ML16152A300
| ML16152A300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon |
| Issue date: | 04/25/2016 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML16152A300 (52) | |
Text
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - RO Form ES-401-2 Facility Diablo Canyon Date of Exam:
April, 2016 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency &
Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
2 3
3 N/A 4
3 N/A 3
18 6
2 2
1 1
1 2
2 9
4 Tier Totals 4
4 4
5 5
5 27 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
3 2
3 2
2 2
2 3
3 3
3 28 5
2 1
1 1
1 0
1 2
1 1
1 0
10 3
Tier Totals 4
3 4
3 2
3 4
4 4
4 3
38 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1
2 3
4 10 1
2 3
4 7
3 3
2 2
Note:
- 1.
Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 X
G2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
4.2
- 39.
000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X
EA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity 3.8
- 40.
000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X
EA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: ESF actuation system in manual 4.4
- 41.
000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X
AK2.07 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: RCP seals 2.9
- 42.
000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X
AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Relationship of charging flow to pressure differential between charging and RCS 2.7
- 43.
000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X
AK2.05 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: Reactor building sump 2.6
- 44.
000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X
AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Effect on the CCW flow header of a loss of CCW 3.5
- 45.
000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X
AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction 3.7
- 46.
000029 ATWS / 1 X
EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a ATWS: Operating switch for charging pump recirculation valve 3.4
- 47.
000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X
G2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.
4.1
- 48.
000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)
Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 X
AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture:
Conditions requiring a reactor trip 4.6
- 49.
000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 L081 #49 X
AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): AFW controls, including the use of alternate AFW sources 4.5
- 50.
000055 Station Blackout / 6 X
EK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout : Natural circulation cooling 4.1
- 51.
000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X
AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus 4.1
- 52.
000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X
AA1.02 Aility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:
Static inverter dc input breaker, frequency meter, ac output breaker, and ground fault detector 3.1
- 53.
000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X
EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:
Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
3.5
- 54.
W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 X
EA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation). Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.
3.4
- 55.
BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X
G2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.
3.3
- 56.
000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals:
2 3
3 4
3 3
Group Point Total:
18
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.
3.7
- 57.
000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X
AA2.09 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Charging and letdown flow capacities 2.9
- 58.
000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X
E06: Degraded core cooling, EK3.3Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to degraded core cooling: Manipulation of controls required to obtain the desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.
4.0
- 59.
000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X
AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Location or process point that is causing an alarm 2.7
- 60.
W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X
E02 SI termination: EK2.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between SI termination and the following: Facilitys heat removal systems, incl primary coolant, emergency coolant, decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
3.5
- 61.
W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X
EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure). Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Steam Generator Overpressure).
3.0
- 62.
W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 Bank P-85720 X
EK1.2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Containment Flooding):
Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures associated with containment flooding.
2.7
- 63.
W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X G2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.
3.8
- 64.
BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X
AA1.2 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling). Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.
3.2
- 65.
CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals:
2 1
1 1
2 2
9
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X
A3.05 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCPS, including:
RCP lube oil and bearing lift pumps 2.7
- 1.
004 Chemical and Volume Control X
A1.06 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: VCT level 3.0
- 2.
005 Residual Heat Removal X
X K1.12 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: Safeguard pumps 3.1
- 3.
K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RHRS: RHR heat exchanger 2.5
- 4.
006 Emergency Core Cooling X
X A3.08 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:
Automatic transfer of ECCS flowpaths 4.2
- 5.
A4.08 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
ESF system, including reset 4.2
- 6.
007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X
G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
4.6
- 7.
008 Component Cooling Water X
K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following: Loads cooled by CCWS 3.4
- 8.
010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Spray valve failures 3.9
- 9.
012 Reactor Protection X
K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the RPS: DNB 3.3
- 10.
013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
X K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS: Sensors and detectors 2.7
- 11.
A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Reset of ESFAS channels 4.3
- 12.
022 Containment Cooling X
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and the following systems: SWS/cooling system 3.5
- 13.
025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray X
X K4.06 Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Iodine scavenging via the CSS 2.8
- 14.
G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
4.0
- 15.
039 Main and Reheat Steam - steam dump?
X K1.04 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems: RCS temperature monitoring and control 3.1
- 16.
059 Main Feedwater X
A1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems: Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves 2.7
- 17.
061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X
X K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the AFW:
Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer 3.6
- 18.
A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW, including:
Automatic AFW isolation 4.1
- 19.
062 AC Electrical Distribution X
A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Methods for energizing a dead bus 2.9
- 20.
063 DC Electrical Distribution X
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Major DC loads 2.9
- 21.
064 Emergency Diesel Generator X
X A2.16 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of offsite power during full-load testing of ED/G 3.3
- 22.
A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Transfer ED/G (with load) to grid 3.4
- 23.
073 Process Radiation Monitoring X
K3.01 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRM system will have on the following:
Radioactive effluent releases 3.6
- 24.
076 Service Water X
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Service water 2.7
- 25.
078 Instrument Air X
K4.01 Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Manual/automatic transfers of control 2.7
- 26.
103 Containment X
X K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following: Loss of containment integrity under refueling operations 3.7
- 27.
G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.
3.8
- 28.
K/A Category Point Totals:
3 2
3 2
2 2
2 3
3 3
3 Group Point Total:
28
ES-401 5
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 001 Control Rod Drive X
A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CRDS, including: Rod height 3.7
- 29.
002 Reactor Coolant X
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of forced circulation 4.1
- 30.
011 Pressurizer Level Control X
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Transfer of PZR LCS from automatic to manual control 3.2
- 31.
014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X
K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: Discriminator/compensation circuits 2.6
- 32.
016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X
K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ITM system will have on the following: Natural circulation indications 3.5
- 33.
027 Containment Iodine Removal X
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Fans 3.1
- 34.
028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control X
A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls including:
Containment pressure 3.4
- 35.
029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator X
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the S/GS and the following systems: MFW/AFW systems 4.2
- 36.
041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal
072 Area Radiation Monitoring X
A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ARM system controls including: Radiation levels 3.4
- 37.
075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air X
K4.01 Knowledge of SAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Cross-connect with IAS 2.9
- 38.
