ML083570470
| ML083570470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/2008 |
| From: | Morris J Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Corp |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML083570470 (26) | |
Text
Duke JAMES R. MORRIS, VICE PRESIDENT EEnergy, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Carolinas Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road / CN01 VP York, SC 29745 803-701-4251 803-701-3221 fax December 18, 2008 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414 McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 50-369 and 50-370 Proposed Technical Specification (TS) Amendment to Relax Completion Times and Surveillance Intervals for-the Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation TS 3.3.1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation TS 3.3.2, Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.3.6, (Catawba only) and Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS) TS 3.3.9, (Catawba only)
Reference:
Letter from Duke to NRC, same subject, dated December 11, 2007 The reference letter proposed changes to the Catawba and McGuire TS that are consistent with Standard Technical Specification Change Travelers TSTF-41 1, Revision 1, "Surveillance Test Interval Extensions for Components of the Reactor Protection System (WCAP-15376)"; and TSTF-418, Revision 2, "RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times (WCAP-14333)". In addition, plant-specific proposed changes not addressed by TSTF-4 11, Revision 1 or TSTF-418, Revision 2 have been supported by plant-specific analysis.
On November 10, 2008, a telephone conference call was held among representatives of Duke and NRC staff concerning commitments made in the reference letter. By copy of this letter, Duke is formally revising these commitments. Revised Attachment 5 to this letter contains a compilation of these commitments. New or revised information is indicated via revision bars in the margin of the pages.
www. duke-energy. com
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 December 18, 2008 The commitment revisions made via this letter do not impact the previously submitted TS pages or the original No Significant Hazards Consideration or Environmental Consideration.
Also included via this letter (Enclosure 1) is a response to an NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI). The format of the response is to restate the NRC RAI, followed by our response.
Finally, included via this letter (Enclosure 2) is Westinghouse Affidavit CAW-08-2502, "WCAP-15376 Implementation Guideline Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation (Proprietary)". This affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter and its attachment and enclosures is being sent to the appropriate state officials.
Inquiries on this matter should be directed to L. J. Rudy at (803) 701-3084 (Catawba) or P. T. Vu at (704) 875-4302 (McGuire).
Very truly yours, J. R. Morris LJR/s Attachment and Enclosures
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 December 18, 2008 J. R. Morris affirms that he is the person who subscribed his name to the foregoing statement, and that all statements and matters set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
J. R. M s, Site Vice President Subscribed and sworn to me: -)21Vý Soý Date tll'do_ý-
Notary Public My commission expires: P7 12- 12-4)
Date
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oVao44 if**otmceo'*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 December 18, 2008 xc (with attachment and enclosures):
L.A. Reyes U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 A. T. Sabisch Senior Resident Inspector (Catawba)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Station J. B. Brady Senior Resident Inspector (McGuire)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station J. F. Stang, Jr. (addressee only)
NRC Senior Project Manager (Catawba and McGuire)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 S. E. Jenkins Section Manager Division of Waste Management South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull St.
Columbia, SC 29201 B. 0. Hall Section Chief Division of Environmental Health, Radiation Protection Section North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 5 December 18, 2008 bxc (with attachment and enclosures):
R. D. Hart (CNO1RC)
L. J. Rudy (CNO1RC)
P. T. Vu (MGO1RC)
R. L. Gill (EC050)
NCMPA-1 NCEMC PMPA Catawba Document Control File 801.01 McGuire Document Control File 801.01 RGC Date File ELL-EC050
ATTACHMENT 5 REVISED
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS
Attachment 5 REVISED
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by Duke in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. L. J. Rudy, Regulatory Compliance, Catawba Nuclear Station (803) 701-3084 or Mr. P. T. Vu, Regulatory Compliance, McGuire Nuclear Station (704) 875-4302.
COMMITMENT Due Date/Event The proposed changes to the Catawba and McGuire Within 90 days of Nuclear Stations Technical Specifications will be NRC approval.
implemented within 90 days of NRC approval.
Activities that degrade the availability of auxiliary Administrative controls will feedwater, reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure relief, be implemented within 90 ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC), days of NRC approval.
or turbine trip should not be scheduled when an RTB or a logic train is out of service.
