ML091950355

License Amendment Request to Support Plant Modifications to the Nuclear Instrumentation System

ML091950355
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire
Issue date:	07/01/2009
From:	Brandi Hamilton Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML091950355 (80)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Duke BRUCE H HAMILTON Vice President PC7Energy. McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation MG01 VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 704-875-5333 704-875-4809 fax bhhamilton@duke-energy. com July 1,2009 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

SUBJECT:

License Amendment Request to Support Plant Modifications to the Nuclear Instrumentation System Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, enclosed is a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) License Amendment Request (LAR) for the McGuire Nuclear Station Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications (TS) and the Catawba Nuclear Station Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TS. The proposed LAR is in support of plant modifications planned for the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations. The existing Source Range (SR) and Intermediate Range (IR) excore detector systems, which utilize boron triflouride (BF 3) detectors and compensated ion chamber detectors, respectively, are to be replaced with equivalent neutron monitoring systems in order to increase system reliability. The new instrumentation will utilize fission chamber detectors that will perform both the SR and the IR monitoring functions. The proposed LAR affects TS 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation" for both the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations, and TS 1.1, "Definitions" for the Catawba Nuclear Station. Applicable aspects of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," are incorporated in the scope of the proposed changes. Implementation of the above described plant modifications will impact the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs) for both stations. The necessary UFSAR revisions will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). A oD www. duke-energy corn

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 1, 2009 Page 2 Duke Energy Carolinas requests approval of this LAR within one calendar year of the submittal date. This will support the planned implementation of the associated plant modification for Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2'during its Fall 2010 refueling outage (2EOC17). Implementation of the plant modifications for Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 and McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 would be in later refueling outages. Amendment implementation will be accomplished within 60 days of NRC approval. Note that the proposed TS changes have been structured so that they can be implemented and utilized for either the existing or the replacement excore detector systems. Within one year following the implementation of the modification for the final unit, Duke will submit a follow-up administrative license amendment request to delete the superseded TS requirements. provides a description of the proposed change and the technical justification, an evaluation of significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92(c), and the following attachments: Attachments la and lb provide the existing TS pages marked-up to show the proposed changes for the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations, respectively. Retyped (clean) TS pages will be provided to the NRC immediately prior to issuance of the approved amendment. Attachments 2a and 2b provide the existing Bases pages marked-up to show the proposed changes for the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations, respectively. These pages are provided for information only. provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal. In accordance with Duke's administrative procedures and Quality Assurance Program, this LAR has been reviewed and approved by the respective McGuire and Catawba Plant Operations Review Committees and the Duke Nuclear Safety Review Board. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this LAR is being sent to the designated officials of the States of North Carolina and South Carolina. /

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 1, 2009 Page 3 If there are any questions orif additional information is needed, please contact Mr. M. K. Leisure at (980)875-5171. Sincerely, Bruce H. Hamilton Enclosures

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 1, 2009 Page 4 xc with enclosure: L. A. Reyes Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. B. Brady NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station A.T. Sabisch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station J. H. Thompson (addressee only) NRC Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 B. 0. Hall, Section Chief Division of Environmental Health Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645 S. E. Jenkins, Section Manager Division of Waste Management South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull St. Columbia, SC 29201

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 1, 2009 Page 5 Bruce H. Hamilton affirms that he is the person who subscribed his name to the foregoing statement, and that all the matters and facts set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge. Bruce H. Hamilton, Vice President, McGuire Nuclear Station Subscribed and sworn to me: JgI3TO1 Da /Ite 'Date )00 ~AZ1 6 Notary Public C) My commission expires: 1 vu-L, ) bate

ENCLOSURE 1 Evaluation of the Proposed Change

Subject:

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation

1.

DESCRIPTION

2.

PROPOSED CHANGE

3.

BACKGROUND

4.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

5.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

5.3 Precedents

6.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.

REFERENCES ATTACHMENTS: Ia. McGuire Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Page Markups lb. Catawba Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Page Markups 2a. McGuire Units 1 and 2 Bases Page Markups 2b. Catawba Units 1 and 2 Bases Page Markups I Page 2 of 22

1.

IDESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a request to amend Renewed Facility Operating Licenses NPF-9 and NPF-17 for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, respectively, and Renewed Facility Operating Licenses NPF-35 and NPF-52 for Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2,' respectively. The proposed changes would revise the McGuire and Catawba Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," and the Catawba TS 1.1, "Definitions," as necessary to support planned plant modifications associated with the replacement and upgrade of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Source Range (SR) and Intermediate Range (IR) instrumentation.

2.

PROPOSED CHANGE Specifically, the proposed changes would revise the McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 and Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications as follows: McGuire Nuclear Station

1.

Note 2 in Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.11 currently reads: Power and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2. Note 2 is proposed to be revised to read: Power Range Neutron Flux high voltage detector saturation curve verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2. In addition, a new Note 3 is proposed to be added to read: Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2.* The asterisked footnote applicable to Note 3 is proposed to read: This note applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors which do not require detector plateau voltage verification. Therefore, this note does not apply to the fission chamber neutron detectors. Page 3 of 22

2.

Table 3.3.1-1 presently lists an Allowable Value entry for Function 4, "Intermediate Range Neutron Flux," of "< 30% RTP" (Rated Thermal Power) in two locations. It is proposed to retain these entries with a new asterisked footnote appended, and add an additional Allowable Value entry adjacent to each existing entry to read ":5 38% RTP". The asterisked footnote will read as follows: The < 30% RTP Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The < 38% Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors.

3.

Table 3.3.1-1 presently lists an Allowable Value entry for Function 5, "Source Range Neutron Flux," of "< 1.3 E5 cps" in two locations. It is proposed to retain these entries with a new double-asterisked footnote appended, and add an additional Allowable Value entry adjacent to each existing entry to read "< 1.44E5 cps". The double-asterisked footnote will read as follows: The < 1.3 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied boron triflouride (BF 3) Source Range neutron detectors. The BF 3 neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The < 1.44 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Source Range neutron detectors.

4.

Table 3.3.1-1 presently lists Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint entries for Function 16, "Reactor Trip System Interlocks," Item a, "Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6," of "> 4E-1 1 amp" and "1 E-10 amp", respectively. It is proposed to retain these entries with a new triple-asterisked footnote appended, and add additional Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint entries adjacent to each existing entry to read "> 6.6E-6% RTP" and "1 E-5% RTP", respectively. The triple-asterisked footnote will read as follows: The > 4E-1 1 amp Allowable Value and the 1 E-1 0 amp NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The > 6.6E-6% RTP Allowable Value and the 1 E-5% RTP NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. Page 4 of 22

5.

Two new lettered footnotes, designated (j) and (k), would be added to Table 3.3.1-1. The two new footnotes would apply to the cross-referenced CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) and CHANNEL CALIBRATION requirements listed in the "SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS" column of the Table for Functions 4 and 5, specifically the SR 3.3.1.7, 3.3.1.8, and 3.3.1.11 entries for which Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints are applicable. The new footnotes would read as follows: (j) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. (k) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the UFSAR. Catawba Nuclear Station 1. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT definition in TS Section 1.1 presently states, in part: "If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT." It is proposed to revise this sentence to read: "Unless otherwise specified, if plant conditions warrant..."

2.

Note 2 in Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.11 currently reads: Power and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or2. Note 2 is proposed to be revised to read: Power Range Neutron Flux high voltage detector saturation curve verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or2. In addition, a new Note 3 is proposed to be added to read: Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2.* Page 5 of 22 The asterisked footnote applicable to Note 3 is proposed to read: This note applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors which do not require detector plateau voltage verification. Therefore, this note does not apply to the fission chamber neutron detectors.

3.

Table 3.3.1-1 presently lists an Allowable Value entry for Function 4, "Intermediate Range Neutron Flux," of "< 31% RTP" (Rated Thermal Power) in two locations. It is proposed to retain these entries with a new asterisked footnote appended, and add an additional Allowable Value entry adjacent to each existing entry to read "< 38% RTP". The asterisked footnote will read as follows: The < 31% RTP Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The _ 38% RTP Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors.

4.

Table 3.3.1-1 presently lists an Allowable Value entry for Function 5, "Source Range Neutron Flux," of "< 1.4 E5 cps" in two locations. It is proposed to retain these entries with a new double-asterisked footnote appended, and add an additional Allowable Value entry adjacent to each existing entry to read "< 1.44E5 cps". The double-asterisked footnote will read as follows: The < 1.4 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied boron triflouride (BF 3) Source Range neutron detectors. The BF 3 neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The < 1.44 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Source Range neutron detectors.

5.

Table 3.3.1-1 presently lists Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint entries for Function 16, "Reactor Trip System Interlocks," Item a, "Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6," of ">6E-11 amp" and "lE-10 amp", respectively. It is proposed to retain these entries with a new triple-asterisked footnote appended, and add additional Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint entries adjacent to each existing entry to read "> 6.6E-6% RTP" and "1 E-5% RTP", respectively. The triple-asterisked footnote will read as follows: Page 6 of 22 The > 6E-1 1 amp Allowable Value and the 1 E-1 0 amp NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The > 6.6E-6% RTP Allowable Value and the 1 E-5% RTP NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors.

6.

