooling Isolation Spray Actuation Isolation Injection Feedwater Building Design Basis Events System System System System System System System Vent System Loss of Reactor Coolant - Large Break Loss of Reactor Coolant - Small Break (1)
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- (2)
Steamline or Feedwater Line Break (Inside Containment)
- (3)
Steamline or Feedwater Line Break (Outside Containment)
- (3)
(1) Includes CEA Ejection (2) Manual Actuation (3) Steamline Break Only
Denotes Action Required
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-2 Revision 307 (07/13)
ESFAS SENSORS AND SETPOINTS (DRN 06-884, R15)
Actuation Signal Sensor (1)
Nominal Values Analytical Limit Tag Number Full Power and and Range Normal Oper. Limits (DRN 99-0459; 03-2061, R14)
CIAS, SIAS Pressurizer RCIP-102 A,B,C,D 2250 psia 1560 psia Pressure Low 0-3000 psia 2125-2275 psia (DRN 99-0459; 03-2061, R14)
(DRN 02-1730, R12-A)
CIAS, MSIS, SIAS CBIP-SMA,SMB, Containment SMC, SMD 14.7 psia 19.7 psia Pressure High 0.30 psia 14.275-15.7 psia CSAS CBIP-SMA,SMB Containment SMC, SMD Pressure High-High 14.7 psi 19.7 psia 0-30 psia 14.275-15.7 psia (DRN 02-1730, R12-A)
(DRN 00-1044, R11-A; 03-2061, R14;05-130, R14; EC-8460, R307)
MSIS and EFAS SGIP-1013A,B,C,D (2)
Steam Generator PT-1023A,B,C,D 832 psia 576 psia Pressure Low 0-1200 psi 970 - 800 psia (DRN 00-1044, R11-A; 03-2061, R14;05-130, R14; EC-8460, R307)
RAS SGIIL-305A,B,C,D Refueling Water Storage 0-100%
94%
7%
Pool Level Low 91-100%
(EC-8460, R307)
EFAS SGIL-1113A,B,C,D Steam Generator LT-1123A,B,C,D 64.4%
5% (5)
Level Low 0-100%
59.4-69.4%
(EC-8460, R307)
EFAS Differential 0 psid 230 psid Between Steam N/A(3)
Gen's Press (DRN 06-884, R15)
(1)
Four Sensors for each variable parameter.
(2)
Setpoint can be manually decreased as pressure is reduced during a plant cooldown. The setpoint is automatically increased as steam generator pressure increases.
(3)
The differential steam generator pressure signal is produced by a bistable utilizing signals from bother generators' pressure sensors.
(DRN 06-884, R15)
(4)
The analytical limits correspond to those used in the safety analysis. The actual equipment setpoints are determined to ensure that the specified protective action is initiated at or before the monitored parameter reaches the nominal values. The equipment setpoints are listed in the Technical Specifications.
(DRN 06-884, R15)
(5)
% of this distance between steam generator upper and lower level instrument nozzles.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-3 Revision 10 (10/99)
ESFAS BYPASSES Title Function Initiated By Removed By Notes Trip Channel Bypass Disables any given trip Manually by controlled Same switch Interlocks allow channel access switch one channel for any type trip to be bypassed at one time.
RPS/ESFAS Disables low pressurizer Key Operator switch Automatic if Allows plant depressurization Pressurizer trip and SIAS (1 per channel) pressurizer below 400 psia without Pressure if pressurizer Pres-pressure is initiating SIAS or low Bypass sure is < 400 psia
> 500 psia pressurizer trip
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-4 AUXILIARY SUPPORTING SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Engineered Safety Features Systems Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System Cooling Water System Diesel Generatotor Systems Charging Pump Rooms Boric Acid Make-up Pump Rooms Diesel Generator Rooms Chiller Rooms ESF Swgr.
Rooms Battery Rooms ESF Pump Rooms CCW Pump Rooms Standby Power Distribution Systems Safety Injection X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X Containment Isolation X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Main Steam Isolation X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Emergency Feedwater X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Containment Cooling X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Shield Building Ventilation System X
X X
X X
Combustible Gas Control System X
X X
X X
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 1 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON SIAS Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Start Shield Bldg Vent E-17 (3ASA)
X System Fan SBVMFAN0001A Open(10)
Shield Bldg Vent 2HV-B160A (1)
Fan E-17 (3ASA)
SBVMVAAA101A Train A Inlet Valve Open (10)
Shield Bldg Vent 2HV-B158A (1)
Fan E-17 (3ASA)
SBVMVAAA110A Train A Outlet Valve Open/
Shield Bldg Vent Fan 2HV-B162A (1)
Close (10)
E-17 (3ASA) Main SBVMVAAA114A Discharge to Stack Valve Close/
Shield Bldg Vent 2HV-B164A (1)
Open (10)
Fan E-17 (3ASA)