086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals:
1 1
1 1
0 1
2 1
1 1
0 Group Point Total:
10
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:
Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR
- 1.
Conduct of Operations 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.
2.9 66 2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.
3.9 67 2.1.29 Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc.
4.1 68 2.1.
2.1.
2.1.
- 2.
Equipment Control 2.2.3 Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units.
3.8 69 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
3.7 70 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
4.0 71 2.2.
2.2.
2.2.
- 3.
Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
3.2 72 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc 3.2 73
- 4.
Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
4.5 74 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.
3.7 75 2.4.
Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - SRO Form ES-401-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam:
April, 2016 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency &
Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
N/A N/A 18 3
3 6
2 9
2 2
4 Tier Totals 27 5
5 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
28 3
2 5
2 10 1
1 1
3 Tier Totals 38 5
3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1
2 3
4 10 1
2 3
4 7
2 2
1 2
Note:
- 1.
Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X
G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
4.7 76 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X
AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The length of time after the loss of CCW flow to a component before that component may be damaged 3.1 77 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 X
G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
4.2 78 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)
Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X
AA2.20 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Interlocks in effect on loss of ac vital electrical instrument bus that must be bypassed to restore normal equipment operation 3.9 79 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X
G2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.
4.4 80
W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 X
EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
4.2 81 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals:
3 3
Group Point Total:
6
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X
AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Availability of BWST (RWST) 4.2 82 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X AA2.02 Occurrence of a fuel handling incident 4.1 83 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X
G2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.
4.4 84 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X G2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
4.6 85 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery
K/A Category Point Totals:
2 2
Group Point Total:
4
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal X
G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
4.2 86 006 Emergency Core Cooling X
A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Water hammer 3.5 87 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water X
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
High/low surge tank level 3.5 88 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection X
G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
4.7 89 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution X
A2.11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Aligning standby equipment with correct emergency power source (D/G) 4.1 90
063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals:
3 2
Group Point Total:
5
ES-401 5
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G
K/A Topic(s)
IR 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X G2.2.23 Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations.
4.6 91 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ;
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level 3.5 92 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X
A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Fuel Handling System controls including: Load limits 3.2 93 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection
K/A Category Point Totals:
1 1
1 Group Point Total:
3
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:
Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR
- 1.
Conduct of Operations 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices.
3.9 94 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.
3.9 95 2.1.
2.1.
2.1.
2.1.
- 2.
Equipment Control 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests.
3.6 96 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
4.1 97 2.2.
2.2.
2.2.
2.2.
- 3.
Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
3.7 98 2.3.12 2.3.
2.3.
2.3.
2.3.
- 4.
Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.5 Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.
4.3 99 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
4.2 100 2.4.
Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 7
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection RO T2/G1 073 K5.03 Verbiage and importance matched K3.01 - wrote question to K3.01 Updated ES-401-2 SRO T2/G1 062 A2.03 Randomly selected to replace A2.03. 062 A2.03 is very nearly the same as the KA for APE 057 AA2.20 (question
- 79) and RO knowledge.
Randomly replaced with A2.11 - Aligning standby equipment with correct power source (D/G)
SRO T3/G3 2.3.5 randomly replaced with 2.2.12.
2.3.5 is RO knowledge Updated ES-401-2
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L141 Administrative Topic (See Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (NRCL141-A1)
M, R Calculate Rod Hold Points 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.
(3.9)
(modified from NRCL091-A1)
Conduct of Operations (NRCL141-A2)
M, R Determine Spent Fuel Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operations.
(4.3)
(modified from NRCADM061C-A1)
Equipment Control (NRCL141-A3)
M, R Verify Clearance Points and Tagging Requirements 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.
(4.1)
(modified from NRCL061-EC-SRO)
Radiation Control (NRCL141-A4)
N, R Determine Refueling Cavity Volume Available for Mode 6 SI Pump Test 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
(3.4)
(New)
Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)
ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: rev follows initial submittal
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L141 Administrative Topic (See Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (NRCL141-A5)
M, R Verify Calculation of Rod Hold Points 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.
(4.2)
(modified from NRCL091-A5)
Conduct of Operations (NRCL141-A6)
M, R Review Determination of Spent Fuel Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operations.
(4.4)
(modified from NRCADM061C-A1)
Equipment Control (NRCL141-A7)
M, R Verify Clearance Points and Tagging Requirements 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.
(4.3)
(modified from NRCL061-EC-SRO)
Radiation Control (NRCL141-A8)
M, R Authorize Gas Decay Tank Discharge 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.
(3.8)
(from NRCADM061-RC-SRO)
Emergency Procedures/Plan (NRCL141-A9)
N, R Manual Preparation of Emergency Notification Form 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.
(4.5)
(New)
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)
ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: rev follows initial submittal
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075)
A,M,S 1
- d. (S4) (074.EA2.02) Restore Temporary Core Cooling During ICC Event A,L,N,S 4P
- e. (S5) (076.A2.02) Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low Pressure N,S 4S
- f. (S6) (062.A4.07) Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Start-Up Power A,L,N,S 6
- g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051)
D,S 7
- h. (S8) (008.A2.04) Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW High Radiation N,S 8
In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. (P1) (013.G2.1.13) De-Energize SSPS to Block Safety Injection (LJP-095)
D,E,L 2
- j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A)
D,E,L,R 4S
- k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Perform Local Start of a Diesel Generator (LJP-003A)
A,D,E,L 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3
< 9 / < 8 / < 4
> 1 / > 1 / > 1
- / -
/ > 1 (control room system
> 1 / > 1 / > 1
> 2 / > 2 / > 1
< 3 /
< 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)
> 1 / > 1 / > 1 ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: Initial Submittal
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075)
A,M,S 1
- d. (S4) (074.EA2.02) Restore Temporary Core Cooling During ICC Event A,L,N,S 4P
- e.
- f. (S6) (062.A4.07) Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Start-Up Power A,L,N,S 6
- g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051)
D,S 7
- h. (S8) (008.A2.04) Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW High Radiation N,S 8
In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. (P1) (013.G2.1.13) De-Energize SSPS to Block Safety Injection (LJP-095)
D,E,L 2
- j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A)
D,E,L,R 4S
- k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Perform Local Start of a Diesel Generator (LJP-003A)
A,D,E,L 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3
< 9 / < 8 / < 4
> 1 / > 1 / > 1
- / -
/ > 1 (control room system
> 1 / > 1 / > 1
> 2 / > 2 / > 1
< 3 /
< 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)
> 1 / > 1 / > 1 ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: Initial Submittal
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075)
A,M,S 1
- c.
