ML13032A562
| ML13032A562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| 50-324/12-301, 50-325/12-301 | |
| Download: ML13032A562 (225) | |
Text
_____ #d Jz Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.:2012-2 Op Test No.: FINAL Examiners: Operators:
(SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 62% power during startup following a refueling outage. 1A NSW Pump is under clearance.
Turnover: Following shift turnover, place the second Reactor Feedwater Pump (2B) in service Event No.
MaIf. No. ] Type*
Event Event Description N-BOP 1 Place the 2B Reactor Feedwater Pump in service.
NSRO C-RO HPCI Inadvertent Initiation with F012 Mm Flow Vlv failing to close 2 ESO22F C-SRO (AOP-03) (TS) 3a RWOO7F Resin Intrusion (AOP-26) 3b Lower power lAW RRCP EEO3OM- C-BOP MCC 2TD trip I Standby Stator Water Cooling Pump fails to auto 4
2TD C-SRO start 5 Main Stack Rad Monitor power failure with failure of Group 6. (TS)
Stator Cooling temperature controller failure 6a ATWS 2 M-ALL ATWS condition requiring entry to LPC. Perform LEP-02.
6b K21 1 9A SDV Vents and Drains Failure.
6c K2119A SLC pumps will not start. Perform LEP-03.
ATWS Actions Terminate and Prevent.
6d N/A All Rods In with RPV water level restored.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
I JIJJVT Scenario Description Event 1 - Place the second reactor feed pump in service lAW 20P-32.
Event 2 After the Feed Pump is in service HPCI will inadvertently initiate. The crew will verify level and then secure HPCI. HPCI manual isolation pushbutton will fail. If injection occurs, the crew will enter AOP-03. Technical Specifications will be addressed. I/C will report they have caused the initiation will working in panel H620. The mm flow valve will fail to close while resetting HPCI.
Event 3a A RWCU filter demin will fail resulting in resin intrusion to the reactor. The resin intrusion will cause high reactor conductivity alarms and the crew will enter AOP-26. RWCU should be isolated.
Event 3b RRCP entered on Hi Main Steam Line Rad. Power should be reduced to clear the alarm.
Event 4 MCC 2TD will trip and the standby stator cooling water will fail to auto start. The standby stator cooling water pump can be manually started. The 2D air compressor will also be lost and 0AOP-20.0 may be entered. Unit One may be contacted to start the 1 D Air Compressor.
Event 5 Power to the Main Stack Rad Monitor will be lost. The power results in Group 6 isolation and Secondary containment isolation. The group 6 will fail to isolate and all actions will be done manually. Technical Specifications will be addressed.
Event 6a- The Stator Cooling system temperature control valve will fail closed. Stator coolant temperatures will rise and alarm in the control room. Temperatures continue to rise until the Stator Coolant trip circuit energizes. The APP directs a manual reactor scram and turbine trip.
On the scram rods -l 00 of the control rods will fail to fully insert. The crew will respond to the ATWS per LPC.
Event 6b- Control rods can be manually driven into the core with RMCS. The SDV Vents & Drains will fail. When level has been lowered and level band has been established, the SDV V&D will be repaired. Control rods can then be inserted by repeated manual scram.
Event 6c- When SLC initiation is attempted, neither SLC pump will start due to switch failure. If RWCU was not isolated earlier then RWCU will not automatically isolate requiring manual isolation of G31-F004. The crew will perform LEP-03 and align for alternate boron injection using CRD.
Event 6d- The crew will terminate and prevent injection, re-injection will start when level is at 90 inches due to Table 3 conditions not met. Feedwater and RCIC will be available for level control.
When all control rods are inserted and level is being raised to the normal band of 170 to 200 inches the scenario may be terminated.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 2
SVZIWJJ. a. - a I e K DUKE ENERGY BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION
/4 2012 NRC EXAM SCENARIO #2 4: :7 PREPARED BY: Robert Bolin 9104/2012 Operations Instructor/Developer DATE CONCURRED BY:
DATE VALIDATED BY:
(Operations Depart eqt Rep. CATE N //
VALIDATED BY: / C,.
OperationJ3eaytment Rep4; DATE
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VALIDATED BY: 7/d4%//{
APPROVED BY:
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Simulator Setup Initial Conditions:
IC ENP-24.5 for IC 9 RxPower 62%
Core Age BOC Events:
Event # Trigger Description 1 NA Place Reactor Feed Pump in Service 2 1 Manual Inadvertent HPCI initiation 3 3 Manual Resin Intrusion 4 4 Manual MCC 2TD Loss 5 2 Manual Main Stack Rad Monitor Power Failure 6a 5 Manual Stator Coolant Temperature Failure 6b NA Auto Scram Discharge Vents and Drains fail closed 6c NA SLC switch failure Malfunctions Summary Shaded entries are Active M Current Target Ramp Act. Deact MaIf. ID Description Trig ID Value Value Time Time Time RPO1OF ATWS 3 True True ESO57F HPCI TRIP FAILURE False True ESO14F HCIC INADVERTANT START FALSE TRUE 1 RDO36F Scram Disc Vol Drn Fails Closed False True 5 XYOO9F Stator CIng Temp Contr Fails False True 5 RWOO7F RWCU RESIN INJ TO RX VESSEL False True 3 RPOO5F Auto Scram Defeat False True 7 EEO3OM 2TD Individual Bus Failure False True 4 Remotes Summary Remote ID ED_IAUPB2A6
] MUft*
Description UPS 2A to Sample Detection Skid
{ current Closed
[ Te Open 2 Trig EP_IAEOPJP1 Bypass LL3 Group I Isol Off On 8 EP_IACS993U DW CLR A&D Overide Normal/Run Normal Run 10 EP_IACS994U DW CLR B&C Overide Normal/Run Normal Run 10 EP_IASW5997 SW-V106 LOCA Override Normal Bypass 10 EP_lASW5998 SW-V1 03 LOCA Override Normal Bypass 10 SL_IALEPO3 Alt = Sub Pump / Hose Lineup Normal Alt 11 RS_IAFLTFVD FILTA FILTER OUTLET VLV MANUAL DEMAND RW_IAFLTFVB FILTER B OUTLET VLV CONTROLLER MODE RW_IAFLTFVA FILTER A OUTLET VLV CONTROLLER MODE AI_IAIUICMPRSS Unit I Air Compressor Status Off Off 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 4
JAi 1III12IIRIPI!
Switches Summary
. Target Override Switch ID Description Trig Position Value K2119A SIB Liq Pump A-B Stop On K21 1 9A SIB Liq Pump A-B Pump A Off K21 I 9A SIB Liq Pump A-B Pump AB Off K21 I 9A S/B Liq Pump A-B Pump B Off K61 06A CAC PURGE & VENT VLV ISOL Override On K6106A CAC PURGE & VENT VLV ISOL Off Off K5412A Stat Coolant Pmp A Auto Off Annunciator Summary Window Description Tagname Override Oval AVaI Actime Dactime Trig 1-9 LOSSOFSTATCOOLANTTRIPCKT ZUA219 ON ON OFF 2OSec 5 ENER Special Instructions
- 1. Ensure simulator security is established lAW TAP-41 1.
- 2. Ensure appropriate keys have blanks in switches.
- 4. Ensure no rods are bypassed in the RWM.
- 5. Ensure hard cards and flow charts are cleaned up.
- 6. Ensure all key have blanks installed.
- 7. Ensure affected procedures are free of any marks.
- 8. Place all SPDS displays to the Critical Plant Variable display (#100).
- 9. Reset to IC-9 and place in run.
- 10. Ensure ENP-24.5 form for lC-9 is located at the P603 panel.
- 11. Raise power to -62% using recirc.
- 12. Adjust FWLC setpointto 190 inches.
- 13. Ensure 2B Stator Cooling Pump running and 2A in standby
- 14. Load scenario file, if required.
- 15. Place protected equipment placards on 2A and 2B NSW Pumps.
- 16. Update orange protected equipment board with IB, 2A, and 2B NSW.
- 17. Advance all chart recorders to indicate steady state conditions.
- 18. Provide Shift Briefing sheet to the CRS.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 5
AE!f!I!L It Scenario Information Critical Tasks (bolded/italicized in the required operator action statements)
- Perform LEP-02, Alternate Rod Insertion using RMCS.
References:
OENP-24.5 OGP-04 LEP-02 LEP-03 SEP-10 LPC RSP RVCP 20P-32 Tech Specs TRM 0A1-81 OAOP-03 OAO P-20 OAO P-26 APP A-i (1-4) (3-5) (4-4)
APP A-04 (1-4)
APP UA-01 (3-2) (4-1) (6-i) (6-2)
APP UA-02 (1-8) (1-9) (2-8) (6-9)
APP UA-03 (5-4) (6-3) (6-4)
APP UA-04 (3-5) (4-5)
APP UA-05 (1-9) (2-9) (3-5) (4-6) (6-10)
APP UA-06 (2-5)
APP UA-i 3 (6-6)
APP UA-25 (1-8)
APP UA-28 (1-4) (1-5) (2-4) (3-4) (4-4) 001-50.11 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 6
IlI1IIItINIIiIIIIIITAL EVENT I PLACE 2B REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE BOP - Places the second reactor feed pump in service.
Malfunctions required: None.
Objectives:
SCO Directs placing the second RFP in service lAW 20P-32 Section 5.7.
BOP Places the second reactor feed pump in service lAW 20P-32 Section 5.7.
Success Path:
Second REP in service.
Simulator Operator Actions:
D If contacted as the RE to monitor core performance, inform crew that you will monitor core performance on the computer.
L Acknowledge requests for the Radwaste Operator.
U After RFP B REC/RC VLV, FW-FV-V47, has been closed and when directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Action Notes Directs Second REP be placed in service lAW 20P-32.
RO Time Action Notes Plant Monitoring 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 7
EVENT I PLACE 2B REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE BOP Time Action Notes Performs 20P-32, Section 57 There are several procedural notes before this step is performed.
Determines initial conditions met.
Notify Radwaste Operator to monitor CDD flows and place additional demineralizers in service as necessary.
Ensure RFP B LP SUPPLY VLV, RHS-V1, is open Slowly raise RFPT B speed by placing RFPT B LOWER/RAISE speed control switch in RAISE until speed is greater than approximately 2550 rpm When RFPT B speed is greater than approximately 2550 rpm, then raise RFPTB SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6O1B, output to match DFCS STPT and SPEED STPT on Panel P603 to within 100 rpm.
Notify Radwaste Operator to monitor CDD effluent conductivity for each demineralizers in service 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 8
JItIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII!IIV t4L EVENT I PLACE 2B REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE BOP (Contd)
Time Action Notes Confirm the following RFPT B speed signals on Panel P603 agree within approximately 100 rpm:
- DFCS STPT (speed demand from DFCS).
- SPEED STPT (speed demand from 5009 control)
Place MAN/DFCS control switch in DFCS.
Slowly raise RFPT B speed by depressing the raise pushbutton on C32-SIC-R6OIB until RFP discharge pressure is approximately equal to reactor pressure.
Open RFP B DISCH VLV, FW-V4 Slowly raise RFPT B speed, using RFPTB SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6OIB, until B DEM is approximately equal to A DEM of the on line REP.
DEPRESS AIM pushbutton on RFPT B SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6OIB, AND CHECK AIM indicator changes to A (automatic).
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 9
IEM1IzL1 EVENT I PLACE 2B REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE BOP (Contd)
Time Action Notes When pump suction flow is greater than 3.9 X 106 lbm/hr, and heater drains are forward pumping, then close RFP B RECIRC VLV, FW FV-V47, by momentarily placing control switch in CLOSE.
When RFP B RECIRC VLV closes, then adjust level setpoint on MSTR RFPT SP/PX LVL CTL, C32-SIC-R600, to 187 inches.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 10
EVENT 2 HPCI INADVERTENT INITIATION WI F012 MIN FLOW VLV FAILING TO CLOSE The crew responds to an inadvertent HPCI initiation and possible injection.
Malfunctions required: Inadvertent HPCI initiation Objectives:
SRO Direct actions in response to an inadvertent HPCI initiation and potential positive reactivity addition Determine actions required for LCD per Technical Specifications RD - Respond to an inadvertent HPCI initiation and potential positive reactivity addition Success Path:
Verify HPCI initiation signal not present and isolate HPCI.
Simulator Operator Actions:
U WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER I .(HPCI Initiation)
U If contacted as I&C to assist with troubleshooting, after Tech Spec is addressed remove the HPCI initiation and trip failures and then report that I/C caused the initiation signal while working in the H620 panel. Everything has been checked out and the initiation signal is now clear.
U If contacted as Reactor Engineer to look at thermal limits due to HPCI injection, report that he will evaluate and monitor.
U When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 11
JIIAIFI!LZT A EVENT 2 HPCI INADVERTENT INITIATION WI F012 MIN FLOW VLV FAILING TO CLOSE Required Operator Actions Tech Spec Determination SRO Time Action Notes Direct crew to verify no HPCI initiation signal is present Direct crew to trip HPCI following verification of false initiation Direct crew to isolate HPCI on failure of trip pushbutton (May use isolation pushbutton or direct steam supply valves to be closed).
Direct crew to enter and execute AOP-3 .0 Positive Reactivity Addition, if injection has occurred.
Contact maintenance to look at the HPCI Initiation signal.
May also contact Reactor Engineer to look at thermal limits.
Evaluate Tech Spec 3.5.1 ECCS -
Operating Condition Dl - Verify RCIC is OPERABLE Condition D2 Restore HPCI in 14 days Direct HPCI shutdown lAW OP-19 after I/C confirms signal has cleared.
Evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)
Condition Cl - Isolate in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Condition C2 Verify isolated every 31 days.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 12
iiir EVENT 2 HPCI INADVERTENT INITIATION WI F012 MIN FLOW VLV FAILING TO CLOSE RO Time Action Notes Verify false HPCI initiation signal (No LL2 signal present or high drywell pressure)
Trip HPCI by pushing the HPCI trip pushbutton, recognize failure of trip May depress Manual Isolation System A pushbutton to isolate HPCI.
OR May isolate the steam supply valves (E41-F002 and F003) to HPCI to isolate system.
Enter and execute AOP-3.O Positive Reactivity Addition Respond to the following A-I alarms:
1-4, HPCI LOW FLOW 3-5, HPCI ISOLATION TRIP SIG A I N ITIATED 4-4, HPCI SYS PRESS LO Perform 20P-19 to shutdown HPCI.
Place VACUUM PUMP control switch in START.
Depress INITIATION SIGNAL! RESET push button.
Ensure HPCI INJECTION VLV, E41-F006, is closed.
