Text

Initial Exam 2015-302 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML16049A077
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	02/18/2016
From:	; Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	Download: ML16049A077 (201)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: BFN Scenario Number: NRC - 4 Op-Test Number:1510 Examiners:__________________ Operators: SRO: _________________

__________________ ATC: _________________

__________________ BOP: _________________

Initial Conditions: 93% power following Main Turbine Valve Testing and Radwaste reported loud noise and the Radwaste in-leakage has increased.

Turnover: A down power is in progress to approximately 75 to 80% using the Reactivity Control Plan (RCP) for dose considerations in the 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room. Following power reduction perform Automatic Start Test of all RFPT Oil Pumps per 2-OI-3. RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D has failed downscale and IMs are troubleshooting the problem. Tech Spec 3.3.5.2 Condition B.2 has been entered.

Event Malfunction Event EventDescription Number Number Type*

R-ATC

1. N/A Reduce power using Recirc.

R-SRO N-BOP

2. N/A Test Emergency Oil Pumps for RFPs N-SRO

3. PC02 C-BOP Trip B Reactor Building Fan; Operator swaps fans.

RWCU Isolation on High NRHX Room Temp (failed Temp OVERRIDE I-ATC Control Valve 70-49), and 69-1fails to close. Enters AOI 4. HS-69-1A I-SRO 2A for Group 3 RWCU isolation and manually isolates CU06 TS-SRO RWCU.

Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 PCIVs and TRM 3.4.1.

C-BOP Inadvertent RCIC Auto Initiation and injection; BOP

5. RC02 C-SRO Operator will trip RCIC Turbine TS-SRO Tech Spec 3.5.3 RCIC System C-ATC

6. FW30B Reactor Feed Pump B Governor Speed Failure Downscale.

C-SRO ED02 ED06B Loss of various offsite power sources and eventually all

7. M-ALL ED03 offsite power.

ED01 B DG fails to start and D DG Fails to tie to bus, Actions are DG01B C-BOP taken to restore power by closing D DG output breaker and 8.

DG03D C-SRO starting B EDG, then verifies its respective output breaker closes.

C-BOP

9. N/A RCIC tripped from event 6, but is available to use.

C-SRO HPCI controller fails in Auto; Operator transfers control to

10. HP03 C-BOP manual and operates as needed.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events

1. The crew will begin to lower recirc pump speed in accordance with OI-68 to achieve a load reduction of approximately 100 MWe. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change, the scenario may continue.

2. BOP operator performs the auto start test of the RFP Emergency Bearing Oil Pumps (EBOP) IAW applicable sections 2-OI-3 (Sections 8.13, 8.14, and 8.15).

When the Lead Examiner is satisfied, the scenario may continue.

3. RX Bldg Ventilation Abnormal alarm will annunciate. BOP operator will respond IAW 2-ARP-9-3D, Window 3. He will go to panel 2-9-25 and recognize that the running Reactor Building fans have tripped and the discharge dampers are closed. He will start the standby fans in slow speed and verify that the discharge dampers open. He will report the trip of the fans and dispatch personnel to investigate.

4. The crew will respond to RWCU ISOL LOGIC CHANNEL A/B TEMP HIGH, 2-ARP-9-5B Windows 32/33 annunciators. The BOP operator will report the trip of RWCU pumps and Group 3 isolation of RWCU. He will also report the failure of 2-FCV-69-1 to close and manually close the valve. He will report the successful isolation of RWCU. An operator will be dispatched to the Auxiliary Instrument Room to check ATUs on Panel 9-83 and 9-85. The BOP operator will check Leak Detection temperatures on 2-9-21 and report no other alarms. It will be reported that 69-835 A/C indicate greater than 131°F and the US will enter EOI-

3. Work control will be contacted to investigate. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied, the scenario may continue. The US will enter Tech Spec 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, Condition A which requires isolating the affected penetration flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . He will also enter TRM 3.4.1, Coolant Chemistry which requires sampling every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

5. RCIC will auto start and inject in to the RPV. The BOP operator will report the status of RCIC and the SRO will direct tripping the RCIC Turbine. The SRO will enter Tech Spec 3.5.3 and verify HPCI is OPERABLE per actions A.1.

6. Reactor Feed Pump B Governor will fail downscale and the C RFP will max out on speed and flow. Reactor water level will slowly lower and the SRO will direct entry into 2-AOI-3-1, Loss of Reactor Feedwater or Reactor Water Level High/Low. ATC operator will take manual control of governor and restore Reactor Water Level to normal band in accordance with 2-AOI-3-1. (Note: Unit Supervisor may direct a reactor scram on lowering reactor water level.)

7. The crew will respond to alarms on 9-23. The BOP operator will report PCB 5204, 500kV West Point line, has tripped open. The load on the West Point line is redistributed among the remaining in-service lines therefore the crew will continue to monitor critical parameters. The Load Dispatcher may be called. A loss of the Trinity 161kV line will then occur followed by a loss of 500kV Bus1 and a loss of all offsite power (LOOP). The ATC operator will announce a reactor scram and respond IAW AOI-100-1. The unit will initially be in a Station Blackout however actions by the BOP operator will energize the 2A and 2B 480V Shutdown Boards and the crew will respond IAW AOI-57-1A.

8. Following the loss of offsite power, the BOP operator will recognize that the B Diesel Generator has failed to start. He will manually start the diesel and recognize that it automatically tied to the 4kV Shutdown Board. He will also recognize that the D Diesel Generator has started but has failed to connect to the 4kV Shutdown Board. He will verify that there are no lockouts on the board and manually close the Diesel Generator output breaker. He will report the failures and that all 4kV Shutdown Boards are energized.

9. RCIC will be tripped from Event #6 but BOP operator can reset RCIC Trip Throttle Valve and use RCIC for injection if needed.

10. The BOP operator will recognize and report that HPCI is not injecting into the RPV. He will determine that the HPCI flow controller has failed in automatic and take manual control of HPCI flow. He will raise HPCI flow rate and report that HPCI is injecting to the RPV.

The Scenario ends when Reactor Water Level is in the normal control band of +2 inches to +51 inches with power restored to 480V Shutdown Boards A and B.

Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks 2

1. Restore power to one of the 480V Shutdown Boards to exit Station Blackout

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain electrical power to one of the two 480V Shutdown Boards. Loss of power to the 480V Shutdown Boards is one of the top contributors to Core Damage Frequency.

2. Cues:

Procedural Compliance

Loss of power to 480V Shutdown Boards

3. Measured by:

Criterion is that the crew energizes the 4kV Shutdown Boards which power the two 480V Shutdown Boards on the unit.

4. Feedback:

One of the two 480V Shutdown Boards energized.

5.Critical Task #2 Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to restore power to one of the two 480V Shutdown Boards within 30 minutes to prevent lose of ability to operate breakers remotely.

2. Crew aligns ANY preferred injection systems in Table L-1 to restore and maintain RPV Water level greater than -162 inches, once EOI-1 is entered.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling and prevent degradation of fission product barrier.

2. Cues:

Procedural Compliance

RPV Water Level rises due to injection sources aligned and injecting

3. Measured by:

Criterion is that the crew aligns ANY preferred injection systems in Table L-1 to restore and maintain RPV Water Level greater than -162 inches.

4. Feedback:

RPV Water Level trend.

5. Critical Task #2 Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to restore RPV Water Level above (-) 180 inches Unit 2

SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS

Tech Spec 3.3.5.2 Condition B.2 for RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D.

2A RFPT is secured to investigate high bearing temperatures.

ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D has failed downscale and IMs are troubleshooting the problem.

Continue the down power to 75 to 80 % for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry using 2-GOI-100-12 and the Urgent Load Reduction RCP.

Automatic Start Test of all RFPT Oil Pumps per 2-OI-3 Sections 8.13, 8.14 and 8.15.

(required on all RFPs by the troubleshooting plan to eliminate common cause concerns)

STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 87ºF

Main Turbine Valve Testing completed last shift and Rad Waste reported loud noise and has noticed an increase in Rad Waste in-leakage.

COMMON

Shift Manager reports that there is a Thunder Storm Watch for the Tennessee Valley Service Area.

UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 93%

UNIT 3 100%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Load Reduction for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by Examiner to begin event #1 call Control Room/

DRIVER US and state as Shift Manager, Proceed with power reduction for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room Entry Room entry.

Updates the Crew with the Station Managements request and prepares to lower Reactor Power.

SRO Assumes the Reactivity Manager position.

2-GOI-100-12A 5.1 Notifications and Approvals

[3] NOTIFY Chattanooga Load Coordinator of impending shut down or SRO power reduction and REQUEST unloading instructions. (Unloading instructions are N/A if generator breaker is open.)

[4] NOTIFY Radiation Protection of Power Reduction or Reactor Shutdown.

Calls Radiation Protection to inform them of the reactor shutdown SRO power reduction.

DRIVER As the Rad Pro, acknowledge the load reduction.

Page 1 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Load Reduction for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reactivity Control Plan Form Title of Evolution: Maintenance in Feedpump Room RCP

1. Lower reactor power to 90% power using core flow

2. Insert first 2 groups of control rods per the RCP.

CR 22-31 pos 06-00 __ CR 22-39 pos 10-00 __

CR 30-39 pos 06-00 __ CR 38-39 pos 10-00 __

CR 38-31 pos 06-00 __ CR 38-23 pos 10-00 __

CR 30-23 pos 06-00 __ CR 22-23 pos 10-00 __

3. lower reactor power to 75-80% using core flow

4. Maintain 75-80% reactor power while maintenance is in progress ATC 2-OI-68 6.2 Adjusting Recirc Flow

[2] WHEN desired to control Recirc Pumps 2A and/or 2B speed with the RECIRC MASTER CONTROL, THEN ADJUST Recirc Pump Speed 2A & 2B using the following pushbuttons as required.

LOWER SLOW, 2-HS-96-33 LOWER MEDIUM, 2-HS-96-34 LOWER FAST, 2-HS-96-35 Lowers reactor recirculation flow IAW the RCP Urgent Load Reduction and 2-OI-68 Sec. 6.2 BOP Provides peer check to ATC for reactivity changes.

SRO Provides oversight for the reactivity changes.

ATC Inserts Control Rods in the sequence provided in the RCP.

Examiner Note: Individual pump speeds should be mismatched by ~60 RPM during dual pump operation between 1200 and 1300 RPM to minimize harmonic vibration.

End of Event #1, Request Event #2.

Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 9 Page 2 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs performance Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2A Oil SRO Pumps 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2A Oil Pumps NOTES

1) This test is performed weekly and with RFPT 2A in operation.

The section tests auto start features of 2A1 and 2A2 Main Oil Pumps and 2A3 EBOP. During normal operation, 2A1 and 2A2 Main Oil Pumps are in service and 2A3 EBOP is in standby BOP (AUTO after stop). With this pump alignment, Steps 8.13[5.1]

and 8.13[5.2] are not performed.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-6.

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor approval to perform this test.

SRO Approves the test of the 2A Feed Pump Oil Pumps.

[2] CHECK position of the following switches:

RFPT 2A 2A1 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-103A, in Normal after START or STOP.

BOP

RFPT 2A 2A2 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-250A, in Normal after START or STOP.

RFPT 2A EBOP 2A3, 2-HS-3-102A, in Auto after START or STOP.

Page 3 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] TEST EBOP 2A3 as follows:

[3.1] DEPRESS and HOLD 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-105A.

BOP

[3.1.1] CHECK the following:

Red (running) light and amber (auto start) light at pushbutton illuminated.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29 in alarm.

[3.2] RELEASE 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, BOP 2-HS-3-105A.

[3.3] PLACE RFPT 2A EBOP 2A3 switch, 2-HS-3-102A, in START (return to AUTO).

[3.3.1] CHECK the following:

BOP Amber (auto start) light extinguished at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-105A.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29, will reset.

[3.4] PLACE RFPT 2A EBOP 2A3, 2-HS-3-102A, in STOP (return to AUTO).

BOP

CHECK Red light at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton extinguished.

Page 4 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF both RFPT 2A 2A1 and 2A2 Main Oil Pumps are running, THEN BOP (Otherwise N/A) N/A GO TO Step 8.13[6].

[6] NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2A Oil Pumps complete.

[7] IF performing Section 8.14 or 8.15, THEN BOP CONTINUE at appropriate section.

[8] IF all Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps are complete THEN RECORD results in Narrative Log.

Page 5 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs performance Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2B Oil Pumps 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2B Oil Pumps NOTES

1) This test is performed weekly and with RFPT 2B in operation.

The section tests the auto start features of 2B1 and 2B2 Main Oil Pumps and 2A3 EBOP. During normal operation, 2B1 and 2B2 Main Oil Pumps are in service and 2B3 EBOP is in standby BOP (AUTO after stop). With this pump alignment, Steps 8.14[5.1]

and 8.14[5.2] are not performed.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-6.

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor approval to perform this test.

SRO Approves the test of the 2B Feed Pump Oil Pumps.

[2] CHECK position of the following switches:

RFPT 2B 2B1 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-129A, in Normal after START or STOP.

BOP

RFPT 2B 2B2 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-254A, in Normal after START or STOP.

RFPT 2B EBOP 2B3, 2-HS-3-128A, in Auto after START or STOP.

Page 6 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] TEST EBOP 2B3 as follows:

[3.1] DEPRESS and HOLD 2B3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-131A.

BOP

[3.1.1] CHECK the following:

Red (running) light and amber (auto start) light at pushbutton illuminated.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29 in alarm.

[3.2] RELEASE 2B3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, BOP 2-HS-3-105A.

[3.3] PLACE RFPT 2B EBOP 2B3 switch, 2-HS-3-128A, in START (return to AUTO).

[3.3.1] CHECK the following:

BOP Amber (auto start) light extinguished at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-131A.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29, will reset.

[3.4] PLACE RFPT 2B EBOP 2B3, 2-HS-3-128A, in STOP (return to AUTO).

BOP

CHECK Red light at 2B3 EBOP TEST pushbutton extinguished.

Page 7 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF both RFPT 2B 2B1 and 2B2 Main Oil Pumps are running, THEN BOP (Otherwise N/A) N/A GO TO Step 8.14[6].

[6] NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2B Oil Pumps complete.

[7] IF performing Section 8.13 or 8.15, THEN BOP CONTINUE at appropriate section

[8] IF all Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps are complete THEN RECORD results in Narrative Log.

Page 8 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs performance Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2C Oil Pumps 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2C Oil Pumps NOTES

1) This test is performed weekly and with RFPT 2C in operation.

The section tests the auto start features of 2C1 and 2C2 Main Oil Pumps and 2C3 EBOP. During normal operation, 2C1 and 2C2 Main Oil Pumps are in service and 2C3 EBOP is in standby BOP (AUTO after stop). With this pump alignment, Steps 8.15[5.1]

and 8.15[5.2] are not performed.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-6.

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor approval to perform this test.

SRO Approves the test of the 2C Feed Pump Oil Pumps.

[2] CHECK position of the following switches:

RFPT 2C 2C1 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-1154A, in Normal after START or STOP.

BOP

RFPT 2C 2C2 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-258A, in Normal after START or STOP.

RFPT 2C EBOP 2C3, 2-HS-3-153A, in Auto after START or STOP.

Page 9 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 8 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] TEST EBOP 2C3 as follows:

[3.1] DEPRESS and HOLD 2C3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-156A.

BOP

[3.1.1] CHECK the following:

Red (running) light and amber (auto start) light at pushbutton illuminated.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29 in alarm.

[3.2] RELEASE 2C3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, BOP 2-HS-3-156A.

[3.3] PLACE RFPT 2C EBOP 2C3 switch, 2-HS-3-153A, in START (return to AUTO).

[3.3.1] CHECK the following:

BOP Amber (auto start) light extinguished at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-156A.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29, will reset.

[3.4] PLACE RFPT 2C EBOP 2C3, 2-HS-3-153A, in STOP (return to AUTO).

BOP

CHECK Red light at 2C3 EBOP TEST pushbutton extinguished.

Page 10 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 9 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF both RFPT 2C 2C1 and 2C2 Main Oil Pumps are running, THEN BOP (Otherwise N/A) N/A GO TO Step 8.13[6].

[6] NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2C Oil Pumps complete.

[7] IF performing Section 8.14 or 8.15, THEN BOP CONTINUE at appropriate section. N/A

[8] IF all Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps are complete THEN RECORD results in Narrative Log.

NRC End of Event 2, request Event #3.

Page 11 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Trip B Reactor Building Supply Fan; Operator swaps fans.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event 4, insert DRIVER Event Trigger 4 to trip B RB supply fan.

2-ARP-9-3D, Window 3 BOP RX BLDG VENTILATION ABNORMAL 2-ARP-9-3D, Window 3 Operator Action:

A. IF PCIS group 6 isolation exists, THEN REFER TO 2-AOI-64-2d. N/A B. NOTIFY Unit Supervisors, Unit 1 and Unit 3. Notifies the other Units.

C. VERIFY standby fans start. Notices that it did not start and starts it.

BOP D. DISPATCH personnel to check Bldg P (PDIC 64-2, El 639', RxBldg.)

E. IF P is at or above - 0.17 in. H2O THEN ENTER 2-EOI-3 Flowchart, 2-XA-55-3D, window 32.

F. DISPATCH personnel to CHECK 480V AC Rx Bldg Vent Bd 2A and 2B.

G. IF unable to restore ventilation, THEN REFER TO 2-AOI-30B-1. N/A Driver: If dispatched report DP locally is reading -.35 in H20 If dispatched to check fans, report that belts are off of Rx Zone Exh Fan 2A. No issues with Rx Zone 2A supply Fan.

Examiner Note: Acceptable to start RB Supply Fan A or B in slow speed.

End of Event 3, request Event #4.

Page 12 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 6 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation on NRHX Outlet Temp (failed Temp Control Valve),

and 69-1 fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event 5, Insert DRIVER Event Trigger 5 to initiate an isolation of RWCU and failure of 69-1 to auto close.

Reports that RWCU Pump has tripped and a Group 3 Isolation due to high area temp.

ATC Reports that RWCU 69-1 failed to automatically isolate.

Manually isolates the valve and reports successful isolation of 69-1.

SRO Directs entry into AOI-64-2A Enters AOI-64-2A Group 3 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation NOTES

1) Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation is initiated by any one of the following signals:

Reactor Vessel Water Level Low (PCIS Group 3 isolation).

SLC Injection Initiation.

RWCU Isolation Logic for Area Temperatures (PCIS Group 3 isolation).

RWCU Non-Regenerative HX Discharge ATC Temperature High.

A. Any one or more of the following annunciator in alarm:

1. RWCU ISOL LOGIC CHANNEL A(B) TEMP HIGH (2-XA-55-5B, Window 32 and/or 33)

2. RX VESSEL WTR LEVEL LOW HALF SCRAM (2-XA 4A, Window 2)

3. RWCU LEAK DETECTION TEMP HIGH (2-XA-55-3D, Window 17).

4. RWCU NON-REGENERATIVE HX DISCH TEMP HIGH (2-XA-55-4B, Window 17).

5. SLC INJECTION FLOW TO REACTOR (2-XA-55-5B, Window 14).

6. SCRAM, PRIMARY CTMT PRESS HIGH (2-XA-55-1, Window 24).

Page 13 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 6 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation on NRHX Outlet Temp (failed Temp Control Valve),

and 69-1 fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS B. The following valves CLOSE:

1. RWCU INBD SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE, 2-FCV 1. Remains OPEN

2. RWCU OUTBD SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE, 2-FCV-69-2.

3. RWCU RETURN ISOLATION VALVE, 2-FCV-69-12.

C. Reactor Water Cleanup Recirc Pumps 2A and 2B TRIP.

4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions ATC [1] PERFORM the following:

VERIFY CLOSED RWCU INBD SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE, 2-FCV-69-1.

VERIFY CLOSED RWCU OUTBD SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE, 2-FCV-69-2.

VERIFY CLOSED RWCU RETURN ISOLATION VALVE, 2-FCV-69-12.

VERIFY TRIPPED Reactor Water Cleanup Recirc Pumps 2A and 2B.

If AUO is dispatched, wait 3 minutes and report that TCV 70-49 has is indicating full closed locally.

DRIVER If AUO is dispatched to RB elev. 593 ft, report the setpoint to controller is set at 110 deg F and in automatic.

Page 14 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 6 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation on NRHX Outlet Temp (failed Temp Control Valve),

and 69-1 fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[1] IF any EOI entry condition is met, THEN ENTER appropriate EOI(s).

[2] CHECK the following to confirm high area temperature condition exists:

LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM TEMPERATURE, 2-TI-69-29 (Panel 2-9-21).

ATUs in Auxiliary Instrument Room.

ATC

[3] IF isolation is caused by high area temperature, THEN DETERMINE if a line break exists by:

RWCU ARMs 2-RI-90-9A, 13A, and 14A.

Visual Observation.

Rx Zone Exhaust Rad Monitors 2-RE-90-142A, 142B,143A, and 143B.

[4] PERFORM necessary Heat Balance adjustments. REFER TO 2-OI-69.

Checks RWCU temperatures on LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM (Panel 2-9-21). Reports no indication of elevated temperatures.

BOP Dispatches AUO to Aux Inst Rm to check RWCU temperatures As AUO, acknowledge checking RWCU temperatures in Aux.

Inst. Room. Wait three minutes, call control room and report that TE-69-835A is reading 132°F and TE-69-835B is reading DRIVER 134°F.

If requested, the RE will work on adjusting heat balance per 2-OI-69, section 8.16.

Page 15 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 6 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation on NRHX Outlet Temp (failed Temp Control Valve), and 69-1 fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Page 16 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 4 Page 5 of 6 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation on NRHX Outlet Temp (failed Temp Control Valve), and 69-1 fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Page 17 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation on NRHX Outlet Temp (failed Temp Control Valve), and 69-1 fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Page 18 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Inadvertent RCIC Initiation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DRIVER When Examiner is ready, fire trigger #6 BOP Operator recognizes RCIC has auto initiated and reports to SRO the status.

BOP Operator will secure RCIC by tripping RCIC Turbine per BOP OPDP-8, Conduct of Operations.

Dispatch AUO to investigate locally and Aux Instrument Room.

SRO will Direct RCIC Turbine to be tripped and address Tech SRO Spec 3.5.3 RCIC System.

Tech Spec 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3: The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS NOTE LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION A. RCIC System inoperable.

SRO A.1 Verify by administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE. -

Immediately AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status. -

14 days SRO Briefs crew of Tech Spec and Verifies HPCI is OPERABLE.

Page 19 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Inadvertent RCIC Initiation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO will enter applicable APPX R LCO ref pg 752 of Fire SRO Protection Report Vol 1 system 071 RCIC.

As AUO, acknowledge checking in Aux. Inst. Room. Wait three minutes, call control room and report that an inadvertent initiation has occurred.

DRIVER As AOU Report no noticeable damage locally in the RCIC Room.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #5, request Event #6.

Page 20 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Reactor Feed Pump B Governor Speed Failure Downscale.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by Examiner, insert trigger #25 for Reactor Driver Feed Pump B Governor Speed Failure Downscale (FW30B) 2-AOI-3-1, Loss of Reactor Feedwater or Reactor Water Level High/Low 4.1 Immediate Actions -None 4.2 Subsequent Actions CAUTION

[NRC/C] Operations outside of allowable regions shown on the Recirculation System Operating Map could result in thermal-hydraulic power oscillations and subsequent fuel damage. Refer to 2-GOI-100 12A for required actions and monitoring to be performed during power reduction. [NCO 940245001]

ATC [1] VERIFY applicable automatic actions.

[2] IF Reactor Water Level OR Feedwater flow is lowering due to loss of Condensate, Condensate Booster, or Feedwater Pump(s),

THEN:

LOWER Recirc flow as required to avoid scram on low level AND CONTINUE at Section 5.0.

ATC Operator observes Reactor Water Level Lowering, RFP B Speed lowering and RFP C Speed rising.

Operator may attempt a core flow runback.

SRO directs entering 2-AOI-3-1, Loss of Reactor Feedwater or SRO Reactor Water Level High/Low Examiner note: The Unit Supervisor may order a reactor scram prior to taking manual control of RFP B Governor. If this occurs, once parameters are stable request Event

7 Loss of Offsite Power.

Page 21 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Reactor Feed Pump B Governor Speed Failure Downscale.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 2-AOI-3-1, Loss of Reactor Feedwater or Reactor Water Level High/Low 5.0 LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL OR LOSS OF FEEDWATER

[1] IF Feedwater Control System has failed, THEN PERFORM the following:

[1.1] PLACE individual RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switches in Manual Governor (depressed position with amber ATC light illuminated).

[1.2] ADJUST RFP Discharge flows with RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switches as necessary to maintain Reactor Water Level.

ATC operator will depress Manual Governor Control for RFP B and adjust as necessary to restore Reactor water level to normal band.

Examiner note: End of Event #6, when ready request Event #7.

Page 22 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When NRC Chief Examiner is ready for the LOOP, insert Event Trigger 7, to cause a sequential loss of the Westpoint DRIVER Line, Murray Line, Trinity 161 line, Bus 1 500kV, and all offsite power.

Announces Reactor Scram Reactor Scram OATC Hard Card 1.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

[1] DEPRESS REACTOR SCRAM A and B, 2-HS-99-5A/S3A and 2-HS-99-5A/S3B, on Panel 2-9-5.

[2] IF scram is due to a loss of RPS, THEN PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in START & HOT STBY AND PAUSE for approximately 5 seconds (Otherwise N/A)

[3] Refuel Mode One Rod Permissive Light check:

[3.1] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in REFUEL.

[3.2] CHECK illuminated REFUEL MODE ONE ROD ATC PERMISSIVE light, 2-XI-85-46.

[3.3] IF REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 2-XI-85-46, is NOT illuminated, THEN CHECK all control rod positions at Full-In Overtravel, or Full-In.(Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 2-HS-99-5A-S1, in SHUTDOWN.

[5] REPORT the following status to the US:

Reactor Scram

Mode Switch is in Shutdown

All rods in or rods out

Reactor Water Level and trend (recovering or lowering)

Reactor pressure and trend

MSIV position (Open or Closed)

Power level Page 23 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Performs immediate operator actions IAW hard card and makes ATC scram report.

BOP Reports loss of all off site power.

Directs BOP operator to enter 0-AOI-57-1A Enters EOI-1 on RPV Water Lvl below +2 ACTION Verifies RX scram REQUIRED Note 1 The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions when:

Any 19 control rods are at notch 02 with all other control rods fully inserted OR All control rods except one are inserted to or beyond position 00 OR Determined by Reactor Engineering (0-TI-394)

SRO IF THEN It has NOT been determined that the reactor NO ACTION will remain subcritical without boron under all REQUIRED conditions RPV water level CANNOT be determined NO ACTION REQUIRED PC water lvl and drywell press CANNOT be NO ACTION maintained in the safe area of Curve 7 REQUIRED Reactor Power AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram Directs ATC to enter 2-AOI-100-1 Page 24 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 0-AOI-57-1A 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions NOTE Performing this instruction, in conjunction with an earthquake, may require resetting the individual Diesel Generator's 86G Lockout BOP Relay and the Field Breaker(both locally at the Diesel Generator electrical cabinet).