Two new lettered footnotes, designated (I) and (m), would be added to Table 3.3.1-1. The two new footnotes would apply to the cross-referenced CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) and CHANNEL CALIBRATION requirements listed in the "SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS" column of the Table for Functions 4 and 5, specifically the SR 3.3.1.7, 3.3.1.8, and 3.3.1.11 entries for which Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints are applicable. The new footnotes would read as follows: (I) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. (m) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the UFSAR. Further Discussion As described above, the TSs are modified such that the pre-replacement and post-replacement requirements are shown, since the plant modifications that replace the detectors will occur during separate refueling outages for each unit. After full implementation of all the modifications, a future LAR will be processed such that only the post-replacement requirements are shown in the TSs. As also described above, included in the scope of the proposed changes is the addition of two lettered footnotes applicable to the affected Surveillance Requirements listed in Table 3.3.1-1. These footnotes are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 3. A, Attachments 1la and lb provide a marked-up version of the Technical Specifications for Page 7 of 22 McGuire and Catawba, respectively, showing the proposed changes. Duke will make conforming changes to the Technical Specification Bases in accordance with TS 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program." Attachments 2a and 2b provide the affected TS Bases markups for McGuire and Catawba, respectively. These Bases markups are included for information only. Following NRC approval of this amendment request, for ease of operator use, two complete versions of each corresponding TS Bases section may be physically utilized. One version would be applicable to the existing plant configuration and one version applicable to the proposed plant configuration. This will reflect the fact that the proposed plant modifications will be implemented on a staggered basis for each of the McGuire and Catawba units.

3.

BACKGROUND The Reactor Trip System (RTS) consists of all components from the field-mounted process instrumentation (transmitters, RTDs, neutron detectors, etc.) to the reactor trip switchgear, whose functioning is required to initiate a reactor trip when required. The RTS includes portions of the excore Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS). The excore NIS consists of three discrete but overlapping ranges. These ranges are the Source Range (SR), the Intermediate Range (IR), and the Power Range (PR). Reactor startup and power escalation requires a permissive signal from the higher range instrumentation channels before the lower range trips can be manually blocked by the operator. The PR high neutron flux trip circuit trips the reactor when two of the four PR channels exceed the trip setpoint. There are two bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a high and low range trip setting. The high trip setting provides protection during normal power operation and is always active. The low trip setting, which provides protection during startup, can be manually bypassed when two out of the four PR channels read above approximately 10 percent power (permissive interlock "P-10"). Three out of the four channels below P-1 0 automatically reinstates the low trip function. The IR high neutron flux trip circuit trips the reactor when one out of the two IR channels exceeds the'trip setpoint. This trip, which provides protection during reactor startup, can be manually blocked if two out of the four PR channels are above P-1 0. Three out of the four PR channels below this value automatically reinstates the IR high neutron flux trip. The SR high neutron flux trip circuit trips the reactor when one out of the two SR channels exceeds the trip setpoint. This trip, which provides protection during reactor startup and plant shutdown, can be manually bypassed when one out of the two IR channels reads above the permissive interlock "P-6" setpoint value and is automatically reinstated when both IR channels decrease below the P-6 setpoint value. This trip is also automatically bypassed by two-out-of-four logic from the PR permissive interlock (P-10). This trip function dan also be reinstated below P-10 by an administrative action Page 8 of 22 requiring manual actuation of two control board mounted switches. Each switch will reinstate the trip function in one of the two protection logic trains. The SR trippoint is set between the P-6 setpoint (SR cutoff power level) and the maximum SR power level. The PR low setpoint trip and the IR and SR trips described above are designed to protect the reactor core against power excursions during reactor startup or low power operation. The SR and IR trips provide redundant protection to the low setpoint trip of the PR neutron flux channels for the Condition II fault for an uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical or low power startup condition as described in Sections 7.2 and 15.4 of the McGuire and Catawba UFSARs. In this analysis, only the PR low setpoint trip of 25% power is assumed to actuate to mitigate the accident. No automatic protective actuation of the intermediate range or source range trips is credited in this or any of the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Due to reliability and parts obsolescence issues, the existing Westinghouse-supplied SR and IR excore detector systems are being replaced for both the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations with Thermo Scientific-supplied 300i Neutron Flux Monitoring Systems (NFMS). The existing SR and IR excore detector systems utilize boron triflouride (BF 3) detectors and compensated ion chamber detectors, respectively. The new instrumentation will utilize fission chamber detectors that will perform both the SR and the IR monitoring functions. The modification to replace the SR and IR detectors will not affect any function related to post-accident monitoring, and depending upon the exact alarm setting, may provide improved notification for boron dilution mitigation with an earlier actuation of the High Flux at Shutdown alarm.

4.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS General The new Thermo Scientific equipment is compatible with the rest of the nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection systems and will perform the same functional requirements of the equipment that it will replace. However, it will differ in the following aspects from the existing equipment that it will replace: Detector Orientation - The common Thermo Scientific detector assembly will utilize two fission chamber detectors that provide both the source and intermediate range signals. The fission chamber detector will be positioned such that the centerline of the sensitive volume aligns with the centerline of the core height. The existing BF 3 detector is positioned below the centerline of the core height. Source Range Scale - The SR indication scale will change from 100_106 cps (six decades) to 10-1106 cps (seven decades). Page 9 of 22 Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm - The alarm setpoint is updated, when requested, is electronically established based on a selectable ratio of 1.5 to 4 times steady-state, and is automatically reduced as steady-state count rate decreases. For the existing SR instrumentation, the adjustment is manually established at approximately 5 times steady-state (McGuire) or 3 times steady-state (Catawba). Intermediate Range Scale Units - IR scale units will change from amps to percent power. Intermediate Range Scale - The IR indication scale-will change from 10-11-1o-3 amps (eight decades) to 108-200% RTP (over ten decades). Source Range De-energization - With the existing Westinghouse system, the SR indication is disabled by de-energizing high voltage to the SR detectors when the SR trip is blocked upon receipt of the permissive P-6. This is done in order to prevent damage to the BF 3 detectors due to operation beyond their design limits. The removal of high voltage from the Thermo Scientific fission chamber detectors is not required. They will remain energized through all levels of operation. Detector Plateau Curve Calibration - The Thermo Scientific fission chambers do not require detector plateau curves to be obtained as part of the channel calibration. The fission chambers operate in the ionization chamber region of the detector ionization curve. The pulse output of the detectors is not dependent on the applied voltage over a wide range of voltage. The fission chambers are operated at a fixed high voltage. The PR detectors will remain a Westinghouse installation with vendor recommended saturation curve testing. Thermo Scientific does not require periodic saturation or plateau curve testing for fission chamber detectors. The change in units for the IR scale will result in a change in the value of the P-6 setpoint from its present value in amps, to the equivalent value in percent power. The change in the detector output, together with the change in IR units, requires a verification of the coordination between the SR neutron flux trip and the P-6 setpoints. The coordination of the SR and the P-6 setpoints is as follows. The SR neutron flux trip setpoint and the P-6 permissive are set relative to the overlap between the SR and IR scales. The P-6 permissive is selected such that its bistable trips after the IR indication comes on scale (so IR operation can be verified) and before the SR indication goes off scale (within the overlap region of the instruments). Also within this overlap region is the SR neutron flux trip setpoint. The SR neutron flux trip setpoint is set between the P-6 permissive and the upper range of the SR scale. The SR trip setpoint must be set sufficiently above the P-6 value in order to allow the operator time to block the SR trip and at the same time be below the maximum range of the SR indication. For the SR function, interest is only in the relative change from a baseline value and not in an absolute value of neutron flux. Page 10 of 22 Calculations prepared for this modification verified correct correlation between the SR neutron flux trip and the P-6 permissive setpoints for the new instrumentation. The planned plant modification extends IR bottom range two additional decades. The previous Westinghouse IR P-6 setpoint was established at one decade overlap (1 x 10-1o amps). The proposed P-6 setpoint of 1E-5% RTP provides three decades of overlap to ensure adequate margin to the SR trip setpoint to allow the operator time to actuate the SR neutron flux trip block signal and at the same time ensure a conservative signal overlap with the IR indication. Setpoint Calculation Changes Introduction Setpoint calculation revisions were performed in support of the planned plant modifications, resulting in the need for changes to associated values listed in TS Table 3.3.1-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation", as described in Section 2 above. These setpoint calculations were performed in accordance with Duke Energy Engineering Directives Manual (EDM)-102, "Instrument Setpoint/Uncertainty Calculations," Revision 3. The methodology described in EDM-1 02 is consistent with the intent of Instrument Society of America (ISA) Standard RP67.04-1994 Part II, "Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation." Basic Methodology - EDM-102 The loop uncertainty methodology is primarily based on the "Square-Root-Sum-of-the-Squares" (SRSS) technique for combination of random-independent uncertainty terms. Random-dependent and bias uncertainty terms must be addressed through a combination of the SRSS and/or algebraic techniques. The over-all methodology requires identification of applicable sources of instrument uncertainty, and categorization of each as a random-independent (x,y), random-dependent (w,u), and bias/abnormal distribution (vt) terms. The magnitude of each term is then combined to determine the "Total Loop Uncertainty" (TLU) as depicted below. The "+" and "-" convention represents the positive or negative uncertainty limits within the measured setpoint or indication. + TLU=+{x 2 + y2 + (w + u) 2}1/2 +V + t - TLU=-{x2 + y2 + (w + u)2}1/2 - v - t The treatment of bias/abnormal distribution terms requires additional discussion. Bias terms are typically based on conservative estimates and are predictable. Bias terms would normally be applied only in an additive manner, to the respective "+" or "-" TLU component. Biases of unknown direction would be applied in an additive manner to both the -TLU and +TLU determinations. Application of a non-reoccurring bias term shall not be applied so as to decrease a TLU value. Proper application of a bias would normally result in reduced margin for the setpoint limit of interest. Terms that have an Page 11 of 22 abnormal distribution cannot be SSRS'd with normally distributed terms and must therefore be added as a limit of error in both directions. Evaluation of setpoint acceptability requires comparison of the total loop uncertainty against the operational ranges and the protected limits (process, analytical, and/or safety limits). This setpoint relationship is based on guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation". The typical reactor protection and/or safeguard setpoint relationship, depicting a high process setpoint, is depicted as follows: Safety Limit (SL) Analytical Limit (AL) Tech Spec Allowable Value (AV) Nominal Setpoint <Range of Normal Operation Safety Limits (SL) are the values chosen to reasonably protect the integrity of physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. Analytical Limits (AL) typically are values utilized in the safety analyses, which were specifically chosen to allow the equipment time to act and prevent exceeding the Safety Limits. The Allowable Value (AV) represents an acceptable benchmark (specified by Technical Specifications) for which periodic calibrations/checks must fall within to ensure operability. When a channel "As-found" condition is determined to be less conservative than the AV, the channel must be declared inoperable. The AV determination is based on expected uncertainty influences for the portion of the loop tested. Uncertainty magnitudes must be representative of the surveillance interval duration. Examples of typical uncertainty influences, which may be measured during testing, are reference accuracy, calibration uncertainty, representative uncertainty for temperature variations between calibrations, representative drift over surveillance interval, etc. The AV determination shall be based on the most conservative of either EDM Method 1 or 2, outlined below. EDM Method 2 is typically more conservative for applications with little or no margin from the AL. Conversely, EDM Method 1 is more conservative for applications with substantial margin. The combination of terms for the AV determination should be consistent with that for the TLU value. TLU = +/ - [RUNT2 + RUT2]112 + biases where: NT = denotes uncertainty associated with the portion of the loop not tested during the channel check, calibration, etc. T = denotes uncertainty associated with the portion of the loop tested during the channel check, calibration, etc. RU = total random uncertainty Page 12 of 22 J EDM METHOD 1 AV = SP +'/ - RUT-cal where: SP = nominal setpoint +/- = "+" or "-" sign convention dictated by whichever is in the direction of the Analytical Limit (i.e. towards AL) T-cal = includes representative (minimum) uncertainty term magnitudes associated with the portion of the loop tested and for the desired interval (attributed to the expected variation from "as-left" conditions). EDM METHOD 2 AV = AL + / - RUNT = AL + / - {[(TLU - Biases) 2-RUT-cal2]1 /2 + Biases} where: AL = Analytical Limit "+" or "-" sign convention dictated by whichever is in the direction setpoint (i.e. towards setpoint) Total Loop Uncertainty The setpoint calculation revisions used the EDM-102 methodology to determine the channel uncertainty. However, the method of applying the uncertainty value to the logarithmic instrumentation is different from that used previously. The previous setpoint calculation applied the percent of span accuracy values for SR and IR channels linearly to the range of 0 to 1 x 106 cps and 0 to 120% RTP, respectively. This method results in overly conservative allowable values for the SR and IR channels for a given channel accuracy. Applying the accuracies this way results in allowable values more restrictive than the design capabilities of the instrumentation. This could require excessive calibration checks more frequently than required by the TS to ensure compliance. The setpoint calculation for the replacement instrumentation applies the accuracies for SR and IR channels logarithmically, which is more appropriate, since these instrumentation channels operate in this mode. The calculated TLU adjusted Nominal Trip Setpoint values are as follows: Plant Instrument TLU adjusted NTSP McGuire SR 4.66 E5 cps Catawba SR 4.66 E5 cps McGuire IR 154.08 %RTP Catawba IR 157.89 %RTP McGuire P-6 1.62 E-6 %RTP Catawba P-6 1.58 E-6 %RTP Page 13 of 22 Analytical Limits The Analytical Limit (AL) is the limit of a measured or calculated variable established by the safety analyses to ensure that-a safety limit is not exceeded. The SR and IR neutron flux trips and the "P-6" interlock are not explicitly credited in any design basis accidents. Only the PR low setpoint trip of 25% RTP is credited for actuating to mitigate the uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly withdrawal from a subcritical or low power startup accident, as described in Sections 7.2 and 15.4 of the McGuire and Catawba UFSARs. The SR neutron flux trip does provide a diverse trip function in subcritical modes to help ensure that the UFSAR analysis of this event remains bounding, but its function is not explicitly credited. Since the SR and IR neutron flux trips are not explicitly credited in the accident analyses, no AL has been established for use in the accident analysis. However, reasonable values for use in the setpoint calculations have been established as follows: Plant Instrument Value McGuire SR 6.0 E5 cps Catawba SR 6.0 E5 cps McGuire IR 155% RTP Catawba IR 160% RTP An AL is not applicable for the "P-6" interlock function. Nominal Trip Setpoints The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is the value at which the trip or actuation is intended to occur. The NTSP is primarily chosen to assure that a trip or safety actuation occurs before the process reaches the AL. Secondarily, the NTSP is chosen to assure the plant can operate and experience expected operational transients without unnecessary trips or safeguards actuations. Many methods are available to determine a NTSP which prevents a process from exceeding the AL while providing adequate operating margin. The following equation represents one such acceptable method for determining the Nominal Trip Setpoint: NTSP = AL +/- (TLU + Margin) Note that the margin term is an allowance added to the instrument channel uncertainty which moves the setpoint farther away from the AL. The TLU plus margin allowance is summed or subtracted from the AL depending on whether the process is increasing or decreasing toward the NTSP. The calculated Nominal Trip Setpoints are as follows: Page 14 of 22 Plant Instrument Nominal Trip Setpoint McGuire SR 1.0 E5 cps

