ML16152A300

2016-04 - Draft Outlines

ML16152A300
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	04/25/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML16152A300 (52)

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ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - RO Form ES-401-2 Facility Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April, 2016 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 2 3 3 4 3 3 18 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 2 1 1 N/A 1 2 N/A 2 9 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 4 5 5 5 27 10 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 28 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 10 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 3 4 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 3 38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 3 2 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor X G2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications 4.2 39.

Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret the following 3.8 40.

as they apply to a small break LOCA: Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X EA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following 4.4 41.

as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: ESF actuation system in manual 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X AK2.07 Knowledge of the interrelations between the 2.9 42.

Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: RCP seals 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of 2.7 43.

the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Relationship of charging flow to pressure differential between charging and RCS 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X AK2.05 Knowledge of the interrelations between the 2.6 44.

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: Reactor building sump 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following 3.5 45.

Water / 8 responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Effect on the CCW flow header of a loss of CCW 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following 3.7 46.

System Malfunction / 3 responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction 000029 ATWS / 1 X EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor the following 3.4 47.

as they apply to a ATWS: Operating switch for charging pump recirculation valve 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X G2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of 4.1 48.

major system components and controls.

000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the 4.6 49.

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture:

Transfer / 4 Conditions requiring a reactor trip 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 4.5 50.

Feedwater / 4 following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): AFW controls, including the use L081 #49 of alternate AFW sources 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X EK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of 4.1 51.

the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout : Natural circulation cooling

000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following 4.1 52.

responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X AA1.02 Aility to operate and / or monitor the 3.1 53.

following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:

Static inverter dc input breaker, frequency meter, ac output breaker, and ground fault detector 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the 3.5 54.

(LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant X EA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following 3.4 55.

Recirc. / 4 as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation). Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat X G2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. 3.3 56.

Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 2 3 3 4 3 3 Group Point Total: 18

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation 3.7 57.

strategies.

000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X AA2.09 Ability to determine and interpret the 2.9 58.

following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Charging and letdown flow capacities 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X E06: Degraded core cooling, 4.0 59.

EK3.3Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to degraded core cooling: Manipulation of controls required to obtain the desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the 2.7 60.

following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Location or process point that is causing an alarm W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X E02 SI termination: EK2.2 Knowledge of the 3.5 61.

interrelations between SI termination and the following: Facilitys heat removal systems, incl primary coolant, emergency coolant, decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational 3.0 62.

implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure). Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Steam Generator Overpressure).

W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 X EK1.2 Knowledge of the operational 2.7 63.

implications of the following concepts as Bank P-85720 they apply to the (Containment Flooding):

Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures associated with containment flooding.

W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X G2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational 3.8 64.

implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X AA1.2 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 3.2 65.

following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling). Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 1 1 2 2 9

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G K/A Topic(s) IR #

003 Reactor Coolant X A3.05 Ability to monitor automatic 2.7 Pump operation of the RCPS, including: 1.

RCP lube oil and bearing lift pumps 004 Chemical X A1.06 Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.0 and Volume Control changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated 2.

with operating the CVCS controls including: VCT level 005 Residual Heat X X K1.12 Knowledge of the physical 3.1 Removal connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and 3.

the following systems: Safeguard pumps K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of a 2.5 loss or malfunction on the following 4.

will have on the RHRS: RHR heat exchanger 006 Emergency Core X X A3.08 Ability to monitor automatic 4.2 Cooling operation of the ECCS, including:

5.

Automatic transfer of ECCS flowpaths A4.08 Ability to manually operate 4.2 and/or monitor in the control room: 6.

ESF system, including reset 007 Pressurizer X G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and 4.6 Relief/Quench Tank execute procedure steps. 7.

008 Component X K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a 3.4 Cooling Water loss or malfunction of the CCWS will 8.

have on the following: Loads cooled by CCWS 010 Pressurizer X A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the 3.9 Pressure Control impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use 9.

procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Spray valve failures 012 Reactor X K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 3.3 Protection implications of the following concepts 10.

as the apply to the RPS: DNB 013 Engineered X X K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a 2.7 Safety Features loss or malfunction on the following Actuation will have on the ESFAS: Sensors 11.

and detectors

A4.02 Ability to manually operate 4.3 and/or monitor in the control room: 12.

Reset of ESFAS channels 022 Containment X K1.01 Knowledge of the physical 3.5 Cooling connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and 13.

the following systems: SWS/cooling system 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment X X K4.06 Knowledge of CSS design 2.8 Spray feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Iodine scavenging via the CSS 14.

G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal 4.0 condition procedures. 15.

039 Main and Reheat X K1.04 Knowledge of the physical 3.1 Steam - steam connections and/or cause-effect dump? relationships between the MRSS and 16.

the following systems: RCS temperature monitoring and control 059 Main Feedwater X A1.03 Knowledge of the physical 2.7 connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and 17.

the following systems: Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves 061 X X K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 3.6 Auxiliary/Emergency implications of the following concepts Feedwater as the apply to the AFW:

Relationship between AFW flow and 18.

RCS heat transfer A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic 4.1 operation of the AFW, including: 19.