One complete Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Administrative controls will train that can be actuated automatically must be be implemented within 90 maintained when a logic train is out of service. days of NRC approval.
Activities that could degrade the operable train of RPS Administrative controls will and ESFAS including master relays, slave relays, and be implemented within 90 analog channels should not be scheduled when an RTB or days of NRC approval.
a logic train is out of service.
Activities on electrical support systems and cooling Administrative controls will systems for auxiliary feedwater, RCS pressure relief, be implemented within 90 AMSAC, turbine trip, one complete train of ECCS, or the days of NRC approval.
available RPS and ESFAS actuation functions should not be scheduled during RTB or logic train maintenance.
That is, one complete train of a function that supports a complete train of a function noted above must be available.
As part of the implementation of the proposed license Administrative controls will amendment, to address a logic cabinet in maintenance; be implemented within 90 Duke will ensure solid state protection system (SSPS) days of NRC approval.
train and engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) train unavailability is included in the Catawba and McGuire Maintenance Rule 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1),
(a)(2), and (a)(4) program.
Page 5-1
Attachment 5 Catawba and McGuire will trend as-found and as-left Administrative controls will data under the System Health Program for the three be implemented within 90 representative trip functions analyzed in WCAP-15376. days of NRC approval.
(i.e., OTDT, SG level, and pressurizer pressure) for two years (four data points) after implementation of the amendment granting 184-day COTs. The data will be trended to evaluate whether the extended frequencies for the affected instruments remain valid.
Page 5-2
Enclosure 1 Response to NRC RAI
Enclosure 1 NRC Question Provide an update of the IPE and IPEEE seismic, fire and high winds and other risk estimates and a discussion on external event WCAP-15376 and 14333 risk impacts.
Duke Response The Catawba and McGuire PRAs are full scope models that include both internal and external events.
The following is a list of the reviews conducted on the PRA modeling which assures the technical adequacy of the existing PRA model with respect to external events:
- A peer review sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) was conducted on the original Catawba and McGuire PRAs (References 1 and 2).
" An SER has been received on the IPE and IPEEE for both Catawba and McGuire (References 3 and 4 respectively for Catawba. References 5 and 6 respectively for McGuire.)
- In October 2000, a peer review of the McGuire PRA was conducted as part of the WOG PRA Certification Program.
" In March 2002, a peer review of the Catawba PRA was conducted as part of the WOG PRA Certification Program.
- In August 2008, a PRA Technical Adequacy Self-Assessment was conducted against the Supporting Requirements (SRs) in the ASME standard (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications," ASME-RA-Sc-2007) and RG 1.200 for both Catawba and McGuire.
These previous reviews did not identify deficiencies related to the scope of external initiating events considered. No fundamental plant weaknesses or vulnerabilities with regard to external events were identified during the IPEEE examination for Catawba or McGuire. There were no plant changes identified from the IPEEE that would significantly reduce the risk from external events. The seismic, fire, and tornado modeling that exists in the Catawba and McGuire PRAs is at the level of detail used to support the IPE and IPEEE submittals and is consistent with the ASME standard and RG 1.200 supporting requirements.
A. Catawba Seismic The dominant events in the current seismic PRA sequences involve either a loss of power or control with a loss of Secondary Side Heat Removal (SSHR). A majority of the sequences involve a loss of off-site power with corresponding diesel hardware or circuitry failures.
ESFAS failures are explicitly modeled in the seismic PRA. The accident sequences from the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) quantification for seismic events were reviewed to identify sequences that contain failures of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). The results are provided in Table 1.
Page 1-1
Enclosure 1
._Table 1: Seismic +
Initiator Description CDF for Total Percent Name ESFAS Seismic Contribution to Actuation CDF Seismic CDF Signal Failures in Seismic
........ ........ . ....... . ... .. S eq ue nc es _. .. ... . . . .. .. ... .. ... ..
[%SEISMIC Seismic Initiator 1.2E-07/yr 1.2E-05/yr 1.0%
+Applies to both Units I and 2.
The results show that ESFAS failures are not a dominant contributor to the seismic PRA results. Seismic cut sets containing failures of ESFAS components compose approximately 1% of the seismic CDF. This represents a very small contribution to the CDF. Therefore, it is concluded that the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the seismic external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed ESFAS extended Surveillance Test Intervals (STI) and Completion Times (CT).