[1] VERIFY Diesel Generators have started and tied to respective 4kV Shutdown Boards The Diesel Generator failures are Event 8 and are addressed NRC on Page 44. The remaining AOI-57-1A actions are continued here.

[2] VERIFY two EECW Pumps (not using the same EECW strainer) are in service supplying Diesel Generators.

[4] PERFORM the following to ensure at least one train of DieselGenerator Room Fans are energized:

VERIFY 480V DSL Aux Board A or B energized.

Verifies two EECW pumps are in service Verifies Diesel Aux Boards are energized 4.2 Subsequent Actions BOP NOTE The following subsequent actions may be performed out of order, depending on plantconditions.

NOTES

1) EECW supply valves to the Control Air Compressors and RBCCW are air operated. If initial air pressure is low, air compressors may trip on high temperature, until cooling water flow is established.

Page 25 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2) At US discretion, the 0-FCV-67-53 valve can be placed in the open position with handswitch. The valve will automatically come open once EECW pressure is above setpoint. REFER TO OI-67 for valve operation.

3) The North header supply to Unit 1 RBCCW, the North header supply to Unit 2 RBCCWand the South header supply to Unit 3 RBCCW are normally isolated with a manual valve; therefore no flow will occur when either 1-FCV-67-50, 2-FCV-67-50 or 3-FCV-67-51 opens.

[6] WHEN EECW header pressure is restored above the reset pressure setpoint (psig) for the valves listed below, THEN Common Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 0-FCV-67-53 106 - - -

BOP FCV-67-50 - 90 91 92 FCV-67-51 - 107 109 113 RESET EECW supplies to Control Air Compressors and RBCCW, at Unit 1 Panel 1-LPNL-925-0032 and Unit 2,3 Panels 2(3)-25-32. REFER TO the EECW to the RCW Crossties for Control Air & RBCCW section of 0-OI-67.

[7] START Control Air Compressors A, D and G as required and MONITOR system pressure. REFER TO 0-AOI-32-1.

[9] PLACE RPS MG Sets A and B in service. REFER TO1(2,3)-

OI-99.

Calls for EECW to be reset, air compressors to be restarted, and RPS to be restored.

Acknowledge resetting EECW, restarting air compressors and restoring RPS. Insert Event Trigger 10, 11, 12 (tasks DRIVER complete on a timed sequence). Call operator to report tasks completed.

Page 26 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reactor Scram BOP Unit Operator Hard 1.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS: PANELS 2-9-7 & 2-9-8 NOTES

1) To OPEN PCB 224 with the control room handswitch, ONE of the following is required: 2-XA-55-8A window 7, GEN REVERSE PWR FIRST RELAY OPERATION 2-EA-57-136, WITH GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 2-HS-242-224A, placed in TRIP.

OR GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 2-HS-242-224A, placed in BYPASS.

2) The following steps are not required to be performed in order, but only as required to maintain stable conditions.

[1] At 50 MWe, or as directed by the Unit Supervisor, ENSURE TRIPPED the Main Turbine as follows:

BOP [1.1] DEPRESS the TRIP pushbutton, 2-HS-47-67D on Panel 2-9-7.

[1.2] ENSURE OPEN GENERATOR PCB 224.

[1.3] ENSURE TRIPPED VOLTAGE REGULATOR

[2] ANNOUNCE Reactor SCRAM over PA system.

Trips the Main Turbine. Verifies PCB 224 OPEN and Voltage Regulator tripped.

Reports Main Turbine tripped.

NOTE The following steps are not required to be performed in order, but only as required to maintain stable conditions.

[1] MONITOR and CONTROL RPV pressure to keep below 1073 psig and stable.

[1.1] IF RPV pressure is lowering rapidly, THEN CLOSE the MSIVs. (Otherwise N/A)

Page 27 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RPV Water Lvl

An RPV water lvl instrument may be used to determine or trend lvl only when it reads above the Minimum Indicated Lvl associated with the highest max DW or SC run temp*

If DW temps or SC area temps (Table 6), as applicable, are outside the safe region of Curve 8, the associated instrument may be unreliable due to boiling in the run ENSURE each as required

PCIS isolations (Groups 1, 2 and 3) ADDRESSED

ECCS ADDRESSED

RCIC ADDRESSED Verified PCIS isolations.

SRO IF THEN RPV water lvl can be restored and maintained above -162 in. NO ACTION AND REQUIRED The ADS timer has initiated Loss of available injection systems is anticipated OR Raising RPV water lvl above +51 in will NO ACTION facilitate use of shutdown cooling, steam- REQUIRED driven injection systems, or Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table L-2)

Page 28 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and

+51 in. with ANY Preferred Injection Systems (Table L-1)

IF THEN RPV water lvl cannot be restored and NO ACTION maintained between +2 in. and +51 in. REQUIRED RPV water lvl cannot be restored and NO ACTION maintained above -162 in. REQUIRED SRO Table L-1 Preferred Injection Systems SOURCES APPX INJ PRESS RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 5D 1200 psig Directs BOP operator to restore and maintain RPV water level between +2 in. and +51 in. using RCIC, Appendix 5C and/or HPCI, Appendix 5D.

Operator should recognize that RCIC was tripped earlier and NRC this would be the start of event 9 and is addressed on Page 46 RPV Press IF THEN A high drywell pressure ECCS signal exists ADDRESSED SRO (2.45 psig)

EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATIONIS NO ACTION REQUIRED or has been required REQUIRED Emergency RPV depressurization is NO ACTION anticipated REQUIRED Page 29 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF ANY MSRV is cycling THEN MANUALLY OPEN MSRVs UNTIL ACTION RPV press drops to the press at which all REQUIRED main turbine bypass vlvs are fully open (APPX 11A)

IF THEN Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be NO ACTION maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the REQUIRED existing RPV press Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the NO ACTION safe area of Curve 4 REQUIRED SRO STEAM COOLING IS REQUIRED NO ACTION REQUIRED STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig using the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

OK to use ANY Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table P-1)

Crosstie CAD to DW Control Air (APPX 8G, 20H) if necessary Directs BOP operator to control RPV pressure 800 - 1000 psig using Appendix 11A, SRVs.

2-EOI Appendix-5C 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS CAUTIONS BOP 1) Operating RCIC turbine below 2100 rpm may result in unstable system operation andequipment damage.

2) High Suppression Chamber pressure may trip RCIC.

3) Operating RCIC Turbine with suction temperatures above 240°F may result inequipment damage.

Page 30 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[8] CHECK proper RCIC operation by observing the following:

A. Speed accelerates above 2100 rpm.

B. Flow to RPV controlled automatically at 620 gpm.

C. 2-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, closes asflow rises above 120 gpm.

[9] ADJUST 2-FIC-71-36A, RCIC SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, as necessary to control injection.

[10] IF BOTH of the following exist:

RCIC Initiation signal is NOT present, AND

RCIC flow is below 60 gpm, THEN ENSURE OPEN 2-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.

Adjusts RCIC flow controller as necessary to control RPV water level BOP Verifies RCIC minimum flow valve CLOSED when RCIC flow greater than 120 gpm.

2-EOI Appendix-11A 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[1] IF Drywell Control Air is NOT available, THEN EXECUTE EOI Appendix 8G, CROSSTIE CAD TO DRYWELL CONTROL AIR, CONCURRENTLY with this procedure.

[2] IF Suppression Pool level is at or below 5.5 ft, THEN CLOSE MSRVs and CONTROL RPV pressure using other options.

[3] OPEN MSRVs using the following sequence to control RPV pressure as directed by SRO:

Page 31 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1 2-PCV-1-179 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 2 2-PCV-1-180 MN STM LINE D RELIEF VALVE 3 2-PCV-1-4 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 4 2-PCV-1-31 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE 5 2-PCV-1-23 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 6 2-PCV-1-42 MN STM LINE D RELIEF VALVE 7 2-PCV-1-30 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE 8 2-PCV-1-19 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE BOP 9 2-PCV-1-5 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE 10 2-PCV-1-41 MN STM LINE D RELIEF VALVE 11 2-PCV-1-22 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 12 2-PCV-1-18 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE 13 2-PCV-1-34 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE Controls RPV pressure as directed.

Determines that HPCI is needed to restore and maintain RPV water level.

When HPCI is started, either manually or automatically, event NRC 10 would start. This is addressed on Page 47 2-AOI-100-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[3] DRIVE in all IRMs and SRMs from Panel 2-9-5 as time and conditions permit.

[3.1] DOWNRANGE IRMs as necessary to follow power as it ATC lowers.

[4] ENSURE SCRAM DISCH VOL VENT & DR VLVS CLOSED by green indicating lights at SDV Display on Panel 2-9-5.

Performs subsequent actions of AOI-100-1 as time permits Page 32 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Suppression Pool cooling should be placed in service as soon as practicable following MSRV, HPCI and / or RCIC operation regardless of indicated Suppression Pool temperatures to verify that thermal stratification does not exist.

[5.3] IF required to maintain reactor water level, THEN START RCIC and/or HPCI as required.

REFER TO 2-OI-71 and/or 2-OI-73.

[5.4] IF HPCI and/or RCIC are in service and injecting to the ATC/BOP vessel, THEN

MONITOR and CONTROL Reactor Water Level as necessary.

TRIP HPCI and/or RCIC as necessary to prevent exceeding High Reactor Water Level setpoint.

[5.5] IF Reactor Water Level exceeds +51 inches, THEN ENSURE TRIPPED the following turbines:

HPCI

RCIC Operates HPCI/RCIC IAW EOI Appendices to control RPV water level as directed Critical Task #2:

Crew aligns ANY preferred injection systems in Table L-1 to restore and maintain RPV Water level greater than -162 inches, once EOI-1 is entered.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling and prevent degradation of fission product barrier.

2. Cues:

Procedural Compliance

RPV Water Level rises due to injection sources aligned and injecting

3. Measured by:

Criterion is that the crew aligns ANY preferred injection systems in Table L-1 to restore and maintain RPV Water Level greater than -162 inches.

4. Feedback:

RPV Water Level trend.

5. Critical Task #2 Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to restore RPV Water Level above (-) 180 inches Page 33 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RPV Press STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig using the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

OK to use ANY Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table P-1)

SRO TABLE P-1 Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems Source APPX HPCI with CST suction if available 11C Directs BOP operator to place HPCI in pressure control using EOI Appendix 11C.

RPV Press STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig using the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

OK to use ANY Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table P-1)

TABLE P-1 SRO Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems Source APPX HPCI with CST suction if available 11C Directs BOP operator to place HPCI in pressure control using EOI Appendix 11C.

Page 34 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF THEN DW Control Air is or becomes unavailable NO ACTION REQUIRED IF THEN It is anticipated that RPV depressurization will NO ACTION result in a loss of injection required for REQUIRED adequate core cooling DEPRESSURIZE the RPV and maintain cooldown rate below 100ºF/hr Crosstie CAD to DW Control Air (APPX 8G, 20H) if necessary IF THEN ANY MSRV is being used for RPV NO ACTION depressurization AND DW Control Air is or SRO REQUIRED becomes unavailable Directs BOP operator to depressurize the RPV and maintain a cooldown rate below 100°F.

WHEN shutdown cooling RPV press interlock clears AND further cooldown is required Page 35 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 2-EOI APPENDIX-11C CAUTION

Operating HPCI Turbine below 2400 rpm may result in unstable systemoperation and equipment damage.

Operating HPCI Turbine with suction temperatures above 140°F mayresult in equipment damage.

1. IF ................. Suppression Pool level drops below 12.75 ft, THEN ...........TRIP HPCI and CONTROL RPV pressure using otheroptions.

2. IF ................. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required, OR Steam Cooling is required, THEN ...........EXECUTE EOI Appendix 16C and 16D as necessary tobypass HPCI Low RPV pressure and Test Mode IsolationInterlocks.

4. IF ................. HPCI Turbine is operating, BOP THEN ...........ALIGN HPCI in test mode as follows:

a. OPEN 2-FCV-73-35, HPCI PUMP CST TEST VLV.

b. OPEN 2-FCV-73-36, HPCI/RCIC CST TEST VLV.

c. CLOSE 2-FCV-73-44, HPCI PUMP INJECTION VALVE.

d. CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 6.

6. VERIFY proper HPCI minimum flow valve operation as follows:

a. IF ................. HPCI flow is above 1200 gpm, THEN ...........VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MINFLOW VALVE.

b IF ................. HPCI flow is below 600 gpm, THEN ...........VERIFY OPEN 2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.

7. THROTTLE 2-FCV-73-35, HPCI PUMP CST TEST VLV, to control HPCI pump discharge pressure at or below 1100 psig.

8. ADJUST 2-FIC-73-33, HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, controller to control RPV pressure.

Aligns HPCI in the pressure control mode IAW Appendix 11C.

Commences a RPV cooldown as directed.

Page 36 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. IF ................. HPCI injection to the RPV becomes necessary, THEN ........... ALIGN HPCI to the RPV as follows:

a. OPEN 2-FCV-73-44, HPCI PUMP INJECTION VALVE.

b. THROTTLE 2-FCV-73-35, HPCI PUMP CST TEST VLV, to control injection.

BOP c. GO TO EOI Appendix-5D.

If needed for RPV level control, realigns HPCI IAW Appendix and injects into the RPV.

Reports Suppression Pool Temperature at 95°F and rising Enters EOI-2 on Suppression Pool Temperature above 95°F.

Suppr Pl Temp Caution 2:

Operating pumps with suction from the suppression pool above the NPSH Limit (Curve 1, 2, 9 or 10) or with suppression pool water level below 10 ft (Vortex limit) may cause equipment SRO damage MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl temp ACTION below 95°F using available suppr pl cooling REQUIRED (APPX 17A)

Directs BOP operator to initiate Suppression Pool Cooling IAW Appendix 17A Page 37 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX-17A NOTE Placing a BYPASS SEL switch in BYPASS in step 1 below prevents automatic opening of the affected RHR loops outboard injection valve. This makes LPCI mode of that RHR loop inoperable.

1. IF Adequate core cooling is assured, OR Directed to cool the Suppression Pool irrespective of adequate core cooling, THEN......BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock AS NECESSARY:

PLACE 2-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ BOP VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

PLACE 2-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

2. PLACE RHR SYSTEM I(II) in Suppression Pool Cooling as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR Heat Exchanger(s).

c. THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm RHRSW flow:

2-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 2A RHRSW OUTLET VLV

2-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 2B RHRSW OUTLET VLV

2-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 2C RHRSW OUTLET VLV

2-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 2D RHRSW OUTLET VLV Page 38 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

d. IF ............. Directed by SRO, THEN.......PLACE 2-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

e. IF .............LPCI INITIATION Signal exists, THEN.......MOMENTARILY PLACE 2-XS-74-121(129),

RHR SYS I(II) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT in SELECT.

f. IF ............. 2-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN....... VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

g. OPEN 2-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS I(II) SUPPR BOP CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV.

h. VERIFY desired RHR pump(s) for Suppression Pool Cooling are operating.

CAUTION RHR system flows below 7000 gpm or above 10000 gpm for one-pump operation may result in excessive vibration and equipment damage.

i. THROTTLE OPEN 2-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS I(II) SUPPR POOLCLG/TEST VLV, to maintain EITHER of the following as indicated on2-FI-74-50(64), RHR SYS I(II) FLOW:

Between 7000 and 10000 gpm for one-pump operation.

OR

At or below 13000 gpm for two-pump operation.

Page 39 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

j. VERIFY CLOSED 2-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM I(II) MIN FLOW VALVE.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 1.

l. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers.

BOP

m. IF ............. Additional Suppression Pool Cooling flow is necessary, THEN.......PLACE additional RHR and RHRSW pumps in serviceusing Steps 2.b through 2.l.

Places RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW EOI-Appendix 17A.

WHEN supprpl temp CANNOT be maintained below 95° SRO OPERATE all available suppr pl cooling using only RHR pumps NOT required to assure adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX 17A)

Directs BOP operator to place all available suppression pool cooling in service.

Places all available suppression pool cooling in service as BOP directed.

Page 40 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BEFORE Suppr pl temp rises to 110°F EOI-1 NO ACTION REQUIRED EOI-1 previously entered WHEN supprpl temp and SRO RPV press CANNOT be maintained within a safe area of Curve 3 DW Temp Caution 1

Ambient temp may affect RPV water level indication and trend MONITOR and CONTROL DW temp below NO ACTION 160°F using available DW cooling REQUIRED Page 41 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN DW temp CONNOT be maintained below 160 °F PC Press MONITOR and CONTROL PC press below NO ACTION 2.45 psig using the Vent system (AOI-64-1) REQUIRED WHEN SRO PC press CONNOT be maintained below 2.45 psig PC H2 IF THEN H2 and O2 monitoring system is inoperable NO ACTION REQUIRED Offsite radioactivity release rate reaches ODCM limits OR NO ACTION H2 is NO longer detected in PC(2.4% on REQUIRED control room indicators)

Page 42 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENSURE H2/O2 analyzer in service (APPX NO ACTION

19) REQUIRED WHEN H2 is detected in PC (2.4% on control room indicators)

SRO Suppr Pl Lvl MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl lvl -6 in. to -1 in. (APPX 18)

IF THEN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained below -1 NO ACTION in.

REQUIRED Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained above -6 NO ACTION in.

REQUIRED Page 43 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

B DG Failure to Start and D DG Failure to Tie to the Bus.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 0-AOI-57-1A 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions NOTE Performing this instruction, in conjunction with an earthquake, may require resetting theindividual Diesel Generator's 86G Lockout Relay and the Field Breaker(both locally at theDiesel Generator electrical cabinet).

[1] VERIFY Diesel Generators have started and tied to respective 4kV Shutdown Boards, THEN DISPATCH personnel to Diesel Generators.

BOP Determines that B Diesel Generator failed to start. Starts B Diesel Generator by taking 0-HS-82-B/1A to START. Verifies B Diesel Generator starts and ties to 4kV Shutdown Board B.

Determines that D Diesel Generator started but failed to tie to 4kV Shutdown Board D. Checks that no lockout conditions are present and CLOSES DG Output Breaker 1816 to tie D Diesel Generator to 4kV Shutdown Board D Reports failures and that all 4kV Shutdown Boards are currently energized.

Dispatches AUO to monitor the diesels for proper operation.

Call Work Control to initiate an investigation for the diesel failures Page 44 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

B DG Failure to Start and D DG Failure to Tie to the Bus.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1:

Restore power to one of the 480V Shutdown Boards to exit Station Blackout

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain electrical power to one of the two 480V Shutdown Boards. Loss of power to the 480V Shutdown Boards is one of the top contributors to Core Damage Frequency.

2. Cues:

Procedural Compliance

Loss of power to 480V Shutdown Boards

3. Measured by:

Criterion is that the crew energizes the 4kV Shutdown Boards which power the two 480V Shutdown Boards on the unit.

4. Feedback:

One of the two 480V Shutdown Boards energized

5. Critical Task #1 Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to restore power to one of the two 480V Shutdown Boards within 30 minutes to prevent lose of ability to operate breakers remotely.

As AUO, acknowledge monitoring the diesel generators.

DRIVER As Work Control, acknowledge work orders to investigate the failures on the diesel generators.

End of Event 7 and 8, when Suppression Cooling is in service NRC per EOI-2.

Page 45 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

RCIC available after LOOP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reports to US that RCIC was tripped earlier and is available if the RCIC Turbine Trip Throttle Valve is reset.

BOP Directs resetting RCIC Turbine Trip Throttle Valve and use RCIC SRO to restore Reactor Water Level.

Examiner Note: BOP Operator resets RCIC Turbine Trip Throttle Valve by closing FCV-71-9 and then reopening FCV-71-9 End of Event 9 Page 46 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 10 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

HPCI Flow Controller Fails in Automatic Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 2-EOI Appendix-5D 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[4] VERIFY at least one SGTS train in operation.

CAUTIONS

1) Operating HPCI Turbine below 2400 rpm may result in unstable system operation and equipment damage.

2) Operating HPCI Turbine with suction temperatures above 140°F may result in equipment damage.

[5] VERIFY 2-FIC-73-33, HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, controller is in one of the following configurations, as desired:

in AUTO and set for 5300 gpm for rapid injection NOTE HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump will NOT start UNTIL 2-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAMSUPPLY VLV, starts to open.

BOP

[7] PLACE HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP handswitch in START.

[8] PLACE HPCI STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER handswitch in START.

[9] OPEN the following valves:

2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE

2-FCV-73-44, HPCI PUMP INJECTION VALVE.

[10] OPEN 2-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV, to start HPCI Turbine

[11] CHECK proper HPCI operation by observing the following:

A. HPCI Turbine speed accelerates.

B. 2-CKV-73-45, HPCI SYSTEM CHECK VLV, opens by observing 2-ZI-73-45A, DISC POSITION, red light illuminated.

C. HPCI flow to RPV stabilizes and is controlled automatically at the setpoint. (N/A if controller in manual).

D. 2-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, closes as flow exceeds approximately 1200 gpm.

Page 47 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 10 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, 2-FCV-073-0030, automatically opens when system flowis at or below 900 gpm (lowering) only if a system initiation signal is present. Manuallyopening the min flow valve may be required for pump min flow protection.

Recognizes that HPCI does not accelerate to full speed.

Check HPCI lineup and recognizes that the HPCI flow controller is not operating properly in AUTO.

Reports the failure of the HPCI flow controller.

Takes manual control of the HPCI flow controller and adjusts HPCI flow as necessary to control RPV water level as directed.

Calls Work Control to initiate a work order to investigate the failure of the HPCI flow controller.

As Work Control, acknowledge initiating a work order to DRIVER investigate the problem with the HPCI flow controller.

NRC End of Event 10 Page 48 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario Setup IC 28 Exam IC 289 Schedule Files(s): Schedule #4 rev 0.sch Malfunctions Description Event Dela Severity Ramp Initial Final

y value value DG01B DG B Fail to auto start ACTIVE NA NA NA NA NA DG03D DG D Fail to auto tie ACTIVE NA NA NA NA NA Inadvertent RCIC Auto RC02 5 NA NA NA NA NA Initiation CU06A RWCU 69-1 isol fail 4 NA NA NA NA NA PC02 RB Vent Fan failure 3 NA NA NA NA NA LOSS OF ALL ED01 7 185 NA NA NA NA OFFSITE POWER 500-KV PCB 5204 ED02 7 NA NA NA NA NA TRIP AND LOCKOUT LOSS OF 161-KV ED06B TRANSFORMER 7 120 NA NA NA NA CSST B ED03 500 KV BUS 1 FAULT 7 180 NA NA NA NA HPCI AUTOMATIC HP03 FLOW CONTROLLER 10 120 NA NA NA NA FAILURE RWCU ISOL ON HI SW05 4 NA NA NA NA NA TEMP NRHX WOODWARD GOVERNOR SPEED FW30B 6 NA NA NA NA 0 CONTROL HS FAILURE Remotes Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value RPS A NORM RP01 7 300 NA NA NA RESET SUPPLY RPS B NORM RP02 7 330 NA NA NA RESET SUPPLY EECW LOWW SW22 7 180 NA NA NA RESET PRESS RELAYS Page 49 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CONTROL AIR IA05A COMP A LOCAL 7 360 NA NA NA RESET CONTROL CONTROL AIR IA05D COMP D LOCAL 7 360 NA NA NA RESET CONTROL CONTROL AIR IA09 COMP G LOCAL 7 360 NA NA NA RESET CONTROL SWYD BKR 5208 ED31B5208 7 NA NA NA NA TRIP MAN CONTROL SWYD BKR 5254 ED31B5254 7 60 NA NA NA TRIP MAN CONTROL SWYD BKR 5258 ED31B5258 7 60 NA NA NA TRIP MAN CONTROL Overrides Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value HS-69-1A RWCU ISOL VLV 4 None NA NA OPEN OPEN HS-46-9 RFPT 2B ZLOHS469_1 SPEED CONT 6 NA NA NA NA OFF RAISE/LOWER Page 50 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS

Tech Spec 3.3.5.2 Condition B.2 for RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D.

2A RFPT is secured to investigate high bearing temperatures.

ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D has failed downscale and IMs are troubleshooting the problem.

Continue the down power to 75 to 80 % for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry using 2-GOI-100-12 and the RCP.

Automatic Start Test of all RFPT Oil Pumps per 2-OI-3 Sections 8.13, 8.14 and 8.15.

(required on all RFPs by the troubleshooting plan to eliminate common cause concerns)

STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 87ºF

Main Turbine Valve Testing completed last shift and Rad Waste reported loud noise and has noticed an increase in Rad Waste in-leakage.

COMMON

Shift Manager reports that there is a Thunder Storm Watch for the Tennessee Valley Service Area.

UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 93%

UNIT 3 100%

Page 51 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 Facility:Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.:NRC-3 Op-Test No.:1510 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

ATC:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: Low Power Rx SU 1%, ~950 psig with B& C Condensate Pump, C Condensate Booster Pump and C RFP in MANUAL Turnover: Raise Rx Power to achieve 10-50% open on 1st bypass valve position and then place C RFP in Service.

Event Event Malf. No. Event Description No. Type*

R-ATC Raise power with Control Rods to achieve 1 N/A R-SRO approximately 10-50% on 1stbypass valves.

Place C RFP in Service per GOI Step 5.4[63] and N-BOP 2 N/A control Reactor Water Level with CRD, RWCU N-SRO Blowdown and RFP C in manual.

C-ATC RD06 CR 50-35 Stuck 3 C-SRO Control Rod OPERABILITY LCO 3.1.3 R5035 TS-SRO 4 MS01 C-BOP Seal Steam Regulator Failure I-ATC 5 NM05H IRM H Fails Downscale; Bypass IRM per OI-92A I-SRO SLC A Pump oil level low.

6 N/A TS-SRO Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1.7 3-FCV-2-29 Condensate Short Cycle drifts C-BOP 7 ZAIFC0229A1 closed. Manual action required per OPDP-1 sect C-SRO 3.3.5.

Steam Leak in Reactor Building and failure of TH35B one main steam line MSIVs to close.

MS06C Rx SCRAM, Emergency Depresson 2 Max Safe MS06D M-ALL Area Rads (EOI-3)Fuel Failure RP15A 8

PC14 TH23 Loss of power to 3B 250V DC RMOV Board RF ED24B Precursor 9 HP07 C-BOP HPCI 120V Power Failure Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 C-BOP Fail two ADS valves to open on blowdown, result 10 N/A C-SRO of power loss to 3B 250V DC RMOV BD.

