ML14056A217

Issuance of Amendments Regarding Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System (TAC MF3473&74)

ML14056A217
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/27/2014
From:	Jason Paige Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	Henderson K Duke Energy Carolinas
Paige, Jason NRR/DORL 415-5888
References
TAC MF3473, TAC MF3474
Download: ML14056A217 (17)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 2014 Mr. Kelvin Henderson Site Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING EXIGENT LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (TAC NOS. MF3473 AND MF3474)

Dear Mr. Henderson:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 272 to Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-35 and Amendment No. 268 to Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-52 for the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your exigent license amendment request (LAR) dated February 17, 2014.

The amendments revise TS Table 3.3.4-1, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls as a result of an inoperable instrumentation function on Unit 2. Although the specifics of the LAR only involve Unit 2, the amendment is being docketed for both units since Unit 1 and Unit 2 utilize common TSs.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

K. Henderson If you have any questions, please call me at 301-415-5888.

I 6))!)

sincC

<.yJ{*u..{

Jason C. Paige, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 272 to NPF-35

2. Amendment No. 268 to NPF-52

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC NORTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-413 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 272 Renewed License No. NPF-35

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A The application for amendment to the Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-35 filed by the Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, acting for itself, and North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation (licensees), dated February 17, 2014, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-35 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 272, which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this renewed operating license. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 day from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to License No. NPF-35 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 27, 2014

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY NO. 1 PIEDMONT MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY DOCKET NO. 50-414 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 268 Renewed License No. NPF-52

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A The application for amendment to the Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-52 filed by the Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, acting for itself, North Carolina Municipal Power Agency No. 1 and Piedmont Municipal Power Agency (licensees), dated February 17, 2014, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 268, which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this renewed operating license. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to License No. NPF-52 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 27, 2014

ATIACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 272 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-35 DOCKET NO. 50-413 AND LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 268 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-52 DOCKET NO. 50-414 Replace the following pages of the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TSs) with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Licenses Licenses NPF-35, page 4 NPF-35, page 4 NPF-52, page 4 NPF-52, page 4 TSs TSs 3.3.4-3 3.3.4-3

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 272 ,which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this renewed operating license. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(3) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21 (d), as revised on December 16, 2002, describes certain future activities to be completed before the period of extended operation. Duke shall complete these activities no later than December 6, 2024, and shall notify the NRC in writing when implementation of these activities is complete and can be verified by NRC inspection.

The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement as revised on December 16, 2002, described above, shall be included in the next scheduled update to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4), following issuance of this renewed operating license. Until that update is complete, Duke may make changes to the programs described in such supplement without prior Commission approval, provided that Duke evaluates each such change pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 and otherwise complies with the requirements in that section.

(4) Antitrust Conditions Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this renewed operating license.

(5) Fire Protection Program (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #2, SSER #3, SSER #4, SSER #5)*

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, for the facility and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, subject to the following provision:

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

• The parenthetical notation following the title of this renewed operating license condition denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplement wherein this renewed license condition is discussed.

Renewed License No. NPF-35 Amendment No. ?72

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 268 ,which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this renewed operating license. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(3) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(d), as revised on December 16, 2002, describes certain future activities to be completed before the period of extended operation. Duke shall complete these activities no later than December 6, 2024, and shall notify the NRC in writing when implementation of these activities is complete and can be verified by NRC inspection.

The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement as revised on December 16, 2002, described above, shall be included in the next scheduled update to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report required by 10 CFR 50.71 (e)(4), following issuance of this renewed operating license. Until that update is complete, Duke may make changes to the programs described in such supplement without prior Commission approval, provided that Duke evaluates each such change pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 and otherwise complies with the requirements in that section.

(4) Antitrust Conditions Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this renewed operating license.

(5) Fire Protection Program (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER #2, SSER #3, SSER #4, SSER #5)*

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended, for the facility and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, subject to the following provision:

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

• The parenthetical notation following the title of this renewed operating license condition denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplement wherein this renewed license condition is discussed.