Automatic AFW isolation 062 AC Electrical X A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the 2.9 Distribution impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to 20.

correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Methods for energizing a dead bus 063 DC Electrical X K2.01 Knowledge of bus power 2.9 Distribution supplies to the following: Major DC 21.

loads

064 Emergency X X A2.16 Ability to (a) predict the 3.3 Diesel Generator impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those 22.

malfunctions or operations: Loss of offsite power during full-load testing of ED/G A4.07 Ability to manually operate 3.4 and/or monitor in the control room:

Transfer ED/G (with load) to grid 23.

073 Process X K3.01 - Knowledge of the effect that 3.6 Radiation Monitoring a loss or malfunction of the PRM 24.

system will have on the following:

Radioactive effluent releases 076 Service Water X K2.01 Knowledge of bus power 2.7 supplies to the following: Service 25.

water 078 Instrument Air X K4.01 Knowledge of IAS design 2.7 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which 26.

provide for the following:

Manual/automatic transfers of control 103 Containment X X K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a 3.7 loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following: Loss of containment 27.

integrity under refueling operations G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal 3.8 operating procedures are used in 28.

conjunction with EOPs.

K/A Category Point 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 28 Totals:

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive X A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic 3.7 29.

operation of the CRDS, including: Rod height 002 Reactor Coolant X A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 4.1 30.

the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of forced circulation 011 Pressurizer Level Control X A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or 3.2 31.

monitor in the control room: Transfer of PZR LCS from automatic to manual control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.6 32.

malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: Discriminator/compensation circuits 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss 3.5 33.

or malfunction of the ITM system will have on the following: Natural circulation indications 027 Containment Iodine Removal X K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to 3.1 34.

the following: Fans 028 Hydrogen Recombiner X A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.4 35.

and Purge Control changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls including:

Containment pressure 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator X K1.01 Knowledge of the physical 4.2 36.

connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the S/GS and the following systems: MFW/AFW systems 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal

072 Area Radiation Monitoring X A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.4 37.

changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ARM system controls including: Radiation levels 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air X K4.01 Knowledge of SAS design feature(s) 2.9 38.

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Cross-connect with IAS 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 Group Point Total: 10

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as 2.9 66 minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component 3.9 67 status.

2.1.29 Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, 4.1 68 breakers, switches, etc.

2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

2.2.3 Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences 3.8 69 between units.

2.

Equipment 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 3.7 70 Control 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. 4.0 71 2.2.

2.2.

2.2.

Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or 2.3.4 3.2 72 emergency conditions.

2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed 3.2 73

3. operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel Radiation Control handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions 4.5 74 associated with EOP entry conditions.

4.

Emergency 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation. 3.7 75 Procedures / Plan 2.4.

Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - SRO Form ES-401-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April, 2016 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 18 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 N/A N/A 9 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 27 5 5 10 1 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 10 1 1 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 38 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and 4.7 76 make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the 3.1 77 Water / 8 following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The length of time after the loss of CCW flow to a component before that component may be damaged 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 X G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical 4.2 78 Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X AA2.20 Ability to determine and interpret the 3.9 79 following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Interlocks in effect on loss of ac vital electrical instrument bus that must be bypassed to restore normal equipment operation 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X G2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing 4.4 80 emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant X EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of 4.2 81 Recirc. / 4 appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 Group Point Total: 6

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the 4.2 82 following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Availability of BWST (RWST) 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X AA2.02 Occurrence of a fuel handling 4.1 83 incident 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X G2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan 4.4 84 protective action recommendations.

000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X G2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action 4.6 85 level thresholds and classifications.

BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery

K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 Group Point Total: 4 ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal X G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in 4.2 86 Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

006 Emergency Core Cooling X A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.5 87 the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Water hammer 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water X A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.5 88 the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

High/low surge tank level 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection X G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions 4.7 89 for operations and safety limits.

013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution X A2.11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 4.1 90 the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Aligning standby equipment with correct emergency power source (D/G)

063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 5

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X G2.2.23 Ability to track Technical 4.6 91 Specification limiting conditions for operations.

027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.5 92 the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ;

and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.2 93 changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Fuel Handling System controls including: Load limits 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection

K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 3 ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices. 3.9 94 1.

Conduct 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as 3.9 95 of Operations minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent 3.6 96 tests.

2. 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 4.1 97 Equipment 2.2.

Control 2.2.

2.2.

2.2.

2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or 3.7 98 emergency conditions.

3. 2.3.12 Radiation Control 2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

2.4.5 Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures 4.3 99 network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

4.

Emergency 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. 4.2 100 Procedures / Plan 2.4.

Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Group Randomly Selected Reason for Rejection K/A RO T2/G1 073 K5.03 Verbiage and importance matched K3.01 - wrote question to K3.01 Updated ES-401-2 SRO T2/G1 062 A2.03 Randomly selected to replace A2.03. 062 A2.03 is very nearly the same as the KA for APE 057 AA2.20 (question

79) and RO knowledge.

Randomly replaced with A2.11 - Aligning standby equipment with correct power source (D/G)

SRO T3/G3 2.3.5 randomly replaced with 2.2.12.

2.3.5 is RO knowledge Updated ES-401-2

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L141 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Calculate Rod Hold Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, M, R curves, tables, etc.

(NRCL141-A1) (3.9)

(modified from NRCL091-A1)

Determine Spent Fuel Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant (NRCL141-A2) procedures during all modes of plant operations.