Ensure BYPASS TO CST VLV, E41-F008, is closed Ensure MIN FLOW BYPASS TO This valve is failed open TORUS VLV, E41-F012, opens 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 13
EVENT 2 HPCI INADVERTENT INITIATION WI F012 MIN FLOW VLV FAILING TO CLOSE RO Contd Time Action Notes Close TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV, E41-FOO1, and immediately depress and hold TURBINE TRIP push button until E41-FOO1 is fully closed Ensure TURBINE STOP VALVE, E41-V8, closes Ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP auto starts as the turbine speed lowers Close COOLING WATER SUPPLY VLV, E41-F059 Ensure MIN FLOW BYPASS TO Valve is failed open, reports to CRS. May direct AO to manually close and rack out breaker.
TORUS VLV, E41-F012, closes When Tech Spec is addressed move on to the next event.
BOP Time Action Notes Monitor for HPCI injection Enter and execute AOP-3.O Positive Reactivity Addition, if injection has occurred.
Determine current operating point on the power-to-flow map Notify Reactor Engineer 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 14
EVENT 3a RWCU RESIN INTRUSION RWCU high conductivity followed shortly by reactor coolant high conductivity. Other conductivity alarms throughout the steam cycle begin to alarm. MSL Rad Hi and Hi-Hi alarms, alarms will clear as power is reduced, then power can be raised to burn out the resin. Resin results in high radiation at MSL monitors primarily due to N-16 (very short 1/2 life), therefore rising radiation is not seen on SJAE, stack or Turbine Building ARMs.
Conductivity alarms will begin to clear as the resin decomposes.
Malfunctions required: RWCU Resin lnj to the Rx Vessel.
Objectives:
SCO Direct actions for a resin intrusion in the reactor vessel.
BOP Perform actions for a resin intrusion into the reactor vessel.
Success Path:
Simulator Operator Actions:
L When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 3 to activate resin injection to the reactor.
D If directed as AO to isolate A RWCU filter demin, Wait 2 minutes and report that the RWCU filter controller is messed up and the filter cannot be isolated locally.
Li If directed as Radwaste to isolate a CDD, initiate batch file CDD Out of Service.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 15
- I1II1I!IJII!I!I1Ic!LJ:L 1L? f!III!F EVENT 3a RWCU RESIN INTRUSION Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct entry into OAOP-26.O, High Reactor Coolant or Condensate Conductivity Direct isolation of RWCU Contact maintenance to investigate If conductivity is > 2.0 pmhos/cm, enter TRM 3.13, Condition Al and A2.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Diagnose conductivity alarms to be RWCU resin intrusion A-4, 1-4, Cleanup Sys HI Conductivity UA-28, 1-4, Cond Pump Discharge Cndy High 2-3, Rx Fw Dislvd 02 High 2-4, Rx Feedwater Conductivity High 4-4, Main Steam Conductivity High Enter and announce OAOP-26.0, High Reactor Coolant or Condensate Conductivity May direct A0 to isolate the A RWCU filter demin.
Isolates RWCU by shutting down the running RWCU pumps and closing the G31-F001, F004, and F042.
Notify chemistry for samples BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor Plant Parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 16
1JILIILUL I J71ZW EVENT 3b RWCU RESIN INTRUSION POWER MANIPULATION MSL Rad Hi and Hi-Hi alarms, alarms will clear as power is reduced, then power can be raised to burn out the resin. Resin results in high radiation at MSL monitors primarily due to N-16 (very short 1/2 life), therefore rising radiation is not seen on SJAE, stack or Turbine Building ARMs.
Malfunctions required: None.
Objectives:
SCO Direct actions for a resin intrusion in the reactor vessel.
BOP Perform actions for a resin intrusion into the reactor vessel.
Success Path:
Simulator Operator Actions:
D If asked as chemistry for samples, acknowledge the request.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 17
L L (A V EVENT 3b RWCU RESIN INTRUSION POWER MANIPULATION Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Enter into RRCP for MSL Rad alarms Direct power be reduced to clear MSL Rad alarms May refer to TRM 3.13 and OAI-81 for chemistry limits.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Reduce power to clear MSL Rad Hi alarm.
Depress the lower medium pushbutton on the Recirc master controls.
Continue to lower until the MSL When the MSL Hi Rad alarm is clear, proceed to the next event.
Rad Hi alarm clears or when the OENP-24.5 recirc flow limit is reached (47 Mlbms/hr).
When the MSL Rad Hi alarm is clear, may be directed to raise power.
Depresses the raise slow pushbutton on the Recirc master controls.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor Plant Parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 18
JJ1I!IIIIIII1IIIII1IIL iLA JY AIUPIW EVENT 4 MCC 2TD trip I Standby Stator Water Cooling Pump fails to auto start The crew will respond to a trip of MCC 2TD with the standby stator cooling water pump failure to auto start. The standby stator cooling water pump can be manually started. The 2D air compressor will also be lost (loss of controls) and OAOP-20.O, Pneumatic (Air/Nitrogen) System Failures, may be entered.
Objectives:
SCO Direct the standby Stator Cooling Water pump to be started.
BOP Start the standby Stator Water Cooling pump identify 2D air compressor failure.
Success Path:
Standby Stator Cooling Water Pump started and actions of OAOP-20.O Pneumatic (Air/Nitrogen) System Failures, addressed.
Simulator Operator Actions:
U When the directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 4 to trip the feeder breaker to MCC 2TD.
U When asked as the TB AC to investigate the 2F feeder breaker trip, report a trip of the feeder breaker to MCC 2TD, (ATO) on 480V Substation 2F is tripped with the white overcurrent indicating flag protruding from the breaker.
U If asked as I&C to investigate, acknowledge any requests. If asked do not recommend re-energizing 2TD until an investigation can be completed.
U If asked to investigate/acknowledge the 2B RFP alarm, acknowledge the local panel alarm and report that the alarm on the local panel is H PU Pump 2 Running in Stby. If asked the standby pump is operating with no problems noted.
U If dispatched to verify proper operation of the standby Stator Water Cooling Water Pump or the 2B air Compressor, report no problems with the operation of the pump/compressor are noted.
U If contacted as Ui, report that the I D air compressor is not running. If asked to start the 1D Air Compressor modify remote AI_IAIU1CMPRSS to ON and report ID air compressor is running.
U When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 19
ILLI!IIZIFII EVENT 4 MCC 2TD trip I Standby Stator Water Cooling Pump fails to auto start Required Operator Actions SRO Time Action Notes Acknowledges report of alarms received/cleared for the BOP/R0.
Directs B0P operator to start the standby stator water cooling pump.
May ask for l&C to investigate
- 1) The trip of the feeder breaker to 2TD
- 2) The failure of the standby Stator Water Cooling pump to auto-start.
May direct entry into OAOP-20.0, Pneumatic (Air/Nitrogen) System Failures,.
May review the load list for MCC 2TD (001-50.1 1).
RO Time Action Notes Plant Monitor Report alarms to the SCO. REP alarm may be addressed by the BOP. This alarm is due to the power loss of HPU Pump #1.
HPU Pump #2 has auto-started.
UA-1 3, 6-6 REP B Control Trouble May Dispatch an AC to investigate the REP alarm may be addressed by the BOP.
alarm on the 2B REP.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 20
EVENT 4 MCC 2TD trip I Standby Stator Water Cooling Pump fails to auto start BOP Time Action Notes Report alarms to the SCO.
UA-6, 2-5 Sub 2F 480V Feeder Bkr Trip UA-13, 6-6 RFP B Control Trouble UA-1, 3-2 Air Compr D Trip UA-2, 1-8 Stat coolant Inlet Flow-Low UA-2, 1-9 Loss of Stat Coolant Trip Ckt Ener UA-2, 2-8 Stat Coolant Press-Low UA-2, 6-9 Exciter Coolant Flow-Low Start the standby Stator Water Cooling Action to start the pump is in the APPs, or Pump. an auto action that did not occur.
UA-2, 4-9 Stator Cool Reserve Pump Running will annunciate on starting of the standby pump and then will clear when the 2B pump is placed in off.
Dispatch an AC to investigate the Sub 2F Feeder Breaker Trip.
May dispatch an AC to investigate the Stator Water Cooling pump that was started.
May enter and announce OAOP-20.O, Actions for starting the 1D are also in the APP.
Pneumatic (Air/Nitrogen) System Failures, for the trip of 2D Air Compressor.
Verifies that the 2B Air Compressor auto starts If 1 D Air Comp. is started the 2B will go back into a standby condition when the air header pressure is
. returned to normal.
May ask Unit Cne to start the ID AIr Compressor and verify 2B returns to 2D air compressor has lost power to the controls.
standby.
May place the 2D A/C in Stop.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 21
III gtiiizzr 1
EVENT 5 MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR FAILURE Power to the Main Stack Rad Monitor will be lost. The power results should result in a Group 6 isolation, which fails and the crew must manually initiate a Group 6 isolation.
Malfunctions required: UPS 2A to Sample Detection Skid breaker open.
Objectives:
SCO Determine actions required for LCO per Technical Specifications.
BOP Respond to a process radiation monitoring downscale/inop annunciator.
Performs actions to manually initiate a Group 6 Isolation.
Success Path:
Technical Specification I TRM
- 3.3.6.1 PCIS Instrumentation, Function 2c Condition Al, Place in trip condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Condition Bl, Restore Isolation capability in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
- 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Condition B.l, Analyze grab samples every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Condition B.2, Restore operable in 30 days
- TRM 3.4 Post Accident Monitoring, Functions 2,5, and 6 Condition B.l, Restore one required channel in 7 days.
- ODCM 7.3.2 Gaseous Effluent Monitoring, Function 1
- A.l, Enter the Condition referenced in Table 7.3.2-1
- B.1, Take a grab sample once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
- B.2, Analyze the grab sample for gross noble gas activity within 24 h rs
- B.3, Restore the channel in 30 days
- C.1, C.1.1, Immediately Initiate actions to establish auxiliary sampling equipment to continuously collect samples from the associated effluent release pathway as required by Table 7.3.7-1
- C.2, Restore the channel in 30 days
- D.1, Estimate the flow rate through the associated pathway
- D.2, Restore the channel in 30 days 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 22
EVENT 5 MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR FAILURE Simulator Operator Actions:
D Insert Trigger 2 at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
D If asked to investigate, report Ckt #6 on UPS Panel 2A to the Stack Rad Monitor is tripped.
If contacted as Unit One, report that Unit One has the same alarms present.
If contacted as l&C to investigate, acknowledge the request, if asked do not recommend transfer to the alternate power supply until the cause of the trip is investigated.
D When tech spec call is made close the UPS 2A to Sample Detection Skid breaker before going to the next event and report I&C with E&RC have repaired the problem with the Main Stack Rad Monitor.
U When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Tech Spec Declaration.
SRO Time Action Notes Direct actions of the APPS for the Main Stack Rad Monitor Direct Group 6 isolation.
Direct I/C to investigate loss of UPS 2A.
Refer to Tech Specs. If follow-up questioning is necessary provide Group 6 hard card and alarms to applicant (for the end of
. the scenario) alternatively, tell applicant a Group 6 See success path on previous page. isolation occurred and provide a list of alarms.
RO Time Action Notes Plant Monitoring May open the SW-Vill orVll7 to supply cooling water to the vital header lAW 2APP-UA-05 1-9 or 2-9.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 23
IIILII!IJ1tIIIIIIIIIL__
EVENT 5 MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR FAILURE BOP Time Action Notes Report loss of Main Stack Rad Monitor and references the following APPs:
UA-03 5-4, PROCESS OG VENT PIPE RAD HI-HI 6-3, PROCESS SMPL OG VENT PIPE DNSC/INOP 6-4, PROCESS OG VENT PIPE RAD-HI UA-05 1-9, FAN CLG UNIT CS PUMP RM A INL PRESS LO 2-9, FAN CLG UNIT CS PUMP RM B INL PRESS LO 3-5, SBGT SYS B FAILURE 4-6, SBGT SYS A FAILURE 6-10, RX BLDG ISOLATED UA-25 1-8, CTMTATMOS RAD MON DNSC/INOP Report TS review for the SCO from the Annunciator reviews.
. 3.6.4.3
. 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1, function 2c
. ODCM 7.3.2 Table 7.3.2-1 Function 1, 7.3.7, and 7.3.13
. TRM 3.4, Table 3.4.2 function 5 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 24
ItFIIt1I1ILL JW d 7 EVENT 5 MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR FAILURE BOP contd Time Action Notes Determine that SBGT should have started and Reactor Building Ventilation should have isolated.
Starts both SBGT trains by placing them in Start.
Isolates RB Ventilation by either closing the BFIV5 (which will trip the fans) or Shutting off the fans then closing the BFIVs.
Dispatch AC to investigate UPS 2A condition.
May open the SW-V111 orVll7 to supply cooling water to the vital header lAW 2APP-UA-05 1-9 or 2-9.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 25
IPIII1I!GJD IIZ EVENT 5 MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR FAILURE BOP contd Time Action Notes Determines that a Group 6 Isol did not occur and closes the following valves onXU-51:
CAC-SV-4540 CAC-SV-4409-1 CAC-SV-4409-2 CAC-SV-4409-3 CAC-SV-4409-4 CAC-SV-1 260 CAC-SV- 1261 CAC-SV-1 262 CAC-SV-454 1 CAC-SV-441 0-1 CAC-SV-441 0-2 CAC-SV-44 10-3 CAC-SV-441 0-4 CAC-SV-3440 CAC-SV-3439 Determines that a Group 6 lsol did not occur and verifies closed the following valves on XU-51:
CAC-V21 6 CAC-V58 CAC-VI 5 CAC-V4 CAC-V5 CAC-V6 CAC-V7 CAC-V8 CAC-V9 CAC-VI 0 CAC-V49 CAC-V50 CAC-V55 CAC-V56 CAC-V22 CAC-V23 CAC-VI 72 CAC-V160 CAC-Vi 61 CAC-Vi 62 CAC-V163 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 26
EVENT 5 MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR FAILURE BOP contd Time Action Notes Determines that a Group 6 Isol did not occur and closes the following valves on XU-2:
CAC-SV-1 21 8A X-206A-A CAC-SV-1 200B X-49B-B CAC-SV-1 225B X-76-B CAC-SV-1 227A X-73-A CAC-SV-1 2278 X-73-B CAC-SV1 227C X-73-C CAC-SV-1227E X-73-E CAC-SV-1205E X-60-E CAC-SV-1 209A X-57-A CAC-.SV-1209B X-57-B CAC-SV-1 211 E X-54-E CAC-SV-1 211 F X-.54-F CAC-SV-1231 B X-244-B CAC-SV-1 21 3A X-209B-A CAC-SV-1 21 5E X-245-E Determines that a Group 6 Isol did not occur and verifies closed the following valves on XU-75:
RXS-SV-4 186 RXS-SV-41 88 Determines that a Group 6 lsol did not occur and verifies closed the following valves on XU-79:
RXS-SV-41 87 RXS-SV-41 89 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 27
Y1LffII!IVLX EVENT 6a!6b STATOR COOLING TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE I ATWS Stator Cooling temperature controller will fail energizing the trip circuitry. The APP will direct a manual scram. On the scram rods 1OO of the control rods will fail to fully insert.
The crew will respond to the ATWS per LPC.