SBVMVAAA113A Recirc Valve to Annulus Start Shield Bldg Vent E-17 (3BSB)
X System Fan SBVMFAN0001B Open (10)
Shield Bldg Vent Fan 2HV-B161B (1)
E-17 (3BSB) Train B SBVMVAAA101B Inlet Valve Open (10)
Shield Bldg Vent Fan 2HV-B159B (1)
E-17 (3BSB) Train B SBVMVAAA110B Outlet Valve Open/
Shield Bldg Vent Fan 2HV-B163B (1)
Close (10)
E-17 (3BSB) Main SBVMVAAA114B Discharge to Stack Valve Stop CEDM Cooling Unit E16(3A)
X CDCMFAN0002A Stop CEDM Cooling Unit E16(3C)
X
CDCMFAN0002C
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 2 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Stop CEDM Cooling Unit E16(3B)
X CDCMFAN0002B Stop CEDM Cooling Unit E16(3D)
X CDCMFAN0002D Close/
Shield Bldg Vent Fan 2HV-B165B (1)
Open (10)
E-17 (3BSB) Recirc SBVMVAAA113B Valve to Annulus Stops (3)
Control Rm Toilet E-34 (3ASA)
X Exhaust Fan HVCMFAN0011A Stops (3)
Control RM Toilet E-34 (3BSB)
X Exhaust Fan HVCMFAN0011B Close Control Rm Toilet 3HV-B177A X
Exhaust Fan E-34 (3ASA)
HVCMVAAA307
& E-34 (3BSB) Isolation Discharge Valve Close Control Rm Toilet 3HV-B178B X
Exhaust Fan E-34 (3ASA)
HVCMVAAA306
& E-34 (3BSB) Isolation Discharge Valve Open Control Rm Toilet D-18 (SA)
X Exhaust Fan E-34 (3ASA)
HVCMVAAA304A By-pass Damper Open Control Rm Toilet D-18 (SB)
X Exhaust Fan E-34 (3BSB)
HVCMVAAA304B By-pass Damper Stop Control Rm Kitchen &
E-42 (3)
(1)
(1)
Conference Rm Exhaust HVCMFAN0012 Fan (Not connected to emergency DG bus)
Close Control Rm Kitchen &
Conference Rm Exhaust HVCMVAAA314 Fan E-42 (3)
Isolation Discharge
Valve
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 3 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Control Rm Kitchen &
Conference Rm Exhaust HVCMVAAA313 Fan E-42 (3) Isolation Discharge Damper Open Control Rm Kitchen &
D-19 (SA)
X Conference Rm Exhaust HVCMVAAA312A Fan E-42 (3) By-pass Damper Open Control Rm Kitchen &
D-19 (SB)
X Conference Rm Exhaust HVCMVAAA312B Fan E-42 (3) By-pass Damper Start (4)
Control Rm Emergency S-8 (3ASA)
X Filtration System Fan HVCMFAN0010A Open Control Rm Emergency D-17 (SA)
(1)
Filtration System Fan HVCMVAAA205A S-8 (3ASA) Inlet Damper Open Control Rm Emergency D-41 (SA)
(1)
Filtration System Fan HVCMVAAA213A S-8 (3ASA) Return Air Damper Start Safeguard Pump AH-2 (3ASA)
(1)
Rm A Cooler HVRMAHU0034A Start Safeguard Pump AH-2 (3CSA)
(1)
Rm A Cooler HVRMAHU0036A Start Safeguard Pump AH-2 (3BSB)
(1)
Rm B Cooler HVRMAHU0034B Start Safeguard Pump AH-2 (3DSB)
(1)
Rm B Cooler HVRMAHU0036B Start Safeguard Pump AH-21 (3SAB)
(1)
Rm A Cooler HVRMAHU0034AB Start Equipment Rm Cooler AH-26(3ASA)
(1)
HVCMAHU0013A
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 4 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Start Equipment Rm Cooler AH-26(EBSB)
(1)
HVCMAHU0013B Start (4)
Control Rm Emergency S-8 (3BSB)
X Filtration System Fan HVCMFAN0010B Open Control Rm Emergency D-17 (SB)
(1)
Filtration System Fan HVCMVAAA205B S-8 (3BSB) Inlet Damper Open Control Rm Emergency D-41 (SB)
(1)
Filtration System Fan HVCMVAAA213B S-8 (3BSB) Return Air Damper Start Control Rm Air Handling Unit AH-12 (3ASA)
X (Continuously running if HVCMAHU0001A selected)
Start Control Rm Air Handling Unit AH-12 (3BSB)
X (Continuously running HVCMAHU0001B if selected)
Close Control Rm Supply Fan D-40 (SA)
X AH-12 (3ASA) Intake HVCMVAAA103A Damper Close Control Rm Supply Fan D-40 (SB)
X AH-12 (3BSB) Intake HVCMVAAA103B Damper Open AH-25(3ASA)
D-48 (SA)
X Recirc. Damper SVSMVAAA105A Open AH-25(3BSB)
D-48 (SB)
X
Recirc. Damper SVSMVAAA105B
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 5 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Open AH-25(3ASA)
D-49 (SA)
X Recirc. Damper SVSMVAAA106A Open AH-25(3BSB)
D-49 (SB)
X Recirc. Damper SVSMVAAA106B Auto AH-25(3ASA) EHC CHLD 3AC-TM188A (1)
Control WTR CONTR VA CHWMVAAA591 Auto AH-25(3BSB) EHC CHLD 3AC-TM189B (1)
Control WTR CONTR VA CHWMVAAA900 Open Control Rm Supply Fan D-39(SA)
(1)
AH-12(3ASA) Return Air HVCMVAAA105A Damper Open Control Rm Supply Fan D-39(SB)
(1)
AH-12(3BSB) Return Air HVCMVAAA105B Damper Close Control Rm Supply Fan 3HV-B169A X
AH-12 (3ASA) & AH-12 (3BSB)
HVCMVAAA102 Outside Intake Air Valve Close Control Rm Supply Fan 3HV-B170B X
AH-12 (3ASA) & AH-12 HVCMVAAA101 (3BSB) Outside Intake Air Valve Start (4)
CVAS Fan E-23 (3ASA)
X HVRMFAN0021A Start (4)
CVAS Fan E-23 (3BSB)
X HVRMFAN0021B Open CVAS Fan E-23 (3ASA) 3HV-B210A X
Transfer Valve HVRMVAAA302 Open (10)
CVAS Filter Train A 3HV-B208A (1)
Inlet Valve HVRMVAAA304A Open (10)
CVAS Filter Train A 3HV-B206A (1)
Outlet Valve HVRMVAAA313A
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 6 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Reactor Aux Bldg 3HV-B218A X
