ML15079A098

Initial Exam 2015-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML15079A098
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	03/20/2015
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
Shared Package
ML15079A140	List: ML15079A074 ML15079A082 ML15079A093 ML15079A098 ML15079A104 ML15079A106 ML15079A110 ML15079A121 ML15079A125 ML15079A128 ML15079A133
References
50-259/15-301, 50-260/15-301, 50-296/15-301
Download: ML15079A098 (209)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: BFN Scenario Number: NRC-1 Op-Test Number: 1501 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

ATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1, 2, and 3 Reactor Power is approximately 100%. 2A CCW pump was removed from service for breaker PMs and is ready to be returned to service. 2-SR-3.8.6.2(2)

Quarterly Check of 250V Main Bank Number 2 Battery is in progress.

Turnover: Return the 2A CCW pump to service IAW 2-01-27 section 8.3. Southwest Load Dispatch is anticipating a power system alert starting this evening due to a cold front moving through the area.

Event Malfunction Event Event Description Number Number Type*

N-BOP Return the 2A CCW pump to service IAW 2-01-27

1. N/A N-SRO section 8.3.

I-BOP Respond to an LPRM downscale alarm and bypass

2. nm07 the failed detector.

Work Control calls and informs the US that SR-

3. N/A TS-SRO 3.8.6.2(2) in progress, two cells out of spec Cat. B Limits.

The U1 US reports that 1-XA-55-22C window 5 Start of Strong Motion Accelerograph is in alarm.

M-

4. N/A O-AOl-100-5 Earthquake is entered and the SM and precursor U1 US are evaluating 4.2[1] through [1 O] to determine if shutting down is required The SM directs initiating a Reactor Shutdown IAW R-ATC 2-GOl-100-12A. The Reactor Engineer recommends

5. N/A R-SRO using the urgent load reduction RCP initially to lower core flow to 60%.

C-ATC

6. rd01a CRD pump 2A trips respond IAW 2-AOl-85-3 C-SRO rc09 C-BOP

7. RCIC steam leak failure of RCIC to auto isolate rc10 TS-SRO HPCI Injection line junction with FW A line break-

8. fw19 M-ALL SCRAM

9. override C-ATC 2C RFP discharge valve fails to close C-BOP HPCI is manually secured due to pumping out the

10. N/A feedwater break

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events

1. The crew will conduct a pre-job brief for placing the 2A CCW pump in service. The BOP operator will place 2A CCW pump in service per 2 27 section 8.3 which has incorporated T-MOD-BFN-2-2013-010. Once the pump is in service the scenario may continue.

2. The crew will respond to 2-XA-55-5A window 5, LPRM Downscale. The BOP operator will bypass the failed LPRM IAW 2-01-928. The SRO will determine that the affected APRM/OPRM and RSM remain operable. The scenario may continue.

3. 2-SR-3.8.6.2(2) Quarterly Check of 250V Main Bank Number 2 Battery is in progress and the Work Control Center Calls and informs the SRO that two connected cells specific gravities are 1.095 causing all cells to be 1.200. SRO will assess the operability of the batteries in accordance with Tech Specs 3.8.6 declaring that battery inoperable and initiates an active LCO on Condition A requiring Required Actions A.1, A.2 and A.3. Once the TS call is completed the scenario may continue.

4. The U1 US reports that 1-XA-55-22C window 5; Start of Strong Motion Accelerograph is in alarm. O-AOl-100-5 Earthquake is entered and the SM and U 1 US are evaluating steps 4.2[1] through [1 O] to determine if shutting down is required. The crew will monitor the plant for abnormal conditions and as soon as the lead examiner is ready to move on, the next event can be initiated.

5. The crew will enter 2-GOl-100-12A and the Urgent Load Reduction RCP.

The ATC will lower Reactor Recirc flow to 60% IAW step 1A of the RCP.

When the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the Reactivity manipulation the scenario may continue.

6. The 2A CRD pump will trip. The ATC operator will perform the immediate operator actions of 2-AOl-85-3 to place the 18 CRD pump in service. The ATC operator will verify 18 CRD pump is in service and perform the subsequent actions of the AOI. Once the CRD system flows and pressures have been restored to their pre-trip conditions the scenario may continue.

7. RCIC will receive an isolation signal due to a steam leak in the RCIC pump room with a failure to automatically isolate. The US will enter EOl-3 and 2-AOl-64-2C, and the BOP operator will perform actions necessary to isolate RCIC (manually closing 2-FCV-71-2 and 3). The SRO will determine RCIC system inoperable and RCIC isolation valves inoperable. (TS 3.5.3 Condition A, 3.6.1.3 Condition 8). Once the steam leak has been terminated (i.e. Steam

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Valves closed) and the Tech Spec call has been made the scenario may continue.

8. Once the plant is stable, the HPCI injection line will fail where it connects to the 'A' Feedwater line in the Steam Tunnel. A scram will be inserted due to loss of feedwater and lowering reactor water level. The crew will isolate the feedwater system. The crew will respond IAW EOl-1 and EOl-

3. Reactor water level will not be able to be maintained above (-) 162 inches and the US will enter C-1. When Reactor Water Level lowers to(-)

162 inches the crew will verify Low Pressure injection systems aligned and running then perform an ED and recover Reactor Water Level using Low pressure systems.

9. Following the HPCI injection line break the 2C RFP discharge valve will fail to close. The ATC operator will close the 2C RFP suction valve to complete the Feedwater isolation.

10. The BOP operator will manually trip and lock out HPCI due to pumping out the injection line break.

The Scenario ends when the crew has performed an emergency depressurization and re-established Reactor Water Level above the top of active fuel(-) 162 inches.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks 4

1. With a primary system discharging into secondary containment, take action to manually isolate the leak.

1. Safety Significance Isolating high energy sources can preclude failure of secondary containment and subsequent radiation release to the public

2. Cues Procedural compliance Secondary Containment Area Temperature and Radiation indications

3. Measured by Operator action to isolate the leak

4. Feedback Valve position indication and lowering Area Temperature

2. To prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization when Reactor Water Level cannot be restored and maintained above -162 inches, inhibit ADS.

1. Safety Significance Preventing an automatic actuation which could challenge plant safety.

(such as an unintentional ESF actuation). (App. D 1.A.)

Prevent degradation of fission product barrier

2. Cues Procedural compliance

3. Measured by ADS logic inhibited prior to automatic initiation

4. Feedback RPV Pressure and Water level trend ADS LOGIC BUS A/B INHIBITED annunciators

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

3. With a(n) injection system(s) operating and lined up for injection, before RPV water level reaches -180", initiate Emergency Depressu rization.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling Prevent degradation of fission product barrier

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Reactor Water level trend

3. Measured by:

Observation: US direct Emergency Depressurization before RPV level lowers to -180 inches.

4. Feedback:

Reactor Pressure trend SRV status indications

4. With RPV pressure below the Shutoff Head of the available Low Pressure system(s), operate available Low Pressure system(s) to restore RPV water level above TAF.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling Prevent degradation of fission product barrier.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Pressure below low pressure ECCS system(s) shutoff head

3. Measured by:

Operator manually starts or initiates at least one low pressure ECCS system and injects into the RPV to restore water level above TAF

4. Feedback:

Reactor pressure trend Reactor water level trend

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _1_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Return the 2C CCW pump to service IAW 2-01-27 section 8.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs the BOP Operator to start 2C CCW Pump in accordance SRO with 2-01-27 Section 8.4 8.4 Returning CCW Pump To Service

[5] VERIFY CLOSED the CCW PUMP 2B(2C) DISCH ISOL VALVE, 2-FCV-27-21 (29) on Panel 2-9-20.

CAUTIONS

1) Capacitor bank fuses are subject to clearing when the unit boards are being supplied from the 161 kV source and large pumps are started. Unit Supervisors should evaluate placing the Capacitor Banks in Manual prior to starting RHR, CS or CCW pumps.

2) When returning a pump to service with at least one pump BOP already in operation, the pump being placed in service may experience perturbations in flow and motor amps. It may be necessary to throttle Condenser Water Box Discharge Valves as stated in Section 6.1 to stabilize pump.

[7] START CCW PUMP 2B(2C) using 2-HS-27-18A(26A) on Panel 2-9-20, THEN VERIFY the respective CCW PUMP 2B(2C) DISCH VALVE, 2-FCV-27-21 (29) automatically travels to the full open position.

BOP operator makes plant announcement on intent to start 2C CCWpump.

BOP Verifies 2-FCV-27-29 is closed, starts 2C CCW pump and verifies that 2-FCV-27-29 travels to the full open position.

Reports to US that 2C CCW pump has been started.

NRG End of Event No. 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _L Page 1of4 Event

Description:

Respond to LPRM 40-49C downscale alarm and bypass the failed detector.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When NRG Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 2, insert F3 (imf DRIVER NM07L4049C 0) to fail LPRM downscale.

Responds to LPRM DOWNSCALE alarm (2-XA-55-5A, Window 5)

ATC ReportsLPRM 40-49C downscale.

A VALIDATE LPRM downscale by observing LPRM Bargraph on Panel 2-9-14 or 2-9-5.

B. IF detector has failed downscale, THEN BOP 1. BYPASS failed detector. REFER TO 2-0l-92B.

2. INITIATE a WO including detector number and location BOP operator validatesLPRM 40-49C downscale by observing bar-graph on Panel 2-9-14.

US directs BOP operator to bypassLPRM 40-49C IAW 2-0l-92B.

SRO Contacts WC to initiate WO on LPRM 40-49C.

DRIVER Acknowledge initiating a WO on LPRM 40-49C

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: ~ Page 2of4 Event

Description:

Respond to LPRM 40-49C downscale alarm and bypass the failed detector.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 6.3 Bypassing LPRM detectors CAUTION Bypassing LPRMs such that there are less than 20 detectors per channel, or, less than 3 per any given level, will yield the associated APRM channel instrument INOP CONDITION (i.e. Rod Block). This condition results in the associated APRM being INOP but does not yield an Automatic APRM INOP TRIP.

Tech Spec Section 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation, and associated basis, addresses APRM operability requirements.

NOTE All operations are performed on Panel 2-9-14 unless specifically stated otherwise.

[3] DEPRESS any softkey to illuminate the display on the desired APRM/LPRM channel chassis.

BOP

[4] CHECK that more than 20 LPRMs in average exist by observing "number of LPRMs in average" on the selected APRM chassis.

[5] CHECK more than 3 LPRMs are operable in the LPRM strings at the level in which the LPRM is to be bypassed for the selected APRM chassis.

Depresses any softkey on APRM 4 channel chassis, checks more than 20 LPRMs in average by observing 'number of LPRMs in average' and checks more than 3 LPRMs are operable at the 'C' level.

[7] DEPRESS the "ETC" softkey until "BYPASS SELECTIONS" illuminates on the bottom row of the display.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page 3of4 Event

Description:

Respond to LPRM 40-49C downscale alarm and bypass the failed detector.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[8] DEPRESS "BYPASS SELECTIONS" softkey, enter the password, and DEPRESS "ENT".

[9] SELECT the desired LPRM to be bypassed by using the left or right arrows on the softkey board until the inverse video illuminates the correct LPRM.

[1 O]DEPRESS the "BYPASS/HV OFF" softkey to bypass the selected LPRM.

[11 ]CHECK "BYP/HV OFF" is indicated under the selected LPRM.

BOP

[12]DEPRESS "EXIT" softkey to return display to the desired bargraph.

[13]CHECK, as a result of bypassing the LPRM, that no alarms are received on Panel 2-9-5 or on the APRM/LPRM channel.

Depresses 'ETC' key until 'BYPASS SELECTIONS' is illuminated, depresses 'BYPASS SELECTIONS', enters 1234 and depresses

'ENT'. Uses left and right arrows to select LPRM 40-49C, depresses BYPASS/HV OFF' and checks BYP/HV OFF is indicated under LPRM 40-49C. Depresses 'EXIT' Checks that no alarms are received on 2-9-5 as a result of ATC bypassing LPRM 40-49C.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _2_ Page 3of4 Event

Description:

Respond to LPRM 40-49C downscale alarm and bypass the failed detector.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US reviews T.S. 3.3.1.1-1 and TRM 3.3.4-1 to determine that the affected APRM/OPRM and RBM channels remain OPERABLE.

3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE Function:

~. Average Power Range Monitors - 3 channels per trip system required. All channels are OPERABLE SRO TR 3.3.4 Control Rod Block Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4 The control rod block instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.

Function:

1. Average Power Range Monitors - 3 channels per trip function required. All channels are OPERABLE Briefs crew on LPRM status not affecting APRM/OPRM and RBM ooerabilitv.

NRC End of Event No. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Return the 2C CCW pump to service IAW 2-01-27 section 8.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When NRG Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 3, call the Unit Supervisor as Work Control SRO and tell him that the l&C group DRIVER has reported that two connected cells of the 250 V Number 2 Battery specific gravities are low, at 1.095 causing all cells to have a specific gravity of 1.200.

Takes the report and performs a Tech Spec determination on the SRO battery using Tech Specs 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters.

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters LCO 3.8.6 Battery cell parameters for the Unit, Shutdown Board, and DG batteries shall be within the limits of Table 3.8.6-1.

APPLICABILITY: When associated DC electrical power subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE---------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each battery.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION BOP TIME A. One or more batteries A.1 Verify pilot cells 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with one or more battery electrolyte level and float \

cell parameters not within voltage meet Category A or B limits. Table 3.8.6-1 Category C limits.

AND A.2 Verify battery cell 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> parameters meet Table 3.8.6-1 Category C AND limits.

Once per 7 days thereafter AND (continued)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page 2of2 Event

Description:

Return the 2C CCW pump to service IAW 2-01-27 section 8.3.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3 Restore battery cell 31 days parameters to Category A and B limits of Table 3.8.6-1.

Table 3.8.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

Battery Cell Parameter Requirements CATEGORY A: CATEGORYC:

LIMITS FOR EACH CATEGORYB: ALLOWABLE VALUE DESIGNATED PILOT LIMITS FOR EACH FOR EACH PARAMETER CELL CONNECTED CELL CONNECTED CELL Electrolyte > Minimum level > Minimum level Above top of plates, Level indication mark, and indication mark, and and not overflowing s Y. inch above s Y. inch above BOP maximum level maximum level indication mark(a) indication mark(a)

Float Voltage  ::::2.13 v  :::: 2.13 v > 2.07 v Specific  :::: 1.20  :::: 1.195 Not more than 0.020 Gravity (b) below average of all (c)(d) AND connected cells Average of all AND connected cells

> 1.205 Average of all connected cells

1.195 The SRO declares Battery Number 2 Inoperable and updates the crew with the LCO by reading the Conditions and Required Actions for A.1, A2, and A.3, a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 7 day, and 31 day LCO.

NRC End of Event No. 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: --1_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

The U 1 US reports that 1-XA-55-22C window 5 Start of Strong Motion Accelerograph is in alarm. O-AOl-100-5 Earthquake is entered and the SM and U1 US are evaluating 4.2[1] through [1 O] to determine if shutting down is required Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 4, then as U1 US, call US and report that 'Start of Strong Motion Accelerograph' (1-XA-55-22C Window 5) annunciator is in alarm.

Driver O-AOl-100-5 for Earthquake has been entered and the SM is evaluating the subsequent actions to determine if a shutdown is required.

Briefs crew on entering O-AOl-100-5.

SRO Reviews O-AOl-100-5.

Crew Monitors plant for abnormal conditions.

NRC End of Event No. 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

The SM directs initiating a Reactor Shutdown IAW 2-GOl-100-12A.

The Reactor Engineer recommends using the urgent load reduction RCP initially to lower core flow to 60% and driving the first set of control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 5, then as SM, call US and direct initiating a reactor shutdown IAW GOl-100-Driver 12A. The RE has recommended using the urgent load reduction RCP initially to lower core flow to 60% and insert the first set of control rods on the emergency shove sheet.

Briefs crew and directs a reactor shutdown IAW 2-GOl-100-12A.

SRO Directs using urgent load reduction RCP to lower core flow and rods.

2-GOl-100-12A 5.1 Notifications and Approvals

[3] NOTIFY Chattanooga Load Coordinator of impending shut down or power reduction and REQUEST unloading instructions. (Unloading instructions are N/A if generator breaker is open.)

[4] NOTIFY Radiation Protection of Power Reduction or Reactor Shutdown.

Calls Chattanooga Load Coordinator to inform him of the required reactor shutdown.

SRO Calls Radiation Protection to inform them of the required reactor shutdown.

As Load Coordinator and RP, acknowledge required reactor Driver shutdown.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

The SM directs initiating a Reactor Shutdown IAW 2-GOl-100-12A.

The Reactor Engineer recommends using the urgent load reduction RCP initially to lower core flow to 60% and driving the first set of control rods.

lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reactivity Control Plan Form Title of Evolution: Urgent Load Reduction/Recirc Pump Trip Contingency Plan Urgent Load Reduction:

1A. Lower power by lowering core flow to 57% - 60% core flow. (If a recirculation pump trip is imminent, only lower using the pump to be tripped.)

2-01-68 6.2 Adjusting Recirc Flow ATC [2] WHEN desired to control Recirc Pumps 2A and/or 28 speed with the RECIRC MASTER CONTROL, THEN ADJUST Recirc Pump Speed 2A & 28 using the following pushbuttons as required.

RAISE SLOW, 2-HS-96-31 RAISE MEDIUM, 2-HS-96-32 LOWER SLOW, 2-HS-96-33 LOWER MEDIUM, 2-HS-96-34 LOWER FAST, 2-HS-96-35 Lowers reactor recirculation flow IAW the RCP Urgent Load Reduction and 2-01-68 Sec. 6.2 Individual pump speeds should be mismatched by -60 RPM NRG during dual pump operation between 1200 and 1300 RPM to minimize harmonic vibration.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

The SM directs initiating a Reactor Shutdown IAW 2-GOl-100-12A.

The Reactor Engineer recommends using the urgent load reduction RCP initially to lower core flow to 60% and driving the first set of control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Provides peer check to ATC for changes in reactor recirculation BOP flow.

Selects the first control rod listed on the emergency load reduction ATC sheet and verifies CRD parameters in their normal ranges.

Provides peer check to ATC for selecting and driving the control BOP rods.

Drives the first control rod listed on the emergency load reduction ATC sheet and continues on until all rods on the sheet have been driven in.

SRO Provides oversight for the reactivity change

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.:__§___ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

CRD pump 2A trips respond IAW 2-AOl-85-3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 6, insert F5 Driver (imf rd01a) to trip CRD Pump 2A ATC Reports trip of CRD Pump 2A SRO Directs entry into 2-AOl-85-3 2-AOl-85-3 4.1 Immediate Actions

[1] IF operating CRD pump has failed AND standby CRD pump is available, THEN PERFORM the following at Panel 2-9-5: (Otherwise N/A)

[1.1] PLACE CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL, 2-FIC 11, in MAN at minimum setting.

[1.2] START associated standby CRD Pump using one of the following:

• CRD PUMP 1B, using 2-HS-85-2A.

• CRD Pump 2A, using 2-HS-85-1A.

[1.3] IF CRD Pump 1B was started, THEN OPEN CRD PUMP 1B DISCH TO U2, using 2-HS-85-8A

[1.4] ADJUST CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL, 2-FIC 11, to establish the following conditions:

• CRD CLG WTR HOR DP, 2-PDl-85-18A, approximately 20 psid.

• CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL, 2-FIC-85-11, between 40 and 65 gpm.

[1.5] BALANCE CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL, 2-FIC-85-11, AND PLACE in AUTO or BALANCE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _6_ Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

CRD pump 2A trips respond IAW 2-AOl-85-3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs Immediate Operator actions to place 1B CRD pump in service.

Reviews 2-AOl-85-3 Immediate Operator Actions and performs applicable subsequent actions.

ATC 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[5] NOTIFY REACTOR ENGINEER of CRD system failure.

Calls Reactor Engineer to report the trip of CRD pump 2A and subsequent start of CRD pump 1B SRO Calls WC to investigate the trip of CRD pump 2A Acknowledge calls to RE and WC concerning trip of CRD pump Driver 2A.

Conducts a crew brief including current plant conditions, events SRO that have occurred.

SRO may or may not conduct a crew brief depending on current conditions.

NRC End of Event No. 6 May move on to the next event when satisfied with conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _7_ Page 1 of 5 Event

Description:

RCIC steam leak failure of RCIC to Auto Isolate. This event contains a critical task (CT) for the BOP highlighted in yellow below.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRG Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 6, insert F6 Driver (bat) to initiate a RCIC steam line leak and failure of 71-2 and 71-3 to auto close.

Responds to RX BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH (2-XA-55-3A, Window 22) annunciator.

A DETERMINE area with high radiation level on Panel 2-9-11.

(Alarm on Panel 2-9-11 will automatically reset if radiation level lowers below setpoint.)

D. NOTIFY RAD PRO.

BOP E. IF the TSC is NOT manned and a "VALID" radiological condition exists, THEN USE public address system to evacuate area where high radiological conditions exist.

Determines that RM-90-26A (CS 1/RCIC ROOM) is in alarm.

Reports to US that 90-26A is in alarm but below max safe.

Uses public address system to evacuate the Reactor Building Notifies RP of rising radiation condition in Reactor Building.

Enters EOl-3 on Any Secondary Containment Area Radiation level above Max Normal value of Table 4 SC/R Monitor and Control Secondary Cntmt radation lvls - CHECKED SRO WHEN any area radiation lvl is above Max Normal (Table 4) -

CHECKED ISOLATE all systems that are discharging into the area EXCEPT systems required:

• For damage control OR

• To be operated by EOls

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 5 Event

Description:

RCIC steam leak failure of RCIC to Auto Isolate. This event contains a critical task (CT) for the BOP highlighted in yellow below.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE 3: Tables 3 and 4 contain information that may be used to SRO determine if a primary system is discharging into Secondary Cntmt (emergency depressurization will reduce discharge)

Responds to RCIC STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION TEMP HIGH (2-XA-55-3D, Window 10) annunciator A. CHECK RCIC temperature switches on LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM TEMPERATURE indicator, 2-Tl-69-29 on Panel 2 21.

B. IF RCIC is NOT in service AND 2-Fl-71-1A(B), RCIC STEAM FLOW indicates flow, THEN BOP C. IF high temperature is confirmed, THEN ENTER 2-EOl-3 Flowchart.

E. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.3.6.1, 3.5.3.

Checks RCIC room temperature on LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM TEMPERATURE indicator and reports71-41A (CS l/RCIC) temperature in alarm and below max safe.

Continues to monitor RCIC area temperature and radiation Re-enters EOl-3 on Any Secondary Cntmt area temperature above Max Normal value of Table 3 SC/T SRO Caution: Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend - CHECKED Monitor and Control Secondary Cntmt temps - CHECKED

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _7_ Page 3 of 5 Event

Description:

RCIC steam leak failure of RCIC to Auto Isolate. This event contains a critical task (CT) for the BOP highlighted in yellow below.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior OPERATE available ventilation (APPX 8F)

DEFEAT isolation interlocks if necessary (APPX 8E) - CIRCLED WHEN any area temp is above Max Normal (Table 4) -

CHECKED ISOLATE all systems that are discharging into the area EXCEPT systems required:

• For damage control OR

• To be operated by EOls NOTE 3: Tables 3 and 4 contain information that may be used to determine if a primary system is discharging into Secondary Cntmt (emergency depressurization will reduce discharge)

Responds to RCIC TURBINE TRIPPED (2-XA-55-3B, Window 14) annunciator.

Recognizes that RCIC AUTO ISOL (A/B) amber lights are illuminated, and that isolation valves 71-2 and 71-3 have failed to close on the isolation signal.

BOP Reports failure of RCIC to isolate to US.

Manually closes RCIC isolation valves 71-2 and 71-3. Reports isolation valves closed to US Checks secondary containment radiation and temperatures and reports radiation levels and temperatures lowering in the RCIC area.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _7_ Page 4 of 5 Event

Description:

RCIC steam leak failure of RCIC to Auto Isolate. This event contains a critical task (CT) for the BOP highlighted in yellow below.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task - With a primary system discharging into secondary containment, take action to manually isolate the leak.

1. Cues Secondary Containment Area Temp & Rad indications.

2. Standard Operator isolates the leak by closing the RCIC Steam Isolation Valves 2-FCV-71-2 and/or 2-FCV-71-3.

3. Feedback Valve position indicate closed (Green light ON and Red light OFF) and lowering Area Temperature Panel 2-9-21 RCIC Area Temperatures.

The Critical Task is not met if:

The Operator fails to close the isolation valves OR The Area Temperatures exceeds Max Safe for that area and the crew misdiagnoses this as an unisolable leak.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _7_ Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

RCIC steam leak failure of RCIC to Auto Isolate. This event contains a critical task (CT) for the BOP highlighted in yellow below.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reviews Tech Spec 3.5.3 (RCIC System) and determines that Condition A is applicable.

A. RCIC System inoperable A.1 Verify by administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE - IMMEDIATELY Reviews Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 (PCIVs) and determines that Condition A is applicable.

A. NOTE Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PC IVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except due to MSIV leakage not within limits.

SRO A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. - 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> AND A.2 NOTE Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated - Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment Conducts a crew brief including current plant status and Technical Specifications required actions for RCIC.

SRO may or may not conduct a crew brief depending on current conditions.

NRG End of Event No. 7 May move on to the next event when satisfied with conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 1of22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When directed to continue to Event No. 7, insert F7 (bat) to initiate Driver a HPCI injection line break in the steam tunnel and override RFP

'C' discharge valve OPEN.

May or may not recognize RFP speed slowly rising. If recognized, reports to US and continues to monitor feedpump speed and reactor water level.

Reports reactor water level slowly lowering and 'A' feedwater line flow rising Responds to REACTOR WATER LEVEL ABNORMAL (2-XA 5A, Window 8) annunciator A. VALIDATE Reactor water level hi/low using multiple indications including Average Narrow Range Level on 2-XR ATC 53 recorder, 2-Ll-3-53, 2-Ll-3-60, 2-3-206 and 2-Ll-3-253 on Panel 2-9-5.

B. IF alarm is valid, THEN REFER TO 2-AOl-3-1 or 2-01-3.

C. IF 2-Ll-3-53, 2-Ll-3-60, 2-Ll-3-206 and 2-Ll-3-253 has failed or is invalid, THEN with SRO permission, BYPASS the affected level instrument. REFER TO 2-01-3 Section 8.2.

Continues to monitor reactor water level and confirms that reactor water level is lowering using multiple indication.