RTS signal failures are not modeled in the seismic PRA because the primary contributors of an ATWS event to the CDF are from internal transient events such as loss of main feedwater, and loss of load/turbine trip. Seismic events are relatively infrequent events that have an initiating event frequency significantly less than internal transient events. Excluding the ATWS contribution to the CDF from a seismic event is acceptable based on the very small contribution to the CDF from this event. Therefore, it is concluded that the small increases in signal unavailability for RTS components proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the seismic external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS extended Surveillance Test Intervals (STI) and Completion Times (CT).
Fire The risk significant fire initiating events in the PRA are those fires that result in failure of the component cooling water (KC) system. This was initially noted in the IPEEE report submitted to the NRC on June 21, 1994 (Section 1.4.1 of IPEEE). The component cooling system provides cooling to the pumps for the majority of the mitigating systems.
Consequently, when component cooling is failed by a fire, all of the significant mitigating systems are failed.
The dominant fire sequences included a loss of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal cooling support systems (i.e., KC cooling) leading to RCP seal LOCAs. In these sequences, core damage can be mitigated by operator actions to manually start the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
The fire accident sequences in the CDF quantification that included both internal and external events were reviewed to identify sequences that contain failures of ESFAS actuation signals or failures of the RTS. The results are shown in Table 2.
Page 1-2
Enclosure I Table 2: External Fire +
Initiator Description CDF for Fire Percent Name* ESFAS/RTS Event Contribution Actuation CDF to Fire Event Signal CDF Failures in Fire Sequences
%FCBLR Cable Room I-ire Causes A Loss Of 0/yr 9.4E- 0.0%
Component Cooling (KC) Water I 07/yr
%FKC KC Power Ca ble Initiating Event 0/yr 3.6E- 0.0%
07/yr
%FCR Control Room Fire Causes A Loss Of KC 0/yr 2.OE- 0.0%
0 7 /yr Total Fire 0/yr 1.5E- 0.0%
06/yr
- Other fire initiating events are included in the PRA model, but only the ones listed in Table 2 appear in the cut set file. +Applies to both Units I and 2.
The results show that ESFAS/RTS failures are not a dominant contributor for fire events.
This review indicated that none of the fire sequences contain these types of failures.
Therefore, it is concluded that the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the fire external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS and ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
High Winds (Tornados)
The effects of tornados are included in the Catawba PRA model. Dominant tornado sequences are those that induce a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) followed by failures of the emergency power system. Emergency power system failures are dominated by failures of the emergency diesel generators to run or common cause failures of the diesels to run.
The tornado accident sequences in the CDF quantification that included both internal and external events were reviewed to identify sequences that contain failures of ESF actuation signals or failures of the RTS. The results are shown in Table 3.
Page 1-3
Enclosure I Table 3: Tornados +
Initiator Description CDF for Tornado Percent Name ESFAS/RTS Event Contribution Actuation CDF to Tornado Signal Event CDF Failures in Tornado Sequences - _
%TORNSW Tornado Causes Loss of Offsite Power 0/yr 3.4E- 0.0%
'(LOOP) 07/yr
+Applies to both Units 1 and 2.
The results show that ESFAS/RTS failures are not a dominant contributor for tornado events. This review indicated that none of the tornado sequences contain these types of failures. Therefore, it is concluded that the smallincreases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the tornado external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS and ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
External Flooding and Other External Events The evaluation conducted for the Catawba IPE and IPEEE concluded that the contribution to plant risk from external flooding, transportation, and nearby facility accidents is not significant. Thus it is expected that the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS and ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
B. McGuire Seismic The dominant accident sequences involve a failure of secondary side heat removal along with a loss of power. A majority of the remaining sequences involve Reactor Coolant Pump seal LOCAs of varying sizes.
ESFAS failures are explicitly modeled in the seismic PRA. The accident sequences from the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) quantification for seismic events were reviewed to identify sequences that contain failures of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). The results are provided in Table 4.