• Catawba SR 1.0 E5 cps
• McGuire IR 25% RTP
• Catawba IR 25% RTP
• McGuire P-6 1E-5% RTP Catawba P-6 1 E-5% RTP
• This license amendment application does not propose changes to these values.

Allowable Values The Allowable Value is a limiting value that the trip setpoint may have when tested periodically, beyond which the channel must be declared inoperable. The AV for each setpoint is calculated using the two EDM methods described above in the Basic Methodology - EDM-1 02 Section. The more conservative calculated value for the two methods is then utilized as the AV. Although the accuracy of the new instrumentation is better than the existing instrumentation, the net result of applying the rack uncertainties logarithmically is an increase in the SR and IR allowable values. The calculated Allowable Values are as follows: Plant Instrument Allowable Value McGuire SR - 1.44 E5 cps Catawba SR <1.44 E5 cps McGuire IR - 38% RTP Catawba IR < 38% RTP McGuire P-6 > 6.6 E-6% RTP Catawba P-6 > 6.6 E-6% RTP As-Found Tolerance "As-Found" is the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is found after a period of operation and before recalibration (if necessary). The As-Found Tolerance is the allowance within the TLU that the channel or portion thereof must be within to ensure the channel is capable of producing a trip prior to reaching the Safety Analysis AL. Values recorded during a channel as-found surveillance which are less than the As-Found Tolerance would clearly indicate a channel is operating as intended. Values recorded during a channel as-found surveillance which exceed the As-Found Tolerance would require a more detailed review to determine the effects of the increased uncertainty on the operability of the channel. Uncertainties which make up the As-Found Tolerance for the portion of the channel under surveillance include, reference Page 15 of 22 accuracy, drift, setting tolerance and measurement and test equipment. The calculated As-Found Tolerances for the SR and IR channels are as follows: Plant Instrument As-Found Tolerance McGuire SR < 2.25 % span Catawba SR < 2.25 % span McGuire IR < 1.82 % span Catawba IR < 1.82 % span The above As-Found Tolerances are given in percent span and must be converted to cps or RTP about the previous surveillance As-Left value to obtain the As-Found Tolerance in cps or RTP on the logarithmic scale for these channels. As-Left Tolerance "As-Left" is the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is left after calibration or final setpoint device setpoint verification. The As-Left Tolerance is the acceptable setting variation about the setpoint that the technician may leave the setting following calibration. The size of the setting or As-Left Tolerance is generally based on the reference accuracy and limitations of the technician in adjusting the module (measurement and test equipment and reading resolution). The previous calibration or surveillance As-Left setting value for a channel shall be used as the starting point for determining if the next surveillance As-Found Tolerance is met. Summary The proposed changes do not affect any safety analysis conclusions because the SR and IR neutron flux trips are not explicitly credited in any safety analysis. The proposed changes to the setpoints and allowable values will implement realistic values based on the design capabilities of the instrumentation. Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.11, Notes 2 and 3 Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.11 Note 2 currently states: "Power and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2." As previously described, the Thermo Scientific fission chambers do not require detector plateau curves to be obtained as part of the channel calibration. Accordingly, Note 2 is proposed to be modified to apply only to the Power Range detectors. This change limits the scope of the existing note to only the Power Range detectors, and, as such, is an administrative change that has no adverse effect on plant safety. Additionally, Note 2 is proposed to be modified to clarify that the verification method could be more accurately described as a "high voltage detector saturation curve" verification rather than a "detector plateau voltage" verification. This change, while Page 16 of 22 unrelated to the planned plant modifications, is a clarification that does not affect the intent of the note, and, as such, has no adverse effect on plant safety. A new Note 3 is proposed to be added which includes the'exception previously included in Note 2 applicable to the existing IR detectors. Since the plannedlplant modifications are to be implemented in a phased manner, it is necessary to retain existing TS requirements. In that Note 3 is simply a relocation of an existing requirement, it is an administrative change that has no adverse effect on plant safety. Changes Related to TSTF-493 Included in the scope of the proposed changes is the addition of two lettered footnotes applicable to the affected Surveillance Requirements listed in Table 3.3.1-1. These footnotes are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 3. The first new lettered footnote requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. The second new lettered footnote requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP). Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. This footnote also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the UFSAR. These new footnotes enhance safety by ensuring that unexpected as-found conditions are evaluated prior to returning the channel to service, and ensuring that as-left settings provide sufficient margin for uncertainties. These changes will have no adverse effect on plant safety. NTSP Definition Change The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT definition in TS Section 1.1 of the MNS TS presently states, in part: "Unless otherwise specified, if plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT." Page 17 of 22' Were it not for the "unless otherwise specified" preface, the provision in the MNS TS NTSP definition allowing the trip setpoint to be set outside the calibration tolerance band would be inconsistent with the TSTF-493-related footnote which requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP. With the preface, this provision included in the definition is not applicable to Table 3.3.1-1 functions for which the TSTF-493-related footnotes apply. The current CNS TS definition does not include the preface "unless otherwise specified". The proiposed change to the CNS TS definition will-add this preface and make the CNS definition consistent with the MNS definition, thereby accommodating the integration of the TSTF-493 related changes into TS Table 3.3.1-1. As such, this change is administrative and will have no adverse effect on plant safety. Summary The new Thermo Scientific equipment is compatible with the rest of the nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system, and will perform all the functional requirements of the equipment being replaced. The changes to the TS described above reflect the detailed operational characteristics of the new Thermo Scientific equipment and do not adversely affect the overall operation or ability of the equipment to perform its intended function. The new TS setpoint values are functionally equivalent to the existing values and have no adverse impact on the plant safety analyses, and consequently no impact on plant safety.