C Condensate Booster Pump Trips C-ATC Loop I RHR Logic power Failure and Core Spray 11 FW02C C-SRO Div I Logic Power Failure, result of power loss to 3B 250V DC RMOV BD.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (TS) Tech Spec Events

1. Reactor Power starts at approximately 1% and 950 psig. The first event starts with a reactivity brief from the SRO to the ROs concerning pulling control rods and watching the IRMs carefully. The goal is for the ATC to pull rods using the pull sequence to achieve enough power and steam production to maintain main 1stturbine bypass valves between approximately 10-50% open.

2. The C RFP will be placed in service in accordance with GOI-100-1A Unit Startup and Power Operation, Step 5.4 [63]. The BOP will perform the actions required to maintain reactor water level in band with CRD, RWCU Blowdown and Manual Governor Control of RFP C.

3. This event is manually triggered when the times the RO selects a control rod 50-35 and then positions it to position 04. The crew will raise drive water pressure and the control rod will not move. The SRO will declare that control rod INOP in accordance with T.S.3.1.3 Control Rod Operability. When the Tech Spec is addressed, the scenario may continue with the next event.

4. The Seal Steam Regulator PIC-1-147 will fail closed which requires the BOP operator to use the manual bypass to restore Seal Steam. This will require continuous monitoring. The local report will indicate that the Seal Steam Controller will not operate and has no idea why it failed.

5. When directed by the NRC Chief Examiner, the next event may be triggered.

IRM H will fail downscale. Once reported to US, the US will direct bypassing IRM H per 3-OI-92A, Intermediate Range Monitors to continue with Reactor Startup.

6. When directed by the NRC Chief Examiner, the next event may be triggered.

This event will cause 3-FCV-2-29 to slowly drift closed. The BOP Operator will take manual control of 3FCV-2-29 per OPDP-1 Conduct of Operations section 3.3.5 and restore Condensate Parameters to normal.

Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1

7. When directed by NRC Chief Examiner, the RB AUO will report that SLC Pump A oil level sight glass is empty with no oil level indication. The US will enter T. S.

3.7.1 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System Condition A.

8. When the NRC Chief Examiner is satisfied with the actions of Event 6, the next event can be triggered. The major event for this scenario is a steam leak that develops in the Reactor Building side of the main steam tunnel. This will cause radiation and temperatures to start rising in areas of the Reactor Building. The Crew will anticipate the Main Steam Line isolation and manually close all eight MSIVs, however one line fails to isolate. The Reactor will be scrammed and the crew will monitor both Radiation and temperatures in the reactor building to determine entry into EOI-3 (Secondary Containment Control) and when two areas identified in Table SC-1 or SC-2 on EOI-3 exceed their Max Safe Rad or Temp limits, the crew will Emergency Depressurize the reactor to reduce the driving force behind the steam leak. To assist in plausibility to the failures of events 8-10, the 250V DC RMOV Board will lose power when the mode switch is taken to shutdown position.

9. To complicate level recovery, the HPCI 120V power will fail requiring the BOP to use other available injection source, manually because the loss of 3B 250V DC RMOV removes the Flow Controller.

10. To complicate the ED, the loss of 3B 250V DC RMOV will de-energize two of the MSRVs, requiring the RO to compensate and open two other SRVs.

11. The available running Condensate Booster Pump will trip resulting in the use of the low pressure ECCS systems for Reactor Water Level Control.

This is further complicated by the loss of the 3B 250V DC RMOV. Both DIV I LPCI and CS systems will not function and require the operator to use DIV II LPCI and CS to recover Reactor Water Level.

The Scenario ends when the crew has performed an Emergency Depressurization based on two areas above Max Safe and Reactor Water Level is restored using LP ECCS.

Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 Critical Tasks: 2

1. With the reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any area exceeds the maximum safe operating value.

1. Safety Significance Scram reduces to decay heat the energy that the RPV may be discharging into thesecondary containment.

2. Cues Procedural Compliance Secondary Containment Area Temperature, Level and/or radiation indication

3. Measured by:

Observation - With a primary system discharging into secondary containment a reactor scram is initiated before a maximum safe condition is reached

4. Feedback Control rod positions Reactor Power reduction

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

The operating crew fails to insert a manual reactor scram prior to 1st Area Radiation Levels reaching the Max Safe Value.

2. With a primary system discharging into the Secondary Containment when two or more areas are greater than their maximum safe operating values for the same parameter, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance Places the primary system in the lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to theSuppression Pool in preference to outside the Primary Containment, and reduces driving head and flow of system discharging into the Secondary Containment.

2. Cues Procedural Compliance Secondary Containment Area temperature, level, or radiation indication Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1

3. Measured by:

Observation - US transitions to EOI-C2 and directs opening at least 6 MSRVs when two or more areas are greater than their maximum safe operating values for the same parameter.

4. Feedback Reactor Pressure Trend MSRV status indications

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

The operating crew fails to recognize Emergency Depressurization is required when 2 Area Radiation Levels exceed the Max Safe value within 5 minutes.

OR The operating crew fails to initiate an Emergency Depressurization within 10 minutes after 2 Area Radiation Levels exceeding Max Safe value.

Unit 3

SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS

Condensate Booster Pump A is disassembled for overhaul.

Condensate Booster Pump B was tagged last shift for troubleshooting activities due to high vibration reading on pump start.

ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

Pull control rods IAW 3-GOI-100-1A 5.4 [71] to achieve 10-50% open on the first Bypass valve position starting with CR 34-43.

Place RFP C in service to control Reactor Water Level IAW 3-OI-3 section 5.5 Placing the First RFP in service step 5.5 [12].

STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 50ºF

RWCU Blowdown in service

CRD Pump 2A in service

IRMs on ranges 6-7

CPs: B & C in service

CBPs: C in service.

COMMON UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 100%

UNIT 3 Rx at 1 % Power

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 5 Event

Description:

Pull Control Rod for 10-50% Bypass Valve Position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Begin recording data for scenario SRO Crew assumes the shift.

Directs ATC to raise reactor Power to achieve 30% Bypass Valve position on the first Bypass Valve per 3-GOI-100-1A [71] in preparation to place first RFP on RX WATER LVL CONTROL, 3-LIC-46-5, in AUTO and begin warm up of a second RFP.

SRO SRO -Performs Reactivity Brief with the crew.

SRO -Assumes Reactivity SRO Over-site function.

Begins pulling Control Rods at Group 22 CR 34-43 of the movement sheet and 3-OI-85, Control Rod Drive System.

NOTE ATC Positive or Negative reactivity should normally be made by only one method at a time. [SOER 07-1].

3-GOI-100-1A [55] CONTINUEwithdrawing Control Rods at the Unit Supervisor discretion.

Note to NRC Examiner: Student may notch withdrawal or continuous withdrawal Control Rods per 3-OI-85, Control Rod Drive System Page 1 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of5 Event

Description:

Pull Control Rod for 10-50% Bypass Valve Position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-OI-85,Control Rod Drive System 6.6 Control Rod Withdrawal CAUTIONS

1) Positioning control rods should be done with the utmost diligence and care. Notch Withdrawing control rods provides the most deliberate controlled method of withdrawing control rods.

2) [NER/C] Never pull control rods except in a deliberate, carefully controlled manner, while closely monitoring the Reactors response. [INPO SOER-96-001]

NOTES

1) If the control rod is uncoupled, the four rod display digital read-out and the full core display digital readout and background light will extinguish for the uncoupled rod and the ATC annunciator CONTROL ROD OVERTRAVEL (3-XA-55-5A, Window 14) will seal in.

2) Coupling integrity is satisfied if CRD Notch Override Switch is used and rod is withdrawn to Position 48.

3) The following steps are performed from Panel 3-9-5 unless noted otherwise.

Group 22 Pull CR 34-43 to position 04 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 42-35 to position 04 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 42-27 to position 04 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 34-19 to position 04 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 26-19 to position 04 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 18-27 to position 04 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 10-35 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 26-51 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

Note to NRC Examiner: Event 2 RFP Startup will accompany Event #1 Up Power.

Page 2 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 5 Event

Description:

Pull Control Rod for 10-50% Bypass Valve Position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-OI-85,Control Rod Drive System 6.6.1 Initial Conditions Prior to Withdrawing Control Rods

[1] REVIEW Precautions and Limitations in Section 3.7 and Section 3.8.

[2] VERIFY the following prior to control rod movement:

CRD POWER, 3-HS-85-46 in ON.

Rod Worth Minimizer is operable and LATCHED into thecorrect ROD GROUP when Rod Worth Minimizer isenforcing (not required with no fuel in RPV).

NOTES

1) Section 6.6.2 is applicable for all control rod withdrawals and addressed as required during or following any control rod withdrawal.

2) If rod insertion to position 00 is required and core thermal ATC power is less than or equal to 10%, entry into LCO 3.1.6 may be required.

6.6.2 Actions Required During and Following Control Rod Withdrawal

[1] IF the control rod fails to withdraw, THEN Refer to Section 8.15 for additional methods to repositioncontrol rod.

[2] IF the control rod double notches, or withdraws past its correct/desired position, THEN Refer to Section 6.7 for inserting control rod to itscorrect/desired position. [NRC IR 84-02]

[3] IF at any time while driving a selected rod during the performance of this section, the Control Rod moves more thanone notch from its intended position, THEN Refer to 3-AOI-85-7, Mispositioned Control Rod.

Page 3 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 1 Page 4 of 5 Event

Description:

Pull Control Rod for 10-50% Bypass Valve Position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-OI-85,Control Rod Drive System 6.6.2 Actions Required During and Following Control Rod Withdrawal (continued)

[4] OBSERVE the following during control rod repositioning:

Control rod reed switch position indicators (four rod display) agree with the indication on the Full Core ATC Display.

Nuclear Instrumentation responds as control rods move through the core (This ensures control rod is following drive during Control Rod movement.)

[5] ATTEMPT to minimize automatic RBM Rod Block as follows:

N/A 6.6.2 Actions Required During and Following Control Rod Withdrawal(continued)

[6] NA 6.6.3 Control Rod Notch Withdrawal

[1] SELECT the desired control rod by depressing the appropriate ATC CRD ROD SELECT pushbutton, 3-XS-85-40.

[2] OBSERVE the following for the selected control rod:

CRD ROD SELECT pushbutton is brightly ILLUMINATED

White light on the Full Core Display ILLUMINATED

Rod Out Permit light ILLUMINATE Page 4 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

Pull Control Rod for 10-50% Bypass Valve Position Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-OI-85,Control Rod Drive System 6.6.3 Control Rod Notch Withdrawal (continued)

[3] VERIFY Rod Worth Minimizer is operable and LATCHED into the correct ROD GROUP when the Rod Worth Minimizer is enforcing.

[4] PLACE CRD CONTROL SWITCH, 3-HS-85-48, in ROD OUT ATC NOTCH, and RELEASE.

[5] OBSERVE the control rod settles into the desired position and the ROD SETTLE light extinguishes.

[6] IF control rod is notch withdrawn to rod notch Position 48, N/A When Control Rod 50-35 is pulled to position 04 insert trigger DRIVER

2 for Stuck Control Rod to start Event #3.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #1, Event 2 RFP Startup will accompany Event #1 Up Power. When Event #1 and #2 complete request Event #3.

Page 5 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Placing C RFP in service per 3-OI-3, Reactor Feedwater System Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-GOI-100-1A Unit Startup

Pull CR 34-51 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 50-35 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 50-27 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

ATC

Pull CR 34-11 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 26-11 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

Pull CR 10-27 to position 06 IAW pull sheet ___

50-35 will not move past 04 and begin event #3 on pg 7.

NOTE Positive or Negative reactivity should normally be made by only one method at a time. [SOER 07-1].

3-GOI-100-1A Unit Startup

[71] WHEN Reactor pressure reaches approximately 950 psig and the first bypass valve 10% to 50% open, THEN

[71.1] VERIFY the first RFP is in service maintaining Reactor water level.

2-OI-3 Reactor FeedwaterSystemSection 5.5

[12] ESTABLISH flow to the vessel and maintain level as follows:

SLOWLY Raise speed of RFPT using RFPT 3C BOP SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch, 3-HS-46-10A.

[13] WHEN sufficient flow is established to maintain RFP MIN FLOW VALVE in the CLOSED position ( 2 x 106 lbm/hr), THEN

PLACE RFP 3C MIN FLOW VALVE, 3-HS-3-6, in AUTO.

[14] ADJUST the following as necessary to control RFPT speed and maintain Reactor water level:

SLOWLY Raise speed of RFPT using RFPT 3C SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch, 3-HS-46-10A.

BOP control Reactor Water Level with CRD, RWCU Blowdown and RFPT 3C Speed Controller.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #2, When Event #1 and #2 complete request Event

3.

Page 6 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event

Description:

Control Rod 50-35 Stuck Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When Control Rod 50-35 is pulled to position 04 insert trigger DRIVER

2 for Stuck Control Rod.

3-OI-85, Control Rod Drive System 8.15 Control Rod Difficult to Withdraw

[1] VERIFY the control rod will not notch out. Refer to Section 6.6.

Determines Control Rod 50-35 will not notch out

[2] REVIEW all Precautions and Limitations in Section 3.0.

Reviews P&L ATC CAUTION

[NER/C] Never pull control rods except in a deliberate, carefully controlled manner, while closely monitoring the Reactors response. [INPO SOER-96-001]

[3] [NRC/C] IF RWM is enforcing, THEN VERIFY RWM is operable and LATCHED in to the correct ROD GROUP. [NRC-IR 84-02]

Page 7 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 6 Event

Description:

Control Rod 50-35 Stuck Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.15 Control Rod Difficult to Withdraw NOTES

1) Steps 8.15[4] through 8.15[6] should be used when the control rod is at Position 00 while Step 8.15[7] should be used when the control rod is at or between Positions 02 and 46.

2) Double clutching of a control rod at Position 00 will place the rod at the "overtravel in" stop, independent of the RMCS timer, allowing maximum available time to establish over-piston pressure required to maintain the collet open and prevent the collet fingers from engaging the 00 notch.

3) Step 8.15[4] may be repeated as necessary until it is determined that this method will not free the control rod.

[4] ,[5]

ATC Step [4] [5] [6] are N/A due to CR 50-35 is at position 06

[7] IF the control rod is at or between Positions 02 and 46, THEN PERFORM the following to withdraw the control rod using elevated drive water pressure:

[7.1] RAISE CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A, to 300 psid, using CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV, 3-HS-85-23A.

[7.2] ATTEMPT to withdraw the control rod using CRD CONTROL SWITCH, 3-HS-85-48.

[7.3] IF the control rod successfully notches out, THEN LOWER CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A, to between 250 psid and 270 psid, using CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV, 3-HS-85-23A, and PROCEED to Section 6.6.

Page 8 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 6 Event

Description:

Control Rod 50-35 Stuck Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION To prevent a drive from double notching in a high rod worth region and to reduce exposure of drive seals and directional control valves to excessive pressures, the CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP should be returned to between 250 psid and 270 psid as soon as possible.

[7.4] IF the control rod failed to notch out, THEN RAISE CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A, to 350 psid, using CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV, 3-HS-85-23A.

[7.5] ATTEMPT to withdraw the control rod using CRD CONTROL ATC SWITCH, 3-HS-85-48.

[7.6] LOWER CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A, to between 250 psid and 270 psid, using CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV, 3-HS-85-23A.

[7.7] IF the control rod has failed to notch out using elevated CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineer and NOTIFY Unit Supervisor for further instructions.

Raises Drive Water Pressure and CR does not move.

SRO Directs using continuous insert.

Page 9 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 6 Event

Description:

Control Rod 50-35 Stuck Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6.7.3 Continuous Insertion of Control Rod

[1] VERIFY Section 6.7.1 has been performed.

[2] SELECT the desired control rod by depressing the appropriate CRD ROD SELECT pushbutton, 3-XS-85-40.

[3] OBSERVE the following for the selected control rod:

CRD ROD SELECT pushbutton is brightly ILLUMINATED White light on the Full Core Display ILLUMINATED ATC [4] PLACE and HOLD CRD CONTROL SWITCH, 3-HS-85-48, in ROD IN.

[5] WHEN control rod notch reaches the even rod notch position prior to the desired final control rod notch position, THEN RELEASE CRD CONTROL SWITCH, 3-HS-85-48.

[6] OBSERVE the control rod settles into desired position and the ROD SETTLE light extinguishes.

Attempts to use continuous insert and it does not work.

Directs proceeding to section 8.16, Control Rod Difficult to SRO insert.

Following notification to Rx Engineering call US and state as DRIVER Shift Manager; Attempt to insert control rod to position 00 Page 10 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 6 Event

Description:

Control Rod 50-35 Stuck Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.16 Control Rod Difficult to Insert

[1] VERIFY the control rod will not notch in, in accordance with Section 6.7 or Section 8.19.

[2] REVIEW all Precautions and Limitations in Section 3.0.

[3] [NRC/C] IF RWM is enforcing, THEN VERIFY RWM operable and LATCHED in to the correct ROD GROUP. [NRC IR 84-02]

[4] CHECK CRD SYSTEM FLOW is between 40 gpm and 65 gpm, indicated by 3-FIC-85-11.

[5] CHECK CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A is between 250 psid and 270 psid.

[6] IF CRD SYSTEM FLOW or CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP had to be adjusted, THEN PROCEED to Section 6.7.

ATC Note the following may or may not be attempted.

[7] IF control rod motion is observed, but the CRD fails to notch-in with normal operating drive water pressure, THEN:

[7.1] NOTIFY Reactor Engineer to determine what parameters should be recorded for further evaluation.

[7.2] RAISE CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A, not to exceed 300 psid, using CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV, 3-HS-85-23A.

[7.3] INSERT control rod as directed in Section 6.7.

[7.4] LOWER CRD DRIVE WTR HDR DP, 3-PDI-85-17A, to between 250 psid and 270 psid using CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VLV, 3-HS-85-23A.

Raises Drive Water Pressure and CR does not move.

Page 11 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

Control Rod 50-35 Stuck Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Steps [8], [9], [10], [11] are N/A

[12] IF the control rod still fails to notch in, THEN:

[12.1] NOTIFY the Unit Supervisor and Reactor Engineer to Refer to section Stuck Control Rod-Test to distinguish a Hydraulic ATC Problem from Mechanical Binding, 0-TI-20, and RETURN to Section 8.16.

[12.2] REQUEST the Unit Supervisor and Reactor Engineer to evaluate the control rod operability. Refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY LCO 3.1.3 Each control rod shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

NOTE----------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each control rod.

CONDITION A

NOTE----------------------------------------

Rod worth minimizer (RWM) may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," if required, to allow continued operation.

SRO TS A.1 Verify stuck control rod separation criteria are met.-

immediately AND A.2 Disarm the associated control rod drive (CRD). -2 hours AND A.3 Perform SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod. -N/A AND A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1. -72 hours Note: SRO may conservatively enter LCO 3.1.3 or wait for results of 0-TI-20 evaluation. CR 50-35 will remain at position 04 after Rx Scram.

Note to NRC Examiner: End of Event #3. Request Event #4.

Page 12 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Seal Steam Regulator Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by NRC Chief Examiner Fire Trigger #3 for DRIVER Seal Steam Regulator Failure.

3-ARP-9-6B window 21 STEAM TO STEAM SEAL REG PRESS LOW Automatic Actions: None Operator Actions:

A. CHECK steam seal header pressure, 3-PI-1-148, Panel 2-9-7.

B. VERIFY proper valve alignment on Panel 3-9-7.

C. IF pressure is low, THEN OPEN steam seal bypass valve 3-FCV-1-145.

BOP D. DISPATCH personnel to check 3-PIC-1-147 (El 617' TurbBldg).

E. CHECK condenser vacuum on 3-P/TR-2-2 (Panel 3-9-6) and turbine vibration on 3-XR-47-15 (Panel 3 7) normal.

BOP Operator will observe Steam Seal Header Pressure lowering and OPENS Steam Seal Bypass Valve 3-FCV-1-145 and returns pressure to normal.

When dispatched state as AUO 3-PIC-147 Steam Seal DRIVER Controller doesnt appear to be working properly Note to Examiner: End of Event #4, when ready proceed to Event #5.

Page 13 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

IRM H fails Downscale Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by NRC, insert trigger # 5 for IRM H Failing DRIVER Downscale.

3-ARP-9-5A window 19 IRM DOWNSCALE AUTOMATIC ACTION:

Rod withdrawal block if IRM range switch is not in position 1 (one) or REACTOR MODE SWITCH in RUN.

OPERATOR ACTION:

A. VALIDATE alarm by multiple indications.

ATC B. SELECT next lower range on IRM range switch.

C. IF alarm does not reset with use of Range switch, THEN BYPASS initiating channel. REFER TO 3-OI-92A.

D. NOTIFY Reactor Engineer.

E. REFER TO Tech Spec Tables 3.3.1.1-1, TRM Tables 3.3.4-1 and 3.3.5-1.

ATC recognizes that IRM H fails downscale and reports to SRO. Calls RE to notify them of IRM H condition.

Directs ATC to bypass IRM H per 3-OI-92A and calls IMs to SRO investigate IRM H failure.

3-OI-92A, Intermediate Range Monitor CAUTION

[QA/QC] NPG-SPP 10.4 requires approval of the Plant Manager or ATC his designee prior to any planned operation with IRMs bypassed unless bypassing is specifically allowed within approved procedures.

Page 14 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

IRM H fails Downscale Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DRIVER As RE, respond to IRM H information.

2-OI-92A, Intermediate Range Monitor NOTES

1) It is not necessary for a bypassed IRM channel to have its detector inserted into the core.

2) Only one IRM in each trip system can be bypassed at a time.

3) All operations are performed on Panel 3-9-5 unless specifically stated otherwise.

ATC [1] REVIEW all precautions and limitations in Section 3.0.

[2] PLACE the appropriate IRM Bypass selector switch to the BYPASS position:

IRM BYPASS, 3-HS-92-7A/S4A

IRM BYPASS, 3-HS-92-7A/S4B

[3] CHECK that the Bypassed light is illuminated.

Places IRM BYPASS Switch to IRM H and verifies bypass light is illuminated.

Note to Examiner: Tech spec not required, only a tracking LCO. End of Event #5, request event #6.

Page 15 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

SLC PUMP A OIL LEVEL LOW.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by NRC Examiner call Unit Supervisor and DRIVER report following as RB AUO; SLC PUMP A Oil Level sight glass is indicating empty with oil observed on the floor.

Updates the crew of the status of SLC PUMP A.

Calls work control to dispatch operator to rack out SLC SRO Pump Breaker and calls for a work order to repair SLC Pump A.

REFERs TO Tech Spec 3.1.7.

Tech Spec 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System LCO 3.1.7 Two SLC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION A. One SLC subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore SLC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days Note to Examiner: End of Event #6, when ready request Event #7.

Page 16 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

FCV-2-29, Condensate Short Cycle Drifting Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by NRC Chief Examiner fire trigger #7 (5 min DRIVER ramp) for FCV-2-29, Condensate Short Cycle Drifting Closed 3-ARP-9-6B, CONDENSATE DEMIN ABNORMAL AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: NONE OPERATOR ACTIONS:

A. CHECK system flow conductivity, and system DP, on Panel 3-9-6 for abnormalities.

ATC Recognizes that FCV-2-29, Condensate Short Cycle Drifting closed and takes manual control per OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations and restores parameters to normal.

ATC OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations 3.3.5 Manual Control of Automatic Systems A. If an automatic control or an automatic action is confirmed to have malfunctioned, take prompt actions to place that control in manual or to accomplish the desired function. Establishment of manual level control following automatic FCV failure to control level or manual start of an EDG that failed to auto start.

If dispatched report that 3-FCV-2-29 is indicating closed DRIVER locally and no air leaks noted.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #7, request Event #8 Page 17 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Fire Trigger #8, Steam Leak in Reactor Building when DRIVER requested by NRC Examiner.

Note to NRC Examiner: Numerous alarms are received when Steam Leak Occurs, 3-3A-W22, RX BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH, 3-3A-W4, RX BLDG, TURB BLDG, RF ZONE EXH RADIATION HIGH, 3-3D-W24, MAIN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION TEMP HIGH,3-3A-W7, MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION HIGH, 3-9-3A-W27 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION HIGH HIGH 3-9-3A-W22 RX BLDG AREA RADIOATION HIGH Automatic Action: None A.DETERMINE area with high radiation level on Panel 3-9-11.

(Alarm on Panel 3-9-11 will automatically reset if radiation level lowers below setpoint.)

B. IF the alarm is from the HPCI Room while Flow testing is being performed, THEN REQUEST personnel at the HPCI Quad to validate conditions.

BOP C. NOTIFY RAD PRO.

D. IF the TSC is NOT manned and a VALID radiological condition exists., THEN USE public address system to evacuate area where high radiological conditions exist E.Step E is N/A F. MONITOR other parameters providing input to this annunciator frequently as these parameters will be masked from alarming while this alarm is sealed in.

Note to NRC Examiner: BOP Operator will evacuate the affected areas and begin looking for other indication of source.

Page 18 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-9-3A-W22 RX BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH(continued)

G. IF a CREV initiation is received, THEN

1. VERIFY CREV A(B) Flow is 2700 CFM, and 3300 CFM as indicated on 0-FI-031-7214(7213) within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months of the CREV initiation. [BFPER 03-017922]

2. IF CREV A(B) Flow is NOT 2700 CFM, and 3300 CFM as indicated on 0-FI-031-7214(7213) THEN PERFORM the following: (Otherwise N/A) [BFPER 03-BOP 017922]

a. STOP the operating CREV per 0-OI-31.

b. START the standby CREV per 0-OI-31.

H. IF alarm is due to malfunction, THEN REFER TO 0-OI-55.

I. ENTER 3-EOI-3 Flowchart.

J. REFER TO 3-AOI-79-1 or 3-A01-79-2 if applicable.

Note to NRC Examiner: SRO Enters EOI-3, Secondary Containment Control, continued on page 26.

If dispatched: State that the Main Steam Tunnel Fan is ON.

DRIVER If dispatched to investigate, report that there is steam in the vicinity of the Steam Vault Door. RP will not allow me to proceed any further.

Page 19 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 3 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-9-3A-W4 RX BLDG, TURB BLDG, RF ZONE EXH RADIATION HIGH Automatic Action: None A. REQUEST Unit 1 Operator assist in determining source of alarm.

B. IF high activity is confirmed, THEN NOTIFY RAD PRO.

C. REQUEST Chemistry perform radiochemical analysis to determine source.

D. IF Dry Cask storage activities are in progress, THEN NOTIFY CASK BOP Supervisor.

E. IF the TSC is NOT manned, THEN EVACUATE personnel from affected areas.

F. Step is N/A G. REFER TO 3-AOI-79-1 or 3-AOI-79-2 if applicable.

H. MONITOR release rate for ODCM compliance. IF ODCM limits are exceeded, THEN REFER TO EPIP-1.

I. IF Air Particulate Monitor Controller is operable, THEN REFER TO 3-OI-90, to reset alarms.

Note to NRC Examiner: BOP Operator will evacuate the affected areas.