(4.3)

(modified from NRCADM061C-A1)

Verify Clearance Points and Tagging Requirements Equipment Control 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

M, R (4.1)

(NRCL141-A3) (modified from NRCL061-EC-SRO)

Determine Refueling Cavity Volume Available for Mode 6 SI Pump Test Radiation Control N, R 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that (NRCL141-A4) may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

(3.4)

(New)

Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: rev follows initial submittal

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L141 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Verify Calculation of Rod Hold Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, M, R curves, tables, etc.

(NRCL141-A5) (4.2)

(modified from NRCL091-A5)

Review Determination of Spent Fuel Pool Heat Load/Removal Parameters Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant (NRCL141-A6) procedures during all modes of plant operations.

(4.4)

(modified from NRCADM061C-A1)

Verify Clearance Points and Tagging Requirements Equipment Control 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

M, R (4.3)

(NRCL141-A7) (modified from NRCL061-EC-SRO)

Authorize Gas Decay Tank Discharge Radiation Control 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

M, R (3.8)

(NRCL141-A8) (from NRCADM061-RC-SRO)

Manual Preparation of Emergency Notification Form Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan N, R implementation.

(NRCL141-A9) (4.5)

(New)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: rev follows initial submittal

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075) A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination A,EN,L,N,S 2

c. (S3) (010.A2.03) Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a SGTR A,L,N,S 3

d. (S4) (074.EA2.02) Restore Temporary Core Cooling During ICC Event A,L,N,S 4P

e. (S5) (076.A2.02) Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low Pressure N,S 4S

f. (S6) (062.A4.07) Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Start-Up Power A,L,N,S 6

g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051) D,S 7

h. (S8) (008.A2.04) Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW High Radiation N,S 8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (013.G2.1.13) De-Energize SSPS to Block Safety Injection (LJP-095) D,E,L 2

j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A) D,E,L,R 4S

k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Perform Local Start of a Diesel Generator (LJP-003A) A,D,E,L 8

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: Initial Submittal

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075) A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination A,EN,L,N,S 2

c. (S3) (010.A2.03) Prepare for RCS Depressurization during a SGTR A,L,N,S 3

d. (S4) (074.EA2.02) Restore Temporary Core Cooling During ICC Event A,L,N,S 4P e.

f. (S6) (062.A4.07) Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Start-Up Power A,L,N,S 6

g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051) D,S 7

h. (S8) (008.A2.04) Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW High Radiation N,S 8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) (013.G2.1.13) De-Energize SSPS to Block Safety Injection (LJP-095) D,E,L 2

j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A) D,E,L,R 4S

k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Perform Local Start of a Diesel Generator (LJP-003A) A,D,E,L 8

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: Initial Submittal

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 04/18/2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L141 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. (S1) (004.A2.25) Makeup Control - Dilute (LJC-075) A,M,S 1

b. (S2) (013.A2.01) Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination A,EN,L,N,S 2 c.

d.

e.

g. (S7) (015.A2.02) Remove Power Range Channel N42 from Service (LJC-051) D,S 7 g.

h.

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i.

j. (P2) (E05.EA1.1) Reset the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (LJP-012A) D,E,L,R 4S

k. (P3) (068.AA1.31) Perform Local Start of a Diesel Generator (LJP-003A) A,D,E,L 8

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27 Rev 0 Rev 0: Initial Submittal

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 1 (U2, R3, R4)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1 2(U2,R4,R3) 3 4(U2,R3,R4)

P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 4 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 2* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *,3,4,5 2,3,4 6 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 5,8 3 2 2 1 TS 2,5 3,4 4 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,4,5,7,8 2 6 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 5,8 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 4 4 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,5 2,3,6,7 6 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 5,8 3 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp1 rev 0.doc

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 2 (I3, I4, R6)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1(I3,R6,I4) 2 3(I3,I4,R6) 4(I4,I3,R6)

P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 2 9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2,3 4 0 2 2 RX 1 4 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 2,3,4 10 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,6 2,4,5,7,8 2,3,6,7 11 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp2 rev 0

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 3 (I5, I6, R7)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1(I5,R7,I6) 2 3(I5,I6,R7) 4(I6,I5,R7)

P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 2 9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2,3 4 0 2 2 RX 1 4 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 2,3,4 10 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,6 2,4,5,7,8 2,3,6,7 11 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp3 rev 0

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 4 (U1, R1, R2)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1(U1,R2,R1) 2 3(U1,R1,R2) 4 P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 7 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2,3 4 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 7 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 2* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,6 *,4,5,7,8 6 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp4 rev 0.doc

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 5 (I1, I2, R5)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2016 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 1(I1,R5,I2) 2 3(I1,I2,R5) 4(I2,I1,R5)

P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,5 2 9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2,3 4 0 2 2 RX 1 4 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 3* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *,5,6,8 3,4,5,9 2,3,4 10 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,6 2,4,5,7,8 2,3,6,7 11 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 6 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-grp5 rev 0

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group x (Un, In, Rn, Rn)

Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: April 18, 2015 Operating Test Number: L141 A E Scenarios P V 5 (Spare) - - -

P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,3,4,5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6,7 2 2 1 TS 2,3 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,8 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6,7 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,5,9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 0 ES-301-5-L141-Spare(S5) rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 1 OpTest No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% with MFW in service, aligned to StartUp Power, MOL, 1430 ppm boron Turnover: In OP L3, performing step 6.29, raising power to 8%.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A R(ATC, Raise reactor power from 2% to 8% OP L3, sec 6.29.