Normal Ventilation HVRMVAAA108 System Isolation Valve Close Reactor Aux Bldg 3HV-B217B X
Normal Ventilation HVRMVAAA109 System Isolation Valve Open Reactor Aux Bldg 3HV-B225B X
Ventilation System Fan HVRMVAAA301 E-23 (3BSB) Transfer Valve Open (10)
CVAS Filter Train B 3HV-B209B X
Inlet Valve HVRMVAAA304B Open (10)
CVAS Filter Train B 3HV-B207B (1)
Outlet Valve HVRMVAAA313B Close Reactor Aux Bldg 3HV-B226A X
Normal Ventilation HVRMVAAA106 System Isolation Valve Status Display QSPDS-2 X
Enable Alarm RAB Neg Press ANN Window X
Lost Alarm CP18-915A RAB Neg Press ANN Window X
Lost Alarm CP18-915B Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal 3HV-B227B X
Ventilation System HVRMVAAA107 Isolation Valve Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal 3HV-B224A X
Ventilation System Supply HVRMVAAA104 to Pipe Penetration Area Valve Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal 3HV-B223B X
Ventilation System Supply to HVRMVAAA105 Pipe Penetration Area Valve Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal 3HV-B216A X
Ventilation System Exhaust HVRMVAAA111 from Pipe Chase Area Valve
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 7 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal 3HV-B215B X
Ventilation System Exhaust HVRMVAAA110 from Pipe Chase Area Valve Stop Computer Room Supplemental AH-31(3)
(7)
(7)
Air Handling Unit HVCMAHU0007 Stop Annulus Neg. Pressure E-19(3A)
(7)
(7)
Exhaust Fan ANPMFAN0001A Stop Annulus Neg. Pressure E-19(3B)
(7)
(7)
Exhaust Fan ANPMFAN0001B Stop Cable Vault Area E-49(3)
(7)
(7)
Exhaust Fan SVSMFAN0009 Close Annulus Negative Pressure 3HV-B175A X
System Isolation Valve ANPMVAAA101 Close Annulus Negative Pressure 3HV-B176B X
System Isolation Valve ANPMVAAA102 Stop Reactor Aux Bldg Normal S-6 (3A)
(7)
Ventilation System Supply Fan HVRMFAN0002A Stop Reactor Aux Bldg Normal S-6 (3B)
(7)
Ventilation System Supply Fan HV4MFAN0002B Stop Reactor Aux Bldg Normal E-22 (3A)
X Ventilation System Exhaust Fan HVRMFAN0009A Stop Reactor Aux Bldg Normal E-22 (3B)
X Ventilation System Exhaust Fan HVRMFAN0009B Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal D-4 (A)
(1)
Ventilation System Exhaust HVRMVAAA121A Fan E-22 (3A) Inlet Damper Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal D-5 (A)
(1)
Ventilation System Exhaust HVRMVAAA122A Fan E-22 (3A) Outlet Damper Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal D-4 (B)
(1)
Ventilation System Exhaust HVRMVAAA121B
Fan E-22 (3B) Inlet Damper
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 8 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Reactor Aux Bldg Normal D-5 (B)
(1)
Ventilation System Exhaust HVRMVAAA122B Fan E-22 (3B) Outlet Damper Start Switchgear Area Air AH-25 (ASA)
X Handling Unit SVSMAHU0001A Start Switchgear Area Air AH-30 (3ASA)
X Handling Unit SVSMAHU0002A Open AH-30 (3ASA)
D-50 (SA)
(1)
Inlet Damper SVSMVAAA201A Start Switchgear Area Air AH-25 (3BSB)
X Handling Unit SVSMAHU0001B Start Switchgear Area Air AH-30 (3BSB)
X Handling Unit SVSMAHU0002B Close to min.
Switchgear Area Air Handling D-65 (SA)
X open position Unit AH-25(3ASA) Outside Damper SVSMVAAA101 Close to min.
Switchgear Area Air Handling D-65 (SB)
X open position Unit AH-25 (3BSB) Outside Damper SVSMVAAA102 Open Switchgear Area Air Handling D-8 (SA)
(1)
Unit AH-25 (3ASA) Return Air SVSMVAAA103A Damper Open Switchgear Area Air Handling D-8 (SB)
(1)
Unit AH-25 (3BSB) Return Air SVSMVAAA103B Damper Start Battery Room A Exhaust Fan E-29 (3A-SA)
X SVSMFAN0006A Start Battery Room A Exhaust Fan E-29 (3B-SB)
X SVSMFAN0006B Start Battery Room B Exhaust Fan E-30 (3A-SA)
X SVSMFAN0005A Start Battery Room B Exhaust Fan E-30 (3B-SB)
X
SVSMFAN0005B
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 9 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Start Battery Room AB Exhaust Fan E-31 (3A-SA)
X SVSMFAN0004A Start Battery Room AB Exhaust Fan E-31 (3B-SB)
X SVSMFAN0004B Open AH-30 (3BSB)
D-50 (SB)
(1)
Inlet Damper SVSMVAAA201B Start (2)
RAB H&V Equipment Room AH-13 (3ASA)
X Supply Fan HVRMAHU0022A Start (2)
RAB H&V Equipment Room AH-13 (3BSB)
X Supply Fan HVRMAHU0022B Start (2)
RAB H&V Equipment Room E-41 (3ASA)
(1)
Exhaust Fan HVRMFAN0024A Start (2)
RAB H&V Equipment Room E-41 (3BSB)
(1)
Exhaust Fan HVRMFAN0024B Start Computer Battery Room E-46 (3A-SA)
X Exhaust Fan SVSMFAN0003A Start Computer Battery Room E-46 (3B-SB)
X Exhaust Fan SVSMFAN0003B Start (6)
Water Chiller WC-1 (3ASA)
X RFRMCHL0001A Start (6)
Water Chiller WC-1 (3BSB)
X RFRMCHL0001B Start (6)(9)
Water Chiller WC-1 (3CSAB)