5.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed amendment affects McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) and Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation", and CNS TS 1.1, "Definitions". The proposed changes support planned plant modifications associated with the replacement and upgrade of theNuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Source Range (SR) and Intermediate Range (IR) instrumentation. Applicable aspects of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," are incorporated in the scope of the proposed changes. An evaluation has been performed to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendments by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below: Page 18 of 22

1.

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No The proposed Technical Specification changes are in support of a plant modification involving the replacement and upgrade of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Source Range and Intermediate Range instrumentation. The specific Technical Specification changes are associated with 1) the methods of calibrating NIS channels; 2) the definition of Nominal Trip Setpoint; 3) the specific Nominal Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values for various NIS channels, including the Intermediate Range, Source Range and Intermediate Range Permissive "P-6" instrumentation; 4) the addition of specific requirements to be taken if an as-found Intermediate Range or Source Range channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance; and 5) the addition of specific requirements regarding resetting of an Intermediate Range or Source Range channel setpoint within an as-left tolerance. The NIS is accident mitigation equipment and does not affect the probability of any accident being initiated. In addition, none of the above-mentioned proposed Technical Specification changes affect the probability of any accident being initiated. The performance of the replacement SR and IR detectors and associated equipment will equal or exceed that of the existing instrumentation. The proposed changes to Nominal Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values are based on accepted industry standards and will preserve assumptions in the applicable accident analyses. None of the proposed changes alter any assumption previously made in the radiological consequences evaluations, nor do they affect mitigation of the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. In summary, the proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or single failures are introduced as a result of any of the proposed changes. The NIS is not capable by itself of initiating any accident. Other than the replacement of the detectors themselves and the associated hardware, no physical changes to the overall plant are being proposed. No changes to the overall manner in which the plant is operated are being proposed. Therefore, none of the Page 19 of 22 proposed changes will create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their intended functions. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, and -the containment barriers. The modification to replace the SR and IR detectors and associated equipment will not have any impact on these barriers. In addition, the proposed Technical Specification changes will not have any impact on these barriers. No accident mitigating equipment will be adversely impacted as a result of the modification. The proposed changes do not affect any safety analysis conclusions because the SR and IR neutron flux trips are not explicitly credited in any accident analysis. The replacement instrumentation will have overall performance capabilities equal to or greater than those for the existing instrumentation. Therefore, existing safety margins will be preserved. None of the proposed changes will involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above, -it is concluded that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c), and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified. 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria Following implementation of planned plant modifications, the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations will remain in compliance with applicable regulations and requirements. As discussed in the McGuire and Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports, Section 7.2.2.2.3, applicable regulations and requirements include: 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 1, Quality standards and records; GDC 4, Environmental and dynamic effects design basis; GDC 21, Protection system reliability and testability; GDC 22, Protection system independence; GDC 23, -Protection system failure modes; and GDC 24 Separation of protection and control systems. This section of the UFSAR also discusses industry standard IEEE Standard 279-1971. The seismic design considerations for the Reactor Trip System are discussed in UFSAR Section 7.2.1.1.10 (McGuire) and 7.2.1.1.11 (Catawba) and meet the requirements of GDC 2, Design basis for protection against natural phenomena. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," provides regulatory guidance pertinent to the updated Page 20 of 22 instrument setpoint calculations performed in support of the plant modification and this license amendment application.. Regulatory Guide 1.105 endorses Instrument Society of America (ISA) Standard S67.04-1994 Part I, subject to four listed exceptions and clarifications. The four listed exceptions and clarifications, taken verbatim from RG 1.105 (as shown in italics), and discussions of each, as applicable to this license amendment application, are as follows: RG 1.105 Requlatory Position C. 1 Section 4 of ISA-S67.04-1994 specifies the methods, but not the criterion, for combining uncertainties in determining a trip setpoint and its, allowable values. The 95/95 tolerance limit is an acceptable criterion for uncertainties. That is, there is a 95% probability that the constructed limits contain 95% of the population of interest for the surveillance interval selected. A 95/95 tolerance is used to establish acceptable uncertainty values for the instrument strings. At the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations, this is assured by means of the calculation methods, instrument string calibration, and setpoint verification. RG 1.105 Requlatory Position C.2 Sections 7 and 8 of Part 1 of ISA-S67. 04-1994 reference several industry codes and standards. If a referenced standard has been incorporated separately into the NRC's regulations, licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation. If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method acceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a referenced standard has been neither incorporated into the NRC's regulations nor endorsed in a regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consider and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regulatory practice. The setpoint calculation revisions supporting the proposed Technical Specification changes were performed in accordance with Duke Energy Engineering Directives Manual (EDM)-102, "Instrument Setpoint/Uncertainty Calculations," Revision 3. The methodology described in EDM-102 is appropriately justified and is consistent with industry practice. RG 1.105 RecqulatorV Position C.3 Section 4.3 of ISA-$67.04-1994 states that the limiting safety system setting (LSSS) may be maintained in technical specifications or appropriate plant procedures. However, 10 CFR 50.36 states that the Page 21 of 22 technical specifications will include items in the categories of safety limits, limiting safety system settings (LSSS), and limiting control settings. Thus, the LSSS may not be maintained in plant procedures. Rather, the LSSS must be specified as a technical-specification-defined limit in order to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36. The LSSS should be developed in accordance with the setpoint methodology set forth in the standard, with the LSSS listed in the technical specifications. In accordance with Section 4.3 of Part 1 of ISA S67.04-1994, the purpose of the LSSS is to assure that protective action is initiated before the process conditions reach the analytical limit. In addition, the LSSS may be the Allowable Value, the trip setpoint, or both. Consistent with NRC guidance, the LSSS are specified in the McGuire Nuclear Station and Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specifications in the "Allowable Value" column of Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation". RG 1.105 Regulatory Position C.4 ISA-$67.04-1994 provides a discussion on the purpose and application of an allowable value. The allowable value is the limiting value that the trip setpoint can have when tested periodically, beyond which the instrument channel is considered inoperable and corrective action must be taken in accordance with the technical specifications. The allowable value relationship to the setpoint methodology and testing requirements in the technical specifications must be documented. The Allowable Value relationship to the setpoint methodology and testing requirements in the Technical Specifications is documented in the setpoint calculation. The setpoint calculation is maintained as part of plant records.

5.3 Precedents

A license amendment involving a similar plant modification was approved for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (Reference 2). Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Page 22 of 22

6.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.

REFERENCES

1.

Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-493, Revision 3, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions."

2.

NRC letter dated January 22, 1999, "Issuance of Amendments - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. MA3505 and MA3506)," Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425, ADAMS Accession No. ML012390342.

ATTACHMENT la McGuire Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Page Markups

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.4

---

NOTES This Surveillance must be performed on the reactor trip bypass breaker prior to placing the bypass breaker in service.

Perform TADOT. 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.6

---

NOTES Not required to be performed until 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 75% RTP.

Calibrate excore channels to agree with incore detector 92 EFPD measurements. SR 3.3.1.7

---

NOTES Not required to be performed for source range instrumentation prior to entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry into MODE 3.

Perform COT. 184 days (continued) McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1710 Amendment Nos. 248/228

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.8 NOTES This Surveillance shall include verification that interlocks P-6 (for the Intermediate Range channels) and P-10 (for the Power Range channels) are in their required state for existing unit conditions. Perform COT. NOTE ------- Only required when not performed within previous 184 days Prior to reactor startup AND Four hours after reducing power below P-1 0 for power and intermediate range instrumentation AND Four hours after reducing power below P-6 for source range instrumentation AND Every 184 days thereafter (continued) McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-11 Amendment Nos. 248/228

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.9

---

:NOTES Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 92 days SR 3.3.1.10

---

NOTES This Surveillance shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.1.11

---

NOTES

1.

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

2.

Power and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltagehigh voltage detector saturation curve verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2.

3.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be performed 18 months prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2.* Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.1.12 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.1.13 Perform COT. 18 months (continued) This note applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors which do not require detector plateau voltage verification. Therefore, this note does not apply to the fission chamber neutron detectors. McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-12 Amendment Nos. 484M66

McGuire TS Table 3.3.1-1 INSERTS INSERT 1 The < 30% RTP Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The < 38% Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The < 1.3 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied boron triflouride (BF 3) Source Range neutron detectors. The BF 3 neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The - 1.44 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Source Range neutron detectors. INSERT 2 (j) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. (k) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the UFSAR. INSERT 3 The > 4E-1 1 amp Allowable Value and the 1E-10 amp NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The 2 6.6E-6% RTP Allowable Value and the 1 E-5% RTP NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors.