SRO) 2 MAL_NIS3B 11.0 ramp 0 SRO Intermediate range detector NI36 fails low @ 3.0%. (AP5, TS 3.3.1.F) (Used for SRO TS/ECG Only).

3 CNV_MFW9_2 0.0 ramp 120 C (BOP, Feed Reg Bypass Valve FCV1510 fails closed in AUTO, but can delIA CNV_MFW9_2 2 cd= NOT SRO) be controlled manually (PK0915).

FTDFCV1510_AUTO 4 XMT_CVC19_3 ramp 60 I (ATC, VCT level LT112 fails low causing continuous makeup; is SRO) stopped manually (AP19).

5 MAL_EPS4E_2 DIFFERENTIAL C (BOP, Loss of 4kV Vital Bus H (diff trip); alternate equipment is SRO) placed in service, and Tech Specs implemented (AP27, TS 3.4.11.C, 3.8.1.B, 3.8.4.A).

6 MAL_RCP1A 15 ramp 60 C (ALL) RCP 11 #1 seal leak ramps in over 1 minute followed by rise in XMT_RCP17_3 228 seal leakoff and bearing temperatures. SRO directs Rx Trip XMT_RCP18_3 208 and tripping of RCP 11. (AP28)

(bth rmp 180, delay 300) 7 MAL_EPS5C_2 DIFFERENTIAL M (ALL) Loss of All AC. Loss of nonvital buses (12kV and 4kV) due to 12 cd= H_V2_260G_1 kV S/U Bus differential trip. D/G 12 fails to start due to SDR MAL_DEG1B_2 NO_RESET cd= activation. D/G 13 lost on fuel failure. (CT24, CT27) (see H_V4_220R_1 summary page).

MAL_DEG2C_1 cd=

H_V4_224R_1 8 VLV_AFW7_2 C (BOP) Turbine driven AFW fails to autostart due to FCV95 failing to delIA VLV_ AFW7_2 2 open in auto; manual start required.

cd=V3_219S_3

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC Sim Exam 01 r0.docx Page 1 of 32 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Event 8) 1

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 3,4,5,6) 4

4. Major transients (12) (Event 7) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E0.1) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (ECA0.0, 0.1) 2

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 2 L141 NRC Sim Exam 01 r0.docx Page 2 of 32 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1. Control rods are used to raise power from 2% to 8% OP L3, Secondary Plant Startup, step 6.29.

2. Intermediate range detector NI36 fails low @ 3.0%. The ATC operator identifies single intermediate range detector lowering with no other indications corroborate a power decrease. SFM directs power ascension placed on hold. OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel is referenced and TS 3.3.1.F, One Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable addressed.

3. Feed Reg Bypass valve FCV1510 slowly fails closed in AUTO, causing S/G 11 level to lower. Crew responds to PK0915, Digital Feedwater Cont System, taking manual control of the failed valve. May refer to TS 3.7.3 for MFRV bypass valves, but LCO is not applicable.

4. Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel LT112 fails low, resulting in a continuous (and erroneous) makeup signal. The crew diagnoses the level channel failure by comparing other VCT parameters, and by using OP AP19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. The makeup system is secured by taking the makeup controller to manual.

5. 4 kV bus H trips on differential. OP AP27, Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus is used to stabilize and respond to the loss of the bus, and place redundant equipment in service. Applicable short actions Tech Specs are addressed: TS 3.4.11.CPressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves; 3.8.1.BAC Sources Operating for D/G 11; 3.8.4.ADC Sources.

6. RCP 11 seal leak ramps in over 1 minute resulting in high seal return flow. Crew responds to AR PK05 01, RCP NO 11 for seal leakoff flow greater than 5.0 gpm and transitions to OP AP28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure. When seal leakoff and radial out bearing temperatures begin to rise, SFM directs Rx Trip and subsequent tripping of RCP 11.

7. Crew enters E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions into E0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. During stabilization activities, a differential trip on 12kV Startup bus causes a loss of nonvital power (12kV and 4kV). D/G 12 fails to start due to SDR activation and D/G 13 is lost on fuel failure, resulting in a loss of all AC condition.

8. Crew transitions to ECA0.0, Loss of All Vital AC Power. Actions are taken to isolate potential RCS leak paths, including RCP seal cooling (CT27, Isolate RCP Seal Injection prior to restarting a charging pump during subsequent recovery actions), while identifying available options for power restoration. The turbine driven AFW pump (TDAFP) fails to autostart and must be manually started to restore AFW flow to the S/Gs.

500 kV is available and crew will backfeed the unit to restore power (CT24, Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus prior to exiting ECA0.0), eventually restoring RCS inventory control (part of TCOA),

using EOP ECA0.0 and ECA0.1.

Scenario includes TCOA to backfeed the unit, isolate RCP seal cooling, and restore inventory control within 54 minutes (of loss of all AC). ***

The scenario is terminated once CCP is restarted in ECA 0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recover Without SI Required.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1

• • • (TCOA) The loss of all AC was evaluated against TCOA #37 (station blackout); the conditions of the scenario are close enough to the TCOA conditions that both the TCOA and time limits are applicable: must complete 500KV backfeed, RCP seal isolation (just direction within 42 min), and restore RCS inventory control within 54 minutes (of loss of power).

L141 NRC Sim Exam 01 r0.docx Page 4 of 32 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 2 OpTest No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 50% MOL 1850 ppm boron; Bus F week: AFW 13 and D/G 13 OOS Turnover: Chemistry requests 120 gpm Letdown in service for minor crud burst clean up.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (ATC, Crew places 120 gpm letdown in service including starting of BOP) 2nd CCP per OP B1A:XII, Section 6.3.