Recommends a manual reactor scram Directs a manual reactor scram.

SRO Directs that Reactor Feed Pumps be tripped, RFP Discharge valves closed, and Condensate/Condensate Booster Pumps be secured (isolate and stop leak)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 2 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Initiates a manual reactor scram Reactor Scram OATC Hard Card 1.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ATC

[1] DEPRESS REACTOR SCRAM A and B, 2-HS-99-5A/S3A and 2-HS-99-5A/S3B, on Panel 2-9-5.

[2] IF scram is due to a loss of RPS, THEN PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in START & HOT STBY AND PAUSE for approximately 5 seconds (Otherwise N/A)

[3] Refuel Mode One Rod Permissive Light check:

[3.1] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in REFUEL.

[3.2] CHECK illuminated REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46.

[3.3] IF REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46, is NOT illuminated, THEN CHECK all control rod positions at Full-In Overtravel, or Full-In.

(Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in ATC SHUTDOWN.

[5] REPORT the following status to the US:

• Reactor Scram

• Mode Switch is in Shutdown

• "All rods in" or "rods out"

• Reactor Water Level and trend (recovering or lowering)

• Reactor pressure and trend

• MSIV position (Open or Closed)

• Power level Performs immediate operator actions IAW hard card and makes scram report

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 3 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Enters EOl-1 on RPV Water Lvl below +2" Verify RX scram - CHECKED RC/Q Monitor and Control reactor power - CHECKED The reactor is subcritical SRO AND NO boron has been injected THEN EXIT RC/Q and ENTER AOl-100-1, Reactor Scram - CHECKED Directs ATC to enter 2-AOl-100-1 RC/L CAUTION: Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend - CHECKED MONITOR and CONTROL RPV water lvl - CHECKED VERIFY each as required

• PCIS isolations (Groups 1, 2, and 3) - CHECKED It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - SUBCRITICAL RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft - CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained below 55 psig - CAN

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 4 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F - CHECKED RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in and +51 in with ANY of the following CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig SRO CRD 58 1640 psig RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 50 1200 psig CNDS 6A 480 psig cs 6D,6E 330 psig LPCI 68, 6C 320 psig Directs BOP to restore and maintain reactor level between +2 in and +51 in using HPCI in accordance with Appendix 50 RC/P OW press is above 2.4 psig - NO Emergency RPV depressurization is anticipated - NO AND The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all SRO conditions Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Is ANY MSRV cycling - NO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _8_ Page 5 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Steam cooling is required - NO Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the existing RPV press - CAN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the safe area - CAN of Curve 4 OW control air becomes unavailable - AVAIL Boron inj is required - NO AND The main condenser is available AND There has been no indication of a steam line break STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig with the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

Directs BOP to control reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig in accordance with Appendix 8B Verifies that Main Turbine Bypass valves are controlling reactor BOP pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig.

Verifies and reports successful Gr. 2, 3, 6, and 8 PCIS Isolations When ATC operator attempts to isolate the feedwater leak by securing the condensate and feedwater system and closing the RFP discharge valves, he should recognize and report the failure of the RFP 'C' discharge close. This will initiate Event No. 9.

NRC When BOP operator attempts to restore and maintain reactor water level with HPCI, he should recognize that HPCI discharge pressure is less than reactor pressure and that HPCI is pumping into the leak. This will initiate Event No. 10.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 6 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2-AOl-100-1 2.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

[2] DRIVE in all IRMs and SRMs from Panel 2-9-5 as time and conditions permit.

[3] VERIFY SCRAM DISCH VOL VENT & DR VL VS closed by green indicating lights at SDV Display on Panel 2-9-5.

ATC

[4] MONITOR and CONTROL Reactor Water Level between

+2" and +51", or as directed by US, using RFP/RFPT.

[5] RETURN to body of procedure at step 4.2[5] AND CONTINUE with actions as required.

Drives in all IRMs and SRMS. Verifies SCRAM DISCH VOL VENT

& DR VLVS closed.

Reports Reactor Water level continuing to lower RC/L-4 RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and +51 in. with ANY of the following:

SRO INJ SOURCE APPX INJ PRESS CRD 58 1640 psig Directs ATC to use Appendix 58 to maintain reactor water level

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 7 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2-EOI Appendix-58 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[2] IF BOTH of the following exists, ATC

• CRD is NOT required for rod insertion, AND

• Maximum injection flow is required,THEN LINE UP ALL available CRD pumps to the RPV as follows:

[2.1] IF CRD Pump 2A is available, THEN VERIFY RUNNING CRD Pump 2A.

[2.2] IF CRD Pump 1B is available, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. NOTIFY Unit 1 Operator to verify closed 1-FCV 8, CRD PUMP B DISCH TO U2, (Panel 1-9-5).

B. START CRD Pump 1B.

C. OPEN 2-FCV-85-8, CRD PUMP 1B DISCH TO U2.

ATC CAUTION Failure to maintain CRD system pressure above 1450 psig on 2-Pl-85-13A could result in pump runout

[2.3] OPEN the following valves to increase CRD flow to the RPV:

• 2-PCV-85-23, CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV

• 2-PCV-85-27, CRD CLG WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV

• 2-FCV-85-50, CRD EXH RTN LINE SHUTOFF VALVE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 8 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[2.4] ADJUST 2-FIC-85-11, CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL to control injection WHILE maintaining 2-Pl-85-13A, CRD ACCUM CHG WTR HOR PRESS, above 1450 psig, if possible Maximizes CRD flow to the RPV IAW Appendix 5B Reports Reactor Water Level continuing to slowly lower.

2-AOl-100-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

VERIFY TRIPPED the Main Turbine as follows:

[9.1] DEPRESS the TRIP pushbutton, 2-HS-47-670 on Panel 2-9-7. [NER/C] [INPO SOER 81-015]

BOP

[9.2] PERFORM the following as required to VERIFY OPEN GENERATOR PCB 224:

[9.2.1] CHECK green light illuminated and red light not illuminated above handswitch GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 2-HS-242-224A.

[9.3] IMMEDIATELY PLACE VOLTAGE REGULATOR START/STOP SEL, 2-HS-57-24, to STOP and release.

[9.4] CHECK the following at 2-HS-57-24:

• GREEN light illuminated

• RED light extinguished BOP

[10] MONITOR Main Turbine Vibration on TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION, 2-XR-47-15, during coast down.

[11] ADJUST TURBINE OIL TEMPERATURE CONT, 2-TIC 75, setpoint to 85°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 9 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM 1 lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[12] WHEN turbine speed is less than 900 RPM, THEN START the following:

• TURBINE BEARING LIFT OIL PUMPS

• MOTOR SUCTION PUMP

• AC TURNING GEAR OIL PUMP Performs subsequent actions IAW 2-AOl-100-1 ATC/BOP Reports reactor water level continuing to lower RC/L IF RPV water lvl can be restored and maintained above -162" AND SRO The ADS timer has initiated THEN INHIBIT ADS - CHECKED Directs BOP to inhibit ADS BOP Inhibits ADS

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 10 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task - To prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization when Reactor Water Level cannot be restored and maintained above -162 inches, inhibit ADS.

1. Safety Significance Maintain adequate core cooling Prevent degradation of fission product barrier

2. Cues Procedural compliance

3. Measured by ADS logic inhibited prior to automatic initiation

4. Feedback RPV Pressure and Water level trend ADS LOGIC BUS A/B INHIBITED annunciators The Critical Task is not met if:

The Operator fails to turn both ADS A/B Inhibit switches to the inhibit position prior to an uncontrolled blowdown.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _8_ Page 11of22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F - CHECKED IF RPV water lvl CANNOT be restored and maintained between +2" and +51 in.

SRO THEN RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl above -162 in.AUGMENT RPV water lvl control as necessary with ANY of the following:

SLC (test tank) 78 1450 psig SLC (boron tank) 78 1450 psig Directs ATC to initiate SLC IAW App 78 2-EOI Appendix-78 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[1] IF EOI Appendix 3A is required to be performed, THEN EXIT this procedure.

ATC NOTE SLC Test Tank is preferred source because unborated water may be supplied to the RPV through this injection path.

[2] IF RPV injection is needed immediately ONLY to prevent or mitigate fuel damage, THEN CONTINUE at Step 1.0(1 O] to inject SLC Boron Tank to RPV.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _8_ Page 12 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[1 O] UNLOCK and PLACE 2-HS-63-6A, SLC PUMP 2A/2B, control switch in START-A or START-B (Panel 9-5).

[11] CHECK SLC injection by observing the following:

• Selected pump starts, as indicated by red light illuminated above pump control switch.

• Squib valves fire, as indicated by SQUIB VALVE A and B CONTINUITY blue lights extinguished.

• SLC SQUIB VALVE CONTINUITY LOST Annunciator in alarm (2-XA-55-5B, Window 20).

ATC

• 2-Pl-63-7A, SLC PUMP DISCH PRESS, indicates above RPV pressure.

• System flow, as indicated by 2-IL-63-11, SLC FLOW, red light illuminated,

• SLC INJECTION FLOW TO REACTOR Annunciator in alarm (2-XA-55-5B, Window 14).

Injects SLC to the RPV IAW App 7B. Reports SLC injecting to the RPV ATC/BOP Reports RPV water level continuing to slowly lower Briefs crew on current plant status. Includes RPV water level lowering below -122" and receiving Gr. 1 isolation, transitioning RPV pressure control to 9-3, implementing C1, Alternate Level Control.

Can RPV water lvl be restored and maintained above -162 in.-NO SRO Exits RC/Land enters C1, Alternate Level Control CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 13 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Emergency RPV depressurization is required - NO It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - HAS RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft- CAN OR SRO Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained below 55 psig Verifies ADS inhibited CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F Crew Reports RPV water level approaching -122" Directs closing MSIVs SRO Directs RPV pressure control 800 psig - 1000 psig using App 11A

-SRVs BOP Closes MSIVs

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 14 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2-EOI Appendix-11A 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS LOCATION: Unit 2 Control Room ATTACHMENTS None

[1] IF Drywell Control Air is NOT available, THEN EXECUTE EOI Appendix BG, CROSSTIE CAD TO DRYWELL CONTROL AIR, CONCURRENTLY with this BOP procedure.

[2] IF Suppression Pool level is at or below 5.5 ft, THEN CLOSE MSRVs and CONTROL RPV pressure using other options.

[3] OPEN MSRVs using the following sequence to control RPV pressure as directed by SRO:

1 2-PCV-1-179 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 2 2-PCV-1-180 MN STM LINED RELIEF VALVE 3 2-PCV-1-4 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 4 2-PCV-1-31 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE 5 2-PCV-1-23 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 6 2-PCV-1-42 MN STM LINED RELIEF VALVE 7 2-PCV-1-30 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE 8 2-PCV-1-19 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE BOP 9 2-PCV-1-5 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 10 2-PCV-1-41 MN STM LINED RELIEF VALVE 11 2-PCV-1-22 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 12 2-PCV-1-18 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 13 2-PCV-1-34 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE Opens SRVs as required to maintain RPV pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 15 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior C-1 RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV lvl above -162" using ANY of the following:

LPCI system I (pumps A or C) 68 320 psig SRO LPCI system II (pumps B or D) 6C 320 psig CS system I (pumps A or C) 6D 330 psig CS system II (pumps B or D) 6E 330 psig Directs BOP to align CS and LPCI for injection to the RPV IAW Appendices 68, 6C, 6D and 6E Verifies that LPCI and CS are aligned with pumps running.

Reports LPCI and CS aligned Reports all four diesels have started Calls for AUO to monitor diesel generators SRO C-1 Can 2 or more CNDS, LPCI or CS inj subsystems be lined up - YES WHEN RPV water lvl drops to -162 in.

Direct crew to report when RPV water level lowers to -162 in.

DRIVER As AUO, acknowledge monitoring diesel generators for proper operation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _8_ Page 16 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM 1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Is ANY CNDS, LPCI or CS inj subsystem lined up for inj with at least one pump running - YES Is ANY RPV inj source lined up with at least one pump running - YES BEFORE RPV water lvl drops to -180 in.CONTINUE - CONTINUES EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED Updates crew that emergency depressurization is required EOl-1, RC/L IF Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required THEN EXIT RC/P and ENTER C2, Emergency RPV Depressurization SRO Enters C2, Emergency RPV Depressuriztion SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Containment water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 44 ft- CAN OW control air becomes unavailable -AVAIL

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 17 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Will the reactor remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - YES Is OW press above 2.4 psig - NO SRO Is suppr pl lvl above 5.5 ft - YES OPEN all ADS vlvs (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate)

Directs BOP to open all ADS valves Opens all ADS valves, verifies open using alternate indications BOP and reports 6 ADS valves open With a(n) injection system(s) operating and lined up for injection, before RPV water level reaches -180", initiate Emergency Depressurization.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling Prevent degradation of fission product barrier

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Reactor Water level trend

3. Measured by:

Observation: US direct Emergency Depressurization before RPV level lowers to -180 inches.

4. Feedback:

Reactor Pressure trend SRV status indications The Critical Task is not met if:

The Crew fails to Emergency Depressurize the RPV after being below -180 inches for greater than tern minutes.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: _8_ Page 18 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior C-1 SRO INJECT into the RPV with ANY available sources Directs injection of water to the RPV using all available sources C-2 Can 6 ADS vlvs be opened - YES IF Less than 4 MSRVs are open - NO AND RPV press is 70 psi or more above suppr chmbr press SRO The reactor is NOT subcritical - SUBCRITICAL WHEN the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - SUBCRITICAL WHEN shutdown cooling RPV press interlock clears - STOP When RPV pressure lowers below 450 psig, verifies and reports ATC/BOP that LPCI and CS injection valves have opened.

Report water injection into the RPV and reactor water level rising C-1 IF RPV water lvl can be restored and maintained above -162 in.

THEN EXIT this procedure and ENTER EOl-1, RPV Control, at Step RC/L-1 SRO Exits C-1, re-enters EOl-1 RC/L Directs coordinating injection of LPCI and CS to RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and +51 in. using LPCI and CS, Appendices 68, 6C, 6D, and 6E 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 19 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With RPV pressure below the Shutoff Head of the available Low Pressure system(s), operate available Low Pressure system(s) to restore RPV water level above TAF.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling Prevent degradation of fission product barrier.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Pressure below low pressure ECCS system(s) shutoff head

3. Measured by:

Operator manually starts or initiates at least one low pressure ECCS system and injects into the RPV to restore water level above TAF

4. Feedback:

Reactor pressure trend Reactor water level trend Reports SUPPR POOL AVERAGE TEMP HIGH (2-XA-55-3E, Window 12) in alarm. Temperature greater than 95°F BOP Coordinates with ATC to restore RPV water level to +2 in to +51 in. IAW Appendices 68, 6C, 60, and 6E.

2-ARP-9-3E SRO A. IF alarm is valid, THEN ENTER 2-EOl-2 Flowchart.

NRC If desired, scenario can be ended at this point DRIVER Place simulator in FREEZE at direction of NRC Chief Examiner

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 20 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOl-2 SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO SAMG entry is required - NO CAUTION

1. 4 PC press vs pump NPSH - CHECKED OW sprays have been initiated - NO Suppr chmbr sprays have been initiated - NO PC water level CANNOT be restored and maintained below 105 ft OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be restored and maintained below SRO 55 psig - CAN CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits - CHECKED MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl temp below 95°F using available suppr pl cooling (Appx 17A) - CHECKED WHEN suppr pl temp CANNOT be maintained below 95°F OPERATE all available suppr pl cooling using only RHR pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX 17A)

Directs BOP to use all available RHR for suppression pool cooling using App 17A If still restoring RPV water level, may only use one loop of RHR for NRC pool cooling. If level has been restored to normal, both loops of RHR can be used for pool cooling.

2-EOl-Appendix-17 A NOTE: Placing a BYPASS SEL switch in BYPASS in step 1 below prevents automatic opening of the affected RHR loop's outboard injection valve. This makes LPCI mode of that BOP RHR loop inoperable.

1. IF ...........Adequate core cooling is assured, OR

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 21of22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directed to cool the Suppression Pool irrespective of adequate core cooling, THEN ........ BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock AS NECESSARY:

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

2. PLACE RHR SYSTEM 1(11) in Suppression Pool Cooling as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR Heat Exchanger(s).

c. THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm RHRSW flow:

• 2-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 2A RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 2B RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 2C RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 20 RHRSW OUTLET VLV.

d. IF ............. Directed by SRO, THEN ....... PLACE 2-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD in MANUAL OVERIDE

e. IF ............. LPCI Initiation signal exists, THEN ....... MOMENTARILY PLACE 2-XS-74-121(129), RHR SYS 1(11) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT in SELECT.

f. IF ............. 2-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ....... VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

g. OPEN 2-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV.

h. VERIFY desired RHR pump(s) for Suppression Pool Cooling are operating.

CAUTION RHR system flows below 7000 gpm or above 10000 gpm for one-pump operation may result in excessive vibration and equipment damage.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

FW A line break-SCRAM Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

i. THROTTLE OPEN 2-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR POOL CLGfTEST VLV, to maintain EITHER of the following as indicated on 2-Fl-74-50(64), RHR SYS 1(11) FLOW:

• Between 7000 and 10000 gpm for one-pump operation.

OR

• At or below 13000 gpm for two-pump operation.

j. VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM 1(11) MIN FLOW VALVE.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 1.

I. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers.

Places available RHR in suppression pool cooling IAW App 17A Notifies Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to the in-service RHR Heat Exchangers.

As chemistry, acknowledge call that RHRSW is aligned to the in-Driver service heat exchangers NRG If desired, scenario can be ended at this point DRIVER Place simulator in FREEZE at direction of NRG Chief Examiner

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _9_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

2C RFP discharge valve fails to close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Trips Reactor Feed Pumps, Condensate Booster Pumps, and Condensate Pumps. Closes RFP Discharge valves.

ATC Recognizes and reports the failure of RFP 'C' Discharge valve to close. Recommends closing RFP 'C' Suction valve to complete the isolation.

SRO Directs closing the RFP 'C' Suction valve.

ATC Closes RFP 'C' Suction valve.

NRC End of Event #9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _1Q_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

HPCI is manually secured due to pumping out the feedwater break Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes that HPCI Discharge Pressure is lower than reactor pressure and that HPCI is pumping into the Steam Tunnel.

BOP Reports to US and recommends tripping HPCI Directs trip and lockout of HPCI (to isolate additional leakage SRO source.

Trips HPCI by depressing and holding the HPCI TURBINE TRIP pushbutton, 2-HS-73-18A, until zero rpm is indicated on HPCI TURBINE SPEED, 2-Sl-73-51, THEN taking HPCI AUXILIARY BOP OIL PUMP switch, 2-HS-73.47A, to PTL.

Reports HPCI secured NRC End of Event #10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SIMULATOR SETUP IC 28 Exam IC 92 Batch File or Pref File I 1501NRC1 NM07L4049C LPRM 40-49C 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 RD01A CRD Pum 1A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A RC09 RCIC Steam Leak 0 15 10:00 N/A N/A Failure of RCIC to RC10 Active 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A Isolate FW19 FW Line A Break 7 0 25 5:00 N/A N/A Reroc>~s > 0*~.~crtptio'1:~,.s 0; ~ *,r:~#'~~~: 1*.*<~~lay) "$e~~ifitJk' ~'R~roP*~ ,1rfiti~F 01

• i.eihaFvarui. **

• • .*.* * ..** .. *** ...**... :** .* I**.* .*...  :: ** .

.;* { ,*value:. \>

NM01 L2409C LPRM 24 -0 9C Active NIA N/A N/A N/A BYP HV OFF Bypassed - -

NM01 L2441 C ~~~~s~~41 C Active N/A N/A N/A N/A BYP- HV- OFF NM01 L4833C LPRM 48-33C Active N/A N/A N/A N/A BYP- HV- OFF Bypassed LPRM 56-25B NM01 L5625B Bypassed Active N/A N/A N/A N/A BYP- HV- OFF NM01 L5641 C LPRM 56 -41 C Active N/A N/A N/A N/A BYP- HV- OFF Bypassed

. ~inil

~~iru~1*"

3C Feedpump Disch ZDIHS35A[2] Active N/A N/A N/A N/A Norm Valve control switch Batch I Pref File(s): 1501 NRC1 imf NM07L4049C (2) 0 imf RD01A (5) imf RC09 (6) 15 10:00 imf RC10 imf FW19 (7) 25 5:00

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 irf NM01 L2409C BYP HV OFF irf NM01 L2441 C BYP HV OFF irf NM01 L4833C BYP HV OFF irf NM01 L5625B BYP HV OFF irf NM01L5641C BYP_HV_OFF ior ZDIHS35A norm

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: BFN Scenario Number: NRC-2 Op-Test Number: 1501 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

ATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 100%. The Steam Tunnel booster fan is tagged out for lubrication PMs. Suppression Pool Cooling is in service due to a HPCI flow rate test on the previous shift.

Turnover: Secure Suppression Pool Cooling. MIG signed on and will be performing 2-SR-3.3.6.1.5(4A/A) Core and Containment Cooling Systems RCIC Turbine Steam Line High Flow Instrument Channel A Calibration.

Event Malfunction Event Event Description Number Number Type*

N-BOP Secure from Suppression Pool Cooling using 1 N/A N-SRO 2-01-74 MIG reports that 2-RLY-071-13A-K12 did not I-SRO 2 N/A energize when 2-PDT-71-1A was pressurized and TS-SRO that they have stopped at step 7.4[7]8.

Override 28 C-BOP The 2A Steam Packing Exhauster will trip and the 28 3

SPE Auto C-SRO Steam Packing Exhauster will not auto start.

C-ATC 4 SW10A The 2A Fuel Pool Cooling pump will Trip.

C-SRO C-ATC 5 TH128 Recirc Pump 28 vibration high C-SRO R-ATC 6 TH108 C-BOP Recirc Pump 28 seal failure/2-AOl-68-1A TS-SRO TH22 7 RH01A&C M-All LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 RH068 SRO directs cool down or rapid depressurization of C-BOP 8 TC02 the RPV using Turbine bypass valves however they C-SRO fail closed and ED will be required.

C-BOP Core Spray Loop II injection valve will fail to open on 9 CS02A&B initiation signal but can be manually opened.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events

1. The BOP operator will secure from Suppression Pool Cooling using 2-01-74. When Suppression Pool Cooling is secured the scenario may continue.

2. The Instrument Mechanic Foreman will call the SRO and report that during performance of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.5(4A/A), Core and Containment Cooling Systems RCIC Turbine Steam Line High Flow Instrument Channel A Calibration, 2-RLY-071-13A-K12 did not energize when 2-PDT-71-1A was pressurized and that they have stopped at step 7.4[7]B. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.6.1 and table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine that function 4a is the affected function and that the Tech Spec requires placing the channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Once the Tech Spec call is completed the scenario may continue.

3. The running steam packing exhauster will trip and the standby exhauster will fail to auto start. The BOP operator will place the standby steam packing exhauster in service IAW 2-0l-47C section 6.3 and adjusts its operation to obtain 10-12 inches of H2 0 vacuum. At that point the scenario may continue.

4. The 2A Fuel Pool Cooling pump will trip. The SRO will direct the ATC to enter 2-AOl-78-1 and the 2B Fuel Pool Cooling pump will be placed in service IAW 2-AOl-78-1 step 4.2[3]. When the 2B Fuel Pool Cooling pump is in service and the lead examiner is ready the scenario may continue.

5. 2-XA-55-4B window 20 RECIRC Pump Motor B Vibration High alarms.

The BOP operator will dispatch an AUO to 2-LPNL-925-0712 and he/she will report that 2-Xl-68-710 and E are in alarm reading 12.0 mils and rising slowly. The SRO will direct lowering 2B Recirc speed to attempt to clear the alarm. The ATC operator will lower 2B Recirc pump speed. The AUO will report that 2-Xl-68-71 D and E lowered to -10 mils and will reset the alarm locally. When the lead examiner is ready the scenario may continue.

6. 2-XA-55-4B window 20, RECIRC Pump Motor B Vibration High alarms again and 2-XA-55-4B, window 25 Recirc Pump B no. 1Seal Leakage ABN, alarms. The number 2 seal pressure will rise to approximately Reactor Pressure. The SRO will direct tripping the 2B Recirc Pump and entering 2-AOl-68-1A. The ATC operator will lower Reactor Power IAW the RCP and 2-AOl-68-1A. The BOP operator will carry out the subsequent actions of the AOI. The SRO will address Tech Spec 3.4.1.

When conditions have stabilized and the lead examiner is ready the scenario may continue.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

7. A leak in the Drywell will develop causing Drywell Temperature and Pressure to rise. The SRO will set a trigger value for a Reactor Scram and when that value is reached a manual Scram will be inserted or the Reactor will Scram at 2.45 psig Drywell Pressure. All control rods will be inserted on the scram. The SRO will direct entry into 2-AOl-100-1. The SRO will direct Suppression Chamber spray per EOl-2 Appendix 17C.

The BOP operator will attempt to spray the Suppression Chamber however the First loop attempted the RHR pumps will trip. The BOP operator will attempt to spray the Suppression Chamber with the Second loop of RHR however the select logic will fail. If the SRO directs spraying the Suppression Chamber with Standby coolant or Fire Protection using RHR loop 1, the breaker for 2-FCV-074-0100 (480V RMOV BO 1B compartment 19A) or RHR loop II the breaker for 2-FCV-074-0101 (480V RMOV BO 3B compartment 19E) will not close.

The SRO/BOP operator will determine that neither the Suppression Chamber nor the Drywell can be sprayed. The SRO may attempt to cool down or anticipate that an ED will be required and attempt to rapidly depressurize the Reactor using the bypass valves however the bypass valves will fail closed. An ED will be required based on Drywell Temperature or the PSP curve. As the Reactor depressurizes the action required area of curve 8 RPV Saturation Temp will be entered and Reactor Water Level indication will be lost. The SRO will direct entry into C-4 and the crew will inject using available systems until the Main Steam Lines are flooded.

8. When the SRO directs a cool down or rapid depression of the RPV using the main turbine bypass valves, the operator will determine and report that the bypass valves have failed closed. This will lead to an ED being required.

9. With an accident signal present the Core Spray loop II injection valve will fail to automatically open, the BOP operator will manually open the injection valve.

The Scenario ends when the crew has performed an emergency depressurization and flooded the RPV to the Main Steam Lines.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks 2

1. When Suppression Chamber pressure cannot be maintained within the safe area of Curve 6 (PSP) or Drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 280°F the SRO determines that Emergency Depression is required and is initiated as directed by the SRO.

