Letter Sequence Draft RAI |
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TAC:ME8160, Eliminate Use of Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes (Withdrawn, Closed) TAC:ME8161, Eliminate Use of Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes (Withdrawn, Closed) TAC:ME8162, Eliminate Use of Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes (Withdrawn, Closed) |
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MONTHYEARML12076A0452012-03-0808 March 2012 Request for Amendment to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Request ML1213103802012-05-10010 May 2012 Acceptance Review Email, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Revision 3 Project stage: Acceptance Review ML12248A1502012-09-0404 September 2012 E-mail Draft Request for Additional Information, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Revision 3 Project stage: Draft RAI ML12250A7202012-09-11011 September 2012 Request for Additional Information, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Revision 3 Project stage: RAI ML12286A3302012-10-11011 October 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Response to RAI ML12341A1292012-12-0505 December 2012 E-mail, Draft Request for Additional Information, Round 2, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160/ME8162) Project stage: Draft RAI ML12347A0402012-12-19019 December 2012 Request for Additional Information, Round 2, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160-ME8162) Project stage: RAI ML12362A2922013-01-0303 January 2013 Request for Additional Information, Round 3, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160-ME8162) Project stage: RAI ML13039A0132013-01-31031 January 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Response to RAI ML13072A1822013-03-13013 March 2013 Email, Draft Request for Additional Information, Round 4, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160-ME8162) Project stage: Draft RAI ML13127A2432013-05-0808 May 2013 5/29/13 Meeting Via Conference Call with Arizona Public Service Company to Discuss Palo Verde Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 (TAC ME8160-ME81 Project stage: Meeting ML13150A0812013-06-0303 June 2013 Request for Additional Information, Round 4, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 Project stage: RAI ML13154A4502013-06-26026 June 2013 Summary of Meeting Via Conference Call with Arizona Public Service Co. to Discuss Palo Verde Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 (TAC ME8160-ME816 Project stage: Meeting ML13210A2382013-07-25025 July 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Response to RAI ML14051A1032014-02-13013 February 2014 Withdrawal of Request for Amendment to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Aleration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Request ML14059A1782014-03-0707 March 2014 Withdrawal of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 Project stage: Withdrawal ML14059A1812014-03-0707 March 2014 FRN - Withdrawal of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 Project stage: Withdrawal 2013-01-03
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24011A1002024-01-10010 January 2024 March 2024 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML23334A1612023-11-30030 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - RAIs Associated with License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23334A0072023-11-29029 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR That Revises TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23298A1232023-10-25025 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 1 - RAIs for Relief Request 70, Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle ML23243B0082023-08-31031 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Action: Opportunity to Review and Comment on a New NRC Information Collection, 10 CFR Part 50.55a, Codes and Standards (3150-XXXX) ML23233A0132023-08-18018 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23220A0512023-08-0303 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Re Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - SUNSI Review of UFSAR, Rev. 22 ML23202A0162023-07-20020 July 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Revise TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23143A1332023-05-23023 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Revising TS 3.3.11 to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Rev. 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls ML23130A0132023-05-10010 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review for Authorized Use of Mururoa Supplied Air Suits (Models V4F1 and MTH2) Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1703 and 10 CFR 20.1705 ML23017A0932023-01-17017 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde - Acceptance of License Amendment Request Regarding Adoption of TSTF-107, Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable (L-2022-LLA-0181) ML23013A0632023-01-13013 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22348A1672022-12-14014 December 2022 March 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22339A2372022-12-0505 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22173A0682022-06-17017 June 2022 Email Concurrence on SE Input for Columbia Pltr LAR ML22167A1872022-06-16016 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Revised Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues ML22136A0922022-05-16016 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-487-A, Revision 1, Relocate DNB Parameters to the COLR ML22075A1902022-03-16016 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues ML22055A5842022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Final RAIs for 22nd Refueling Outage (Spring 2021) Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML22034A0132022-02-0202 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 2 - Verbal Approval of RR-69 to Extend Containment Tendon Inspection from 2/8/22 to 6/8/22 ML22032A0312022-01-31031 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review for an Exemption Regarding Elimination of Dafas Using RIPE Process ML22025A4012022-01-0303 January 2022 March 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML21333A1982021-11-19019 