Page 1-4
Enclosure I Table 4: Seismic +
Initiator Description CDF for ESFAS Total Percent Name Actuation Seismic Contribution to Signal Failures CDF Seismic CDF in Seismic Sequences.
ISEISMiC .... Seis~mic-Initi*0tr .. .OE--3_06~yr T.....9E-70*6-yri 33....
7%
SEISMIC ... ......
..1.......
_;. :'1..
Seismic Initiator...........
4.5E-08/yr !...1...1E-05/yr 0.4% .......
+Applies to both Units 1 and 2.
- Current model
- IPEEE model Seismic cut sets containing failures of ESFAS components compose approximately 34% of the seismic CDF. The discrepancy in contribution levels from the Catawba analysis occurs due to differences in modeling for the two plants. Following the IPEEE submittal (submitted to NRC by letter dated June 1, 1994), aneffort was made to simplify the McGuire seismic fault tree. Several of the components and structures used in the analysis were screened out due to their generically good performance in earthquakes or seismic simulation tests. A plant level surrogate fragility (versus component-level fragilities) was then included to represent the screened-out elements. Even though the seismic CDF values did not vary greatly between the IPEEE and the current PRA model of record (1.1E-05/yr.
IPEEE vs. 8.8E-06/yr. Current model), and the dominant sequences from both models remained the same (i.e.,a loss of power combined with a loss of SSHR), it was subsequently determined that the current analysis was not as robust as the IPEEE analysis since the surrogate items tend to dominate the results thus artificially inflating the percent contribution to the seismic CDF from ESFAS failures.
Regarding ESFAS failures, the percent contribution to the seismic CDF contribution from the McGuire IPEEE is 0.4%. The current seismic model was reviewed to estimate the impact of restoring component level fragility values. Based upon a review of the McGuire IPEEE results it is expected that when the component fragility values are reinstated into the current seismic model, the percent contribution to the seismic CDF from ESFAS component failures will also be approximately 0.4%. This item has been entered into the PRA change tracking system. Current plans are to revise the McGuire seismic analysis at the next major PRA update.
It is concluded the current seismic model percent contribution to the McGuire seismic CDF due to ESFAS actuation signal failures is artificially elevated due to the use of plant level fragilities. This percentage is expected to .drop to less than 1% when component level fragilities are reinstated. Based on this model revision, the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the seismic external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
Page 1-5
Enclosure 1 RTS signal failures are not modeled in the seismic PRA because the primary contributors of an ATWS event to the CDF are from internal transient events such as loss of main feedwater, and loss of load/turbine trip. Seismic events are relatively infrequent events that have an initiating event frequency significantly less than internal transient events. Excluding the ATWS contribution to the CDF from a seismic event is acceptable based on the very small contribution to the CDF from this event. Therefore, it is concluded that the small increases in signal unavailability for RTS components proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the seismic external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS extended Surveillance Test Intervals (STI) and Completion Times (CT).
Fire The risk significant fire initiating events in the PRA are those fires that result in failure of the nuclear service water (RN) system. This was initially noted in the IPEEE report submitted to the NRC on June 1, 1994 (Section 4.8 and Appendix B Section 3.5.4 of IPEEE). The RN system provides cooling to the pumps for the majority of the mitigating systems. Consequently, when nuclear service water is failed by a fire, all of the significant mitigating systems are failed. In this scenario the fire affects the power cables to the running train and prevents the opposite train from being started from the control room due to a loss of breaker control power.
The dominant fire sequences included a loss of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal coo ling support systems (i.e., RN cools component cooling) leading to RCP seal LOCAs. In these sequences, core damage can be mitigated by 1) operator actions to start the train with no breaker control power from the switchgear room, 2) operator actions to swap RN from the other unit, or 3) manually starting the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
The fire accident sequences in the CDF quantification that included both internal and external events were reviewed to identify sequences that contain failures of ESFAS actuation signals or failures of the RTS. The results are shown in Table 5.