2 XMT_RMS11_3 1000000.0 I (BOP, RM12 fails high. Leak detection system is placed in service SRO) (PK1121, TS 3.4.15.C).

3 MAL_CVC8A 100.0 ramp=30 C (ATC, Seal Injection Filter 11 plugs causing reduction in charging SRO) flow to RCP seals. (PK0422) 4 MAL_GEN4_2 R (ATC) Full Load Rejection from 50% power; crew stabilizes power C (BOP, between 2030% power (AP2).

SRO) 5 PMP_CVC7_4 C (ALL) BATP 12 trips during boration. Boration is placed on hold and OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL BATP 11 placed in service (PK0511, PK1722, ECG 8.4.A).

6 MAL_MSS3A 4500000.0 M (ALL) Steamline break outside containment on S/G 11, upstream of ramp=240 the MSIVs resulting in a Rx Trip and SI. S/G 11 must be isolated (CT17) (see summary page).

7 MAL_PPL5A 3 C (BOP) Auto/man reactor trip fails requiring manual opening of 13D/E MAL_PPL5B 3 breakers (CT1) (see summary page).

8 MAL_PPL1A FAILURE_TO_INIT C (BOP) Train A Phase A fails to actuate on the SI, requiring manual MAL_SYS2 cd='fnispr_1 lt 5 alignment. Loss of Startup immediately following Rx Trip ramp=2 results in loss power to the RCPs. Blowdown of the faulted S/G eventually drives the crew into FRP.1 and the critical task of SI termination (CT48) (see summary page).

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC Sim Exam 02 r0.docx Page 1 of 33 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Events 7,8) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4,5) 4

4. Major transients (12) (Event 6) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E2) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FRP.1) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 3 L141 NRC Sim Exam 02 r0.docx Page 2 of 33 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

1. (Normal Evolution) Crew places 120 gpm letdown in service per OP B1A:XII, section 6.3 (for RCS cleanup)

2. RM12 (containment gaseous radiation monitor) fails high and crew responds using guidance of AR PK1121, High Radiation which calls for CFCU Drain Collection System to be placed in service. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.4.15.C, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.

3. Inservice Seal Injection Filter 11 plugs, reducing flow to RCP seals and bringing in AR PK0422, RCP Seal Inj Fltr DeltaP Hi. ATC operator throttles RCP seal injection hand control valve, HCV142, as needed to maintain pressurizer level and directs field operator to swap seal injection filters.

4. An underfrequency condition on the grid results in a full load rejection on Unit 1 from 50% power. OP AP2, Full Load Rejection is implemented to stabilize the plant on steam dumps between 2030% power.

5. Boric Acid transfer pp 12 trips during boration. Crew responds per AR PK0511, CVCS MAKEUP DEVIATION and AR PK1722, 480V BUS 1G . Crews aligns blender to BATP 11, and continues boration as needed. Shift Foreman enters ECG 8.4.A, Reactivity Control Systems - Flow Paths - Operating.

6. A steamline break outside containment on S/G 11, upstream of the MSIVs results in a Rx Trip and Safety Injection***. The crew will address the critical task of isolating S/G 11 per EOP E2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (CT17, Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transition out of E2).

7. On the Safety Injection, Rx Trip does not automatically actuate (ATWS). Manual Rx Trip switches are ineffective as well, requiring the crew to manual open breakers 13D/E per EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (CT1, Manually trip the reactor from the control room before emergency boration is required).

8. Train A of Phase A Containment Isolation fails, requiring manual alignment as part of EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary, and Auxiliaries Status).

Loss of Startup immediately following Rx Trip results in loss of power to the RCPs, which combines with the breakflow cooldown, eventually driving crew into EOP FRP.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, and the critical task of SI termination (CT48, Terminate ECCS flow so that RCS pressure and temperature are controlled before the end of the scenario).

The scenario is terminated once Safety Injection is terminated in FRP.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition (completion of step 11).

• • • CT / TCOA note: Steam break was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOAs) # 18 & 19 (MSLB IC & OC); the break sizes, ramp times, initial power levels, and other conditions differ significantly from the conditions used in this scenario. For these reasons, the S/G isolation will remain critical (a critical task, per WOG), but no TCOA time limits are applied to this scenario.

L141 NRC Sim Exam 02 r0.docx Page 3 of 33 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 3 OpTest No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 1004 ppm boron; AFW 13 and D/G 13 OOS Turnover: Perform partial STP IIC.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A R(ALL) Call from Grid Control Center for Unit 1 backdown order to shed 100 MW within 20 minutes due to 500 kV line fire risk (AP25) 2 PMP_ASW1_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL C (BOP, ASW Pp 11 trips on OC. ASW Pp 12 fails to start in auto, PMP_ASW2_1 AS_IS SRO) and is started manually (PK0103, AP10, TS 3.7.8.A).

delIA PMP_ASW2_1 2 3 DSC_ROD1 BREAKER_CLOSED C (ATC, The normal DRPI power supply fails. Rods are placed in SRO) manual until transferred to backup power (PK0321, TS 3.1.7.B) 4 PMP_CND10 OC_TRIP_DV_FAIL C (ALL) Heater #2 Drip Pump over current trip. Programmed ramp fails to autoinitiate and must be initiated manually (AP15, AP25).