November 2021 NRC Review of PVNGS Training Needs Analysis and Training Required by Condition I of the Confirmatory Order EA-20-054 ML21306A1882021-10-18018 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Second Pre-submittal Meeting for the Proposed Exemption to Eliminate Dafas Using RIPE Process ML21272A0592021-09-28028 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - SUNSI Review of UFSAR, Rev. 21 ML21264A1352021-09-17017 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21237A0762021-08-25025 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of RR-67, Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection ML21228A0082021-08-16016 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of an LAR for Administrative Changes to Technical Specifications ML21228A1042021-08-12012 August 2021 RR-67, Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (EPID L-2021-LLR-0050) (Email) ML21237A5172021-08-10010 August 2021 Email to PV Licensee and Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Notification of Inspection of the Licensees Implementation Industry Initiative Associated with the Open Phase Condition (NRC Bulletin 2012-01) and Request Fo ML21160A1442021-06-0909 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1 and, 2 - Acceptance Review for Order Approving Transfers of Control of Licenses for Minority Interests Subject to Expiring Leases ML21154A0082021-05-26026 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21146A3342021-05-14014 May 2021 ISFSI - Final Package for an Order Associated with Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses from Pnm to Avangrid ML21132A2372021-05-12012 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3, and ISFSI - Final Package for an Order Associated with Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses from Pnm to Avangrid ML21103A3632021-04-13013 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review for Indirect Transfer of Control of Licenses Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80 and 10 CFR 72.50 ML21064A2372021-03-0303 March 2021 ISI Request for Information Rls ML21053A0262021-02-22022 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21043A1462021-02-11011 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAI for an Order Associated with Indirect License Transfer from Public Service Company of New Mexico to Avangrid, Inc ML21023A0212021-01-13013 January 2021 PVNGS PI&R Request for Information RA ML20366A1682020-12-31031 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3, and ISFSI - Acceptance Review of an Order Associated with Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses ML21005A2712020-12-29029 December 2020 102-08208 PVNGS Communication Required by Confirmatory Order EA-20-054 ML20325A0392020-11-19019 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Verbal Authorization of RR 66 to Extend Containment Tendon Inspection by One Year Based on 10 CFR 50.55a(Z)(2) ML20316A0162020-11-0909 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Acceptance Review of RR 66, Request Containment Post-Tensioning System Inspection One-Time by One Year Due to COVID-19 Pandemic ML20295A4912020-10-21021 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Associated with Adopting TSTF-501, Relocate Stored Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Volumes to Licensee Control ML20265A0982020-09-21021 September 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Associated with Making Necessary Administrative Changes to Technical Specifications ML20108E9462020-04-16016 April 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Clarification to PVNGS Part 26 Exemption Request (ML20105A481) ML20091K0752020-03-31031 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Acceptance Review of RR 65, Request for Relief from RPV Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles and a Pressurizer Surge Line Weld Overlay Examination ML20091M1992020-03-31031 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Verbal Authorization of RR 65, Request for Relief from RPV Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles and a Pressurizer Surge Line Weld Overlay ISI Examinations ML20050C9742020-02-19019 February 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1,2, and 3 - Framatome Htp Fuel LAR and Exemption Third Audit Summary (EPIDs L-2018-LLA-0194 and L-2018-LLE-0010) 2024-01-10
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML24011A1002024-01-10010 January 2024 March 2024 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML23334A1612023-11-30030 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - RAIs Associated with License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23334A0072023-11-29029 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR That Revises TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23298A1232023-10-25025 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 1 - RAIs for Relief Request 70, Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle ML23031A3392023-01-31031 January 2023 In-service Inspection Request for Information ML23013A0632023-01-13013 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22348A1672022-12-14014 December 2022 March 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22339A2372022-12-0505 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22272A3252022-09-29029 September 2022 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML22209A1752022-07-28028 July 2022 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML22187A2632022-07-0606 July 2022 Notification of Inspection (NRC IR 05000528/2022004, 05000529/2022004 and 05000530/2022004) and Request for Information ML22067A2292022-03-0202 March 2022 Inservice Inspection Inspection PWR Request for Information ML22055A5842022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Final RAIs for 22nd Refueling Outage (Spring 2021) Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML22035A3302022-02-10010 February 2022 Requests for Confirmation of Information for Exemption to Delete Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Based on Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations ML22025A4012022-01-0303 January 2022 March 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML21245A2222021-09-0101 