Control rods can be manually driven into the core with RMCS. The SDV Vents & Drains will fail. When level has been lowered and level band has been established, the SDVV&D will be repaired. Control rods can then be inserted by repeated manual scram.
When SLC initiation is attempted, neither SLC pump will start due to switch failure. The crew will perform LEP-03 and align for alternate boron injection using CRD.
Malfunctions required: Stator Cooling Failure I ATWS 3 I SDV Vent & Drain failure! SLC Switch failure Objectives:
SCO Direct actions for a reactor scram per EOP-O1-RSP.
Direct actions to control reactor power per EOP-O1-LPC.
RO/BOP Perform immediate actions for a reactor scram.
Perform actions for an ATWS per EOP-O1-LPC.
Success Path:
Performs actions of LPC, Inserts control rods and recognizes failure of SLC and performs alternate boron injection.
Simulator Operator Actions:
D When directed by the lead examiner, Initiate Trigger 5 for the Stator Cooling failure u If requested to perform alternate boron injection using CRD, acknowledge the request. (will be performed after RPV injection is re-started)
E Acknowledge request as I&C to investigate failure of Stator Cooling, SLC andlor SDV Vents and Drains.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Critical Tasks Direct LEP-03, Alternate Boron Injection, using CRD.
Perform LEP-02, Alternate Rod Insertion using RMCS.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 28
EVENT 6a16b STATOR COOLING TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE I ATWS SRO Time Required Actions Notes May direct I&C to investigate Stator Cooling temperature controller.
Direct a manual reactor scram.
Enter RSP and transition to LPC.
Direct mode switch to shutdown when steam flow < 3 Mlbs/hr.
Direct ARt initiation.
Direct Recirc Pump speeds reduced to 10%.
Direct Recirc Pumps Tripped.
Direct SLC initiation.
Direct LEP-03, Alternate boron Critical Task. CRD will be used for injection. injection.
Direct ADS inhibited.
Direct RWCU isolation.
Direct LEP-02, Alternate Rod Critical Task. RMCS will be used to insert Insertion, rods.
Contact WCC to install LEP-02 Section 3 jumpers when the RO requests them.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 29 II7hrf Z.
EVENT 6a16b STATOR COOLING TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE I ATWS BOP Time Required Actions Notes Addresses the following alarms:
UA-02 1-9, LOSS OF STAT COOLANT TRIP CKT ENER 3-8, STAT COOLANT INLET TEMP-HIGH 4-8, STAT COOLANT OUTLET TEMP-HIGH UA-05 1-5, GENERATOR TEMPERATURE TROUBLE Places ADS in inhibit.
Identifies RWCU does not isolate (if it was not isolated in prior event).
Closes RWCU Outboard IsoI Valve G31-F004.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 30
EVENT 6a16b STATOR COOLING TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE I ATWS RO Time Required Actions Notes Place mode switch to shutdown when steam flow < 3x10 6 lb/hr.
Initiates ARI.
Places Recirc Pump speeds reduced to 10%.
Trips Recirc Pumps.
Initiates SLC.
Recognizes failure of SLC and reports to SCO.
Performs LEP-03, Alternate Boron Critical Task Injection.
Direct AO to perform LEP-03, Section 1, Alternate Boron Injection using CRD.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 31
EVENT 6a16b STATOR COOLING TEMP CONTROLLER FAILURE I ATWS RO Contd Time Required Actions Notes Performs LEP-02, Alternate Rod Critical Task Insertion. (RMCS Section)
Insert IRMs.
When < range 3 on IRMs insert SRMs.
Start both CRD pumps.
Place CRD Flow Controller to Manual.
Throttle open flow controller to establish? 260 drive water psid.
Bypass RWM.
Selects control rods and drives in using Emerg rod in notch override.
Performs alternate rod insertion per LEP-02 Section 3.
Req uest jumpers for LEP-02 Section 3.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 32
JI!flIIIIP$IIhdIL L EVENT 6d TERMINATE & PREVENT INJECTION I ALL RODS IN The crew will terminate and prevent injection, re-injection will start when level is at 90 inches due to Table 3 conditions not met. Feedwater and RCIC will be available for level control. When level has been lowered and level band has been established, the scram discharge volume vents and drains will be repaired. Control rods can then be inserted by manual scram. When all control rods are inserted and level is being maintained 170 to 200 inches the scenario may be terminated Malfunctions required: None Objectives:
SCO Direct actions to lower reactor vessel level when the conditions of Table 3 are not met per EOP-01-LPC.
RO/BOP Control reactor level during an ATWS per EOP-01 LPC.
Success Path:
When actions are taken to control reactor water level during the ATWS after terminating and preventing, the SDV vents and drains will be repaired and rods can be inserted. When all rods are inserted and level is being controlled 170 200 inches the scenario may be terminated.
Simulator Operator Actions:
LI If requested to defeat Group I LL3, wait 2 minutes, initiate Trigger 8 and inform the SCO that the jumpers are installed.
LI If requested to install LEP-02, Section 3 jumpers, wait until level has been terminated and prevented or 5 minutes whichever is longer, insert Trigger 7 and inform the SCO that the jumpers are installed.
LI If requested as l&C to investigate the failure of the scram discharge volume vents and drains, acknowledge the request.
LI If requested to defeat Drywell Cooler LOCA Lockout, wait three minutes, initiate Trigger 10 and inform the SCO that the jumpers are installed.
LI When injection to the RPV has been re-established and if requested to line up boron to the CRD system initiate Trigger 11.
LI When directed by the lead evaluator, delete the following commands:
LI Malfunction RDO36F, Scram Disc Vol Drn Fails Closed LI Malfunction RPO1OF, ATWS 3 (Make sure RPS is reset before deleting)
Inform the SCO that a loose wire was found on the SDV vent and drain logic and have been fixed.
LI If contacted as the RB AC to secure Alternate Boron Injection delete remote S L_IALEPO3.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 33
EVENT 6d TERMINATE & PREVENT INJECTION I ALL RODS IN Required Operator Actions Critical Tasks Terminate and prevent HPCI/Feedwater during the A TWS (CS/RHR if LOCA signal received)
SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct Group 10 switches to override reset.
Direct terminate and prevent (Critical Task)
HPCI/Feedwater (CS/RHR when LOCA signal received).
When level reaches +90 inches, evaluate Table 3:
. If not met, establishes a level band of LL4 to +90 inches.
Directs Drywell cooling restored per SEP-I 0.
Evaluate TAF and LL4 indicated levels using Caution 1 graphs.
Direct injection established to maintain If level is lowered to less than 45 inches RPV level LL4 to 90 inches (LL3) then the LP ECCS pumps will start and will need to be terminated and prevented.
(should try to keep level above the LL3 setpoint, most likely will establish a level band of 60-90 inches)
Exit LPC and enter RVCP when all rods are in.
Direct securing Alternate Boron Injection.
Direct level restored to 170 200 inches after rods are all in.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 34
IJIIII11FIIIIIIftdIFW2L. I 4 EVENT 6d TERMINATE & PREVENT INJECTION I ALL RODS IN BOP Time Required Actions Notes Places Group 10 switches to override reset Terminate and prevent injection to (Critical Task)
RPV.
HPC! Places HPCI Aux Oil Pump to Pull to Lock.
FW - IF two RFPs are operating THEN TRIP one PERFORM either of the following for the operating RFP
- 1. PLACE MAN/DFCS control switch to MAN RAPIDLY REDUCE speed to approximately 1000 rpm with the LOWER/RAISE speed control switch OR
- 2. PLACE RFPT Speed Control in M SELECT DEM and RAPIDLY REDUCE speed to approximately 2550 rpm Close FW-V6 and FW-V8.
PLACE SULCV, in M.
Sets demand for Zero ECCS - Turns OFF low pressure ECCS pumps if they start.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 35
AL EVENT 6d TERMINATE & PREVENT INJECTION I ALL RODS IN BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes May place Feedwater in service for level control during ATWS when directed by the SCO.
RAISE RFPT A(B) SP CTL speed until discharge pressure is greater than or equal to 100 psig above reactor pressure ADJUST SULCV to establish desired injection Restores level to 170 200 inches after all rod inserted.
Increases RCIC controller to 500 gpm.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 36
EVENT 6d TERMINATE & PREVENT INJECTION I ALL RODS IN RO Time Required Actions Notes Continues to select control rods and drive in using Emerg rod in notch override.
Monitor APRM5 for downscale.
Performs LEP-02 Section 3 after jumpers are installed.
Inhibit ARt Places ARI Initiation Switch to INOP Places ARI Reset Switch to RESET and maintains for 5 seconds.
Verifies red TRIP light above ARI Initiation is OFF Reset RPS when scram jumpers installed.
Ensures Dish Vol Vent & Drain Test switch is in Isolate.
Confirms Disch Vol Vent Valves V139 and CV-FO1O are closed Confirms Disch Vol Drain valves V140 and CV-FO11 are closed.
Resets RPS.
Place Disch Vol Vent & Drain Test switch to Normal Recognize/report failure of scram discharge volume vents and drains.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 37
JIIIII!IIIIIIIIIIPILL LL L ZLIFKY EVENT 6d TERMINATE & PREVENT INJECTION I ALL RODS IN RO Contd Time Required Actions Notes Confirms Disch Vol. Vent & Drains are open when reported fixed.
Inserts a scram after discharge volume has drained for -2 minutes.
Reports all rods in.
Directs AC to secure Alternate Boron Injection.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 38
I1III!IIIIIII1ItIII!IIIIII Simulator Operator Activities:
WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 39
Shift Briefing Plant Status The plant is operating at -62% power during startup following a refuel outage.
GP-04 is complete up to step 5.2.24.
Alternate Power verifications lAW OGP-04 are being performed by the Reactor Engineer.
A severe thunderstorm warning has been issued for Brunswick County for the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Equipment Out of Service 1A NSW Pump is under clearance for breaker refurbishment, expected to be returned to service in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Protected Equipment 1B, 2A, and 2B NSW Pump Plan of the Day Place the second feed pump in service and then continue to raise power to 100%.
2012 NRC Scenario #2 Page 40
U Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.:2012-3 Op Test No.: FINAL Examiners: Operators:
(SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: Unit is operating at 75% power (IC-b) APRM 2 INOP and bypassed.
Turnover: Following shift turnover, complete Main Stop Valve Testing lAW 20P-26.
Event Malt. No. Event Event Description No. Type*
i Main Turbine Stop Valve Test CRO Recirc Pump B trip. (AOP-04)(TS) 2a RCO55D C-SRO Supply breaker does not open.
RRO Insert control rods and or raise recirc flow to exit scram avoidance 2b R-SRO region of the power to flow map.
3 K4517A TCC Pump Trip (AOP-17) 4 DGOO1F E8 Trip (AOP-36.1) (TS)
RCOO7F C-RO RR Pump A Seal Failure (AOP-14)
RCOO8F C-SRO A small steam leak in the drywell, rising drywell temp & press 6a NBOO6F MAll (already elevated due to partial loss of DW coolers)
C-BOP Drywell spray on RHR Loop A fails to function (Loop B spray not 6b K1J36A C-SRO available due to E8 loss). Drywell temp exceeds 300°F 7 M-All Emergency Depressurization, Start B Loop RHR pumps.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
iIfrIIIIIIIIItIIIIIII!AIPIt7 ZiL 7 L .
Scenario Description Event I 20P-26, Section 8.6 (Main Turbine Stop Valve Test) is complete up to Step 8.6.2.7 with feedwater level control transferred to single element lAW 20P-32. MTSV Testing will continue testing MSVs I through 4. DFCS will be transferred to 3-element when complete.
Event 2 VFD coolant leakage will occur that will cause a trip of the Recirc pump. The supply breaker does not trip and must be opened manually. 0AOP-04.0 will be entered. Technical Specifications will be addressed. The plant will be in the Scram Avoidance Region of the power to flow map. Recirc flow must be increased or control rods must be inserted to exit this region. With only one recirc pump in operation reactor power must be less than 50% and core flow must be greater than 30.8 Mlbs but less than 45 MIbs.
Event 3 2B TCC pump will trip. The crew will enter AOP-1 7 and place the 20 TCC pump in service.
Event 4 An alarm is received indicating a Substation E8 high temperature/ground. After a 30 second time delay a trip of E8 will occur. Trip will cause a 1/2 scram and 1/2 Group 1. A Group Isolation for groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 will be received. The crew will enter AOP-36.1. CREV A fan will have to be manually started. Distribution Panel 2AB-TB will be directed to be transferred to its alternate power supply. The SJAEs will be in 1/2 load and may be directed to be placed in full load. RPS B should be transferred to alternate lAW OP-03. Technical Specifications will be addressed.
Event 5 Reactor Recirc Pump 2A seal #1 will fail and seal pressures will equalize. Shortly after the seal #1 failure, a seal #2 failure will occur. The crew will respond to the Recirc Pump seal failure and the rising drywell temperature and pressure per AOP-14.0. AOP-14.0 will direct the Recirc Pump be shutdown and then be isolated. If the pump is not isolated, a reactor scram will occur on high drywell pressure. The crew will insert a reactor scram due to no operating recirc pumps.
Event 6 A small steam leak will develop in the drywell. Drywell temperature and pressure rises at a faster rate requiring initiation of drywell sprays. RHR Loop 2B is unavailable for spray due to loss of E8 (valve power). When RHR 2A is placed in drywell spray, the outboard spray valve (FOI6A) will fail. With no spray available, drywell temperature will exceed 300°F (cannot be restored and maintained below) requiring emergency depressurization.
Event 7 During the depressurization, low pressure injection systems (RHR, Core Spray and Condensate) must be operated to prevent uncontrolled injection. B Loop of RHR will fail to auto start.
When emergency depressurization actions have been performed, the scenario may be terminated.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 2
i1ia1iv DUKE ENERGY BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION 2012 NRC EXAM SCENARIO #3 I
PREPARED BY: 9104/2012 Operations Instructor/Developer DATE CONCURRED BY: 9/04/12 Qp.&tions [nstructtveioper DATE
_ 4c I VALIDATED BY: C j F
Operáfions DepçtmeiitRep.
_ /
DATE VALIDATED BY:
artmefle 9
Operatioiisp DATE
/7 VALIDATED BY: t-7/\* 2 O/C 7tp4Fati&&ent Rep. DATE C-APPROVED BY:
Facility Re5resen tiv DATE
,i4flNShIIdL IiIIacSV. 4 ,4 * /&4F
IIiI!1IIIIIIII1I!tII1i!IL . .
SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC 10 Rx Pwr 100%
Core Age BOC Events:
Event # Trigger Description I Main Turbine Stop Valve Test 2a 1 Manual VFD Coolant leakage.
2b Insert control rods and or raise recirc flow 3 3 Manual TCC Pump Trip 4 4 Manual E8 Trip 5 6 Manual RR Seal Failure 6a 7 Manual Small steam leak in the drywell 6b Drywell spray fails 7 Emergency Depressurization.