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

1. Manual Reactor Trip 1,2 2

2 B SR 3.3.1.14 C SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA NA NA 3 (a), 4(a), 5(a)

2.

Power Range Neutron Flux

a.

High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 < 110% RTP 109% RTP < 26% RTP 25% RTP

b.

Low 4

3.

Power Range Neutron Flux Rate High Positive Rate

4.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux

5.

Source Range Neutron Flux 1,2 1 (b), 2 (c) 2(d) 2(d) 3(a), 4(a) 5(a) 4 2 2 DSR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 F,G S FSR3.3.1.114 H SR 3.3.1.1 1 < 5.5% RTP with time constant 5% RTP with time constant > 2 sec 2 I,J 2 J,K 3 (e), 4(e), 5(e) I L SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.11 N/A N/A a) Wi Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. (b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. (c) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. e With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide indication. McG-uire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-14 Amendment Nos. (continued) 494M4-7

-No0 C4i 4&1tPj P~L fov/ de4 Table 3.3.1 -1 (page 2of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS. VALUE SETPOINT

6. Overtemperature AT

7.

Overpower AT 1,2 1,2 4 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17 M SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 33.31.10 SR 3.3.1.16 M SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 Refer to Note 1 (Page 3.3.1-18) Refer to Note 2 (Page 3.3.1-19) Refer to Note 1 (Page 3.3.1-18) Refer to Note 2 (Page 3.3.1-19)

8. Pressurizer Pressure

a.

Low '1(f) 4 4 > 1935 psig 1945 psig < 2395 psig 2385 psig

b.

High 1,2

9. Pressurizer Water Level - High

10. Reactor Coolant Flow -

Low

a.

Single Loop

b.

Two Loops

11.

Undervoltage RCPs 1(f) 3 < 93% 92% 1(g) 1(h) 1(f) 3 per loop 3 per loop 1 per bus N SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 M SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 M SR 3.3.1.9 'SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 > 87% > 87% > 5016 V 88% 88% 5082 V (continued) (f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock. (g) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. (h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P78 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. McGuire Units I and 2 3_31-15 Amendment Nos. 222 / 204

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

12. Underfrequency RCPs

13. Steam Generator (SG) Water Level -

Low Low 1(f) 1,2 1 per bus 4 per SG

14. Turbine Trip M

SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 O SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 P SR 3.3.1.10' SR 3.3.1.15 Q SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.14 16.7% > 15% > 55.9 Hz 56.4 Hz,

a.

Low Fluid Oil Pressure

b.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure l(g) 1(g) 3 > 42 psig 45 psig 4 > 1% open > 1% open

15. Safety Injection (SI)

Input from Engineered Safety. Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks

a.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6

b.

Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7

c.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8

d.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10

e.

Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13 1,2 2 trains NA. NA 2 (d) 1,2 2 1 per train 4 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 > 4E-11 amp 1E-l10amp SR 3.3.1.13 ic--,,5.P7oP T SR 3.3.1.5 T SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13 S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13 T SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA < 49% RTP 48% RTP > 7% RTP and < 11% RTP 10% RTP 1 2 < 11% turbine impulse pressure equivalent 10% turbine impulse pressure equivalent (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. (f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock. (g) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. (continued) McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment Nos. 194A79

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

17. Reactor Trip 1,2 2 trains R, V SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Breakers 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 trains C

SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA

18. Reactor.Trip Breaker 1,2 1 each per U

SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Undervoltage and RTB Shunt Trip Mechanisms 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 1 each per C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA RTB

19. Automatic Trip Logic

.1,2 2 trains Q, V SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA (a) (i) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB. McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-17 Amendment Nos. 194/175

ATTACHMENT lb Catawba Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Page Markups

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) MASTER RELAY TEST MODE NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT OPERABLE - OPERABILITY PHYSICS TESTS A MASTER RELAY TEST shall consist of energizing each master relay and verifying the OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay. A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT shall be the design value of a setpoint. The trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be less or more conservative than the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by a calibration tolerance. If-Unless otherwise specified. if plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s). PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation. These tests are:

a.

Described in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR;

b.

Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or

c.

Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. QPTR shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) (continued) Catawba Units 1 and 2 1.1-4 Amendment Nos. !-.9IM-1

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.4

---

NOTE This Surveillance must be performed on the reactor trip bypass breaker prior to placing the bypass breaker in service.

Perform TADOT. 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS* SR 3.3.1.5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.6

---

NOTE Not required to be performed until 24 hours after THERMAL POWER is > 75% RTP.

Calibrate excore channels to agree with incore detector 92 EFPD measurements. SR 3.3.1.7

---

NOTE Not required to be performed for source range instrumentation prior to entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4.hours after entry into MODE 3.

Perform COT. 184 days I (continued)

• The SR 3.3.1.4 Frequency of "62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS" as it applies to Unit 2 Train 2A and Train 2B reactor trip breaker testing may be extended on a one-time basis to March 10, 2009 at 0500 hours, upon which Unit 2 shall be in Mode 3 with reactor trip breakers open for the End of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage. Upon entry into Mode 3 with reactor trip breakers open for this refueling outage, this extension shall expire. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not applicable to this extension.

z__1 Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-10 Amendment Nos. 248/242

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.8 I-- I i r- ---- ------ -- -------- --- -- -------. This Surveillance shall include verification that interlocks P-6 (for the Intermediate Range channels) and P-10 (for the Power Range channels) are in their required state for existing unit conditions. Perform COT. NOTE-Only required when not performed within previous 184 days Prior to reactor startup AND Four hours after reducing power below P-10 for power and intermediate range instrumentation AND Four hours after reducing power below P-6 for source range instrumentation AND Every 184 days thereafter (continued) Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-11 Amendment Nos. 247/240

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.9

---

NOTE-----------------

Verification of.setpoint is not required. Perform TADOT. 92 days SR 3.3.1.10

---

NOTE This Surveillance shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.1.11 NOTE

1.

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

2.

Power and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux deteGtOr plateau veltagehiah voltage detector saturation curve verification is not required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2.

3.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detector plateau voltage verification is not required to be 18 months performed prior to entry into MODE 1 or 2.* Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.1.12 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.1.13 Perform COT. 18 months (continued) This note applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors which do not require detector plateau voltage verification. Therefore, this note does not apply to the fission chamber neutron detectors. Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-12 Amendment Nos. +7-3H165-

Catawba TS Table 3.3.1-1 INSERTS INSERT 1 The 5 31% RTP Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The < 38% RTP Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The < 1.4 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the Westinghouse-supplied boron triflouride (BF 3) Source Range neutron detectors. The BF 3 neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The < 1.44 E5 cps Allowable Value applies to the replacement fission chamber Source Range neutron detectors. INSERT 2 (I) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. (m) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the UFSAR. INSERT 3 The > 6E-11 amp Allowable Value and the 1E-10 amp NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the Westinghouse-supplied compensated ion chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors. The compensated ion chamber neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber neutron detectors. The >.6.6E-6% RTP Allowable Value and the 1 E-5% RTP NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT value apply to the replacement fission chamber Intermediate Range neutron detectors.

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

1. Manual Reactor Trip 1,2 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 2

B SR 3.3.1.14 C SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA NA NA

2. Power Range Neutron Flux

a.

High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 < 110.9% RTP 109% RTP I

b.

Low 4 < 27.1% RTP 25% RTP I

3.

Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate

4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux

5.

Source Range Neutron Flux

6. Overtemperature AT 1,2 1 (b), 2(c) 2 (d) 2 (d) 3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 1,2 D

SR 3.3.1.7 < 6.3% RTP 5% RTP SR 3.3.1.11 with time with time constant constant > 2 sec > 2 sec F,G R3.3.1.1 </31%,RTP 25% RTP SR 3.3.1.8 R 1p SIR 3.3. 1.11 No e1 P g N t H SR 3.3.1.1 31-%RTP-25%RTP SR 3.3.1.87( ) 3.3-.- SR 3.3.1.1<0 4.0 c E' SR 3.3.1.1 Reet R 5cs 10E5ecto SR 3.3.1.3 Not 1(Pge Noe SR 3.3.1.6 e)- 3..1-18)C(Page JK SR 3.3.1.7 .4E4 3.3.1518) SR 3.3.1.10c SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17 /J E(continued) (a ea or Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. (b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. (c) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

• re P6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

"a tawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-14 Amendment Nos. +79H171

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

7.

Overpower AT 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 2 (Page Note 2 SR 3.3.1.6 3.3.1-19) (Page SR 3.3.1.7 3.3.1-19) SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17

8.

Pressurizer Pressure

a.

Low 1(e) 4 L SR 3.3.1.1 _ 1938(f) psig 1945(0 SR 3.3.1.7 psig SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16

b.

High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1

• 2399 psig 2385 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16

9.

Pressurizer Water 1(e) 3 L SR 3.3.1.1 < 93.8% 92% Level - High SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10

10. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low

a.

Single Loop l(g) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 > 89.7% 91% SR.3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16

b.

Two Loops l(h) 3 per loop L SR 3.3.1.1 Ž> 89.7% 91% SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 (continued) (e) (f) (g) (h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.. Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure - Low are 2 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag. Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment Nos. 179/171

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

11.

Undervoltage RCPs

12. Underfrequency RCPs

13. Steam Generator (SG) Water Level -

Low Low 1(e) l(e) 1 per bus 1 per bus 4 per SG L SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 L SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16

• 5016 V
• 55.9 Hz 5082 V 56.4 Hz 1,2

Ž9% (Unit 1) > 35.1% (Unit 2) of narrow range span 10.7% (Unit 1) 36.8% (Unit 2) of narrow range span

14. Turbine Trip

a.