Page 1-6
Enclosure 1 Table 5: External Fire +
Initiator Description . CDF for Fire Percent Name* ESFAS/RTS Event Contribution Actuation CDF to Fire Event Signal CDF Failures in Fire i Sequences FVIC Vital I&C Fire Causes A Loss Of RN 0/yr 6.1E- 0.0%
1 06/yr FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes A Loss Of RN 0/yr 1.2E- 0.0%
07/yr FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes Loss 0/yr 7.7E- 0.0%
FCR Of RN Control Room Fire Causes A Loss Of RN 0/yr f 08/yr 2.8E- 0.0%
008/yr FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire 0/yr 2.8E- 0.0%
08/yr=*
FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 0/yr 2.3E- 0.0%
........ . 08/yr ITotal Fire 0/yr 6.4E- 0.0%
06/yr
- Other fire initiating events are included in the PRA model, but only the ones listed in Table 5 appear in the cut set file.
+Applies to both Units I and 2.
The results show that ESFAS/RTS failures are not a dominant contributor for fire events.
This review indicated that none of the fire; sequences contain these types of failures.
Therefore, it is concluded that the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the fire external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS and ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
High Winds (Tornados)
The effects of tornados are included in the McGuire PRA model. Dominant tornado sequences are those that induce a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) followed by failures of the emergency power system. Emergency power system failures are dominated by failures of the emergency diesel generators to run or common cause failure of diesels-to run.
The tornado accident sequences in the CDF quantification that included both internal and external events were reviewed to identify sequences that contain failures of ESF actuation signals or failures of the RTS. The results are shown in Table 6.
Page 1-7
Enclosure I Table 6 Tornados +
Initiator Description CDF for Tornado j Percent Name ESFAS/RTS Event Contribution Actuation CDF to Tornado Signal Event CDF Failures in Tornado Sequences I`-ORNSW Tornado Causes Loss of Offsite Power O/yr 1.6E- 0.0%
S(LOOP) .. 06/yr
+Applies to both Units I and 2.
The results show that ESFAS/RTS failures are not a dominant contributor for tornado events. This review indicated that none of the tornado sequences contain these types of failures. Therefore, it is concluded that the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will have a very small impact on the tornado external event CDF and will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS and ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
External Flooding and Other External Events The evaluation conducted for the McGuire IPE and IPEEE concluded that the contribution to plant risk from external flooding, transportation, and nearby facility accidents is not significant. Thus it is expected that the small increases in signal unavailability proposed by the changes will not impact the conclusions made for the proposed RTS and ESFAS extended STIs and CTs.
C. Conclusions- Catawba and McGuire External events such as seismic, fires, and tornados are infrequent events that have initiating event frequencies that are significantly smaller than those of comparable internal events.
Therefore the CDF contribution involving RTS or ESFAS signal failures is expected to be small compared to internal event contributors. The above discussion demonstrates this point
- that actuation signal failures or unavailabilities are very small contributors to the CDF for external events. Therefore, any external event related increase in CDF due to the proposed RTS and ESFAS changes is expected to be very small and the prior conclusions of the original submittal remain valid.
D. References
- 1. EPRI review published as part of, "Catawba Nuclear Station Unit I Probabilistic Risk Assessment," Volumes 1-3, Duke Power. Company,August 18, 1987.
- 2. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, "McGuire Unit 1 PRA Peer Review," May 27, 1983.
- 3. Letter USNRC to Duke Power Company, "Safety Evaluation of Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Submittal," June 7, 1994.
- 4. Letter USNRC to Duke Power Company, "Catawba Nuclear Station-Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE);" April 12, 1999.
Page 1-8
Enclosure I
- 5. Letter USNRC to Duke Power Company, "Staff Evaluation of the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units I and 2 Individual Plant Examination - Internal Events Only," June 30, 1994.
- 6. Letter USNRC to Duke Power Company, "Review of McGuire Nuclear Station Units I and 2- Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal," February 16, 1999.
Page 1-9
Enclosure 2 Westinghouse Affidavit CAW-08-2502
Westinghouse Westinghouse Electric Company Nuclear Services P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 1 5230-0355 USA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directtel: (412) 374-4643 Document Control Desk ' Direct fax: (412) 374-3846 Washington, DC 20555-0001 e-mail: greshaja@westinghouse.com Our ref. CAW-08-2502 November 24, 2008 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Subject:
WCAP-15376 Implementation Guideline Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation (Proprietary)
The proprietary information for which withholding is being requested in the above-referenced report is further identified in Affidavit CAW-08-2502 signed by the owner of the proprietary information, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. The affidavit, which accompanies this letter, sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, this letter authorizes the utilization of the accompanying affidavit by Duke Power Company.
Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the application for withholding or the Westinghouse affidavit should reference this letter, CAW-08-2502, and should be addressed to J. A. Gresham, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355.
Very truly yours, resh'am, Manager Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing Enclosures cc: G. Bacuta (NRC OWFN 12E-1)
CAW-08-2502 AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
ss COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared J. A. Gresham, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse), and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:
A. Gresham, Manager Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing Sworn to and subscribed before me this 24 th day of November, 2008 Notary Public COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Notaral Seal Sharon L.Markie, Notary Pubic Monroeville Boro, Allegheny County My Commission Expires Jan. 29,2011 Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries
2 CAW-08-2502 (1) I am Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing, in Nuclear Services, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rule making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of Westinghouse.
(2) I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations and in conjunction with the Westinghouse "Application for Withholding" accompanying this Affidavit.
(3) I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.
(4) Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.
(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.
(ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public. Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence.
The application of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required.
Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:
(a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.
3 CAW-08-2502 (b) It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.
(c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.
(d) It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.
(e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Westinghouse or customer funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to Westinghouse.
(f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.
There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:
(a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.
(b) It is information that is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.
(c) Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.
(d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.
4 CAW-08-2502 (e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.
(f) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.
(iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.
(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.
(v) The proprietary information sought to be withheld in this submittal is that which is appropriately marked in "WCAP-1 5376 Implementation Guideline Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation" (Proprietary) on behalf of the PWR Owners Group by Westinghouse, being transmitted by the PWR Owners Group letter and Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure to the Document Control Desk. The proprietary information as submitted for use by the PWR Owners Group is applicable to other licensee submittals.
This information is part of that which will enable Westinghouse to:
(a) Provide risk-informed assessment of the RTS and ESFAS to extend the interval for surveillance testing.
(b) Provide licensing defense services.
Further this information has substantial commercial value as follows:
(a) Westinghouse plans to sell the use of similar information to its customers for purposes of extending surveillance testing intervals.
5 CAW-08-2502 (b) Westinghouse can sell support and defense of extending surveillance testing intervals.
Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar assessments and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.
The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Westinghouse effort and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.
In order for competitors of Westinghouse to duplicate this information, similar technical programs would have to be performed and a significant manpower effort, having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE Transmitted herewith are proprietary and/or non-proprietary versions of documents furnished to the NRC in connection with requests for generic and/or plant-specific review and approval.
In order to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations concerning the protection of proprietary information so submitted to the NRC, the information which is proprietary in the proprietary versions is contained within brackets, and where the proprietary information has been deleted in the non-proprietary versions, only the brackets remain (the information that was contained within the brackets in the proprietary versions having been deleted). The justification for claiming the information so designated as proprietary is indicated in both versions by means of lower case letters (a) through (f) located as a superscript immediately following the brackets enclosing each item of information being identified as proprietary or in the margin opposite such information. These lower case letters refer to the types of information Westinghouse customarily holds in confidence identified in Sections (4)(ii)(a) through (4)(ii)(f) of the affidavit accompanying this transmittal pursuant to 10 CF.R 2.390(b)(1).
COPYRIGHT NOTICE The reports transmitted herewith each bear a Westinghouse copyright notice. The NRC is permitted to make the number of copies of the information contained in these reports which are necessary for its internal use in connection with generic and plant-specific reviews and approvals as well as the issuance, denial, amendment, transfer, renewal, modification, suspension, revocation, or violation of a license, permit, order, or regulation subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 regarding restrictions on public disclosure to the extent such information has been identified as proprietary by Westinghouse, copyright protection notwithstanding. With respect to the non-proprietary versions of these reports, the NRC is permitted to make the number of copies beyond those necessary for its internal use which are necessary in order to have one copy available for public viewing in the appropriate docket files in the public document room in Washington, DC and in local public document rooms as may be required by NRC regulations if the number of copies submitted is insufficient for this purpose. Copies made by the NRC must include the copyright notice in all instances and the proprietary notice if the original was identified as proprietary.