Renewed License No. NPF-52 Amendment No. 268

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 Table 3.3.4-1 (page 1 of 1)

Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls FUNCTION/INSTRUMENT REQUIRED OR CONTROL PARAMETER NUMBER OF FUNCTIONS

1. Reactivity Control

a. Reactor Trip Breaker Position 1 per trip breaker

2. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Control

a. Pressurizer Pressure

3. Decay Heat Removal via Steam Generators (SGs)

a. RCS Hot Leg Temperature- Loop A 1 per loop and B

b. RCS Cold Leg Temperature- Loop A* 1 per loop and B

c. SG Pressure 1 per SG

d. SG Level 1 per SG or AFW Flow

4. RCS Inventory Control

a. Pressurizer Level

• For Unit 2 only, Loop A of this Function is not required to be operable until such time that its associated resistance temperature detector (RTD) can be replaced either during the Cycle 20 Refueling Outage or another outage that facilitates replacement, whichever occurs first.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 Amendment Nos. 272, 268

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 272 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-35 AND AMENDMENT NO. 268 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-52 DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated February 17, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14050A346), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy, the licensee), requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Catawba 1 and 2).

The proposed changes would revise TS Table 3.3.4-1, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls as a result of an inoperable instrumentation function on Unit 2.

Table 3.3.4-1 specifies requirements for Function 3.b., Decay Heat Removal via Steam Generators (SGs)-Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Leg Temperature- Loop A and Bas "1 per loop". Loop A of this function is inoperable on Unit 2 due to a failed resistance temperature detector (RTD). The licensee asserts that Loop B indication has a reliable maintenance history.

The failed RTD on Loop A cannot be replaced in the present operating mode of Unit 2 (Mode 1).

Therefore, Duke Energy requested NRC approval of this LAR to allow Unit 2 to remain in Mode 1 until such time that the failed RTD can be replaced. The replacement would occur in the next refueling outage or the next outage that would facilitate replacement, whichever occurs first.

Although the specifics of the LAR only involve Unit 2, the amendment is being docketed for both units since Unit 1 and Unit 2 utilize common TSs.

As discussed in the licensee's application, Duke Energy requested that the proposed amendment be processed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, Commission) on an exigent basis in accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) paragraph 50.91 (a)(6). Per 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(6)(i)(B), the NRC staff noticed the February 17,2014, application in the Rock Hill, SC local newspaper, The Herald, on Friday, February 21, 2014, and Saturday, February 22, 2014.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The license amendment request (LAR) concerns requirements for the Remote Shutdown System. As described by the licensee in its LAR, the Remote Shutdown System provides an operator with sufficient instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. Among the instrumentation are indications of reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature. In situations where the control room becomes inaccessible, the operator uses the remote RCS cold leg temperature indications to determine the status of the reactor coolant system and to take appropriate steps to maintain the unit safely. According to the licensee, the remote RCS cold leg temperature is used by several operating, abnormal and emergency procedures as one way that an operator can verify plant conditions. The licensee has stated that control room instrumentation provided by the failed sensor is not used in any emergency or abnormal procedure.

Under the current licensing basis, the licensee is permitted to operate for thirty days if one of the RCS cold leg temperature indications fails. Thirty days was selected based upon operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room. With this LAR, the licensee requested permission to continue power operations beyond thirty days with a failed RCS cold leg temperature indication.

2.1 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications" 10 CFR 50.36( c)(2)(i) specifies that Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) will delineate the lowest functional capability or performance level of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Further it specifies that when an LCO is not met, the licensee shall shutdown the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the condition can be met.

The new remedial action being proposed by the licensee is to extend the time until the next reactor shutdown.

2.2 Evaluation Against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria" Section 3.1 of the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis discusses compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. A discussion of the General Design Criterion (GDC) germane to the RCS Cold Leg Temperature RTDs is provided below.

The licensee has not requested permission to change the design of the facility.

2.2.1 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 34, "Residual Heat Removal" This GDC requires, in part, a residual heat removal system be provided to accomplish its intended safety function. The system safety function shall be to transfer fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded.

Also, suitable redundancy in components and features shall be provided to assure that the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure.

Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, are four-loop Westinghouse pressurized-water reactors.