1. Safety Significance Precludes failure of Primary Containment

2. Cues Procedural compliance High Suppression Chamber or Drywell pressure

3. Measured by Observation-SRO updates or briefs the crew that ED is required based on exceeding PSP curve AND the operator opens 6 ADS/MSRVs

4. Feedback MSRV open indications RPV Pressure lowering

2. With Reactor Water Level unknown, inject into the RPV with available sources until there is indication that the Main Steam Lines are flooded (C-4 Note 7) and maintain them flooded.

1. Safety Significance Prevent fuel damage by establishing adequate core cooling

2. Cues Procedural compliance Loss of all RPV level indications

3. Measured by Observation-Indications that the Main Steam Lines are flooded are listed in C-4 Note 7

4. Feedback MSRV tail pipe temperature MSRV acoustic monitor RPV Pressure trend

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _1_ Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Secure from Suppression Pool Cooling using 2-01-74 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs BOP to secure Suppression Pool Cooling in accordance SRO with 2-01-74 2-01-74 8.6 Shutdown of Loop 1(11) Suppression Pool Cooling NOTE

1) All operations are performed at Panel 2-9-3 unless otherwise noted.

2) RHR flow should be monitored while in operation with multiple flow paths (e.g., LPCI and Suppression Pool Cooling together, etc.). During any evolution, total system flow as indicated on RHR SYSTEM 1(11) FLOW, 2-Fl-74-50(64), should remain between 7,000 to 10,000 gpm for 1 pump operation or between BOP 10,000 and 20,000 gpm for 2-pump operation.

[1] VERIFY Suppression Pool Cooling in operation.

REFER TO Section 8.5.

[2] REVIEW the precautions and limitations in Section 3.0.

[3] NOTIFY Radiation Protection of Suppression Pool Cooling loop removed from service. RECORD name and time of Radiation Protection representative notified in NOMS narrative log.

Verifies Suppression Pooling is in service, reviews P&L's in Section 3, and notifies RP that SPC is being removed from service DRIVER As RP, acknowledge that SPC is being removed from service Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _1_ Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Secure from Suppression Pool Cooling using 2-01-74 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS

1) To prevent draining an RHR Loop, at least one of the RHR System test valves must be closed before stopping RHR Pumps in the associated loop.

2) To prevent excessive vibration, RHR pumps should not be allowed to operate for more than 3 minutes at minimum flow.

3) When closing throttle valve RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR POOL BOP CLG!TEST VLV, 2-FCV-74-59 and 2-FCV-74-73 from the control room, the handswitch should be held in the close position for approximately 6 seconds after the red light extinguishes. Failure to completely close these valves could provide a leak path to the suppression pool from the RHR discharge piping.

[4] IF both RHR Pumps in Loop 1(11) are in operation AND one pump is to be removed from service due to reduced heat load, THEN:

[4.1] THROTTLE RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR POOL CLG!TEST VLV, 2-FCV-74-59(73), to obtain a flow of between 7,000 to 10,000 gpm and Blue light illuminated as indicated on RHR SYS 1(11) FLOW, 2-Fl-74-50(64).

[4.2] STOP RHR PUMP 2A(2B) or 2C(2D) using 2-HS 5A(28A) or 16A(39A).

[4.3] CLOSE associated RHR HX 2A(2B) or 2C(2D) RHRSW OUTLET VALVE, 2-FCV-23-34(46) or 40(52).

[4.4] IF RHRSW for the Heat Exchanger removed from service is not required to support other unit operations, THEN STOP RHRSW pump for the Heat Exchanger removed from service.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. -2._ Event No.: _1_ Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Secure from Suppression Pool Cooling using 2-01-74 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[5] CLOSE RHR SYS 1(11) SU PPR POOL CLGfTEST VLV, 2-FCV-74-59(73).

[6] WHEN RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR POOL CLGfTEST VLV, 2-FCV-74-59(73) is CLOSED, THEN STOP RHR PUMPS 2A(2B) or 2C(2D) using 2-HS 5A(28A) and/or 16A(39A).

[7] CLOSE RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV, 2-FCV-74-57(71).

[8] CLOSE RHR HX(s) 2A(2B) and 2C(2D) RHRSW OUTLET VLV(s), 2-FCV-23-34(46) and 40(52).

BOP

[9] IF RHRSW for RHR Heat Exchanger(s) A(B) and C(D) is not required to support other unit operations, THEN STOP RHRSW Pump(s) for the Heat Exchanger(s) removed from service.

[10] CHECK RHR System discharge header pressure is greater than TRM 3.5.4 limit as indicated on 2-Pl-74-51 (65),

RHR SYS 1(11) DISCH PRESS.

[11] IF the Drywell DP Compressor was removed from service in Section 8.5, THEN REFER TO 2-01-64 to return to service

[12] WHEN 2-Tl-74-136A and B, A/C and BID RHR PUMP ROOM TEMP indicators at Panel 2-9-3 indicate less than 95°F, THEN RETURN EECW to its normal operating configuration, if desired. REFER TO 0-01-67.

BOP NOTE RHR Loop 1(11) is now in a Standby Readiness Condition Secures Suppression Pool Cooling IAW 2-01-74 Reports that Suppression Pooling is shutdown NRC End of Event #1 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. -2_ Event No.: _2_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

MIG reports that 2-RLY-071-13A-K12 did not energize when 2-PDT-71-1A was pressurized Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for the second event, as the l&C Foreman, call the SRO and report the following:

During performance of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.5(4A/A), Core and DRIVER Containment Cooling Systems RCIC Turbine Steam Line High Flow Instrument Channel A Calibration, 2-RLY-071-13A-K12 did not energize when 2-PDT-71-1A was pressurized and that they have stopped at step 7.4[7]B.

Refers to Technical Specifications Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

Table 3.3.6.1-1

4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation SRO

a. RCIC Steam Line Flow - 1,2,3 F High A. One or more required A.1 Place a channel 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for channels inoperable. in trip Functions other than 2.a,2.b,5.h, 6.b, and 6.c Determines that a channel must be place in a tripped condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Conducts a crew brief on the test failure and Technical Specifications requirements due to the failure.

NRC End of Event #2 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _3_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

The 2A Steam Packing Exhauster will trip and the 28 Steam Packing Exhauster will not auto start.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is satisfied with the Technical DRIVER Specification call and ready for Event #3, insert F3 to trip 2A Steam Packing Exhauster Reports STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER VACUUM LOW (2-XA-55-7A, Window 12) in alarm.

Reports SPE Fan 2A has tripped and SPE Fan 2B has failed to start.

2-ARP-9-7A, Window 12 B. IF standby blower fails to start, THEN START standby OR VERIFY normal in service. REFER TO 2-0l-47C.

C. IF blower is running, PERFORM the following:

BOP 1. THROTTLE in-service STEAM PACKING EXHR 2B(2A)

DISCHARGE VLV, 2-HS-66-35A (2-HS-66-34A), UNTIL SPE Vacuum, as indicated on STEAM PACKING EXH VACUUM, 2-Pl-66-54, is between 10" and 12" Vacuum, or as appropriate for plant conditions. REFER TO 2-0l-47C.

2. VERIFY SJAE/OG CNDR CNDS FLOW, 2-Fl-2-42, between 2 x 106 lbm/hr and 3 x 106 lbm/hr to prevent tripping SPE due to inadequate cooling. REFER TO 2-01-2.

Starts 2B SPE Fan and throttles discharge valve until SPE Vacuum is between 1O" and 12" Vacuum. Verifies proper SJAE/OG CNDR condensate flow.

Reports 2B SPE Fan in service Calls Work Control to initiate a WO on the 2A SPE Fan OR directs SRO BOP to call.

DRIVER As Work Control, acknowledge initiating a WO on the 2A SPE fan.

NRC End of Event #3 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No . ..L Event No.: -1_ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

2A Fuel Pool Cooling Pump trips.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event #4, insert F4 (imf sw1 Oa) to trip 2A FPC pump.

Reports FUEL POOL SYSTEM ABNORMAL (2-XA-55-4C, ATC Window 1) in alarm and trip of the 2A Fuel Pool Cooling pump.

SRO Directs entry into 2-AOl-78-1 2-AOl-78-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

NOTE The Fuel Pool Cooling System may be used as desired as an alternate method of decay heat removal, when available: ( Refer to applicable Tech Spec Bases B 3.4.7, B 3.4.8, B 3.9.7,.B 3.9.8 CAUTION Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling System flow will cause Fuel Pool Cooling System Temperature inputs on 2-TR-74-80 to be inaccurate until Fuel Pool Cooling flow is reestablished.

[3] IF Fuel Pool Cooling System failure is from loss of cooling, THEN PERFORM the following:

[3.1] START idle Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 2B(2A).

[3.2] ATTEMPT to restart the tripped Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 2A(2B) as follows:

[3.2.1] INSPECT the tripped Fuel Pool Cooling Pump and Breaker for damage or abnormal conditions.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _L Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

2A Fuel Pool Cooling Pump trips.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[3.2.2] IF no damage or abnormal conditions are found, THEN

[3.2.2] IF no damage or abnormal conditions are found, ATC THEN START the tripped Fuel Pool Cooling Pump.

[3.3] VERIFY RBCCW System is operating and REFER TO 2-01-70 Starts 28 FPC pump. Verifies RBCCW is service. Dispatches personnel to inspect the tripped FPC pump and breaker.

NRC End of Event #4 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _5_ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 28 vibration high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event #5, insert F5 (imf th12b) for 'B' Reactor Recirc Pump high vibration.

Reports RECIRC PUMP MOTOR B VIBRATION HIGH (2-XA 48, Window 20) in alarm.

2-ARP-9-48, Window 20 A. CHECK the following on RECIRC PMP MTR 28 WINDING AND BRG TEMP recorder, 2-TR-68-71 on Panel 2-9-21 are below:

• Pump motor bearing temperatures (<190°F),

• Pump motor winding temperatures (<255°F),

• Pump Seal Cavity temperatures (<180°F),

• Pump motor closed cooling water temperature (<140°F),

ATC B. CHECK for rise in Drywell equip sump pump out rate due to seal leakage.

C. DISPATCH personnel to Panel 2-LPNL-925-0712 (Vibration Mon System) on El 565' (S-R10) and REPORT the Vibration Data for Pump 28 to the Unit Operator and any other alarm indications. The person shall advise the Unit Operator of any changes in the vibration values and Acknowledge Alarms as necessary D. IF alarm seals in, THEN ADJUST pump speed slightly to try to reset the alarm.

Dispatches personnel to Panel 2-LPNL-925-0712 to report vibration on 28 recirc pump.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _5_ Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 28 vibration high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior As RB AUO, acknowledge going to Vibration Panel on 565 and DRIVER reporting recirc pump 'B' vibration Checks Recirc Pump 'B' temperatures on Panel 2-9-21 and BOP reports all temperatures within allowable values.

After 5 minutes, call ATC operator and report that vibration on DRIVER recirc pump 'B' is 12 mils and rising very slowly.

ATC Updates crew on vibration report on 'B' recirc pump Directs ATC to lower 'B' recirc pump speed to try to get vibration SRO alarm to reset.

ATC Lowers 'B' recirc speed at least 5 rpm.

NRG Operator may using 'Lower Slow' (1rpm) or 'Lower Med' (5rpm)

When 'B' recirc pump speed has been lowered approximately 5 rpm, report that vibration is lowering but the alarm is still sealed in.

DRIVER When speed has been lowered approximately 1O rpm, insert F6 (dmf th12b) to delete the vibration condition and report the vibration is approximately 10 mils and lowering very slowly.

Briefs crew on ARP operator actions if the vibration condition SRO would occur again and was unable to be reset.

SRO may not conduct a brief on a possible recurrence.of the alarm NRG End of Event #5 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _6_ Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 28 seal failure/2-AOl-68-1A Timee t11 c_>s_ ition 1" Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event 6, insert F5 (imf th12b) to cause recirc pump 'B' vibration again Reports RECIRC PUMP MOTOR B VIBRATION HIGH (2-XA 48, Window 20) in alarm.

ATC Dispatches personnel to Panel 2-LPNL-925-0712 to report vibration on 28 recirc pump.

Reported recirc pump vibration will continue to rise. Failure of the NRC inner recirc pump seal on your direction.

After 5 minutes, call ATC operator and report that vibration on recirc pump 'B' is 12 mils and rising.

One minute later, call ATC operator and report that vibration on recirc pump 'B' is 15 mils and rising DRIVER One minute later, call ATC operator and report that vibration on recirc pump 'B' is 18 mils and rising.

Insert F7 (imf th10b 70) to fail the 'B' recirc pump inner seal SRO Directs ATC to trip 'B' Recirc Pump and enter 2-AOl-68-1 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: __§___ Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 28 seal failure/2-AOl-68-1A Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Trips 'B' Recirc Pump 2-AOl-68-1A 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

NOTE Power To Flow Map is maintained in O-Tl-248"Station Reactor Engineer" and on ICS.

ATC

[2] IF a single Recirc Pump tripped, THEN CLOSE tripped Recirc Pump discharge valve.

[3] IF Region I or II of the Power to Flow Map is entered, THEN (Otherwise N/A)

IMMEDIATELY take actions to INSERT control rods to less than 95.2% loadline. Refer to O-Tl-464, Reactivity Control Plan Development and Implementation.

DRIVER When 'B' Recirc Pump is tripped insert F6 (dmf th12b) to delete recirc pump 'B' vibration ATC Closes 'B' Recirc Pump discharge valve ATC/

Inserts control rods IAW RCP and control rod shove sheet BOP Reports RECIRC PUMP B NO 1 SEAL LEAKAGE ABN (2-XA 48, Window 25) in alarm.

2-ARP-9-48 NOTE Annunciator Window will not reset until all Alarms are ACK on the recorder 2-XR-68-2/5 (RECIRC PUMPS DISCH FLOW & TEMP).

A. DETERMINE initiating cause by comparing No. 1 and 2 seal cavity pressure indicators on Panel 2-9-4 or ICS.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No.~ Event No.:__§____ Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 28 seal failure/2-AOl-68-1A Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Plugging of No. 2 RO - No. 2 seal pressure approaches no. 1 seal pressure.

• Failure of No. 1 seal - No. 2 seal pressure is greater than ATC 50% of the pressure of No. 1.

Reports that No. 1 seal pressure and No. 2 seal pressure are approximately equal 2-AOl-68-1 A 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

[9] NOTIFY Reactor Engineer to PERFORM the following:

• REFER TO Tech Specs 3.4.1

• 2-SR-3.4.1 (SLO), Reactor Recirculation System Single Loop Operation

• O-Tl-248, Core Flow Determination in Single Loop Operation SRO (1 O] [NER/C] WHEN the Recirc Pump discharge valve has been closed for at least five minutes (to prevent reverse rotation of the pump) [GE SIL-517], THEN (N/A if Recirc Pump was isolated in Step 4.2(8])

OPEN Recirc Pump discharge valve as necessary to maintain Recirc Loop in thermal equilibrium.

Calls RE to inform them of the Recirc Pump trip Directs ATC to open 'B' Recirc Pump discharge valve after 5 minutes ATC Opens 'B' Recirc Pump discharge valve after 5 minutes Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: __§_ Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 28 seal failure/2-AOl-68-1A Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reviews Technical Specification 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation.

OR One recirculation loop may be in operation provided the following limits are applied when the associated LCO is applicable

a. LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR; SRO

b. LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

c. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power -

High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation; A. Requirements of A.1 Satisfy the requirements 24 hr LCO not met of the LCO Briefs crew on the Technical Specification requirements for only one recirc pump in operation.

As RE, acknowledge call that 'B' recirc pump was tripped due to DRIVER high vibration and TS requirements for single loop operations NRC End of Event #6 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event 7, insert F8 (imf th22 100 20:00) bottom head leak.

Reports Drywell Pressure rising slowly Continues to monitor containment parameters Reports PRI CONTAINMENT N2 PRESS HIGH (2-XA-55-38, Window 10) in alarm Reports Drywell Pressure 1.5 psig and rising slowly 2-ARP-9-38 A. CHECK containment pressure using multiple indications:

B. CHECK containment temperature.

BOP C. REFER TO 2-01-64, Venting the drywell with standby gas treatment fan.

Verifies drywell pressure rising using other indications Reports containment temperature rising slowly Reports DRYWELL NORM OPERATING PRESS HIGH (2-XA-55 38, Window 19) in alarm Reports Drywell Pressure 1.6 psig and rising slowly 2-ARP-9-38 G. IF Drywell pressure is high, THEN REFER TO 2-AOl-64-1.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs BOP to vent the drywell IAW 2-AOl-64-1 2-AOl-64-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[2] IF Drywell Pressure is High, THEN PERFORM the following: (Otherwise N/A)

BOP

[2.4] ALIGN and START additional Drywell coolers and fans as necessary. REFER TO 2-01-64.

CAUTION Stack release rates exceeding 1.4 X 107 µci/sec, or a Sl-4.8.B.1.a.1 release fraction above one will result in ODCM release limits being exceeded

[2.5] VENT Drywell as follows:

[2.5.1] CLOSE SUPPR CHBR INBD ISOLATION VLV 2-FCV-64-34 (Panel 2-9-3).

[2.5.2] VERIFY OPEN, DRYWELL INBD ISOLATION VLV, 2-FCV-64-31 (Panel 2-9-3).

[2.5.3] VERIFY 2-FIC-84-20 is in AUTO and SET at 100 scfm (Panel 2-9-55).

[2.5.4] VERIFY RUNNING a Standby Gas Treatment Fan STGTS TRAIN C(A)(B) (Panel 2-9-25).

[2.5.5] IF required, THEN BOP REQUEST Unit 1 Operator to START Standby Gas Treatment Fans A or B. (Otherwise N/A)

[2.5.7] PLACE 2-FCV-84-20 CONTROL DW/SUPPR CHBR VENT, 2-HS-64-35, in OPEN (Panel 2 3).

Calls Unit 1 operator and requests that a standby gas train be started.

Vents the drywell IAW 2-AOl-64-1 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When NRC Chief Examiner is satisfied with AOI actions, insert F9 DRIVER (imf th33d 2 15:00) steam leak in the drywell and F1 O (imf rh01 a-d) trip of all RHR pumps Reports drywell pressure and temperature continuing to rise Reports DRYWELL PRESS APPROACHING SCRAM (2-XA 3B, Window 30) in alarm BOP 2-ARP-9-38 A. CHECK containment pressure and temperature using multiple indications.

Continues to monitor and report containment parameters Briefs crew on current plant conditions.

Directs that a reactor scram be initiated at a point prior to the SRO automatic scram (line in the sand)

Calls line management and Load Dispatcher to inform them of upcoming scram DRIVER Acknowledge call concerning upcoming scram ATC Reports that drywell pressure is at the value directed by SRO Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Initiates a manual reactor scram Reactor Scram OATC Hard Card 1.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

[1] DEPRESS REACTOR SCRAM A and B, 2-HS-99-5A/S3A and 2-HS-99-5A/S3B, on Panel 2-9-5.

[2] IF scram is due to a loss of RPS, THEN PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in START & HOT STBY AND PAUSE for approximately 5 seconds (Otherwise N/A)

[3] Refuel Mode One Rod Permissive Light check:

[3.1] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in REFUEL.

[3.2] CHECK illuminated REFUEL MODE ONE ROD ATC PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46.

[3.3] IF REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46, is NOT illuminated, THEN CHECK all control rod positions at Full-In Overtravel, or Full-In.

(Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in SHUTDOWN.

[5] REPORT the following status to the US:

• Reactor Scram

• Mode Switch is in Shutdown

• "All rods in" or "rods out"

• Reactor Water Level and trend (recovering or lowering)

• Reactor pressure and trend

• MSIV position (Open or Closed)

• Power level Completes 'hard card' actions and makes scram report Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Enters EOl-1 on RPV Water Lvl below +2" Verify RX scram - CHECKED RC/Q Monitor and Control reactor power - CHECKED The reactor is subcritical AND NO boron has been injected THEN EXIT RC/Q and ENTER AOl-100-1, Reactor Scram - CHECKED Directs ATC to enter 2-AOl-100-1 RC/L CAUTION: Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend - CHECKED MONITOR and CONTROL RPV water lvl - CHECKED SRO VERIFY each as required

• PCIS isolations (Groups 1, 2, and 3) - CHECKED It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions -SUBCRITICAL RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft - CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained below 55 psig - CAN CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F - CHECKED Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1S-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _J_ Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in and +S1 in with ANY of the following CNDS and FW SA 1210 psig CRD S8 1640 psig RCIC with CST suction if available SC 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available SD 1200 psig CNDS 6A 480 psig cs 6D,6E 330 psig LPCI 68, 6C 320 psig Directs ATC to restore and maintain reactor level between +2 in and +S1 in using Condensate and Feedwater in accordance with Appendix SA RC/P OW press is above 2.4 psig - NO SRO Emergency RPV depressurization is anticipated - NO AND The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Is ANY MSRV cycling - NO Steam cooling is required - NO Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the existing RPV press - CAN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the safe area - CAN of Curve 4 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior OW control air becomes unavailable -AVAIL Boron inj is required - NO AND The main condenser is available AND SRO There has been no indication of a steam line break STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig with the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

Directs BOP to control reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig in accordance with Appendix 8B Verifies that Main Turbine Bypass valves are controlling reactor BOP pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig.

Verifies and reports successful Gr. 2, 3, 6, and 8 PCIS Isolations 2-EOI APPENDIX-SA

1. IF ............. It is desired to use a reactor feed pump that is in operation, THEN ...... CONTINUE at step 12 to control the operating pump

12. SLOWLY ADJUST RFPT speed UNTIL feedwater flow to the RPV is indicated, using ANY of the following methods on Panel 2-9-5:

• Individual 2-HS-46-8A(9A)(1 OA), RFPT 2A(2B)(2C) SPEED ATC CONT RAISE/LOWER switch in MANUAL GOVERNOR, OR

• Individual 2-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 2A(2B)(2C) SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL, OR

• 2-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in MANUAL with individual 2-SIC

13. ADJUST RFPT speed as necessary to control injection using the methods of step 12.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: _7_ Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

14. WHEN ....... RPV level is approximately equal to desired level AND automatic level control is desired, THEN ........... PLACE 2-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in AUTO with individual 2-SIC 8(9)(10), RFPT 2A(2B)(2C) SPEED CONTROL in AUTO Restores reactor water level to +2 in to +51 in IAW App. 5A 2-AOl-100-1 ATC 2.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

[2] DRIVE in all IRMs and SRMs from Panel 2-9-5 as time and conditions permit.

[3] VERIFY SCRAM DISCH VOL VENT & DR VLVS closed by green indicating lights at SDV Display on Panel 2-9-5.

[4] MONITOR and CONTROL Reactor Water Level between

+2" and +51 ", or as directed by US, using RFP/RFPT.

[5] RETURN to body of procedure at step 4.2[5] AND CONTINUE with actions as required.

Performs AOl-100-1 subsequent actions 2-AOl-100-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

VERIFY TRIPPED the Main Turbine as follows:

[9.1] DEPRESS the TRIP pushbutton, 2-HS-47-67D on Panel 2-9-7. [NER/C] [INPO SOER 81-015]

[9.2] PERFORM the following as required to VERIFY OPEN GENERATOR PCB 224:

[9.2.1] CHECK green light illuminated and red light not BOP illuminated above handswitch GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 2-HS-242-224A.

[9.3] IMMEDIATELY PLACE VOLTAGE REGULATOR START/STOP SEL, 2-HS-57-24, to STOP and release.

[9.4] CHECK the following at 2-HS-57-24:

• GREEN light illuminated

• RED liQht extinQuished Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _J__ Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[10] MONITOR Main Turbine Vibration on TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION, 2-XR-47-15, during coast down.

[11] ADJUST TURBINE OIL TEMPERATURE CONT, 2-TIC-24-75, setpoint to 85°F.

BOP

[12] WHEN turbine speed is less than 900 RPM, THEN START the following:

• TURBINE BEARING LIFT OIL PUMPS

• MOTOR SUCTION PUMP

• AC TURNING GEAR OIL PUMP ATC/BOP Updates crew on drywell pressure continuing to rise and reaching 2.45 psig - EOl-2 entry condition BOP Reports start and injection of HPCI into the RPV.

Verifies HPCI not needed for RPV level control and directs BOP to SRO trip and lockout HPCI.

Trips HPCI by holding the trip pushbutton depressed until turbine BOP speed in zero then taking HPCI Aux Oil Pump sw. to PTL.

Enters EOl-2 and re-enters EOl-1 on High Drywell Pressure.

EOl-2 SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO SAMG entry is required - NO CAUTION

1. 4 PC press vs pump NPSH - CHECKED SRO OW sprays have been initiated - NO Suppr chmbr sprays have been initiated - NO PC water level CANNOT be restored and maintained below 105 ft OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be restored and maintained below 55 psig - CAN CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits - CHECKED Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _l._ Event No.: J_ Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 1ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PC/P MONITOR and CONTROL PC press below 2.4 psig using the Vent system (AOl-64-1) - CHECKED WHEN PC press CANNOT be maintained below 2.4 psig - CHECKED BEFORE suppr chmbr press rises to 12 psig SRO CONTINUE - CHECKED CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits INITIATE suppr chmbr sprays using only pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX 17C)

Directs BOP to initiate Suppression Pool Spray IAW App 17C 2-EOI APPENDIX-17C

1. BEFORE Suppression Chamber pressure drops below 0 psig, CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 6.

2. IF ..... Adequate core cooling is assured OR Directed to spray the Suppression Chamber irrespective of adequate core cooling, THEN ... BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock as necessary:

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BOP BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

5. INITIATE Suppression Chamber Sprays as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. IF ..... EITHER of the following exists:

• LPCI Initiation signal is NOT present, OR

• Directed by SRO, Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _J_ Page11of21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior THEN ... PLACE keylock switch 2-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD, in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

c. MOMENTARILY PLACE 2-XS-74-121(129), RHR SYS 1(11)

CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT, switch in SELECT.

d. IF ..... 2-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS 1(11) INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, BOP THEN ... VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS 1(11)

OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

e. VERIFY OPERATING the desired RHR System 1(11) pump(s) for Suppression Chamber Spray.

Aligns RHR loop for Suppression Pool Spray Attempts to start RHR pump(s) on that loop Reports failure of both RHR pump to start Directs using the other loop of RHR to spray the torus SRO Calls WC to investiQate the RHR pump failure When operator moves to the other loop of RHR, insert F11 or F12, depending on loop being moved to (ior zdihs74121/129 null) and DRIVER delete RHR pump malfunctions for the RHR loop being moved to i.e. RHR pumps will start on the second loop but can't select.