Interventions Summary Note: Shaded entries = Active Malfunctions Summary Maif ID Mult ID Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Value Value RHO20F FOI6A CONTAINMENTSPRAYVALVEEI1-FO16A True True ES046F RHR B FAILURE TO AUTO START False True RCO55D VED B VED COOLING SYSTEM LEAKAGE 0 100 DGOO1F LOSS SUBSTATION E8 False True 00:00:30 4 RC0O7F RecircPumpASeal#1 Fail 0 100 00:00:10 6 RC023F Recirc A Dual Seal Fail False True 00:01:00 6 NB0O6F A MSL BRK BEFORE FLOW RESTRICTORS 0.0 2.0 00:10:00 7 2012 NRC Scenario #3 4
Remotes Summary Remf ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig ID Value Value RP_IAEPAALT RPS ALT EPA BKRS SET SET ED_ZIEDH14 PNL 2AB-TB POWER NORM NORM Override Summary Tag ID Description Position! Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Target Value Value K4517A TBCCW Pump B On Off 3 Q4517LG4 TBCCW Pump B Green On Off 3 Q2735LGH 2B RECIRC GREEN ON OFF Q2735RRH 2B RECIRC RED ON ON =
Annunciator Summary Window Description Tag Name Override OVal AVaI Actime Dactime Trig Type UA18 3-4 Sub E8 Temp Hi/Ground ZUA1 834 On On Off 00:00:31 4 Expert commands Create trigger 8 on 2B Recirc Stop pushbutton not in norm and then enter the following expert command: trc:8,dod:q2735LGH Create trigger 9 on 2B Recirc Stop pushbutton in STOP and then enter the following expert command: trc:9,dod:q2735RRH 2012 NRC Scenario #3 5
Special Instructions
- 1. Ensure simulator security is established lAW TAP-41 1.
- 2. Ensure appropriate keys have blanks in switches.
- 4. Ensure no rods are bypassed in the RWM.
- 5. Ensure hard cards and flow charts are cleaned up.
- 6. Ensure all key have blanks installed.
- 7. Ensure affected procedures are free of any marks.
- 8. Place all SPDS displays to the Critical Plant Variable display (#100).
- 9. Reset to IC-I 0 and place in run.
- 10. Ensure ENP-24.5 form for IC-b is located at the P603 panel.
II. Place DFCS in single element.
- 12. Ensure 2B TCC pump only is running.
- 13. Load scenario file, if required.
- 14. Advance all chart recorders to indicate steady state conditions.
- 15. Provide Shift Briefing sheet to the CRS.
- 16. Provide a marked up copy of 20P-26 Section 8.6 completed up to step 8.6.2.7 2012 NRC Scenario #3 6
Critical Tasks Inserting a manual Reactor Scram when Recirc Pumps are tripped or in anticipation of tripping Reactor Recirc Pumps.
Depressurize the reactor when drywell average air temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 300°F (at or before 340°F) by performing or anticipating emergency depressurization.
References:
20P-02 20P-26 20P-32 2A0 P-04 OAOP-17 0AOP-14 2APP-A-05 (4-8) 2APP-A-07 (2-3) (3-3) (3-4) (4-2) (4-3) (4-6) (5-3) (5-5) 2APP-UA-03 (2-4) 2APP-UA-1 8 (3-4)
RSP RVCP PCCP SEP-02 SEP-03 Tech Spec OENP-24.5 2012 NRC Scenario #3 7
EVENT I MAIN TURBINE STOP VALVE TESTING 20P-26, Section 8.6 (Main Turbine Stop Valve Test) is complete up to Step 8.6.2.7 with feedwater level control transferred to single element lAW 20P-32. MTSV Testing will continue testing MSV5 1 through 4. Annunciator A-7 4-2 FW CTL SYS TROUBLE during TSV testing. DFCS will be transferred to 3-element when complete.
Malfunctions required: None Oblectives:
SCO Direct actions for the performance of Main Stop Valve Testing.
RO/BOP Perform Main Stop Valve Testing Success Path:
Complete the performance of 20P-26 Section 8.6.
Simulator Operator Actions:
II If contacted as Load Dispatcher, acknowledge request or information.
D If contacted as System Engineer (any discussion about fast closure), inform crew fast closure of MTSVs is satisfactory matches previous performances.
D When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 8
f EVENT I MAIN TURBINE STOP VALVE TESTING Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct performance of Main TSV testing RD Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the Plant BOP Time Required Actions Notes Performs 2OP-26, Section 8.6 Main Turbine Stop valve testing.
For each Stop Valve:
Depress and hold TEST push button Verify valve travel is smooth from 100% to 10% open Verify valve travel is fast from 10%
open to 0% open Responds to A-7 4-2 FW CTL SYS TROUBLE during TSV testing Transfers DFCS to 3 element lAW OP-32 Verify on SULCV, FW-LIC-3269, that level error is less than 2 inches.
Shift FEEDWATER CONTROL MODE SELECT control switch to 3 ELEM Reports results of testing and DFCS alignment 2012 NRC Scenario #3 9
EVENT 2aIb Reactor Recirc Pump Trip I Exit Scram Avoidance Region A coolant leak develops on VFD B that will cause the recirc pump to trip. The supply breaker does not trip and must be opened manually. 2AOP-04.0 will be entered. Technical Specifications will be addressed. The plant will be in the Scram Avoidance Region of the power to flow map. Recirc flow must be increased or control rods must be inserted to exit this region. With only one recirc pump in operation reactor power must be less than 50%
and core flow must be greater than 30.8 Mlbs but less than 45 Mlbs.
Malfunctions required: VFD B Coolant Leakage /4 kV breaker override Objectives:
SCO Direct Shift Response To Recirculation Pump Trip Per 2AOP-04.0.
RO/BOP Respond to a Recirc Pump trip lAW 2AOP-04.0.
Success Path:
Identifies that the supply breaker did not trip and manually trips the breaker.
Manipulates reactor power to exit the scram avoidance region using rods and I or recirc flow.
Simulator Operator Actions:
D When directed by the lead examiner, Initiate Trigger I VFD B Coolant Leakage.
Li If contacted as the AO to investigate VFD Alarms, wait until Recirc pump has tripped and report that the coolant pumps are tripped due to coolant leakage.
Li If contacted as reactor engineer, report you will monitor thermal limits and use OENP-24.5 rods to exit scram avoidance region.
Li If contacted as chemistry for samples, acknowledge request Li If contacted as NIT to backup OPRM data acknowledge the request.
Li When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 10
III!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIF Z) 1 J2 NIZ EVENT 2aIb Reactor Recirc Pump Trip I Exit Scram Avoidance Region Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct response to Annunciators.
Direct entry into 2AOP04.0, Low Core Flow Determine region of operation on power/flow map (computer display 806 may be used for reference)
Direct actions to exit scram avoidance region.
(Flow must be maintained >30.8 but
<45 Mlbs/hr and power must be
<50%)
Evaluate TS 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating Determine Condition A Requirements of the LCO are not met applies Required Action A.1 Satisfy the requirements of the LCO May contact I/C to prepare for changing setpoints.
APLHGR limits and APRM setpoints must be adjusted within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> May enter GP-14, Extended Single Recirculation Loop Operation BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the Plant Determines region of operation on Operation is still on the TLO graph.
power/flow map is in the Scram Avoidance Region (computer display 806 may be used for reference)
Monitor for THI 2012 NRC Scenario #3 11
EVENT 2aIb Reactor Recirc Pump Trip I Exit Scram Avoidance Region RD Time Required Actions Notes Respond to the foflowing alarms during this event:
A-07 2-3, RECIRC VFD B ALARM UNACK 3-3, RECIRC VFD B ALARM 3-4, RECIRC VFD B COOLING SYS TROUBLE 4-3, RECIRC VFD B TRIP WARNING 4-6, RECIRC LOOP B ONLY OUT OF SERVICE 5-3, RECIRC VFD B TRIPPED 5-5, PUMP B SEAL STAGING FLOW HI/LO A-05 4-8 OPRM TRIP ENABLED UA-23 4-4, E REHEATER FIRST STAGE LEVEL HI-LO 4-5, W REHEATER FIRST STAGE_LEVEL_HI-LO Observes indications on the VFD B HMI on Panel XU-4 Dispatch AD to investigate Diagnose and report supply breaker lAW APP A-7, 5-3, Recirc VFD B Tripped and confirmation on XU-4, 2-B32-YFD-VDT-002B, no t t rippe d Recirc VFD 2B identifies that both VFD coolant pumps are tripped, this indicates that the supply breaker should have tripped.
Opens Recirc Pump B 4 kV Supply Breaker Enter and announce 2AOP-04.O, Low Core Flow Determine if valid core flow indication exists on process computer (WTCF).
2012 NRC Scenario #3 12
t EVENT 2b Exit Scram Avoidance Region RO Contd Time Required Actions Notes Determines region of operation on Operation is still on the TLO graph.
power/flow map is in the Scram Avoidance Region (computer display 806 may be used for reference)
May do one or both of the following to exit the scram avoidance region:
- 1. Insert control rods Turns select power on Selects a control rod from the ENP-24.5, Immediate Power Reduction sheet.
Drive the selected rod from position 08 to position 00.
The order of the rod selection is 26-35, 26-19, 18-27, and then 34-27.
- 2. Raise core flow using the running Recirc Pump Reduce CRD flow to 30 gpm 2012 NRC Scenario #3 13
i JUII EVENT 2b Exit Scram Avoidance Region RO Contd Time Required Actions Notes If charging pressure high alarms, may request CRD Pump A discharge valve throttled closed per the APP Maintain core flow >30.8 E6 lb/hr to prevent excessive cooldown of idle loop.
or If Core Flow is <30.8 E6 lb/hr log bottom head and loop temperature every 15 minutes Monitor for THI Notify Reactor Engineer Notify chemistry 2012 NRC Scenario #3 14
LL EVENT 3 TBCCW PUMP B TRIP TCC Pump 2B will trip and TBCCW low header pressure will alarm. The crew will respond per OAOP-17.0 and place a TBCCW pump in service Malfunctions required:
Trip of 2B TCC pump Objectives:
SCO Direct entry into OAOP-17.0.
RO Execution of OAOP-17.0 Success Path:
2A or 2C TBCCW pump started and TCC pressures restored to normal.
Simulator Operator Actions:
El Insert Trigger 3 to trip 2B TCC pump at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
If contact as the TB AO, wait one minute and report that 2B TCC pump is hot to the touch and the breaker on 2TM is tripped.
El If contacted as Unit One CRS, report Unit One is not using the 2C TCC Pump.
El Acknowledge request as l&C to do troubleshooting/repair for the 2B TCC Pump.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Action Notes Direct entry into OAOP-17.0.
Direct start of 2A and/or 2C TCC Pump.
Direct I/C to investigate loss of 2B TCC pump.
RO Time Action Notes Plant Monitoring.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 15
1II1IIIIII!1IWAII!II Jk EVENT 3 (Contd) TBCCW PUMP B TRIP BOP Time Action Notes Report loss of 2B TCC Pump and refer to APPs.
UA-03 2-4, TBCCW PUMP DISCH HEADER PRESS LOW Enter OAOP-17.O.
Dispatch AO to investigate 2B TCC Pump condition.
May dispatch AO to perform p restart checks for 2A or 2C TCC Pump.
Starts 2A and/or 2C TCC pump.
(Depending on the amount of time that no TCC pump is operating, one pump may not immediately restore TCC pressure due to the system loads TCC temperature control valves being wide open.)
If needed, verify Unit One is not using 2C TCC pump and start pump.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 16
EVENT 4 480V Bus E8 LOSS An alarm is received indicating a Substation E8 high temperature/ground. After a time delay the main breaker to E8 will trip. A 1/2 scram and % Group 1 (% Group 1 will not reset after RPS transfer). Group isolations for 2, 3, 6, 8, Secondary Containment (Inboard BFIVs do not auto close, will close by push button). CREV Fan A fails to start due to circuitry configuration (this is not a malfunction) and should be manually started. RCIC Steam Line Drain Pot Level Hi after a time delay (100 second from power loss). MSL DAQ Trouble and MSIV Pit Temp alarms after a time delay (DAQ UPS battery depletes)
Malfunctions required: E8 bus Hi Temp / Ground Alarm and E8 Trip Objectives:
SCO Direct Actions For A Loss of Any 4KV Buses or 480V Buses Per AOP-36. 1 ROIBOP Respond to a Loss of a 480 VAC Emergency Bus per OAOP-36.1 Shift the RPS Bus To The Alternate Power Supply per 20P-03 Success Path:
Transfer RPS to alternate, restart affected loads.
Simulator Operator Actions:
Li When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 4, E8 Hi Temp Alarm and E8 Trip (time delayed).
Li If asked as OAO to investigate, when E8 has tripped as the OAO report Sub E8 breaker tripped (white trip indicator on front of breaker). Report odor of burnt insulation (no smoke or fire)
Li If asked as l&C to investigate alarm failure, acknowledge the request Li If asked as the SM, approve the placing of RPS on Alternate.
Li If asked as l&C to investigate E8 Loss, after a couple of minutes report there is a ground on E8 that has caused the Bus loss.
Li If requested to verify RPS Alt EPA breakers are set, verify remote function RP_IAEPAALT, SET.
Li If requested to transfer 2AB-TB to alternate, modify remote function ED_ZIEDH14, ALT Li If requested to monitor MSIV pit temperature in back-panel (at MSL DAQ cabinets) report temperature from Monitored Parameter, Cert Testing, hvt23561 (bottom of list)
Li When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 17
EVENT 4 480V Bus E8 LOSS Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct APP for Sub E8 alarm Direct entry into AOP-36.1 Direct l&C to investigate Direct RPS be transferred to The Group isolations cannot be reset due to the loss of E8.
alternate and the 1/2 scram reset May direct entry into AOP-39.O due to loss of battery chargers Refer to Tech Spec 3.8.7 determines 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> action (Condition B.1) LrwL RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitor the Plant 2012 NRC Scenario #3 18
TS Entry Question Loss of E8 Question What is the required TS call for E8 inoperable?
Response
If E8 is inoperable, for reasons other than planned maintenance, Condition B of TS 3.8.7 should be entered for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Per LCO 3.0.6, no supported system Conditions and Required Actions are required to be entered provided a loss of safety function does not exist. Since the question does not indicate any additional inoperable equipment, a loss of safety function per the SFDP (i.e., Appendix F of the TRM) does not exist.
Given that Required Action B.1 of TS 3.8.7 adequately maintains plant safety, no cascading to supported system TSs need to be implemented. Technical Specifications, however; do not prohibit cascading to supported systems.
Discussion TS 3.8.7, for Units 1 and 2, deals with Division I and Division II AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems operability. This TS requires both subsystems to be operable in Modes 1,2, and 3.
The Bases for TS 3.8.7, Division II to consist, in part, of E2, E4, E6, and E8. With E8 inoperable for reasons other than planned maintenance, Condition B of TS 3.8.7 is entered. This requires restoration of the AC electrical power distribution subsystem within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. If this is not completed, Condition E is entered (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />).