X X
RFRMCHL0001C Close Annulus Negative D-25(3)
(1)
(1)
Pressure System ANPMVAAA103 Inlet Damper Close Annulus Negative D-26(3)
(1)
(1)
Pressure System ANPMVAAA106
Exhaust Damper
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 10 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Start Chilled Water Pump P-1 (3A-SA)
(1)
CHWMPMP0001A Start Chilled Water Pump P-1 (3B-SB)
(1)
CHWMPMP0001B Start Chilled Water Pump P-1 (3C-SAB)
(1)
(1)
CHWMPMP001AB Start Diesel Gen A Room E-28 (3A-SA)
(1)
Exhaust Fan HVRMFAN0025A Start Diesel Gen B Room E-28 (3B-SB)
(1)
Exhaust Fan HVRMFAN0025B Start Component Cooling Water AH-10 (3ASA)
(1)
Pump A Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0028a Start Component Cooling Water AH-20 (3ASAB)
(1)
A/B Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0028AB Start Pump B Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0028B Start Component Cooling Water AH-20 (3BSAB)
(1)
Pump A/B Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0030 Start Charging Pump A AH-18 (3ASA)
(1)
Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0040A Start Charging Pump A/B AH-22 (3ASAB)
(1)
Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0040AB Start Charging Pump B AH-18 (3BSB)
(1)
Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0040B Start Charging Pump A/B AH-22 (3BSAB)
(1)
Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0042AB
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 11 of 19)
Revision 12-A (01/03)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Start Low Pressure Safety A
X Injection Pump SIMPMP00001A Start Low Pressure Safety B
X Injection Pump SIMPMP0001B Start High Pressure Safety A
X Injection Pump SIMPMP0002A Start High Pressure Safety B
X Injection Pump SIMPMP0002B Start (9)
High Pressure Safety A/B X
X Injection Pump SIMPMP0002AB Open (10)
LPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1549A1 to Loop 1A (SI-615)
X SIMVAAA139B Open (10)
LPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1539B1 X
to Loop 1B (SI-625)
SIMVAAA138B Open (10)
LPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1541A2 to Loop 2A (SI-635)
X SIMVAAA139A Open (10)
LPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1543B2 to Loop 2B (SI-645)
X SIMVAAA138A Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1550A1 to Loop 1A (SI-617)
X SIMVAAA225A
¨(DRN 02-1017, R12)
Close LPSI Header Auto Vent SI-ISV-6011 X
Isolation Valve Close LPSI Header Auto Vent SI-ISV-6012 X
Isolation Valve (DRN 02-1017, R12)
¨(DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
Close LPSI A to RC Loop 2B Upstr SI ISV 14023A X
Auto Vent Containment Isolation Close LPSI A to RC Loop 2B Upstr SI ISV 14024A X
Auto Vent Auto Isolation (DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 12 of 19) Revision 10 (10/99)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1546A2 to Loop 1B (SI-627)
X SIMVAAA226A Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1547B3 to Loop 2A (SI-636)
X SIMVAAA227B Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1548A4 to Loop 2B (SI-647)
X SIMVAAA228A Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1540B2 to Loop 1B (SI-626)
X SIMVAAA226B Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1542A3 to Loop 2A (SI-637)
X SIMVAAA227A Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1544B4 to Loop 2B (SI-646)
X SIMVAAA228B Open (10)
HPSI Flow Control Valve 2SI-V1545B1 to Loop 1A (SI-616)
X SIMVAAA225B Open (10)
S I Tank 1A Isolation 1SI-V1505TK1A Valve (SI-614)
X SIMVAAA331A
Close S I Tank 1A Leakage 1SI-F1551TK1A X
Drain Valve (SI-618)
SIMVAAA303A Open (10)
S I Tank 1B Isolation 1SI-V1506TK1B X
Valve (SI-624)
SIMVAAA331B
Close S I Tank 1B Leakage 1SI-F1552TK1B X
Drain Valve (SI-628)
SIMVAAA303B
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 13 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Open (10)
S I Tank 2A Isolation 1SI-V1507TK2A X
Valve (SI-634)
SIMVAAA332A Close S I Tank 2A Leakage 1SI-F1553TK2A X
Drain Valve (SI-638)
SIMVAAA304A Open (10)
S I Tank 2B Isolation 1SI-V1508TK2B X
Valve (SI-644)
SIMVAAA332B Close S I Tank 2B Leakage 1SI-F1554TK2B X
Drain Valve (SI-648)
SIMVAAA304B Close RCS Loop 1 Hot Leg 1SI-V2504 X
Inj. Drain Valve (SI-301)
SIMVAAA301 Open Refueling Water 2SI-L103A X
Storage Pool SIMVAAA106A Outlet Valve Open Refueling Water 2SI-L104B X
Storage Pool SIMVAAA106B Outlet Valve Open SG No. 2 Emerg.
2FW-V853A (1)
Permissive FW Control VA EFWMVAAA224B Open SG No. 1 Emerg.
2FW-V852A (1)
Permissive FW Control VA EFWMVAAA223A Open SG No. 2 Emerg.
2FW-V854B (1)
Permissive FW Control VA EEFWMVAAA223B Open SG No. 1 Emerg.