Stop Valve EH Pressure Low

b.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure

15. Safety Injection (SI)

Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) 10) 1,) 1,2 4 4 2 trains N SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 0 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 P SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.14 > 500 psig Ž 1% open NA 550 psig NA NA (e) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock. (i) Not used, () Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. I!~~~~r p~~VJJ p T3/4FA Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment Nos. 179/171

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 7). Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks

a.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6

b.

Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7

c.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8

d.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9

e.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-,10

f.

Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13 2(d) 2 R SR 3.3.1.11 >6E-11 amp 1E-10 amp ISR 3.3.113 NA NA KIP S SIR 3.3.1.5 NA NA 1 1 per train 1,2 4 4 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13 S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13 R SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13 S SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.13 < 50.2% RTP 48% RTP < 70% RTP 69% RTP 1 2 Ž> 7.8% RTP and _< 12.2% .RTP < 12.2% RTP turbine impulse pressure equivalent 10% RTP I 10% RTP turbine impulse pressure equivalent

17. Reactor Trip Breakers(k)

18. Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms

19. Automatic Trip Logic 1,2 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 1,2 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 1,2 3(a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 trains 2 trains 1 each per RTB 1 each per RTB Q,U SR 3.3.1.4 C

SR 3.3.1.4 T SR 3.3.1.4 C SR 3.3.1.4 P,U SR 3.3.1.5 C SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 trains 2 trains (a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal. (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate' Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. (k) Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB. (continued) Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-17 Amendment Nos. 1:79A71

ATTACHMENT 2a McGuire Units I and 2 Technical Specification Bases Page Markups (Provided for information only)

McGuire Bases INSERTS INSERT 1 (new paragraph) For Functions for which TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions" (Reference 12) has been implemented, this SR is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP). Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the UFSAR. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT definition includes a provision that would allow the as-left setting for the channel to be outside the tolerance band, provided the setting is conservative with respect to the NTSP. This provision is not applicable to Functions for which the second NOTE applies. INSERT 2 (new paragraph) For Functions for which TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions" (Reference 12) has been implemented, this SR is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP). Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the UFSAR. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT definition includes a provision that would allow the as-left setting for the channel to be outside the tolerance band, provided the setting is conservative with respect to the NTSP. This provision is not applicable to Functions for which the second NOTE applies.

McGuire Bases INSERTS (Continued) INSERT 3 The high voltage detector saturation curve is evaluated and compared to the manufacturer's data. The Westinghouse-supplied boron-triflouride (BF 3) source range neutron detectors and compensated ion chamber intermediate range neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber source and intermediate range neutron detectors. INSERT 4 The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the fission chamber source and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of verifying that the channels respond correctly to test inputs with the necessary range and accuracy. INSERT 5 Note 3 applies to the compensated ion chamber intermediate range neutron detectors, and states that this Surveillance is not required to be performed for entry into MODE 2 or 1. Notes 2 and 3 are required INSERT 6 (new paragraph) For Functions for which TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions" (Reference 12) has been implemented, this SR is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect tothe Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP). Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the UFSAR. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT definition includes a provision that would allow the as-left setting for the channel to be outside the tolerance band, provided the setting is conservative with respect to the NTSP. This provision is not applicable to Functions for which the second NOTE applies. INSERT 7 Technical Specification Task Force, Improved Standard Technical Specifications Change Traveler, TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 3.

McGuire Bases INSERTS (Continued) INSERT 8 The Westinghouse-supplied BF3 detectors used for the NIS Source Range Channels are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber detectors. The Westinghouse NIS Source Range Channels utilizing BF3 detectors have a range of 1 to 1E6 cps. The replacement Thermo Scientific NIS Source Range Channels utilizing fission chamber detectors havea range of 0.1 to 1 E6 cps.

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1 or 2, when there is a potential to add a large amount of positive reactivity from a rod ejection accident (REA), the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip must be OPERABLE. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls will provide protection against positive reactivity additions. In MODE 6, no rods are withdrawn and the SDM is increased during refueling operations. The reactor vessel head is also removed or the closure bolts are detensioned preventing any pressure buildup. In addition, the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels present in this mode.

4.

Intermediate Rangqe Neutron Flux 0The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range o 4Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip Function. The NIS intermediate range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal -may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to otrip the reactor. The LCO requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron 4

• Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

Because this trip Function is important only during startup, there is generally no need to disable channels for testing while the Function is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, a third channel is unnecessary. In MODE 1 below the P-10 setpoint, and in MODE 2, when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident during reactor startup, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Above the P-10 setpoint, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip provide core protection for a rod withdrawal accident. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, the Intermediate Range McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-10 Revision No. 99

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Neutron Flux trip does not have to be OPERABLE because other RTS trip functions provide protection against positive reactivity additions. The reactor cannot be started up in this condition. The core also has the required SDM to mitigate the consequences of a positive reactivity addition accident. In MODE 6, all rods are fully inserted and the core has a required increased SDM. Alse, tho NI, nnotte~re~. ......eutrn.. ivo3l proscnt- .in thus ;,OeDB E.

5.

Source Range Neutron Flux The LCO requirement for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Functions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled withdrawal of rods. The NIS source range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS source range detectors do not provide any inputs to control systems. The source range trip is the only RTS automatic protection function required in MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the CRD System capable of rod withdrawal. Therefore, the functional capability at the specified Trip Setpoint is assumed to be available. The LCO requires two channels of Source Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. The LCO also requires one channel of the Source Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with RTBs open. In this case, the source range Function is to provide control room indication. The outputs of the Function to RTS logic are not required OPERABLE when the RTBs are open. The Source Range Neutron Flux Function provides protection for control rod withdrawal from subcritical, boron dilution, and control rod ejection events. The Function also provides visual neutron flux indication in the control room. In MODE 2 when below the P-6 setpoint during a reactor startup, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Above the P-6 setpoint, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip and the McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-11 Revision No. 499-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Power Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip will provide core protection for reactivity accidents. Above the P-6 setpoint, the *fe-1 Sao-c.-e-- J?-#ja " e~,o,C-k. I /ceecL In MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the reactor shut down, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function must also be OPERABLE. If the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE to provide core protection against a rod withdrawal accident. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours the Surveillance requirement SR 3.3.1.7 f-must be completed within 4 hoursdafter entry into MODE 3. rsureillance shall include verification of the high flux at s h i lvalarm setpoint of less than or equal c ti geund of theo average CPS Neutron Level Rn e average CPS Reading isd the most ronsetent h en highest and lowest CPS s \\_ ý ýne u týevel Reading). If the CRD System is not capable of rod withdrawal, the source range detectors are not required to trip the reactor. However, their monitoring Function must be OPERABLE to monitor core neutron levels and provide indication of reactivity changes that may occur as a result of events like a boron dilution. Trudhe neutron detector's high flux a will alarm setpMoidntges than or equal to five times background, in Mode 3, 4, or hall be verified. Once the High Flux at Shutdown Alarm setwints are set at five times background above steady state neon count rate the re-verification/re-adjustment of the high flupshutdown is not required. The neutron cou a willr prease as Mode changes are made from 3 to to 'e em temperature decreases. Any subsequent changes ithe count rate are an indication of gamma flux (due ton Svimgent of irradiated particles in the system) which may causet source range response to vary.- Upon increase in 19eutron count rattue isto activities that add positive reactiyonto the core, the presence of gamma flux will cease to be a fDtettor an lar count rate. g ACHANNEL CHECK provides a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. This is based on the assumption that the two indicating channels should be consistent. Significant differences between the indicating source range channels can occur due to core geometry, decreasing neutron count rate as temperature is decreasing in the system, the location of the Source Assemblies (distance from the Source Detectors), and large amounts of gamma. Each channel should be McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-12 Revision No. Q9-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. Therefore, this trip Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor is critical, and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the reactor is not critical, and this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.

16.

Reactor Trip System Interlocks Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current unit status. They back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore, the interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABLE when the associated reactor trip functions are outside the applicable MODES. These are:

a.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock is actuated when any NIS intermediate range channel goes a roximately e-4dGae-above the minimum channel e-c*Jec-. ca S reading.TfE5th channels drop below the setpoint, the permissive will automatically be defeated. The LCO requirement for the P-6 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed: on increasing power, the P-6 interlock allows the manual block of the NIS Source Range, Neutron Flux reactor trip. This prevents a premature block of the source range trip and allows the operator to ensure that the intermediate range is OPERABLE prior to leaving the source range. W~he-4hseura*e---- .a4sG-re-oved-, an on decreasing power, the P-6 interlock automatically enables the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip. The LCO requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 when below the P-6 interlock setpoint. McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-23 Revision No. J RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) The LCO requires four channels of Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1. In MODE 1, a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions and, a turbine trip could cause a load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System, so the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the core is not producing sufficient power to be concerned about DNB conditions and the reactor is not at a power level sufficient to have a load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System.

d.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 The Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 interlock is actuated at approximately 10% power, as determined by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors. If power level falls below 10% RTP on 3 of 4 channels, the nuclear instrument trips will be automatically unblocked. The LCO requirement for the P-10 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed: on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trip. Note that blocking the reactor trip also blocks the signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal; on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip; on increasing power, the P-10 interlock automatically provides a backup signal to block the Source Range N eutron Flux reactor trip l e d, alcctc.. ., i e tt the P-10 interlock provides one of the two inputs to the P-7 interlock; and McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.311-26 Revision No. Q9-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs and associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal. The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 6). ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.1-1. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.1-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate. A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found equal to or more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition(s) entered for the protection Function(s) affectede.4f-plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS. If the trip