LCO 3.0.6 states:
When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP). If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
When a support systems Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
In this example, TS 3.8.7, Condition B does not direct entry into Conditions or Required Actions for a supported system.
Page 1 of 3
TS Entry Question Loss of E8 Additionally, the Bases for LCO 3.0.6 states, in part:
Specification 5.5.11, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP), ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists.
Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
Cross division checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support safety systems are required. The cross division check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. of Appendix F to the TRM provides a table of TS Support/Supported systems.
TS 3.8.7 supports numerous TS systems. Cross divisions checks for each supported system on both Units would need to be performed to ensure a loss of safety function does not exist.
However, based on the plant status, no additional inoperable equipment was identified.
Therefore, a loss of safety function would not exist and no supported system TSs are required to be entered.
The Bases for LCO 3.0.6 also states:
The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems LCOs Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition in the support systems Required Actions.
As stated in the LCO 3.0.6, support system Required Actions (i.e., in this case Required Action B.1 of TS 3.8.7) were established to ensure plant safety without the need for cascading to supported system TSs. This is confirmed in the Bases for Required Action B. 1 of TS 3.8.7 which states:
With one or more required AC buses or distribution panels in one division inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Page 2 of 3
TS Entry Question Loss of E8 Addressing specific examples provided:
For DG#4, the cooling water valves are both powered from MOO DGD fed from E8. Loss of safety function has not occurred for supported Technical Specification 3.8.1 as off sight power remains available to E4. As previously stated, Technical Specifications do not prohibit cascading, but cascading would not be required per LCO 3.0.6.
For the B Feedwater injection line, 2-B21 -F032B, Feedwater injection outboard isolation valve is powered from E8. Oontainment isolation valve 2-B21-F010B is in series with 2-B21-F032B and is not affected by the loss of power. As such safety function per supported Technical Speciation 3.6.1.3 is not lost for primary containment isolation. As previously stated, Technical Specifications do not prohibit cascading, but cascading would not be required per LCD 3.0.6.
Page 3 of 3
i!LL -
EVENT 4 480V Bus E8 LOSS BOP Time Required Actions Notes Reference APP for Sub E8 alarm Dispatch AC to E8 to investigate Diagnose and report loss of Sub E8 Enter and announce AOP-36.1 Section 3.2.10 IS Enclosure 2 Manually start CREV Fan A Direct 2AB-TB be transferred to alternate (E7)
Transfer RPS to alternate per OP.. See Enclosure I for OP-03 Section 8.2 The Group isolations cannot be reset due to the loss 03, Section 8.2 and reset RPS Verify available Division I equipment operating (RBCCW, Drywell coolers, Battery Chargers)
Ensure SJAE A is operating, if AOP-36.1 has a step 3.2.10.8 to ensure SJAE is operating lAW OP-30 directed, place SJAE A in full load per OP-30 2012 NRC Scenario #3 19
EVENT 5 RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE Reactor Recirc Pump 2A seal #1 will fail and seal pressures will equalize. Shortly after the seal #1 failure, a seal #2 failure will occur. The crew will respond to the Recirc Pump seal failure and the rising drywell temperature and pressure per AOP-14.O. AOP-14.O will direct the Recirc Pump be shutdown and then be isolated. If the pump is not isolated, a reactor scram will occur on high drywell pressure. The crew will insert a reactor scram due to no operating recirc pumps.
Malfunctions required: #1 seal failure / Dual seal failure Objectives:
SCO Direct Shift Response To Recirculation Pump Trip RO/BOP Respond To Recirc Pump Trip Success Path:
Isolate the Recirc pump and insert a reactor scram.
Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 6, RR Pump Seal Leakage.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Critical Task Inserting a manual Reactor Scram when Recirc Pumps are tripped or in anticipation of tripping Reactor Recirc Pumps.
SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct entry into and actions of OAOP-14.O for abnormal drywell parameters Direct Recirc Pump A shutdown then isolated Direct a Manual Reactor Scram Critical Task Inserting a manual Reactor Scram when Recirc Pumps are tripped or in anticipation of tripping Reactor Recirc Pumps.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the plant 2012 NRC Scenario #3 20
L . I!II1III1I EVENT 5 RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE RO Time Required Actions Notes Review the following alarms during this event:
A-06 5-3, OUTER SEAL LEAKAGE FLOW DETECTION HI 6-3, PUMP A SEAL STAGING FLOW_HIGH/LOW Enter and announce AOP-14.0 Stop Recirculation Pump A by depressing the A Recirc Pump VFD STOP pushbutton Close Pump A Disch Vlv, B32-FO3IA.
Close Seal Injection Vlv, B32-V22 Close Pump A Suction Vlv, B32-F023A Close Disch Bypass Vlv, B32-F032A Insert a manual reactor scram. Critical Task Inserting a manual Reactor Scram when Recirc Pumps are tripped or in anticipation of tripping Reactor Recirc Pumps.
Performs scram immediate actions:
- 1. After steam flow is less than 3 x 106 lb/hr, PLACE the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.
- 2. IF reactor power is below 2% (APRM downscale trip), THEN TRIP the main turbine.
- 3. ENSURE the master reactor level controller setpoint is +170.
- 4. IF two reactor feed pumps are running, and reactor vessel level is above +160 and rising, then trip one.
Maintains RPV level 170-200 inches Places the SULCV in service lAW See Enclosure 3 for SULCV Hard Card.
Hard Card 2012 NRC Scenario #3 21
?T
EVENT 617 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL I ED A small steam leak will develop in the drywell. Drywell temperature and pressure rises at a faster rate requiring initiation of drywell sprays. RHR Loop 2B is unavailable for spray due to loss of E8 (valve power). When RHR 2A is placed in drywell spray, the outboard spray valve (F016A) will fail.
With no spray available, drywell temperature will exceed 300°F (cannot be restored and maintained below) requiring emergency depressurization. During the depressurization, low pressure injection systems (RHR, Core Spray and Condensate) must be operated to prevent uncontrolled injection. B Loop of RHR will fail to auto start. When emergency depressurization actions have been performed, the scenario may be terminated.
Malfunctions required: Small steam line break in the DW and RHR B Loop fail to start.
Objectives:
SCO Directs Emergency Depressurization actions when exceeding 300°F in the DW.
BOP Perform Emergency Depressurization actions when instructed by the SOC.
Success Path:
Perform Emergency Depressurization of the reactor due to 300°F in the DW.
Simulator Operator Actions:
Li When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 7 to activate the steam leak.
Li If asked to check breaker for El l-FO16A (MCC 2XC) report thermal overload tripped, if directed to reset thermal overload, report it trips again, if directed to manually open Ell-FO16A, report valve is bound.
Li If dispatched to monitor DG operation, report DG4 is running with no cooling water.
Li Monitor drywell average temperature on ERFIS, if required to achieve 300 degrees DW temp, modify steam leak severity.
Li When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Critical Task Depressurize the reactor when drywell average air temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 300°F by performing or anticipating emergency depressurization.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 22
EVENT 617 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL I ED SRO Time Action Notes Recognize drywell temperature and pressure rising at faster rate and diagnose as line break.
Enters PCCP and RVCP.
Direct suppression chamber spray per SEP-03.
Direct drywell spray per SEP-02.
Direct maintenance to investigate El l-FOI6A.
Before drywell temperature reaches 300°F, may direct anticipating emergency depressurization if MSlVs are open.
If drywell temperature exceeds 300°F, Critical Task Anticipating may be a determines it cannot be restored below critical task if 300°F is not reached due to 300°F (unless actions in progress for anticipating emergency depressurization.
anticipating ED) and directs emergency depressurization.
Direct low pressure ECCS be operated to prevent uncontrolled injection.
Direct B Loop RHR pumps to be started when the initiation signal is present.
Direct DW/Suppression Pool Sprays to be terminated if LL3 is reached.
Direct condensate to be operated to prevent uncontrolled injection.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 23
EVENT 617 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL I ED RO Time Action Notes May recognize drywell temperature and pressure rising at faster rate and diagnose as line break.
Initiate suppression chamber spray per See Enclosure 4.
SEP-03.
Initiate drywell spray per SEP-02 See Enclosure 5.
Recognize and report failure of Eli FOI6A to open as thermal overload.
May dispatch AO to check breaker and attempt to reset thermal overload per the APP.
May secure Drywell/Suppression Pool Sprays if LOCA signal is reached.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 24
EVENT 617 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL I ED BOP Time Action Notes May recognize drywell temperature and pressure rising at faster rate and diagnose as line break.
Shutdown DG4 due to loss of cooling water to the DG.
Performs actions to rapidly critical task if this maintains Drywell depressurize the RPV to the main temperature less than 300°F.
condenser as directed by the SCO.
Open Bypass valves using Bypass Jack not to exceed 3 Mlbs/hr steam flow (exceeding this value causes a Group 1 isolation)
Opens seven ADS valves when critical task if Drywell temperature cannot be directed by the SCO. maintained less than 300°F.
Verifies low pressure ECCS actuations at 410# in RPV.
Recognizes RHR Loop B Pumps do not auto start and starts the pumps.
Overrides ECCS off to prevent Due to the E8 loss will not be able to shut off the B uncontrolled injection, loop RHR Pumps.
Operate Condensate as necessary to To control injection pumps will have to be prevent uncontrolled injection, secured because of the power loss to some valves.
Maintains level 170 200 inches.
(Main Steam lines are at 250 inches) 2012 NRC Scenario #3 25
Simulator Operator Activities:
WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2012 NRC Scenario #3 26 T
41 t1&4L a. - - ii a:
ENCLOSURE 1 82 Transferring RPS Bus B from Normal to Alternate Power Cot 8.2.1 Initial Conditions 1 AU applicable prerequisites of Section 4 0 are met.
- 2. 28 RPS MG SET can NOT supply power to RPS Bus B OR must be removed from operation for maintenance or testing.
NOTE: IF the white ALT Ught is NOT lit in the Idliowing step, THEN either Section 5.3 or 8.5 must be completed prior to performing this section,
- 3. White ALT light located above the RPS POWER SOURCE SELECT SWITCH, C72&S1. on Panel H12-P610 is on.
4, SCRAM signal is NOT present on RPS Bus A (this may ue waived by Shift Manager based on plant conditions).
- 5. Tracking LCO does NOT exist on RPS breakers that would interfere with the transfer. (ret, Tech Spec 3.3.8.2)
- 6. Shift Managers permission has been obtained to transfer RPS Bus B from normal to alternate power
- 7. E&RC informed of impending Reactor Building ventilation isolation.
822 Procedural Steps
- 1. IF Sub ESiPnl. 2E8 is to remain energized, THEN GO TO Section 8.5 to shift RPS alternate power source to Alternate Supply (2E8) AND RETURN TO Step 8.2 2 2
- 2. IF the MSIV5 are open, THEN ENSURE the folIov.ng lights are on:
- MS/V SQL. COIL AC lights on Panel H12-P622 for 82 1-F022A-D MS/V SQL. COIL DC lights on Panel H12-P622 for 82 i-FO22AO P43/V SQL, COIL AC lights on Panel H12.P623 for 821-F028A-D
- MS/V SQL. COIL DC lIghts on Panel H12-P623 for 821 FO28kD
] 20P-O3 Rev. 55 1 Page 22 of 65 2012 NRC Scenario #3 27 I . ,. t eA <.
)Kaf&
4 adiS.lilL Lilt *.4 e at a e a. 4% 2 a K at a 0 ENCLOSURE 1
&22 Procedural Steps NOTE: IF a Group 3 isolation signal is bypassed, THEN Tech Spec 3.3.6. 1 requires SLC system declared INOPERABLE within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Tech Spec 31.7 requires an 8-hour LCO to be in effect. WHEN a pnmary containment isolation valve is iNOPERABLE AND the unit is in Mode 1. 2, 3, OR when instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with LCO 3.3.6. 1, THEN an S-hour LCO is in effect in accordance with Tech Spec 3.6.1.3.
- 3. IF Group 3 or Group 8 Isolation signal is undesirable due to operation of RWCU or RHR shutdown cooling, THEN PERFORM the folling:
- a. OBTAIN permission from Shirt Manager to defeat the Group 3 or Group 8 Isolation signal.
b, iF RWCU is in operation. THEN PLACE circuit breaker for RWCU OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVEJ G31-F004 (250V DC MCC 2XDB Oompt, 848), in OFF..
- c. IF RHR shutdown cooling is operating, THEN PLACE circuit breaker for RI-JR SHUTDOWN 1nd,. er.
COOLING ISOLATION VALVE, El l-F008 (250V DC MCC 2)08 Cornpt, 850), in OFF d IF RHR Loop B shutdown cooling is operating, THEN PLACE circuit breaker for LOOP B LPCI INBOARD INJECTION VALVE, El i-FOISB (480? MCC 2X8-2 Compt. DL 7). in OFF.
& REViEW Table 2 with the Control Room to identify trip signals and isolations that may occur when transferring RPS Bus B to alternate power (Dead Bus Transfer).
CR5 Signature:
CAUTION Transferring RPS Bus B to alternate power following a loss of power on RPS Bus B shall always be accomplished by placing RPS POWER SOURCE SELECT SWITCH in ALT B. A SCRAM will result if the switch is placed in ALTA.
5, PLACE RPS POWER SOURCE SELECT SWITCH, C728-Sl, on Panel H12-P610 in ALT 8.
[bP-o3 Rev,55 Page2Sof6S{
2012 NRC Scenario #3 28 J,,.... . . .. . .r.,, .f i,AAtX&,
Kfl1 Klsasgp LJO a t4a s a Sae.. b&EIAI& IThVfl ENCLOSURE 1 8.2.2 Procedural Steps
- 6. PLACE REACTOR SCRAM RESET SWITCH 072-55, In OP 1/4 AND OP 2/3.
- 7. ENSURE TRIP SYS B SCRAM GROUPS 1, Z 3, 4, lights on Panel H12-P603 are on.
- 8. ENSURE SCRAM GROUPS 1. 2, 3,4 lights on Panel H12-P611 are On,
NOTE: CREV will automatically shutdown when the following step is performed. IF verification of CREV auto start is desired, THEN verification must be performed prior to me following step.
- 10. DEPRESS ISOLATION RESET GROUPS 1, 2, 3, 6. 8, push button, 471 S32, on Panel H12-P601 to reset primary containment isolation logic.
1 1. DEPRESS ISOLATION RESET GROUPS 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, push button. A 7l-S33, on Panel Hl2-P601 to reset pnmary containment Isolation logic.
- 12. ENSURE Group 1 BID logic is reset by observing OUTBOARD MSIV LOGIC AC AND iNBOARD MSIV LOGIC DC lights on Panel H12-P601 are on.
IS. ENSURE MSIVAC LOGIC light on Panel H12-P823 is on.