2FW-V851B (1)
Permissive FW Control VA EFWMVAAA224A Close RCS Loop 2 Hot Leg Injection 1SI-V2505 X
Drain VA (SI-302)
SIMVAAA302
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 14 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Start Diesel Generator A
X EGEGEN0001A Start Diesel Generator B
X EGEGEN0001B Start Charging Pump A
X CVCMPMP0001A Start Charging Pump B
X CVCMPMP0001B Start (9)
Charging Pump AB X
X CVCMPMP0001AB Start Boric Acid Make-up Pump A
X BAMMPMP0001A Start Diesel Generator A Sequence A
X Loading Start Diesel Generator B Sequence B
X Loading Start Boric Acid Make-up Pump B
X BAMMPMP0001B Open (10)
Boric Acid Tank A Gravity Feed 3CH-V106A X
Valve to Charging Pumps (CH-509)
BAMMVAAA113A Open (10)
Boric Acid Tank B Gravity 3CH-V107B X
Feed Valve to Charging Pumps (CH-508)
BAMMVAAA113B Close Boric Acid Pump A Recirc Line 3CH-F170A X
Valve (CH-510)
BAMMVAAA126A Close Boric Acid Pump B Recirc Line 3CH-F171B X
Valve (CH-511)
BAMMVAAA126B Open (10)
Reactor Make-up Bypass Valve 3CH-V112AB(CH-514) X
BAMMVAAA133
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 15 of 19) Revision 10 (10/99)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Close Reactor Make-up Stop Valve 3CH-F117AB(CH-512) X CVCMVAAA510 Close Letdown Control Valve 1CH-F2501A/B X
(CH-516)
CVCMVAAA103 Close Letdown Stop Valve 1CH-F1516A/B(CH-515)X CVCMVAAA101 Close (10)
VCT Discharge Valve 2CH-V123A/B(CH-501)
X
Trip Diesel Generator A EG-EBKR3A-14X Permissive Output Breaker Trip Diesel Generator B EG-EBKR3B-15 X
Permissive Output Breaker Start Component Cooling Water Pump A
X CCMPMP0001A Start Component Cooling Water Pump B
X CCMPMP0001B Start (9)
Component Cooling Water Pump A/B X
X CCMPMP0001AB Open CCW Outlet Valve from 3CC-F131B X
Shutdown HX B CCMVAAA963B Start Aux Component Cooling Water Pump A
X ACCMPMP0001A Start Aux Component Cooling Water Pump B
X ACCMPMP0001B Close CCW Pump A Discharge Header 3CC-F109A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA126A Close CCW Pump A Discharge Header 3CC-RF110A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA127A
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 16 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close CCW Pump B Discharge Header 3CC-F112A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA126B Close CCW Pump B Discharge Header 3CC-F111A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA127B Close CCW Pump A Suction Header 3CC-F113A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA114A Block Instrument Air Compressor A
X Auto Operation IAMCMP0001A Block Instrument Air Compressor B
X Auto Operation IAMCMP0001B Close CCW Pump A Suction Header 3CC-F114A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA115A Close CCW Pump B Suction Header 3CC-F116A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA114B Close CCW Pump B Suction Header 3CC-F115A/B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA115B Trip &
Station Service Transformer SSD-EBKR-3A-8 X
Block Auto Close 3A32 FDR BRKR Trip &
Station Service Transformer SSD-EBKR-3B-9 X
Block Auto Close 3B32 FDR BRKR Close CCW Train B Supply to NNS 3CC-F123B X
Isolation Valve CCMVAAA200B Close CCW Supply to NNS Isolation 3CC-F133A/B X
Valve CCMVAAA501 Close CCW Train B Return to CCW 3CC-F121B X
Pumps Common Suction Hdr CCMVAAA563 Isolation Valve Close CCW Return from NNS to CCW 3CC-F132A/B X
Pumps Common Suction Hdr CCMVAAA562
Isolation Valve
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 17 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Reset to CCW Heat Exchanger A 3CC-TM290A X
SIAS Temperature Control ACCMVAAA126A operational Valve mode Reset to CCW Heat Exchanger B 3CC-TM291B X
SIAS Temperature Control ACCMVAAA126B operational Valve mode Close Fuel Pool Temp 3CC-FM138A/B X
Control Valve CCMVAAA620 Close Letdown Temperature 3CC-TM169A/B (1)
(1)
Control Valve CCMVAAA636 Start Charging Pump AB Seal AB (1)
(1)
Lube Pump CVCMPMP0012AB Start Charging Pump A Seal A
(1)
Lube Pump CVCMPMP0012AB Start Charging Pump B Seal B
(1)
Lube Pump CVC MPMP00012B Close (10)
SIS Sump Isolation Valve 2SI-L101A X
SIMVAAA602A Close (10)
SIS Sump Isolation Valve 2SI-L102B X
SIMVAAA602B Start (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 (3ASA)
X CCSMFAN0003A Start (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 (3CSA)
X CCSMFAN0003C Start (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 (3BSB)
X CCSMFAN0003B Start (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 (3DSB)
X CCSMFAN0003D Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F154A1 X
(3CSA) CCW Inlet Containment CCMVAAA807A Isolation Valve Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F158A1 X
(3CSA) CCW Outlet Containment CCMVAAA823A Isolation Valve
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 18 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F155A2 X
(3DSB) CCW Inlet Containment CCMVAAA808A Isolation Valve Open Containment Fan Coolers 3CC-TM 148A X
System "A" CCW Flow Control Valve CCMVAAA835A Open Containment Fan Cooler Safety D-69 (SA)
X Discharge Damper CCSMVAAA102A Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F159A2 X
(3ASA) CCW Outlet Containment CCMVAAA822A Isolation Valve Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F156B1 X
(3DSB) CCW Inlet Containment CCMVAAA808B Isolation Valve Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F160B1 X
(3DSB) CCW Outlet Containment CCMVAAA822B Isolation Valve Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F157B2 X
(3BSB) CCW Inlet Containment CCMVAAA807B Isolation Valve Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler 3CC-TM 149B X
System "B" CCW Flow Control Valve CCMVAAA835B Open Containment Fan Cooler Safety D-70 (SB)
X Discharge Damper CCSMVAAA102B Open (8)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 2CC-F161B2 X
(3BSB) CCW Outlet Containment CCMVAAA823B Isolation Valve Open Diesel Generator A Room Exhaust LD-2(SA)
(1)
Fan E-28 (3A-SA) Intake Damper HVRMVAAA501A Auto Control Diesel Generator B Room Exhaust D-6(SB)
(1)
Fan E-28 (3B-SB) Pitch Rotor HVRMVAAA502B Open Diesel Generator B Room Exhaust D-7(SB)
(1)
Fan E-28 (3B-SB) Intake Damper HVRMVAAA501B Auto Control Diesel Generator A Room Exhaust D-6(SA)
(1)
Fan E-28 (3A-SA) Pitch Rotor HVRMVAAA502A
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-5 (Sheet 19 of 19) Revision 9 (12/97)
NOTES:
(1)
Auxiliary equipment actuated through interlock with primary equipment. No separate actuation is provided.