SRO calls Chemistry for analysis and directs Monitoring release rate for ODCM compliance.

Page 20 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 4 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-3D-W24, MAIN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION TEMP HIGH Automatic Actions: Impending MSIV Isolation at 189°F area temp.

OperatorAction:

NOTES

1) 3-LI-64-159A, SUPPR POOL WATER LEVEL may give erroneous indications due to High Temperatures experienced by the Instrument during a Main Steam high energy line break in Secondary Containment.

2) The following Steps may be performed in any order or concurrently as necessary.

A. CHECK the following temperature indications:

MN STEAM TUNNEL TEMP temperature indicator, 3-TIS-1-60Aon Panel 3-9-3.

BOP

Temperature Switches 3-TS-1-60B, -60C, or -60D window(s) on Panel 3-9-21.

RWCU Piping in the Main Steam Tunnel temperature indicators,3-TIS-69-834A(B)(C)(D), Auxiliary Instrument Room Panels 9-83(84)(85)(86) OR ICS HPTURB' mimic.

B. CHECK the following flow indications:

MAIN STEAM LINE FLOW A(B)(C)(D), 3-FI-46-1(2)(3)(4) on Panel 3-9-5.

RFW FLOW LINE A(B), 3-FI-3-78A(78B) on Panel 3-9-5.

RFP 3A(3B)3C) flow indicators, 3-FI-3-20(13)(6) on Panel 3-9-6.

C. IF RCIC is NOT in service AND 3-FI-71-1A(B), RCIC STEAM FLOW indicates flow, THEN ISOLATE RCIC and VERIFY Temperatures lowering.

Page 21 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 5 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-3D-W24, MAIN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION TEMP HIGH (continued)

D. CHECK for elevated RAD Levels on the following Instruments:

3-RM-90-20, CRD-HCU West.

3-RM-90-29, Suppression Pool.

E. IF HPCI is injecting with elevated Suppression Pool Temperature,THEN CONSIDER securing HPCI to determine if it is the source of the leak.

F. IF Rx Bldg main steam tunnel temperature is above 170°F on3-TIS-1-60A on Panel 3-9-3, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. ENTER 3-EOI-3 Flowchart.

BOP

2. VERIFY Rx Zone fans, 3-HS-64-11A at Panel 3-9-25, in fast speed.

3. VERIFY Steam Vault Exhaust Booster Fan in service.

REFER TO 3-OI-30B.

G. IF turbine building main steam tunnel temperature is above 160°F on 3-TS-1-60B, -60C, or -60D on Panel 3-9-21, THEN DISPATCH personnel to 480V AC Turb Bldg Vent Bd 3A (TB, El 617') to verify TB fans and the Mechanical Spaces Exhaust Fan running.

Note to NRC Examiner:Informs SRO that Alarm is EOI-3 Entry Condition and SRO Enters EOI-3.

When Dispatched; Report that the TB fans and Mechanical Space Exhaust Fan are running.

DRIVER If requested report that the Main Steam Tunnel Booster Fan is ON.

Page 22 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 6 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-3A-W7, MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION HIGH Automatic Actions: none Operator Actions:

A. For High MSL rad alarms due to recent Noble Metals applications, industry experience indicates that the only corrective action is continued reactor operation. The normal build up of iron oxide crud on the fuel surface and system cleanup by the Reactor Water Cleanup system will reduce the amount of N16 and N13 released from the core, which will decrease main steam line radiation over time.

B. CHECK following radiation recorders:

1. MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION, 3-RR-90-135 on Panel 3-9-2.

BOP 2. OFFGAS PRETREATMENT RADIATION, 3-RR 157 on Panel 3-9-2.

3. OFFGAS RADIATION, 3-RR-90-160 on Panel 3-9-2.

4. OFFGAS POST-TREATMENT RADIATION, 3-RR-90-265 on Panel 3-9-2

5. STACK GAS/CONT RM RADIATION FROM STACK GAS, 0-RR-90-147 onPanel 1-9-2 C. NOTIFY Radiation Protection.

D. [NRC/C] REQUEST Chemistry perform radiochemical analysis of primary coolant. [NCO 940247001]

E. IF off-gas pretreatment radiation, 3-RR-90-157, has risen significantly (30% above previous hour average), THEN REQUEST Chemistry perform analysis of pretreatment off-gas.

Page 23 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 7 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-3A-W7, MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION HIGH(continued)

F. SHUTDOWN Hydrogen Water Chemistry. REFER TO 3-OI-4.

G. REFER TO 0-SI-4.8.B.1.A.1 for ODCM compliance and to determine if power level reduction is required.

H. [NRC/C] REDUCE reactor power to maintain off-gas radiation within ODCM limits as directed by Unit Supervisor.

BOP

[NCO 940247001]

I. IF ODCM limits are exceeded, THEN REFER TO EPIP-1.

Note to NRC Examiner: BOP Reports Rx Bldg main steam tunnel temperature 3-TIS-1-60A on Panel 3-9-3 and MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION, 3-RR-90-135 on Panel 3-9-2 are rising and MS Tunnel Booster Fan is OFF.

3-9-3A-W27 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION HIGH HIGH Automatic Action:

A. Mechanical vacuum pumps trip.

B. Vacuum pump suction valves 3-FCV-66-36 and 3-FCV 40 close.

Operator Action:

BOP A. VERIFY alarm on 3-RM-90-136 thru 137 on Panel 3-9-10.

B. CONFIRM main steam line radiation level on recorder 3-RR-90 135, Panel 3-9-2.

Page 24 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 8 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-9-3A-W27 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION HIGH HIGH (continued)

C. IF alarm is VALID and scram has NOT occurred, THEN PERFORM the following:

IF core flow is above 60%, THEN

1. LOWER core flow to between 50-60%.

2. MANUALLY SCRAM the Reactor.

3. REFER TO 3-AOI-100-1.

BOP D. IF SLC injection per RC/Q of EOI-1 is NOT required, THEN VERIFY the MSIVs closed.

E. NOTIFY RAD PRO.

F. VERIFY actions OF 3-ARP-9-3A window 7 have been completed.

G. IF Technical Specifications limits are exceeded, THEN REFER TO EPIP-1.

Directs ATC to manually scram the reactor and enter 3-AOI 100-1.

Directs BOP operator to evacuate (Reactor and Turbine SRO Buildings) and to close (MSIVs and MSL Drain Valves).

Enters EOI-1, RPV Control and EOI-3 Secondary Containment Control Inserts a manual reactor scram. ATC performs immediate and subsequent actions of 3-AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram.

ATC Provides scram report to US.

Evacuates Reactor Building and Turbine Building and BOP attempts to close MSIVs and drains but B MSL OUTBD &INBD MSIV Fails to isolate. BOP reports this information to US.

Directs offsite release rates monitored in accordance with SI-SRO 4.8.B.1.a.1 for EOI-4 information Page 25 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 9 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters EOI-3 on Any Secondary Cntmt Area Temp above Max Normal value of Table - SC-1 (Steam tunnel (RB) XA-55-3D-24, alarmed)

Override SC-1 IF THEN Rx Zone ventilation exh NO ACTION REQUIRED radiation lvl is above 72 mR/hr Refuel Zone ventilation exh NO ACTION REQUIRED radiation lvl is above 72 mR/hr Rx Zone ventilation is isolated AND Rx Zone ventilation exh NO ACTION REQUIRED radiation lvl is below 72 mR/hr Refuel Zone ventilation is isolated AND Refuel Zone NO ACTION REQUIRED ventilation exh radiation lvl is below 72 mR/hr SRO EOI-3 SC Temperature SC-2 Caution 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water level indication and trend SC/T-1 IF THEN IF Rx Zone or Refuel Zone ventilation exh radiation lvl is NO ACTION REQUIRED below 72 mR/hr Page 26 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 10 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note to NRC Examiner: Override is applicable when Reactor and Refueling Zone Radiation Levels reach 72 mr/hr.

Override SC-1 IF THEN Rx Zone ventilation exh ACTION REQUIRED radiation lvl is above 72 mR/hr Refuel Zone ventilation exh ACTION REQUIRED radiation lvl is above 72 mR/hr Rx Zone ventilation is isolated AND Rx Zone ventilation exh NO ACTION REQUIRED radiation lvl is below 72 mR/hr SRO Refuel Zone ventilation is isolated AND Refuel Zone NO ACTION REQUIRED ventilation exh radiation lvl is below 72 mR/hr SRO: Directs BOP Operator to Verify Group 6 Isolation and ensure SBGT has Auto Initiated BOP Operator verifies Reactor Zone and Refueling Zone Fans are secure and dampers closed.

BOP BOP Verifies SBGT A, B & C are in service.

Page 27 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 11 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-3 SC Temperature (continued)

SC/T-2 WHEN ANY area temperature exceeds its Max Normal temperature (Table SC-1)

SRO Note to NRC Examiner: Continue to step SC-3 on page 30 if entered due to Area Temperature Page 28 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 12 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-3 SC Radiation SC/R-1 WHEN ANY area radiation level exceeds its Max Normal radiation level (Table SC-2 SRO Note to NRC Examiner: Continue to step SC-3 on page 30 once first Area Radiation Max normal is exceeded.

Page 29 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 13 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-3 SC Temperature, Radiation or Water Level SC-3 Note 3 Tables SC-1 and SC-2 contain information that may be used to determine if a primary system is discharging into Secondary Cntmt (emergency depressurization will reduce discharge)

ISOLATE all systems that are discharging into the area EXCEPT systems required:

For damage control OR ACTION REQUIRED To be operated by EOIs Critical Task #1:

SRO With the reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any area exceeds the maximum safe operating value.

SRO Directs ATC to manually scram the reactor and enter 3-AOI 100-1.

Directs BOP operator to evacuate (Reactor and Turbine Buildings) and to close (MSIVs and MSL Drain Valves).

Enters EOI-1, RPV Control

Go to Page 34 for EOI-1 Actions Critical Task #1 Failure Criteria:

The operating crew fails to insert a manual reactor scram prior to 1st Area Radiation Levels reaching the Max Safe Value.

Critical Task #1 Start Time:_________ Critical Task #1 Stop Time: __________

Page 30 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 14 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Inserts a manual reactor scram. ATC performs immediate ATC and subsequent actions of3-AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram.

Provides scram report to US.

Evacuates Reactor Building and Turbine Building and BOP attempts to close MSIVs and drains but B MSL OUTBD &INBD MSIV Fails to isolate. BOP reports this information to US.

Directs offsite release rates monitored in accordance with SI-SRO 4.8.B.1.a.1 for EOI-4 information EOI-3 SC Water Level STOP SIGN SC/L-1 WHEN ANY floor drain sump or area water level exceeds its Max Normal level (Table SRO SC-3)

Page 31 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 15 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-3 SFP Level EOI-3 SFP Temperature SF/T-1 MAINTAIN SFP temperature below 125°F using available NO ACTION REQUIRED SFP cooling SF/T-2 WHEN SFP temperature CANNOT be maintained below 150°F EOI-3 SFP Level SF/L-1 SRO RESTORE and MAINTAIN SFP level above 662 ft 8 in. -

NO ACTION REQUIRED ADDRESSED SF/L-2 WHEN SFP level CANNOT be restored and maintained above 662 ft 8 i

Page 32 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 16 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-3(continued)

RPV Depressurization SC-7 WHEN a primary system is discharging into secondary SC-8 BEFORE ANY SC parameter reaches its MAX Safe value (Tables SC-1, SC-2, SC-3)

Enter EOI-1-ACTION REQUIRED ACTION REQUIRED SRO Directs ATC to manually scram the reactor and enter 3-AOI-100-1.

SRO SRO Directs BOP operator to evacuate (Reactor and Turbine Buildings) and to close (MSIVs and MSL Drain Valves).

Enters EOI-1, RPV Control Note to NRC Examiner: Proceed to page 35 for EOI-1, RPV Control actions.

Critical Task #2 Start Time:_________ Critical Task #2 Stop Time: __________

Page 33 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 17 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-3 (continued)

ATC Depresses the Manual Scram Pushbuttons and verifies all rods are fully inserted.

Picks up the pager and announce to Evacuate the Reactor and Turbine Buildings.

BOP Closes MSIVs and reports that B MSL Failed to Isolate.

SC-9 WHEN ANY SC parameter exceeds its Max Safe SRO value in 2 or more areas for the same parameter(Tables SC-1, SC-2, SC-3) containment SC-10 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION SRO IS REQUIRED SRO ENTERS 3-C-2 EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION Note to NRC Examiner: ED will be required on 2 Max Safe Area RADS or Area Temps.

Proceed to Page 47 for 3-C-2 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION STEPS.

Page 34 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters EOI-1 from EOI-3 RC-1 Verifies RX scram ACTION REQUIRED Receives SCRAM Report from ATC Operator.

RC-2 Note 1 The reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all conditions when:

Any 19 control rods are at notch 02 with all other control rods fully inserted OR All control rods except one are inserted to or beyond position 00 OR SRO Determined by Reactor Engineering (0-TI-394)

IF THEN It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain NO ACTION REQUIRED subcritical without boron under all conditions RPV water level CANNOT be NO ACTION REQUIRED determined PC water lvl and drywell press CANNOT be maintained in the NO ACTION REQUIRED safe area of Curve 7 RC-3 Caution 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water level indication and trend Page 35 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1(continued)

RC/L-1 ENSURE each as required PCIS Isolations (Group 1, 2 and 3) ACTION REQUIRED ECCS NO ACTION REQUIRED RCIC ACTION REQUIRED Override RC/L-2 IF THEN RPV water lvl can be restored and maintained above -162 in.

NO ACTION REQUIRED AND The ADS timer has initiated Loss of available injection systems is anticipated OR SRO Raising RPV water lvl above

+51 in. will facilitate use of NO ACTION REQUIRED shutdown cooling, steam-driven injection systems, or Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table L-2)

RC/L-3 RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and

+51 in. with ANY Preferred Injection Systems (Table L-1)-

ACTION REQUIRED IF THEN RPV water lvl cannot be restored and maintained NO ACTION REQUIRED between +2 in. and +51 in.

RPV water lvl cannot be restored and maintained NO ACTION REQUIRED above -162 in.

Page 36 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 20 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1(continued)

Directs ATC to restore and maintain reactor level between +2 in and +51 in using Table L-1 Systems Table L-1 Preferred Injection Systems SOURCES APPX INJ PRESS SRO CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig CRD 5B 1640psig RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 5D 1200 psig CNDS 6A 410 psig CS 6D,6E 330 psig LPCI 6B, 6C 320 psig APPENDIX 5A

1. IF It is desired to use a reactor feed pump that is in operation, THEN CONTINUE at step 12 to control the operating pump.

12. SLOWLY ADJUST RFPT speed UNTIL feedwater flow to the RPV is indicated, using ANY of the following methods on Panel 3-9-5:

Individual 3-HS-46-8A(9A)(10A), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C)

SPEEDCONT RAISE/LOWER switch in MANUAL GOVERNOR, OR

Individual 3-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C)

SPEEDCONTROL in MANUAL, ATC OR

3-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in MANUALwith individual 3-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) SPEED CONTROL in AUTO.

13. ADJUST RFPT speed as necessary to control injection using the methods of step 12.

14. WHEN RPV level is approximately equal to desired level AND automatic level control is desired, THEN PLACE 3-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in AUTO with individual 3 SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) SPEED CONTROL in AUTO.

Page 37 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 21 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1 RPV Pressure Override RC/P-1 IF THEN A high drywell pressure ECCS ADDRESSED signal exists (2.45 psig)

Emergency RPV depressurization is NO ACTION REQUIRED REQUIRED or has been required SRO Emergency RPV ACTION REQUIRED depressurization is anticipated SRO Directs BOP operator to RAPIDLY DEPRESSURIZE the RPV with main turbine bypass valves:

OK to exceed 100ºF/hr cooldown rate

Lower pressure as low as practicable while maintaining RPV injection required for adequate core cooling Attempts to use Main Turbine Bypass Valves via Manual BOP Jack. Reports that Bypass Valve are FULL OPEN.

RC/P-2 IF ANY MSRV is cycling THEN MANUALLY OPEN MSRVs UNTIL RPV press SRO drops to the press at which all NO ACTION REQUIRED main turbine bypass vlvs are fully open (APPX 11A)

Page 38 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 22 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1(continued)

Override RC/P-3 IF THEN Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be maintained in a NO ACTION REQUIRED safe area of Curve 3 at the existing RPV press Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the safe area of NO ACTION REQUIRED Curve 4 STEAM COOLING IS NO ACTION REQUIRED REQUIRED RC/P-4 STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig using the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B) ACTION REQUIRED

OK to use ANY Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems SRO (Table P-1)

Crosstie CAD to DW Control Air (APPX 8G) if necessary IF THEN DW Control Air is or becomes NO ACTION REQUIRED unavailable Directs BOP operator to control Reactor Pressure between 800 - 1000 psig using Main Turbine Bypass Valves.

Table P-1 Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems SOURCE APPX MSRVs only if suppr pl lvl is above 5.5 ft IF MAIN STEAM RELIEF VLV AIR ACCUM PRESS LOW annunciator (XA-55-3D-18) is in alarm 11A THEN MINIMIZE MSRV cycling by using sustained opening for depressurization Page 39 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 23 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1(continued)

RC/P-5 IF THEN It is anticipated that RPV depressurization will result in a NO ACTION REQUIRED loss of injection required for adequate core cooling RC/P-6 DEPRESSURIZE the RPV and maintain cooldown rate below SRO 100ºF/hr - ACTION REQUIRED

Crosstie CAD to DW Control Air (APPX 8G) if necessary IF THEN ANY MSRV is being used for RPV depressurization AND NO ACTION REQUIRED DW Control Air is or becomes unavailable Page 40 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 24 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1 (continued)

SRO Directs BOP Operator to DEPRESSURIZE the RPV and maintain cooldown rate below 100ºF/hr Begins Opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves to depressurize BOP the Reactor Plant.

RC/P-7 WHEN shutdown cooling RPV SRO press interlock clears AND further cooldown is required Page 41 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 25 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note to NRC Examiner: The following is a list of actions to be taken after Condensate and Feedwater are lost and when the SRO determines that Normal Reactor Level Band of +2 - +51 inches cannot be restored and maintained.

EOI-1 (continued)

RC/L-3 RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and

+51 in. with ANY Preferred Injection Systems (Table L-1)

IF THEN RPV water lvl cannot be restored and maintained ACTION REQUIRED between +2 in. and +51 in.

RPV water lvl cannot be restored and maintained NO ACTION REQUIRED above -162 in.

SRO SRO Directs ATC Operator to RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl above -162 in.

OK to use ANY Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table L-2)

Table L-1 Preferred Injection Systems SOURCES APPX INJ PRESS CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig CRD 5B 1640psig RCIC with CST suction if available 5C 1200 psig HPCI with CST suction if available 5D 1200 psig CNDS 6A 410 psig CS 6D,6E 330 psig LPCI 6B, 6C 320 psig Page 42 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 26 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1 RC/L-3(continued)

Table L-2Alternate Injection Systems SOURCES APPX INJ PRESS SLC (Test Tank) 7B 1450 psig SLC (Boron Tank) 7B 1450psig CNDS Transfer Pumps to RHR and 7A 110 psig CS RHR Crosstie to other Units 7C 320 psig STBY Coolant 7D 160 psig RHR Drain Pumps 7E, 7F 50 psig PSC Head Tank Pumps 7G 30 psig SRO RCIC (Aux Boiler Steam) with CST 7H 1200 psig RCIC Manual Start EDMG-24 App 1200 psig B

HPIC (Aux Boiler Steam) with CST 7J 780 psig Fire Protection System 7K 150 psig Portable Pumps EDMG-24 App 150 psig E

Note to NRC Examiner: US will enter the ALTERNATE LEVEL Leg of EOI-1 at this time if scenario goes to this point.

Page 43 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 27 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note to Examiner: Pages 44-46 may not be applicable due to expecting crew to Emergency Depressurize RPV on 2 Max Safe Area Radiation Levels.

EOI-1 Alternate Level Control Override RC/L-4 IF THEN RPV water lvl can be restored NO ACTION REQUIRED SRO and maintained above -162 in.

RC/L-5 INHIBIT ADS SRO Directs BOP Operator to INHIBIT ADS BOP Operator placed Div 1 and Div 2 ADS Inhibit Switches to BOP INHIBIT and verifies responses.

RC/L-6 RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl above -162 with ANY Preferred Injection Systems (Table L-1)

OK to use ANY Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table L-2)

IF THEN IF 2 or more inj sub sys CANNOT be lined up:

SRO

CNDS

LPCI system I (pumps A or C)

LPCI system II (pumps ACTION REQUIRED B or D)

CS system I (pumps A or C)

CS system II (pumps B or D)

Page 44 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 28 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1 Alternate Level Control (continued)

ATC Lines up Table L-2 systems SRO Directs ATC operators to preparing as many of the SRO Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table L-2) as possible for injection ATC Begin aligning alternate sources.

STOP SIGN RC/L-7 WHEN RPV water lvl drops to-162 in.

RC/L-8 IF THEN NO CNDS, LPCI or CS inj SRO subsystem is lined up for inj ACTION REQUIRED with at least one pump running SRO Directs MAXIMIZE injection with Table L-2 subsystems RC/L-9 Is ANY RPV inj source lined up with at least one pump running Page 45 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 29 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-1 Alternate Level Control (continued)

SRO Verifies at least 1 pump running and ready for injection STOP SIGN RC/L-10 WHENRPV water lvl SRO CANNOT be restored and maintained above -180 RC/L-11 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED SRO SRO ENTERS 3-C-2 EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION Note to NRC Examiner: Proceed to page 47 for 3-C-2 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Page 46 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 30 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-C-2 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Override C2-1 IF THEN RPV water level CANNOT be NO ACTION REQUIRED determined It is anticipated that RPV depressurization will result in NO ACTION REQUIRED loss of injection required for adequate core cooling Containment water lvl CANNOT be maintained below NO ACTION REQUIRED 44 ft C2-2 IF THEN IF DW press is above 2.45 NO ACTION REQUIRED psig SRO C2-3 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE the RPV -ACTION REQUIRED IF THEN Suppr pl lvl is above 5.5 ft THEN OPEN 6 MSRVs (ADS vlvs preferred) OK to exceed 100°F/hr cooldown rate DW Control Air is or becomes NO ACTION REQUIRED unavailable Less than 4 MSRVs can be opened AND NO ACTION REQUIRED RPV press is 70 psi or more above suppr chmbr press Note to NRC Examiner:SRO Directs BOP Operator to OPEN 6 ADS MSRVs Page 47 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 31 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-C-2 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION (continued)

BOP Operator takes ADS MSRVs handswitches to OPEN and 2 fail to OPEN. BOP the selects 2 additional MSRVs and reports to SRO that 6 MSRVs are OPEN and that 2 ADS MSRVs failed to operate by Handswitches.

Critical Task #2:

With a primary system discharging into the Secondary Containment when two or more areas are greater than their maximum safe operating values for the same Crew parameter, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US Critical Task #2 Failure Criteria:

The operating crew fails to recognize Emergency Depressurization is required when 2 Area Radiation Levels exceed the Max Safe value within 5 minutes.

OR The operating crew fails to initiate an Emergency Depressurization within 10 minutes after 2 Area Radiation Levels exceeding Max Safe value.

C2-4 WHEN shutdown cooling RPV press SRO interlock clears AND furthercooldown is required Note to NRC Examiner: Once ED has been completed and Reactor Water Level has been recovered to +2 inches to +51 inches, this will end the scenario.

Page 48 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 32 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT CONTROL SRO Enters on High Suppression Pool Temperature above 95°F Suppr Pl Temp Caution 2 Operating pumps with suction from the suppression pool above the NPSH Limit (Curve 1, 2, 9 or 10) or with suppression pool water level below 10 ft (Vortex limit) may SRO cause equipment damage SP/T-1 MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl temp below 95°F using available ACTION REQUIRED suppr pl cooling (APPX 17A)

SRO Directs BOP Operator to Initiate a Loop of Suppression Pool Cooling per APPX 17A 3-EOI APPENDIX-17A NOTE:

BOP Placing a BYPASS SEL switch in BYPASS in step 1 below prevents automatic opening of the affected RHR loops outboard injection valve. This makes LPCI mode of that RHR loop inoperable.

Page 49 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 33 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 SP/T-1 (continued)

1. IF adequate core cooling is assured, OR Directed to cool the Suppression Pool irrespective ofadequate core cooling, THEN.......BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock AS NECESSARY:

PLACE 3-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

PLACE 3-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

2. PLACE RHR SYSTEM I(II) in Suppression Pool Cooling as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW BOP header.

b. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR HeatExchanger(s).

c. THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm RHRSW flow:

3-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 3A RHRSW OUTLET VLV

3-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 3B RHRSW OUTLET VLV

3-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 3C RHRSW OUTLET VLV

3-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 3D RHRSW OUTLET VLV

d. IF ............. Directed by SRO, THEN.......PLACE 3-XS 122(130), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

Page 50 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 34 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 SP/T-1 (continued)

e. IF .............LPCI INITIATION Signal exists, THEN.......MOMENTARILY PLACE 3-XS-74-121(129),

RHR SYS I(II) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT in SELECT.

f. IF ............. 3-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN....... VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

g. OPEN 3-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS I(II) SUPPR CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV.

h. VERIFY desired RHR pump(s) for Suppression Pool Cooling are operating.

CAUTION RHR System flows below 7000 gpm or above 10000 gpm for BOP one-pump operation may result in excessive vibration and equipment damage.

i. THROTTLE OPEN 3-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS I(II)

SUPPR POOL CLG/TEST VLV, to maintain EITHER of the following as indicated on 3-FI-74-50(64), RHR SYS I(II) FLOW:

Between 7000 and 10000 gpm for one-pump operation.

OR

At or below 13000 gpm for two-pump operation.

j. VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM I(II)

MIN FLOW VALVE.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 1.

l. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers. IF .. Additional Suppression Pool Cooling flow is necessary, THEN....PLACE additional RHR and RHRSW pumps in service using Steps 2.b through 2.l.

Page 51 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 35 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 (continued)

SP/T-2 WHEN Suppr pl temp CANNOT be maintained SRO below 95° SRO Determines to Operate All Available Suppression pool Cooling Loops and directs BOP Operator to place another Loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling BOP Starts addition RHR Loop per APPX 17A Note to NRC Examiner: Step are repeated for APPX 17A for additional RHR Pumps.

Page 52 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 36 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 SP/T-3 (continued)

SP/T-4 BEFORE supprpl temp rises to 110°F SRO Enters EOI-1; Action already completed.