- 15. IF any of the following breakers were placed in OFF to defeat the Group 3 or Group 8 Isolation signal, THEN PLACE the appropriate clrcull breakers in ON:
Compt. 848 on MCC 2XDB (031-F004)
Compt. 650 on MCC 2XDB (El iF0O8)
Compt. DL7 on MOO 2XB-2 (El 1-F0158)
- 16. RESET main steam line radiation monitors AND ENSURE proper operarion.
Rev. 55 Page 24 of 65 2012 NRC Scenario #3 29
fl tlaLn2 C a La. . . a daii& Lii LI.
ENCLOSURE 1 8.2,2 Procedural Steps
- 17. RESET Off-Gas (SJAE) radiation monitors AND ENSURE proper operation.
- 18. REALIGN affected systems as directed by the Unit CR8.
- 19. OPEN. DWFLOOR DRAIN OUTED 1SOL VLV, G1&F004.
- 20. OPEN DWEQUIPMENTDRAIN OUTED ISOL VLV G I 6-F020.
- 21. IF desired, THEN OPEN STEAM LiNE DRAiN OUTED ISOL liLt, B2i-F019.
- 22. OPEN OUTED SAMPLE ISOL liLt, B32-F020.
- 24. REVIEW Table 2 AND ENSURE affected systems and components are realigned for the current plant CR8 conditions.
- 25. COMPLETE Attachment 7.
NOTE: Reference WO #1878878 for instructions to obtain scram pilot solenoid valves voltage.
- 26. INITATE a supplemental check, in accordance with 001-03.7, to have l&C confirm voltage supplied to the scram pilot solenoid valves to be less than or equal to 125 volts, once per shut or as directed by Unit CR8.
Date/Ti me Completed Performed By (Print) Initials Reviewed By:
Unit CRSISRO 2OP-03 Rev. 55 Page 25 of 65 2Ol2NRCScenario#3 30
ja.ara -- a - La a eta ENCLOSURE 2 3.2.10 LOSS of 4160V Bus E4or4BOV Bus E8 NOTE: Power to SRV acoustic monitors conies from Sub ES. IF power is lost to the monitors. THEN SRV position indication lights on the RTGB should NOT be used determine valve to position.
NOTE: Attachment 4 contains a listing of loads supplied from Bus E4.
- 1. CHECK RTG8 and local annunciators for the diesel generator and electrical distribution system to determine the cause of the malfunction NOTE: Loss of Bus E4 power causes a loss of RTGB indication and IJA-Ol alarms for AIR COMPRESSOR 28 but does NOT affect compressor operation.
NOTE: Loss of Bus E4 power also causes CROSS-TIE VALVE, 2-SA-PV-5074, to fall closed with no RTGB indication, NOTE: In service air compressor high discharge pressure (Ui [125 psigJ U2 [i3O psig]) OR relief valves lifting could be an indication of air dryer high differential pressure potentially caused by valves in the flow path failing closed.
- 2. ENSURE one of the following is operating:
- CE EMERS RECIRC FAN, 2A-ERF.CB fl CE EMERS RECIRC FAk 28-ERF-C5 3, IF Sub ES is deenergized, AND Sub El is available, L THEN SHIFT the Manual Bus Transfer (MBT) device for Panel MB-TB to the alternate power source (Sub EIJDP 2E7). (located on Turbine Stulding 20t Elev.)
j OAOP-36. 1 Rev. 60 Page 44 of 94 2012 NRC Scenario #3 31 2I1L1SIII1SLMTh. J,.
ASVflt -t a ,.i 1 Jl t!W I9 Ls ENCLOSURE 2 32.10 Loss of 41GW Bus E4Or4SOV Bus ES NOTE: IF 120 VAC Panel 248-TB is dc-energized, THEN CROSS-TIE VALVE, 2-SA-PV-5071, rails closed and has no RTGS indication. GROSS-TIE VALVE 2-SA-PV-5071 may be opened with the manual handwheel which will gag it in the open position.
NOTE: TB and 28 Service Air Compressors are NOT designed to individually carry the lull system demand of both units when the cross tie valves are open.
CAUTION The unaffected units air compressors and air pressure should be monitored dunnq the cross-tie operation to prevent loss of both units. lithe affected units air header pressure has lowered significantly ordepressurized, then the cross-tie could cause a loss of service air on the unaffected un[t. Consequences of a loss of service air on the unaffected unit should be considered by both Units CR5.
- 4. IF the opposite unit has power to its Service Air compressors AND it is desired to cross-tie air systems.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. OBTAIN permission from the opposite Unit CR5 to cross-tie unit air systems.
b ENSURE CROSS-TIE VALVE, 2-54-PV-5071 is open, (Unit 2, XU-2),
c ENSURE GROSS-TIE VALVE, i-SA-PV-5071 is fl open, (Unit 1, XU-2).
- 2. IF problems occur during cross-tie operation, THEN, at the direction of the Unit CR5 or Reactor Operator, CLOSE one of the following:
- a. IF Service Air Dryer 15 is in standby OR in service on Unit 1, THEN CLOSE, 2--PV-5O71 OR b IF Service Air Dryer 15 is in service on Unit 2, THEN CLOSE, 1-SA-PV-5071, OAOP-36,1 Rev. 60 Page 45 of 94 2012 NRC Scenario #3 32 r
ina
lila J2 .11 - a. b.. Sw eraS d ENCLOSURE 2 3.2.10 Loss of 4160V Bus E4 or4SOV Bus ES
- 6. IF required THEN TRANSFER RPS bus B to alternate LI supply in accordance with 20P-03, Section 8.2.
- 8. IF required, THEN ENSURE an Oft-Gas train is in service LI in accordance with 2OP-30, Section 5.2.
- 9. IF no RBCCW pump is running, THEN PLACE all LI RBCCW pump control switches in OFF AND PERFORM one of the following:
NOTE: Drywell temperature limit for starting the R8CCW System:
- Greater than or equal to 260T below the 75 elevation, as indicated on Control Room recorder GAG- TR-4426 (ii data is available).
- Greater than or equal to 258cF as indicated on Points 1, 3 & 4 of RSDP recorder GAG-TR-778.
- IF any local drywell temperature is currently greater than the starting temperature limit OR has exceeded the starting temperature limit since the initiation of the event, THEN START RBCCW Pump A and Pump C in accordance with 20P-21, Section 8.6.
- IF all local drvwell temperatures have remained less LI than The starting temperature limit since the initiation of the event, THEN START RBCCW Pump A and Pump C in accordance with 20P-21, Section 5.2.
NOTE: Each drywell cooler will start automatically wtien its MCC is energized while a scram signal is present.
10, ENSURE all available drywell coolers are operating. LI II. ENSURE NSW and CSW pumps are operating as LI appropriate for plant conditions.
OAOP-36.1 Rev. 60 Page 46 of 94 2012 NRC Scenario #3 33 fl jskjYy
A u. eJlse - e S fat Fig!
ENCLOSURE 2 3.2.10 Loss of 4160V Bus E4 or 480V Bus ES
- 12. ENSURE the available battery chargers are energized D and supplying DC loads.
- a. IF power has been removed from the battery D chargers for greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, THEN REMOVE selected loads from the battery based upon 001-50 load list
- 13. MONITOR 125V DC battery voltage for 28-1 and 28-2 D batteries.
- a. REMOVE 125V DC battery loads as necessary El prior to reaching the low voltage limit of 105 volts.
- 15. REMOVE any battery from service prior to reaching the El low voltage limit, 105 volts or 21 volts, as applicable.
NOTE: IF in Modes 1, 2 CR3 AND the CSW Header is supplying RBCCW, without determining SW flow to the RSCCW HX in accordance with 20P-43, Section 8.16, THEN the CSW Header should be considered inoperable (reference Tech Spec 3.7.2).
- 16. IF required, THEN PERFORM the following to transfer RBCCW HXs from the NSW header to the CSW header:
- a. CONFIRM CSW system available. El
- b. ENSURE at least one of the following is closed:
-RBCCWHX SER VICE WATER INLET VALVE, El SW-VI 03
-RBCCWHX SERVICE WATER INLET VALVE, El SW-V106
-NUCLEAR HEADER TORBCCWHEAT El EXCHANGER SUPPLY VAL VE SW-V1 93 OAOP-.36. 1 Rev. 60 Page 47 of 94 2012 NRC Scenario #3 34
ENCLOSURE 2 3.2.10 Less ef 4160V Bus E4 or48OV Bus E NOTE: High differential pressure may cause the S W.V1$6 to be difficult to open.
IF CSW is NOT supplying RHRSW, THEN temporarily securing cSW pumps on the CSW header should be considered.
HEAT EXCHANGERS SUPPLY VAL yE, SWV1 46.
I NOTE: Starling a fuel pool cooling pump requires approximatey 50 KW.
- 17. IF required for Spent Fuel Pool Cooflng. THEN START Fuel Pool Cooling Pump A in accordance with 20P- 13.
Section 8.16.
- 18. IF Bus E4 is de-energized AND Bus E2 is available, ThEN ENSURE the Electnc Fire Pump power supply is aligned to Bus E2 in accordance with 0OP4 I Section 8.56.
END OF SECTION OAOP-36. 1 Rev. 60 Page 48 of 2012 NRC Scenario #3 35
a s C NaV1 ENCLOSURE 3 ATTACHMENT 6 Page 1 of 2 Feedwater Level Control Following a Reactor Scram NOTE This attachment is NOT to be used for routine system operation.
ENSURE the following:
- FW-V6 AND FW-V8 OR E FW-Vi 18 AND FW-V1 19 closed
- EW-E\-i77 closed D
- EW-V120 closed U
- FW control MODE SELECT in I ELEM U
- SULCV in NI (MANUAL) closed U
- S*21-F032A AND!OR S21-E0326 open U
- ADJUSTt0 181 U
- 3. IF any REP is running, THEN:
- b. PLACE REPT A(S) SP CTL in NI (MANUAL) U
- 4. IF no REP is running, THEN:
- b. ENSURE the following:
- REPT A(S) SP CTL in NI (MANUAL) at lower limit U
- REPT A(S) MAN/DECS control switch in MAN U
- Reactor water Level is less than +206 inches AND REPT U A&S HIGH LEVEL TRIP reset
- c. DEPRESS REPT A(S) RESET U 20P-32 Rev. 184 Page347of357 2012 NRC Scenario #3 36 saaIanas NZ T
i ..tJ .i a e e LI Li ENCLOSURE 3 ATTACHMENT 6 Page 2 or 2 Feedwater Level Control Following a Reactor Scram ci. ENSURE RFPT A(S) LP AND HP STOP VLVS open e, ROLL RFPT A(S) to 1000 rpm by depressing RFP A(S) LI START RAISE RFPT A(S) to approximately 2550 rpm using the LI LOWER/RAISE control switch
- g. DEPRESS RFPTA(S)DECScTRLRESET LI
- 5. ENSURE MAN/DFCS control swItch in DFCS LI
- 6. RAISE RFPT A(S) SP CTL speed until discharge pressure is greater LI than or equal to 100 psig above reactor pressure
- 9. IF needed, THEN THROTTLE FW-V120 LI 10 IF needed. THEN GO TO 20P-32 Seclion 8171cr level control LI 3 2/1204 2 S11205
{ 20P42 Rev. 184 Page 348 of 2012 NRC Scenario #3 37
ENCLOSURE 4 SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY tO ENTRY CONDITION As directed by the PCIP section of Primary Containment Control Procedure, EOP-02-PCCP 2O OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Manpower: 1 Reactor Operator Special equipment: None RO; 2i IF supprasson chamber pressure is less than 2.5 psig, THEN EXIT this procedure RO: 2.2 IF necessary. THEN PLACE Loop A(5) 2/3 CORE HEIGHT LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch, E1i-US-SlBAtSlSBJ, in MANUAL OVERRO.
RO: 2.3 IF the CTMT SPR OVRD light for the Loop A(S)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL swItch.
Ell-CSSi7A(Sl7B) is NOT on, THEN MOMENTARILY PLACE Loop A(S) CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, El 1-CSSl7A(5178), to MANUAL.
RO: 2$ iF INBOARD INJECTiON VLV. El lFOl5A(FOl58 is open, AND injection to the reactor is NOT requweci. THEN CLOSE OUT8OARD iNJECTION VL V El 1-FOl 7AFOi 78)
RO: 2.5 ENSURE RHR Loop A(B) is placed in the LPCI, Suppression Pool Cooling, or Drywell Spray mode.
RO: 2.13 ENSURE TORUS DISCHARGE !SOL VL El I-FO28AFO288,i, is open.
RO: 27 OPEN TORUS SPRAY ISOL VL V, El lFO27A(FO276).
RO: 2.8 WHEN suppression chamber pressure is less than 2.5 psig OR El suppression pool spray is no longer required, THEN CLOSE TORUS SPRAY ISOL VLV. El l-FO27AcFO278, RO: 2.9 IF reinitiation of suppression pool spray is required, ThEN El RETURN to Step 2. 1, on page 2.
RO: 2.10 WHEN suppression pool spray 15 no tonger required. THEN El EXIT this procedure AND CONTINUE in the procedure(s) in effect.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 38
S 1 tie ttddal aa a -
ENCLOSURE 5 DRYWELL SPRAY PROCEDURE 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS
- As directed by the PC/P section of Primary Containment Control Procedure, EOP-02-PCCP OR
- As directed by the DW1T section of Primary Containment Control Procedure, EOP-02-PCC P 2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Manpower I Reactor Operator I Auxiliary Operator I Independent Verifier Special equipment: 2 3095 keys I screwdriver I locking screwdriver tape RO: 2.1 ENSURE WELL WATER TO ViTAL HEADER VLVJ D SW-V141, is closed.
NOTE: With a LOCA signal present, OUTBOARD INJECTiON VIA ,
1 El 1-FOI7A(FO1IBj can NOT be closed for five minutes.
RO: 2.2 IF INBOARD INJECTION VLV Eii-FO15A(FOi5B) is LI open, THEN CLOSE OUTBOARD INJECTION VIA, El 1-FOl 7A(FOi 78).
2.3 ENSURE one of the following valves is open:
RO: - CONy SW TO VITAL HEADER VLV S W-Vi 11 LI RO: - Nt/C SW TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW-V1 17 LI OEOP-0I-SEP-02 Rev. 17 Page 2 of 16 2012 NRC Scenario #3 39
ENCLOSURE 5 2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 2,4 COMMENCE cirywell spray by performing the oflowing:
RO: 2.4.1 ENSURE both reactor redrculation pumps are tripped.
2.4.2 IF:
RO: A Group 10 soIation has occurred due to a loss of power, AND RO: - Power has been restored, THEN RESET the Gmup 10 isolation by performing the following:
RO: I MOMENTARILY PLACE DIV I NON4NTRPT, RNA-SV-5262, control switch to OVERRIDE RESET. AND THEN to OPEN.
RO: 2. ENSURE DiV I NON-INTRPT, RNA-SV-5262, is open.
RO: 3. ENSURE DIV I SAGKUP N2 RACK ISOL VLV, El RNASV.5482, is closed.