(2)
One selected fan is running during normal operation. On SIAS second fan is started (both fans running).
(3)
One selected fan is running during normal operation. On SIAS both fans are tripped and locked-out.
(4)
Neither fan is operated during normal operation. On SIAS both fans are started.
(5)
Operator shall manually open one of the two emergency outside Air Intake System (no individual contacts from SIAS required).
(6)
Selected number of water chillers are running during normal operation. On SIAS two water chillers shall receive start signal.
(7)
Non-safety units are actuated through isolated contacts during emergency operation (no individual contacts from SIAS).
(8)
Three selected fans are running at fast speed and their associated isolating CCW valves are open during normal operation. On SIAS all four fans shall run at low speed with all associated isolating CCW valves open.
(9)
Will start only if AB pump is selected for B pump and AB Bus aligned to B Bus or if AB pump is selected for A Pump and AB Bus aligned to A Bus.
(10)
Thermal overload contacts are bypassed on SIAS.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-6 Revision 9 (12/97)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON RAS Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Stop LPSI Pump A
X SI-MPMP0001A Stop LPSI Pump B
X SI-MPMP0001B Open-Alarm SIS Sump Outlet 2SI-L101A X
Valve to Recirc (SI-653)
SI-MVAAA602A Open-Alarm SIS Sump Outlet 2SI-L102B X
Valve to Recirc (SI-654)
Header B SI-MVAAA602B Close Refueling Water 2SI-L103A X
Permissive Storage Pool SI-MVAAA106A Outlet Valve Close Refueling Water 2SI-L104B X
Permissive Storage Pool SI-MVAAA106B Outlet Valve Overload Bypass Safety Injection Pumps "A" 2SI-V809A X
Only Min. Flow Isol. VA SIMVAAA121A Overload Bypass Safety Injection Pumps "A" 2SI-V810A X
Only Min. Flow Isol. VA SIMVAAA120A Overload Bypass Safety Injection Pumps "B" 2SI-V801B X
Only Min. Flow Isol. VA SIMVAAA121B Overload Bypass Safety Injection Pumps "B" 2SI-V802B X
Only Min. Flow Isol. VA SIMVAAA120B
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3.7 Revision 9 (12/97)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON CSAS
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Start Containment Spray Pump A
X
CS-MPMP0001A
Start Containment Spray Pump B
X
CS-MPMP0001B
Open Containment Spray Isol 2CS-F305A X
Valve CS-MVAAA125A
Open Containment Spray Isol 2CS-F306B X
Valve CS-MVAAA125B Fail to start Cont. Spray Pump A Alarm X
Fail to start Cont. Spray Pump B Alarm X
Close RCP Cooling Water 2CC-F146A/B X
Supply Cont Isol Valve CC-MVAAA641
Close RCP Cooling Water 2CC-F-243A/B X
Return Isol Valve CC-MVAAA710
Close RCP Cooling Water 2CC-F147A/B X
Return Isol Valve CC-MVAAA713
Close CCW Train A Return to 3CC-F120A X
CCW Pumps Common CC-MVAAA727
Suction Hdr Isolation Valve
Close CCW Train A Supply to 3CC-F122A X
NNS Isolation Valve CC-MVAAA200A
Open CCW Outlet Valve from 3CC-F130A X
Shutdown HX A CC-MVAAA963A Start Safeguard Pump Room A AH-2 (3A-SA)
(1)
Cooler HVRMAHU0034A Start Safeguard Pump Room A AH-2 (3C-SA)
(1)
Cooler HVRMAHU0036A Start Safeguard Pump Room B AH-2 (3B-SB)
(1)
Cooler HVRMAHU0034B Start Safeguard Pump Room B AH-2 (3D-SB)
(1)
Cooler HVRMAHU0036B
NOTES: (1)
Actuates through interlock with primary equipment.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 1 of 5)
Revision 12 (10/02)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON CIAS Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Trip Override Containment Atmos Release Sys S-3 (3A-SA)
X Permis.
Supply Fan CAR MFAN 0001A Trip Override Containment Atmos Release Sys E18 (3A-SA)
X Permis.
Exhaust Fan CAR MFAN 0002A Close (2)
Containment Atmos Release Sys 2HV-B167A (1)
Disch Valve CAR MVAAA 204A Close (2)
Containment Atmos Release Sys 2HV-F253A X
Suct Valve CAR MVAAA 201A Trip Override Containment Atmos Release Sys S-3 (3B-SB)
X Permis.
Supply Fan CAR MFAN 0001B Trip Override Containment Atmos Release E18 (3B-SB)
X Permis.