5 MAL_CVC1 0.12 ramp=180 C (ALL) 35 gpm letdown leak inside containment ramps in over 3 minutes. Crew performs diagnostics and addresses leak.

(AP18) 6 ASISRWST 1.9e6 cd=jmlsei1 delay=10 M (ALL) Large seismic results in 100% DBA LBLOCA. Reactor Trip and ramp=420 Safety Injection autoinitiate. RWST damage causes tank to ZMLSEI1_F 0.37 drain at an accelerated rate.

MAL_SEI1 0.37 delay=1 ramp=15 MAL_RCS2A 100%_DBA 7 CONDITIONAL: H_V4_221R_1 C (BOP) ASW Pp 12 trips off during bus transfer and must be PMP_ASW2_1 OPEN manually restarted (CT9) (see scenario summary).

delIA PMP_ASW2_1 2 cd= V1_243S_1

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (continued)

L141 NRC Sim Exam 03 r0.docx Page 1 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 8 VLV_CSS5_1 1 C Two Containment Spray valves fail to actuate; manual delIA VLV_CSS5_1 2 cd= V1_205S_3 (BOP) alignment from the Control Room required.

VLV CSS3_1 1 delIA VLV_CSS3_1 2 cd= V1_204S_3 9 PMP_RHR2_1 CLOSE cd= H_V1_237R_1 C RHR Pp 12 fails to autotrip @ 33% RWST level and must delIA PMP_RHR2_1 2 cd= V1_237S_1 (ATC) be manually stopped. Crew transitions to E1.3 to perform Cold Leg Circulation alignment (CT36) (see scenario summary).

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 8

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Events 7,8,9) 3

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4,5) 4

4. Major transients (12) (Event 6) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E1, E1.3) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 2 L141 NRC Sim Exam 03 r0.docx Page 2 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

1. Call from Grid Control Center for Unit 1 backdown order to shed 100 MW within 20 minutes due to 500 kV line fire risk.

2. Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) Pump 11 trips on overcurrent (OC). ASW Pump 12 fails to start in automatic, but can placed in manual and started by the operator. Actions will be per AR PK0103, Aux Salt Water Pumps (for OC trip of 11 ASW PP), but may be taken prior to entering the Annunciator Response Procedure in accordance with OP1.DC10, Conduct of Operations since this is the case of an automatic actuation that failed to occur. Actions may also be taken per OP AP10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.7.8.A for one ASW train inoperable.

3. Normal power supply to DRPI trips open. Crew responds per AR PK0321, DRPI FAILURE/ROD BOTTOM, placing rods in manual. If the load shed ramp is still in progress, Shift Foreman directs the ramp to be placed on hold. The crew contacts field operators to place DRPI on backup power. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.1.7.B for more than one DRPI per group inoperable.

4. #2 Heater Drain Pp trips on overcurrent. The programmed ramp is bypassed and crew must manually ramp to 770 MWe @ 40 mw/min per OP AP15, Loss of Feedwater Flow, Section C: Heater 2 Drain Pump Trip. The crew will respond to the ramp, borate as needed, and stabilize the plant following the guidance of OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown.

5. 35 gpm letdown line leak inside containment, downstream RO 27/28/29 ramps in over 3 minutes. Crew identifies lowering letdown flow and rising charging. Diagnostic brief by crew identifies letdown line inside containment as likely leak source (pressurizer pressure stable, structure sumps rising, RM12 in alarm). Crew enters OP AP18, Letdown Line Failure to address the leak.

6. Large seismic results in 100% DBA LBLOCA. Reactor Trip and Safety Injection autoinitiate and crew enters EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. RWST is damaged by the earthquake and drains at an accelerated rate.

7. ASW Pp 12 trips off during bus transfer and must be manually restarted (CT9, Manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train before exiting E0).

8. Containment Spray, Train B valves 8994B and 9001B fail to open requiring manual alignment as part of EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary, and Auxiliaries Status).

9. Crew continues through E0 diagnostic steps, and transitions to E1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Functional restoration status trees will be monitored and crew identifies transition criteria for FRP.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock. Conditions will be met for exiting the procedure at the first step. RWST level will reach 33% and RHR Pp12 auto trip fails, but can be manually stopped in the Control Room. The crew to transition immediately to EOP E1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, performing the TCOA/CT*** of Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment (CT36, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation and establish at least 1 train of ECCS flow prior to RWST level reaching 4%).

The scenario is terminated once the first train of Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment is complete per step 11 of EOP E1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

L141 NRC Sim Exam 03 r0.docx Page 3 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1

• • • TCOA note: This DBA LBLOCA was evaluated against TCOA #8, and is similar to the TCOA bases event, so TCOA time limits will be applied to the scenario (operators have 10 min to align to cold leg recirculation, as timed from the RWST reaching 33% [alarm comes in] and finishing the alignment [8804A open, which is the last significant action in the lineup])

L141 NRC Sim Exam 03 r0.docx Page 4 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 4 OpTest No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; AFW 13 and D/G 13 OOS Turnover: Perform STP PCCP11, starting with step 12.9.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (ATC, Crew starts CCP 11, shuts down CCP 13, and makes flow BOP) adjustments as directed by surveillance procedure STP P CCP11.