September 2021 Request for Information ML21200A2392021-07-20020 July 2021 Docs Request AC - AA August 2021 ML21154A0082021-05-26026 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21064A2372021-03-0303 March 2021 ISI Request for Information Rls ML21042B9692021-02-18018 February 2021 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection and Initial Request for Information ML21043A1462021-02-11011 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAI for an Order Associated with Indirect License Transfer from Public Service Company of New Mexico to Avangrid, Inc ML21023A0212021-01-13013 January 2021 PVNGS PI&R Request for Information RA ML21011A1972021-01-12012 January 2021 Unit 2, and Unit 3 - Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Baseline Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2021012, 05000529/2021012 and 05000530/2021012) and Request for Information ML20227A0992020-08-14014 August 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20118D1362020-04-28028 April 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20049A0992020-02-14014 February 2020 Notification of Cyber Security Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2020401; 05000529/2020401; and 05000530/2020401) and Request for Information ML20049A0252020-02-12012 February 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for License Amendment Request Associated with Changes to Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements ML20021A3172020-01-21021 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for Relief Request 64, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19317D0782019-11-13013 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1 - Requests for Additional Information on Unit 1 21st Refueling Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19234A3202019-08-29029 August 2019 Redacted - Request for Additional Information for Amendment and Exemption Request to Support the Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (EPID L-2018-LLA-0194; EPID L-2018-LLE-0010) ML19155A1842019-05-30030 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mvib Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19095A6552019-04-0404 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mphb Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19044A7342019-02-13013 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde1, 2, and 3 - Official Requests for Additional Information for RR 62, Third and Fourth 10-Year ISI Intervals, Proposed Alternative - Pressurizer Heat Sleeve Repairs ML19008A3612019-01-0808 January 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Response Time Testing of Pressure Transmitters ML18341A0252018-12-0303 December 2018 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)(05000528/2019011, 05000529/2019011, and 05000530/2019011) and Initial Request for Information ML18271A0392018-10-0202 October 2018 Non Proprietary - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested License Amendments and Exemptions Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (Epids L-2018-LLA-0194 and L-2018-LLE-0010) ML18221A5102018-08-23023 August 2018 Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID: L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18229A3132018-08-17017 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 - Second Se ML18227A8672018-08-15015 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 ML18124A0112018-05-0303 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official Eeob RAIs for TSTF-505 (4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18099A0072018-04-0606 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for 10 CFR 50.69 LAR (CAC Nos. MF9971, MF9972, and MF9973; EPID L-2017-LLA-0276) ML18094B1122018-04-0404 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAIs for TSTF-505 (Initiative 4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578: EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18066A7032018-03-0707 March 2018 Notification of Nrc Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) 05000528/2018011, 05000529/2018011, and 05000530/2018011 Initial Request for Information ML17248A0162017-08-31031 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAI for RRs PRR-03, PRR-04 and PRR-05, Pump Testing ML17107A0052017-04-14014 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) ML17082A4462017-03-28028 March 2017 PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Transition to CE 16x16 Ngf - Draft RAIs Rev 3 ML17003A0182017-01-0202 January 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Draft RAIs for the Second Emergency LAR Associated with EDG 3B Failure ML16258A0312016-09-14014 September 2016 PVNGS Units 1-3 - Notif of NRC Insp of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instr. Orders and Emer. Prep. Comm./Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plns(05000528/ 2016009;05000529/2016009;and 05000530/2016009) and ML16111B3312016-04-20020 April 2016 Notification of NRC Component Design Bases Inspection (05000528/2016007; 05000529/2016007; 05000530/2016007) and Initial Request for Information ML16083A2502016-03-23023 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for EAL LAR 2024-01-10
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Burkhardt, Janet From: Rankin, Jennivine Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2013 10:16 AM To: Carl.Stephenson@aps.com; Robert.Roehler@aps.com
Subject:
Draft Request for Additional Information Related to LAR to remove the term CORE ALTERATION from Tech Specs (ME8160, ME8161, and ME 8162)
Attachments: Draft RAIs 2.docx Good morning Rob and Carl, By letter dated March 8, 2012, and supplemented by letters dated October 11, 2012, and January 31, 2013, Arizona Public Service Co. (APS, the licensee) submitted a license amendment (LAR) for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12076A045, ML12286A330, and ML13039A013, respectively). The proposed amendment would eliminate the use of the term CORE ALTERATION from the technical specifications.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the information provided by the licensee and determined that the additional information identified in the attachment is needed in order for the NRC staff to complete its review.