Sys Exh Fan CAR MFAN 0002B Close (2)
Containment Atmos Release 2HV-B168B (1)
Sys Disch Valve CAR MVAAA 204B Close (2)
Containment Atmos Release 2HV-F254B X
System Suct Valve CAR MVAAA 201B
¨(DRN 02-1017)
Close Containment Pressure 2HV-F228A X
Exhaust Valve CAR MVAAA 200B Close Containment Pressure 2HV-F229B X
Exhaust Valve CAR MVAAA 202B Close Letdown Control Valve 1CH-F2501A/B X
(CH-516)
CVC MVAAA 103
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 2 of 5) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Letdown Control Valve 2CH-F1518A/B X
(CH-523)
CVC MVAAA 109
Close RCP Bleed Off Cont Isol Valve 2CH-RF1512A/B X
(CH-505)
CVC MVAAA 401
Close RCP Bleed Off Cont Isol Valve 2CH-F1513A/B X
(CH-506)
RC MVAAA 606
Close Reactor Drain Tk Cont Isol Valve 2BM-F108A/B X
(BM-301)
BM MVAAA 109
Close Reactor Drain Tk Cont Isol Valve 2BM-F109A/B X
(BM-302)
BM MVAAA 110
Close Nitrogen Cont Isol Valve 2NG-F604 X
NG MVAAA 157
Close Waste Gas Cont Isol Valve 2WM-F157A/B X
(WM-320)
GWM MVAAA 104
Close Waste Gas Cont Isol Valve 2WM-F158A/B X
(WM-321)
GWM MVAAA 105
Close Cont Sump Pumps Isol Valve 2WM-F104A/B X
SP MVAAA 105
Close Cont Sump Pumps Isol Valve 2WM-F105A/B X
SP MVAAA 106
Close Coolant Sampling Containment 2SL-F1501A/B X
Isol Valve PSL MVAAA 105
Close Coolant Sampling Containment 2SL-F1504A/B X
Isol Valve PSL MVAAA 107
Close Pressurizer Surge Line Cont 2SL-F1502A/B X
Isol Valve PSL MVAAA 203
Close Pressurizer Surge Line Cont 2SL-F1505A/B X
Isol Valve PSL MVAAA 204
Close Pressurizer Stm Space Sampling 2SL-F1503A/B X
Cont Isol Valve PSL MVAAA 303
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 3 of 5) Revision 10 (10/99)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Close Pressurizer Stm Space Sampling 2SL-F1506A/B X
Cont Isol Valve PSL MVAAA 304 Close Steam Gen 1 Sampling Isol Valve 2SL-F601 X
SSL MVAAA 8004A Close Steam Gen 1 Sampling Isol Valve 2SL-F602 X
SSL MVAAA 8006A
Close Steam Gen 2 Sampling Isol Valve 2SL-F603 X
SSL MVAAA 8004B Close Steam Gen 2 Sampling Isol Valve 2SL-F604 X
SSL MVAAA 8006B Close Instr Air Containment Isol Valve 2IA-F601AB X
IA MVAAA 909 Close Fire Wtr Containment Isol Valve 2FP-F129 X
FP MVAAA 601B Close Fire Wtr Containment Isol Valve 2FP-F127 X
FP MVAAA 601A Close Steam Gen No. 1 Blowdown Cont 2BD-F603 X
Isol Valve BD MVAAA 102A Close Steam Gen No. 1 Blowdown Cont 2BD-F604 X
Isol Valve BD MVAAA 103A Close Steam Gen No. 2 Blowdown Cont 2BD-F605 X
Isol Valve BD MVAAA 102B Close Steam Gen No. 2 Blowdown Cont 2BD-F606 X
Isol Valve BD MVAAA 103B Close Stm Line 1 Upstream Normal 2MS-V670 X
Drain Valve MS MVAAA 120A Close Stm Line 1 Upstream Emerg 2MS-V671 X
Drain Valve MS MVAAA 119A Close Stm Line 2 Upstream Normal 2MS-V663 X
Drain Valve MS MVAAA 120B Close Stm Line 2 Upstream Emerg 2MS-V664 X
Drain Valve MS MVAAA 119B
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 4 of 5)
Revision 12-A (01/03)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Close Hydrogen Analyzer 2HA-E609A X
HRA ISV 0110A Close Supply & Return Line Valves 2HA-E608A X
HRA ISV 0109A Close 2HA-E610A X
HRA ISV 0126A Close 2HA-E629B X
HRA ISV 0110B Close 2HA-E628B X
HRA ISV 0109B Close 2HA-E630B X
HRA ISV 0126B Close Containment Purge 2HV-B151A X
Air Make-Up Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 103 Close Containment Purge 2HV-B150B X
Air Make-Up Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 102 Close Containment Purge 2HV-B152A X
Air Make-Up Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 104 Close Containment Purge 2HV-B155A X
Exhaust Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 205 Close Containment Purge 2HV-B154B X
Exhaust Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 204 Close Containment Purge 2HV-B153B X
Exhaust Isol Valve CAP MVAAA 203 Close SI Tank Drain to RWSP 2SI-F1561A/B X
Control Isol Valve (SI-682)
SIMVAAA343
¨(DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
Close LPSI A to RC Loop 2B Upstr SI ISV 14023A X
Auto Vent Containment Isolation Close LPSI A to RC Loop 2B Upstr SI ISV 14024A X
Auto Vent Auto Isolation (DRN 02-1400, R12-A)
Close Containment Atmosphere 2CA-E604B X
ARM ISV 0109 Close RAD Monitoring Cont 2CA-E605A X
ARM ISV 0110
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-8 (Sheet 5 of 5)
Revision 12-A (01/03)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B Close Isol Valves 2CA-E606A X
ARM ISV 0103
¨(DRN 00-531, R11-A;01-990, R11-B)
Close Containment Pressure 2HV-E633B X
Instrumentation CVR ISV 0400 Isolation Valve Close Containment Pressure 2HV-E634A X
Instrumentation CVR ISV 0401 Isolation Valve (DRN 00-531, R11-A;01-990, R11-B)
Close Letdown Temperature 3CC-TM 169A/B (1)
(1)
Control Valve CC MVAAA 636 Status Display QSPDS-2 X
NOTES:
(1)
Actuates through interlock with primary equipment.