RO: 4. MOMENTARILY PLACE DIV II NON-*!NTRPT, RNASV5281, control switch to OVERRIDE RESET, AND THEN to OPEN RO: & ENSURE DIV!! NON4NTRPT, RNASV52$i, is open.
RO: 6. ENSURE DIV II BACKUP N2 RACK ISOL VLV, El RMA-SV-5481, is closed.
RO: 2.4.3 PLACE all thveli cooler control switches to OFF (110).
OP.OT-SEP-02 Rev. 17 Page 3 of 16 2012 NRC Scenario #3 40 Zit lilt J7l II[. .
1 JP laid e ENCLOSURE 5 2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.4A IF the drywell coolers continue to run, THEN PERFORM the following to energize the LOCA lockout relays for the drywell cooler fans:
RO: Unit I Only: In Panel XU-27, west side, D PLACE DIW CLR A&D OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5993, keylock switch in STOP.
RO: Unit I Only: In Panel XU-28, west side, D PLACE DiW CLR B&C OVERRIDE SWITC VA-CS-5994, keylock switch in STOR RO: - Unit 2 Only: In Panel XU-27, west side, D PLACE D/W CLR A&D OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-C S-5993, keylock switch in STOP.
RO: - Unit 2 Only: In Panel XU-28, east side, El PLACE DIW CLR B&C OVERRIDE SWITCH, VA-CS-5994 keylock switch in STOP.
RO: 2.4.5 IF the drywell coolers continue to run, THEN El PERFORM Attachment 1 on page 13, AND RETURN to Step 24.6.
RO: 2t6 IF necessary, THEN PLACE Loop A(B) 23 CORE El HEiGHT LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch, E11-CS-SI8A(SISB,), to MANUAL OVERRD, RO: 2.43 IF the CTMT SPR OVRD light for Loop A(B) El CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, E11-CS-SI7A(SI7B), is NOT on, THEN MOMENTARILY PLACE Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, E11-CS-SI7A (SlTBj, to MANUAL.
RO: 2.48 ENSURE TORUS COOLING ISOL VLV El El 1-E024A (F0248), is closed.
OEOP-O1-SEP-02 Rev. 17 Page4oM6 2012 NRC Scenario #3 41 T
f
V - a .., a .a ENCLOSURE 5 2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS RO: 2.4 9 IF while executing the toilowing steps dryweil LI pressure drops below 15 psig, THEN TERMINATE drywell spray in accordance wth Step 21, on page 8.
1410 CONFiRM the foDowing:
RO: - Dryweil pressure and drywell temperature are in the SAEE region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit graph (see Figure 1 on next page),
RO: - Suppression pool water level is below +21 Li inches.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 42
ENCLOSURE 5 FIGURE I Drywell Spray Initiattn Lrnt 450 -m-t-------
EE 400 1
UNSAFE U.
uJ II I
i1 D 350 -
I I
I I w I 300 I Ui I
250 Ui SAFE 0
200 Ui
-J 1 150 I 00 50 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 DRYWELL PRESSURE (PSEG) 2012 NRC Scenario #3 43
ENCLOSURE 5 2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS RO: 2.4 1 1 ENSURE one RHR Pump is running.
RO: 2.4.12 OPEN LoopA(B) DRYWELL SPRAY INBD ISOL LI VL V. El lFO2lA(FO2lB)
RO: 2,4,13 THROTTLE OPEN LoopA(B) DRYWELL SPRAY LI OT8D ISOL VLV. El l-FOI6A(F0168). to obtain between 8,000 gprn and 10000 gpm flow RO: 24.14 IF additional coong is required, THEN START the LI second Loop A(B) RHR pump AND limit flow to less than or equal to 11,500 gpei.
2.5 ENSURE RHRSW Loop A(B) is operating in accordance with the following:
NOTE: RHR SW 800STER PUMPS A & C (B & D LOOA OVERR(DE switch.
Ell-Sl9A(S9B), is utilized to override the LOCA trip signal to RHR SW Booster Pumps A 8 C (B & D).
RO: 2.5 1 IF necessary, THEN PLACE RHRSWBOOSTER LI PUMPS A & C (B & 0) LOCA OVERRIDE switch, El1SlA(Sl8). in MANUAL OVERRD RO: 2.5.2 ALIGN the RHR Service Water System to supply cooling water to RHR Heat Exchanger A(8) (OP..43).
2.6 ALIGN RHR flow through the heat exchanger as follows:
RO: 2.6 1 ENSURE HXA(Bi INLET VW E1l.FO47A(FO478) is open.
RO: 2.6.2 ENSURE HXA(8) OUTLET VLV.
E1l-FOO3A(FQO3B is open.
NOTE: HXA(B BYPASS VLV Ell-F048A (F048B1. is normally open, but with a LPCI initiation signal present can NOT be closed or throttled for rnree minutes.
RO: 2..3 CLOSE HXA(BJ BYPASS VLV. El t-FO48AFO48B).
2012 NRC Scenario #3 44
Shift Briefing Plant Status The plant is operating at 75% power following a startup.
A severe thunderstorm warning has been issued for Brunswick County for the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Equipment Out of Service APRM 2 INOP and bypassed.
Protected Equipment None Plan of the Day Complete Main Stop Valve Testing lAW 20P-26, Section 8.6. Then transfer DFCS to 3 element control. Raise power to 85% using recirc flow.
2012 NRC Scenario #3 45
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Brunswick Scenario No.: NRC 2012-4 Op-Test No.: FINAL Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit Two is operating at 5% power. Reactor startup is in progress per GP-02.
GP-10 sequence A2X is complete up to Step 12 Item 179. IRM A is inoperable due to spiking and is bypassed. 2A NSW Pump is under clearance. 2A CSW pump is in standby aligned to the Nuclear SW Header.
Turnover: Place RFP 2A in automatic control. Continue with GP-02 actions to raise reactor power to 10% in preparation for placing the Mode switch to RUN.
Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*
1 N/A NBOP Place RFP A in Auto N-SRO 2 N/A R-RO Raise reactor power by pulling control rods R-SRO 3 NIO18F 1-RO IRM C Fails Upscale (TS) l-SRO 4 CWO27F C-BOP CSW 2C Pump Trip CSW 2A Auto Start Failure (AOP-1 9, TS)
C-SRO 5 RDOO5M C-RO Rod Drift (AOP-2.0, AOP-3.0, APP A-05, TS)
C-SRO 6 CFO35F C-BOP SULCV Fails Closed C-SRO 7 RPOO5F M-ALL Multiple Rod Drifts/Manual Scram/ATWS RPO11F C-RO 7a K2624A C-RO ARI Failure to Reset/Rod Select Fails/SLC Pumps Fail to start K2322A C-SRO 8 ESOO4F C-RO SRV F Fails Open (AOP-30)
C-SRO 8a CAO2OF M-All SRV F Tailpipe Rupture Emergency Depressurize (PSP)
- (N)ormal (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Event 1 The crew will place REP A in automatic operation lAW OGP-02, Step 5.3.46.
Event 2 When REP A has been placed in automatic operation, the crew will commence raising reactor power by pulling rods in preparation for placing the Mode switch to RUN. Rod pulls will commence at Step 12, Item 179 (38-15 @ 00) of the A2X sequence.
Event 3 IRM C will fail upscale causing a rod block and half scram. The Unit SRO will address IRM A and C inoperability lAW TS 3.3.1.1. Once addressed, Ops Center SRO will report IRM A is ready to be returned to service following proper channel check. The crew will take the actions of the APP and bypass IRM C and reset the half scram. Following bypassing of IRM C and resetting the half scram, control rods will continue to be withdrawn raising power.
Event 4 CSW pumps are aligned with 2B and 2C running and 2A in standby aligned to the Nuclear SW header. CSW Pump 2C will trip. CSW Pump will not auto start requiring the BOP operator to manually start the pump. This will require aligning the pump to the conventional service water header. The crew will enter OAOP-19.
The Unit SRO will address CSW Pump operability lAW TS 3.7.2.
Event 5 When Tech Specs have been addressed, the crew will continue to raise reactor power. Control Rod 30-31 will drift outward. The crew will enter AOP-2.0 and will reference AOP-3.0. lAW 2APP A-05 3-2, the operator will attempt to arrest the control rod and then will drive the rod to position 00. The SRO will address Rod Pattern Control and Control Rod Operability lAW Tech Spec 3.1.6 and 3.1.3.
Event 6 The SULCV will fail closed stopping feed flow to the vessel. Reactor water level will drop requiring action to re-establish flow to the vessel.
Event 7 When level control has been established, multiple control rods will drift. The RO will insert a manual reactor scram lAW the requirements of AOP-02. When the manual scram is initiated, not all control rods will insert requiring entry into LPC. The SRO will direct performance of LEP-02. SLC pumps will fail to run.
Event 7a When performing LEP-02, ARI will fail to reset and the Rod Select will fail preventing the insertion of control rods.
Event 8 SRV F will fail open. AOP-30 will be entered. The SRV will not reset using the control switch. Pulling fuses lAW AOP-30 results in loss of indication but the SRV remains open.
Event 8a SRV F tailpipe will rupture, pressurizing containment.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 2
IS S tvt,a. - as . a l DUKE ENERGY BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2012 NRC Exam Scenario #4 Prepared By: a Nuclear Operations Instructor 9/2/iL Date Concurred By Operations Instructor Date Validated By:
Tent%epritaUve 9
OjrionsDep Date 2/
/ >o /
Validated By: )K -
Validated By:
Approved By:
iII1IiiJi1iJJ1J1IftJZ7L1 /@&
r
SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC-6 RxPwr 5%
Events:
Trigger Trigger Description Number 1 Normal Ops (Place REP A in automatic) 2 Raise reactor power by pulling control rods 3 1 Manual IRM C fails upscale 4 2 Manual CSW Pump 2C trips 5 3 Manual Control rod 30-31 drifts out 6 4 Manual SULCV fails closed 7 5 Manual Multiple Rod Drifts 7a 6 Automatic Rod Select power fails/ATWS 8 7 Manual SRV F fails open 8a 8 Manual SRV F tail pipe rupture Malfunctions Summary MaIf ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig ID Value Value RD005M 30-31 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL DRIFT FALSE TRUE 3 NIO18F IRM C FAILS HI FALSE TRUE 1 CWO27F C CSW PUMP MOTOR WINDING FAULT FALSE TRUE 2 CFO35F S/U LV CONT VLV FAILS CLOSED FALSE TRUE 4 RD005M 22-47 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL DRIFT FALSE TRUE 5 RD0O5M 14-39 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL DRIFT FALSE TRUE 5 RD005M 30-23 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL DRIFT FALSE TRUE 5 RPO11F ATWS-4 FALSE TRUE 6 ESOO4F ADS VALVE F FAILS OPEN FALSE TRUE 7 CAO2OF SRV F TAIL PIPE RUPTURE FALSE TRUE 7 2012 NRC Scenario #4 4
SIMULATOR SETUP Remotes Summary Remf ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig ID Value Value ED_IABKCFI2 BKR CTL FUSES NSW PUMP 2A OUT OUT SL_IASLRA 2A SLC PUMP MOTOR BKR OPEN OPEN SLIASLRB 2B SLC PUMP MOTOR BKR CLOSE OPEN 00:00:10 10 Override Summary Tag ID Description Position/ Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Target Value Value Q4B201G4 NUC SW PMP A DISCH VLV(GREEN) ON/OFF ON OFF K2322A ROD SEL POWER OFF OFF ON 6 K2322A ROD SEL POWER ON ON OFF 6 K2624A CS-5562 ARI RESET OFF OFF Q15O8LGJ SRVVLVB21-FO13F GREEN ON OFF 8 Q15O8RRJ SRVVLVB21-FOI3FRED ON OFF 8 Q221 1 LGO S/B LIQ PMP A GREEN ON/OFF ON ON Q22OILAO SQUIBA*READYAMBER ON/OFF ON ON K1727A CONT SPRAY VLV CONTROL MANUAL OFF OFF K1227A CONT SPRAY VLV CONTROL MANUAL OFF OFF Annunciator Summary Window Description Tagname Override Type Oval AVaI Actime Dactime Trig 4-5 SQUIB VALVE CONTINUITY LOSS ZA445 OFF OFF ON 2012 NRC Scenario #4 5
Special Instructions
- 1. Ensure simulator security is established lAW TAP-41 1.
- 2. Ensure appropriate keys have blanks in switches.
- 4. Ensure no rods are bypassed in the RWM.
- 5. Ensure hard cards and flow charts are cleaned up.
- 6. Ensure all key have blanks installed.
- 7. Ensure affected procedures are free of any marks.
- 8. Place all SPDS displays to the Critical Plant Variable Display #100.
- 9. Reset to IC-6 and place in run.
- 10. Ensure no ENP-24.5 is located at the P603 panel.
- 11. Bypass IRM A and place off normal tag.
- 12. Place red cap on 2A Nuclear Service Water Pump control switch.
13.CSW Pumps B and C operating.
14.CSW Pump A selected for the NSW header.
- 15. Place Protected Equipment placards on 2B NSW Pump.
- 16. Update orange Protected Equipment sign to indicate 1A, 1B, and 2B NSW Pumps.
- 17. Ensure GP-10 is completed up to Step 12 Item 179 of A2X sequence with Attachment 3.
- 18. Ensure OGP-02 is completed up to Step 5.3.46.
- 19. Ensure Reactor pressure is 800 psig and #1 BPV open at least 40%.
- 20. Load scenario file if required.
21 .Advance all chart recorders to indicate steady state conditions.
- 22. Provide Shift Briefing sheet to the CRS.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 6
f :zAN Scenario Information Critical Tasks (Critical Tasks are bolded & italicized in required operator statements)
- 1. Emergency Depressurize when PSP is exceeded
- 2. Perform LEP-02, Alternate Control Rod Insertion REFERENCES A. GP-02 B. OP-07 C. OPO8 D. OP-32 E. GP-1O F. AOP-02.O G. AOP-03.O H. AOP-19.O I. AOP-23.O J. AOP-30.O K. EOP-O1-RSP L. EOP-O1-LPC M. EOP-01-RVCP N. EOP-02-PCCP
- 0. EOP-LEP-02 P. EOP-01-SEP-02 Q. EOP-O1.-SEP-03 R. Conduct Of Operations Manual S. Technical Specifications T. Annunciator Panel Procedures 2012 NRC Scenario #4 7
EVENT I Shift Turnover, Place Reactor Feed Pump A in Automatic Operation The crew will place REP A in automatic operation lAW OGP-02, Step 5.3.46 Malfunctions required:
None Objectives:
SCO Directs placing RFP A in automatic operation.
BOP Place REP A in automatic operation.
Monitor reactor water level and proper operation of REP and SULCV.
Success Path:
RFP A controlling reactor water level in automatic operation.
Simulator Operator Actions:
D When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Normal operation. Place REP A in automatic operation.