Each loop is equipped with instrumentation to measure the hot leg and cold leg temperatures, respectively. This instrumentation is part of the function for Decay Heat Removal via SGs as stipulated in Table 3.3.4-1, "Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls." The other instrumentation listed is SG Pressure and Level or Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow.

The systems required for a safe shutdown are described in the plant's current licensing basis (see Catawba UFSAR, Section 7.4).

2.2.2 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion GDC 13, "Instrumentation and Control" This GDC requires, in part, that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety.

The Catawba Nuclear Station Main Control Room (MCR) is the location from which the licensee monitors the overall plant conditions. In the event of an MCR evacuation due to an emergency, plant conditions including safe shutdown can be monitored from an alternative location, the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP).

The licensee has not proposed any changes to its instrumentation and control design basis.

2.2.3 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion GDC 19, "Control Room" This GDC requires, in part, that operating reactor licensees to provide a control room from which actions can be taken to maintain the nuclear power unit in a safe condition under accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). In addition, operating reactor licensees must provide equipment (including the necessary instrumentation), at appropriate locations outside the control room, with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor.

The licensee has not proposed any changes to the control room design.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 34, "Residual Heat Removal" The Catawba Nuclear Station TS 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Required Action A.1 requires the RCS cold leg temperature indication be restored in 30 days if one or more is found inoperable. Otherwise, the plant must be shut down in accordance with the timeframe prescribed in Required Actions 8.1 and 8.2 of TS 3.3.4.

As stated in the February 17, 2014, letter, the licensee confirmed that the affected instrument only displays RCS Cold Leg temperature readings and is not part of the reactor protection system (RPS) and does not provide input to any safety-related shut down system. The licensee further identified that where T-Cold indication is necessary in Emergency Procedures (EPs), Abnormal Procedures (APs), and operating procedures, alternate indication, or an alternate methodology for inferring temperature, is available in place of this particular indication in the MCR and at the ASP.

The licensee stated that that no additional training is necessary to use alternate indications for cold leg temperatures. Therefore, based on the diversity of RCS temperature indication available to plant operators, redundant indication will be available to respond to any plant event that may require the use of the Remote Shutdown System.

3.2 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion GDC 13, "Instrumentation and Control" If the control room becomes inaccessible, the operators can establish control at the ASP, and place and maintain the unit in Mode 3. Not all controls and necessary transfer switches are located at the remote shutdown panel. Some controls and transfer switches will have to be operated locally at the switchgear, motor control panels, or other local stations. The unit automatically reaches Mode 3 following a unit shutdown and can be maintained safely in Mode 3 for an extended period of time. The operability of the remote shutdown control and instrumentation functions ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit in Mode 3 should the control room become inaccessible.

With the unit in Mode 3, the AFW System and the SG safety valves or the SG power operated relief valves (PORVs) can be used to remove core decay heat and meet all safety requirements.

This scenario and the availability of alternate indications for RCS temperature, as indicated in Section 3.1 above, ensures that there is sufficient information available to place and maintain the unit in Mode 3 should the control room become inaccessible.

3.3 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, "Control Room" The licensee indicated that the RCS Cold Leg Temperature function has been identified as part of Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) system and therefore, the instrumentation related to that function must be addressed according toTS 3.3.3, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation."

However, the inoperability of RCS Cold Leg Temperature-Loop A by itself does not require the unit to enter a TS Condition necessitating a unit shutdown per TS 3.3.3. It requires the submission of a PAM Report pursuant to TS 5.6.5. The licensee has indicated that no relief is needed or is being requested as part of this LAR from TS 3.3.3. Therefore, the NRC staff makes no finding with respect to this TS.