- d.
- e.
- g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051)
D,S 7
- g.
- h.
In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i.
- j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A)
D,E,L,R 4S
- k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Perform Local Start of a Diesel Generator (LJP-003A)
A,D,E,L 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3
< 9 / < 8 / < 4
> 1 / > 1 / > 1
- / -
/ > 1 (control room system
> 1 / > 1 / > 1
> 2 / > 2 / > 1
< 3 /
< 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)
> 1 / > 1 / > 1 ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: Initial Submittal
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 1 (U2, R3, R4)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1
2(U2,R4,R3) 3 4(U2,R3,R4)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 4
1 1
1 0
NOR 2*
1 1
1 1
I/C
- ,3,4,5 2,3,4 6
4 4
2 MAJ 6
5,8 3
2 2
1 TS 2,5 3,4 4
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 4
1 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 2
1 1
1 I/C 2,4,5,7,8 2
6 4
4 2
MAJ 6
5,8 3
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 4
4 2
1 1
0 NOR 1
1 2
1 1
1 I/C 3,5 2,3,6,7 6 4
4 2
MAJ 6
5,8 3
2 2
1 TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions:
- 1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp1 rev 0.doc
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 2 (I3, I4, R6)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1(I3,R6,I4) 2 3(I3,I4,R6) 4(I4,I3,R6)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 4
3 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 2
9 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 2,5 2,3 4
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
4 2
1 1
0 NOR 3*
1 1
1 1
I/C
- ,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 2,3,4 10 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 3,4 2
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 4
3 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 2,6 2,4,5,7,8 2,3,6,7 11 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions:
1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp2 rev 0
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 3 (I5, I6, R7)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1(I5,R7,I6) 2 3(I5,I6,R7) 4(I6,I5,R7)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 4
3 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 2
9 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 2,5 2,3 4
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
4 2
1 1
0 NOR 3*
1 1
1 1
I/C
- ,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 2,3,4 10 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 3,4 2
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 4
3 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 2,6 2,4,5,7,8 2,3,6,7 11 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions:
1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp3 rev 0
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 4 (U1, R1, R2)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1(U1,R2,R1) 2 3(U1,R1,R2) 4 T
O T
A L
M I
N I
M U
M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 2
1 1
0 NOR 3*
1 1
1 1
I/C
- ,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 7 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 2
2 2
1 TS 2,5 2,3 4
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 1
1 0
NOR 3*
1 1
1 1
I/C
- ,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 7 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 2
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 2
1 1
0 NOR 2*
1 1
1 1
I/C 2,6
- ,4,5,7,8 6 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 2
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions:
- 1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp4 rev 0.doc
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 5 (I1, I2, R5)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1(I1,R5,I2) 2 3(I1,I2,R5) 4(I2,I1,R5)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 4
3 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 2
9 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 2,5 2,3 4
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
4 2
1 1
0 NOR 3*
1 1
1 1
I/C
- ,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 2,3,4 10 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 3,4 2
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 4
3 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 2,6 2,4,5,7,8 2,3,6,7 11 4
4 2
MAJ 7
6 5,8 4
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions:
1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp5 rev 0
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group x (Un, In, Rn, Rn)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2015 Operating Test Number: L141 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 5 (Spare)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 2,3,4,5 4
4 2
MAJ 6,7 2
2 1
TS 2,3 0
2 2
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 4
1 1
0 NOR 1
1 1
1 I/C 2,8 4
4 2
MAJ 6,7 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
1 I/C 3,4,5,9 4
4 2
MAJ 7
2 2
1 TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions:
- 1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-Spare(S5) rev 0
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam01r0.docx Page1of32 Rev0
Facility:
DiabloCanyon(PWR)
ScenarioNo:
1
OpTestNo:
L141NRC
Examiners:
Operators:
InitialConditions:
2%withMFWinservice,alignedtoStartUpPower,MOL,1430ppmboron
Turnover:
InOPL3,performingstep6.29,raisingpowerto8%.
Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
Raisereactorpowerfrom2%to8%OPL3,sec6.29.
2 MAL_NIS3B11.0ramp0 SRO IntermediaterangedetectorNI36failslow@3.0%.(AP5, TS3.3.1.F)(UsedforSROTS/ECGOnly).
3 CNV_MFW9_20.0ramp120 delIACNV_MFW9_22cd=NOT FTDFCV1510_AUTO C(BOP, SRO)
FeedRegBypassValveFCV1510failsclosedinAUTO,butcan becontrolledmanually(PK0915).
4 XMT_CVC19_3ramp60 I(ATC, SRO)
VCTlevelLT112failslowcausingcontinuousmakeup;is stoppedmanually(AP19).
5 MAL_EPS4E_2DIFFERENTIAL C(BOP, SRO)
Lossof4kVVitalBusH(difftrip);alternateequipmentis placedinservice,andTechSpecsimplemented(AP27,TS 3.4.11.C,3.8.1.B,3.8.4.A).
6 MAL_RCP1A15ramp60 XMT_RCP17_3228 XMT_RCP18_3208 (bthrmp180,delay300)
C(ALL)
RCP11#1sealleakrampsinover1minutefollowedbyrisein sealleakoffandbearingtemperatures.SROdirectsRxTrip andtrippingofRCP11.(AP28) 7 MAL_EPS5C_2DIFFERENTIAL cd=H_V2_260G_1 MAL_DEG1B_2NO_RESETcd=
H_V4_220R_1 MAL_DEG2C_1cd=
H_V4_224R_1 M(ALL)
LossofAllAC.Lossofnonvitalbuses(12kVand4kV)dueto12 kVS/UBusdifferentialtrip.D/G12failstostartduetoSDR activation.D/G13lostonfuelfailure.(CT24,CT27)(see summarypage).
8 VLV_AFW7_2 delIAVLV_AFW7_22 cd=V3_219S_3 C(BOP)
TurbinedrivenAFWfailstoautostartduetoFCV95failingto openinauto;manualstartrequired.