SP/T-5 Note 2 TSC staff may recommend an alternate curve for station blackout per 0-AOI-57-1A SRO WHEN Suppr pl temp and RPV press CANNOT be maintained within a safe area of Curve 3 2Curve SP/T-6 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED Page 53 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 37 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 DW TEMP Caution 1

Ambient temp may affect RPV water level indication and trend DW/T-1 MONITOR and CONTROL DW temp below 160°F using NO ACTION REQUIRED available DW cooling DW/T-2 WHEN DW temp CONNOT be maintained SRO below 160 °F EOI-2 PC Press PC/P-1 MONITOR and CONTROL PC press below 2.45 psig using NO ACTION REQUIRED the Vent system (AOI-64-1)

PC/P-2 WHEN PC press CONNOT be maintained below 2.45 psig Page 54 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 38 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 PC H2 PC/H-1 IF THEN H2 and O2 monitoring system is inoperable NO ACTION REQUIRED Offsite radioactivity release rate reaches ODCM limits OR H2 is NO longer detected in NO ACTION REQUIRED PC(2.4% on control room indicators)

PC/H-2 SRO ENSURE H2/O2 analyzer in service (APPX 19) NO ACTION REQUIRED PC/H-3 WHEN H2 is detected in PC (2.4% on control room indicators)

Page 55 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 8 Page 39 of 39 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Reactor Building, Inboard MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOI-2 Suppr Pl Lvl SP/L-1 MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl lvl -6 in. to -1 in. (APPX 18)

IF THEN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained below -1 in. NO ACTION REQUIRED SRO Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained above -6 in. NO ACTION REQUIRED Note to NRC Examiner: Once ED has been completed and Reactor Water Level has been recovered to +2 inches to +51 inches this will end the scenario.

Page 56 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

HPCI 120V Power Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-ARP-9-3F HPCI 120 VAC POWER FAILURE Automatic Action:

A. HPCI controller loses power. HPCI becomes inoperable.

B. If HPCI is in service, the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve, 3-BOP FCV-73 18, closes. HPCI controller loses power. HPCI becomes inoperable.

C. 3-PI-064-67B will lose power and become inop.

BOP Operator recognizes loss of power and reports to US that HPCI is not OPERABLE.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #9 Page 57 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 10 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Two ADS Valves failing to open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On Emergency Depressurization, BOP Operator Recognizes BOP that 2 ADS MSRVs fail to Open due to Loss of Power to 2B 250 VDC Bus B and OPENS 2 additional MSRVs.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #10 Page 58 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 11 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Condensate Booster Pump C Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-ARP-9-6C window 15 RFPT C ABNORMAL AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None OPERATOR ACTIONS:

A. CHECK other RFP alarms on Panel 3-9-6 to determine problem area.

B. REFER TO appropriate alarm response procedure.

ATC C. IF NO other annunciator on Panel 3-9-6 is in alarm, THEN PERFORM an alarm summary on alarm types.

ATC Operator recognizes that Condensate Booster Pump C and RFPT C have tripped. ATC determines that Condensate and Feedwater are not available and transitions to Panel 9-3 for Reactor Water Level Control using RCIC, RHR Loop II and Core Spray loop II.

Note to Examiner: End of Event #11 Page 59 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 3 Event No.: 12 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Loss of 3B 250V DC RMOV BD.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior MAIN STEAM SYSTEM

ADS Logic Bus A & B o Power to B logic will auto transfer to alternate (ADS remains functional with 4 ADS valves)

ADS Relief Valve 3-PCV-1-18 Power Loss

ADS Relief Valve 3-PCV-1-19 Power Loss

ADS Relief Valve 3-PCV-1-22 Power Loss (loss of alternate power supply)

NON ADS Relief Valve 3-PCV-1-31, 42, 179 loss of power supply

Main Steam Line Drain Valve 3-FCV-1-56 power loss

INBOARD MSIV indication and DC Solenoid power loss RCIC SYSTEM

Div 1 Logic Power Failure -RCIC INOP

3-FCV-71-3 RCIC Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve power loss BOP

3-FCV-71-34 RCIC Min Flow Valve power loss HPCI SYSTEM

Div I logic power loss -HPCI remain functional. (Scenario has malfunction for HPCI 120V Power Loss which will make HPCI INOP and unavailable for use.)

3-FCV-73-36 HPCI/RCI CST TEST RTN Valve power loss RWCU SYTEM

3-FCV-69-2 RWCU INBD ISOL Valve power loss RHR SYSTEM

Div I logic power failure -RHR will not inject due to 450 psig interlock CS SYSTEM

Div I logic power failure -RHR will not inject due to 450 psig interlock ECCS Div I ATU Inverter power loss Backup Scram Valves Channel B power loss Examiner Note: End of Event #12 Page 60 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Scenario Setup IC 8 Exam IC 253 Schedule Files(s): Scenario #3.sch, Scenario #3.evt Trigger Appx Trigger Appx 18 18 24 7G 19 7A CS 25 7H 20 7A RHR 26 8E 21 7B 27 16H 22 7E 28 16J 23 7F 29 18 RHR A Malfunctions Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value STICK ANY RD06R5035 CONTROL ROD CR 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50-35 B Main Steam Line TH35B Break in Steam 8 60 .5 N/A N/A .5 Tunnel (Rx Building)

TH23 Fuel Failure 8 N/A 100 N/A N/A 100 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Failure MS06C 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A to Close: FCV-1-26 MSL B INBD Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Failure MS06D 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A to Close: FCV-1-27 MSL B OUTBD MSIV and DRAIN RP15A 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ISOL Failure C Condensate FW02C 11 180 N/A N/A N/A TRIP Booster Pump Trip A Condensate FW02A ACTIVE N/A N/A N/A N/A TRIP Booster Pump Trip HPCI Logic Power HP07 9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Failure NM05H IRM H Amp Failure 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 Steam Seal Regulator MS01 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 Failure Page 61 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Remotes Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value MS Tunnel Booster Fan PC14 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A STOP Trip Transfer power supply ED24B to 250V RMOV BD 3A, 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A OPEN 3B, AND 3C Overrides Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value RM10H RM-90-20A 8 N/A N/A 1100 N/A 1000 RM10S RM-90-29A 8 N/A N/A 840 N/A 1000 PMP 52 BREAKER COND FAIL 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 056A BST PMP A PWR PMP 52 BREAKER COND FAIL 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 062A BST PMP B PWR ZAIFC0229A FCV-2-29 COND 7 N/A N/A 300 N/A 0 1 SHORT CYCLE Control Board Setup:

Reset IC 253

Begin recording data

Place simulator in RUN

Ensure RWM screen is selected and alarms are clear

Adjust Rx Water Level to ensure stable trend Page 62 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS

Condensate Booster Pump A is disassembled for overhaul.

Condensate Booster Pump B was tagged last shift for troubleshooting activities due to high vibration reading on pump start.

ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

Pull control rods IAW 3-GOI-100-1A 5.4 [71] to achieve 10-50% open on the first Bypass valve position starting with CR 34-43.

Place RFP C in service to control Reactor Water Level IAW 3-OI-3 section 5.5 Placing the First RFP in service step 5.5 [12].

STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 50ºF

RWCU Blowdown in service

CRD Pump 2A in service

IRMs on ranges 6-7

CPs: B & C in service

CBPs: C in service.

COMMON UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 100%

UNIT 3 Rx at 1 % Power Page 63 of 63 Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 Facility: BFN Scenario Number: NRC - 2 Op-Test Number:15-10 Examiners:__________________ Operators: SRO: _________________

__________________ ATC: _________________

__________________ BOP: _________________

Initial Conditions:98% Reactor Power Turnover: Start HPCI for Quarterly Surveillance; RHR Loop I is in Suppression Pool Cooling per 3-OI-74, SGT A is in service per 0-OI-65.

Event Malfunction Event EventDescription Number Number Type*

N-BOP Continue HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 sec 6.4.

1. N/A N-ATC SR 3.6.2.1.1 Suppression Chamber Water Temp Check N-SRO OVERRIDE HPCI Pump Suction Press Low Alarm (Failure of PS-73 I-BOP

1) and failure of HPCI to trip. Respond per ARP 3-ARP-9-3F

2. I-SRO XA-55-3F_13 window 13 TS-SRO ZAOPI7328A Tech Spec 3.5.1 (ECCS and RCIC)

Loss of RPS Bus B, 1/2 SCRAM, Restore Power to RPS B RP01B C-ATC per AOI-99-1

3. REMOTE C-SRO Tech Spec on equipment that is inoperable due to the RP04 B TS-SRO power loss FW05C C-BOP C2 FW Heater Tube Leak and Extraction Steam Fails to 4.

FW19C C-SRO isolate. Manual isolation per 3-AOI-6-1A R-ATC Reduce Rx Power for FW Heater Removal

5. N/A R-SRO Remove FW Heater from service per OI-6 or AOI-6-1A TU02C/D C-ATC Main Turbine Vibration rise, Rx Scram to take Unit offline/

6.

TC03A-J C-SRO Bypass valves fail to open RD09A/B

7. M-ALL High Power ATWS -Hydraulic Lock RD17A/B

8. FW14A/B/C C-ATC Feedwater Pump A/B/C Trip

9. AD01G C-BOP SRV Leaks/sticks open

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 Events

1. The BOP operator will continue in the HPCI Quarterly Surveillance, SR 3.5.1.7.

Upon Lead Examiner direction, the scenario may continue.

2. While HPCI is operating, the HPCI Pump Suction Press Low alarm will annunciate. The BOP operator will check suction pressure and respond IAW ARP-9-3F Window 13. The operator reports that HPCI should have tripped and closes the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve, 3-FCV-73-16. The US will declare HPCI inoperable and enter Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition C. He will verify, administratively, that RCIC is operable immediately and restore HPCI to operable with 14 days. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the Tech Spec, the scenario may continue.

3. A loss of RPS Channel B will occur. The crew will respond IAW 3-AOI-99-1, Loss of Power to One RPS Bus. Personnel will be dispatched to determine the cause of the loss of RPS. It will be reported that the failure was due to the B2 circuit protector assembly. The US will direct that RPS B be transferred to the alternate power supply and for the ATC to reset the 1/2 Scram. When RPS has been restored, the US will direct restoring equipment IAW 3-AOI-99-1 and 3-OI-99, Reactor Protection System.The US will refer to Tech Specs for the equipment that is removed from service and is now inoperable. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the restoration and Tech Spec, the scenario may continue.

4. When the lead examiner is satisfied with the last event this event can be manually triggered which causes a feedwater tube leak to develop in the C2 High Pressure Heater. The crew will notice and report heater level rising and electric power, MWe, lowering. Bypass Vlv to Condenser Not Closed will annunciate. The crew will recognize and report increased condensate flow and proper drain/dump valve operation for the C2 heater. As heater level continues to rise, the Level High annunciator will be received and the crew will respond IAW the ARP. The crew will verify that FCV-6-96 drain valve is open and recognize that Extraction Steam Isolation Valves will fail to close and manual action will be required. The US will direct entry into 3-AOI-6-1A.

5. After 3-AOI-6-1A is entered, the US will direct lowering reactor > 5% below initial power level and call the RE to evaluate thermal limits. 3-OI-6 will be referred to for turbine/heater load restrictions. The US will direct a mid power runback to lower reactor power to approximately 79%. He will also direct that the C2 Heater be isolated IAW Attachment 1 of 3-AOI-6-1A. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the reactivity manipulation, the scenario may continue.

Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1

6. The Crew will recognize and report increasing main turbine bearing vibration.

The crew will refer to ARP-9-7B, Window 32 for Main Turbine High Vibration and report that an immediate turbine trip is required if a journal bearing exceeds 12 mils. The US will direct a manual reactor scram and main turbine trip when bearing vibration exceeds 12 mils. The ATC operator will manually scram the reactor to take the main turbine offline. Following the scram, the ATC operator will report the failure of the main turbine bypass valves to respond to rising reactor pressure

7. The ATC operator will manually scram the reactor and make the scram report. He will continue to take actions IAW the OATC Hard Card and initiate ARI, verify that recirc pumps are tripped, and initiate SLC. The BOP operator will control reactor pressure 800 - 1000 psig using the SRVs. The US will direct that RPV injection be terminated and prevented and reactor level lowered to at least (-) 50 inches. After reactor water has been lowered to (-) 50 inches, the US will direct maintaining (-) 50 to

(-)100 inches. If torus temperature rises to 110°F, the US will direct continuing to lower reactor water level until power is less than 5% or TAF is reached. Appendix 1F and 2 will be called for and control rods will be inserted using Appendix 1D. After SDVs have drained, a scram will be initiated and all rods will insert. Reactor water level will be restored to normal.

8. After the ATC operator terminates and prevents injection to the RPV and reactor water level is lowering, the operating feedwater pump will trip. The operator will respond by restoring another feedwater pump to service.

9. As reactor power lowers due to lowering reactor water level and initiation of SLC, the BOP operator will identify that a SRV has stuck open. The operator will respond IAW 3-AOI-1-1 and attempt to close the valve. When the operator takes the MSRV Auto Actuation Logic to INHIBIT, the valve will close.

The Scenario ends when the crew has re-initiated a reactor scram, all control rods have inserted and reactor water level has been restored to normal.

Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 Critical Tasks 2

1. Inhibit ADS prior to automatic initiation to prevent uncontrolled RPV depressurization and injection during an ATWS.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Criterion is ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation unless all required injection systems are Terminated and Prevented.

4. Feedback:

RPV pressure trend

RPV level trend

ADS LOGIC BUS A/B INHIBITED annunciator status

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to inhibit ADS prior to inadvertent initiation of ADS.

2. When Reactor Power is greater than 5% or unknown and RPV Level is greater than (-) 50 inches, STOP and PREVENT all injection into the RPV except RCIC, CRD and SLC.

1. Safety Significance:

With thermal power being produced in the RPV and all actions to lower power have not brought reactor power out of the heating range, power oscillation and subsequent fuel damage may be generated from these conditions persisting. Stopping and preventing injection to lower RPV level will reduce this challenge to the reactor.

2. Cues:

Reactor is scrammed and all ATWS actions are taken by the operator and power is greater than or equal to 5% power or unknown.

3. Measured by:

Reactor power on APRM NUMAC or recorder displays.

4. Feedback:

RPV Level lowering

Reactor Power lowering

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

Unit 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 The Operating Crew exceeds curve 3, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Curve, requiring Emergency Depressurization with Control Rods Out.

3. With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, inject boron into the RPV.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

Suppression Pool temperature.

3. Measured by:

Observation - If operating IAW EOI-1A, US determines that SLC is required (indicated by verbal direction or EOI placekeeping action) before exceeding 110 degrees in the Suppression Pool.

AND RO places SLC A / B Pump control switch in ON, when directed by US.

4. Feedback:

Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indications.

SLC tank level.

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

Failure to initiate SLC prior to Suppression Pool Temperature exceeding 110 °F Unit 3

SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS None ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

Continue HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Sec 6.4.

SR 3.6.2.1.1 Suppression Chamber Water Temp Check STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 30ºF COMMON Thunderstorms are in Northern Alabama UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 100%

UNIT 3

Reactor Power is 98% to support HPCI run.

RHR Loop I & II are in Suppression Pool Cooling per 3-OI-74.

SGT A is in service per 0-OI-65 to support HPCI run.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DRIVER Ensure Critical Parameters are recorded CREW Assumes shift 3-SR-3.5.1.7 6.4 HPCI Main Pump and Booster Pump Testing

[9] ALIGN HPCI System for a manual start by performing the following steps:

[9.1] ENSURE HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL 3-FIC-73-33 is in AUTO position. (Depressing the AUTO operation mode transfer switch changes mode of the controller)

[9.2] ENSURE HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL 3-FIC-73-33 is set to control at 530 (5,300 gpm).(Adjusting the Setpoint up/down keys changes the setpoints.)

BOP Ensures HPCI flow controller is for 5300 gpm and in AUTO.

[9.3] PLACE HPCI STEAM PACKING EXHAUSTER by placing 3-HS-73-10A to START.

[9.4] ENSURE OPEN 3-FCV-73-36, using HPCI/RCIC CST TEST VLV 3-HS-73-36A.

[9.5] OPEN 3-FCV-73-35, using HPCI PUMP CST TESTVLV, 3-HS-73-35A.

STARTS HPCI Steam Packing Exhauster, verifies HPCI/RCIC CST Test valve (73-36A) is open and OPENS HPCI Pump CST Test valve (73-35A)/

Unit 3 Page 1 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[10] IF 3-SR-3.5.1.1(HPCI), Maintenance of Filled HPCI Discharge Piping was being performed, THEN ENSURE 3-SR-3.5.1.1(HPCI), Maintenance of Filled HPCI Discharge Piping has been completed.

(Otherwise N/A)

[11] RECORD pretest suction pressure and thrust bearing temperature below:

Marks step 10 as NA and verifies suction pressure and thrust bearing temperature are within acceptable range.

[12] [NER] ENSURE communication is established with Operations personnel in HPCI Room. [IE 93-67]

[13] [NER] REQUEST that Operations personnel in HPCI Room ensure that all unnecessary personnel have BOP exited HPCI Room. [IE 93-67]

[14] [NER] ANNOUNCE HPCI Turbine startup over Plant Public Address System. [IE 93-67]

Establishes communications with Operations personnel in HPCI room. Directs that personnel in HPCI room evacuate the room and announces HPCI startup over PA system.

[15] PLACE HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP 3-HS-73-47A to START.

[16] OPEN 3-FCV-73-30, using HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, 3-HS-73-30A.

Places HS for HPCI Aux Oil Pump (73-47A) to START and OPENS HPCI Min Flow Valve (73-30)

DRIVER: Report as RBO AUO that local suction pressure is 32 psig for step 6.4 [11]

Unit 3 Page 2 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[17] ENSURE personnel are ready to monitor 3-FCV 18 forsmooth operation AND NOTIFY the personnel monitoring that the next step will open 3-FCV-073-0018.

Verifies personnel ready to monitor 73-18 and notifies them that the next step will open 73-18.

NOTES

1) During the startup of the HPCI Turbine a second Operator should be utilized to monitor for abnormal conditions and alarms.

2) The HPCI Turbine parameters should be monitored during HPCI startup. This will ensure proper response of the control systems. If HPCI pumps suction pressure causes an auto swap BOP of the HPCI Suction Valves from CST to the Torus, then the HPCI Turbine should be tripped.

3) Review Step 6.4[19] to ensure actions occur when 3-FCV 16 opens.

4) Personnel monitoring the 3-FCV-73-18 valve for smooth operation must pay close attention to valve travel from the time 3-FCV-73-16 is opened until 3-FCV-73-18 is full open and stable.

5) Smooth operation for 3-FCV-73-18 is a continuous operation from full close to full open without erratic movement. Sound can be used to assist in determining operation of valve. (i.e.,

the valve slamming open suddenly and then closed and then ramps open is NOT smooth operation)

Unit 3 Page 3 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 4 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS

1) If HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV 3-FCV-73-16 fails to fully open, then the governor controls ystem ramp generator will time out and HPCI turbine speed, discharge pressure, or flow will be lower than expected.

DO NOT RE-ATTEMPT to open HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV 3-FCV-73-16 unless HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE 3-FCV-73-18 is closed using HPCI TURBINE TRIP 3-HS-73-18A. Failure to observe this caution will result in a turbine overspeed trip if 3-FCV-73-16 is opened with the ramp generator timed out.

2) During the startup of the HPCI Turbine, the flow indication will remain high during the transient until the Governor Control System stabilizes the HPCI Flow to the desired setpoint.

The response time of the Governor Control System is slow.

BOP Therefore flow should NOT be adjusted until the system has stabilized. During this time the operator should monitor the speed indication for proper operation of the Governor Control.

The Ramp Generator will cause the Turbine Speed to rise at a steady rate until the Signal Converter circuit takes control and lowers the speed to stabilize the flow at the desired setpoint.

3) Starting the HPCI turbine with HWC in service and without the flow being at a reduced rate may result in higher than Normal Radiation Levels.

WARNING

[NER] Failure of both HPCI Steam Exhaust piping rupture discs during Turbine startup and operation will result in a process steam release into HPCI Room. This release raises the risk of personnel injury until steam line isolation occurs. Therefore, personnel in HPCI Room should minimize stay time in close proximity to rupture disc cage assembly. [IE 93-67]

Unit 3 Page 4 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 1 Page 5 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Start of Critical Step(s)

[18] OPEN 3-FCV-73-16, using HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV, 3-HS-73-16A.

End of Critical Step(s)

[19] OBSERVE the following actions occur:

HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP starts.

[NRC/C] HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE 3-FCV-73-18 opens by observing 3-ZI-73-18 position indicating lights.[Appendix R]

HPCI TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 3-FCV-73-19 partially or fully opens by observing 3-ZI-73-19 position indicating lights.

BOP

[NRC/C] HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE 3-FCV-73-30 closes when HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL3-FIC-73-33 indicates approximately 125 ( 1250 gpm) flow.

[Appendix R]

HPCI Turbine speed rises to greater than 2400 rpm asindicated on HPCI TURBINE SPEED 3-SI-73-51.

HPCI STM LINE CNDS INBD/OUTBD DR VLVS 3-FCV-73-6A and 3-FCV-73-6B close by observing 3-ZI-73-6A and 3-ZI-73-6B position indicating lights.

HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP stops as Turbine speed rises.

Unit 3 Page 5 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 6 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OPENS HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve (73-16) and observes the proper indications. Verifies HPCI Aux Oil Pump stops as turbine speed rises.

[20] CHECK smooth operation of 3-FCV-73-18 AND MARK the results below.

[21] IF the answer above is NO, THEN PERFORM the following: (Otherwise N/A)

NOTIFY System Engineer of condition.

INITIATE an SR/WO.

PROCEED with test.

[22] CHECK RESET the following annunciators:

BOP

HPCI PUMP DISCH FLOW LOW 3-FA-73-33 (3-XA-55-3F, window 5)

HPCI TURBINE TRIPPED 3-ZA-73-18 (3-XA-55-3F, window 11)

HPCI TURBINE GLAND SEAL DRAIN PRESSURE HIGH3-PA-73-46 (3-XA-55-3F, window 14)

HPCI TURBINE BEARING OIL PRESSURE LOW3-PA-73-47 (3-XA-55-3F, window 19)

[23] CHECK System flow, discharge pressure and Turbine speedis stable prior to performing the next step.

Verifies smooth operation of 73-28, resets associated annunciators and checks for stable operation of HPCI.

DRIVER: Report as RB AUO that no abnormal indication of HPCI observed locally.

Unit 3 Page 6 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 7 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTES

1) Pause periodically as HPCI discharge pressure approaches the desired test pressure to allow HPCI system flow, discharge pressure, and Turbine speed to stabilize.[BFPER 00-003572-000]

2) Due to discharge pressure indicator failures, speed should be monitored NOT to exceed 4345 rpm to minimize exceeding design discharge pressure.

[24] WHILE maintaining HPCI Turbine Speed less than 4345 rpm, ADJUST HPCI Pump Discharge Pressure as follows:

BOP [24.1] [NRC/C] SLOWLY THROTTLE 3-FCV-73-35 using HPCI PUMP CST TEST VLV, 3-HS 35A, as necessary until the following are achieved:

HPCI PUMP DISCH PRESS as indicated on 3-PI-73-31A is psig _______ (Step 6.4[2.2])

Discharge flow steadies at or above 500 (5,000 gpm) as indicated by HPCI SYSTEM FLOW/CONTROL, 3-FIC-73-33.

[Appendix R]

Adjusts HPCI Discharge Pressure using 73-35 until pressure is greater than or equal to 1035 psig (+5, -85) or discharge flow steadies at or above 5000 gpm.

Unit 3 Page 7 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 1 Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[24.2] [NRC/C] CHECK HPCI Room for evidence of steam, oil and gland seal condenser leaks.

[RPT-82-13]

[24.3] REQUEST Radiation Protection to monitor Radiation and Contamination levels to ensure either has NOT risen significantly.

BOP

[24.4] CHECK System flow, discharge pressure, and Turbine speed are stable prior to performing the next step.

Calls personnel in HPCI room to check for leaks and stable operation of HPCI. Calls RP to monitor radiation and contamination levels in HPCI area.

As AUO in HPCI area, report no leaks and stable operation of HPCI.

DRIVER As RP, report no significant rise in radiation or contamination.

NRC End of Event #1,request Event #2 Unit 3 Page 8 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

HPCI Low Suction Pressure/Failure to trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event #2, insert Event DRIVER Trigger 2 to insert malfunction XA-55-3F_13 to ON and override HPCI Suction Press to -15.

Reports HPCI Pump Suction Pressure Low annunciator and HPCI still operating.

Refers to 3-9-3F, W13 3-ARP-9-3F Automatic Action:

A. Turbine Trip

1. HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, 3-FCV-73-18, closes BOP

2. HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE 3-FCV-73-30, closes Operator Action:

A. Verify automatic action has occurred.

Reports failure of HPCI to trip and initiates a manual turbine trip.

Reports manual trip of HPCI successful.

Reports Critical Parameters (Reactor Power, Reactor Pressure, ATC and Reactor Water Level) are stable.

Acknowledges report of HPCI Turbine Trip failure and directs HPCI turbine trip.

Directs BOP to initiate an investigation on the HPCI suction pressure low annunciator.

Refers to Technical Specifications 3.5.1 SRO Unit 3 Page 9 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

HPCI Low Suction Pressure/Failure to trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.HPCI System C.1 Verify by Immediately inoperable administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE AND C.2 Restore HPCI 14 days SRO System to OPERABLE status Determines that TS 3.5.1 Condition C is applicable. Verifies that RCIC System is OPERABLE. Declares HPCI System in INOPERABLE and must be restored to OPERABLE status in 14 days.

APPENDIX R:

A. Restore the equipment function in 7 days or provide equivalent shutdown capability by one of the following methods:

Briefs crew on current plant conditions and T.S. LCO for HPCI Calls maintenance to initiate investigation on the HPCI Low BOP Suction Pressure annunciator and HPCI failure to trip.

Acknowledge initiating an investigation into HPCI Low DRIVER Suction Pressure condition and failure of HPCI to trip.

Examiner Note: End of Event #2, request Event #3 DRIVER CUE: After event #2, call US and state as the Shift Manager, Secure Suppression Pool Cooling at this time.

Unit 3 Page 10 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event # 3, insert DRIVER Event Trigger 3 to insert malfunction RP01B, RPS CHANNEL MG SET FAILURE CHANNEL B Reports a reactor half scram and loss of RPS B ATC Reports Critical Parameters, (Reactor Power, Reactor Pressure, and Reactor Water Level) are stable.

Calls the outside US to investigate the loss of RPS B and BOP restore power to RPS B.

As the outside US, acknowledge investigating the loss of RPS DRIVER B and the direction to restore power to RPS B Wait 3 minutes, then as the outside US, call control room and DRIVER report that the cause of the RPS loss is a trip of the RPS B MG Set.

Acknowledges report from outside US and directs that RPS B be transferred to the alternate source.