When aligning the other loop of RHR for suppression pool spray, discovers that the SELECT amber light will not remain illuminated when the "SELECT" switch is taken to "SELECT" BOP Reports that Suppression Pool Spray cannot be initiated in either loop of RHR Calls WC to initiate a WO for troubleshooting the problem with the SRO SELECT switch for RHR As WC, acknowledge initiating WOs to investigate and repair DRIVER problems with RHR pumps and SELECT loQic.

Reports that drywell pressure and temperature are continuing to CREW rise.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DW/T CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend - CHECKED MONITOR and CONTROL DW temp below 160°F using available OW cooling - CHECKED WHEN OW temp CANNOT be maintained below 160°F - CHECKED OPERATE all available OW cooling - CHECKED BEFORE OW temp rises to 200° EOl-1, RPV Control at Step RC SCRAM BEFORE OW temp rises to 280°F CONTINUE SRO Is suppr pl lvl below 19 ft. - YES Is DW temp within the safe area of Curve 5 - YES SHUT DOWN Recirc pumps and OW blowers Directs ATC to Shutdown 'A' Reactor Recirc pump Directs BOP to shutdown DW blowers CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits - CHECKED INITIATE OW sprays using only pumps NOT required to assure adequate core coolinQ by continuous ini (APPX17B)

ATC Reports 'A' recirc pump secured BOP Reports OW blowers secured Directs BOP to initiate Drywell Sprays (on loop of RHR with SELECT logic) using standby cooling IAW App 17B 2-EOI APPENDIX-17B

1. BEFORE drywell pressure drops below 0 psig, CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 7. _

SRO

2. IF ..... Adequate core cooling is assured OR Directed to spray the Drywell irrespective of adequate core cooling, Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: J__ Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior THEN ... BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock as necessary:

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

3. VERIFY Recirc Pumps and Drywell Blowers are shut down.

4. IF ..... Directed by SRO to spray the Drywell using Standby Coolant supply, THEN ... CONTINUE in this procedure At Step 8 using RHR Loop I OR At Step 9 using RHR Loop 11.

SRO 8(9). INITIATE Drywell Spray on RHR Loop I using Standby Coolant Supply as follows:

a. IF ..... EITHER of the following exists:

• LPCI Initiation signal is NOT present, OR

• Directed by SRO, THEN ... PLACE keylock switch 2-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS I (II) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD, in MANUAL OVERRIDE

b. MOMENTARILY PLACE 2-XS-74-121(129), RHR SYS I (II) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT, switch in SELECT.

c. IF ..... 2-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ... VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

d. VERIFY CLOSED the following valves:

• 2-FCV-74-61(75), RHR SYS 1(11) OW SPRAY INBD VLV

• 2-FCV-74-60(74), RHR SYS 1(11) OW SPRAY OUTBD VLV

• 2-FCV-74-58(72), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBR SPRAY VALVE

• 2-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR POOL CLG/TEST VLV

• 2-FCV-23-52(46), RHR HX (28)20 RHRSW OUTLET VLV.

e. VERIFY RHR Pumps 2A(28) and 2C(2D) are NOT running.

f. 01 Dispatches AUO to restore power to 74-100 or 74-101(depending on the loop of RHR being used)

Acknowledge closing the breaker for either 74-100 or 74-1O1 to restore power to the valve.

DRIVER After 5 minutes, report that the breaker, for the valve called for, cannot be closed.

Calls WC to send personnel out to assist getting breaker closed SRO on crosstie valve Acknowledge sending personnel to assist getting power restored DRIVER to the crosstie valve.

Reports drywell pressure and temperature continuing to rise CREW Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No._£___ Event No.: _7_ Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF the SRO decides to Rapidly Depressurize the RPV, this would NRC initiate Event No. 8 EOl-2, DW/T WHEN DW temp CANNOT be restored and maintained below 280°F EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED(EOl-1, RC/P-4; C1-1, C1-20; C5-12, C5-14)

Updates crew that Emergency Depressurization is required EOl-1, RC/L IF Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required THEN EXIT RC/P and ENTER C2, Emergency RPV Depressurization Enters C2, Emergency RPV Depressurization SRO SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Containment water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 44 ft- CAN DW control air becomes unavailable - AVAIL Will the reactor remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - YES Is DW press above 2.4 psig - YES PREVENT inj from ONLY those CS and LPCI pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling (Appx 4)

Direct ATC to terminate and prevent feedwater and condensate using App 4 2-EOI APPENDIX-4

6. PREVENT injection from CONDENSATE and FEEDWATER by performing the following:

ATC

a. IF............. .immediate injection termination from a reactor feedwater pump is required, THEN ........... PERFORM step 6.d for the desired pump.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. __£___ Event No.: _7_ Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

b. LOWER RFPT 2A(2B)(2C) speed to minimum setting (approximately 600 rpm) using ANY of the following methods on Panel 2-9-5:

• Using 2-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in MANUAL AND individual 2-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 2A(2B)(2C) SPEED CONTROL in AUTO, OR

• Using individual 2-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 2A(2B)(2CSPEED CONTROL in MANUAL, OR

• Using individual 2-HS-46-8A(9A)(1 OA), RFPT 2A(2B)(2C)

SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch in MANUAL GOVERNOR.

ATC c. CLOSE the following valves BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 500 psig:

• 2-FCV-3-19, RFP 2A DISCHARGE VALVE

• 2-FCV-3-12, RFP 2B DISCHARGE VALVE

• 2-FCV-3-5, RFP 2C DISCHARGE VALVE

• 2-LCV-3-53, RFW START-UP LEVEL CONTROL

d. TRIP RFPTs as necessary to prevent injection by DEPRESSING the following push-buttons:

• 2-HS-3-125A, RFPT 2A TRIP

• 2-HS-3-151A, RFPT 2B TRIP

• 2-HS-3-176A, RFPT 2C TRIP.

Terminates and prevents condensate and feedwater IAW App 4 Reports when complete C-2 Is suppr pl lvl above 5.5 ft - YES OPEN all ADS Vlvs SRO (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate)

Directs BOP to open all ADS valves Opens all ADS valves, verifies open using alternate indications BOP and reports 6 ADS valves open Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK When Drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 280°F the SRO determines that Emergency Depressurization is required and is initiated as directed by the SRO.

1. Safety Significance Precludes failure of Primary Containment

2. Cues Procedural compliance High Drywell temperature

3. Measured by Observation-SRO updates or briefs the crew that ED is required based on Drywell temperature AND the operator opens 6 ADS/MSRVs

3. Feedback MSRV open indications RPV Pressure lowering This Critical Task is not met if the Crew does not ED by 300°F.

EOl-1, RC/L RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and +51 in. with ANY of the following:

RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 5D 1200 psig SRO CS 6D, 6E 330 psig LPCI 68, 6C 320 psig Directs BOP to restore and maintain RPV water level between +2 in. and +51 in. using RCIC/HPCI, Appendices 5C/5D. Supplement with CS/LPCI, Appendices 68, 6C, 6D, and 6E.

Insert Shift F2 (cs02b) to prevent auto opening of CS II inbd DRIVER injection valve and Shift F3 (imf th34f) for flashing all reference legs.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When reactor pressure lowers below 450 psig, the operators will NRC verify that LPCl/CS injection valves open. This will initiate Event No. 9 ATC/BOP Coordinate restoring RPV water level to +2 in. to +51 in. using RCIC/HPCl/CS/LPCI ATC/BOP Report isolation of RCIC and HPCI on low reactor pressure Briefs crew on current plant conditions including the potential to SRO flash RPV level reference legs.

Monitors RPV water level using all instrumentation Reports indication of 'notching' on RPV water level ATC/BOP instrumentation Reports RPV water level is 'unknown' EOl-1, RC/L IF THEN RPV water lvl CANNOT be EXIT RC/L and determined ENTER C4, RPV Flooding C-4 CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend SRO IF RPV water lvl can be determined - CANNOT AND It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - SUBCRITICAL Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RPV water lvl can be determined - CANNOT AND The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions SRO PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft - CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained below 55 psig- CAN OW control air becomes unavailable -AVAILABLE IF THEN The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions B>

Is suppr pl lvl above 5.5 ft. - YES OPEN all ADS vlvs - OPEN (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate Can 6 ADS vlvs be opened - YES IF THEN It has been determined that the RPV has been flooded to the main steam D>

SRO lines Can any MSRV be opened - YES ISOLATE ANY of the following NOT needed for RPV injection Injection

• Main steam lines

• Main steam line drains

• HPCI

• RCIC Directs BOP to isolate/verify isolated Main Steam lines, Main Steam line drains, HPCI and RCIC Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verifies main steam lines, main steam line drains, HPCI, and BOP RCIC are isolated.

Reports isolated CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F SRO FLOOD the RPV to the elevation of the main steam lines with the following:

CRD 5B 1640 psig CNDS 6A 480 psig LPCI 6B, 6C 320 psig SRO cs 6D,6E 330 psig Directs flooding the RPV to the steam lines using available sources of injection Inject to the RPV using all available sources of injection ATC/BOP Report that RPV pressure is rising Report that MSRV have reopened C-4 Can ANY MSRV be opened - YES NOTE?

Indication that the RPV is flooded to the main steam lines may include ANY of the following:

SRO

• Tail pipe temperatures of open SRVs decrease to subcooled values.

• Rising RPV pressure as noncondensibles are compressed.

• Actuation of SRV tail pipe acoustic monitors.

• MSRVs re-open and stay open at RPV pressures below 50 psig above suppression chamber pressure due to the head of water above the MSRVs. (MSRVs may open and close sluggishly if the discharge flow is subcooled.)

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _7_ Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Monitors for indications that the RPV is flooded Determines that the RPV is flooded C-4 IF It CANNOT be determined that the RPV Is flooded to the Main Steam Lines - CAN SRO ISOLATE the following: - ISOLATED

• Main steam lines

• Main steam line drains

• HPCI

• RCIC CONTROL RPV inj as low as practicable to maintain the steam lines flooded Directs controlling RPV injection as low as practicable to maintain the steam lines flooded ATC/BOP Control RPV injection as directed.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --2._ Event No.: _7_ Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

LOCA/Scram with inability to spray the Drywell/C4 Time - __ 1iuon Applicant's Actions or Behavior With Reactor Water Level unknown, inject into the RPV with available sources until there is indication that the Main Steam Lines are flooded (C-4 Note 7) and maintain them flooded.

1. Safety Significance Prevent fuel damage by establishing adequate core cooling

2. Cues Procedural compliance Loss of all RPV level indications

3. Measured by Observation-Indications that the Main Steam Lines are flooded are listed in C-4 Note 7

4. Feedback MSRV tail pipe temperature MSRV acoustic monitor RPV Pressure trend This Critical Task is not met if the Crew fails to continue to raise level and maintain pressure on the vessel.

NRC End of Event #7 and scenario Place simulator in FREEZE upon direction of the NRC Chief DRIVER Examiner Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _8_ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Rapid depressurization of the RPV using Turbine bypass valves Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When SRO makes the decision to rapidly depressurize the RPV, DRIVER insert SHIFT F1 (imf tc02 0) to fail the main turbine bypass valves closed EOl-2, DW/T WHEN OW temp CANNOT be restored and maintained below 280°FDW EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED(EOl-1, RC/P-4; C1-1, C1-20; CS-12, CS-14)

Determines that OW temperature will exceed 280°F and won't be able to restore and maintain below 280°F EOl-1, RC/P IF Emergency RPV depressurization is anticipated AND The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions THEN RAPIDLY DEPRESSURIZE the RPV with the main turbine bypass vlvs (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown Directs BOP to rapidly depressurize the RPV with the main turbine bypass valves.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _8_ Page 2of2 Event

Description:

Rapid depressurization of the RPV using Turbine bypass valves Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2-01-47 8.0 INFREQUENT OPERATIONS 8.1 Bypass Valve Operation NOTES BOP 1) Section 8.1.1 uses the RAISE, 2-HS-47-130B and LOWER, 2-HS-4 7-130A for the Bypass Jack to open and close the Bypass Valves.

2) When using the Jack to operate the Bypass valves, the valves will stay open at the desired position until closed by the LOWER, 2-HS-47-130A pushbutton. EHC Auto cooldown will not close the Bypass Valves, if the BPV DEMAND is greater than 0%

8.1.1 Using Bypass Valve Demand

[1] To open Bypass valves DEPRESS the BPV demand RAISE, 2-HS-47-130B pushbutton to slowly open the Bypass Valves until the desired number of Bypass valves are open.

BOP Attempts to open the Main Turbine Bypass valves to rapidly depressurize the RPV.

Reports that the Main Turbine Bypass valve will not open.

Calls WC to initiate troubleshooting on the bypass valves NRC End of Event #8 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _2_ Event No.: _9_ Page 1 of#

Event

Description:

Core Spray Loop II injection valve will fail to open on initiation signal but can be manually opened Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When reactor pressure lowers below 450 psig, checks that LPCI and CS injection valves automatically open.

BOP Reports that CS II inboard injection valve (75-53) failed to automatically open.

Opens CS II inbd injection valve (75-53)

BOP Reports that CS II inbd injection valve is open NRG End of Event #9 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SIMULATOR SETUP IC Exam IC Batch File or Pref File Batch I Pref File(s):

Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: BFN Scenario No.: NRC - 3 Op-Test No.: 1501 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

ATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 5%. Unit1 and Unit 2 are at 100% power.

Turnover: Perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation IAW 3-0l-47A, Sec. 6.2.

Continue plant startup IAW 3-GOl-100-1A section 5.4, mode change from Mode 2 to Mode 1.

Event Malfunction Event Event Description Number Number Type*

N-BOP Perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump 1 N/A N-SRO Alternation IAW 3-0l-47A, Sec. 6.2 R-ATC 2 N/A Power increase with Control Rods to 8% IAW GOI R-SRO C-ATC RD07R0239 3 TS- Control Rod Drift in RD06R0239 SRO C-BOP 4 OG04A Loss of SJAE 'A' I Swap to STBY SJAE 'B' C-SRO I-ATC 5 NM05 IRM 'C' Failure Upscale/Half Scram TS-SRO C-BOP Loss of 4KV Shutdown Board 3ED, 3D DIG fails to 6 DG03D TS-SRO AUTO tie FW14C C-ATC 7 Trip of RFP 3C/ recover with already warm RFP 3B C-SRO PC 14 (e20 0) 100 Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on 8 300 75 M-ALL Torus water level 9 FW30 C-ATC Failure of RFP 3B governor/pump needs tripped.

AD01D C-BOP 10 ADS SRV Failures AD01E C-SRO

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events

1. The BOP Operator will perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation IAW 3-01-47A, Section 6.2. The Operator will have to turn off the pump twice before it will work. Once the EHC Pumps have been swapped the scenario may continue.

2. ATC will withdraw control rods in order to raise power to 8% for a mode change from 2 to 1. Once the Chief Examiner has seen an appropriate amount of power rise he may choose to continue with the next event which will halt control rod withdrawal.

3. Control Rod xx-xx will begin to drift in to approximately position 10, and the ATC will respond IAW 3-AOl-85-5 and bypass the RWM and insert Control Rod xx-xx to position 00. The SRO will declare Control Rod xx-xx inoperable and refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3 condition C. The SRO will also refer to Tech Spec 3.1.6 condition A for BPWS and 3.3.2.1 condition C for RWM. Once the rod has been inserted and the Tech Spec call has been made the scenario may continue.

4. Loss of SJAE A, BOP operator swaps to B SJAE IAW 3-AOl-47-3, Loss of Condenser Vacuum or IAW 3-01-66 or the hardcard. After the standby SJAE has been placed in service and Main Condenser vacuum has recovered, the scenario may continue.

5. The ATC will respond to a failure of IRM 'C' upscale and notice and report that a% scram failed to come in on the upscale condition. IRM 'C' will be bypassed IAW 3-AOl-92-A, section 6.1. The SRO will refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 and enter an Information A loss of trip function occurred and that Condition will be entered in the spec. After the BOP Operator bypasses the failed IRM and the SRO has completed the Tech Spec call the scenario may continue.

6. D 4KV Shutdown Board will lose power and the D Diesel Generator will fail to automatically tie to the Shutdown Board. The BOP will manually tie the Diesel to the board. SRO will refer to Tech Specs and determine TS 3.8.1 condition A, B, and G, and TS 3.8.7.A. The ATC will be resetting RPS and PCIS. After the BOP Operator ties the Diesel to the Buss and the SRO has completed the Tech Spec call the scenario may continue.

7. The ATC will respond to a trip of the 3C RFP IAW 3-AOl-3-1 by raising the speed of the warm RFP 3B to feed the RPV. Once the ATC has entered AOl-3-1 and raised the speed on the standby Reactor Feedpump to maintain RPV Water Level the scenario may continue.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

8. At the cue of the Chief Examiner initiate the next event. An unisolable leak will develop on the suppression chamber. The US will direct entry into EOl-3 on secondary containment area flood alarms and EOl-2 on suppression pool water level. Prior to 12. 75 ft, in the Suppression Pool, the US will direct HPCI to be secured and locked out. Prior to 11.5 ft in the Suppression Pool the US will transition to EOl-1 and direct a SCRAM. An ATWS will exist on the SCRAM. The crew will work through EOl-1 and C-5 to insert control rods, maintain reactor water level, and reactor pressure. The US will transition to C-2 to emergency depressurize before Suppression Pool water level lowers to 11.5 feet.

9. The US will direct terminating and preventing IAW EOI appendix 4, and the 3B RFP governor will fail as is. The ATC/BOP will Trip the 3B RFP.

10. The BOP will report that two of the ADS SRV's failed for Emergency Depressurization. Two additional non ADS SRV's will be opened at the direction of the SRO.

The Scenario ends when Emergency Depressurization and Reactor Water Level is restored and maintained within the assigned band or upon request of Lead Examiner.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks 4

1. When Suppression Pool Level cannot be maintained above 12.75 feet HPCI secured to prevent damage.

1. Safety Significance:

Prevent failure of Primary Containment from pressurization of the Suppression Chamber

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Suppression Pool Level indication

3. Measured by:

Observation - HPCI Auxiliary Pump placed in Pull to Lock

4. Feedback:

HPCI does not Auto initiate No RPM indication on HPCI

2. When Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 11.5 feet the US determines that Emergency Depressurization is required, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of Containment

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Suppression Pool Level Trend

3. Measured by:

Observation - US determines (indicated by announcement or observable transition to C-2) that Emergency Depressurization is required before Suppression Pool level drops below 11.5 feet.

Observation - RO opens at least 6 SRV's during performance of Emergency Depressurization actions.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

4. Feedback:

RPV pressure trend SRV status indications Suppression Pool temperature trend

3. During an ATWS, when conditions with Emergency Depressurization required, Terminate and Prevent RPV injection from ECCS and Feedwater until reactor pressure is below the MARFP as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Prevention of fuel damage due to uncontrolled feeding.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Observation - No ECCS injection prior to being less than the MARFP.

Observation - Feedwater terminated and prevented until less than the MARFP.

4. Feedback:

Reactor power trend, power spikes, reactor short period alarms.

Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

4. With RPV pressure <MARFP, slowly increase and control injection into RPV to restore and maintain RPV level above TAF as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling and preclude possibility of large power excursions.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance RPV pressure indication

3. Measured by:

Observation - Injection not commenced until less than MARFP, and injection controlled such that power spikes are minimized, level restored and maintained greater than TAF

4. Feedback:

RPV level trend RPV pressure trend Injection system flow rate into RPV

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _1_ Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation IAW 2-01-47 A, Sec. 6.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2-0l-47A 6.2 EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation

[1] VERIFY EHC System in service. REFER TO Section 5.1.

[2] REVIEW Precautions and Limitations listed in Section 3.0 NOTES

1) This section is performed from Panel 2-9-7 unless otherwise specified.

2) This test should be performed during weekly alternation of pumps.

3) This section describes the actions necessary to test (standby)

EHC Pump 2A. Testing EHC Pump 2B is the same and the component numbers are enclosed in parenthesis.

4) Operations personnel should be present at the EHC skid to observe proper system operation.

5) If EHC PUMP 2A(2B) TEST, 2-HS-47-4A(5A), is depressed for longer than 10 seconds, annunciator STANDBY EHC PUMP BOP FAILED, 2-XA-47-111 (2-XA-55-7B, window 15), will alarm.

[3] DEPRESS the EHC PUMP 2A(2B) TEST, 2-HS 4A(5A), and CHECK the following actions occur:

• EHC Hydraulic Fluid Pump 2A(2B) starts.

• Annunciator STANDBY EHC PUMP RUNNING, 2-XA-47-108 (2-XA-55-7B Window 8), ANNUNCIATES. o

• Red light above test switch is ILLUMINATED (PS 1B(2B)) (positive indication of pump discharge pressure NOTE Allow both EHC pumps to operate for at least 30 seconds to allow the Standby pump to expel any air which may have accumulated in the pump casing

[4] CHECK the started EHC HYO PUMP 2A(2B) DISCH PRESS, 2-Pl-47-1(2), indicates between 1550 psig and 1750 psig, locally at the EHC skid.

Calls AUO at EHC skid to verify EHC pump discharge pressure Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _1_ Page 2of4 Event

Description:

Perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation IAW 2-01-47A, Sec. 6.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER As AUO report EHC pump discharge pressure is 1650 psig NOTE If, after starting the standby EHC pump, EHC pump discharge pressure is significantly above 1750 psig, there may be a problem with the pressure compensator. Consideration should be given to contacting System Engineering prior to placing the standby EHC pump in service.

[5] IF the started EHC pump discharge pressure is NOT between 1550 psig and 1750 psig, THEN ADJUST pressure compensator for the started EHC pump to adjust pump discharge pressure. REFER TO Section 8.6[1].

NOTES

1) Voltmeters in Step 6.2[6] normally indicate approximately zero volts. When an EHC header pressure switch actuates, the associated voltmeter will indicate approximately mid-scale. The Unit Operator should be notified if a voltmeter indicates greater than 5 volts with the EHC System in service.

2) If two out of three EHC header pressure switches actuate, a turbine trip will occur.

[6] CHECK locally on Junction Box 2-JBOX-047-10166 that the following voltmeters indicate approximately 0 volts:

• TURB EHC HOR PRESS 2-PS-47-63A TRIP IND, 2-E1-047-0063A.

• TURB EHC HOR PRESS 2-PS-47-63B TRIP IND, 2-El-047-0063B.

• TURB EHC HOR PRESS 2-PS-47-63C TRIP IND, 2-El-047-0063C.

Calls operator at Junction Box to verify voltmeters indicate approximately 0 volts.

DRIVER As operator at Junction Box, report voltmeters indicate approximately 0 volts.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _1_ Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation IAW 2-01-47A, Sec. 6.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[7] IF alternating operating EHC pumps, THEN STOP EHC pump 2B(2A) using EHC HYO FLUID PUMP 2B(2A), 2-HS-47-2A(1A).

[10] CHECK EHC HEADER PRESSURE, 2-Pl-47-7, indicates between 1550 psig and 1650 psig.

BOP The EHC Pump will not stop on the first attempt and the Operator will notice this and report it right away or try the switch again and then report to the US that the pump failed to stop on the first attempt.

[12] IF pumps were alternated, THEN RESET any disagreement flags by placing the operating EHC pump handswitch, 2-HS-47-1A(2A), to START.

[13] CHECK EHC PMP 2A(2B) MTR amps, 2-El-47-1(2) indicates less than 140 amps for the operating pump.

[14] VERIFY EHC Pump 2A(2B), EHC PUMP SUCTION FILTER and EHC AUX PUMP SUCTION FILTERS indicate CLEAN, locally at the EHC skid.

[15] [NER/C] VERIFY MANUAL FLOW CONTROL VALVE, 2-47-588, is set at 2.5 turns clockwise. [INPO SOER 84-006]

Calls AUO at EHC skid to verify pump suctions filters clean and that manual flow control valve is 2.5 turns clockwise.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _1_ Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Perform EHC Auto Pump Start Test & Weekly Pump Alternation IAW 2-01-47 A, Sec. 6.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior As AUO, report that EHC pump and aux. pump suctions filters DRIVER indicate clean and 2-47-588, manual flow control valve, is set 2.5 turns clockwise.

NOTES

1) Voltmeters in Step 6.2[16] normally indicate approximately zero volts. When an EHC header pressure switch actuates, the associated voltmeter will indicate approximately mid-scale. The BOP Unit Operator should be notified if a voltmeter indicates greater than 5 volts with the EHC System in service.

2) If two out of three EHC header pressure switches actuate, a turbine trip will occur.

[16] CHECK locally on Junction Box 2-JBOX-047-10166 that the following voltmeters indicate approximately 0 volts:

• TURB EHC HOR PRESS 2-PS-47-63A TRIP IND, 2-El-04 7-0063A.

• TURB EHC HOR PRESS 2-PS-47-63B TRIP IND, 2-El-047-0063B.

• TURB EHC HOR PRESS 2-PS-47-63C TRIP IND, 2-El-047-0063C.

Calls operator at JB to check voltmeters DRIVER As operator at Junction Box, report voltmeters all indicate approximately 0 volts.

NRC End of Event #1 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _2_ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Power increase with Control Rods to 8% IAW GOI Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Conducts crew brief to focus on the continued reactor startup SRO Directs ATC to continue startup IAW GOl-100-1A 2-GOl-100-1A 5.4 Withdrawal of Control Rods while in Mode 2 (continued)

[67] CONTINUE to withdraw control rods to raise Reactor power to approximately 8% per 2-01-85 and 2-SR-3.1.3.5(A).

2-01-85 6.6.3 Control Rod Notch Withdrawal

[1] SELECT the desired control rod by depressing the appropriate CRD ROD SELECT pushbutton, 2-XS-85-40.

[2] OBSERVE the following for selected control rod:

• CRD ROD SELECT pushbutton is brightly ATC ILLUMINATED.

• White light on the Full Core Display ILLUMINATED

• Rod Out Permit light ILLUMINATED.

[3] VERIFY ROD WORTH MINIMIZER operable and LATCHED into correct ROD GROUP when Rod Worth Minimizer is enforcing.

[4] PLACE CRD CONTROL SWITCH, 2-HS-85-48, in ROD OUT NOTCH and RELEASE

[5] OBSERVE control rod settles into desired position AND ROD SETTLE light extinguishes.