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam01r0.docx Page2of32 Rev0
TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)
ActualAttributes
- 1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7
- 2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Event8) 1
- 3. Abnormalevents(2-4)(Events3,4,5,6) 4
- 4. Majortransients(12)(Event7) 1
- 5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E0.1) 1
- 6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2)(ECA0.0,0.1) 2
- 7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(SeeScenarioSummary) 2
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam01r0.docx Page3of32 Rev0 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
-NRC#1
1.
Controlrodsareusedtoraisepowerfrom2%to8%OPL3,SecondaryPlantStartup,step6.29.
2.
IntermediaterangedetectorNI36failslow@3.0%.TheATCoperatoridentifiessingleintermediate rangedetectorloweringwithnootherindicationscorroborateapowerdecrease.SFMdirectspower ascensionplacedonhold.OPAP5,MalfunctionofEagle21ProtectionorControlChannelisreferenced andTS3.3.1.F,OneIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperableaddressed.
3.
FeedRegBypassvalveFCV1510slowlyfailsclosedinAUTO,causingS/G11leveltolower.Crew respondstoPK0915,DigitalFeedwaterContSystem,takingmanualcontrolofthefailedvalve.May refertoTS3.7.3forMFRVbypassvalves,butLCOisnotapplicable.
4.
VolumeControlTank(VCT)levelchannelLT112failslow,resultinginacontinuous(anderroneous) makeupsignal.ThecrewdiagnosesthelevelchannelfailurebycomparingotherVCTparameters,and byusingOPAP19,MalfunctionoftheReactorMakeupControlSystem.Themakeupsystemissecured bytakingthemakeupcontrollertomanual.
5.
4kVbusHtripsondifferential.OPAP27,LossofVital4kVand/or480VBusisusedtostabilizeand respondtothelossofthebus,andplaceredundantequipmentinservice.ApplicableshortactionsTech Specsareaddressed:TS3.4.11.CPressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves;3.8.1.BACSources OperatingforD/G11;3.8.4.ADCSources.
6.
RCP11sealleakrampsinover1minuteresultinginhighsealreturnflow.CrewrespondstoARPK05 01,RCPNO11forsealleakoffflowgreaterthan5.0gpmandtransitionstoOPAP28,SectionB,RCP Number1SealFailure.Whensealleakoffandradialoutbearingtemperaturesbegintorise,SFMdirects RxTripandsubsequenttrippingofRCP11.
7.
CrewentersE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection,andtransitionsintoE0.1,ReactorTripResponseto stabilizetheplant.Duringstabilizationactivities,adifferentialtripon12kVStartupbuscausesalossof nonvitalpower(12kVand4kV).D/G12failstostartduetoSDRactivationandD/G13islostonfuel failure,resultinginalossofallACcondition.
8.
CrewtransitionstoECA0.0,LossofAllVitalACPower.ActionsaretakentoisolatepotentialRCSleak paths,includingRCPsealcooling(CT27,IsolateRCPSealInjectionpriortorestartingachargingpump duringsubsequentrecoveryactions),whileidentifyingavailableoptionsforpowerrestoration.The turbinedrivenAFWpump(TDAFP)failstoautostartandmustbemanuallystartedtorestoreAFWflow totheS/Gs.
500kVisavailableandcrewwillbackfeedtheunittorestorepower(CT24,EnergizeatleastoneAC EmergencyBuspriortoexitingECA0.0),eventuallyrestoringRCSinventorycontrol(partofTCOA),
usingEOPECA0.0andECA0.1.
ScenarioincludesTCOAtobackfeedtheunit,isolateRCPsealcooling,andrestoreinventorycontrol within54minutes(oflossofallAC).***
ThescenarioisterminatedonceCCPisrestartedinECA0.1,LossofAllACPowerRecoverWithoutSIRequired.
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam01r0.docx Page4of32 Rev0
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam02r0.docx Page1of33 Rev0
Facility:
DiabloCanyon(PWR)
ScenarioNo:
2
OpTestNo:
L141NRC
Examiners:
Operators:
InitialConditions:
50%MOL1850ppmboron;BusFweek:AFW13andD/G13OOS
Turnover:
Chemistryrequests120gpmLetdowninserviceforminorcrudburstcleanup.
Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
Crewplaces120gpmletdowninserviceincludingstartingof 2ndCCPperOPB1A:XII,Section6.3.
2 XMT_RMS11_31000000.0 I(BOP, SRO)
RM12failshigh.Leakdetectionsystemisplacedinservice (PK1121,TS3.4.15.C).
3 MAL_CVC8A100.0ramp=30 C(ATC, SRO)
SealInjectionFilter11plugscausingreductionincharging flowtoRCPseals.(PK0422) 4 MAL_GEN4_2 R(ATC)
FullLoadRejectionfrom50%power;crewstabilizespower between2030%power(AP2).
5 PMP_CVC7_4 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL C(ALL)
BATP12tripsduringboration.Borationisplacedonholdand BATP11placedinservice(PK0511,PK1722,ECG8.4.A).
6 MAL_MSS3A4500000.0 ramp=240 M(ALL)
SteamlinebreakoutsidecontainmentonS/G11,upstreamof theMSIVsresultinginaRxTripandSI.S/G11mustbe isolated(CT17)(seesummarypage).
7 MAL_PPL5A3 MAL_PPL5B3 C(BOP)
Auto/manreactortripfailsrequiringmanualopeningof13D/E breakers(CT1)(seesummarypage).
8 MAL_PPL1AFAILURE_TO_INIT MAL_SYS2cd='fnispr_1lt5 ramp=2 C(BOP)
TrainAPhaseAfailstoactuateontheSI,requiringmanual alignment.LossofStartupimmediatelyfollowingRxTrip resultsinlosspowertotheRCPs.BlowdownofthefaultedS/G eventuallydrivesthecrewintoFRP.1andthecriticaltaskofSI termination(CT48)(seesummarypage).