2 PMP_CVC1_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL C (ALL) CCP 11 trips on overcurrent causing letdown to isolate.

cd=H_V2_266G_1 delay=60 Crew restores letdown and restarts CCP 13 (AP17, TS Trigger on CCP 13 Shutdown (Green Light) 3.5.2.A) 3 VLV_PZR6_2 0.001 C (BOP, PCV474 leaking by. Leaking PORV is identified and SRO) associated block valve closed (PK0523, TS 3.4.11.A) 4 MAL_RCS4H 10 ramp=60 R (ALL) 10 gpm SGTL ramps in over 1 minute. Crew diagnoses the leak and determines shutdown is warranted (OP O4, AP 3, AP25, TS 3.4.13.B).

5 LOA_CND1 0.075 cd=smss lt 1150 M (ALL) Vacuum leak causes rapid loss of condenser vacuum LOA_CND1 0.75 cd='fnispr_1 lt 5 requiring a turbine trip/Rx trip (AP7).

6 VLV_PZR4_2 0.03 cd='fnispr_1 lt 5 C (BOP) PCV455C fails slightly open on trip and will not close requiring operator to close associated block valve (CT10)

(see Scenario Summary page).

7 MAL_AFW1 1 cd='fnispr_1 lt 5 C (BOP) Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump trips on overspeed PMP_AFW1_1 AS_IS and Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 12 fails to autostart, but can be started in manual.

delIA PMP_AFW1_1 2 cd= V3_221S_3 8 CONDITIONAL:LPPLSG1L AND LPPLSG2L M (ALL) Crew transitions to E0.1. AFW Pp 12 overcurrent trip at PMP_AFW1 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL less than the minimum required S/G level leads to Loss Of cd=(bsgnw(1) GT 13.5) OR (bsgnw(2) GT Heat Sink condition. Secondary heat sink is restored using 13.5) condensate per FRH.1 (CT43) (see Scenario Summary page).

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC Sim Exam 04 r0.docx Page 1 of 32 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Events 6,7,8) 3

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (12) (Events 5 and 8) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E0.1) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FRH.1) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 2 L141 NRC Sim Exam 04 r0.docx Page 2 of 32 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

1. (Normal Evolution) Crew performs control room portion of STP PCCP11, Routine Surveillance Test of Centrifugal Charging Pump 11 which requires starting CCP 11, shutting down CCP 13, and associated flow control adjustments.

2. CCP 11 trips on overcurrent one minute after CCP 13 is shutdown, causing letdown to isolate. Crew restores charging and letdown using OP AP17, Loss of Charging. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.5.2.A, ECCS - Operating.

3. PCV474 begins leaking by. Crew responds per AR PK0523, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP guidance, identifying PCV474 as the leaking PORV. Block valve 8000A is closed and Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.4.11.A, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

4. S/G 14 develops a 10 gpm tube leak over a one minute period. Crew determines leak rate and enters OP AP3, Steam Generator Tube Failure. Leak is also evaluated per OP O4, Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection, which directs crew to reduce power by 50% in the next hour and be in Mode 3 within two hours. Shift Foreman determines TS 3.4.13.B, RCS Operational Leakage applies.

5. A vacuum leak causes condenser vacuum to degrade rapidly. Crew may attempt to adjust ramp rate per OP AP7, Degraded Condenser, but will not be successful in avoiding an automatic turbine trip/Rx trip.

6. PCV455C fails slightly open on trip and cannot be closed manually. Board operator will close the associated block valve (Critical Task CT10, Close the block Motor Operated Valve (MOV) upstream of the stuck open PZR PORV by completion of the first step in the EOP network that directs the crew to close the block MOV).

7. Turbine driven Aux Feedwater pump trips on overspeed and cannot be restarted. The remaining Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (MDAFW 12) fails to auto start and must be started manually.

8. Crew transitions from E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to E0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Motor Driven Aux Feedwater 12 trips on overcurrent when S/G 3 & 4 reach approximately 13.5%, leading to Loss Of Heat Sink condition. EOP FRH.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink is used to establish secondary feedwater from the condensate system. (Critical Task CT43: Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G before RCS bleed and feed is required (i.e. before WR S/G level in any 3 S/G is less than 18% OR Pressurizer pressure is greater than 2335 psig due to a loss of secondary heat sink).

The scenario is terminated in FRH.1, once condensate flow to the steam generators has been established.

L141 NRC Sim Exam 04 r0.docx Page 3 of 32 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 5 OpTest No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; Bus F week: AFW 13 and D/G 13 OOS Turnover: Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service per OP B9:III, Primary Sampling System - Shutdown and Clearing, starting on step 6.2.2.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (ATC, Crew isolates valves and secures extra backup heaters BOP) per OP B9:III, Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service Section 6.2.

2 XMT_RCS93_3 679.0 ramp=60 I (ATC, Loop 3 Tcold slowly fails high. Crew takes manual control SRO) of rods and charging as needed (AP5, TS 3.3.1.E,X; 3.3.2.M).

3 VLV_SGB13_1 1 I (BOP, RM23 fails instantaneously high. Auto swap of VLV_SGB14_1 1 SRO) blowdown discharge fails requiring manual alignment from Control Room (PK1117, ECG 39.3.B).

XMT_RMS23_3 1000000.0 ramp=0 delIA VLV_SGB13_1 2 cd=V3_189CS_3 delIA VLV_SGB14_1 2 cd=V3_189CS_3 4 MAL_MFW2A 7.0 ramp=120 R (ATC) MFP 11 experiences rising vibrations requiring ramp to C (BOP, 50% power (PK0913, AP25).