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO 3.4.5 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. Drywell floor drain sump monitoring system; and

b. One channel of either primary containment SRO atmospheric particulate or atmospheric gaseous monitoring system.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME D.All required D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately leakage detection systems inoperable Unit 3 Page 11 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TR 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION TR 3.3.11 Hydrogen Monitoring Instrumentation LCO3.3.11 The primary containment hydrogen analyzer shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 during the time period

a. From 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is > 15% RTP following startup, to SRO

b. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to < 15%

RTP prior to the next scheduled reactor shutdown.

ACTIONS CONDITIONS A. Primary containment hydrogen analyzer inoperable.

A.1 Restore primary containment hydrogen analyzer to OPERABLE status. -7 DAYS TR 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS TR 3.6.2 Hydrogen Oxygen Concentration Monitor LCO3.6.2 The Primary Containment oxygen concentration monitor shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 during the time period

a. From 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is > 15% RTP following startup, to

b. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to reducing THERMAL POWER to < 15%

SRO RTP prior to the next scheduled reactor shutdown.

ACTIONS CONDITIONS A. Primary containment oxygen concentration monitor inoperable.

A.1 Begin alternate sampling and analyze results.

Immediately AND once per 7 DAYS thereafter Unit 3 Page 12 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TR 3.4.1 Coolant Chemistry LCO 3.4.1 Reactor coolant chemistry shall be maintained within the limits of Table 3.4.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.4.1-1 Calls Chemistry to meet TSR 3.4.1.1 for alternate sampling.

As the outside US, acknowledge transferring RPS B to the alternate source of power.

Insert Event Trigger 10 to insert remote function RP04 to B, RPS A/B ALTERNATE.

DRIVER Call control room and report that RPS B has been transferred to alternate power.

As Chemistry, acknowledge the need for alternate sampling to be performed.

Directs ATC operator to reset RPS and PCIS IAW OI-99 and/or SRO AOI-99 AOI-99-1, Loss of Power to one RPS Bus 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO/BOP 4.1 Immediate Action

[1] STOP all testing with potential RPS half-scrams or PCIS logic isolation signals.

Unit 3 Page 13 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-99-1, Loss of Power to one RPS Bus 4.2 Subsequent Actions NOTES

1) If power cannot be restored promptly to a de-energized RPS Bus, plant operation may continue until repairs are made provided all plant operational limits are met

2) With Reactor Building Ventilation isolated, Main Steam Line BOP Tunnel Area temperature can reach PCIS Group 1 isolation trip setpoint in less than 10 minutes unless the Main Steam Tunnel Booster Fan is in service.

3) Loss of RPS will isolate 3-RM-90-256, Drywell Air Monitor, and TS LCO 3.4.5 Condition B should be entered.

[1] VERIFY automatic actions occur.

[2] VERIFY Steam Tunnel Booster FAN operating by observation of MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE, 3-TIS 60A.

SRO [4] IF desired to place RPS Bus B on Alternate Supply, THEN PERFORM Step 4.2[9]. (Otherwise N/A)

Dispatches personnel to transfer then transfer RPS B to alternate.

As the outside US, acknowledge transferring RPS B to the alternate source of power.

Insert Event Trigger 10 to insert remote function RP04 to B, DRIVER RPS A/B ALTERNATE.

Call control room and report that RPS B has been transferred to alternate power.

Unit 3 Page 14 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-99-1, Loss of Power to one RPS Bus 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[12] RESET the RPS trip logic half scram at Panel 3-9-5 as follows:

NOTE The eight CONTROL ROD TEST SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A and B LIGHTS SHOULD ILLUMINATE

[12.1] MOMENTARILY PLACE SCRAM RESET, 3-HS 5A-S5, as follows:

[12.2] RESET FIRST position. (Group 2/3)

[12.3] RESET SECOND position. (Group 1/4)

[12.4] NORMAL position.

ATC

[13] CHECK the following conditions:

[13.1] All eight SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A/B LOGIC RESET lights ILLUMINATED.

[13.2] The following four lights ILLUMINATED:

[13.2.1] SYSTEM A BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 3-IL-99-5A/AB.

[13.2.2] SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 3-IL-99-5A/CD.

[13.3] Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves indicate OPEN.

ATC Operator Resets RPS Scram by placing HS-99-5A-S5 to group 2/3 then 1/4 and verifies indications as stated above.

Unit 3 Page 15 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-99-1, Loss of Power to one RPS Bus 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[14] RESET PCIS trip logic at Panel 3-9-4 as follows:

[14.1] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV I RESET, 3-HS-64-16A-S32, to left and right RESET positions.

[14.2] CHECK the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

[14.2.1] MSIV GROUP A1, 3-IL-64-A1

[14.2.2] MSIV GROUP B1, 3-IL-64-B1

[14.3] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV II RESET, 3-HS-64-16A-S33, to left and right RESET positions.

[14.4] CHECK the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

[14.4.1] MSIV GROUP A2, 3-IL-64-A2

[14.4.2] MSIV GROUP B2, 3-IL-64-B2 BOP BOP Operator resets PCIS by placing HS-64-16A-S32 PCIS Div I RESET to left and right and observes indications as stated above.

[16] RESET the secondary containment isolation logic at Panel 3-9-25, as follows:

[16.1] PLACE the REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS switch, 3-HS-64-11A, to OFF.

[16.2] PLACE REFUEL ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS Switch, 3-HS-64-3A, to OFF.

[16.3] VERIFY only one SBGT trains operating.

[17] START the Refuel Zone supply and exhaust fans, at Panel 3-9-25, as follows:

[17.1] PLACE REFUEL ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS Switch, 3-HS-64-3A, in SLOW A (SLOW B) position.

Unit 3 Page 16 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-99-1, Loss of Power to one RPS Bus 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[18] START the Reactor Building supply and exhaust fans, at Panel 3-9-25, as follows:

[18.1] PLACE the REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS switch, 3-HS-64-11A, to the SLOW A(B) position.

[19] SECURE remaining SBGT train per 0-OI-65 section 7.1.

[20] IF fans transfer to fast speed is required after five minutes, THEN: PLACE the REACTOR ZONE FANS BOP AND DAMPERS switch, 3-HS-64-11A, to the FAST A(B) position.

[21] IF fans transfer to fast speed is required after five minutes, THEN: PLACE the REFUEL ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS switch, 3-HS-64-3A, to the FAST A(FAST B) position.

[22] REFER to 3-OI-99 to restore remaining affected systems to operation following RPS Bus Power loss and RETURN to Step 4.2[23]

BOP Operator starts REFUEL and REACTOR ZONE FANS as described above.

As Unit 1, acknowledge securing SBGT trains and CREV.

Insert Event Trigger 11 to STOP SGTS trains.

For CREV take FP05A and FP05B to STOP then NORM.

DRIVER Call control room and report SBGT trains and CREV secured.

When called upon to reset ATU RP09 insert trigger 25 to perform actions to reset Local ATU RP09 Alarms.

Unit 3 Page 17 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-OI-99 8.5 Restoration to Normal Following RPS Bus Power Loss or Transfer NOTES

1) This section provides instructions for resetting the various system isolations and reopening affected valves to allow those systems to be restored to normal operation in accordance with their respective operating instructions.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 3-9-5 unless otherwise noted.

3) When RPS Bus power is lost to some scram discharge volume level switches, their RTD heater is de-energized. Following the restoration of power, a time delay, dependent on how long the level switch was de-energized, prevents resetting the halfscram signal. This may take up to 37 seconds after RPS power is restored. Precaution 3.0 O can be referred to for more information on these level switches

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor/SROs permission to restore to ATC normal.

[2] MOMENTARILY PLACE SCRAM RESET, 3-HS-99-5A-S5, as follows:

[2.1] RESET FIRST position. (Group 2/3)

[2.2] RESET SECOND position. (Group 1/4)

[2.3] NORMAL position.

[3] CHECK the following conditions:

A. All eight SCRAM SOLENOID GROUP A/B LOGIC RESET lights ILLUMINATED.

B. The following four lights ILLUMINATED:

SYSTEM A BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 3-IL-99-5A/AB.

SYSTEM B BACKUP SCRAM VALVE, 3-IL-99-5A/CD.

C. Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves indicate OPEN.

D. Points SOE033 and SOE035 on ICS computer or on the First Out Printer reads NOTTRIP for RPS A.

E. Points SOE034 and SOE036 on ICS computer or on the First Out Printer reads NOTTRIP for RPS B.

Unit 3 Page 18 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] At Panel 3-9-4, RESET PCIS trip logic as follows:

[4.1] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV I RESET,3-HS 16A-S32, to left and right RESET positions.

[4.2] CHECK the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

MSIV GROUP A1.

MSIV GROUP B1.

[4.3] MOMENTARILY PLACE PCIS DIV II RESET,3-HS ATC 16A-S33, to left and right RESET positions.

[4.4] CHECK the following red lights ILLUMINATED:

MSIV GROUP A2.

MSIV GROUP B2.

Resets RPS and PCIS IAW OI-99 Reports RPS and PCIS have been reset Directs BOP operator to restore remaining systems IAW OI-

` SRO 99.

NOTE Steps 8.5[5] through 8.5[22] can be performed in any order.

[5] VERIFY the green lights are ILLUMINATED on all 5 of the QLVPS located at Panel 9-14.

[6] RESTORE Reactor and Refuel Zone Ventilation to normal operation. REFER TO 3-AOI-64-2D, Group 6 Ventilation System Isolation.

[7] RESTORE Standby Gas Treatment System to standby readiness. REFER TO 0-OI-65, Section 7.0.

BOP 3-AOI-64-2D 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

[10] WHEN initiating signal has been corrected AND necessary repairs have been made, THEN

[10.1] VERIFY PCIS RESET:

RESET PCIS DIV I RESET, 3-HS-64-16A-S32.

RESET PCIS DIV II RESET, 3-HS-64-16A-S33.

Unit 3 Page 19 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 10 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-AOI-64-2D 4.2 Subsequent Actions (continued)

[10] WHEN initiating signal has been corrected AND necessaryrepairs have been made, THEN

[10.1] VERIFY PCIS RESET:

RESET PCIS DIV I RESET, 3-HS-64-16A-S32.

RESET PCIS DIV II RESET, 3-HS-64-16A-S33.

[10.2] RESET Reactor/Refuel isolation logic as required:

PLACE REFUELING ZONE FANS AND DMPRS,3-HS-64-3A in OFF.

PLACE REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DMPRS, 3-HS-64-11A in OFF.

[10.3] START Reactor/Refuel zone ventilation as required:

PLACE REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS switch, 3-HS-64-11A, in SLOW A (SLOW B).

PLACE REFUEL ZONE FANS AND DAMPERSSwitch, 3-HS-64-3A, in SLOW A (SLOW B).

BOP [10.4] VERIFY for the fans started the dampers open and fans start as indicated by illuminated red lights above the following switches:

The two green lights A(B) above REFUEL ZONEFANS AND DAMPERS Switch, 3-HS-64-3A,extinguish and the two red lights A(B) illuminate.

The two green lights A(B) above REACTOR ZONEFANS AND DAMPERS Switch 3-HS-64-11A,extinguish and the two red lights A(B) illuminate.

REACTOR ZONE SPLY OUTBD ISOL DMPR, 3-HS-64-13.

REACTOR ZONE SPLY INBD ISOL DMPR, 3-HS-64-14.

REACTOR ZONE EXH INBD ISOL DMPR, 3-HS-64-42.

REACTOR ZONE EXH OUTBD ISOL DMPR, 3-HS-64-43.

REACTOR ZONE FANS AND DAMPERS, 3-HS-64-11A.

REFUEL ZONE SPLY OUTBD ISOL DMPR, 3-HS-64-5.

REFUEL ZONE SPLY INBD ISOL DMPR,3-HS-64-6.

REFUEL ZONE EXH OUTBD ISOL DMPR,3-HS-64-9.

REFUEL ZONE EXH INBD ISOL DMPR,3-HS-64-10.

Unit 3 Page 20 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 11 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[11] NOTIFY RADCON of the isolation restoration AND REQUEST surveys.

Verifies PCIS reset and restarts reactor/refuel zone ventilation IAW AOI-64-2d. Runs fans in SLOW for 5 minutes before shifting BOP to FAST speed.

Verifies green lights illuminated on all 5 QLVPS.

Calls Unit 1 operator to secure SBGT trains.

As Unit 1, acknowledge securing SBGT trains and CREV.

Insert Event Trigger 11 to STOP SGTS trains.

For CREV take FP05A and FP05B to STOP then NORM.

DRIVER Call control room and report SBGT trains and CREV secured.

When called upon to reset ATU RP09 insert trigger 21 to perform actions to reset Local ATU RP09 Alarms.

8.5 Restoration to Normal Following RPS Bus Power Loss or Transfer (continued)

[8] At Panel 3-9-3, PLACE PSC head tank pumps in service as follows:

PLACE PSC PUMP SUCTION INBD ISOL VALVE,3-HS 57A, in AUTO After OPEN.

BOP

PLACE PSC PUMP SUCTION OUTBD ISOL VALVE,3-HS-75-58A, in AUTO After OPEN.

PLACE PSC HEAD TANK PUMPS 3A & 3B,3-HS-75-75A

&3-HS-75-76A in AUTO.

Places PSC head tank pumps back in service.

Unit 3 Page 21 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 12 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[9] IF RHR System was in Shutdown Cooling, THENRESTORE RHR System. REFER TO 3-AOI-74-1. (N/A ifSection 8.11 performed).

NOTE 3-FCV-64-139 and 3-FCV-64-140 opens and closes automatically when the Drywell DPCompressor starts and stops.

[10] At Panel 3-9-3, RESTORE Drywell DP Compressor toautomatic operation as follows:

[10.1] DEPRESS DRYWELL DP COMP SUCTION VLV RESET pushbutton, 3-HS-64-139A.

[10.2] DEPRESS DRYWELL DP COMP DISCH VLV RESET pushbutton, 3-HS-64-140A.

[10.3] VERIFY OPEN DRYWELL INBD ISOLATION VLV using 3-HS-64-31.

[10.4] VERIFY OPEN SUPPR CHBR INBD ISOLATION VLV using 3-HS-64-34.

[11] At Panel 3-9-4, RESTORE Drywell Floor and Equipment BOP Drain Systems to normal operation as follows:

[11.1] NOTIFY Radwaste Operator that Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sump isolation valves are being reopened.

[11.2] PLACE DW EQPT DRAIN INBD ISOL VALVE, 3-HS-77-15A, in AUTO After OPEN.

[11.3] PLACE DW EQPT DRAIN OUTBD ISOL VALVE, 3-HS-77-15B, in AUTO After OPEN.

[11.4] PLACE DW FLOOR DRAIN INBD ISOL VALVE, 3-HS-77-2A, in AUTO After OPEN.

[11.5] PLACE DW FLOOR DRAIN OUTBD ISOL VALVE, 3-HS-77-2B, in AUTO After OPEN.

Restores Drywell DP Compressor to automatic operation.

Restores Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain systems to normal operation.

[12] IF DW Radiation Monitor CAM, 3-RM-90-256 was secured due to a preplanned transfer, THEN (otherwise N/A)

Unit 3 Page 22 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-010_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 3 Page 13 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of RPS B, Half Scram Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Step 8.3[13] bullets may be performed in any order.

[13] IF DW Radiation Monitor CAM, 3-RM-90-256, isolated due to loss of RPS, THEN (otherwise N/A)

MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the following RESET push buttons on Panel 3-9-2 and verify the associated valves open.

UPPER INBD SUPPLY ISOL VALVE RESET,3-HS-90-254A-A (opens FCV-90-254A).

LOWER INBD SUPPLY ISOL VALVE RESET,3-HS 254B-A (opens FCV-90-254B).

OUTBD RETURN ISOL VALVE RESET,3-HS-90-257A-A (opens FCV-90-257A).

OUTBD SUPPLY ISOL VALVE RESET,3-HS-90-255A BOP (opens FCV-90-255).

INBD RETURN ISOL VALVE RESET,3-HS-90-257B-A (opens FCV-90-257B).

[14] At Panel 3-9-54,PLACE H2/O2 Analyzer in service per 3-OI-76.

[15] At Panel 3-9-55, VERIFY PATH A VENT FLOW CONT,3-FIC-84-20, in AUT0 with setpoint at 100 scfm.

Returns DW Radiation Monitor CAM to service. Places H2/O2 Analyzer in service. Verifies 3-FIC-84-20 in AUTO w/setpoint at 100 scfm.

[16] RESTORE Reactor Water Cleanup System to normal operation. REFER TO 3-OI-69, Section 5.0. (N/A ifSection 8.10 performed)

NRC End of Event #3, Request Event #4 Unit 3 Page 23 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

C2 Feedwater Heater Tube Leak/Lower reactor power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event 4, insert Event Trigger 4 to insert malfunction FW05C to 100 in 600, C2 DRIVER Feedwater Heater Tube Leak ramped to 100% over 10 minutes.

Announces BYPASS VLV TO CONDENSER NOT CLOSED annunciator.

Refers to 3-9-6A, W18 ARP 3-ARP-9-6A Operator Action:

A. CHECK heater high or low level or moisture separator high or low level alarm window illuminated on Panel 3-9-6 or 3-9-7 to BOP identify which bypass valve is opening.

B. CHECK ICS to determine which bypass valve is open.

C. DISPATCH personnel to check which valve's light is extinguished on junction box 3-JBOX-006-3422, Col T-7 J-LINE, elevation 565'.

Dispatches AUO to JB to determine which light is extinguished.

Checks Feedwater Heater mimics on ICS screen (FWHL)

ATC Reports that the drain valve on C2 heater (LCV-6-40A) is opening.

As AUO sent to JB, call control room and report that the light DRIVER is extinguished for LCV-6-40A ATC Announces HEATER C2 LEVEL HIGH annunciator.

Refers to 3-9-6A, W10 ARP 3-ARP-9-6A Operator Action:

A. CHECK the following indications:

Condensate flow recorder 3-XR-002-0026 (Point 4), Panel 2 BOP 9-6.Rising flow is a possible indication of a tube leak.

Heater C2 shell pressure, 3-PI-5-26, and drain cooler C5 flow,3-FI-6-52, Panel 3-9-6. High or rising shell pressure or drain cooler flow is possible indication of a tube leak.

Checks Condensate flow recorder and reports rising condensate flow.

Unit 3 Page 24 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

C2 Feedwater Heater Tube Leak/Lower reactor power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE If a Hi level occurs when a heater is not in service (extraction stm isolated) it is not required toisolate the condensate or feedwater side unless a gross tube failure is indicated. A gross tube leak would be indicated by rising flow on Condensate Flow Recorder 3-XR-002-0026 (Point 4), Panel 9-6or elevated Heater shell pressure approaching the extraction steam header pressure.

A. CHECK drain valve 3-FCV-6-96 open.

C. VERIFY level on ICS screen Feedwater Heater Level (FWHL).

IF the C2 heater indicates HIGH (Yellow), THEN BOP VERIFYproper operation of the Drain and Dump Valves.

DISPATCH personnel to local Panel 3-LPNL-925-562C on El.

586, to VERIFY and MANUALLY control the level.

Check drain valve 6-96 and confirms that it is OPEN.

Verifies on ICS screen that C2 heater indicates HIGH (Yellow).

Reports that drain is OPEN and drain valve is OPENING for C2 heater.

Calls outside US to attempt to manually control heater level at Panel 925-562C Acknowledge going to local panel to attempt controlling level DRIVER for C2 heater.

EXAMINER NOTE: If the crew diagnoses the tube leak quickly, they may reduce reactor power to 79% IAW OI-6 and isolate the heater. Methods to reduce power may include Mid Power Runback, Core Flow Runback or incremental lowering of Recirc Pump Speed.

BOP Reports C2 heater indicates HIGH-HIGH (Red)

Unit 3 Page 25 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 4 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

C2 Feedwater Heater Tube Leak/Lower reactor power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs entry into 3-AOI-6-1A, High Pressure Feedwater Heater String/Extraction Steam isolation 3-AOI-6-1A SRO 4.1 Immediate Actions

[1] REDUCE Core Thermal Power to 5% below initial power level to maintain thermal margin.

Directs ATC to initiate an Upper Power Runback 3-OI-68 8.12 Initiating Manual Runbacks NOTES

1) Manual runback controls are utilized when it becomes necessary to reduce reactor power and core flow during abnormal plant conditions.

2) This section is performed at Panel 3-9-5.

3) Depressing a manual runback pushbutton initiates a runback of both recirc pumps until the setpoint is reached. Depressing the pushbutton a second time stops the manual runback. The pushbutton can be depressed a third and fourth time to reinitiate and stop the manual runback. This pattern can be repeated until the applicable setpoint is reached.

ATC 4) Illustration 2 can be referred to for additional information on manual runback controls.

5) [II/C] When initiating manual runbacks, the appropriate manual pushbutton must be depressed until the backlight is blinking, then the pushbutton can be released.[PER98-013557-000]

6) If 25 rpm mismatch in the lower direction exists between Speed Demand and Calculated Speed, the Manual Runback pushbuttons are disabled.

[1] IF time permits, THEN REVIEW Precautions and Limitations.

(REFER TO Section 3.0).

Unit 3 Page 26 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 4 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

C2 Feedwater Heater Tube Leak/Lower reactor power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[2] IF desired to reduce Reactor Power to approximately 90%,THEN (Otherwise N/A):

[2.1] DEPRESS RECIRC PUMPS UPPER POWER RUNBACK Pushbutton, 3-HS-68-42.

[2.2] CHECK the following:

Pushbutton backlight blinks until setpoint ATC isreached.

Reactor power lowers to approximately 90%.

Depresses Recirc Pumps Upper Power Runback pushbutton Checks that pushbutton backlight blinks and reactor power lowers to approximately 90%

Reports that reactor power is approximately 90%

NRC End of Event 4 and beginning of Event 5.

Unit 3 Page 27 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Lower Reactor Power/Feedwater Heater Removal From Service Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-AOI-6-1A 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[1] REFER TO 3-OI-6 for turbine/heater load restrictions.

[2] REQUEST Reactor Engineer EVALUATE and ADJUST thermal limits, as required.

CAUTION Failure to reduce core power if fuel is operating at or near the preconditioned envelope in any region of the core may result in fuel damage

[3] ADJUST reactor power and flow as directed by Reactor Engineer/Unit Supervisor to stay within required thermal andfeedwater temperature limits. REFER TO 3-GOI-100-12or 3-GOI-100-12A for the power reduction.

[4] ISOLATE heater drain flow from the feedwater heater string by closing the appropriate FEEDWATER SRO HEATER A2(B2)(C2)DRAIN TO HTR A3(B3)(C3), 3-FCV-6-94(95)(96).

[5] IF a tube leak is indicated, THEN PERFORM manual actions of Attachment 1 for affected heaters.

[6] VERIFY automatic actions occur. REFER TO Attachment 1.

Attachment 1 Feedwater Heater String Isolation Alignment Requirements C1 or C2 The following valves must be MANUALLY CLOSED 3-FCV-3-24, HP HTR C2 FW Inlet ISOL VALVE 3-FCV-3-77, HP HTR C1 FW Outlet ISOL VALVE The following valves AUTO Isolate 3-FCV-5-13, HP Heater C1 EXTR ISOL VLV 3-FCV-5-25, HP Heater C2 EXTR ISOL VLV 3-FCV-6-85, Moisture SEP LC RES C1 ISOL VLV 3-FCV-6-174, Moisture SEP LC RES C2 ISOL VLV Unit 3 Page 28 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Lower Reactor Power/Feedwater Heater Removal From Service Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-OI-6 Illustration 1 Maximum Turbine-Generator Load Allowed when any Feedwater Heater is Not in Service HEATERS OUT (Tube and Shell Side)

One HP string 920 MWe (79%)

SRO Directs BOP operator to CLOSE 3-FCV-6-96 Calls Reactor Engineer to evaluate and adjust thermal limits Directs ATC operator to initiate a recirc mid power runback to lower reactor power to approximately 79%

Directs ATC operator to monitor the Power To Flow map and to monitor for power oscillations.

3-OI-68 8.12 Initiating Manual Runbacks (continued)

[3] IF desired to reduce Reactor Power to approximately 78.5%,THEN (Otherwise N/A):

[3.1] DEPRESS RECIRC PUMPS MID POWER ATC RUNBACK pushbutton, 3-HS-68-43.

[3.2] CHECK the following:

Pushbutton backlight blinks until setpoint is reached.

Reactor power lowers to approximately 78.5%.

Unit 3 Page 29 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Lower Reactor Power/Feedwater Heater Removal From Service Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Depresses Recirc Pumps Mid Power Runback pushbutton Checks that pushbutton backlight blinks and reactor power ATC lowers to approximately 78.5%

Reports that reactor power is approximately 78%

Directs that reactor power be maintained less than 920 MWe Directs BOP operator to CLOSE 3-FCV-3-24, HP HTR C2 FW Inlet ISOL VALVE and 3-FCV-3-77, HP HTR C1 FW Outlet ISOL VALVE.

SRO Directs BOP operator to verify 3-FCV-5-13, HP Heater C1 EXTR ISOL VLV, 3-FCV-5-25, HP Heater C2 EXTR ISOL VLV, 3-FCV-6-85, Moisture SEP LC RES C1 ISOL VLV, and 3-FCV 174, Moisture SEP LC RES C2 ISOL VLV automatically isolate.

Closes heater isolation valves as directed Verifies automatic isolation of extraction steam and moisture BOP separators.

Reports isolation of heater string.

Extraction Steam and MS isolation will NOT automatically NRC close on High Level in FW Heater.

3-AOI-6-1A

[7] MONITOR TURB THRUST BEARING TEMPERATURE,3-TR-47-23, for rising metal temperature and possible active/passive plate reversal.

[8] DETERMINE cause which required heater isolation and PERFORM necessary corrective action.

SRO Direct BOP operator to monitor main turbine thrust bearing temperature.

Calls management to inform them of the power reduction and cause.

Calls Work Control to initiate repair package for the C2 heater.

As RE, acknowledge checking Thermal Limits As management, acknowledge the heater leak and lowering DRIVER of reactor power.

As Work Control, acknowledge preparing work package for the repair of C2 heater.

NRC Enc of Event #5, request Event #6 Unit 3 Page 30 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 6 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Vibration, Reactor Scram, Failure of Main Turbine Bypass Valves Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When NRC Chief Examiner is ready for Event #6, insert Event DRIVER Trigger 6 to cause Main Turbine Vibration to rise on two bearings.

Announces Main Turbine Vibration High alarm.

Checks Turbine Vibration Recorder and/or Turbine Vibration screen on EHC workstation. Reports rising Main Turbine vibration Refers to 3-9-7B, W32 ARP 3-ARP-9-7B Operator Action:

A. VERIFY alarm by checking the following:

On EHC WORKSTATION, Turbine Vibration screen.

On ICS, MAIN TURBINE BEARINGS (TURBBRG) screen.

TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION recorder, 3-XR-47-15 (Panel 3-9-7).

Computer points47-15A thru 47-15M.

CAUTION If Main Turbine trips Unit Supervisor will decide if Condenser Vacuum should be broken to lower Main Turbine speed at a higher rate.