[6] IF control rod is notch withdrawn to rod notch Position 48, THEN Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: __£_ Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Power increase with Control Rods to 8% IAW GOI Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PERFORM control rod coupling integrity check as follows:

[6.1] PLACE CRD CONTROL SWITCH, 2-HS-85-48, in ROD OUT NOTCH and RELEASE. D

[6.2] CHECK control rod coupled by observing the following:

• Four rod display digital readout AND full core display digital readout AND background light remain illuminated.

ATC *CONTROL ROD OVERTRAVEL annunciator (2-XA-55-5A, Window 14) does not alarm.

[6.3] CHECK control rod settles into Position 48 and ROD SETTLE light extinguishes.

[6.4] IF control rod coupling integrity check fails, THEN Refer to 2-AOl-85-2.

Withdraws control rods IAW 2-01-85 and 2-SR- 3.1.3.5(A).

NRG End of Event #2 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _3_ Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Control Rod Drift In Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRG Chief Examiner is satisfied with the reactivity DRIVER change and is ready for Event No. 3, insert F3 (bat NRC/1501-3-3) to drift control rod 2243 in.

Reports CONTROL ROD DRIFT (2-XA-55-5A, Window 28) in alarm.

2-ARP-9-5A A.DETERMINE which rod is drifting from Full Core Display C. IF rod drifting in, THEN REFER TO 2-AOl-85-5 and 2-AOl-85-7.

2-AOl-85-5 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions (1] IF multiple rods are drifting into core, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM Reactor. Refer to 2-AOl-100-1.

4.2 Subsequent Actions NOTE If Reactor Power is less than 24%, the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) system may impose rod blocks ATC

[1] IF Reactor Power is less than less than 24% RTP, THEN MANUALLY BYPASS the Rod Worth Minimizer on Panel 2-9-5 as follows: (Otherwise N/A)

[1.1] PLACE RWM SWITCH PANEL, 2-XS-85-9025, in BYPASS position.

[1.2] CHECK the Manual Bypass light is illuminated.

[1.3] NOTIFY the Unit Supervisor that Rod Worth Minimizer has been manually Bypassed. (Reference Tech Spec Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.1.6)

[1.4] When time permits, PERFORM the remaining actions to Manually Bypass the Rod Worth Minimizer per 2 85.

[2] IF a Control Rod is moving from its intended position without operator actions, THEN INSERT the Control Rod to position 00 using CONTINUOUS IN. (Otherwise N/A)

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _3_ Page 2of4 Event

Description:

Control Rod Drift In Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Identifies and reports control rod 22-43 drifting into the core ATC Monitors the full core display for other control rod drifts When control rod 22-43 stops moving (stuck), insert Shift F3 (dmf DRIVER rd07r2243) to delete the drift then insert Shift F4 (dmf rd06r2243) to allow the rod to be inserted Bypasses the RWM Identifies and reports that the drifting control rod has stopped moving at notch position 10 Selects the control rod 22-43 and inserts the rod to position 00 using CONTINUOUS IN Reports control rod 22-43 inserted FULL IN ATC

[4] NOTIFY the Reactor Engineer to Evaluate Core Thermal Limits and Preconditioning Limits for the current Control Rod pattern.

Calls Reactor Engineer to report control rod 22-43 drifting into the core. Subsequently inserted to FULL IN. Need to evaluate core thermal limits and preconditioning limits.

Dispatches AUO to investigate the rod drift at the HCU As RE, acknowledge control rod 22-43 drifting in and subsequently being inserted fully into the core. Will evaluate core DRIVER thermal limits and preconditioning limits.

As AUO, acknowledge going to HCU for control 22-43 to investigate the rod drift Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _3_ Page 3of4 Event

Description:

Control Rod Drift In Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluates Technical Specifications 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY LCO 3.1.3 Each control rod shall be OPERABLE C. One or more control rods Fully insert inoperable 3 hr inoperable for reasons control rod other than Condition A or B AND Disarm the associated 4 hr CRD 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control LCO 3.1.6 OPERABLE control rods shall comply with the requirements of the banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS).

A. One or more OPERABLE A.2 Declare associated 8 hr control rods not in control rod inoperable compliance with BPWS SRO 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.1 The control rod block instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

C. Rod worth minimizer C.1 Verify:::: 12 rods Immediately (RWM) inoperable during withdrawn reactor startup. AND C.2.2 Verify movement of control rods is in compliance with banked position withdrawal sequence by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff Updates crew on Technical Specification requirements for the inoperable control rod, RWM, and BPWS.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _3_ Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Control Rod Drift In Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior As Rx Bldg AUO, report that the scram outlet valve riser DRIVER temperature has higher than normal temperature.

NRC End of Event #3 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: ~ Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Loss of SJAE 'A' I Swap to STBY SJAE 'B' lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 4, insert F4 (imf og04a) to isolate 'A' SJAE.

Reports OG HOLDUP LINE INLET FLOW LOW (2-XA-55-53, Window 4) in alarm.

BOP 2-ARP-9-53 D. VERIFY that SJAE auto isolation has NOT occurred Reports that SJAE 'A' has isolated Directs BOP to swap to SJAE 'B' using the hard card SRO Directs ATC to monitor main condenser vacuum 2-01-66 Appendix C Standby SJAE System Lineup Hard Card 2.0 OPERATOR ACTION FOR SJAE 28 NOTES Radiation Protection should be notified prior to placing a SJAE in BOP service. If time does not permit this due to plant conditions then notification should be made when possible.

2-HS-001-0375, SJAE TRAIN PERMISSIVE (located on 2-LPNL-925-0105, U2 TB, el 586') should normally be in the position of the standby SJAE. If problems are encountered while placing a SJAE in service and time permits, operate this switch as required during the performance of this section.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: ~ Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Loss of SJAE 'A' I Swap to STBY SJAE 'B' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[1] VERIFY RESET Off-Gas isolation using 2-HS-90-155, OG OUTLET/DRAIN ISOLATION VLVS.

[2] VERIFY OPEN the following valves:

• 2-HS-66-15, SJAE 28 INLET VALVE.

• 2-HS-1-156A, STEAM TO SJAE 28.

[3] VERIFY in AUTO/OPEN 2-HS-66-18, SJAE 28 OG OUTLET VALVE.

[4] PLACE 2-HS-1-152, SJAE 28 PRESS CONTROLLER, in CLOSE and then in OPEN.

[5] VERIFY OPEN the following valves (red light illuminated):

• 2-PCV-1-153/167, STEAM TO SJAE 28 STAGES 1,2, BOP AND3.

• 2-FCV-1-152, SJAE 28 INTMD CONDENSER DRAIN.

[6] MONITOR hotwell pressure as indicated on CONDENSATE recorder, 2-XR-002-0026 (Point 3), on Panel 2-9-6.

[7] FOR the SJAE not being placed in service, VERIFY CLOSED the following valves:

• 2-HS-66-14, SJAE 2A OG OUTLET VALVE.

• 2-HS-1-150, SJAE 2A PRESSURE CONTROLLER.

• 2-HS-1-155A STEAM TO SJAE 2A Reports 'B' SJAE in service Calls RP to report 'B' SJAE placed in service Reports that main condenser vacuum had started to lower but has ATC returned to normal DRIVER As RP, acknowledge that 'B' SJAE has been placed in service.

NRC End of Event #4 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _5_ Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

IRM 'C' Failure of Upscale/Half Scram Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 5, insert F5 (imf nm05c 100) to fail IRM 'C' upscale.

Reports IRM C Hl-Hl/INOP condition with no reactor half scram.

ATC Immediately stops reactivity changes.

Reports that "IRM CH A, C, E, G Hl-Hl/INOP" (2-XA-55-5A, Window 33) and REACTOR CHANNEL A AUTO SCRAM (2-XA-55-58, Window 1) failed to come in on a valid IRM Upscale condition.

Reviews ARPs 2-ARP-9-SA A. STOP any reactivity changes.

B. VERIFY alarm by multiple indications.

C. RANGE initiating channel or BYPASS initiating channel to reset half-scram. REFER TO 2-0l-92A.

ATC D. With SRO permission, RESET Half Scram. REFER TO 2 99.

H. NOTIFY Reactor Engineer 2-ARP-9-SB A. VERIFY channel A relays dropped out by checking scram solenoid and backup scram valve lights extinguished.

Checks indications and reports IRM 'C' has failed upscale Verifies scram solenoid and backup scram valve lights did not extinguish.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _5_ Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

IRM 'C' Failure Upscale/Half Scram

• Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs that IRM 'C' be bypassed IAW Ol-92A Refers to Technical Specifications 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

Table 3.3.1.1-1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation

1. Intermediate Range Monitors

a. Neutron Flux - High 2 3 G SRO Determines that:

Condition C applies because of the failure of RPS to Trip on a HI-HI signal.

Required Action Restore RPS trip capability Completion time 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SRO Directs ATC and BOP to insert a half scram IAW 01-99 The next event needs to be started before the crew has the opportunity to placing the 112 scram in on A RPS because NRG losing D 4 KV, and B RPS.

End of Event #5 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _Q_ Page 1of4 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Shutdown Board D, D DIG fails to AUTO tie Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 6, insert F6 to cause the loss of 4kV SD Bd D (ed09d) and a failure of 'D' DG DRIVER to automatically tie to the board (dg03d). After diesel has started, insert Shift F6 (dmf ed09d) to delete to overcurrent trip of the board.

ATC Reports a reactor half scram and loss of RPS 'B' Recognizes and reports that 'D' 4kV Shutdown Board is de-energized and 'D' Diesel Generator failed to automatically tie to the board.

Verifies no lockout conditions on the board and closes 'D' Diesel BOP Generator output breaker Reports 'D' 4kV Shutdown Board re-energized Call WC to investigate the loss of 'D' 4kV Shutdown Board and the failure of 'D' to automatically tie to the board.

Calls to have RPS 'B' restored As WC, acknowledge initiating investigation of the loss of 'D' 4kV Shutdown Board and the failure of 'D' Diesel Generator to DRIVER automatically tie to the board.

As outside US, acknowledge restoring power to RPS 'B' Refers to Technical Specifications 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; SRO

b. Unit 1 and 2 diesel generators (DGs) with two divisions of 480 V load shed logic and common accident signal logic OPERABLE; A. One required offsite A.1 Verify power availability 1 hr circuit inoperable. from the remaining AND OPERABLE offsite Once transmission network 18 hr Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _6_ Page 2of4 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Shutdown Board D, D DIG fails to AUTO tie Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior B. One required Unit 1 B.1 Verify power availability 1 hr and 2 DG inoperable. from the offsite AND G. One required offsite G.1 Declare the affected Immediately circuit inoperable. 4.16 kV shutdown AND board inoperable One Unit 1 and 2 DG Inoperable 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SRO 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 1 and 2 4.16 kV Shutdown Boards; A. One Unit 1 and 2 A.1 Restore the Unit 1 and 2 5 day 4.16 kV Shutdown Board 4.16kV Shutdown Bd inoperable. to OPERABLE status Briefs crew on Technical Specification requirements based on the loss of 4kV Shutdown Board 'D' Insert Shift F7 (mrf rp02 reset) to reset RPS 'B' circuit protectors.

DRIVER As outside US, call and report that RPS 'B' has been restored SRO Directs ATC to reset RPS and PCIS IAW 01-99 2-01-99 8.5 Restoration to Normal Following RPS Bus Power Loss or Transfer NOTES

1) This section provides instructions for resetting the various ATC system isolations and reopening affected valves to allow those systems to be restored to normal operation in accordance with their respective operating instructions.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-5 unless otherwise noted.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _Q_ Page 3of4 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Shutdown Board D, D DIG fails to AUTO tie Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

3) When RPS Bus power is lost to some scram discharge volume level switches, their RTD heater is de-energized. Following the restoration of power, a time delay, dependent on how long the level switch was de-energized, prevents resetting the half scram signal. This may take up to 37 seconds after RPS power is restored. Precaution 3.0 0 can be referred to for more information on these level switches

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor/SRO's permission to restore to normal.

[2] MOMENTARILY PLACE SCRAM RESET, 2-HS-99-5A-S5, as follows:

[2.1] RESET FIRST position. (Group 2/3)

[2.2] RESET SECOND position. (Group 1/4)

[2.3] NORMAL position.

[3] CHECK the following conditions:

A. All eight SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A/B LOGIC RESET lights ILLUMINATED. D ATC B. The following four lights ILLUMINATED:

• SYSTEM A BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 2-IL-99-5A/AB.

• SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 2-IL-99-5A/CD.

C. Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves indicate OPEN.

D. Points SOE033 and SOE035 on ICS computer or on the First Out Printer reads "NOTTRIP" for RPS "A".

E. Points SOE034 and SOE036 on ICS computer or on the First Out Printer reads "NOTTRIP" for RPS "B".

[4] At Panel 2-9-4, RESET PCIS trip logic as follows:

[4.1] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV I RESET, 2-HS-64-16A-S32, to left and right RESET positions.

[4.2] CHECK the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

• MSIV GROUP A 1.

• MSIV GROUP B1.

[4.3] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV II RESET, 2-HS-64-16A-S33, to left and right RESET positions.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: __§___ Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Loss of 4KV Shutdown Board D, D DIG fails to AUTO tie Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[4.4] CHECK the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

• MSIV GROUP A2.

• MSIV GROUP 82.

Resets RPS and PCIS IAW 01-99 Reports RPS and PCIS have been reset NRG End of Event #6 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _7_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Trip of RFP 2C/ recover with already warm RFP 28 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 7, insert F7 DRIVER (imf fw14c) to trip reactor feedpump 2C Reports RFPT TRIPPED (2-XA-55-6C, Window 29) in alarm.

ATC Monitors indications and reports RPT 'C' tripped.

Monitors reactor water level SRO Directs entering AOl-3-1 to control reactor water level 2-AOl-3-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions 5.0 LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL OR LOSS OF FEEDWATER

[1] IF Feedwater Control System has failed, THEN PERFORM the following:

[1.1] PLACE individual RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switches in Manual Governor (depressed position with amber light illuminated).

[1.2] ADJUST RFP Discharge flows with RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switches as necessary to maintain Reactor Water Level.

Verifies '28' RFPT speed control switch in manual and raises RFPT speed to control and maintain reactor water level.

Places '28' RFPT in automatic control Reports '28' RFPT in service SRO Calls WC to investigate the trip of '2C' RFPT DRIVER As WC, acknowledge WO to investigate the trip of '2C' RFPT NRC End of Event #7 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 1of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 8, insert F8 DRIVER (bat NRC/1501-3-8) to insert a torus leak and A TWS Reports multiple room flood alarms in secondary containment and ATC/BOP SUPPR CHAMBER WATER LEVEL ABNORMAL (2-XA-55-3B, Window 15) in alarm 2-ARP-9-38 A. CHECK Suppression Pool level using multiple indications.

B. IF level is low, THEN DISPATCH personnel to check for leaks.

E. REFER TO Tech Spec 3.6.2.2.

F. IF level is above -1" or below -6.25" AND NOT in Mode 4 or Mode 5 THEN (otherwise N/A)

ENTER 2-EOl-2 Flowchart.

Reports suppression pool water level lowering BOP Calls AUO to check for leaks in reactor building pump rooms and torus area Enters EOl-3 on secondary containment flood alarms EOl-3 IF SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO Rx Zone ventilation exh radiation lvl is above 72 mR/hr - NO Refuel Zone ventilation exh radiation lvl is above 72 mR/hr - NO Rx Zone ventilation is isolated AND SRO Rx Zone ventilation exh radiation lvl is below 72 mR/hr - NO Refuel Zone ventilation is isolated AND Refuel Zone ventilation exh radiation lvl is below 72 mR/hr- NO CAUTION

1. 7 Spent fuel pool temp and level Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 2of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SC/L WHEN any floor drain sump water level is above 66 in. - YES WHEN any area water level is above 2 in. - YES RESTORE and MAINTAIN floor drain sump water lvls Below 66 in. using all available sump pumps - CHECKED RESTORE and MAINTAIN area water lvls below 2 in. using all available sump pumps - CHECKED SRO WHEN any floor drain sump water lvl cannot be restored and maintained below 66 in - YES WHEN any area water lvl cannot be restored and maintained below 2 in. - YES ISOLATE all systems that are discharging into the area EXCEPT systems required:

For damage control OR To be operated by EOls - CHECKED After being dispatched to check water levels, wait 5 minutes and report that water level is approximately 4 inches and rising in the DRIVER southwest quad. Water is flowing in from the torus area. Source of the leak in unknown Will emergency depressurization reduce discharge into Secondary Cntmt-NO WHEN water lvls in 2 or more areas are above 20 in.

Enters EOl-2 on Supp Pl Lvl below -6.25 in SRO SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO SAMG entry is required - NO CAUTION

1. 4 PC press vs pump NPSH - CHECKED Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 3 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior OW sprays have been initiated - NO Suppr chmbr sprays have been initiated - NO PC water level CANNOT be restored and maintained below 105 ft - CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be restored and maintained below 55 psig - CAN SP/L Primary Containment Flooding is required - NO AND SAMG entry is NOT required MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl lvl between -1 in. and -6 in.

SRO (APPX 18)

Directs BOP to control suppression pool water level IAW App. 18 Can suppr pl lvl be maintained above-6 in. - NO IF THEN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be SECURE HPCI irrespective of Maintained above 12.75 ft whether adequate core cooling Is assured Sets a trigger value, on suppression pool level, for securing HPCI Briefs crew on current plant conditions including securing HPCI at the triqqer value for SPL.

EOI APPENDIX-18 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER INVENTORY REMOVAL AND MAKEUP BOP NOTE: All panel operations performed at Control Room Panel 2 3 unless otherwise stated.

1. IF ..... Suppression Pool Water makeup is required, THEN ... CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 5.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 4of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

5. IF ..... Directed by SRO to Emergency Makeup to the Suppression Pool from Standby Coolant, THEN ... CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 9 using RHR Loop I OR Step 10 using RHR Loop II.

6. IF ......... Directed by SRO to add water to suppression pool, THEN ... MAKEUP water to Suppression Pool as follows:

BOP

a. VERIFY OPEN 2-FCV-73-40, HPCI CST SUCTION VALVE.

b. OPEN 2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.

Adds water to the suppression pool IAW App. 18 Monitors Suppression Pool water level and reports that level is continuing to lower.

SRO Directs securing HPCI BOP Secures HPCI by placing HPCI Aux Oil Pump in PTL.

When Suppression Pool Level cannot be maintained above

12. 75 feet HPCI secured to prevent damage.

1. Safety Significance:

Prevent failure of Primary Containment from pressurization of the Suppression Chamber

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Suppression Pool Level indication

3. Measured by:

Observation - HPCI Auxiliary Pump placed in Pull to Lock

4. Feedback:

HPCI does not Auto initiate No RPM indication on HPCI This Critical Task is not met if the Crew fails to place the HPCI AOP in PTL at 12.75 ft.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 5 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MAINTAIN suppr pl lvl above 11.5 ft (APPX 18)

SRO BEFORE Suppr pl lvl drops to 11.5 ft CONTINUE Enters EOl-1, RPV Control at Step RC-1 SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed SRO command and control - NO VERIFY RX scram Directs ATC to initiate a manual reactor scram Initiates a manual reactor scram Reactor Scram OATC Hard Card 1.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

[1] DEPRESS REACTOR SCRAM A and B, 2-HS-99-5A/S3A and 2-HS-99-5A/S38, on Panel 2-9-5.

[2] IF scram is due to a loss of RPS, THEN PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in START &

HOT STBY AND PAUSE for approximately 5 seconds (Otherwise N/A)

[3] Refuel Mode One Rod Permissive Light check:

ATC

[3.1] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in REFUEL.

[3.2] CHECK illuminated REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46.

[3.3] IF REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46, is NOT illuminated, THEN CHECK all control rod positions at Full-In Overtravel, or Full-In.

(Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in SHUTDOWN.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[5] REPORT the following status to the US:

• Reactor Scram

• Mode Switch is in Shutdown

• "All rods in" or "rods out"

• Reactor Water Level and trend (recovering or lowering)

• Reactor pressure and trend

• MSIV position (Open or Closed)

• Power level Completes immediate operator actions and makes scram report including 'rods out' and 'power level <5%.

ATC 2.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

[1] IF all control rods CAN NOT be verified fully inserted, THEN PERFORM the following (otherwise N/A):

[1.1] INITIATE ARI by Arming and Depressing BOTH of the following:

• ARI Manual Initiate, 2-HS-68-119A

• ARI Manual Initiate, 2-HS-68-1198

[1.2] VERIFY the Reactor Recirc Pumps (if running) at minimum speed at Panel 2-9-4.

[1.3] REPORT "ATWS Actions Complete" and power level.

Completes subsequent actions EOl-1 RC/Q MONITOR and CONTROL reactor power- CHECKED The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - NO SRO The reactor is subcritical - NO AND NO boron has been injected VERIFY reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN - CHECKED INITIATE ARI - CHECKED Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Will tripping Recirc pumps cause trip of Main Turbine, RFP, HPCI, or RCIC- NO Is reactor power above 5% OR unknown - NO BEFORE suppr pl temp rises to 110°F CONTINUE - CHECKED RESET ARI DEFEAT ARI logic trips if necessary (APPX 2) - CHECKED INSERT control rods using ANY of the following methods:

Scram valves opened 1. RESET scram But SDV is full DEFEAT RPS logic trips SRO if necessary 1F 2.DRAIN SDV

3. RECHARGE accumulators

4. INITIATE reactor scram Manual control rod 1. DRIVE control rods Insertion methods BYPASS RWM if 1D necessary Directs ATC to perform App. 1F and 2 and to drive control rods with App. 1D Directs personnel to perform App. 2 and the outside portions of ATC App. 1F Acknowledge performing App. 2 and the outside portions of App.

1F. Wait 3 minutes then insert Shift F8 (bat app02) to defeat ARI DRIVER logic. Wait 5 minutes then insert Shift F9 (bat app01f) to defeat RPS logic EOl-1 RC/L CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl SRO indication and trend - CHECKED MONITOR and CONTROL RPV water lvl - CHECKED Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERIFY each as required:

• PCIS isolations (Groups 1, 2 and 3)

• ECCS

• RCIC It has NOT been determined EXIT RC/L and that the reactor will remain ENTER C5, Level/Power Control subcritical without boron under all conditions C-5 CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN SRO The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - NO PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft- CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained below - CAN 55 psig OW Control Air becomes unavailable -AVAIL INHIBIT ADS Is ANY main steam line open - YES BYPASS the following isolation interlocks:

• MSIV low low low RPV water lvl (APPX 8A)

• RB ventilation low RPV water lvl (APPX 8E)

Directs BOP to inhibit ADS Calls for App 8A and 8E to be performed Acknowledge performing App 8A and App8E.

DRIVER Wait 5 minutes then insert Shift F10 (bat app08a) and Shift F11 (bat app08e). Call US and report App 8A and 8E are complete.

Inhibits ADS BOP Reports ADS inhibited Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 9of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Suppr pl temp is above 110°F - BELOW AND Reactor power is above 5% OR unknown - BELOW AND An MSRV is open or cycling OR OW press is above 2.4 psig - NO AND RPVwater lvl is above -162 in. - YES Is reactor power above 5% OR unknown - NO Emergency RPV depressurization is required - NO Reactor power is above 5% - BELOW OR unknown SRO AND RPV water lvl is above -50 in.

CAUTION

1. 5 Rapid RPV inj may cause core damage

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between -180 in. and +51 in. with the following inj sources CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig Directs ATC to maintain RPV water level +2 in. to +51 in. using App. 5A Condensate and Feedwater Maintains RPV water level +2 in to +51 in IAW App 5A When it is reported that App 2 and the outside portions of App 1F are complete, continues with App 1F EOI Appendix-1 F ATC

[2] WHEN RPS Logic has been defeated, THEN RESET Reactor Scram.

[3] VERIFY OPEN Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 10of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOI Appendix-1 D

[1] VERIFY at least one CRD pump in service.

[3] VERIFY REACTOR MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN.

[4] BYPASS Rod Worth Minimizer.

[5] REFER TO Attachment 2 and INSERT control rods in the area of highest power as follows:

[5.1] SELECT control rod.

[5.2] PLACE CRD NOTCH OVERRIDE switch in EMERG ATC ROD IN position UNTIL control rod is NOT moving inward.

[5.3] REPEAT Steps 1.0[5.1] and 1.0[5.2] for each control rod to be inserted Completes control room portions of App 1F and inserts control rods IAW App 1D Reports driving control rods RC/P OW press is above 2.4 psig - NO Emergency RPV depressurization is anticipated - YES AND The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - NO Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required - NO SRO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Is ANY MSRV cycling - NO Steam cooling is required - NO Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the existing RPV press - CAN Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the safe area - CAN of Curve 4 OW control air becomes unavailable - AVAIL Boron inj is required - NO AND The main condenser is available SRO AND There has been no indication of a steam line break STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig with the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

Directs BOP to control reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig in accordance with Appendix 8B Verifies that main turbine bypass valves are controlling reactor BOP pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig Reports that suppression pool water level is continuinQ to lower Sets a trigger valve and briefs the crew on the requirement to emergency depressurize the RPV before reaching 11.5 ft. in the torus.

EOl-2 SP/L WHEN suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained above 11.5 ft.

EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED(EOl-1, SRO RC/P-4; C1-1, C1-20; C5-12, C5-14)

EOl-1 RC/P Emergency RPV depressurization EXIT RC/P and is or has been required ENTER C2, Emergency Depressurization Enters C2 for EmerQency Depressurization Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 12of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Containment water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 44 ft- CAN DW control air becomes unavailable -AVAIL Will the reactor remain subcritical without Boron under all conditions - NO WHEN all inj into the RPV is stopped and prevented EXCEPT from RCIC, CRD, and SLC per C5, Level/Power Control, SRO Step C5-22 C-5 Emergency RPV depressurization is >E Required STOP and PREVENT ALL inj into RPV EXCEPT from RCIC, CRD and SLC (APPX 4)

Directs ATC to terminate and prevent condensate and feedwater using APP 4 Directs BOP to terminate CS and LPCI using App 4 When App 4 is directed, insert F9 (imf fw30b 55.7) to fail RFP 'B' DRIVER Woodward governor.

When ATC is using App 4 to terminate and prevent condensate NRC and feedwater, he will recognize the failure of 'B' RFP speed to lower. This will start Event No. 9 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 13of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time PosiLiu11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOI APPENDIX-4 NOTE Following receipt of a CORE SPRAY automatic initiation signal, it is NOT necessary to wait until a pump starts before performing step 3.

3. PREVENT injection from CORE SPRAY following an initiation signal by PLACING ALL Core Spray pump control switches in STOP.