• setpoint is found outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP "V

SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted. When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those uspecified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip Function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation. A.1 0Condition A applies to all RTS protection Functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required channels for one or -more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions. McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-29 Revision No. 49-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Channel III, and Channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTs are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies. Performing the Neutron Flux Instrumentation surveillances meets the License Renewal Commitments for License Renewal Program for Neutron Flux Instrumentation Circuits per UFSAR Chapter 18, Table 18-1 and License Renewal Commitments Specification MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.44. SR 3.3.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. . z3.,3. 1. 7_ SR 3.3.1.2 compares the calorimetric heat balance calculation to the NIS channel output every 24 hours. If the calorimetric exceeds the NIS channel output by > 2% RTP, the NIS is not declared inoperable, but must be adjusted. If the NIS channel output cannot be properly adjusted, the channel is declared inoperable. Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.2. The first Note indicates that the NIS channel output shall be adjusted consistent with the calorimetric results if the absolute difference between the NIS channel output and the calorimetric is > 2% RTP. The second Note clarifies that this Surveillance McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-41 Revision No. RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 ýBASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) relationship between excore and incore measurements changes significantly. A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6. The Notestates that this Surveillance is -required only if reactor power is > 75% RTP and that 24 hours is allowed for completing the first surveillance after reaching 75% RTP. The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 184 days. A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the channel will perform the intended Function. The tested portion of the Loop must trip within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours this Surveillance must be completed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. The surveillance shall include verification of the high flux at shutdown alarm setpoint of less than or equal to the average CPS Neutron Level reading (most consistent value between highest and lowest CPS Neutron Level reading) at five times background.. e Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 11. SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-6, during the Intermediate Range COT, and P-10, during the Power Range COT, interlocks are in their required state for the existing unit condition. The verification is performed by visual observation of the McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-44 Revision No. 49-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) permissive status light in the unit control room. The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 184 days of the Frequencies prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10 and P-6. The Frequency of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source, intermediate and power range low instrument channels. The Frequency of "4 hours after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate and power range low channels) and "4 hours after reducing power below P-6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 184 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours afterreducing power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-10 for the power range low and intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels. Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P-10 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS source, intermediate, and power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or < P-6) for periods > 4 hours. The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 11. SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT and is performed every 92 days, as justified in Reference 7. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency relays, setpoint verification is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.1.10 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed at power or during refueling based on testing capability. Channel unavailability evaluations in McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-45 Revision No.-9&-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) References 10 and 11 have conservatively assumed that the CHANNEL CALIBRAITON is performed at power with the channel in bypass. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology., SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable. The applicable time constants are shown in Table 3.3.1-1. SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. Two notes modify this SR. Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a !A)'t2-A ",3 power calorimetric and flux map performed above 15% RTP. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the ource range neutron detectors cnsists of two methods. Metlio-d 1 consists of obtaining the discriminator curves for source range, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data (adjustments to the discriminator voltage are performed as required). Method 2 consists-of performing waveform analysis. This analysis process monitors the actual number and amplitude of the Neutron/Gamma pulses being generated by the SR detector. The high voltage is adjusted to optimize the amplitude of the pulses while maintaining as low as possible high voltage value in order to prolong the detector life. The discriminator voltage is then adjusted, as required, to reasonably ensure that the neutron pulses are being counted by the source range instrumentation and the unwanted gamma pulses are not being counted as neutron pulses. .y-e4,,,bcr The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the intermediate range neutron detectors consists of the high voltage detector plateau for intermediate range, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's naa. Note 2 states that this Surveillance is not required McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-46 Revision No. RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, ao-4s-- r-quirfd for the,IS into*-R-dEiatc ronge detectors foi-entry into MODE 2, -- 2 t-because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the ,-J. "potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed f -with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these ol ,components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency. SR 3.3.1.12 ),&T C~(0 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. Calibration of the AT channels is required at the beginning of each cycle upon completion of the precision heat balance. RCS loop AT values shall be determined by precision heat balance measurements at the beginning of each cycle. The Frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. SR 3.3.1.14 SR 3.3.1.14 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual Reactor Trip and the SI Input from ESFAS. This TADOT is performed every 18 months. The test shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms for the Manual Reactor Trip Function for the Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers. The Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker test shall include testing of the automatic undervoltage trip. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Functions and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-47 Revision No. RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES REFERENCE S

1.

UFSAR, Chapter 7.

2.

UFSAR, Chapter 6.

3.

UFSAR, Chapter 15.

4.

IEEE-279-1971.

5.

10 CFR 50.49.

6.

10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).

7.

WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2, Rev. 1, June 1990.

8.

WCAP 13632-P-A, Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements" Sep., 1995.

9.

WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests" Oct., 1998.

10.

WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, October 1998.

11.

WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, March 2003. ii. J, DELT77 McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-50 Revision No. 4)9-

Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The source range neutron flux monitors are used during refueling operations to monitor the core reactivity condition. The installed source range neutron flux monitors are part of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) while the Wide Range Neutron Flux Monitoring System (Gamma-Metrics) are not. Source range indication is provided via the NIS source range channels and the Gamma-Metrics shutdown monitors using detectors located external to the reactor vessel. These detectors monitor neutrons leaking from the core. Neutron flux indication for these monitors are provided in counts per second. /,S -I e Wode Range (Gamma-Metrics) channels are fission chambers with a range of 0.1 to 1 E5 cps (in the startup range). The NIS source range channels and the Gamma-Metrics shutdown monitors provide continuous visible count rate indication in the control room and a high flux control room alarm to alert operators to any unexpected positive reactivity additions. Since TS 3.9.2 requires isolation of unborated water sources, the shutdown monitors (Gamma-Metrics) audible alarm, NIS source range audible indication and audible alarm are not required for OPERABILITY in Mode 6. The NIS source range detectors and the Gamma-Metrics are designed in accordance with the criteria presented in Reference 1. APPLICABLE Two OPERABLE source range neutron flux monitors (any combination of SAFETY ANALYSES the two NIS source range monitors and the two Gamma-Metrics wide range monitors) are required to provide an indication to alert the operator to unexpected changes in core reactivity such as with a boron dilution accident (Ref. 2) or an improperly loaded fuel assembly. The source range neutron flux monitors satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3). LCO This LCO requires that two source range neutron flux monitors be OPERABLE to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in core reactivity. To be operable, each monitor must provide a visual indication in the Control Room. The visual indication can be, but not limited to, either a gauge, chart recorder, CRT, or some other recording device McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.9.3-1 Revision No. ý

ATTACHMENT 2b Catawba Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Bases Page Markups (Provided for information only)

Catawba Bases INSERTS INSERT 1 (new paragraph) For Functions for which TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions" (Reference 11) has been implemented, this SR is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.1-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of channel performance will verify that the channel will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis assumptions and the channel performance assumptions in the setpoint methodology. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service. The performance of these channels will be evaluated under the station's Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP). Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the NTSP, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires that the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the UFSAR. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT definition includes a provision that would allow the as-left setting for the channel to be outside the tolerance band, provided the setting is conservative with respect to the NTSP. This provision is not applicable to Functions for which the second NOTE applies. INSERT 2 The'high voltage detector saturation curve is evaluated and compared to the manufacturer's data. The Westinghouse-supplied boron-triflouride (BF 3) source range neutron detectors and compensated ion chamber intermediate range neutron detectors are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber source and intermediate range neutron detectors. INSERT 3 The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the fission chamber source and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of verifying that the channels respond correctly to test inputs with the necessary range and accuracy. INSERT 4 Note 2 states that this Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1. Note 3 applies to the compensated ion chamber intermediate range neutron detectors, and states that this Surveillance is not required to be performed for entry into MODE 2 or 1. Notes 2 and 3 are required because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the compensated ion chamber intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors. INSERT 5 Technical Specification Task Force, Improved Standard Technical Specifications Change Traveler, TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 3.

Catawba Bases INSERTS (Continued) INSERT 6 The Westinghouse-supplied BF3 detectors used for the NIS Source Range Channels are being replaced with Thermo Scientific-supplied fission chamber detectors. The Westinghouse NIS Source Range Channels utilizing BF3 detectors have a range of 1 to 1E6 cps. The replacement Thermo Scientific NIS Source Range Channels utilizing fission chamber detectors have a range of 0.1 to 1 E6 cps.

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND APPLICABILITY (continued) against positive reactivity additions or power excursions in MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6.

3.

Power Range Neutron Flux - High Positive Rate The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip uses the same channels as discussed for Function 2 above. The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function 4-ensures that protection is provided against rapid increases in neutron flux that are characteristic of an RCCA drive rod housing -4 rupture and the accompanying ejection of the RCCA. This Function compliments the Power Range Neutron Flux-High and Low Setpoint trip Functions to ensure that the criteria are met for a %rod ejection from the power range.

• .The LCO requires all four-of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High PositiveRate channels to be OPERABLE.

o "In MODE 1 or 2, when there is a potential to add a large amount of positive reactivity from a rod ejection accident (REA), the Power

• . *Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip must be OPERABLE.

) .In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE Q-1 because other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls will provide protection against positive reactivity additions. In MODE 6, no rods are withdrawn and the SDM is increased during refueling o operations. The reactor vessel head is also removed or the closure bolts are detensioned preventing any pressure buildup. In addition, the NIS power range'detectors cannot detect neutron levels present in this mode.