As discussed before, please contact me to discuss scheduling the public meeting to discuss the attached DRAFT RAIs further.
Thank you, Jennie Rankin, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operation Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1
DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF THE TERM CORE ALTERATION IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-528, 50-529, AND 50-530 By letter dated March 8, 2012, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12076A045), as supplemented by a letter dated October 11, 2012 and January 31, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12286A330 and ML13039A013), Arizona Power Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) in which it proposed to remove the use of the term CORE ALTERATION from the Technical Specifications (TSs) including TS 3.9.2, Nuclear Instrumentation for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (PVNGS).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the submitted information and has determined that the following additional information is required to complete the review.
- 1. Chapter 15, section 15.4.6 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) indicates that during operational Modes 3 through 6, the operator relies upon a high neutron flux alarm from the Boron Dilution Alarm System (BDAS) to identify and terminate a boron dilution event. Pages 3 and 4 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013, indicates that the BDAS relies on the startup channels (source range monitor, SRM) in the excore neutron flux monitoring system (ENFMS) to provide source level neutron flux information. The last paragraph on page 3 indicates that the ENFMS contains non-safety related channels.
10 CFR 50.2 defines safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) as those SSCs:
that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to assure: (1) The integrity of the reactor coolant boundary (2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1)
Please confirm whether the BDAS is a safety related or non-safety related system. If the BDAS is a non-safety related system, justify the adequacy of use of the BDAS for mitigating the consequences of the boron dilution event, a design-basis-event (DBE).
Enclosure
- 2. Adequacy of BDAS Alarm Setpoint during Core Offload in Mode 6 with one Operable SRM 2.1 Paragraph 3 on page 4 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013, states:
Once sufficient fuel assemblies have been removed, such that one SRM (and its associated BDAS channel) has indication of higher neutron flux level than the other SRM; the BDAS channel that is associated with the SRM that has reduced flux indication will automatically reduce its setpoint to a lower value, commensurate with the lower neutron flex reading on the SRM. Thus, from this point in the core offload process until the core is entirely offloaded to the spent fuel pool, the two independent BDAS channel will have different setpoint but remain capable of indicating a boron dilution event.
The above response addresses an automatic reduction in the BDAS alarm setpoint that is limited to core offloaded conditions in Mode 6 with two operable SRMs. It is unclear if the BDAS setpoint will decrease if only one SRM is operable. The information should be expanded to address the adequacy of use of one operable SRM (with the other SRM failed, as specified in Condition A of TS 3.9.2) for monitoring the core sub-criticality in Mode 6 while fuel assemblies are being removed from the core in combination with occurrence of a boron dilution event.
2.2 Paragraph 4 on page 6 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013, states:
The proposed change would only allow the addition of soluble poison to the RCS coolant (per TS 3.9.1 and COLR item 3.9.1) that increases the uniform RCS boron concentration. Such a change would not result in a positive change in core reactivity or a reduction in core sub-criticality.
The above response does not consider the reduction in sub-criticality resulting from a boron dilution event which may be caused by an operator error to inject unborated water into the RCS. This boron dilution event is a UFSAR Chapter 15 DBE and should be considered in support of a TS change to remove the term, CORE ALTERATION, from the TS.
2.3 Paragraph 6 on page 6 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013 states:
Should the remaining operable SRM (when there is reduced numbers of fuel assemblies in the core) experience a failure, such that it is inoperable, then TS Bases 3.3.12, Action B.1, describes the redundant methods that are to be implemented when both independent channels of BDAS are inoperable. The use of redundant methods to monitor the RCS boron concentration provides alternate indications of inadvertent boron dilution. This will allow detection with sufficient time for
termination of a boron dilution event before the reactor achieves criticality, consistent with the objectives of the SRP.
The above response discussed the use of the sampling technique to monitor the RCS boron concentration as alternate indications of inadvertent boron dilution. The information does not discuss the frequency of the sampling and time to complete the sampling to assure that the operator can detect and terminate the boron dilution event before the core reaches criticality in 30 minutes, which is specified as an acceptance criterion in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition, (SRP) Section 15.4.6, Inadvertent Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant System (PWR) for a boron dilution event during the Mode 6 operation.