4. PREVENT injection from LPCI SYSTEM I by performing the following:

NOTE Injection may be prevented by performing EITHER step 4.a or step 4.b.

a. Following automatic pump start, PLACE RHR SYSTEM I pump control switches in STOP.

OR

b. BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 450 psig, BOP 1) PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

AND

2) VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52, RHR SYS I LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

5. PREVENT injection from LPCI SYSTEM II by performing the following:

NOTE Injection may be prevented by performing EITHER step 5.a or step 5.b.

a. Following automatic pump start, PLACE RHR SYSTEM II pump control switches in STOP.

OR

b. BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 450 psig,

1) PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

AND

2) VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-66, RHR SYS II LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 14of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Insert F10 (bat NRC/1501-3-10) to prevent two ADS valves from DRIVER opening Terminates and prevents injection on 9-3 IAW App 4.

BOP Reports terminate and prevent complete

6. PREVENT injection from CONDENSATE and FEEDWATER by performing the following:

c. CLOSE the following valves BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 500 psig:

• 2-FCV-3-19, RFP 2A DISCHARGE VALVE ATC

• 2-FCV-3-12, RFP 2B DISCHARGE VALVE

• 2-FCV-3-5, RFP 2C DISCHARGE VALVE

• 2-LCV-3-53, RFW START-UP LEVEL CONTROL Terminates and prevents injection on 9-6 IAW App 4.

Reports terminate and prevent complete C-2 Is suppr pl lvl above 5.5 ft. - YES OPEN all ADS vlvs SRO (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate)

Directs BOP to open all ADS valves When SRO directs opening all ADS valves, Event No. 1Owould NRC start C-2 Are at least 4 MSRVs open - YES SRO The reactor is NOT subcritical - >A Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 15of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 11.5 feet the US determines that Emergency Depressurization is required, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of Containment

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance Suppression Pool Level Trend

3. Measured by:

Observation - US determines (indicated by announcement or observable transition to C-2) that Emergency Depressurization is required before Suppression Pool level drops below 11.5 feet.

Observation - RO opens at least 6 SRV's during performance of Emergency Depressurization actions.

4. Feedback:

RPV pressure trend SRV status indications Suppression Pool temperature trend This Critical Task is not met if Suppression Pool Level gets to 11.5 feet.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 16of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior C-5 Can at least two MSRVs be opened per C2, Emergency RPV Depressurization - YES WHEN RPV press is below MSCP (Table 1A)

SRO Table 1A Minimum Steam Cooling Press 6 or more 190 psig Briefs crew that injection to the RPV will begin when RPV pressure is less than 190 psig CAUTION

1. 5 Rapid RPV inj may cause core damage

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F SRO START and SLOWLY RAISE RPV inj with the following inj sources to restore and maintain RPVwater lvl above -180 in.

CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig Directs ATC to start and slowly raise injection to the RPV, using condensate IAW App 5A, when reactor pressure lowers to less than 190 psig.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 17of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior During an A TWS, when conditions with Emergency Depressurization required, Terminate and Prevent RPV injection from ECCS and Feedwater until reactor pressure is below the MARFP as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Prevention of fuel damage due to uncontrolled feeding.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Observation - No ECCS injection prior to being less than the MARFP.

Observation - Feedwater terminated and prevented until less than the MARFP.

4. Feedback:

Reactor power trend, power spikes, reactor short period alarms.

Injection system flow rates into RPV.

This Critical Task is not met if the Crew injects too fast and causes power oscillations or IRM Upscale trips.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 18of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When reactor pressure lowers to less than 190 psig, slowly starts injection to the RPV IAW App 5A ATC Reports injection to the RPV Determines that RPVwater level is above -180 in. and rising Can RPV water lvl be restored and maintained above -180 in. -YES Was RPV water lvl lowered for Step C5 NO >D SRO Maintain RPVwater lvl between -180 in and +51 in. with the following inj sources:

CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig Directs ATC to restore RPV water level to +2 in to +51 in. using condensate App 5A Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _8_ Page 19of19 Event

Description:

Loss of Torus Water level /SCRAM (ATWS)and ED on Torus water level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continues to restore RPV water level to +2 in to +51 in using condensate Appendix-1 F 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

[4] DRAIN SDV UNTIL the following annunciators clear:

• WEST CRD DISCH VOL WTR LVL HIGH HALF SCRAM (Panel 2-9-4, 2-XA-55-4A, Window 1). D

• EAST CRD DISCH VOL WTR LVL HIGH HALF SCRAM (Panel 2-9-4, 2-XA-55-4A, Window 29).

ATC NOTES

1) If EOI Appendix 2 has been executed, ARI initiation or reset will NOT be possible or necessary in Step 1.0[6].

2) If reactor pressure is greater than 600 psig, SRO may direct performance of step 1.0[6] prior to accumulators being fully recharged.

[6] WHEN CRD Accumulators are recharged, THEN INITIATE manual Reactor Scram and ARI.

Monitors for indication that the Scram Discharge Volumes are drained.

Reports when SDV are drained Reports 'initiating a manual reactor scram' ATC Initiates a manual reactor scram Reports rod movement Resets Reactor Scram and verifies Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves open Scans full core display and reports all control rods inserted.

NRC End of Event #8 and scenario Place simulator in FREEZE upon direction of the NRC Chief DRIVER Examiner Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _9_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Failure of RFP 28 governor/pump needs tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOI APPENDIX-4

6. PREVENT injection from CONDENSATE and FEEDWATER by performing the following:

b. LOWER RFPT 2A(28)(2C) speed to minimum setting (approximately 600 rpm) using ANY of the following methods on Panel 2-9-5:

• Using 2-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in MANUAL AND individual 2-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 2A(28)(2C) SPEED CONTROL in AUTO, OR

• Using individual 2-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 2A(28)(2C)

SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL, OR

• Using individual 2-HS-46-8A(9A)(10A), RFPT 2A(28)(2C)SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch in ATC MANUAL GOVERNOR.

Attempts to lower RFPT '8' speed using App 4 Reports that speed cannot be lowered in manual or automatic

a. IF ................. Immediate injection termination from a reactor feedwater pump is required, THEN ........... PERFORM step 6.d for the desired pump.

d. TRIP RFPTs as necessary to prevent injection by DEPRESSING the following push-buttons:

• 2-HS-3-151A, RFPT 28 TRIP Trips 28 RFPT Reports 28 RFPT tripped NRC End of Event #9 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _3_ Event No.: _.1Q_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

ADS SRV Failures Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Opens six ADS valves Observes acoustic monitor and determines that only four ADS BOP valves have opened Reports that only four ADS valves have opened C-2 Can 6 ADS vlvs be opened - NO OPEN additional MSRVs as necessary to establish 6 MSRVs SRO open (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate)

Directs BOP to open additional MSRVs as necessary to get six MSRVs open Opens two additional MSRVs BOP Reports that two additional MSRVs have been opened and that six total MSRVs are now open NRC End of Event #10 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario Setup IC 9 Exam IC 96 Batch File or Pref File I1501NRC3 RD07R2243 Rod Drift In 22-43 3 NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA RD06R2243 Rod Stuck 22-43 3 00:35 NIA NIA NIA NIA OG04A SJAEATri 4 NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NM05C IRM C Fails U scale 5 NIA 100 NIA NIA 100 D Diesel Fails to Auto DG03D Active NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Tie to SID Bus FW14C Feed Pum C Tri 7 NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA PC14 Torus Water Leak 8 NIA 100 5:00 NIA NIA AD01D ADS Valve Failure 10 NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA AD01E ADS Valve Failure 10 NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA SID Bus D Norm ZDIOHS2110D22A 6 0 NIA NIA CLOSE TRIP Feeder Bkr Tri SID Bus D Norm ZLOOHS2110D22A Feeder Bkr White 6 0 NIA NIA OFF ON Li ht Batch I Pref File(s):

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ADS Valve Failure 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A DOR ZLOOHS211 OD22A (15 0) OFF IMF RD07R2243 (3 0)

IMF RD06R2243 (3 0:35)

IMF OG04A (4 0)

IMF NM05C (5 0) 100 IMF DG03D IMF FW14C (7 0)

IMF PC14 (8 0) 100 6:00 IMF AD01D IMF AD01E Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: BFN Scenario No.: NRC-4 Op-Test No.: 1501 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

ATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is 90%. EECW Pump A3 and Steam Packing Exhauster 3A are out of service.

Turnover: Raise reactor power to 100% after Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 3-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9). The Spare RBCCW pump is in service and the 3B RBCCW pump will be tagged out later this shift for an oil change.

Event Malfunction Event Event Description No. Number Type*

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and 2 N/A N-BOP RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 3-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

R-ATC 1 N/A Raises Reactor Power to 100% IAW 3-GOl-100-12 R-SRO 3 EG13A C-BOP Bus Duct Cooling Fan 3A trip C-ATC RBCCW 3B Pump trip and failure of sectionalizing valve to auto-4 SW02A TS-SRO close C-BOP 5 ED10B Loss of 480V SID Board 3B TS-SRO C-BOP 6 MC04 Loss of Condenser Vacuum C-SRO 7 ED01 M-ALL Loss of Offsite Power 8 DG01A C-BOP DG 3EA Fails to Auto start 9 TH21 M-All LOCA 10 HP04 C-BOP HPCI Steam Supply Valve fails to auto open.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events

1. BOP will conduct Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9). When 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9) is completed or at the direction of the lead examiner the scenario may continue.

2. ATC will raise reactor power to 100% at the direction of the SRO.

3. Bus Duct Cooling Fan 2A will trip and annunciator 2-XA-55-7A window 31, GEN BUS DUCT FAN FAILURE, will be received. The BOP operator will place the 2B Bus Duct Cooling Fan in service. When the 2B Bus Duct Cooling Fan is in service the scenario may continue.

4. The crew will respond to a trip of RBCCW Pump 2A IAW 2-AOl-70-1, The spare RBCCW pump is aligned and will be the only one running until the crew places RBCCW Pump 2B in service. The RBCCW sectionalizing valve will fail to auto close on the trip of RBCCW Pump 2A, the ATC will close the sectionalizing valve. The SRO will evaluate TRM 3.4.1 and take actions for failure to meet surveillance requirement TSR 3.4.1.1.

When the Tech Spec call is completed and the lead examiner is ready the scenario may continue.

5. The crew will respond to a loss of 480V Shutdown Board 2B. This will cause a loss of RPS B, loss of 480V RMOV BO 2B, 2C and 2E. The crew will need to restore power to the 480V RMOV Boards, reset RPS, reset PCIS and restore systems. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification 3.4.5 and determine conditions A, B, and D are required for inoperable containment atmospheric and drywell Floor Drain sump monitoring equipment. Loss of the Shutdown Board will result in entry into Tech Spec 3.8.7 condition B to restore the board in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and 3.8.7 condition C to declare the affected RHR subsystem (RHR Loop II) inoperable immediately. When power has been restored to the RMOV boards and the Tech Spec call is complete or as directed by the Lead Examiner the scenario may continue.

6. Condenser Vacuum will begin to degrade the SRO will initially enter 3-AOl-47-3 and direct reducing reactor power in an attempt to maintain condenser vacuum. Condenser Vacuum will continue to degrade. The SRO will set a trigger value to trip the main turbine and scram the reactor before an automatic turbine trip occurs at approximately 24.3 inched Hg.

7. After the Reactor Scram on vacuum a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The crew will respond to the Reactor Scram IAW 3-AOl-100-1 and O-AOl-57-1A.

8. During the LOOP DG 3EA will fail to automatically start and will have to be manually started and after it starts auto tie to the buss.

9. Sometime after the LOOP a LOCA will develop requiring the crew to utilize systems to maintain Reactor Level and Containment parameters.

10. The HPCI Steam Supply Valve, 3-FCV-73-16, will fail to OPEN on an automatic HPCI initiation signal.

The scenario ends when Drywell Sprays have been initiated and Reactor Level is maintained above TAF (- 162 inches) or upon request of Lead Examiner.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks 3

1. RPV Level maintained above TAF (-162 inches)

1. Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling

2. Cues:

RPV level indication

3. Measured by:

Reactor level indication above -162 inches

4. Feedback:

RPV level trend HPCl/RCIC injection valve open indication

2. When Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeds 12 psig, initiate Drywell Sprays while in the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (DSIL) curve and prior to exceeding the PSP limit.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of containment

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance High Drywell Pressure and Suppression Chamber Pressure

3. Measured by:

Observation - US directs Drywell Sprays IAW with EOI Appendix 178 AND Observation - RO initiates Drywell Sprays

4. Feedback:

Drywell and Suppression Pressure lowering RHR flow to containment OR

2. Before Drywell temperature rises to 280°F, initiate Drywell Sprays while in the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (DSIL) curve.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of containment

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance High Drywell Pressure and Suppression Chamber Pressure

3. Measured by:

Observation - US directs Drywell Sprays IAW with EOI Appendix 178 AND Observation - RO initiates Drywell Sprays

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

4. Feedback:

Drywell and Suppression Pressure lowering RHR flow to containment

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No.__£_ Event No.: _1_ Page 1 of 7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 7.3 Turbine Control Valve, 3-FCV-1-75 (CV #1) Test NOTE Indicator light 3-IL-099-5A-DS15B on Panel 9-17, Bay 1, will extinguish when jumper is installed in Step 7.3[1].

[1] PERFORM the following in Panel 3-9-17 (Bay 1), to simulate Turbine Control Valve, 3-FCV-1-80 (CV #2), is CLOSED:

[1.1] REMOVE the back cover from RPS CH B1 CONTROL BOP VALVE 3A FAST CLOSURE, 3-RLY-099-05AK08F (H3),

if required (Otherwise N/A)

[1.2] INSTALL jumper across contacts 3 to 4 on relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08F.

Calls operator in Aux Instrument Room to install jumper on relay 99-05AK08F As operator in AIR, acknowledge jumpering contacts 3 to 4 on DRIVER relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08F. Insert mrf rp15b jumpered

[3] CHECK the following indications:

• RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV, 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A, on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is illuminated.

• RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV, 3-IL-099-5A-DS15B, on Panel 9-17, Bay 1, is extinguished.

[4] ENSURE Reactor power less than 95%.

[5] RECORD valve position in terms of percent below.

• CV-1, 3-Zl-1-75  %

BOP

• CV-2, 3-Zl-1-80  %

• CV-3, 3-Zl-1-85  %

• CV-4, 3-Zl-1-89  %

Calls operator in Aux Instrument Room to verify indications on panels 9-15 and 9-17 Verifies reactor power less than 95%

Records control valve position As operator in AIR, report that 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A is illuminated DRIVER and 3-IL-099-5A-DS15 is extinguished Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No.~ Event No.: _1_ Page 2 of 7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION If power is not simulated, 3-HS-47-158 should be held in until reactor water level, reactor pressure, and neutron flux signals have stabilized to prevent flux spiking, which would cause a reactor scram.

[6] NOTIFY the UO that performance of the following step will result in a channel A Half Scram.

[7] DEPRESS and HOLD CV-1 TEST push-button, 3-HS-47-158, on Panel 3-9-7 until Step 7.3[12].

Updates crew that the next step will cause a channel A half scram Depresses and hold CV-1 TEST pushbutton

[8] CHECK the following on Panel 3-9-5:

• 3-IL-99-5A/AB, SYSTEM A BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• 3-IL-99-5A/CD, SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, light BOP on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A LOGIC RESET 1 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A LOGIC RESET 2 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A LOGIC RESET 3 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A LOGIC RESET 4 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

[9] CHECK the following Annunciators are in alarm:

• Annunciator REACTOR CHANNEL A AUTO SCRAM (3-XA-55-5B, window 1) is in alarm.

• Annunciator TURB CONTROL VLV FAST CLOSURE HALF SCRAM (3-XA-55-4A, window 15) is in alarm.

• Annunciator RPT SYS A TRIP 3-XA-68-72 (3-XA-55-4A window 11) is in alarm.

Checks appropriate backup scram valve lights are extinguished and all four solenoid group A logic lights are extinguished Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _1_ Page 3of7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Checks appropriate alarms are in alarm

[10] CHECK RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV light indicator 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A, on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is extinguished

[11] CHECK the following on ICS:

• ICS point SOE042 displays TRIP condition.

BOP

• ICS point SOE035 displays TRIP condition.

• ICS point DIG081 displays TRIP condition Calls operator in aux instrument room to verify indication on panel 9-15 Verifies appropriate ICS points display TRIP condition As operator in AIR, report that 3-IL-099-5A.;DS15A, on Panel 9-15, DRIVER Bay 1, is extinguished

[12] WHEN Rx Water Level, Rx Pressure, and Neutron Flux signals have stabilized, THEN RELEASE CV-1 TEST push-button, 3-HS-47-158.

[13] RESET RPS HALF SCRAM SIGNAL on 3-9-5.

[14] RESET the following Panel annunciators:

• RESET affected annunciators 3-HS-55-4 on Panel 3-9-4.

• RESET affected annunciators 3-HS-55-5 on Panel 3-9-5.

Releases TEST push-button Resets half scram signal and panel annunciators BOP

[15] CHECK the following on Panel 3-9-5:

• All four SYSTEM A and SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE lights on Panel 3-9-5 are illuminated.

• All eight SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A & B LOGIC RESET lights on Panel 3-9-5 are illuminated.

[16] CHECK RESET the following Annunciators:

• REACTOR CHANNEL A AUTO SCRAM (3-XA-55-5B, window 1).

• TURB CONTROL VLV FAST CLOSURE HALF SCRAM (3-XA-55-4A, window 15).

• RPT SYS A TRIP 3-XA-68-72 (3-XA-55-4A window 11).

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. -1_ Event No.: _1_ Page 4 of 7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Checks backup scram valve lights illuminated, scram solenoid lights illuminated and annunciators reset

[17] CHECK the following on Panel 3-9-15:

• Relay RPS CH A1 CONTROL VALVE 3A FAST CLOSURE, 3-RLY-099-05AK08E in Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is energized.

• RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV light indicator, 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A, on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is illuminated.

BOP [18] CHECK the following on ICS:

• ICS point SOE042 displays NOT TRIP.

• ICS point SOE035 displays NOT TRIP.

• ICS point DIG081displays NOT TRIP.

Calls operator in aux instrument room to verify 3-RLY-099-05AK08E in Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is energized and 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A, on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is illuminated.

Verifies ICS computer points are indicating NOT TRIP As operator in aux instrument room report 3-RLY-099-05AK08E in DRIVER Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is energized and 3-IL-099-5A-:-DS15A, on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is illuminated.

[20] PERFORM the following for Relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08F (Panel 3-9-17, Bay 1, H3):

[20.1] REMOVE jumper from contacts 3 to 4 on relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08F.

[20.2] INSTALL cover on back of relay if removed in Step 7.3[1] (Otherwise NIA).

BOP

[21] CHECK RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV light indicator, 3-IL-099-5A-DS15B, on Panel 9-17, Bay 1, is illuminated. (N/A this step if turbine first stage pressure is less than 30%.)

Calls operator in aux instrument room to remove jumper and verify 3-IL-099-5A-DS15B, on Panel 9-17, Bay 1, is illuminated As operator in aux instrument room, insert mrf rp15b norm and DRIVER report jumper removed and 3-IL-099-5A-DS15B, on Panel 9-17, Bay 1, is illuminated Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: _1_ Page 5 of 7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE Failure to satisfactorily complete any step designated by (AC) requires immediate notification of the Unit Supervisor. The Cognizant Engineer should be notified in a timely manner.

7.4 Turbine Control Valve, 3-FCV-1-80 (CV #2) Test

[1] PERFORM the following in Panel 3-9-15 (Bay 1), to simulate Turbine Control Valve, 3-FCV-1-75 (CV #1), is CLOSED NOTE BOP Indicator light 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, will extinguish when jumpers are installed in Step 7.4[21].

[1.1] REMOVE the back cover from RPS CH B1 CONTROL VALVE 3A FAST CLOSURE, 3-RLY-099-05AK08E (H3),

if required (Otherwise NIA)

[1.2] INSTALL jumper across contacts 3 to 4 on relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08E.

Calls operator in Aux Instrument Room to install jumper on relay 99-05AK08E As operator in AIR, acknowledge jumpering contacts 3 to 4 on DRIVER relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08E. Insert mrf rp15a jumpered

[3] CHECK the following indications:

• RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV, 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A, on Panel 9-15, Bay 1, is extinguished.

• RPT SYS A TURB CONTROL VLV, 3-IL-099-5A-DS15B, on Panel 9-17, Bay 1, is illuminated.

[4] ENSURE Reactor power less than 95%.

BOP

[5] RECORD valve position in terms of percent below.

• CV-1, 3-Zl-1-75  %

• CV-2, 3-Zl-1-80  %

• CV-3, 3-Zl-1-85  %

• CV-4, 3-Zl-1-89  %

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. -1_ Event No.: _1_ Page 6 of 7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Calls operator in Aux Instrument Room to verify indications on panels 9-15 and 9-17 BOP Verifies reactor power less than 95%

Records control valve position As operator in AIR, report that 3-IL-099-5A-DS15A is extinguished DRIVER and 3-IL-099-5A-DS15 is illuminated CAUTION If power is not simulated, 3-HS-47-159 should be held in until reactor water level, reactor pressure, and neutron flux signals have stabilized to prevent flux spiking, which would cause a reactor scram.

[6] NOTIFY the UO that performance of the following step will result in a channel A Half Scram.

[7] DEPRESS and HOLD CV-1 TEST push-button, 3-HS-47-159, on Panel 3-9-7 until Step 7.4(12].

Updates crew that the next step will cause a channel B half scram Depresses and hold CV-2 TEST pushbutton

[8] CHECK the following on Panel 3-9-5:

BOP

• 3-IL-99-5A/AB, SYSTEM A BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• 3-IL-99-5A/CD, SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP B LOGIC RESET 1 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP B LOGIC RESET 2 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP B LOGIC RESET 3 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

• SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP B LOGIC RESET 4 red light on Panel 3-9-5 is extinguished.

Notes that B scram solenoid logic lights are illuminated.

Informs SRO that a Channel B half scram did not occur as it should have Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _1_ Page 7of7 Event

Description:

Conducts Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, or Turbine Trip and RPT Initiate Logic testing IAW 2-SR-3.3.1.1.8(9).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs that the surveillance procedure be stopped SRO Directs that jumper be removed to place system back to initial conditions As operator in aux instrument room, insert mrf rp15a norm and DRIVER report that jumper across contacts 3 to 4 on relay 3-RLY-099-05AK08E has been removed Refers to Technical Specifications 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

SRO 9. Turbine Control Valve Fast >30% RTP 2 E Closure, Trip Oil Pressure Low C. One or more Functions C.1 Restore RPS 1 hr.

with RPS trip capability trip capability not maintained.

Updates crew on Technical Specification requirements NRC End of Event #1 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-01_ Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor Power from 90% to 100% IAW 2-GOl-100-12 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Conducts refocus brief prior to raising reactor power GOl-100-12 5.0 INSTRUCTION STEPS (continued)

[6] IF power is being reduced (less than 10%) for any of the following reasons (N/A if entering 2-GOl-100-12 to recover from a Recirc Pump Trip or power reduction of >10%)

• Weekly Control Rod Exercise

• Main Turbine Valve Testing

• Ultimate heat Sink temperature > 92.5°F

[6.3] WHEN desired to raise power after testing is complete, THEN PERFORM the following as directed by Unit Supervisor.

(N/A Steps 5.0[7] through 5.0[20].

RAISE Recirculation flow. REFER TO 2-01-68.

MAINTAIN Reactor thermal power within the limits shown ATC on ICS and O-Tl-248, Station Reactor Engineer, as appropriate.

01-68 6.2 Adjusting Recirc Flow NOTES

1) Thermal Limits are shown in O-Tl-248 and 2-SR-2.

2) Recirc Flow changes made during the later part of the operating cycle (Coastdown) could cause core flow values to approach or exceed the allowable values of the Increased Core Flow (ICF)

Region of the power to flow map. Instruments used to monitor pump speed and core flow should be identified in the Reactivity Control Plan. These values should be recorded prior to reducing core flow and used as a benchmark to reestablish the previous conditions when returning to power. Increased caution should be used when changes in Recirc Flow are made in this area.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _2_ Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor Power from 90% to 100% IAW 2-GOl-100-12 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[1] IF desired to control Recirc Pumps 2A and/or 28 speed with Recirc Individual Control, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RAISE Recirc Pump 2A using RAISE SLOW (MEDIUM),

2-HS-96-15A(158). (Otherwise N/A)

• LOWER Recirc Pump 2A using SLOW(MEDIUM)(FAST),

2-HS-96-17A(178)(17C). (Otherwise NIA).

AND/OR

• RAISE Recirc Pump 28 using RAISE SLOW (MEDIUM),

2-HS-96-16A(168). (Otherwise N/A)

• LOWER Recirc Pump 28 using SLOW(MEDIUM)(FAST), 2-HS-96-18A(188)(18C). (Otherwise N/A).

[2] WHEN desired to control Recirc Pumps 2A and/or 28 speed with the RECIRC MASTER CONTROL, THEN ADJUST Recirc Pump Speed 2A & 28 using the following pushbuttons as required.

RAISE SLOW, 2-HS-96-31 RAISE MEDIUM, 2-HS-96-32 LOWER SLOW, 2-HS-96-33 LOWER MEDIUM, 2-HS-96-34 LOWER FAST, 2-HS-96-35 Lowers reactor power, using recirc, to< 95% IAW GOl-100-12 and 01-68.

Individual pump speeds should be mismatched by -60 RPM during dual pump operation between 1200 and 1300 RPM to minimize harmonic vibration (this requirement may be waived for NRG short periods for testing or maintenance).

End of Event #1 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _L Event No.: _3_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Bus Duct Cooling Fan 2A trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 3, insert malfunction to cause 'A' Bus Duct Cooling Fan to trip.

Reports GEN BUS DUCT FAN FAILURE (2-XA-55-7A, Window

31) in alarm ARP-9-7A A. VERIFY Main Bus Cooling Fans, 2-HS-262-1A or 2-HS-262-2A, indicates running on Panel 2-9-8 AND START GEN BUS DUCT HX FAN A(B) using 2-HS-2-6 1A(2A), on panel 2-9-8 to start the standby fan.

Reports 'A' Bus Duct Cooling Fan tripped Starts 'B' Bus Duct Cooling Fan Reports 'B' Bus Duct Cooling Fan in service Dispatches personnel to check 'A' Bus Duct Cooling Fan breaker and fan motor DRIVER Acknowledge checking breaker and fan motor for 'A' Bus Duct Cooling Fan.