B. IF alarm is valid, THEN

1. DETERMINE cause by checking PROBABLE CAUSE section above.

2. REDUCE load and OBSERVE vibration.

3. IF any of the vibration limits requiring a trip are met in Table 1, THEN DEPRESS Turbine TRIP pushbutton, 3-HS-47-67D:

Unit 3 Page 31 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 6 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Vibration, Reactor Scram, Failure of Main Turbine Bypass Valves TABLE 1 NORMAL VIBRATION LIMITS SPEED TRIP AFTER TRIP NORM VIBRATION IMMEDIATELY VIB EXCEEDS IF VIBRATION CONT

_MILS FOR _MIN EXCEEDS OPS BOP 1400 -

RUNNING 10 15 12 MILS 5 MILS SPEED Checks Bearing Oil Temperature as a probable cause.

Reports Bearing Oil Temperature as normal Reports Main Turbine Vibration continuing to rise.

Briefs crew on the current plant status Directs ATC operator to insert a manual reactor scram when SRO Main Turbine Vibration exceed 12 MILS Directs BOP operator to trip the Main Turbine following the reactor scram.

BOP Reports Main Turbine Vibration >12 MILS Initiates a manual reactor scram Reactor Scram OATC Hard Card 1.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ATC [1] DEPRESS REACTOR SCRAM A and B, 3-HS-99-5A/S3A and 3-HS-99-5A/S3B, on Panel 3-9-5.

[2] IF scram is due to a loss of RPS, THEN PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 3-HS-99-5A-S1, in START & HOT STBYAND PAUSE for approximately 5 seconds (Otherwise N/A)

Verify Main Turbine vibration deleted following MT Trip.

DRIVER (Delete malfunction TU02C/TU02D).

Unit 3 Page 32 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 6 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Vibration, Reactor Scram, Failure of Main Turbine Bypass Valves Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] Refuel Mode One Rod Permissive Light check:

[3.1] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 3-HS-99-5A-S1, in REFUEL.

[3.2] CHECK illuminated REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 3-XI-85-46.

[3.3] IF REFUEL MODE ONE ROD PERMISSIVE light, 3-XI-85-46, is NOT illuminated, THEN CHECK all control rod positions at Full-In Overtravel, or Full-In. (Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 3-HS-99-5A-S1, in SHUTDOWN.

ATC

[5] REPORT the following status to the US:

Reactor Scram

Mode Switch is in Shutdown

All rods in or rods out

Reactor Water Level and trend (recovering or lowering)

Reactor pressure and trend

MSIV position (Open or Closed)

Power level Completes hard card actions and makes scram report.

Reactor Scram BOP Unit Operator Hard 1.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS: PANELS 3-9-7 &3-9-8 NOTES

1) To OPEN PCB 224 with the control room handswitch, ONE of the following is required:3-XA-55-8A window 7,GEN REVERSE PWR FIRST RELAY OPERATION 3-EA-57-136,WITH BOP GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 3-HS-242-224A,placed in TRIP.

OR GENERATOR PCB 224 CNTR W/REV BYPASS, 3-HS-242-224A, placed in BYPASS.

2) The following steps are not required to be performed in order, but only as required to maintain stable conditions.

Unit 3 Page 33 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 6 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Vibration, Reactor Scram, Failure of Main Turbine Bypass Valves Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[1] At 50 MWe, or as directed by the Unit Supervisor, ENSURE TRIPPED the Main Turbine as follows:

[1.1] DEPRESS the TRIP pushbutton, 3-HS-47-67D on Panel 3-9-7.

[1.2] ENSURE OPEN GENERATOR PCB 224.

[1.3] ENSURE TRIPPED VOLTAGE REGULATOR

[2] ANNOUNCE Reactor SCRAM over PA system.

Trips the Main Turbine. Verifies PCB 224 OPEN and Voltage Regulator tripped.

Reports Main Turbine tripped.

NOTE The following steps are not required to be performed in order, but only as required tomaintain stable conditions.

[1] MONITOR and CONTROL RPV pressure to keep below 1073 psig andstable.

[1.1] IF RPV pressure is lowering rapidly, THEN BOP CLOSE the MSIVs. (Otherwise N/A)

[1.2] IF MSRVs are cycling and bypass valves are available, THEN MANUALLY OPEN MSRVs on Panel 3-9-3 to maintain RPV Pressure below 1073 psig while maximizing use of the bypass valves.(Otherwise N/A)

[1.3] IF MSRVs are cycling and bypass valves are NOT available, THEN MANUALLY OPEN MSRVs on Panel 3-9-3 until RPV pressure is controlled between 800 and 1000 psig.

(Otherwise N/A)

Reports Main Turbine Bypass valves are not controlling reactor pressure.

Attempts to open bypass valves with the jack.

Reports Main Turbine Bypass valves have failed closed.

Operates MSRVs to control reactor pressure between 800 and 1000 psig.

NRC End of Event #6 and start of Event #7 Unit 3 Page 34 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 1 of 29 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 2.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

[1] IF all control rods CAN NOT be verified fully inserted, THEN PERFORM the following (otherwise N/A)

[1.1] INITIATE ARI by Arming and Depressing BOTH of the following:

ARI Manual Initiate, 3-HS-68-119A

ARI Manual Initiate, 3-HS-68-119B

[1.2] ENSURE the Reactor Recirc Pumps (if running) at minimum speed at Panel 3-9-4

[1.3]DETERMINE IF Reactor Power is ABOVE or BELOW 5%

[1.4] IF Reactor Power is BELOW 5%, THEN PERFORM the following (otherwise N/A)

ATC

REPORT ATWS Actions Complete and power level

[1.5] IF Reactor Power is ABOVE 5%, THEN PERFORM the following (otherwise N/A)

[1.5.1] TRIP both Recirc Pumps

[1.5.2] INITIATE SLC

[1.5.3] REPORT ATWS Action Complete and SLC is or is not injecting and power level.

Reports Rods Out Initiates both channels of ARI Ensures both reactor recirc pumps are at minimum speed Trips both recirc pumps Initiates SLC Reports ATWS Actions Complete, SLC is injecting, and current power level.

Note to Examiner: Proceed to page 57 for EOI-2 Actions Announces entry into EOI-1A, ATWS RPV CONTROL The reactor will remain subcritical without boron ADDRESSED ADDRESSE under all conditions SRO RPV water level CANNOT be determined ADDRESSED ADDRESSE PC water lvl and drywell press CANNOT be ADDRESSED ADDRESSE maintained in the safe area of Curve 7 Unit 3 Page 35 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task #3:

3. With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, inject boron into the RPV.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

Suppression Pool temperature.

3. Measured by:

Observation - If operating IAW EOI-1A, US determines that SLC is required (indicated by verbal direction or EOI placekeeping action) before exceeding 110 degrees in the Suppression Pool.

AND RO places SLC A / B Pump control switch in ON, when directed by US.

4. Feedback:

Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indications.

SLC tank level.

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

Failure to initiate SLC prior to Suppression Pool Temperature exceeding 110

°F Suppression Pool Temp: __________ Time: _________

Unit 3 Page 36 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies and reports one MSRV stuck open

[2] IF any PCIS isolation signal is received, THEN ENSURE PCIS isolations using any of the following:

(Otherwise N/A)

BOP

Containment Isolation Status System on Panel 3-9-4

PCIS Mimic and individual control switch indications

ICS

3-OI-64 Reports PCIS isolations 2,3,6, and 8.

MSRV stuck open is Event 9 and addressed starting on Page NRC 66 RPV Water Lvl ENSURE each as required:

PCIS isolations (Groups 1, 2 and 3) ADDRESSED

ECCS ADDRESSED

RCIC ADDRESSED INHIBIT ADS SRO IFANY main steam line is open THEN START defeating the following isolations:

MSIV low lowlow RPV water lvl (APPX 8A)

RB ventilation low RPV water lvl (APPX 8E)

Directs BOP operator to Inhibit ADS Directs BOP operator to call for EOI Appendix 8A and 8E to be performed.

Inhibits ADS and verifies inhibited by observing 3-9-3C, W18/31 annunciators in alarm BOP Calls Work Control to have EOI Appendix 8A and 8E performed Reports ADS inhibited.

Unit 3 Page 37 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1:

Inhibit ADS prior to automatic initiation to prevent uncontrolled RPV depressurization and injection during an ATWS.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Criterion is ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation unless all required injection systems are Terminated and Prevented.

4. Feedback:

RPV pressure trend

RPV level trend

ADS LOGIC BUS A/B INHIBITED annunciator status

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to inhibit ADS prior to inadvertent initiation of ADS.

As Work Control, acknowledge direction to perform EOI Appendix 8A and 8E.

Insert Event Trigger 7 to insert App8A.sch and Event Trigger DRIVER 8 to insert App8Esch As Work Control, call control room and report EOI Appendix 8A and 8E completed.

MONITOR which RFP is used for RX WATER LEVEL CONTROL and TRIP A or B if C is NOT selected by use of DRIVER manual triggers 21 or 22 for (mf FW014A/B) and then delete the malfunction FW14C for RFP C.

Unit 3 Page 38 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 5 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF THEN Reactor power is above 5% or unknown AND ACTION RPV water lvl is above -50 in. REQUIRED ALL level/power conditions exist (Table Q-1) NO ACTION REQUIRED STOP and PREVENTALL inj into RPV EXCEPT from RCIC, CRD and SLC (Table L-4, APPX 4)

SRO WHEN RPV water lvl drops below

-50 in.

Directs ATC operator to Stop and Prevent all injection to the RPV, except CRD and SLC, using EOI Appendix 4 and lower RPV level to below -50 inches.

Directs ATC and BOP operators to Stop and Prevent all injection to the RPV, except RCIC, using EOI Appendix 4.

3-EOI APPENDIX-4

[1] STOP and PREVENT injection from HPCI by performing the following:

[1.1] IF HPCI Turbine is NOT at zero speed, THEN PRESS and HOLD 3-HS-73-18A, HPCI TURBINE TRIP BOP push-button.

[1.2] WHEN HPCI Turbine is at zero speed, THEN PLACE 3-HS-73-47A, HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP control switch in PULL TO LOCK and RELEASE 3-HS-73-18A, HPCI TURBINE TRIP push-button.

Places HPCI Aux Oil Pump control switch in PTL.

Unit 3 Page 39 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 6 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task #2:

When Reactor Power is greater than 5% or unknown and RPV Level is greater than (-)

50 inches, STOP and PREVENT all injection into the RPV except RCIC, CRD and SLC.

1. Safety Significance:

With thermal power being produced in the RPV and all actions to lower power have not brought reactor power out of the heating range, power oscillation and subsequent fuel damage may be generated from these conditions persisting.

Stopping and preventing injection to lower RPV level will reduce this challenge to the reactor.

2. Cues:

Reactor is scrammed and all ATWS actions are taken by the operator and power is greater than or equal to 5% power or unknown.

3. Measured by:

Reactor power on APRM NUMAC or recorder displays.

4. Feedback:

RPV Level lowering

Reactor Power lowering

5. Critical Task Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew exceeds curve 3, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Curve, requiring Emergency Depressurization with Control Rods Out.

Unit 3 Page 40 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 7 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Following receipt of a CORE SPRAY automatic initiation signal, it is NOT necessary to wait until a pump starts before performing step 1.0[3].

[3] STOP and PREVENT injection from CORE SPRAY following an initiation signal by PLACING ALL Core Spray pump control switches in STOP.

[4] STOP and PREVENT injection from LPCI SYSTEM I by performing the following:

NOTE Injection may be prevented by performing EITHER step 1.0[4.1] or step 1.0[4.2].

[4.1] Following automatic pump start, PLACE RHR SYSTEM I pump control switches in STOP.

OR BOP

[4.2] BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 450 psig,

[4.2.1]PLACE 3-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

AND

[4.2.2]ENSURE CLOSED 3-FCV-74-52, RHR SYS I LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE

[5]PREVENT injection from LPCI SYSTEM II by performing the following:

NOTE Injection may be prevented by performing EITHER step 1.0[5.1]or step 1.0[5.2].

[5.1] Following automatic pump start, PLACE RHR SYSTEM II pump control switches in STOP.

OR Unit 3 Page 41 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 8 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[5.2]BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 450 psig,

[5.2.1] PLACE3-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

AND

[5.2.2] VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-66, RHR SYS II LPCI BOP OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

Places LPCI Sys I and II outboard injection valve bypass switches in BYPASS Reports stopped and prevented on Panel 9-3 3-EOI APPENDIX-4

[6] STOP and PREVENT injection from CONDENSATE and FEEDWATER by performing the following:

[6.1] IF performing for power control and oscillations, THEN PERFORM the following:

Reduce discharge pressure of all Feedwater Pumps to less than Reactor Pressure.

ENSURE Feedwater injection to Reactor vessel is ATC stopped.

CLOSE the following valves BEFORE RPV pressure drops below 500 psig:

3-FCV-3-19, RFP 3A DISCHARGE VALVE

3-FCV-3-12, RFP 3B DISCHARGE VALVE

3-FCV-3-5, RFP 3C DISCHARGE

3-LCV-3-53, RFW START-UP LEVEL CONTROL Unit 3 Page 42 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 9 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reports stopped and prevented on Panel 9-6 and RPV water ATC level lowering.

Reports RPV water level < -50 inches.

BOP Reports Suppression Pool temperature > 110°F ALL level/power conditions exist (Table Q-1) ACTION REQUIRED Table Q-1 Level/Power Conditions Suppression Pool Temperature is above 110ºF CHECKED Reactor Power above 5% OR unknown CHECKED RPV Level above -162 in. CHECKED MSRV open/cycling OR DW pressure above 2.4 CHECKED psig SRO Do ALL Level/Power condtions exist Table (Q-1)

YES CONTINUE to lower RPV water lvl, irrespective of ANY reactor power or RPV water lvl oscillations NRC EOI-2 is addressed starting on page 57 Unit 3 Page 43 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 10 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN ANY Level/Power condition clears (Table Q-1)

Directs ATC to continue to lower RPV water level until Reactor Power is < 5%, or RPV water level lowers to -162 in., or all MSRVs or shut.

Reactor Power IF THEN The reactor is subcritical NO ACTION AND REQUIRED SRO NO boron has been injected ENSURE reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN CHECKED INITIATE ARI CHECKED IF tripping Recirc pumps will cause loss of Main Turbine, RFP, HPCI, or RCIC CHECKED THEN ENSURE Recirc runback (pump speed 480 rpm or less)

IF reactor power is above 5% or Unknown CHECKED THEN TRIP Recirc pumps Unit 3 Page 44 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 11 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognizes and reports trip of RFP C NRC Trip of RFP C is Event 8 and is addressed on Page 65 Control Rod Insertion RESET ARI CHECKED DEFEAT ARI logic trips if necessary (APPX 2)

INSERT control rods using ANY Alternate CHECKED Control Rod Insertion Methods (Table Q-2)

Table Q-2 Alternate Control Rod Insertion Methods CONDITIONS METHODS APPX Scram valves 1. RESET scram opened but DEFEAT RPS logic if SDV is full necessary

2. DRAIN SDV 1F SRO 3. RECHARGE accumulators

4. INITIATE scram Manual control DRIVE control rods rod insertion BYPASS RWM and methods RAISE CRD drive water 1D differential pressure if necessary Directs BOP operator call for EOI Appendix 1F and 2 to be performed NRC EOI-1A Pressure Leg is addressed on Page 50 Unit 3 Page 45 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 12 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Calls Work Control and directs that EOI Appendix 1F and 2 be BOP performed.

As Work Control, acknowledge performing EOI Appendix 1F and 2 Insert Event Trigger 9 & 29 to insert App1F.sch, App2.sch.

DRIVER As Work Control, call control room and report EOI Appendix 1F and 2 completed.

After report remove ATWS Malfunctions, RD09A and RD09B.

ATC Reports that Reactor Power is < 5%

Table Q-1 Level/Power Conditions CHECKED Suppression Pool Temperature is above 110ºF NOT Reactor Power above 5% OR unknown CHECKED CHECKED RPV Level above -162 in.

MSRV open/cycling OR DW pressure above 2.4 CHECKED psig SRO WHEN ANY Level/Power condition clears (Table Q-1)

STOP lowering RPV water lvl AND RECORD level ___________________________ in.

Unit 3 Page 46 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 13 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs ATC Operator to stop lowering RPV water level Records RPV water level where Reactor Power < 5%

IF THEN EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION NO ACTION IS REQUIRED REQUIRED USE ANY Preferred ATWS Injection System (Table L-3) to maintain RPV water lvl between -180 in. and:

Lowered level (if lvl was deliberately lowered in flowpath A)

OR

+51 in. (if lvl was NOT deliberately lowered)

Ok to use CS (Appx 6D,6E) or Alternate Injection SRO Subsystems (Table L-2) if previously required by flowpathEor C4A Table L-3 Preferred ATWS Injection Systems SOURCES APPX INJ PRESS CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig Directs ATC operator to maintain RPV water level between the level where reactor power lowered < 5% and -180 inches using EOI Appendix 5A (CNDS and FW)

Directs ATC operator to perform EOI Appendix 1F and drive control rods using EOI Appendix 1D.

Unit 3 Page 47 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 14 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3-EOI APPENDIX-5A

1. IF ................. It is desired to use a reactor feed pump that is in operation, THEN ...........CONTINUE at step 12 to control the operating pump.

12. SLOWLY ADJUST RFPT speed UNTIL feedwater flow to the RPV is indicated, using ANY of the following methods on Panel 3-9-5:

Individual 3-HS-46-8A(9A)(10A), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C)

SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch in MANUAL GOVERNOR, OR

Individual 3-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL, ATC OR

3-LIC-46-5, REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL, in MANUALwith individual 3-SIC-46-8(9)(10), RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) SPEED CONTROL in AUTO.

13. ADJUST RFPT speed as necessary to control injection using the methods of step 12.

Controls RPV water level as directed using EOI Appendix 5A 3-EOI Appendix-1F 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS

[1] VERIFY Reactor Scram and ARI reset.

[2] WHEN RPS Logic has been defeated, THEN RESET Reactor Scram.

Unit 3 Page 48 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 15 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] VERIFY OPEN Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves.

[4] DRAIN SDV UNTIL the following annunciators clear:

WEST CRD DISCH VOL WTR LVL HIGH HALF SCRAM (Panel 3-9-4, 3-XA-55-4A, Window 1).

EAST CRD DISCH VOL WTR LVL HIGH HALF SCRAM (Panel 3-9-4, 3-XA-55-4A, Window 29).

Resets ARI and Reactor Scram Opens SDV vent and drain valves 3-EOI Appendix-1D 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE This EOI Appendix may be executed concurrently with EOI ATC Appendix 1A or 1B at SROs discretion when time and manpower permit.

[1] VERIFY at least one CRD pump in service NOTES

1) Closing 3-85-586, CHARGING WATER ISOL valve may reduce the effectiveness of EOI Appendix 1A or 1B.

2) A ladder may be required to perform the following step. REFER TO Tools andEquipment, Attachment 1.

3) IF necessary, an alternate ladder is available at the HCU Modules, EAST and Westbanks. It is stored by the CRD Charging Cart.

[2] IF Reactor Scram or ARI CANNOT be reset, THEN DISPATCH personnel to close 3-SHV-85-586, CHARGING WATER SHUTOFF (RB NE, El 565 ft).

Unit 3 Page 49 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 16 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] VERIFY REACTOR MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN.

[4] BYPASS Rod Worth Minimizer.

[5] REFER TO Attachment 2 and INSERT control rods in the area of highest power as follows:

[5.1] SELECT control rod.

[5.2] PLACE CRD NOTCH OVERRIDE switch in EMERG ROD IN position UNTIL control rod is NOT moving inward.

ATC [5.3] REPEAT Steps 1.0[5.1] and 1.0[5.2] for each control rod to be inserted.

Verifies Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN Bypasses the RWM Refers to Attachment 2 and inserts control rods using EMERG ROD IN. Starts with control rods in the area of highest power.

Reports that control rods are being inserted.

IF THEN RPV water lvl CANNOT be restored and NO ACTION maintained above -180 in. AND Core steam flow REQUIRED remains below MCSF (Table L-5)

WHEN SLC has SRO injected into the RPV to a tank lvl of 67%

RPV Press IF THEN A high drywell pressure ECCS signal NO ACTION exists (2.45 psig) REQUIRED EMERGENCY RPV NO ACTION DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED or REQUIRED has been required Unit 3 Page 50 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 17 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IFANY MSRV is cycling THEN MANUALLY OPEN MSRVs UNTIL RPV press drops to the press at ADDRESSED which all main turbine bypass vlvs are fully open (APPX 11A)

IF THEN Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the existing RPV NO ACTION press REQUIRED Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the safe NO ACTION area of Curve 4 REQUIRED BORON INJECTION IS REQUIRED SRO AND The main condenser is available NO ACTION AND REQUIRED There has been no indication of a steam line break STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig using the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

Use Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table P-1), if necessary Crosstie CAD or MSRV carts to DW Control Air (APPX 8G, 20H) if necessary IF THEN DW Control Air is or becomes unavailable NO ACTION REQUIRED Unit 3 Page 51 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 18 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Table P-1 Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems Source APPX Main turb bypass vlvs 8B MSRVs only if suppr lvl is above 5.5 ft IF MAIN STEAM RELIEF VLV AIR ACCUM PRESS LOW annunciator SRO (XA-55-3D-18) is in alarm 11A THEN MINIMIZE MSRV cycling by using sustained opening for depressurization Directs BOP operator to control RPV Pressure 800 - 1000 psig using EOI Appendix 11A, SRVs Directs BOP operator to call maintenance to investigate the failure of the main turbine bypass valves.

Controls RPV pressure as directed.

BOP Calls Work Control and requests maintenance investigate the failure of the Main Turbine Bypass valves.

As Work Control, acknowledge maintenance investigation of DRIVER the Main Turbine Bypass failure.

Reports that the following annunciators have reset:

WEST CRD DISCH VOL WTR LVL HIGH HALF SCRAM (Panel 3-9-4, 3-XA-55-4A, Window 1).

AND EAST CRD DISCH VOL WTR LVL HIGH HALF SCRAM (Panel 3-9-4, 3-XA-55-4A, Window 29).

ATC 3-EOI Appendix-1F NOTES

1) If EOI Appendix 2 has been executed, ARI initiation or reset will NOT be possible or necessary in Step 1.0[6].

2) If reactor pressure is greater than 600 psig, SRO may direct performance of step1.0[6] prior to accumulators being fully recharged.

Unit 3 Page 52 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 19 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[6] WHEN CRD Accumulators are recharged, THEN INITIATE manual Reactor Scram and ARI.

ATC Initiates a manual Reactor Scram and ARI Observes the full core display and reports ALL control rods fully inserted IF THEN The reactor will remain STOP boron inj unless subcritical without boron under required by other procedures all conditions AND ENTER EOI-1 RPV Control Directs ATC operator to STOP boron injection Exits EOI-1A and enters EOI-1, RPV Control.

ENSURE RX scram CHECKED IF THEN It has NOT been determined that the reactor will remain subcritical without boron under all ADDRESSED conditions SRO RPV water level CANNOT be determined ADDRESSED PC water lvl and drywell press CANNOT be ADDRESSED maintained in the safe area of Curve 7 Reactor Power Directs ATC operator to enter AOI-100-1 RPV Water Lvl

An RPV water lvl instrument may be used to determine or trend lvl only when it reads above the Minimum Indicated Lvl associated with the highest max DW or SC run temp*

Unit 3 Page 53 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 20 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

If DW temps or SC area temps (Table 6), as applicable, are outside the safe region of Curve 8, the associated instrument may be unreliable due to boiling in the run IF THEN RPV water lvl can be restored and maintained above -162 in. ADDRESSED AND The ADS timer has initiated Loss of available injection systems is anticipated OR Raising RPV water lvl above +51 in will ADDRESSED facilitate use of shutdown cooling, steam-driven injection systems, or Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table L-2)

SRO RESTORE and MAINTAIN RPV water lvl between +2 in. and

+51 in. with ANY Preferred Injection Systems (Table L-1)

IF THEN RPV water lvl cannot be restored and ADDRESSED maintained between +2 in. and +51 in.

RPV water lvl cannot be restored and ADDRESSED maintained above -162 in.

Table L-1 Preferred Injection Systems SOURCES APPX INJ PRESS CNDS and FW 5A 1210 psig Directs ATC operator to restore and maintain RPV water level to +2 to +51 in. using condensate and feedwater, EOI Appendix 5A Unit 3 Page 54 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 21 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Restores RPV water level as directed RPV Press IF THEN A high drywell pressure ECCS signal exists ADDRESSED (2.45 psig)

EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION NO ACTION IS REQUIRED or has been required REQUIRED Emergency RPV depressurization is NO ACTION anticipated REQUIRED IF ANY MSRV is cycling THEN MANUALLY OPEN MSRVs UNTIL NO ACTION RPV press drops to the press at which all REQUIRED main turbine bypass vlvs are fully open (APPX 11A)

IF THEN SRO Suppr pl temp and lvl CANNOT be NO ACTION maintained in a safe area of Curve 3 at the REQUIRED existing RPV press Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained in the NO ACTION safe area of Curve 4 REQUIRED NO ACTION STEAM COOLING IS REQUIRED REQUIRED STABILIZE RPV press below 1073 psig using the main turbine bypass vlvs (APPX 8B)

OK to use ANY Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table P-1)

Crosstie CAD to DW Control Air (APPX 8G, 20H) if necessary Unit 3 Page 55 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op TestNo.:_15-10_ Scenario No. 2 EventNo.: 7 Page 22 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF THEN DW Control Air is or becomes unavailable NO ACTION REQUIRED IF THEN It is anticipated that RPV depressurization will NO ACTION result in a loss of injection required for REQUIRED adequate core cooling DEPRESSURIZE the RPV and maintain cooldown rate below 100ºF/hr Crosstie CAD to DW Control Air (APPX 8G, 20H) if necessary IF THEN ANY MSRV is being used for RPV NO ACTION SRO depressurization AND DW Control Air is or REQUIRED becomes unavailable Direct BOP Operator to depressurize the RPV and maintain a cooldown rate below 100°F WHEN shutdown cooling RPV press interlock clears AND further cooldown is required BOP Commences RPV cooldown NRC End of Event 7 and scenario Unit 3 Page 56 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 23 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note to Examiner: Entry to EOI-2 May or May NOT be applicable.

Announces entry into EOI-2 on Suppression Pool Temperature EOI-2 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT CONTROL Suppr Pl Temp Caution 2 Operating pumps with suction from the suppression pool above the NPSH Limit (Curve 1, 2, 9 or 10) or with SRO suppression pool water level below 10 ft (Vortex limit) may cause equipment damage MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl temp ACTION below 95°F using available suppr pl cooling REQUIRED (APPX 17A)

Directs BOP operator to initiate Suppression Pool Cooling IAW EOI Appendix 17A 3-EOI APPENDIX-17A NOTE: Placing a BYPASS SEL switch in BYPASS in step 1 below prevents automatic opening of the affected RHR loops outboard injection valve. This makes LPCI mode of that RHR loop inoperable.