The NRC staff requests the licensee provide information to show the adequacy of the BDAS alarm setpoint based on input from only one operable SRM for conditions where the fuel assemblies are being removed from the core during the Mode 6 operation. The information should: (1) discuss identification of the worst case, with fuel assembly removal in a configuration that results in the least effectiveness of the operable SRM to detect neutron fluxes, and the least time available for detection and termination of a boron dilution event; and (2) show that for the identified worst case, the BDAS based on one operable SRM provides adequate, reliable, and un-ambiguous signals for the operator to detect and terminate the boron dilution event before the core reaches criticality in the required 30 minutes in the Mode 6 operation.
Alternatively, the licensee may choose to provide information to show that the frequency of the sampling of the RCS boron concentration is adequate and the time of completion of the sampling are sufficient in providing signals for the operator to detect and terminate the boron dilution event before the core reaches criticality in 30 minutes as specified in SRP Section 15.4.6.
- 3. The NRC staffs RAI dated January 3, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12362A292) states, in part:
Based on the SRP summarized above, please state whether a dropped source or component (or any other item allowed to be moved by CORE ALTERATIONS) can damage a fuel assembly or break and create a radioactive source term. If so, please provide the analysis that shows that the dose consequences of these scenarios are less limiting than the current fuel handling accident. Provide the assumptions, inputs and results of these analyses.
The APS supplement dated January 31, 2013 states, in part:
Based on the conservative assumptions outlined above, the consequences of a dropped source or component (or any other item allowed to be moved by core alterations) are bounded by the current fuel handling accident analysis.
Under routine plant operation, there are no sources present, other than used and new fuel assemblies. In the case of a prolonged shutdown, where a startup neutron source may be needed (e.g., all transuranium has decayed and there is not sufficient neutron flux to start-up using used fuel), the time since shutdown will be sufficiently long that the amount of the critical isotope present (i.e., iodine), is negligible. As a result, a drop of a source is bounded by the current fuel handling accident dose consequence analysis. Therefore, no specific analyses have been performed for other non-bounding drop events.
PVNGS procedures control movement of heavy loads consistent with the current licensing basis with regard to NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. Non-bounding load drop events do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36, Technical specifications, subsection (c)(1 )(ii) for inclusion in the TS limiting conditions for operation (LCOs). As a result, it is appropriate to remove TS controls for such non-bounding events, as proposed by the LAR elimination of the term CORE ALTERATION.
Currently, the term CORE ALTERATIONS would prohibit certain movement of loads over the reactor vessel if certain mitigating systems are not operable. It is not clear to the NRC staff how the items listed as conservatisms in the RAI response would offset the relaxations proposed for mitigating systems (i.e. not requiring operable control room filtration or containment penetrations during CORE ALTERATIONS).
The conservatisms listed in the RAI response either appear to be allowed operational parameters (i.e. uncertainty in core power, allowed time to offload (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />)) or would likely not change the calculated dose results significantly (i.e. 4.8 weight percent vs. 5.0 weight percent enrichment). Conversely, the proposed changes could have significant effects on the dose consequences. The control room filtration significantly decreases control room doses by filtering a source term and the lack of containment penetration operability can change the location of the release from containment and, therefore, change the atmospheric dispersion factors.
From a qualitative standpoint, it is not clear to the NRC staff how the stated assumptions would offset the increases in dose due to the proposed changes.
Therefore, the staff requests a quantitative assessment of the proposed changes.
Please state whether a dropped source or component (or any other item allowed to be moved by CORE ALTERATIONS) can damage a fuel assembly or break and create a radioactive source term. If so, please provide the analysis that shows that the dose consequences of these scenarios are less limiting than the current fuel handling accident. Provide the assumptions, inputs, methodology and results of these analyses.
Also, please state what is meant by non-bounding load drop events. The NRC staff requests APS to explain how a drop of a load that is not a heavy load is determined to be bounded by a drop of a fuel assembly.
- 4. The APS response dated January 31, 2013, to NRC Request 3 stated, in part:
In the PVNGS reactor design, control components (CEAs) are removed from the reactor vessel with the upper guide structure, so a drop of these components is not postulated, and excluded in the definition of CORE ALTERATION.
The term CORE ALTERATION is defined in the PVNGS Technical Specifications as:
CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components [excluding control element assemblies (CEAs) withdrawn into the upper guide structure], within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel.
Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
Can CEAs be decoupled into a fuel assembly or removed from the upper guide assembly and moved over the reactor core? If so, please justify why these CEA drop scenarios are not considered.