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam02r0.docx Page2of33 Rev0 TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)
ActualAttributes
- 1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7
- 2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events7,8) 2
- 3. Abnormalevents(2-4)(Events2,3,4,5) 4
- 4. Majortransients(12)(Event6) 1
- 5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E2) 1
- 6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2)(FRP.1) 1
- 7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(SeeScenarioSummary) 3
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam02r0.docx Page3of33 Rev0 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
-NRC#2
1.
(NormalEvolution)Crewplaces120gpmletdowninserviceperOPB1A:XII,section6.3(forRCS cleanup) 2.
RM12(containmentgaseousradiationmonitor)failshighandcrewrespondsusingguidanceofAR PK1121,HighRadiationwhichcallsforCFCUDrainCollectionSystemtobeplacedinservice.Shift ForemanentersTS3.4.15.C,RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation.
3.
InserviceSealInjectionFilter11plugs,reducingflowtoRCPsealsandbringinginARPK0422,RCPSeal InjFltrDeltaPHi.ATCoperatorthrottlesRCPsealinjectionhandcontrolvalve,HCV142,asneededto maintainpressurizerlevelanddirectsfieldoperatortoswapsealinjectionfilters.
4.
AnunderfrequencyconditiononthegridresultsinafullloadrejectiononUnit1from50%power.OP AP2,FullLoadRejectionisimplementedtostabilizetheplantonsteamdumpsbetween2030%power.
5.
BoricAcidtransferpp12tripsduringboration.CrewrespondsperARPK0511,CVCSMAKEUP DEVIATIONandARPK1722, 480VBUS1G.CrewsalignsblendertoBATP11,andcontinuesborationas needed.ShiftForemanentersECG8.4.A,ReactivityControlSystems-FlowPaths-Operating.
6.
AsteamlinebreakoutsidecontainmentonS/G11,upstreamoftheMSIVsresultsinaRxTripandSafety Injection***.ThecrewwilladdressthecriticaltaskofisolatingS/G11perEOPE2,FaultedSteam GeneratorIsolation(CT17,IsolatetheFaultedSteamGeneratorbeforetransitionoutofE2).
7.
OntheSafetyInjection,RxTripdoesnotautomaticallyactuate(ATWS).ManualRxTripswitchesare ineffectiveaswell,requiringthecrewtomanualopenbreakers13D/EperEOPE0,ReactorTripor SafetyInjection.(CT1,Manuallytripthereactorfromthecontrolroombeforeemergencyborationis required).
8.
TrainAofPhaseAContainmentIsolationfails,requiringmanualalignmentaspartofEOPE0,Reactor TriporSafetyInjection,AppendixE(ESFAutoActions,Secondary,andAuxiliariesStatus).
LossofStartupimmediatelyfollowingRxTripresultsinlossofpowertotheRCPs,whichcombineswith thebreakflowcooldown,eventuallydrivingcrewintoEOPFRP.1,ResponsetoImminentPressurized ThermalShockCondition,andthecriticaltaskofSItermination(CT48,TerminateECCSflowsothat RCSpressureandtemperaturearecontrolledbeforetheendofthescenario).
ThescenarioisterminatedonceSafetyInjectionisterminatedinFRP.1,ResponsetoImminentPressurized ThermalShockCondition(completionofstep11).
- CT/TCOAnote:SteambreakwasevaluatedagainstTimeCriticalOperatorActions(TCOAs)#18&19(MSLBIC&OC);thebreaksizes, ramptimes,initialpowerlevels,andotherconditionsdiffersignificantlyfromtheconditionsusedinthisscenario.Forthesereasons, theS/Gisolationwillremaincritical(acriticaltask,perWOG),butnoTCOAtimelimitsareappliedtothisscenario.
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam03r0.docx Page1of36 Rev0
Facility:
DiabloCanyon(PWR)
ScenarioNo:
3
OpTestNo:
L141NRC
Examiners:
Operators:
InitialConditions:
100%MOL1004ppmboron;AFW13andD/G13OOS
Turnover:
PerformpartialSTPIIC.
Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A R(ALL)
CallfromGridControlCenterforUnit1backdownorderto shed100MWwithin20minutesdueto500kVlinefirerisk (AP25) 2 PMP_ASW1_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL PMP_ASW2_1AS_IS delIAPMP_ASW2_12 C(BOP, SRO)
ASWPp11tripsonOC.ASWPp12failstostartinauto, andisstartedmanually(PK0103,AP10,TS3.7.8.A).
3 DSC_ROD1BREAKER_CLOSED C(ATC, SRO)
ThenormalDRPIpowersupplyfails.Rodsareplacedin manualuntiltransferredtobackuppower(PK0321,TS 3.1.7.B) 4 PMP_CND10OC_TRIP_DV_FAIL C(ALL)
Heater#2DripPumpovercurrenttrip.Programmedramp failstoautoinitiateandmustbeinitiatedmanually(AP15, AP25).
5 MAL_CVC10.12ramp=180 C(ALL) 35gpmletdownleakinsidecontainmentrampsinover3 minutes.Crewperformsdiagnosticsandaddressesleak.
(AP18) 6 ASISRWST1.9e6cd=jmlsei1delay=10 ramp=420 ZMLSEI1_F0.37 MAL_SEI10.37delay=1ramp=15 MAL_RCS2A100%_DBA M(ALL) Largeseismicresultsin100%DBALBLOCA.ReactorTripand SafetyInjectionautoinitiate.RWSTdamagecausestankto drainatanacceleratedrate.
7 CONDITIONAL:H_V4_221R_1 PMP_ASW2_1OPEN delIAPMP_ASW2_12cd=V1_243S_1 C(BOP)
ASWPp12tripsoffduringbustransferandmustbe manuallyrestarted(CT9)(seescenariosummary).
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor (continued)
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam03r0.docx Page2of36 Rev0 Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 8
VLV_CSS5_11 delIAVLV_CSS5_12cd=V1_205S_3 VLVCSS3_11 delIAVLV_CSS3_12cd=V1_204S_3 C
(BOP)
TwoContainmentSprayvalvesfailtoactuate;manual alignmentfromtheControlRoomrequired.
9 PMP_RHR2_1CLOSEcd=H_V1_237R_1 delIAPMP_RHR2_12cd=V1_237S_1 C
(ATC)
RHRPp12failstoautotrip@33%RWSTlevelandmust bemanuallystopped.CrewtransitionstoE1.3to performColdLegCirculationalignment(CT36)(see scenariosummary).