4.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod Withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-10 Revision No. 1

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip Function. The NIS intermediate range detectors are.located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to ,trip the reactor. The LCO requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. Because this trip Function is important only during startup, there is generally no need to disable channels for testing while the Function is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, a third channel is unnecessary. In MODE 1 below the P-10.setpoint, and in MODE 2, when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident during reactor startup, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Above the P-10 setpoint, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip provide core protection for a rod withdrawal accident. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip does not have to be OPERABLE because other RTS trip functions provide protection against positive reactivity additions. The reactor cannot be started up in this condition. The core also has the required SDM to mitigate the consequences of a positive reactivity addition accident. In MODE 6, all rods are fully inserted and the core has a required increased SDM. Al,,, the,IS'- -intermodoto rmat no "' d .t..t... e gR3^nt te-t n

• u*tr.n levels prc.ent R aMODE. 'r Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-11 Revision No.-(ý-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

5.

Source Range Neutron Flux The LCO requirement for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Functions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled withdrawal of rods. The NIS source range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS source range detectors do not provide any inputs to control systems. The source range trip is the only RTS automatic protection function required in MODES 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, the functional capability at the specified Trip Setpoint is assumed to be available. The LCO requires two channels of Source Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. The Source Range Neutron Flux Function provides protection for control rod withdrawal from subcritical and control rod ejection events. The Function also provides visual neutron flux indication in the control room. In MODE 2 when below the P-6 setpoint during a reactor startup, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Above the P-6 setpoint, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip will provide core protection for reactivity accidents. Above the P-6 setpoint, the.N+-t-Sp' r..IC. ran.ge dotectorc o de _energiz.,e, 3n,,', po; ...II In MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the reactor shut down, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function must also be OPERABLE. If the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE to provide core protection against a rod withdrawal accident. If the CRD System is not capable of rod withdrawal, the source range detectors are not required to trip the reactor. Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-12 Revision No. -&-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) ,However, other transients and accidents take credit or varying levels of ESF performance and rely upon rod insertion, except for the most reactive rod that is assumed to be fully withdrawn, to ensure reactor shutdown. Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values are not applicable to this Function. The SI Input is provided by a manual switch or by the automatic actuation logic. Therefore, there is no measurement signal with which to associate an LSSS. The LCO requires two trains of SI Input from ESFAS to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. Therefore, this trip Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor is critical, and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the reactor is not critical, and this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.

16.

Reactor Trip System Interlocks o Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current unit status. They N) ~7back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore, the Qu 1 interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABLE when the associated reactor trip functions are outside the applicable

• o MODES. These are:

a.

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock is actuated when any NIS intermediate range channel goes approximatel above the minimum channel reading. If both channels drop below the setpoint, the permissive will automatically be defeated. The LCO requirement for the P-6 interlock ensures that the following SFunctions are performed: Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1'-23 Revision No. 0

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) on increasing power, the P-6 interlock allows the manual block of the NIS Source Range, Neutron Flux reactor trip. This prevents a premature block of the source range trip and allows the operator to ensure that the intermediate range is OPERABLE prior to leaving the source range. Whe, th-sourco ran.. tri is blacked, the high,,o-ltage to-tho d.t..t... iC a~o rcroved;,and,, on decreasing power, the P-6 interlock automatically e th, e"° ource range detectors an-d* enables the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux'reactor trip. The LCO requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 when below the P-6 interlock setpoint. Above the P-6 interlock setpoint, the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip will be blocked, and this Function will no longer be necessary. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the P-6 interlock does not have to be OPERABLE because the NIS Source Range is providing core protection.

b.

Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 The Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 interlock is actuated by input from either the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10, or. the Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13 interlock. The LCO requirement for the P-7 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed: (1) on increasing power, the P-7 interlock automatically enables reactor trips on the following Functions: 0 Pressurizer Pressure-Low; Pressurizer Water Level-High; Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-24 Revision No.-ý9-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) The LCO requires four channels of Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1. In MODE 1, a turbine trip.could cause a load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System, so the Power Range Neutron Flux interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not at a power level sufficient to have a load'rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System.

e.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 The Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 interlock is actuated at approximately 10% power, as determined by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors. If power level falls below 10% RTP on 3 of 4 channels, the nuclear instrument trips will be automatically unblocked. The LCO requirement for the P-10 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed: on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trip. Note that blocking the reactor trip also blocks the signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal; on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip; on increasing power, the P-10 interlock automatically provides a backup signal to block the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip,"nd ='s, to,'-,nergizo th- .NIS souJrco .. u..... dctor.3, Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-27 Revision No.-.@-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

19.

Automatic Trip Logic The LCO requirement for the RTBs (Functions 17 and 18) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 19) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each train RTB has a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip breaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor. The LCO requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs and associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal. The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 6). ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3. 1-1. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.1-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate. A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, b *or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition(s) entered for the protection Function(s) affected. eplant conditions 3 warrant, t e rip se point may be set outside the OMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-30 Revision No. 4-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES-, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is justified in Reference 12. SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. If the measurements do not agree, the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be calibrated to agree with the incore detector measurements. If the excore channels cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(AI) input to the overtemperature AT Function and overpower AT Function. At Beginning of Cycle (BOC), the excore channels are compared to the incore. detector measurements prior to exceeding 75% power. Excore detectors are adjusted as necessary. This low power surveillance satisfies the initial performance of SR 3.3.1.6 with subsequent surveillances conducted at least every 92 EFPD. At BOC, after reaching full power steady state conditions, additional incore and excore measurements are taken at various Al conditions to determine the Mj factors. The Mj factors are normally only determined at BOC, but they may be changed at other points in the fuel cycle if the L? relationship between excore and incore measurements changes significantly. z *q.,.A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6. The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is > 75% RTP and that 24 hours is allowed for completing the first surveillance after reaching 75% RTP. 'The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 184 days. A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the channel will Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-45 Revision No. 3

RTS Instrumentation 'B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) perform the intended Function. The tested portion of the loop must trip within'the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4'hours this Surveillance must be completed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. ldays is justified in Reference 12.

SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7, except it is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the P-6, during the Intermediate Range COT, and P-10, during the Power Range COT, interlocks are in their required state for the existing unit condition. The verification is performed by visual observation of the permissive status light in the unit control room. The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 184 days of the Frequencies prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10 and P-6. The Frequency of "prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source, intermediate and power range low instrument channels. The Frequency of "4 hours after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate and power range low channels) and "4 hours after reducing power below P-6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 184 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-10 for the power range low and intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 !B 3.3.1-46, Revision No. RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P-10 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS source, intermediate, and power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or < P-6) for periods > 4 hours. The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 12. SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT and is performed every 92 days, as justified in Reference 7. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency relays., setpoint verification is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. SR 3.3.1.10 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology. SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable. The applicable time constants are shown in Table 3.3.1-1. Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-47 Revision No. --3--

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.11 f I SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. This SR is modified by two notes. Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric and flux map erformed above 15% RTP. ",3. IT Z.. -The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the ou"rce range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the high vo age detector plateau and discriminator curves for source range, and the high voltage detector plateau for intermediate ran e, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data.At e-=o--illoncQ ii n~l required for the+ NISl p-wc range deti'C*u Ol i& for Oti-y-irot MODE, 2* or 1, and 3s nt roquired for th rle NISi+trmc~d'm te ralnge do+ct^rs for ontry i*nto MODE 2, bcom" tle uit must bc in at I+,,t MODE 2 to peo, th~ testf:o the intormodiate range detoctors and M .tThe 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency. SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as described in SR 3.3.1.10, every 18 months. The Frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating. experience. Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-48 Revision No.-G-

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) time could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter. As appropriate, each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices is included in the testing. Testing of the RTS RTDs is performed on an 18 month frequency. Response times cannot be determined during unit operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.3.1.16 is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response. The response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of the first electronic component in the channel. REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 7.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.

3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

4. IEEE-279-1971.

5. 10 CFR 50.49.

6. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).

7. WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2, Rev. 1, June 1990.

8. WCAP-1 3632-P-A Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements" Sep., 1995.

9. WCAP-14036-P-A Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests" Oct., 1998.

10.10 CFR 50.67. Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-51 Revision No. Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.2 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The neutron flux monitors are used during refueling operations to monitor the core reactivity condition. The installed neutron flux monitors are part of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) and the Wide Range Neutron Flux Monitoring System (Gamma-Metrics). Source range indication is provided via the NIS source range channels and the Gamma-Metrics shutdown monitors using detectors located external to the reactor vessel. These detectors monitor neutrons leakinq fom the core. Neutron flux indication is provided in counts per second.r-4 h Gil ur ar chainnos h,- av a-rangc of 1 to 1-EGr cp. The Wide Range channels have a range of 0.1 to 1E5 cps (in the startup range). The NIS source range channels and the Gamma-Metrics shutdown monitors provide continuous visible count rate indication in the control room. The NIS is designed in accordance with the criteria presented in Reference 1. The shutdown monitors (Gamma-Metrics) automatic actuations and alarm are not required for OPERABILITY during refueling operations. The NIS source range audible indication and audible alarm are not required for OPERABILITY during refueling operations. APPLICABLE Two OPERABLE neutron flux monitors are required to provide SAFETY an indication to alert the operator to unexpected changes in core ANALYSES reactivity such as with a boron dilution accident (Ref. 2) or an improperly loaded fuel assembly. The neutron flux monitors satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3). LCO This LCO requires that two neutron flux monitors be, OPERABLE to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in core reactivity. To be OPERABLE, each monitor must provide visual indication. APPLICABILITY In MODE 6, the neutron flux monitors must be OPERABLE to determine changes in core reactivity. There are no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels. In MODES 2, 3, 4, and 5, the NIS source range detectors and circuitry are also required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation." The Gamma-Metrics shutdown monitors are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4 and 5 Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.9.2-1 Revision No. ENCLOSURE 2 Summary of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Duke in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. M. K. Leisure at (704)875-5171. COMMITMENT DUE DATE/EVENT Duke will submit a follow-up administrative license Within one year amendment request to delete the superseded TS following the requirements. implementation of the modification for the final unit.}}