NRC End of Event #3 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _A_ Event No.: _A_ Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

RBCCW 28 Pump trip and failure of sectionalizing valve to auto-close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 4, insert DRIVER malfunction to trip RBCCW pump 28 and malfunction to prevent auto closure of 70-48.

Reports RBCCW PUMP DISCH. HOR PRESS LOW (2-XA-55-4C, Window 12) in alarm.

ARP-9-4C A VERIFY 2-FCV-70-48 CLOSING/CLOSED.

B. VERIFY RBCCW pumps A and B in service.

C. VERIFY RBCCW surge tank low level alarm is reset.

D. DISPATCH personnel to check the following:

• RBCCW surge tank level locally.

ATC

• RBCCW pumps for proper operation.

E. REFER TO 2-AOl-70-1 for RBCCW System failure and 2 70, for starting spare pump.

Recognizes and reports that sectionalizing valve 70-48 is not closing and closes 70-48.

Reports 70-48 closed Dispatches personnel to investigate the trip of the 'B' RBCCW pump Contacts Work Control for a work order to investigate the failure of the 70-48 valve Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _A_ Page 2of4 Event

Description:

RBCCW 28 Pump trip and failure of sectionalizing valve to auto-close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER Acknowledge investigating 'B' RBCCW pump trip and the failure of the 70-48 valve to automatically close SRO Directs entry into AOl-70-1 AOl-70-1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions

[1] IF RBCCW Pump(s) has tripped, THEN Perform the following (Otherwise N/A):

ATC

• SECURE RWCU Pumps.

• VERIFY RBCCW SECTIONALIZING VLV, 2-FCV-70-48 CLOSED.

Secures RWCU pumps and verifies 70-48 closed Enters AOl-70-1 and reports immediate operator actions complete CAUTION

[NRC/C] Operations outside of the allowable regions shown on the Recirculation System Operating Map could result in thermal-hydraulic power oscillations and subsequent fuel damage. REFER TO 2-GOl-100-12A for required actions and monitoring to be performed during a power reduction. [NCO 940245001]

[1] IF Reactor is at power AND Drywell Cooling cannot be immediately restored, THEN PERFORM the following (otherwise N/A):

SRO

[2] IF any EOI entry condition is met, THEN ENTER appropriate EOl(s) (otherwise N/A).

Determines that steps 1 and 2 are N/A

[3] IF RBCCW Pump(s) has tripped and it is desired to restart the tripped RBCCW pump, THEN PERFORM the following (otherwise NIA):

[3.1] INSPECT the tripped RBCCW pump and its associated breaker for any damage or abnormal conditions.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: --1_ Page 3of4 Event

Description:

RBCCW 28 Pump trip and failure of sectionalizing valve to auto-close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior As control bay AUO, report 'B' RBCCW pump breaker is tripped and there is also a smell of burnt wiring .

DRIVER As RB AUO, report that 'B' RBCCW pump appears fine other than being tripped.

[4] IF unable to restart a tripped pump, THEN PLACE Spare RBCCW Pump in service. REFER TO 2-01-70.

SRO Directs placing the spare RBCCW pump in service IAW 01-70.

01-70 8.2 Placing Spare Pump in Service CAUTIONS

1) Damage to the RBCCW Pumps and/or RBCCW Heat ATC Exchangers may occur if the number of RBCCW Pumps in operation is not equal to the number of RBCCW Heat Exchangers in operation.

2) Valving in the Spare RBCCW Pump could affect RBCCW Surge Tank level.

[1] VERIFY RBCCW System in operation.

[2] REQUEST Unit 1 to place the Spare RBCCW Pump in service ATC to support Unit 2 operation. REFER TO 1-01-70.

Calls Unit 1 and requests that the spare RBCCW pump be aligned to Unit 2 As Unit 1, acknowledge aligning the spare RBCCW pump to Unit

2. Wait 3 minutes, then insert remote function to align the spare DRIVER RBCCW to Unit 2. Call Unit 2 operator and report that the spare RBCCW pump is aligned to Unit 2.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. ~ Event No.: ~ Page 4of4 Event

Description:

RBCCW 28 Pump trip and failure of sectionalizing valve to auto-close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[5] IF RBCCW flow was restored to two pump operation, THEN PERFORM the following (Otherwise N/A):

ATC [5.1] REOPEN RBCCW SECTIONALIZING VLV, 2-HS 48A.

Reopens 70-48 and reports 70-48 has been reopened Refers to Technical Specifications since RWCU was shutdown.

TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TR 3.4.1 Coolant Chemistry LCO 3.4.1 Reactor coolant chemistry shall be maintained within the limits of 3.4.1-1 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.4.1.1 Monitor reactor coolant Continuously Conductivity OR SRO 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the continuous conductivity monitor is inoperable and the reactor is not in MODE 4 or 5 Calls chemistry to commence sampling for reactor coolant conductivity. Samples required every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Briefs crew on current plant conditions including TS requirements DRIVER As Chemistry, acknowledge sampling requirement NRG End of Event #4 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. __!__ Event No.: _5_ Page 1 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 28 DRIVER When the NRG Chief Examiner is ready for Event #5, insert malfunction to cause of loss of 480V SID Board 2B.

Responds to numerous alarms CREW Diagnoses a loss of 480V Shutdown Board 2B and 480V RMOV Boards 2B and 2C Reports that Reactor Power, Reactor Pressure and Reactor Level are stable following the board loss.

ATC Reports a loss of RPS 'B' and Ch. 'B' half scram.

Responds to the following alarms; 8B-30, 8C-24, and 8C-31 480V SHUTDOWN BO 2B UV OR XFR (2-XA-55-8B, Window 30)

A. Overcurrent - trips and locks out normal Bkr and prevents manual transfer to alternate.

B. IF 480V Shutdown Bd 2B is lost, THEN Manually TRANSFER to alternate source by placing CS in ALTERNATE position on Panel 2-9-8.

D. IF manual transfer is NOT accomplished, THEN BOP REFER to Tech Spec 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 Determines and reports that 2B 480V SID Bd. cannot be transferred to alternate Refers US to TS 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 Dispatches personnel to investigate the loss of 2B 480V SID Bd 480V REACTOR MOV BO 2B OR 2E UV (2-XA-55-8C, Window 24)

A. CHECK light indications for loss of any 480V equipment.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page 2 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior D. IF undervoltage or transfer has occurred, THEN

1. REFER TO TS Section 3.8.7

2. RESET possible half-scram. REFER TO 2-01-99.

E. REFER TO O-Ol-57B to re-energize or transfer board.

480V REACTOR MOV BO 2C UV OR XFR (2-XA-55-8C, Window 31)

A. VERIFY automatic action:

B. CHECK light indications for loss of 480V equipment.

E. REFER TO O-Ol-57B to re-energize or transfer the board.

Directs entry into AOl-99-1, Loss of Power to One RPS Bus AOl-99-1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Action

[1] STOP all testing with potential RPS half-scrams or PCIS logic isolation signals.

4.2 Subsequent Actions NOTES

1) If power cannot be restored promptly to a de-energized RPS Bus, plant operation may continue until repairs are made provided all plant operational limits are met

2) Loss of RPS will isolate 2-RM-90-256, Drywell Air Monitor, and TS LCO 3.4.5 Condition B should be entered.

[1] VERIFY automatic actions occur.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page 3 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V S/D Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[2] VERIFY Steam Tunnel Booster FAN operating by observation of MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE, 2-TIS 60A.

SRO [4] IF desired to place RPS Bus Bon Alternate Supply, THEN PERFORM Step 4.2[9]. (Otherwise N/A)

Dispatches personnel to transfer RMOV Bds 2B, 2C, and 2E to the alternate power source, then transfer RPS 'B' to alternate.

After being dispatched to restore power, wait 5 minutes then insert (bat) to restore power to RMOV Bds 2B/2C/2E. Then insert (bat)

DRIVER to restore power to RPS 'B' and reset ATU Gross Failures Call US and report power restored to RPS 'B' and RMOV Bds 2B, 2C, and 2E. ATU GROSS FAILURES reset in AIR Updates the crew on power restoration SRO Directs ATC to reset RPS logic half scram and PCIS AOl-99-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[12] RESET the RPS trip logic half scram at Panel 2-9-5 as ATC follows:

NOTE The eight CONTROL ROD TEST SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A and BLIGHTS SHOULD ILLUMINATE Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. ~ Event No.: _5_ Page 4of12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V S/D Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[12.1] MOMENTARILY PLACE SCRAM RESET, 2-HS-99-5A-S5, as follows:

[12.2] RESET FIRST position. (Group 2/3)

[12.3] RESET SECOND position. (Group 1/4)

[12.4] NORMAL position.

[13] VERIFY the following:

[13.1] All eight SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A/B LOGIC RESET lights ILLUMINATED.

[13.2] The following four lights ILLUMINATED:

[13.2.1] SYSTEM A BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 2-IL-ATC 99-5A/AB. D

[13.2.2] SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE

[13.3] Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves indicate OPEN.

[14] RESET PCIS trip logic at Panel 2-9-4 as follows:

[14.1] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV I RESET, 2-HS-64-16A-S32, to left and right RESET positions.

[14.2] VERIFY the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

[14.2.1] MSIV GROUP A1.

[14.2.2] MSIV GROUP B1.

[14.3] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV II RESET, 2-HS-64-16A-S33, to left and right RESET positions.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. __!__ Event No.: _5_ Page 5 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[14.4] VERIFY the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

[14.4.1] MSIV GROUP A2.

[14.4.2] MSIV GROUP B2.

Resets RPS logic half scram and PCIS Reports RPS and PCIS reset Directs BOP to restore remaining affected systems IAW 01-99 Refers to Technical Specifications 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SRO 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

b. Unit 2 480 V Shutdown Boards;

c. Unit 2 480 V RMOV Boards 2A, 2B, 2D, and 2E; Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _L Event No.: _5_ Page 6 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior B. One Unit 2 480 V B.1 Restore Board to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Shutdown Board OPERABLE inoperable. status OR 480 V RMOV Board 2B inoperable C. Unit 2 480 V RMOV C.1 Declare the affected Immediately Board 2E inoperable RHR subsystem Inoperable 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO 3.4.5 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. Drywell floor drain sump monitoring system; and

b. One channel of either primary containment atmospheric particulate or atmospheric gaseous SRO monitoring system.

A. Drywell floor drain A.1 Restore drywell floor 24 hr sump monitoring drain sump monitoring system inoperable system to OPERABLE status.

B. Required primary B.1 Analyze grab samples Once Containment of primary containment per Atmospheric atmosphere 12 hr monitoring system AND inoperable. B.2 Restore required primary 30 containment atmospheric days monitoring system to OPERABLE status D. All required leakage D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately detection systems inoperable.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. ~ Event No.: _5_ Page 7 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TR 3.4.1 Coolant Chemistry LCO 3.4.1 Reactor coolant chemistry shall be maintained within the limits of Table 3.4.1-1.

TSR 3.4.1.1 Monitor reactor coolant Continuously conductivity OR 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the SRO continuous conductivity monitor is inoperable and the reactor is not in MODE 4 or 5 Contacts Chemistry to start sampling reactor coolant conductivity every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Briefs crew on the Technical Specification requirements due to the loss of 480V SID Bd B 01-99 8.5 Restoration to Normal Following RPS Bus Power Loss or Transfer NOTE Steps 8.5[5] through 8.5[22] can be performed in any order.

BOP

[5] VERIFY the green lights are ILLUMINATED on all 5 of the QLVPS located at Panel 9-14.

[6] RESTORE Reactor and Refuel Zone Ventilation to normal operation. REFER TO 2-AOl-64-2D, Group 6 Ventilation System Isolation.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No.___!__ Event No.: _5_ Page 8 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V S/D Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior AOl-64-20 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[1 O] WHEN initiating signal has been corrected AND necessary repairs have been made, THEN

[10.1] VERIFY PCIS RESET:

• RESET PCIS DIV I RESET, 2-HS-64-16A-S32.

• RESET PCIS DIV 11 RESET, 2-HS-64-16A-S33.

[10.2] RESET Reactor/Refuel isolation logic as required:

• PLACE REFUELING ZONE FANS AND DMPRS, 2-HS-64-3A in OFF.

• PLACE REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DMPRS, 2-HS-64-11A in OFF.

[10.3] START Reactor/Refuel zone ventilation as required:

• PLACE REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS switch, 2-HS-64-11A, in SLOW A (SLOW 8).

• PLACE REFUEL ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS Switch, 2-HS-64-3A, in SLOW A (SLOW 8).

[10.4] VERIFY for the fans started the dampers open and fans start as indicated by illuminated red lights above the following switches:

• The two green lights A(8) above REFUEL ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS Switch, 2-HS-64-3A, extinguish and the two red lights A(8) illuminate.

• The two green lights A(8) above REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS Switch 2-HS-64-11A, extinguish and the two red lights A(8) illuminate.

• REACTOR ZONE SPLY OUT8D ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-13.

• REACTOR ZONE SPLY IN8D ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-14.

• REACTOR ZONE EXH IN8D ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-42.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. __+/-___ Event No.: _5_ Page 9 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• REACTOR ZONE EXH OUTBD ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-43.

• REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS, 2-HS-64-11A.

• REFUEL ZONE SPLY OUTBD ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-5.

BOP

• REFUEL ZONE SPLY INBD ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-6.

• REFUEL ZONE EXH OUTBD ISOL DMPR, 2-HS-64-9.

• REFUEL ZONE EXH INBD ISOL DMPR, 2-HS 10.

(11] NOTIFY RADCON of the isolation restoration AND REQUEST surveys BOP Restores ventilation and contacts radcon for surveys DRIVER As Radcon, acknowledge that ventilation has been restored and surveys need to be performed.

01-99 8.5 Restoration to Normal Following RPS Bus Power Loss or Transfer BOP

[7] RESTORE Standby Gas Treatment System to standby readiness. REFER TO 0-01-65, Section 7.0.

Calls Unit 1 to have Standby Gas Treatment restored to standby readiness.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. -1._ Event No.: _5_ Page 10of12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER As Unit 1 operator, acknowledge securing SBGT. Insert (bat) to secure SBGT trains.

[8] At Panel 2-9-3, PLACE PSC head tank pumps in service as follows:

• PLACE PSC PUMP SUCTION INBD ISOL VALVE, 2-HS-75-57A, in AUTO After OPEN. D

• PLACE PSC PUMP SUCTION OUTBD ISOL VALVE, 2-HS-75-58A, in AUTO After OPEN. D

• PLACE PSC HEAD TANK PUMPS 2A & 28, 2-HS 75A & 2-HS-75-76A in AUTO.

NOTE 2-FCV-64-139 and 2-FCV-64-140 opens and closes automatically when the Drywell DPCompressor starts and stops.

[1 O] At Panel 2-9-3, RESTORE Drywell DP Compressor to automatic operation as follows:

BOP [10.1] DEPRESS DRYWELL DP COMP SUCTION VLV RESET pushbutton, 2-HS-64-139A.

[10.2] DEPRESS DRYWELL DP COMP DISCH VLV RESET pushbutton, 2-HS-64-140A.

[10.3] VERIFY OPEN DRYWELL INBD ISOLATION VLV using 2-HS-64-31.

[10.4] VERIFY OPEN SUPPR CHBR INBD ISOLATION VLV using 2-HS-64-34.

[11] At Panel 2-9-4, RESTORE Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Systems to normal operation as follows:

[11.1] NOTIFY Radwaste Operator that Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sump isolation valves are being reopened.

[11.2] PLACE OW EQPT DRAIN INBD ISOL VALVE, 2-HS-77-15A, in AUTO After OPEN.

[11.3] PLACE OW EQPT DRAIN OUTBD ISOL VALVE, 2-HS-77-158, in AUTO After OPEN.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _L Event No.: _5_ Page 11 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior (11.4] PLACE OW FLOOR DRAIN INBD ISOL VALVE, 2-HS-77-2A, in AUTO After OPEN.

(11.5] PLACE OW FLOOR DRAIN OUTBD ISOL VALVE, 2-HS-77-28, in AUTO After OPEN.

[12] IF OW Radiation Monitor CAM, 2-RM-90-256 was secured due to a preplanned transfer, THEN (otherwise N/A)

(13] IF OW Radiation Monitor CAM, 2-RM-90-256, isolated due to loss of RPS, THEN (otherwise N/A)

MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the following RESET pushbuttons on Panel 2-9-2 and verify the associated valves open.

BOP *UPPER INBD SUPPLY ISOL VALVE RESET, 2-HS 254A-A (opens FCV-90-254A).

• LOWER INBD SUPPLY ISOL VALVE RESET, 2-HS 2548-A (opens FCV-90-2548).

• OUTBD RETURN ISOL VALVE RESET, 2-HS-90-257A-A (opens FCV-90-257A).

• OUTBD SUPPLY ISOL VALVE RESET, 2-HS-90-255A (opens FCV-90-255).

• INBD RETURN ISOL VALVE RESET, 2-HS-90-2578-A (opens FCV-90-2578).

(14] At Panel 2-9-54, PLACE H2/02 Analyzer in service per 2-01-76.

(15] At Panel 2-9-55, VERIFY PATH A VENT FLOW CONT, 2-FIC-84-20, in AUTO with setpoint at 100 scfm.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _A_ Event No.: _5_ Page 12 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of 480V SID Board 2B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[19] At Panels 2-9-10 and 2-9-11, RESTORE Radiation Monitoring System as follows:

[19.1] DEPRESS applicable RESET pushbuttons.

[19.2] RESTORE Radiation Monitoring System to normal.

REFER TO 2-01-90, Section 5. 0.

BOP

[21] At Panel 2-9-14, VERIFY APRM and RBM Memory lights RESET (If current plant conditions allow).

[22] At Panel 2-9-13, DEPRESS TIP ISOLATION RESET pushbutton.

This completes restoration from. the loss of RPS 'B' with the NRG exception of RWCU.

End of Event #5 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _6_ Page 1 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DRIVER When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 6, insert malfunction for a loss of condenser vacuum.

Reports OG HOLDUP LINE INLET FLOW HIGH (2-XA-55-53, Window 14) in alarm.

ARP-9-53 BOP A. VERIFY holdup line flow on:

2. 2-FR-66-20, Off-gas flow to holdup volume, Panel 9-8.

Checks off-gas flow and reports flow is high ATC Reports degrading condenser vacuum Directs entering AOl-47-3 AOl-47-3 NOTE Turbine trip is expected around 24.3 inches Hg as indicated on 2-XR-002-0026 due to differences between instrument taps for turbine trip and indicated vacuum.

4.2 Subsequent Actions SRO [1] IF ANY EOI entry condition is met, THEN ENTER the appropriate EOl(s).

CAUTION

[NRC/C] Operations outside of the allowable regions shown on the Recirculation System Operating Map could result in thermal-hydraulic power oscillations and subsequent fuel damage. REFER TO 2-GOl-100-12A for required actions and monitoring to be performed during a power reduction. [NCO 940245001]

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _Q_ Page 2of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[2] IF unable to maintain hotwell pressure below -25 inches Hg as indicated on 2-XR-002-0026, with Reactor power less than 30%, THEN TRIP the main turbine.

[3] IF condenser vacuum is lost, THEN OPEN the HOTWELL SAMPLE TO FL DR, 2-DRV-043-1019 (557'@ T-10 C-Line) and CON DEMIN SAMPLE TO FL DR, 2-DRV-043-1020 (557'@ T-6 G-Line), to establish flow through the sample lines.

[4] REDUCE reactor power in an attempt to maintain condenser vacuum.

[5] VERIFY automatic actions SRO Sets a trigger value, on main condenser vacuum, to initiate a manual reactor scram and main turbine trip.

Directs ATC to initiate an Upper Power Runback in an attempt to maintain main condenser vacuum Initiates an Upper Power Runback and reports reactor power lowering.

ATC Monitors main condenser vacuum and reports that vacuum is continuing to degrade Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.:__§_ Page 3of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior AOl-47-3 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[6] CHECK CCW pumps for proper operation.

[7] VERIFY CLOSED CONDENSER VAC BREAKERS 1A and BOP 1B, 2-HS-66-1A, Panel 9-8.

[9] IF SJAE 2A is in service, THEN VERIFY the following Verifies main condenser vacuum breakers are closed.

Verifies proper operation of CCW and in-service SJAE SRO Directs a manual reactor scram and main turbine trip Initiates a manual reactor scram AOl-100-1 Reactor Scram OATC Hard Card 1.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ATC

[1] DEPRESS REACTOR SCRAM A and B, 2-HS-99-5A/S3A and 2-HS-99-5A/S3B, on Panel 2-9-5.

[2] IF scram is due to a loss of RPS, THEN PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in START & HOT STBY AND PAUSE for approximately 5 seconds (Otherwise N/A)

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _A_ Event No.: _6_ Page 4of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[3] Refuel Mode One Rod Permissive Light check:

[3.1] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in REFUEL.

[3.2] CHECK illuminated REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46.

[3.3] IF REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-Xl-85-46, is NOT illuminated, THEN CHECK all control rod positions at Full-In Overtravel, or Full-In. (Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in SHUTDOWN.

[5] REPORT the following status to the US:

• Reactor Scram

• Mode Switch is in Shutdown

• "All rods in" or "rods out"

• Reactor Water Level and trend (recovering or lowering)

• Reactor pressure and trend

• MSIV position (Open or Closed)

• Power level Completes immediate operator actions and makes scram report Continues to monitor main condenser vacuum Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: _6_ Page 6of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reactor Scram BOP Unit Operator Hard Card 1.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS: PANELS 2-9-7 & 2-9-8 NOTES

1) To OPEN PCB 224 with the control room handswitch, ONE of the following is required:

2-XA-55-8Awindow 7, GEN REVERSE PWR FIRST RELAY OPERATION 2-EA-57-136, WITH GENERATOR PCB 224 BOP CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 2-HS-242-224A, placed in TRIP.

OR GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 2-HS-242-224A, placed in BYPASS.

2) The following steps are not required to be performed in order, but only as required to maintain stable conditions.

[1] At :5 50 MWe, or as directed by the Unit Supervisor, VERIFY TRIPPED the Main Turbine as follows:

[1.1] DEPRESS the TRIP pushbutton, 2-HS-47-670 on Panel 2-9-7.

[1.2] VERIFY OPEN GENERATOR PCB 224.

[1.3] VERIFY TRIPPED VOLTAGE REGULATOR BOP

[2] ANNOUNCE Reactor SCRAM over PA system.

Trips the main turbine and announces the reactor scram over the PA system.

Reports the main turbine tripped.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _+/-_ Event No.: _6_ Page 7of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS: PANELS 2-9-3 NOTE The following steps are not required to be performed in order, but only as required to maintain stable conditions

[1] MONITOR and CONTROL RPV pressure to keep below 1073 psig and stable.

[2] IF any PCIS isolation signal is received, THEN VERIFY PCIS isolations using any of the following:

(Otherwise N/A)

• Containment Isolation Status System on Panel 2-9-4 Verifies that main turbine bypass valves are controlling reactor pressure Checks CISS panel and reports 2,3,6, and 8 PCIS isolations Enters EOl-1 on RPV Water Lvl below +2" Verify RX scram - CHECKED RC/Q Monitor and Control reactor power - CHECKED SRO The reactor is subcritical AND NO boron has been injected THEN EXIT RC/Q and ENTER AOl-100-1, Reactor Scram - CHECKED Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _6_ Page 8 of 12 EventDescription: LossofCondenserVacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs ATC to enter 2-AOl-100-1 RC/L CAUTION: Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend - CHECKED MONITOR and CONTROL RPV water lvl - CHECKED VERIFY each as required

• PCIS isolations (Groups 1, 2, and 3) - CHECKED It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - SUBCRITICAL RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft - CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained below 55 psig - CAN SRO CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F - CHECKED RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in and +51 in with ANY of the following CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig CRD 58 1640 psig RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 50 1200 psig CNDS 6A 480 psig cs 6D,6E 330 psig LPCI 68, 6C 320 psig Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _L Event No.: __§__ Page 9 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs ATC to restore and maintain reactor level between +2 in and +51 in using Condensate and Feedwater in accordance with Appendix 5A RC/P OW press is above 2.4 psig - NO Emergency RPV depressurization is anticipated - NO AND The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Is ANY MSRV cycling - NO SRO Steam cooling is required - NO Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the existing RPV press - CAN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the safe area - CAN of Curve 4 OW control air becomes unavailable -AVAIL Boron inj is required - NO AND The main condenser is available AND There has been no indication of a steam line break STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig with the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 88)

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: _§__ Page 10of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs BOP to control reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig in SRO accordance with Appendix 8B Recognizes and reports that main turbine bypass valves have BOP closed due to the loss of vacuum Recognizes and reports Reactor Feedwater Pumps tripped due to ATC loss of vacuum Directs BOP to restore and maintain RPV water level between +2 in. and +51 in. with RCIC using App 5C EOl-1 RC/P

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F SRO AUGMENT RPV press control as necessary with ANY of the following MSRVs ONLY when suppr lvl is above 5.5 ft 11A Directs BOP to maintain RPV pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig using MSRVs, App. 11A EOI APPENDIX-SC CAUTION

• Operating RCIC turbine below 2100 rpm may result in unstable BOP system operation and equipment damage.

• High Suppression Chamber pressure may trip RCIC.

• Operating RCIC Turbine with suction temperatures above 140°F may result in equipment damage.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _A_ Event No.: _6_ Page 11 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

3. VERIFY RESET and OPEN 2-FCV-71-9, RCIC TURB TRIP!THROT VLV.

4. VERIFY 2-FIC-71-36A, RCIC SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, controller in AUTO with setpoint at 620 gpm.

5. OPEN the following valves:

• 2-FCV-71-39, RCIC PUMP INJECTION VALVE

• 2-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE

• 2-FCV-71-25, RCIC LUBE OIL COOLING WTR VLV.

6. PLACE 2-HS-71-31A, RCIC VACUUM PUMP, handswitch in START.

7. OPEN 2-FCV-71-8, RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV, to start RCIC Turbine.

8. CHECK proper RCIC operation by observing the following:

a. RCIC Turbine speed accelerates above 2100 rpm.

b. RCIC flow to RPV stabilizes and is controlled automatically at 620 gpm.

c. 2-FCV-71-40, RCIC TESTABLE CHECK VLV, opens by observing 2-Zl-71-40A, DISC POSITION, red light illuminated.

d. 2-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, closes as flow rises above 120 gpm.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _i._ Event No.: _6_ Page 12of12 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

10. ADJUST 2-FIC-71-36A, RCIC SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, controller as necessary to control injection.