SRO) 5 MAL_MFW2A 25.0 cd=fnispr lt 70 C (BOP, MFP 11 trips at approximately 70% Rx power (AP15).

SRO) 6 ZMLSEI1_F 0.31 M Large seismic results in ATWS condition. Crew manually MAL_SEI1 0.31 delay=1 ramp=15 (SRO, trips the reactor. (CT1) (see summary section).

MAL_PPL5A AUTO; MAL_PPL5B AUTO ATC)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (continued)

L141 NRC Sim Exam 05 r0.docx Page 1 of 37 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 7 MAL_RCS3E 0.7 cd=fnispr lt 5 delay=30 M 700 gpm SBLOCA ramps in. Auto SI has failed, requiring ramp=60 (ALL) crew to manually initiate SI (CT2) (see summary section).

MAL_PPL3A AUTO MAL_PPL3B AUTO 8 PMP_AFW_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL C Multiple pump failures. AFW Pp 12 trips on overcurrent cd=h_v3_221r_1 (ATC) on start. On SI, Bus F ECCS pumps fail to actuate (CCP 11 PMP_CVC1 AS_IS and SIP 11); manual start available. CWPs trip at P12 delIA PMP_CVC1 AS_IS cd= V2_265S_3 causing loss of the condenser, requiring controlled PMP_SIS1 AS_IS cooldown using 10% steam dumps.

delIA PMP_SIS1 AS_IS cd= V1_240S_3 PMP_CWS1_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=jpplp12 PMP_CWS2_2 OVERLOAD_DEV_FAIL cd=jpplp12 9 RLY PPL11 FAIL_AS_IS C Seismic damage causes SSPS relay failures on Phase A RLY PPL12 FAIL_AS_IS (BOP) isolation valves inside/outside containment (CT11) (see summary section).

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES3014) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 8

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) (Events 7,8,9) 3

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4,5,6) 4

4. Major transients (12) (Event 6,7) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E1, E1.2) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 3 L141 NRC Sim Exam 05 r0.docx Page 2 of 37 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #5

1. (Normal Evolution) Watch is assumed as Chemistry completes Pressurizer Steam Space Sampling. Crew isolates valves and secures extra backup heaters per OP B9:III, Section 6.2, Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service, in which they close various sample valves and shutdown additional Backup Pressurizer Heater Groups placed in service during the previous shift.

2. Loop 3 Tcold slowly fails high causing rods to drive in unexpectedly and charging flow to increase momentarily (until Process Control System kicks out the bad signal). Crew takes rods to manual and controls charging as needed in accordance with OP AP5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel. Once rods are returned to their starting all rods out position and temperature returned to normal, rod control can be placed back in Auto. Shift Foreman enters Tech Specs 3.3.1.E,X; 3.3.2.M for the failed channel.

3. S/G Blowdown RM23 fails instantaneously high and blowdown isolates. Blowdown Tank discharge fails to automatically swap to the EDR and must be realigned by the crew. Crew responds per AR PK1117, SG BLOW DOWN HI RAD. Shift Foreman addresses ECG 39.3.B, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation for the failed instrument channel.

4. MFP 11 shows increasing vibration, rising to 7 mils over 2 minutes. Crew responds per AR PK0913 MAIN FEEDPUMP 11, which calls for a 50200 MW/min ramp down to 550 MW. Shift Foreman enters OP AP25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown and directs the crew to ramp the unit.

5. MFP 11 trips at approximately 70% Rx power. Crew performs per guidance of OP AP15, Low of Feedwater Flow continuing the ramp to approximately 50% power and stabilizing the plant (primary and secondary).

6. Large seismic (greater than seismic Rx trip setpoint) occurs shortly after plant has been stabilized. The crew identifies the ATWS condition and performs the critical task of manually tripping the reactor (CT1, Manually trip the reactor from the control room before emergency boration is required).*** Crew enters EOP E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs immediate actions.

7. 700 gpm SBLOCA ramps in rapidly, posttrip. Crew identifies the break by identifying associated SSPS ESF status lights and changing plant parameters associated with the LOCA. Auto SI fails to actuate, resulting in the critical task of manually actuating Safety Injection (CT2: Manually initiate Safety Injection before transitioning to any E1, E2, or E3 series procedure).

8. Seismic damage results in various ESFAS pump failures. On start, AFW Pp 12 trips on overcurrent. Bus F ECCS pumps fail to actuate (CCP 11 and SIP 11) on Safety Injection signal, requiring the crew to manually start both pumps. CWPs trip at P12 causing loss of the condenser, requiring the crew to complete a controlled cooldown using the 10% steam dumps.

9. SSPS slave relays K606, Train A & B both fail causing several Phase A Containment Isolation valves in series (inside and outside containment on a single process line) to remain open, resulting in the critical task of manually closing Phase A containment isolation valves (CT11, Close containment isolation Phase A valves prior to completing E0, Appendix E). Crew will work through E0 diagnostic steps and transition to E1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and then to E1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.***

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Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ESD1 The scenario is terminated once Cooldown is commenced in EOP E1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

• • • TCOA note: The ATWS was evaluated against TCOA #34, PRA - ATWS; must complete manual tripping of the reactor within 90 seconds. The SBLOCA was evaluated against TCOA #10, Small Break Loca. The TCOA requires tripping RHR Pumps or initiating cooling from the RHR Hxs within 30 minutes following a SBLOCA.

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