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor
TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)
ActualAttributes
- 1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 8
- 2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events7,8,9) 3
- 3. Abnormalevents(2-4)(Events2,3,4,5) 4
- 4. Majortransients(12)(Event6) 1
- 5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E1,E1.3) 2
- 6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2) 0
- 7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(SeeScenarioSummary) 2
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam03r0.docx Page3of36 Rev0 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
-NRC#3
1.
CallfromGridControlCenterforUnit1backdownordertoshed100MWwithin20minutesdueto500 kVlinefirerisk.
2.
AuxiliarySaltWater(ASW)Pump11tripsonovercurrent(OC).ASWPump12failstostartin automatic,butcanplacedinmanualandstartedbytheoperator.ActionswillbeperARPK0103,Aux SaltWaterPumps(forOCtripof11ASWPP),butmaybetakenpriortoenteringtheAnnunciator ResponseProcedureinaccordancewithOP1.DC10,ConductofOperationssincethisisthecaseofan automaticactuationthatfailedtooccur.ActionsmayalsobetakenperOPAP10,LossofAuxiliarySalt Water.ShiftForemanaddressesTS3.7.8.AforoneASWtraininoperable.
3.
NormalpowersupplytoDRPItripsopen.CrewrespondsperARPK0321,DRPIFAILURE/RODBOTTOM, placingrodsinmanual.Iftheloadshedrampisstillinprogress,ShiftForemandirectstheramptobe placedonhold.ThecrewcontactsfieldoperatorstoplaceDRPIonbackuppower.ShiftForeman addressesTS3.1.7.BformorethanoneDRPIpergroupinoperable.
4.
- 2HeaterDrainPptripsonovercurrent.Theprogrammedrampisbypassedandcrewmustmanually rampto770MWe@40mw/minperOPAP15,LossofFeedwaterFlow,SectionC:Heater2Drain PumpTrip.Thecrewwillrespondtotheramp,borateasneeded,andstabilizetheplantfollowingthe guidanceofOPAP25,RapidLoadReductionorShutdown.
5.
35gpmletdownlineleakinsidecontainment,downstreamRO27/28/29rampsinover3minutes.Crew identifiesloweringletdownflowandrisingcharging.Diagnosticbriefbycrewidentifiesletdownline insidecontainmentaslikelyleaksource(pressurizerpressurestable,structuresumpsrising,RM12in alarm).CrewentersOPAP18,LetdownLineFailuretoaddresstheleak.
6.
Largeseismicresultsin100%DBALBLOCA.ReactorTripandSafetyInjectionautoinitiateandcrew entersEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection.RWSTisdamagedbytheearthquakeanddrainsatan acceleratedrate.
7.
ASWPp12tripsoffduringbustransferandmustbemanuallyrestarted(CT9,Manuallystartatleast theminimumrequirednumberofASWpumpsinanoperatingsafeguardstrainbeforeexitingE0).
8.
ContainmentSpray,TrainBvalves8994Band9001Bfailtoopenrequiringmanualalignmentaspartof EOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjection,AppE(ESFAutoActions,Secondary,andAuxiliariesStatus).
9.
CrewcontinuesthroughE0diagnosticsteps,andtransitionstoE1,LossofReactororSecondary Coolant.Functionalrestorationstatustreeswillbemonitoredandcrewidentifiestransitioncriteriafor FRP.1,ResponsetoImminentPressurizedThermalShock.Conditionswillbemetforexitingthe procedureatthefirststep.RWSTlevelwillreach33%andRHRPp12autotripfails,butcanbemanually stoppedintheControlRoom.ThecrewtotransitionimmediatelytoEOPE1.3,TransfertoColdLeg Recirculation,performingtheTCOA/CT***ofColdLegRecirculationAlignment(CT36,TransfertoCold LegRecirculationandestablishatleast1trainofECCSflowpriortoRWSTlevelreaching4%).
ThescenarioisterminatedoncethefirsttrainofColdLegRecirculationAlignmentiscompleteperstep11of EOPE1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation.
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam03r0.docx Page4of36 Rev0
- TCOAnote:This DBA LBLOCA was evaluated against TCOA #8, and is similar to the TCOA bases event, so TCOA time limits will be applied to the scenario (operators have 10 min to align to cold leg recirculation, as timed from the RWST reaching 33% [alarm comes in] and finishing the alignment [8804A open, which is the last significant action in the lineup])
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam04r0.docx Page1of32 Rev0
Facility:
DiabloCanyon(PWR)
ScenarioNo:
4
OpTestNo:
L141NRC
Examiners:
Operators:
InitialConditions:
100%MOL960ppmboron;AFW13andD/G13OOS
Turnover:
PerformSTPPCCP11,startingwithstep12.9.
Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
CrewstartsCCP11,shutsdownCCP13,andmakesflow adjustmentsasdirectedbysurveillanceprocedureSTPP CCP11.
2 PMP_CVC1_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=H_V2_266G_1delay=60 TriggeronCCP13Shutdown(GreenLight)
C(ALL)
CCP11tripsonovercurrentcausingletdowntoisolate.
CrewrestoresletdownandrestartsCCP13(AP17,TS 3.5.2.A)
3 VLV_PZR6_20.001
PCV474leakingby.LeakingPORVisidentifiedand associatedblockvalveclosed(PK0523,TS3.4.11.A) 4 MAL_RCS4H10ramp=60 R(ALL) 10gpmSGTLrampsinover1minute.Crewdiagnosesthe leakanddeterminesshutdowniswarranted(OPO4,AP 3,AP25,TS3.4.13.B).
5 LOA_CND10.075cd=smsslt1150 LOA_CND10.75cd='fnispr_1lt5 M(ALL) Vacuumleakcausesrapidlossofcondenservacuum requiringaturbinetrip/Rxtrip(AP7).
6 VLV_PZR4_20.03cd='fnispr_1lt5 C(BOP)
PCV455Cfailsslightlyopenontripandwillnotclose requiringoperatortocloseassociatedblockvalve(CT10)
(seeScenarioSummarypage).