Starts RCIC IAW App 5C and restores and maintains RPV water level +2 in to +51 in.

Appendix-11A 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[1] IF Drywell Control Air is NOT available, THEN EXECUTE EOI Appendix 8G, CROSSTIE CAD TO DRYWELL CONTROL AIR, CONCURRENTLY with this procedure.

[2] IF Suppression Pool level is at or below 5.5 ft, THEN CLOSE MSRVs and CONTROL RPV pressure using other options.

BOP [3] OPEN MSRVs using the following sequence to control RPV pressure as directed by SRO:

1 2-PCV-1-179 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 2 2-PCV-1-180 MN STM LINED RELIEF VALVE 3 2-PCV-1-4 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 4 2-PCV-1-31 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE 5 2-PCV-1-23 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 6 2-PCV-1-42 MN STM LINED RELIEF VALVE 7 2-PCV-1-30 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE 8 2-PCV-1-19 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 9 2-PCV-1-5 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 10 2-PCV-1-41 MN STM LINED RELIEF VALVE 11 2-PCV-1-22 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 12 2-PCV-1-18 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 13 2-PCV-1-34 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE Controls RPV pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig IAW App 11A NRC End of Event #6 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No._+/-_ Event No.: _7_ Page 1 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examineris ready for Event No. 7, insert DRIVER (bat) for a loss of offsite power with a failure of 'A' Diesel Generator to automatically start CREW Recognize and report that a loss of offsite power has occurred.

SRO Directs entry into AOl-57-1A AOl-57-1A 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions NOTE Performing this instruction, in conjunction with an earthquake, may BOP require resetting the individual Diesel Generator's 86G Lockout Relay and the Field Breaker(both locally at the Diesel Generator electrical cabinet).

[1] VERIFY Diesel Generators have started and tied to respective 4kV Shutdown Boards, THEN DISPATCH personnel to Diesel Generators When the BOP operator checks on the status of the Diesel NRC Generators, it would initiate Event No. 8, Failure of the 'A' Diesel Generator to automatically start.

BOP Dispatches personnel to monitor the Diesel Generators DRIVER As AUO, acknowledge monitoring diesel generators Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: _7_ Page 2 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[2] VERIFY two EECW Pumps (not using the same EECW strainer) are in service supplying Diesel Generators.

[3] IF two EECW Pumps (not using the same EECW strainer) are not in service supplying Diesel Generators, THEN PERFORM Attachment 9 (Cooling water is required to be established within 8 minutes) (Otherwise NIA).

BOP

[4] PERFORM the following to ensure at least one train of Diesel Generator Room Fans are energized:

• VERIFY 480V DSL Aux Board A or B energized.

NOTE The following subsequent actions may be performed out of order, depending on plant conditions.

Performs actions IAW AOl-57-1A. Recognizes Diesel Generator

'A' failed to start. Starts 'A' DIG and verifies tied to 4kV SID Bd.

4.2 Subsequent Actions NOTES

1) SBO Unit does attachment 12 only; the other two units perform subsequent actions of AOI.

2) If a Unit is in a Station Blackout condition, performance of this instruction will also require implementation of 1(2)(3)-AOl-30B-BOP 1, Reactor Building Ventilation Failure, on the Unit in Station Blackout.

3) The following is the preferred pump combinations of Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR pumps used in SOC: 1B/20, 1A/2C, 1A/2D, 1B/2C.

By using these pumps it ensures that a loss of a Diesel during a station blackout would not result in a loss of Shutdown cooling for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _i_ Event No.: _7_ Page 3 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[1] IF ANY EOI entry condition is met, THEN REFER TO the appropriate EOl(s). (Otherwise N/A)

[2] IF any Unit is under a "Station Blackout" THEN ONLY PERFORM Attachment 12 for that Unit: - NA

[3] VERIFY automatic actions and PERFORM any that failed to occur.

[4] REFER TO 1(2)(3)-AOl-78-1, FPC System Failure for a complete Loss of AC POWER, as necessary. NOT NEC NOTES

1) EECW supply valves to the Control Air Compressors and RBCCW are air operated. If initial air pressure is low, air compressors may trip on high temperature, until cooling water flow is established.

2) At US discretion, the O-FCV-67-53 valve can be placed in the open position with hand switch. The valve will automatically come open once EECW pressure is above setpoint. REFER TO 01-67 for valve operation.

3) The North header supply to Unit 1 RBCCW, the North header supply to Unit 2 RBCCW and the South header supply to Unit 3 RBCCW are normally isolated with a manual valve; therefore no flow will occur when either 1-FCV-67-50, 2-FCV-67-50 or 3-FCV-67-51 opens.

BOP [5] WHEN EECW header pressure is restored above the reset pressure setpoint (psig) for the valves listed below, THEN Common Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 O-FCV-67-53 106 FCV-67-50 90 91 92 FCV-67-51 107 109 113 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. -1._ Event No.: _7_ Page 4 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RESET EECW supplies to Control Air Compressors and RBCCW, at Unit 1 Panel 1-LPNL-925-0032 and Unit 2,3 Panels 2(3)-25-32. REFER TO the EECW to the RCW Crossties for Control Air & RBCCW section of 0-01-67.

[6] START Control Air Compressors A, D and Gas required and MONITOR system pressure. REFER TO O-AOl-32-1.

[6.1] IF an air compressor trips on high temperature, THEN (Otherwise N/A)

NOTIFY Unit Supervisor for instructions.

[8] PLACE RPS MG Sets A and 8 in service. REFER TO 1(2,3)-01-99.

[9] START the Diesel Driven Fire Pump. REFER TO 0-01-26.

Calls for Control Air Compressors and EECW to be reset and for RPS to be reenergized.

As outside personnel, acknowledge restoring control air, resetting EECW and restoring RPS. Wait 5 minutes, then insert (bat)

DRIVER Call control room and report that control air has been restored, EECW has been reset and RPS has been restored.

Reports that MSIVs are closed ATC/BOP IF bulk suppression pool temperature reaches 95°F, notifies SRO of EOl-2 entry condition.

When suppression pool temperature reaches 95°F, enters EOl-2 SRO Enters EOl-2 on Supp Pl Temp above 95°F Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. ~ Event No.: _7_ Page 5 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO SAMG entry is required - NO CAUTION

1. 4 PC press vs pump NPSH - CHECKED OW sprays have been initiated - NO Suppr chmbr sprays have been initiated - NO PC water level CANNOT be restored and maintained below 105 ft - CAN OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be restored and maintained below 55 psig - CAN SRO SPIT CAUTION

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl temp below 95°F using available suppr pl cooling (APPX 17A) - CHECKED WHEN suppr pl temp CANNOT be maintained below 95°F OPERATE all available suppr pl cooling using only RHR pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX 17A)

Directs BOP to put all available suppression pool cooling in service IAW App 17A EOI APPENDIX-17A BOP NOTE: Placing a BYPASS SEL switch in BYPASS in step 1 below prevents automatic opening of the affected RHR loop's outboard injection valve. This makes LPCI mode of that RHR loop inoperable.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No . .....1._ Event No.: _7_ Page 6 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

1. IF .............. Adequate core cooling is assured, OR Directed to cool the Suppression Pool irrespective of adequate core cooling, THEN ....... BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock AS NECESSARY:

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

2. PLACE RHR SYSTEM 1(11) in Suppression Pool Cooling as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR Heat Exchanger(s).

c. THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to BOP obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm RHRSW flow:

• 2-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 2A RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 2B RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 2C RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 20 RHRSW OUTLET VLV

d. IF ............. Directed by SRO, THEN ....... PLACE 2-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD in MANUAL OVERIDE

e. IF ............. LPCI Initiation signal exists, THEN ....... MOMENTARILY PLACE 2-XS-74-121(129), RHR SYS 1(11) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT in SELECT.

f. IF ............. 2-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ....... VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

g. OPEN 2-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV

h. VERIFY desired RHR pump(s) for Suppression Pool Cooling are operatinQ.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. ___£__ Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Time ... *sition Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION RHR system flows below 7000 gpm or above 10000 gpm for one-pump operation may result in excessive vibration and equipment damage.

i. THROTTLE OPEN 2-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR POOL CLGffEST VLV, to maintain EITHER of the following as indicated on 2-Fl-74-50(64), RHR SYS 1(11) FLOW:

• Between 7000 and 10000 gpm for one-pump operation.

OR

• At or below 13000 gpm for two-pump operation. _ _

BOP

j. VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM 1(11) MIN FLOW VALVE.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 1.

I. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers.

Places RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW App 17A Reports Suppression Pool Cooling in service Contacts Chemistry to reports RHRSW aligned to in service RHR Heat Exchangers.

DRIVER As Chemistry, acknowledge that RHRSW has been aligned to RHR Heat Exchangers.

Refers to Technical Specifications for SPT 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature SRO LCO 3.6.2.1 Suppression pool average temperature shall be:

a. <95°F when any OPERABLE intermediate range monitor (IRM) channel is> 70/125 divisions of full scale on Range 7 and no testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed; Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _L Event No.: _7_ Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior A. Suppression pool Verify suppression Once/hr average temperature pool temperature 2: 95°F but S110°F. S110°F AND AND Any OPERABLE IRM Restore suppression 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> channel > 70/125 pool average SRO divisions of full scale on temperature to Range 7 S95°F AND Not performing testing That adds heat to the suppression pool NRC End of Event #7 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _8_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

DG A Fails to Auto start

-~~ft

--:.:::=n Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports that 'A' Diesel Generator has failed to start Starts 'A' Diesel Generator BOP Verifies the 'A' Diesel Generator ties to 4kV Shutdown Board 'A' Reports that 'A' Diesel Generator has been started and that the diesel generators are tied to all 4kV Shutdown Boards.

NRC End of Event #8 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _L Event No.: _9_ Page 1 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event No. 9, insert DRIVER (bat) for a LOCA and a failure of the HPCI steam supply valve to open automatically.

ATC Reports reactor water level lowering BOP Reports drywell pressure rising Reenters EOl-1on reactor water level RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and +51 in. with ANY of the following:

CRD 5B 1640 psig SRO RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 50 1200 psig Directs BOP to start HPCI IAW App 50 Directs ATC to maximize CRD IAW App 5B When BOP operator starts HPCI OR if HPCI gets an initiation NRC signal due to rising drywell pressure or low reactor water level Event 10 would start Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. __!___ Event No.: _9_ Page 2 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOI Appendix-SD 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[4] VERIFY at least one SGTS train in operation.

CAUTIONS

1) Operating HPCI Turbine below 2400 rpm may result in unstable system operation and equipment damage.

2) Operating HPCI Turbine with suction temperatures above 140°F may result in equipment damage.

[1] VERIFY 2-FIC-73-33, HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, controller is in one of the following configurations, as desired:

• in AUTO and set for 5300 gpm for rapid injection

• in AUTO and set for approximately 2500 gpm for slower injection

• in MANUAL with output at approximately 50% for slower injection.

NOTE HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump will NOT start UNTIL 2-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV, starts to open.

[2] IF high reactor water level trip logic is actuated, THEN

[2.1] DEPRESS HPCI TURBINE TRIP RX LVL HIGH RESET pushbutton.

[2.2] CHECK HPCI TURBINE TRIP LVL HIGH amber light has extinguished.

[3] PLACE HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP handswitch in START.

[4] PLACE HPCI STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER handswitch in START.

[5] OPEN the following valves:

• 2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE

• 2-FCV-73-44, HPCI PUMP INJECTION VALVE.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _1_ Event No.: _9_ Page 3 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

[6] OPEN 2-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV, to start HPCI Turbine.

[7] CHECK proper HPCI operation by observing the following:

A. HPCI Turbine speed accelerates.

B. 2-FCV-73-45, HPCI TESTABLE CHECK VLV, opens by observing 2-Zl-73-45A, DISC POSITION, red light illuminated.

C. HPCI flow to RPV stabilizes and is controlled automatically at the setpoint. (N/A if controller in manual).

BOP D. 2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, closes as flow exceeds approximately 1200 gpm.

CAUTION HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, 2-FCV-073-0030, automatically opens when system flow is at or below 900 gpm (lowering) only if a system initiation signal is present. Manually opening the min flow valve may be required for pump min flow protection.

[8] ADJUST 2-FIC-73-33, HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, controller as necessary to control injection.

[9] VERIFY HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump stops and the shaft-driven oil pump operates properly. D

[1 O] WHEN HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump stops, THEN BOP PLACE HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP handswitch in AUTO.

Injects to the reactor vessel with HPCI IAW App 50 EOI Appendix-58 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[2] IF BOTH of the following exists,

• CRD is NOT required for rod insertion, AND

• Maximum injection flow is required,THEN LINE UP ALL available CRD pumps to the RPV as follows:

[2.2] IF CRD Pump 1B is available, THEN PERFORM the following:

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1._ Event No.: _9_ Page 4of16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior A. NOTIFY Unit 1 Operator to verify closed 1-FCV 8, CRD PUMP B DISCH TO U2, (Panel 1-9-5).

B. START CRD Pump 18.

C. OPEN 2-FCV-85-8, CRD PUMP 1B DISCH TO U2.

CAUTION Failure to maintain CRD system pressure above 1450 psig on 2-Pl-85-13A could result in pump runout.

[2.3] OPEN the following valves to increase CRD flow to ATC the RPV:

• 2-PCV-85-23, CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV

• 2-PCV-85-27, CRD CLG WATER PRES CONTROL VLV

• 2-FCV-85-50, CRD EXH RTN LINE SHUTOFF VALVE.

[2.4] ADJUST 2-FIC-85-11, CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL to control injection WHILE maintaining 2-Pl-85-13A, CRD ACCUM CHG WTR HOR PRESS, above 1450 psig, if possible.

Maximizes CRD flow to the RPV IAW App 58 ATC Reports that RPV water level is continuing to lower EOl-1, RC/L RPV water lvl can be restored and INHIBIT ADS maintained above -162 in.

SRO AND The ADS timer has initiated Directs BOP to Inhibit ADS Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: _9_ Page 5 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Inhibits ADS. Verifies inhibited and reports ADS inhibited.

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F IF RPV water lvl CANNOT be restored and maintained betweeen

+2 in. and +51 in.

SRO THEN RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl above -162 in.

AUGMENT RPV water lvl control as necessary with ANY of the following:

SLC (boron tank) 7B 1450 psig Directs ATC to initiate SLC from the boron tank IAW App 7B EOI Appendix-78 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[2] IF RPV injection is needed immediately ONLY to prevent or mitigate fuel damage, THEN CONTINUE at Step 1.0(1 O] to inject SLC Boron Tank to RPV ATC (1 O] UNLOCK and PLACE 2-HS-63-6A, SLC PUMP 2A/2B, control switch in START-A or START-B (Panel 9-5).

[11] CHECK SLC injection by observing the following:

• Selected pump starts, as indicated by red light illuminated above pump control switch.

• Squib valves fire, as indicated by SQUIB VALVE A and B CONTINUITY blue lights extinguished. D

• SLC SQUIB VALVE CONTINUITY LOST Annunciator in alarm (2-XA-55-5B, Window 20).

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1__ Event No.: _9_ Page 6 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• 2-Pl-63-7A, SLC PUMP DISCH PRESS, indicates above RPV pressure.

• System flow, as indicated by 2-IL-63-11, SLC FLOW, red light illuminated, ATC

• SLC INJECTION FLOW TO REACTOR Annunciator in alarm (2-XA-55-58, Window 14).

Injects SLC to the RPV IAWApp 78 EOl-1, RC/L Can RPV water lvl be restored NO C 1 , Alternate SRO and maintained above -162 in. Lvl Control Enter C1, Alternate Level Control BOP Reports drywell temperature and pressure continuing to rise Re-enters EOl-2 on Drywell Temperature and Pressure PC/H H2 and 02 monitoring system is inoperable - OPERABLE Offsite radioactivity release rate reaches ODCM limits - NO OR H2 is NO longer detected in PC(2.4% on control room indicators) - DETECTED Verify H202 analyzer in service (APP 19)

When H2 is detected in PC (2.4% on control room indicators continue - STOPS SP/L Primary Containment Flooding is required - NO AND SAMG entry is NOT required Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. _+/-__ Event No.: _9_ Page 7 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl lvl between -1 in. and -6 in.

(APPX 18) - CHECKED SRO Can suppr pl lvl be maintained above -6 in. - YES Can suppr pl lvl be maintained below -1 in. - YES PC/P MONITOR and CONTROL PC press below 2.4 psig using the Vent system (AOl-64-1) - CHECKED WHEN PC press CANNOT be maintained below 2.4 psig - CONTINUES SRO BEFORE suppr chmbr press rises to 12 psig CONTINUE - CONTINUES CAUTION

1. 2 PUMP NPSH and Vortex Limits INITIATE suppr chmbr sprays using only pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX 17C)

Directs BOP to initiate Suppression Chamber Sprays using APP 17C EOI APPENDIX-17C

1. BEFORE Suppression Chamber pressure drops below 0 psig, CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 6.

2. IF ..... Adequate core cooling is assured OR Directed to spray the Suppression Chamber irrespective of adequate core cooling, THEN ... BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock as necessary:

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. __L Event No.: _9_ Page 8 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

• PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

3. IF ..... Directed by SRO to spray the Suppression Chamber using Standby Coolant Supply, THEN ... CONTINUE in this procedure At Step 7 using RHR Loop I OR At Step 8 using RHR Loop II.

4. IF ..... Directed by SRO to spray the Suppression Chamber using Fire Protection, THEN ... CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 9.

BOP 5. INITIATE Suppression Chamber Sprays as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. IF ..... EITHER of the following exists:

• LPCI Initiation signal is NOT present, OR

• Directed by SRO, THEN ... PLACE keylock switch 2-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD, in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

c. MOMENTARILY PLACE 2-XS-74-121(129), RHR SYS 1(11)

CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT, switch in SELECT.

d. IF ..... 2-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS 1(11) INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ... VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS 1(11)

OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

e. VERIFY OPERATING the desired RHR System 1(11) pump(s) for Suppression Chamber Spray.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1._ Event No.: _9_ Page 9of16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

f. VERIFY OPEN 2-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV.

g. OPEN 2-FCV-74-58(72), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBR SPRAY VALVE.

h. IF ..... RHR System 1(11) is operating ONLY in Suppression Chamber Spray mode, THEN ... CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 5.k.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 2.

I. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR Heat Exchanger(s).

BOP m.THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm flow:

• 2-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 2A RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 28 RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 2C RHRSW OUTLET VLV

• 2-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 20 RHRSW OUTLET VLV.

n. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers Initiates and reports Suppression Chamber sprays in service IAW App 17C Calls Chemistry to report that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers DRIVER As Chemistry, acknowledge that RHRSW is aligned to RHR heat exchangers Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. ~ Event No.: _9_ Page 10of16 Event

Description:

LOCA II T"1me Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior DW/T CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend MONITOR and CONTROL OW temp below 160°F using available OW cooling OW - CHECKED WHEN OW temp CANNOT be maintained - CONTINUES SRO below 160°F OPERATE all available OW cooling OW - IN SERVICE BEFORE OW temp rises to 200°F - CONTINUES Verifies reactor scrammed BOP Reports Suppression Chamber pressure is greater than 12 psig PC/P WHEN suppr chmbr press exceeds 12 psig - CONTINUES Is suppr pl lvl below 19 ft. - YES SRO Is OW temp within the safe area of Curve 5 Verifies in the safe area - YES SHUTDOWN Recirc pumps and OW blowers Verifies recirc pumps shutdown and directs BOP to shutdown OW blowers BOP Secures all OW blowers and reports all OW blowers shutdown Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No.~ Event No.: _9_ Page 11 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits INITIATE OW sprays using only pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX 17B SRO Directs BOP to initiate OW Sprays IAW App 17B EOI APPENDIX-178

1. BEFORE drywell pressure drops below 0 psig, CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 7.

6. INITIATE Orywell Sprays as follows:

e. VERIFY OPERATING the desired System 1(11) RHR pump(s) for Orywell Spray.

f. OPEN the following valves:

BOP

• 2-FCV-74-60(74), RHR SYS 1(11) OW SPRAY OUTBO VLV

• 2-FCV-74-61(75), RHR SYS 1(11) OW SPRAY INBO VLV.

g. VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM 1(11) MIN FLOW VALVE.

h. IF ..... Additional Orywell Spray flow is necessary, THEN ... PLACE the second System 1(11) RHR Pump in service.

Initiates and reports OW Sprays in service IAW App 17B Reports OW pressure and temperature lowering Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _9_ Page 12 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task

1. When Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeds 12 psig, initiate Drywell Sprays while in the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (DSIL) curve and prior to exceeding the PSP limit.

1.Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of containment 2.Cues:

Procedural compliance High Drywell Pressure and Suppression Chamber Pressure

3. Measured by:

Observation - US directs Drywell Sprays IAW with EOI Appendix 178 Observation - RO initiates Drywell Sprays 4.Feedback:

Drywell and Suppression Pressure lowering RHR flow to containment This Critical Task is not met if OW Pressure reaches 26 psig before Sprays are initiated.

Briefs crew on current plant status.

C/1 CAUTION

1. 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water lvl indication and trend Emergency RPV depressurization is required - NO It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - HAS RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN PC water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 105 ft- CAN Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _9_ Page 13of16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior OR Suppr chmbr press CANNOT be maintained - CAN below 55 psig Verifies ADS inhibited CAUTION SRO

1. 2 Pump NPSH and Vortex Limits

1. 3 Elevated suppr chmbr press may trip RCIC

1. 6 HPCI or RCIC suction temp above 140°F RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV lvl above -162" using ANY of the following LPCI system I (pumps A or C) 6B 320 psig LPCI system 11 (pumps B or D) 6C 320 psig CS system I (pumps A or C) 60 330 psig SRO CS system II (pumps B or D) 6E 330 psig Directs BOP to align CS and LPCI for injection to the RPV IAW Appendices 6B, 6C, 60 and 6E Verifies that LPCI and CS are aligned with pumps running.

Reports LPCI and CS aligned BOP Reports all four diesels have started Calls for AUO to monitor diesel generators DRIVER As AUO, acknowledge monitoring diesel generators for proper operation.

Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _9_ Page 14 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior C-1 Can 2 or more CNDS, LPCI or CS inj subsystems be lined up - YES WHEN RPVwater lvl drops to -162 in.

Direct crew to report when RPV water level lowers to -162 in.

Is ANY CNDS, LPCI or CS inj subsystem lined up for inj with at least one pump running - YES SRO Is ANY RPV inj source lined up with at least one pump running - YES BEFORE RPV water lvl drops to -180 in. CONTINUE-CONTINUES EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED Updates crew that emergency depressurization is required EOl-1, RC/L IF Emergency RPV depressurization is or has been required THEN EXIT RC/P and ENTER C2, Emergency RPV Depressurization Enters C2, Emergency RPV Depressuriztion SAMG entry is required and the TSC SAM team has assumed command and control - NO RPV water lvl CANNOT be determined - CAN Containment water lvl CANNOT be maintained below 44 ft- CAN Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _9_ Page 15of16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior OW control air becomes unavailable -AVAIL Will the reactor remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - YES SRO Is OW press above 2.4 psig - NO Is suppr pl lvl above 5.5 ft- YES OPEN all ADS vlvs (ok to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate)

Directs BOP to open all ADS valves Opens all ADS valves, verifies open using alternate indications BOP and reports 6 ADS valves open C-1 INJECT into the RPV with ANY available sources Directs injection of water to the RPV using all available sources C-2 Can 6 ADS vlvs be opened - YES IF Less than 4 MSRVs are open - NO SRO AND RPV press is 70 psi or more above suppr chmbr press The reactor is NOT subcritical - SUBCRITICAL WHEN the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions - SUBCRITICAL WHEN shutdown cooling RPV press interlock clears - STOP Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. --1_ Event No.: _9_ Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

LOCA Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When RPV pressure lowers below 450 psig, verifies and reports ATC/BOP that LPCI and CS injection valves have opened.

Report water injection into the RPV and reactor water level rising C-1 IF RPV water lvl can be restored and maintained above -162 in.

THEN EXIT this procedure and ENTER EOl-1, RPV Control, at Step RC/L-1 SRO Exits C-1, re-enters EOl-1 RC/L Directs coordinating injection of LPCI and CS to RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and +51 in. using LPCI and CS, Appendices 6B, 6C, 60, and 6E

2. RPV Level maintained above TAF (-162 inches) 1.Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling 2.Cues:

RPV level indication 3.Measured by:

Reactor level indication above -162 inches 4.Feedback:

RPV level trend HPCl/RCIC injection valve open indication This Critical Task is not met if RPV Level remains below-162 for Qreater than 10 minutes.

Coordinate restoring RPV level to +2 in. to +51 in. using App. 6B, ATC/BOP 6C, 60, and 6E NRC Once RPV level has been restored, the scenario can end.

DRIVER When NRC Chief Examiner directs, place the simulator in FREEZE Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-01 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: _1.Q_ Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

HPCI Steam Supply Valve fails to auto open

-~--.-

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior HPCI may receive an initiation signal from either reactor low water NRC level -45 in. or drywell high pressure 2.45 psig.

Recognize and report HPCI failure to initiate (initiation signal present and not injecting to the reactor vessel)

Recognizes that the HPCI Steam Supply valve (73-16) is not open Opens HPCI Steam Supply valve and verifies HPCI injection to BOP the Reactor Vessel.

Reports that HPCI is injecting to the RPV Calls Work Control to request a work order on the steam supply valve for HPCI DRIVER As Work Control, acknowledge investigating failure of 73-16, HPCI Steam Supply valve.

NRC End of Event #10 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SIMULATOR SETUP IC 28 Exam IC 97 Batch File or I 1501NRC4 Pref File EG13A N/A N/A SW02A 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Sectionalizing Valve S&M 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A fails to close.

ED10B SID Board Loss 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Loss of Condenser MC04 6 N/A 50 N/A N/A N/A Vacuum ED01 LOOP 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A DG A fails to Auto DG01A Active N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Start TH21 LOCA 9 N/A 0.2 5:00 N/A N/A HPCI Steam Supply HP04 Valve fails to auto Active N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A o en N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Batch I Pref File(s): 1501 NRC4 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 imf EG13A (3 0) imf SW02A (4 0)

S&M (4 0) batch to fail sectionalizing valve as is.

imf ED1 OB (5 0) imf MC04 (6 0) 50 imf ED01 (7 0) imf DG01A imf TH21 (9 0) 0.2 5:00 imf HP04 Unit 2