3.4 10 CFR 50.36( c)(2)(i)

The existing remedial actions require the licensee to shut down after thirty days with the inoperable instrumentation. Thirty days was selected based upon operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room. The licensee asserts that the risk of operation without this indication is assessed to be very low. This LAR does not affect the probability that the control room would be evacuated. Instead, it increases the time the planUs permitted to remain at-power from thirty days to the next planned or forced outage. The NRC finds this action to be acceptable. The licensee's procedures and training provide redundant or diverse methods which allow the operators to understand RCS Cold Leg Temperatures. Therefore, there will be a retained sufficient capability of instrumentation and controls to provide the indication for decay heat removal via the steam generators. Therefore, the NRC considers the absence of indication from the RCS Cold Leg RTD, Loop A, to be

acceptable for the remainder of the operating cycle. Thus, the appropriate remedial action in this instance is to allow operation in this condition until the end of the Cycle 20 Refueling Outage or another outage that facilitates replacement, whichever occurs first.

4.0 STATEMENT OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES The Commission's regulation, as stated in 10 CFR 50.91, provides special exceptions for the issuance of amendments when the usual 30-day public notice cannot be met. One type of special exception is an exigency. An exigency exists when the staff and the licensee need to act quickly and time does not permit the staff to publish a Federal Register notice allowing 30 days for prior public comment, and the staff also determines that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

In its submittal, the licensee discussed the need for an exigent review of the proposed license amendment. The licensee is basing exigent circumstances on the following: (1) the circumstances leading to the exigency were unforeseen; (2) there was no adverse maintenance history concerning the RTD component; and (3) this remote shutdown system function had previously passed its required TS surveillance and other required testing. In addition, the failed RTD on Loop A cannot be replaced in the present operating mode of Unit 2 (Mode 1). While the plant is operating, the radiological conditions in this area prohibit access by plant personnel.

Therefore, the repairs cannot be safely implemented until the unit is shut down. If the proposed amendment is not granted, TS 3.3.4 would require that the plant be shut down by March 2, 2014, as repairs to the Loop A temperature indicator cannot be made while operating. The shutdown of the plant would result in an unnecessary operational transient since the indication parameters that remain available at the alternate shutdown panel are adequate to safely shut down the plant should an emergency arise.

On the basis of the above discussion, the NRC staff has determined that exigent circumstances exist and that the licensee used its best efforts to make a timely application and did not cause the exigent situation.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DETERMINATION In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(6)(i)(B), on Friday, February 21, 2014, and Saturday, February 22, 2014, the NRC staff noticed the February 17, 2014, application of its proposed no significant hazards consideration determination, and requested for prior public comment by February 26, 2014, in the Rock Hill, SC local newspaper, The Herald. No comments were received. The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the amendment, would not (1) involve a significant

increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue.

(1) The proposed change does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because it does not affect the probability of any accident occurring since the Remote Shutdown System is not an accident initiator or a precursor to the initiation of any analyzed accident. Therefore, there can be no increase in the probability of any accident occurring. The Remote Shutdown System functions to provide an auxiliary means to shut down the unit should the control room become inoperable or uninhabitable. Procedural guidance will ensure that plant operators can compensate for the inoperable Remote Shutdown System function (Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg Temperature- Loop A) while this license amendment is in effect. The risk of extended plant operation with the inoperable function out of service was qualitatively assessed to be low. In addition, the change will not affect the performance of any other plant equipment used to mitigate the consequences of an analyzed accident. There will be no significant impact on the source term or pathways assumed in accidents previously evaluated. No analysis assumptions will be violated and there will be no adverse effects on offsite or onsite dose as the result of an accident.

(2) The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated because it does not change the methods governing normal plant operation; nor are the methods utilized to respond to plant transients and accidents altered.

Procedural guidance will ensure that plant operators appropriately respond to transients and accidents even with the inoperable Remote Shutdown System function. In addition, the change will not create the potential for any new initiating transients or accidents to occur in the actual physical plant.

(3) The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design functions during and following an accident. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the Reactor Coolant System, and the containment system. The proposed amendments will not challenge the acceptability of any analytical limits under normal, transient, and accident conditions. All applicable design and safety limits will continue to remain satisfied such that the fission product barriers will continue to perform their design functions.

Based on the above considerations, the NRC staff concludes that the amendment meets the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92. Therefore, the staff has made a final determination that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding, which was noticed in the local newspaper, The Herald on February 21, 2014, and February 22, 2014.

Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor(s): R. Beacom, EICB Date: February 27, 2014