7 MAL_AFW11cd='fnispr_1lt5 PMP_AFW1_1AS_IS delIAPMP_AFW1_12cd=V3_221S_3 C(BOP)
TurbineDrivenAuxFeedwaterPumptripsonoverspeed andMotorDrivenAuxFeedwaterPump12failsto autostart,butcanbestartedinmanual.
8 CONDITIONAL:LPPLSG1LANDLPPLSG2L PMP_AFW1OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=(bsgnw(1)GT13.5)OR(bsgnw(2)GT 13.5)
M(ALL) CrewtransitionstoE0.1.AFWPp12overcurrenttripat lessthantheminimumrequiredS/GlevelleadstoLossOf HeatSinkcondition.Secondaryheatsinkisrestoredusing condensateperFRH.1(CT43)(seeScenarioSummary page).
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam04r0.docx Page2of32 Rev0
TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)
ActualAttributes
- 1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7
- 2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events6,7,8) 3
- 3. Abnormalevents(2-4)(Events2,3,4) 3
- 4. Majortransients(12)(Events5and8) 2
- 5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E0.1) 1
- 6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2)(FRH.1) 1
- 7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(SeeScenarioSummary) 2
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam04r0.docx Page3of32 Rev0 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
-NRC#4
1.
(NormalEvolution)CrewperformscontrolroomportionofSTPPCCP11,RoutineSurveillanceTestof CentrifugalChargingPump11whichrequiresstartingCCP11,shuttingdownCCP13,andassociated flowcontroladjustments.
2.
CCP11tripsonovercurrentoneminuteafterCCP13isshutdown,causingletdowntoisolate.Crew restoreschargingandletdownusingOPAP17,LossofCharging.ShiftForemanaddressesTS3.5.2.A, ECCS-Operating.
3.
PCV474beginsleakingby.CrewrespondsperARPK0523, PZRSAFETYORRELIEFLINETEMPguidance, identifyingPCV474astheleakingPORV.Blockvalve8000AisclosedandShiftForemanaddressesTS 3.4.11.A,PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs).
4.
S/G14developsa10gpmtubeleakoveraoneminuteperiod.CrewdeterminesleakrateandentersOP AP3,SteamGeneratorTubeFailure.LeakisalsoevaluatedperOPO4,PrimarytoSecondarySteam GeneratorTubeLeakDetection,whichdirectscrewtoreducepowerby50%inthenexthourandbein Mode3withintwohours.ShiftForemandeterminesTS3.4.13.B,RCSOperationalLeakageapplies.
5.
Avacuumleakcausescondenservacuumtodegraderapidly.Crewmayattempttoadjustramprateper OPAP7,DegradedCondenser,butwillnotbesuccessfulinavoidinganautomaticturbinetrip/Rxtrip.
6.
PCV455Cfailsslightlyopenontripandcannotbeclosedmanually.Boardoperatorwillclosethe associatedblockvalve(CriticalTaskCT10,ClosetheblockMotorOperatedValve(MOV)upstreamof thestuckopenPZRPORVbycompletionofthefirststepintheEOPnetworkthatdirectsthecrewto closetheblockMOV).
7.
TurbinedrivenAuxFeedwaterpumptripsonoverspeedandcannotberestarted.TheremainingMotor DrivenAuxFeedwaterPump(MDAFW12)failstoautostartandmustbestartedmanually.
8.
CrewtransitionsfromE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectiontoE0.1,ReactorTripResponsetostabilize theplant.MotorDrivenAuxFeedwater12tripsonovercurrentwhenS/G3&4reachapproximately 13.5%,leadingtoLossOfHeatSinkcondition.EOPFRH.1,ResponsetoLossofSecondaryHeatSinkis usedtoestablishsecondaryfeedwaterfromthecondensatesystem.(CriticalTaskCT43:Establish feedwaterflowintoatleastoneS/GbeforeRCSbleedandfeedisrequired(i.e.beforeWRS/Glevelin any3S/Gislessthan18%ORPressurizerpressureisgreaterthan2335psigduetoalossofsecondary heatsink).
ThescenarioisterminatedinFRH.1,oncecondensateflowtothesteamgeneratorshasbeenestablished.
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam05r0.docx Page1of37 Rev0
Facility:
DiabloCanyon(PWR)
ScenarioNo:
5
OpTestNo:
L141NRC
Examiners:
Operators:
InitialConditions:
100%MOL960ppmboron;BusFweek:AFW13andD/G13OOS
Turnover:
RemovePressurizerSteamSpacePurgefromServiceperOPB9:III,PrimarySampling System-ShutdownandClearing,startingonstep6.2.2.
Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A
Crewisolatesvalvesandsecuresextrabackupheaters perOPB9:III,RemovePressurizerSteamSpacePurge fromServiceSection6.2.
2 XMT_RCS93_3679.0ramp=60 I(ATC, SRO)
Loop3Tcoldslowlyfailshigh.Crewtakesmanualcontrol ofrodsandchargingasneeded(AP5,TS3.3.1.E,X; 3.3.2.M).
3 VLV_SGB13_11 VLV_SGB14_11 XMT_RMS23_31000000.0ramp=0 delIAVLV_SGB13_12cd=V3_189CS_3 delIAVLV_SGB14_12cd=V3_189CS_3 I(BOP, SRO)
RM23failsinstantaneouslyhigh.Autoswapof blowdowndischargefailsrequiringmanualalignment fromControlRoom(PK1117,ECG39.3.B).
4 MAL_MFW2A7.0ramp=120 R(ATC)
MFP11experiencesrisingvibrationsrequiringrampto 50%power(PK0913,AP25).
5 MAL_MFW2A25.0cd=fnisprlt70 C(BOP, SRO)
MFP11tripsatapproximately70%Rxpower(AP15).
6 ZMLSEI1_F0.31 MAL_SEI10.31delay=1ramp=15 MAL_PPL5AAUTO;MAL_PPL5BAUTO M
LargeseismicresultsinATWScondition.Crewmanually tripsthereactor.(CT1)(seesummarysection).
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor (continued)
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam05r0.docx Page2of37 Rev0 Event No Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 7
MAL_RCS3E0.7cd=fnisprlt5delay=30 ramp=60 MAL_PPL3AAUTO MAL_PPL3BAUTO M
(ALL) 700gpmSBLOCArampsin.AutoSIhasfailed,requiring crewtomanuallyinitiateSI(CT2)(seesummarysection).