BOP

1. IF Adequate core cooling is assured, OR Directed to cool the Suppression Pool irrespective of adequate core cooling, Unit 3 Page 57 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 24 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior THEN BYPASS LPCI injection valve open interlock AS NECESSARY:

PLACE3-HS-74-155A, LPCI SYS I OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

PLACE3-HS-74-155B, LPCI SYS II OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

2. PLACE RHR SYSTEM I(II) in Suppression Pool Cooling as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR Heat Exchanger(s).

BOP c. THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm RHRSW flow:

3-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 3A RHRSW OUTLET VLV

3-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 3B RHRSW OUTLET VLV

3-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 3C RHRSW OUTLET VLV

3-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 3D RHRSW OUTLET VLV

d. IF ......Directed by SRO, THEN.......PLACE3-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI 2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

e. IF .............LPCI INITIATION Signal exists, THEN.......MOMENTARILY PLACE3-XS-74-121(129), RHR SYS I(II) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT in SELECT.

Unit 3 Page 58 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 25 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

f. IF ........ 3-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN... VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-52(66), RHR SYS I(II) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

g. OPEN3-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS I(II) SUPPR CHBR/POOL ISOL VLV.

h. VERIFYdesired RHR pump(s) for Suppression Pool Cooling are operating.

CAUTION RHR System flows below 7000 gpm or above 10000 gpm for one-pump operation may result in excessive vibration and equipment damage.

i. THROTTLE OPEN3-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS I(II)

SUPPR POOLCLG/TEST VLV, to maintain EITHER of the following as indicated on 3-FI-74-50(64), RHR SYS I(II)

BOP FLOW:

Between 7000 and 10000 gpm for one-pump operation.

OR

At or below 13000 gpm for two-pump operation.

j. VERIFY CLOSED3-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM I(II) MIN FLOW VALVE.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 1.

l. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR heat Exchangers.

m. IF Additional Suppression Pool Cooling flow is necessary, THEN PLACE additional RHR and RHRSW pumps in service using Steps 2.b through Unit 3 Page 59 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 26 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SP/T-2 WHEN Suppr pl temp CANNOT be maintained below 95° OPERATE all available suppr pl cooling using only RHR pumps NOT required to assure ACTION adequate core cooling by continuous inj (APPX REQUIRED SRO 17A)

Directs BOP operator to operate all available Suppression Pool Cooling.

BEFORE Suppr pl temp rises to 110°F EOI-1 ACTION REQUIRED NRC EOI-1A already entered Starts all available RHR pumps in Suppression Pool Cooling BOP IAW EOI Appendix 17A Unit 3 Page 60 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 27 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note 2 TSC staff may recommend an alternate curve for station blackout per 0-AOI-57-1A WHEN Suppr pl temp and RPV press CANNOT be maintained within a safe area of Curve 3 SRO DW Temp Caution 1 Ambient temp may affect RPV water level indication and trend MONITOR and CONTROL DW temp below NO ACTION 160°F using available DW cooling REQUIRED Unit 3 Page 61 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 28 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN DW temp CONNOT be maintained below 160 °F PC Press MONITORand CONTROLPC press below 2.45 NO ACTION SRO psig using the Vent system (AOI-64-1) REQUIRED WHEN PC press CONNOT be maintained below 2.45 psig Unit 3 Page 62 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 29 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PC H2 IF THEN H2 and O2 monitoring system is inoperable NO ACTION REQUIRED Offsite radioactivity release rate reaches ODCM limits NO ACTION OR REQUIRED H2 is NO longer detected in PC(2.4% on control room indicators)

NO ACTION ENSUREH2/O2 analyzer in service (APPX 19)

REQUIRED SRO WHEN H2 is detected in PC (2.4% on control room Unit 3 Page 63 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 7 Page 30 of 30 Event

Description:

High Power ATWS - Hydraulic Lock.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Suppr Pl Lvl MONITOR and CONTROL suppr pl lvl -6 in. to -1 in. (APPX 18)

IF THEN Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained below -1 NO ACTION in. REQUIRED Suppr pl lvl CANNOT be maintained above -6 NO ACTION SRO in. REQUIRED Unit 3 Page 64 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump A/B/C Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs ATC to respond IAW AOI-3-1 AOI-3-1 4.2 Subsequent Actions CAUTION

[NRC/C] Operations outside of allowable regions shown on the Recirculation System Operating Map could result in thermal-hydraulic power oscillations and subsequent fuel damage. Refer to 3-GOI-100-12A for required actions and monitoring to be performed during power reduction. [NCO 940245001]

[2] IF Reactor Water Level OR Feedwater flow is lowering due to loss of Condensate, Condensate Booster, or Feedwater Pump(s), THEN:

LOWER Recirc flow as required to avoid scram on low level BOP AND CONTINUE at Section 5.0.

5.0 LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL OR LOSS OF FEEDWATER

[8] IF RFPT has tripped and needed to maintain level, THEN PERFORM the following:

[8.7] For Slow Recovery of RFPT in MANUAL GOVERNOR, RAISE RFPT speed using RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switch until desired flow is obtained.

Restores either A, B or C RFP to service IAW AOI-3-1 and maintains RPV water level as directed.

Unit 3 Page 65 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

SRV Leaks/sticks open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs BOP to respond IAW AOI-1-1 AOI-1-1 NOTE Once a MSRV is operated, a time delay of 15 to 30 seconds can be expected before aresponse can be detected on 3-TR-1-1, MSRV DISCHARGE TAILPIPE TEMPERATURE.ICS can be used to monitor the discharge tailpipe temperature, but the appropriateindications on 3-TR-1-1 must be confirmed.

4.1 Immediate Action

[1] IDENTIFY stuck open relief valve by OBSERVING the following:

SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR, 3-FMT-1-4, on Panel 3-9-3, OR

MSRV DISCHARGE TAILPIPE TEMPERATURE recorder, 3-TR-1-1 on Panel 3-9-47.

BOP

[2] IF relief valve transient occurred while operating above 90%

power, THEN REDUCE reactor power to 90% RTP with recirc flow.

(Otherwise N/A)

[3] WHILE OBSERVING the indications for the affected Relief valve on the Acoustic Monitor; CYCLE the affected relief valve control switch as required upto three times:

CLOSE to OPEN to CLOSE positions

[4] IF all SRVs are CLOSED, THEN CONTINUE at Step 4.2.4. (Otherwise N/A)

NOTES

1) Once initial transient of SRV opening has stabilized (pressure regulator compensation)the Heat Balance will indicate bad data.

2) The SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR may seal-in an OPEN position indication.

Unit 3 Page 66 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 2 Event No.: 9 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

SRV Leaks/sticks open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.3 Subsequent Action 4.2.2 Attempt to close valve from Panel 9-3:

[1] PLACE the SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR POWER SWITCH in the OFF position.

[2] PLACE the SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR POWER SWITCH in the ON position.

[3] IF all SRVs are CLOSED, THEN CONTINUE at Step 4.2.4. (Otherwise N/A)

[4] PLACE MSRV AUTO ACTUATION LOGIC INHIBIT, BOP 3-XS-1-202 in INHIBIT:

[5] IF relief valve closes, THEN OPEN breaker or PULL fuses as necessary using Attachment 1 (Unit 2 SRV Solenoid Power Breaker/Fuse Table).

Performs action IAW AOI-1-1 Recognizes that SRV closes when MSRV AUTO ACTUATION LOGIC INHIBIT switch is taken to INHIBIT.

Reports that MSRV is closed.

Directs personnel to perform step 5 to disable the MSRV.

When dispatched to pull fuses wait 2 minutes and then fire DRIVER trigger #13 and call back that fuses have been removed.

NRC End of Event 9 Unit 3 Page 67 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SIMULATOR SETUP IC 28 Exam IC 252 Schedule Files Scenario #2.sch (scenario schedule file)

Appendix 1F/2 - Event Trigger 9 Appendix 8A - Event Trigger 7 Appendix 8E - Event Trigger 8 Xfer RPS to alt. - Event Trigger 10 Stop SBGT - Event Trigger 11 Malfunctions Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value RD09A/B ATWS (Hyd Lock) Initial N/A 75 N/A NA NA RD17A/B SDV Xmit Fail Low Initial N/A NA N/A NA NA RP01B RPS MG Set Fail B 3 N/A NA N/A NA NA FW05C C2 FW Tube Leak 4 N/A 100 600 0 100 TU02C/D Turbine Vibration 6 D:30 100 300 0 100 TURBINE BYPASS TC03A-J 7 N/A NA NA NA 0 VALVE FAILURE RELIEF VALVE ADO1G 9 10 NA NA 0 100 FAILURES_PCV 1-4 RFPT 3A TRIP LOW FW14A BEARING OIL 8 N/A NA NA NA NA PRESS RFPT 3B TRIP LOW FW14B BEARING OIL 8 N/A NA NA NA NA PRESS RFPT 3C TRIP LOW FW14C BEARING OIL 8 N/A NA NA NA NA PRESS Remotes Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value RP04 RPS A/B Alternate 3 N/A NA NA NA B PC01A/B/C SBGT Fan A/B/C 3 N/A NA NA NA STOP FW HTR ISOL FW19C 4 N/A NA NA NA BYP CIRCUIT BYP SW Overrides Description Event Delay Severity Ramp Initial Final

value value HPCI Low Suct XA-55-3F_13 2 120 NA NA OFF ON Press Unit 3 Page 68 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 HPCI Pmp Suct ZAOPI7328A 2 60 NA 60 NA -15 Press HPCI MN Pmp Disch ZAOPI7331A 2 60 NA 60 NA 500 Press ZAIFIC7333A1 HPCI System Flow 2 60 NA 60 NA 60 ZLOHS014 HS-1-4 MSRV 9 N/A NA NA NA OFF Unit 3 Page 69 of 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS None ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

Continue HPCI Quarterly Surveillance SR 3.5.1.7 Sec 6.4.

SR 3.6.2.1.1 Suppression Chamber Water Temp Check STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 30ºF COMMON Thunderstorms are in Northern Alabama UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 100%

UNIT 3

Reactor Power is 98% to support HPCI run.

RHR Loop I is in Suppression Pool Cooling per 3-OI-74.

SGT A is in service per 0-OI-65 to support HPCI run.

Unit 3 Page 70 of 70

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: BFN Scenario Number: NRC - 4 Op-Test Number:1510 Examiners:__________________ Operators: SRO: _________________

__________________ ATC: _________________

__________________ BOP: _________________

Initial Conditions: 93% power following Main Turbine Valve Testing and Radwaste reported loud noise and the Radwaste in-leakage has increased.

Turnover: A down power is in progress to approximately 75 to 80% using the Reactivity Control Plan (RCP) for dose considerations in the 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room. Following power reduction perform Automatic Start Test of all RFPT Oil Pumps per 2-OI-3. RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D has failed downscale and IMs are troubleshooting the problem. Tech Spec 3.3.5.2 Condition B.2 has been entered.

Event Malfunction Event EventDescription Number Number Type*

R-ATC

1. N/A Reduce power using Recirc.

R-SRO N-BOP

2. N/A Test Emergency Oil Pumps for RFPs N-SRO

3. PC02 C-BOP Trip B Reactor Building Fan; Operator swaps fans.

RWCU Isolation on High NRHX Room Temp (failed Temp OVERRIDE I-ATC Control Valve 70-49), and 69-1fails to close. Enters AOI 4. HS-69-1A I-SRO 2A for Group 3 RWCU isolation and manually isolates CU06 TS-SRO RWCU.

Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 PCIVs and TRM 3.4.1.

C-BOP Inadvertent RCIC Auto Initiation and injection; BOP

5. RC02 C-SRO Operator will trip RCIC Turbine TS-SRO Tech Spec 3.5.3 RCIC System C-ATC

6. FW30B Reactor Feed Pump B Governor Speed Failure Downscale.

C-SRO ED02 ED06B Loss of various offsite power sources and eventually all

7. M-ALL ED03 offsite power.

ED01 B DG fails to start and D DG Fails to tie to bus, Actions are DG01B C-BOP taken to restore power by closing D DG output breaker and 8.

DG03D C-SRO starting B EDG, then verifies its respective output breaker closes.

C-BOP

9. N/A RCIC tripped from event 6, but is available to use.

C-SRO HPCI controller fails in Auto; Operator transfers control to

10. HP03 C-BOP manual and operates as needed.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events

1. The crew will begin to lower recirc pump speed in accordance with OI-68 to achieve a load reduction of approximately 100 MWe. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change, the scenario may continue.

2. BOP operator performs the auto start test of the RFP Emergency Bearing Oil Pumps (EBOP) IAW applicable sections 2-OI-3 (Sections 8.13, 8.14, and 8.15).

When the Lead Examiner is satisfied, the scenario may continue.

3. RX Bldg Ventilation Abnormal alarm will annunciate. BOP operator will respond IAW 2-ARP-9-3D, Window 3. He will go to panel 2-9-25 and recognize that the running Reactor Building fans have tripped and the discharge dampers are closed. He will start the standby fans in slow speed and verify that the discharge dampers open. He will report the trip of the fans and dispatch personnel to investigate.

4. The crew will respond to RWCU ISOL LOGIC CHANNEL A/B TEMP HIGH, 2-ARP-9-5B Windows 32/33 annunciators. The BOP operator will report the trip of RWCU pumps and Group 3 isolation of RWCU. He will also report the failure of 2-FCV-69-1 to close and manually close the valve. He will report the successful isolation of RWCU. An operator will be dispatched to the Auxiliary Instrument Room to check ATUs on Panel 9-83 and 9-85. The BOP operator will check Leak Detection temperatures on 2-9-21 and report no other alarms. It will be reported that 69-835 A/C indicate greater than 131°F and the US will enter EOI-

3. Work control will be contacted to investigate. When the Lead Examiner is satisfied, the scenario may continue. The US will enter Tech Spec 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, Condition A which requires isolating the affected penetration flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . He will also enter TRM 3.4.1, Coolant Chemistry which requires sampling every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

5. RCIC will auto start and inject in to the RPV. The BOP operator will report the status of RCIC and the SRO will direct tripping the RCIC Turbine. The SRO will enter Tech Spec 3.5.3 and verify HPCI is OPERABLE per actions A.1.

6. Reactor Feed Pump B Governor will fail downscale and the C RFP will max out on speed and flow. Reactor water level will slowly lower and the SRO will direct entry into 2-AOI-3-1, Loss of Reactor Feedwater or Reactor Water Level High/Low. ATC operator will take manual control of governor and restore Reactor Water Level to normal band in accordance with 2-AOI-3-1. (Note: Unit Supervisor may direct a reactor scram on lowering reactor water level.)

7. The crew will respond to alarms on 9-23. The BOP operator will report PCB 5204, 500kV West Point line, has tripped open. The load on the West Point line is redistributed among the remaining in-service lines therefore the crew will continue to monitor critical parameters. The Load Dispatcher may be called. A loss of the Trinity 161kV line will then occur followed by a loss of 500kV Bus1 and a loss of all offsite power (LOOP). The ATC operator will announce a reactor scram and respond IAW AOI-100-1. The unit will initially be in a Station Blackout however actions by the BOP operator will energize the 2A and 2B 480V Shutdown Boards and the crew will respond IAW AOI-57-1A.

8. Following the loss of offsite power, the BOP operator will recognize that the B Diesel Generator has failed to start. He will manually start the diesel and recognize that it automatically tied to the 4kV Shutdown Board. He will also recognize that the D Diesel Generator has started but has failed to connect to the 4kV Shutdown Board. He will verify that there are no lockouts on the board and manually close the Diesel Generator output breaker. He will report the failures and that all 4kV Shutdown Boards are energized.

9. RCIC will be tripped from Event #6 but BOP operator can reset RCIC Trip Throttle Valve and use RCIC for injection if needed.

10. The BOP operator will recognize and report that HPCI is not injecting into the RPV. He will determine that the HPCI flow controller has failed in automatic and take manual control of HPCI flow. He will raise HPCI flow rate and report that HPCI is injecting to the RPV.

The Scenario ends when Reactor Water Level is in the normal control band of +2 inches to +51 inches with power restored to 480V Shutdown Boards A and B.

Unit 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks 2

1. Restore power to one of the 480V Shutdown Boards to exit Station Blackout

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain electrical power to one of the two 480V Shutdown Boards. Loss of power to the 480V Shutdown Boards is one of the top contributors to Core Damage Frequency.

2. Cues:

Procedural Compliance

Loss of power to 480V Shutdown Boards

3. Measured by:

Criterion is that the crew energizes the 4kV Shutdown Boards which power the two 480V Shutdown Boards on the unit.

4. Feedback:

One of the two 480V Shutdown Boards energized.

5.Critical Task #2 Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to restore power to one of the two 480V Shutdown Boards within 30 minutes to prevent lose of ability to operate breakers remotely.

2. Crew aligns ANY preferred injection systems in Table L-1 to restore and maintain RPV Water level greater than -162 inches, once EOI-1 is entered.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling and prevent degradation of fission product barrier.

2. Cues:

Procedural Compliance

RPV Water Level rises due to injection sources aligned and injecting

3. Measured by:

Criterion is that the crew aligns ANY preferred injection systems in Table L-1 to restore and maintain RPV Water Level greater than -162 inches.

4. Feedback:

RPV Water Level trend.

5. Critical Task #2 Failure Criteria:

The Operating Crew fails to restore RPV Water Level above (-) 180 inches Unit 2

SHIFT MANAGER TURNOVER EQUIPMENT OOS/LCOS

Tech Spec 3.3.5.2 Condition B.2 for RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D.

2A RFPT is secured to investigate high bearing temperatures.

ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE FOR ONCOMING SHIFT

RCIC Water Level Low-Low 58D has failed downscale and IMs are troubleshooting the problem.

Continue the down power to 75 to 80 % for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry using 2-GOI-100-12 and the Urgent Load Reduction RCP.

Automatic Start Test of all RFPT Oil Pumps per 2-OI-3 Sections 8.13, 8.14 and 8.15.

(required on all RFPs by the troubleshooting plan to eliminate common cause concerns)

STATUS WORK WEEK - DIV I , DIV II OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 87ºF

Main Turbine Valve Testing completed last shift and Rad Waste reported loud noise and has noticed an increase in Rad Waste in-leakage.

COMMON

Shift Manager reports that there is a Thunder Storm Watch for the Tennessee Valley Service Area.

UNIT 1 100%

UNIT 2 93%

UNIT 3 100%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Load Reduction for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When requested by Examiner to begin event #1 call Control Room/

DRIVER US and state as Shift Manager, Proceed with power reduction for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room Entry Room entry.

Updates the Crew with the Station Managements request and prepares to lower Reactor Power.

SRO Assumes the Reactivity Manager position.

2-GOI-100-12A 5.1 Notifications and Approvals

[3] NOTIFY Chattanooga Load Coordinator of impending shut down or SRO power reduction and REQUEST unloading instructions. (Unloading instructions are N/A if generator breaker is open.)

[4] NOTIFY Radiation Protection of Power Reduction or Reactor Shutdown.

Calls Radiation Protection to inform them of the reactor shutdown SRO power reduction.

DRIVER As the Rad Pro, acknowledge the load reduction.

Page 1 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Load Reduction for 2A Reactor Feed Pump Room entry Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reactivity Control Plan Form Title of Evolution: Maintenance in Feedpump Room RCP

1. Lower reactor power to 90% power using core flow

2. Insert first 2 groups of control rods per the RCP.

CR 22-31 pos 06-00 __ CR 22-39 pos 10-00 __

CR 30-39 pos 06-00 __ CR 38-39 pos 10-00 __

CR 38-31 pos 06-00 __ CR 38-23 pos 10-00 __

CR 30-23 pos 06-00 __ CR 22-23 pos 10-00 __

3. lower reactor power to 75-80% using core flow

4. Maintain 75-80% reactor power while maintenance is in progress ATC 2-OI-68 6.2 Adjusting Recirc Flow

[2] WHEN desired to control Recirc Pumps 2A and/or 2B speed with the RECIRC MASTER CONTROL, THEN ADJUST Recirc Pump Speed 2A & 2B using the following pushbuttons as required.

LOWER SLOW, 2-HS-96-33 LOWER MEDIUM, 2-HS-96-34 LOWER FAST, 2-HS-96-35 Lowers reactor recirculation flow IAW the RCP Urgent Load Reduction and 2-OI-68 Sec. 6.2 BOP Provides peer check to ATC for reactivity changes.

SRO Provides oversight for the reactivity changes.

ATC Inserts Control Rods in the sequence provided in the RCP.

Examiner Note: Individual pump speeds should be mismatched by ~60 RPM during dual pump operation between 1200 and 1300 RPM to minimize harmonic vibration.

End of Event #1, Request Event #2.

Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 9 Page 2 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs performance Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2A Oil SRO Pumps 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2A Oil Pumps NOTES

1) This test is performed weekly and with RFPT 2A in operation.

The section tests auto start features of 2A1 and 2A2 Main Oil Pumps and 2A3 EBOP. During normal operation, 2A1 and 2A2 Main Oil Pumps are in service and 2A3 EBOP is in standby BOP (AUTO after stop). With this pump alignment, Steps 8.13[5.1]

and 8.13[5.2] are not performed.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-6.

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor approval to perform this test.

SRO Approves the test of the 2A Feed Pump Oil Pumps.

[2] CHECK position of the following switches:

RFPT 2A 2A1 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-103A, in Normal after START or STOP.

BOP

RFPT 2A 2A2 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-250A, in Normal after START or STOP.

RFPT 2A EBOP 2A3, 2-HS-3-102A, in Auto after START or STOP.

Page 3 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] TEST EBOP 2A3 as follows:

[3.1] DEPRESS and HOLD 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-105A.

BOP

[3.1.1] CHECK the following:

Red (running) light and amber (auto start) light at pushbutton illuminated.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29 in alarm.

[3.2] RELEASE 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, BOP 2-HS-3-105A.

[3.3] PLACE RFPT 2A EBOP 2A3 switch, 2-HS-3-102A, in START (return to AUTO).

[3.3.1] CHECK the following:

BOP Amber (auto start) light extinguished at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-105A.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29, will reset.

[3.4] PLACE RFPT 2A EBOP 2A3, 2-HS-3-102A, in STOP (return to AUTO).

BOP

CHECK Red light at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton extinguished.

Page 4 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.13 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF both RFPT 2A 2A1 and 2A2 Main Oil Pumps are running, THEN BOP (Otherwise N/A) N/A GO TO Step 8.13[6].

[6] NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2A Oil Pumps complete.

[7] IF performing Section 8.14 or 8.15, THEN BOP CONTINUE at appropriate section.

[8] IF all Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps are complete THEN RECORD results in Narrative Log.

Page 5 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs performance Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2B Oil Pumps 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2B Oil Pumps NOTES

1) This test is performed weekly and with RFPT 2B in operation.

The section tests the auto start features of 2B1 and 2B2 Main Oil Pumps and 2A3 EBOP. During normal operation, 2B1 and 2B2 Main Oil Pumps are in service and 2B3 EBOP is in standby BOP (AUTO after stop). With this pump alignment, Steps 8.14[5.1]

and 8.14[5.2] are not performed.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-6.

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor approval to perform this test.

SRO Approves the test of the 2B Feed Pump Oil Pumps.

[2] CHECK position of the following switches:

RFPT 2B 2B1 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-129A, in Normal after START or STOP.

BOP

RFPT 2B 2B2 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-254A, in Normal after START or STOP.

RFPT 2B EBOP 2B3, 2-HS-3-128A, in Auto after START or STOP.

Page 6 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] TEST EBOP 2B3 as follows:

[3.1] DEPRESS and HOLD 2B3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-131A.

BOP

[3.1.1] CHECK the following:

Red (running) light and amber (auto start) light at pushbutton illuminated.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29 in alarm.

[3.2] RELEASE 2B3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, BOP 2-HS-3-105A.

[3.3] PLACE RFPT 2B EBOP 2B3 switch, 2-HS-3-128A, in START (return to AUTO).

[3.3.1] CHECK the following:

BOP Amber (auto start) light extinguished at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-131A.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29, will reset.

[3.4] PLACE RFPT 2B EBOP 2B3, 2-HS-3-128A, in STOP (return to AUTO).

BOP

CHECK Red light at 2B3 EBOP TEST pushbutton extinguished.

Page 7 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.14 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF both RFPT 2B 2B1 and 2B2 Main Oil Pumps are running, THEN BOP (Otherwise N/A) N/A GO TO Step 8.14[6].

[6] NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2B Oil Pumps complete.

[7] IF performing Section 8.13 or 8.15, THEN BOP CONTINUE at appropriate section

[8] IF all Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps are complete THEN RECORD results in Narrative Log.

Page 8 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs performance Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2C Oil Pumps 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT 2C Oil Pumps NOTES

1) This test is performed weekly and with RFPT 2C in operation.

The section tests the auto start features of 2C1 and 2C2 Main Oil Pumps and 2C3 EBOP. During normal operation, 2C1 and 2C2 Main Oil Pumps are in service and 2C3 EBOP is in standby BOP (AUTO after stop). With this pump alignment, Steps 8.15[5.1]

and 8.15[5.2] are not performed.

2) The following steps are performed at Panel 2-9-6.

[1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor approval to perform this test.

SRO Approves the test of the 2C Feed Pump Oil Pumps.

[2] CHECK position of the following switches:

RFPT 2C 2C1 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-1154A, in Normal after START or STOP.

BOP

RFPT 2C 2C2 MAIN OIL PMP, 2-HS-3-258A, in Normal after START or STOP.

RFPT 2C EBOP 2C3, 2-HS-3-153A, in Auto after START or STOP.

Page 9 of 51 Unit 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 15-10 Scenario No. 4 Event No.: 2 Page 8 of 9 Event

Description:

Test Oil Pumps for ALL RFPs in accordance with 2-OI-3 Section 8.15 Automatic Start Test of RFPT Oil Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] TEST EBOP 2C3 as follows:

[3.1] DEPRESS and HOLD 2C3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-156A.

BOP

[3.1.1] CHECK the following:

Red (running) light and amber (auto start) light at pushbutton illuminated.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29 in alarm.

[3.2] RELEASE 2C3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, BOP 2-HS-3-156A.

[3.3] PLACE RFPT 2C EBOP 2C3 switch, 2-HS-3-153A, in START (return to AUTO).

[3.3.1] CHECK the following:

BOP Amber (auto start) light extinguished at 2A3 EBOP TEST pushbutton, 2-HS-3-156A.

RFPT OIL PUMP AUTO START annunciation, 2-XA-55-6B, Window 29, will reset.

[3.4] PLACE RFPT 2C EBOP 2C3, 2-HS-3-153A, in STOP (return to AUTO).

BOP

CHECK Red light at 2C3 EBOP TEST pushbutton extinguished.