(2)
Thermal Overload bypassed on CIAS.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-9 (Sheet 1 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON MSIS Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Steam Generator No. 1
Main Steam Isolation Valve 2MS-V602A X
X MS MVAAA 124A
Close Steam Generator No. 2
Main Steam Isolation Valve 2MS-V604B X
X MS MVAAA 124B
Close Steam Generator No. 1
Main Feedwater Isolation Valve 2FW-V823A X
X FW MVAAA 184A
Close Steam Generator No. 2
Main Feedwater Isolation Valve 2FW-V824B X
X FW MVAAA 184B
Close Steam Generator No. 1
Main Feedwater Control Valve 5FW-FM833 X
X FW MVAAA 173A
Close Steam Generator No. 1
Main Feedwater Control Bypass Valve 5FW-FM835 X
X FW MVAAA 166A
Close Steam Generator No. 2
Main Feedwater Control Valves 5FW-FM834 X
X FW MVAAA 173B
Close Steam Generator No. 2
Main Feedwater Control Bypass Valve 5FW-FM836 X
X FW MVAAA 166B
Close Main Steam Line 1 Sample 2MS-F714 X
Isolation Valve SSL MVAAA 301A
Close Main Steam Line 2 Sample 2MS-F715 X
Isolation Valve SSL MVAAA 301B
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V847B X
EFW MVAAA 229A
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V848A X
EFW MVAAA 228A
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-9 (Sheet 2 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V851B X
EFW MVAAA 224A
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-852A X
EFW MVAAA 223A
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V849A X
EFW MVAAA 229B
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V850B X
EFW MVAAA 228B
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V853A X
EFW MVAA 224B
Close Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V854B X
EFW MVAAA 223B Status Display QSPDS-2 X
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-10 (Sheet 1 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)
COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON EFAS Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Starts Emergency Feedwater Pump A EFW MPMP 0001A X
Starts Emergency Feedwater Pump B EFW MPMP 0001B X
Open Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine 2MS-V611A X
STM Shut Off Valve MS MVAAA 401A
Override Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine 2MS-V611A X
Permissive STM Shut Off Valve MS MVAAA 401A
Open Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine 2MS-V612B X
STM Shut Off Valve MS MVAAA 401B
Override Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine 2MS-V612B X
Permissive STM Shut Off Valve MS MVAAA 401B
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V847B X
EFW MVAAA 229A
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V848A X
EFW MVAAA 228A
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V851B X
EFW MVAAA 224A
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #1 2FW-V852A X
EFW MVAAA 223A
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V849A X
EFW MVAAA 229B
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V850B X
EFW MVAAA 228B
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V853A X
EFW MVAAA 224B
Open Emergency Feedwater Valve to SG #2 2FW-V854B X
EFW MVAAA 223B
Close Steam Generator No. 1 Blowdown 2BD-F603 X
Containment Isolation Valve BD MVAAA 102A
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-10 (Sheet 2 of 2) Revision 9 (12/97)
Actuation Channel Action Component Tag Number A
B
Close Steam Generator No. 1 Blowdown 2BD-F604 X
Containment Isolation Valve BD MVAAA 103A
Close Steam Generator No. 2 Blowdown 2BD-F605 X
Containment Isolation Valve BD MVAAA 102B
Close Steam Generator No. 2 Blowdown 2BD-F606 X
Containment Isolation Valve BD MVAAA 103B Starts Emergency FW Pump A Cooler AH-17 (3A-SA)
(1)
HVR MAHU 0038A Starts Emergency FW Pump B Cooler AH-17 (3B-SB)
(1)
HVR MAHU 0038B NOTE:
(1)
Actuates through interlock with primary equipment.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-11 Revision 10 (10/99)
MONITORED VARIABLES REQUIRED FOR ESF SYSTEM PROTECTIVE ACTION System Variable Containment Isolation System Containment Spray System Recirculation System Main Steam Isolation System Safety Injection System Emergency Feedwater System Pressurizer Pressure Containment Pressure Steam Generator Pressure Refueling Water Storage Pool Level
Steam Generator Level
- Denotes monitored variable is required.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 7.3-12 DRAWING COMPARISON PSAR FSAR System Reference Function/Description Reference Function/Description Effect of Safety Safety Injection Figure 7.3-1 Block enable signal Figure 7.3-2 Bypass enable signal Bypass and block is derived from 2-is provided for each functions are out-of-4 low channel from a equivalent operating pressurizer pressure separate pressurize controls. There is signals.
pressure measurement no effect on safety.
channel.
Safety Injection, Figure 7.3-1 Only initiation logic Figures Selective 2-out-of-4 Provides more complete containment spray, is shown.
7.3-2, 7.3-3, actuation logic has information. The containment isolation, 7.3-4 been added, with 2 depicted system containment cooling actuation trains describes additional having manual improved safety actuation at features; e.g.;
equipment level.
manual actuation at equipment level, and remote manual actuation at system level.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.3-13 (Sheet 1 of 3)
Revision 14 (12/05)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
TABLE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.3-13 (Sheet 2 of 3)
Revision 14 (12/05)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
TABLE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Table 7.3-13 (Sheet 3 of 3)
Revision 14 (12/05)
(DRN 03-2061, R14)
TABLE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED
(DRN 03-2061, R14)