8 PMP_AFW_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=h_v3_221r_1 PMP_CVC1AS_IS delIAPMP_CVC1AS_IScd=V2_265S_3 PMP_SIS1AS_IS delIAPMP_SIS1AS_IScd=V1_240S_3 PMP_CWS1_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=jpplp12 PMP_CWS2_2OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=jpplp12 C
(ATC)
Multiplepumpfailures.AFWPp12tripsonovercurrent onstart.OnSI,BusFECCSpumpsfailtoactuate(CCP11 andSIP11);manualstartavailable.CWPstripatP12 causinglossofthecondenser,requiringcontrolled cooldownusing10%steamdumps.
9 RLYPPL11FAIL_AS_IS RLYPPL12FAIL_AS_IS C
(BOP)
SeismicdamagecausesSSPSrelayfailuresonPhaseA isolationvalvesinside/outsidecontainment(CT11)(see summarysection).
- (N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajor
TargetQuantitativeAttributes(PerScenario;SeeSectionD.5.d)(fromformES3014)
ActualAttributes
- 1. Totalmalfunctions(5-8)(Events2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 8
- 2. MalfunctionsafterEOPentry(12)(Events7,8,9) 3
- 3. Abnormalevents(2-4)(Events2,3,4,5,6) 4
- 4. Majortransients(12)(Event6,7) 2
- 5. EOPsentered/requiringsubstantiveactions(1-2)(E1,E1.2) 2
- 6. EOPcontingenciesrequiringsubstantiveactions(0-2) 0
- 7. Criticaltasks(2-3)(SeeScenarioSummary) 3
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam05r0.docx Page3of37 Rev0 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
-NRC#5
1.
(NormalEvolution)WatchisassumedasChemistrycompletesPressurizerSteamSpaceSampling.Crew isolatesvalvesandsecuresextrabackupheatersperOPB9:III,Section6.2,RemovePressurizerSteam SpacePurgefromService,inwhichtheyclosevarioussamplevalvesandshutdownadditionalBackup PressurizerHeaterGroupsplacedinserviceduringthepreviousshift.
2.
Loop3Tcoldslowlyfailshighcausingrodstodriveinunexpectedlyandchargingflowtoincrease momentarily(untilProcessControlSystemkicksoutthebadsignal).Crewtakesrodstomanualand controlschargingasneededinaccordancewithOPAP5,MalfunctionofEagle21ProtectionorControl Channel.Oncerodsarereturnedtotheirstartingallrodsoutpositionandtemperaturereturnedto normal,rodcontrolcanbeplacedbackinAuto.ShiftForemanentersTechSpecs3.3.1.E,X;3.3.2.Mfor thefailedchannel.
3.
S/GBlowdownRM23failsinstantaneouslyhighandblowdownisolates.BlowdownTankdischargefails toautomaticallyswaptotheEDRandmustberealignedbythecrew.CrewrespondsperARPK1117,SG BLOWDOWNHIRAD.ShiftForemanaddressesECG39.3.B,RadioactiveLiquidEffluentMonitoring Instrumentationforthefailedinstrumentchannel.
4.
MFP11showsincreasingvibration,risingto7milsover2minutes.CrewrespondsperARPK0913 MAINFEEDPUMP11,whichcallsfora50200MW/minrampdownto550MW.ShiftForemanenters OPAP25,RapidLoadReductionorShutdownanddirectsthecrewtoramptheunit.
5.
MFP11tripsatapproximately70%Rxpower.CrewperformsperguidanceofOPAP15,Lowof FeedwaterFlowcontinuingtheramptoapproximately50%powerandstabilizingtheplant(primaryand secondary).
6.
Largeseismic(greaterthanseismicRxtripsetpoint)occursshortlyafterplanthasbeenstabilized.The crewidentifiestheATWSconditionandperformsthecriticaltaskofmanuallytrippingthereactor(CT1, Manuallytripthereactorfromthecontrolroombeforeemergencyborationisrequired).***Crew entersEOPE0,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionandperformsimmediateactions.
7.
700gpmSBLOCArampsinrapidly,posttrip.CrewidentifiesthebreakbyidentifyingassociatedSSPSESF statuslightsandchangingplantparametersassociatedwiththeLOCA.AutoSIfailstoactuate,resulting inthecriticaltaskofmanuallyactuatingSafetyInjection(CT2:ManuallyinitiateSafetyInjectionbefore transitioningtoanyE1,E2,orE3seriesprocedure).
8.
SeismicdamageresultsinvariousESFASpumpfailures.Onstart,AFWPp12tripsonovercurrent.BusF ECCSpumpsfailtoactuate(CCP11andSIP11)onSafetyInjectionsignal,requiringthecrewto manuallystartbothpumps.CWPstripatP12causinglossofthecondenser,requiringthecrewto completeacontrolledcooldownusingthe10%steamdumps.
9.
SSPSslaverelaysK606,TrainA&BbothfailcausingseveralPhaseAContainmentIsolationvalvesin series(insideandoutsidecontainmentonasingleprocessline)toremainopen,resultinginthecritical taskofmanuallyclosingPhaseAcontainmentisolationvalves(CT11,ClosecontainmentisolationPhase AvalvespriortocompletingE0,AppendixE).CrewwillworkthroughE0diagnosticstepsand transitiontoE1,LossofReactororSecondaryCoolant,andthentoE1.2PostLOCACooldownand Depressurization.***
AppendixD(rev10)
ScenarioOutline FormESD1
L141NRCSimExam05r0.docx Page4of37 Rev0 ThescenarioisterminatedonceCooldowniscommencedinEOPE1.2,PostLOCACooldownand Depressurization.
TCOAnote:TheATWSwasevaluatedagainstTCOA#34,PRA-ATWS;mustcompletemanualtrippingofthereactor within90seconds.TheSBLOCAwasevaluatedagainstTCOA#10,SmallBreakLoca.TheTCOArequirestrippingRHR PumpsorinitiatingcoolingfromtheRHRHxswithin30minutesfollowingaSBLOCA.