SRO Time Required Actions Notes Ensures conditions for placing REP A in automatic operation Directs RO to place REP A in automatic operation lAW OGP-02, Step 5.3.46.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the plant.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 8
EVENT I Shift Turnover, Place Reactor Feed Pump A in Automatic Operation RO Time Required Actions Notes When reactor feed pump discharge pressure is greater than 900 psig, places REP A in automatic operation.
o Ensures MSTR RFPTSP/RX LVL CTL, C32-SIC-R600, in M (manual).
o Ensures FEED WA TER CONTROL MODE SELECT in I ELEM.
o Depresses SEL pushbutton on RFPTA SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6OIA, until A BIAS is indicted and ensures bias is set to 0%.
o Depresses SEL pushbutton on RFPTA SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6OIA, until PMPA DEMis displayed.
a Depresses SEL pushbutton on MSTR RFPT SP/RX LVL CTL, C32-SIC-R600, until MSTR DEM is displayed.
a Sets MSTR DEM to equal PMP A DEM value displayed on RFPTA SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6OIA, using the raise lower pushbuttons on MSTR RFPT SP/RXLVL CTL, C32-SIC-R600, 2012 NRC Scenario #4 9
EVENT I Shift Turnover, Place Reactor Feed Pump A in Automatic Operation RO contd Time Required Actions Notes o Depresses A/M pushbutton on RFPTA SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6O1A, and checks the indictor on control station changes to A (automatic) and PMP DEM signal remains unchanged.
o Depresses SEL pushbutton on the out-of-service RFPT B SP CTL, C32-SIC-R6OIB, UNTIL LVL ERROR is indicated and checks LVL ERROR is approximately 0 inches.
o Depresses AIM pushbutton on MS TR RFPT SP/RX L VL C TL, C32-SIC-R600, AND checks the indicator on the control station changes to A (automatic).
o Ensures PMPA DEMand VALVE DEM signals remain unchanged.
o Depresses AIM pushbutton on SULCV, FW-LIC-3269, and checks the indictor on the control station changes to M (manual).
o Slowly opens SULCV, using Momentarily depressing the raise or lower pushbuttons on FW-LIC-3269 will cause valve rais J ushb u ft on on FW-LIC- demand to change in increments of 0.1%. Continually 3269, until VALVE DEM, IS depressing the raise or lower pushbuttons will cause 100% and check reactor water valve demand to change at an exponential rate.
level is being maintained between 182 and 192 inches.
Informs SRO that REP A is in automatic controlling level.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 10
EVENT 2 Raise power using rods When RFP A has been placed in automatic operation, the crew will commence raising reactor power by pulling rods in preparation for placing the Mode switch to RUN. Rod pulls will commence at Step 12, Item 179 (38-15 @ 00) of the A2X sequence.
Malfunctions required:
None Objectives:
SRO Directs and monitor reactor power ascension with control rods RO Withdraw control rods to raise reactor power Monitor plant parameters during power ascension Success Path:
Raise power using control rods Simulator Operator Actions:
LI If asked as RE, state that there are no high worth control rods located in steps 12 through 17 of GP-10, A2X LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Ensures no other distracting evolutions are in progress while reactivity controls are being manipulated.
Directs RO to raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods lAW OGP 10, A2X, Step 12, Item 179.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor Plant Parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #4 11
EVENT 2 Raise power using rods RO Time Required Actions Notes Commence rod withdrawal at Step From OPS-NGGC-1306, Section 9.1.4:
12, Item 179, GP-1 0, A2X sequence, When moving a control rod three notches or less, per guidance of 01-01 .02 the control rod should be single notched for the entire move.
20P-07,Section 5.1, Notch Control Concurrent Verification is required when selecting control rods to ensure the correct rod is selected Rod Withdrawal prior to allowing rod movement.
o Ensures ROD SELECT Documentation for control rod manipulations, performed in accordance with this section, is POWER control switch is in provided in OENP-24.5 or GP control rod movement ON. sheets.
20P-07, Attachment 14, Notch Step 12 Rods withdrawn from 00 to 04 (38-15, 14-15, 14-39, and 38-39)
Control Rod Withdrawal Step 13 rods withdrawn from 00 to 04 o Selects control rod by (30-23, 22-23, 30-21, and 22-21) depressing its CONTROL ROD Step 14 rods withdrawn from 00 to 04 SELECT push button. (30-15, 22-15, 38-23, 14-23, 30-31, 14-31, 30-39, and 22-39)
. Ensures the backlighted CONTROL ROD SELECT push button is brightly ill urn i nated
. Ensures the white indicating light on the full core display is ill urn i nated
. Ensures ROD WITHDRAWAL PERMISSIVE indication is ill urn i nated o NOTCH WITHDRAW control rod to position 02 then 04 by momentarily placing ROD MOVEMENT in NOTCH OUT.
o Monitors control rod position and nuclear instrumentation while withdrawing the control rod.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 12
EVENT 2 Raise power using rods RO Contd o Performs the following for control rods withdrawn to an intermediate position:
WHEN control rod reaches designated position, confirms the following:
- Control Rod settles into desired position
- Rod settle light extinguishes o Repeats steps for remainder of The RO must wait 5 seconds after the settle light extinguishes before selecting a different control rod.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 13 p 7
iIIIII9!Lt .
EVENT 3 IRM C fails upscale IRM C will fail upscale causing a rod block and half scram. The Unit SRO will address IRM A and C inoperability lAW TS 3.3.1.1. Once addressed, Ops Center SRO will report IRM A is ready to be returned to service following proper channel check. The crew will take the actions of the APP and bypass IRM C and reset the half scram. Following bypassing of IRM C and resetting the half scram, control rods will continue to be withdrawn raising power.
Malfunctions required:
IRM C Fails upscale Objectives:
SRO Direct actions for IRM C failure.
Address IRM C TS 3.3.1.1 RO Perform actions for IRM C failure Success Path:
Technical Specification I TRM
- 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation Determines with IRM5 A & C inoperable, Condition A. One or more required channels inoperable for Function Ia (IRM Neutron FluxHigh).
Required Action A.1 (Place channel in trip) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- TRM 3.3 Control Rod Block Instrumentation May conservatively declare a tracking LCO, Condition A.1, Restore channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Declare IRM A operable by channel check and bypass IRM C with tracking LCO for IRM C.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 14
EVENT 3 IRM C fails upscale Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by lead examiner, initiate Trigger I initiates to fail IRM C upscale.
LI If contacted as the RE for IRM C inoperability, acknowledge request.
LI When IRM C inoperability has been addressed and by lead examiners direction, contact the control room as Ops Center SRO and report IRM A can be declared OPERABLE following a satisfactory channel check and that the equipment control database will be updated with the final IRM Bypass switch alignment.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Directs APP reference A-05 1-7 REACTOR AUTO SCRAM SYS A 4-7 NEUT MON SYS TRIP 2-4 IRM UPSCALE 2-2 ROD OUT BLOCK 3-4 IRM A UPSCALE/INOP Contacts l&C for IRM C failure.
Evaluate TS 3.3.1.1 and determines that with IRMs A & C inoperable Condition A is applicable for Function la:
LI Required Action A.1 Place channel in trip (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)
May enter TRM 3.3 (Control Rod May conservatively declare a tracking Block Instrumentation) Function 3 LCO, Required Action A.1 Restore Condition A, Tracking LCO. channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 15
EVENT 3 IRM C fails upscale SRO contd Time Required Actions Notes Evaluates IRM A operability following satisfactory channel check A channel check shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior 20P-09, Attachment 4, 2.3.4 during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel (Operability Guidance) Channel indication and status to other indications or status Checks are a sufficient WO PMT for derived from independent instrument channels SRMs and IRMs at power unless a measuring the same parameters.
component failure is suspected in which case an IN curve and TDR trace is desirable.
20P-09, Attachment 4, 2.3.5, Guidelines for Spiking SRM/IRMs:
Instruments declared inoperable that were affected by a plant condition no longer occurring (such as: welding, disturbing cables under vessel, EMI pulse, etc.) can be restored to an operable status without subsequent maintenance activities. A WO PMT task will be used to document satisfactory performance of an instrument channel check (instrument is reading consistent with plant conditions and other channels).
Determines IRM A is operable Directs removing IRM A from Bypass and bypassing IRM C Directs resetting half scram lAW APP-A-05 3-4.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor Plant Parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #4 16
EVENT 3 IRM C fails upscale RO Time Required Actions Notes Stops withdrawing control rods when IRM C fails upscale. ROD OUT BLOCK Determines IRM C failed upscale.
Reports and responds to applicable alarms for IRM C failing upscale:
4-05 1-7 REACTOR AUTO SCRAM SYS A 4-7 NEUT MON SYS TRIP 2-4 IRM UPSCALE 2-2 ROD OUT BLOCK 3-4 IRM A UPSCALE/INOP IRM A UPSCALE/INOP actions:
o May Reposition range switch for IRM C to bring indicated power to between 15 and 50 on the 0-125 scale.
o May verify IRM C Drawer Selector switch (Control Panel H12-P606) is in OPERATE.
o May notify SRO of Tech Spec applicability May inform SRO IRM C cannot be bypassed and half scram cannot be reset due to IRM A being bypassed.
Performs channel check of IRM A for operability. (201-03.2, RO DSR, Item 41)
Removes IRM A from Bypass and bypasses IRM C per APP guidance (APP-A-OS 3-4)
Resets half scram per APP guidance (APP-A-OS 3-4) 2012 NRC Scenario #4 17
EVENT 4 CSW 2C Pump Trip CSW 2A Auto Start Failure CSW pumps are aligned with 2B and 2C running and 2A in standby aligned to the Nuclear SW header. CSW Pump 2C will trip. CSW Pump 2A is aligned to the nuclear header and therefore will not auto start requiring the BOP operator to start the pump lAW 2APP-UA-O1 4-9.
This will require aligning the pump to the conventional service water header. The crew will enter OAOP-1 9. The Unit SRO will address CSW Pump operability lAW TS 3.7.2.
Malfunctions required:
Trip of 2C Conventional Service Water (CSW) Pump Oblectives:
SRO Directs AOP-19 and APP actions Evaluate Service Water TS 3.7.2 BOP Perform actions to start 2A CSW pump on the conventional header RO Monitors plant parameters Success Path:
Technical Specification I TRM
- 3.7.2 Service Water (SW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
Determines with 2C CSW Pump inoperable, Condition C, One required conventional service water pump (CSW) inoperable applies.
Required Action C.1, Immediately verify the one OPERABLE CSW pump and one OPERABLE Unit 2 NSW pump are powered from separate 4.16 kV emergency buses.
Required Action C.2, 7 Days AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO, Restore required CSW pump to OPERABLE status.
2A CSW pump running on the conventional header.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 18
EVENT 4 contd CSW 2C Pump Trip CSW 2A Auto Start Failure Simulator Operator Actions:
L When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 2 to trip 2C Conventional Service Water Pump.
D If contacted as OSAO, report 51 devices picked up on the 2C CSW pump breaker and the pump motor is hot to the touch.
u If contacted as Unit One, acknowledge and reset alarms.
U When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Start CSW Pump 2A on the conventional header Technical Specification CSW Pump 2C inoperability.
SRO Time Required Actions Notes Directs APP reference UA-O1 1-9 CONV HDR SERV WA TER PRESS-LOW 4-9 CONVHDR SWPUMP C TRIP UA-15 6-1 BUS El_RKV MOTOR OVLD May direct entry into OAOP-19.O, Conventional Service Water System Failures.
Directs BOP to start CSW Pump 2A on the conventional header.
Evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.2 Service Water and Ultimate Heat Sink.
Determine with One Required CSW Pump Inoperable:
U Required Action C.1 Verify the one operable CSW and one operable U/2 NSW pump powered from separate 4KV buses (Immediately)
AND U Required Action C.2 Restore required pump to operable (7 days and 14 days from discovery_to_meet_LCO) 2012 NRC Scenario #4 19
EVENT 4 contd CSW 2C Pump Trip CSW 2A Auto Start Failure BOP Time Required Actions Notes Respond to alarms:
UA-O 1 1-9 CONVHDR SERV WATER PRESS-LOW 4-9 CONVHDR SWPUMP C TRIP UA-15 6-1 BUS El RKV MOTOR OVLD Announce and enter OAOP-19.O, Conventional Service Water System Failures.
Start 2A CSW pump as follows: If valve selector switch is placed in CONV HDR first, pump will auto start.
o Place 2A Mode Selector in MAN o Ensure valve selector switch in CONV HDR o StartCSWpump2A o Confirm discharge valve for CSW pump 2A automatically opens o Confirm Cony Hdr Sen. Water Press-Low alarm is clear.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitor plant parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #4 20
EVENT 5 Control Rod Drift When Tech Specs have been addressed, the crew will continue to raise reactor power.
Control Rod 30-31 will drift outward. The crew will enter AOP-2.0 and will reference AOP-3.0.
lAW 2APP A-05 3-2, the operator will attempt to arrest the control rod and then will drive the rod to position 00. The SRO will address Rod Pattern Control and Control Rod Operability lAW Tech Spec 3.1.6 and 3.1.3.
Malfunctions required:
Control Rod Drift out Objectives:
SCO Direct actions in response to a drifting control rod Evaluate Technical Specifications RO Respond to a drifting control rod Success Path:
The drifting control rod is fully inserted, valved out of service and electrically disarmed.
Tech Spec 3.1.6, Rod Pattern Control Condition A. One or more OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with BPWS Required Action A.1 Move associated control rod(s) to correct position (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)
OR A.2 Declare associated control rod(s) inoperable (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)
Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability Condition C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition AorB Required Action C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />)
AND C.2 Disarm the associated CRD (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) 2012 NRC Scenario #4 21
Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 3 to initiate control rod 30-31 drift out.
El When control rod has been fully inserted, delete malfunction RDOO5M for Control Rod 30-31. DO NOT delete rod drift malfunctions for other rods at this time.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct actions in response to rod drift alarm:
APP-A-05 (3-2), Rod Drift Direct entry into OAOP-02.0, Control Rod Malfunction/Misposition.
Reference OAOP-03, Positive Reactivity Addition.
Evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.6, Rod Pattern Control LI Condition A.2 - Declare Since the control rod does not comply with the BWPS, declare it inoperable.
associated control rod inoperable (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />):
Evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability:
LI Condition C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />),
AND LI C.2 Disarm the associated CRD (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />).
2012 NRC Scenario #4 22
EVENT 5 contd Control Rod Drift RO Time Required Actions Notes Perform the actions of APP-A-05 (3-2)
ROD DRIFT as follows:
o Determines control rod 30-31 is drifting.
o Selects control rod 30-3 1 and determines drifting out.
o Attempt to arrest the drift by If control rod drifts out beyond the banked position of 08 then the RWM will have to be bypassed to a, i insert the rod to 00.
o Fully inserts control rod 30-31.
May need to obtain Key #38 from the SRO key locker and bypass the RWM to insert the rod to 00.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor plant parameters Monitors core parameters, main steam line radiation and off-gas activity 2012 NRC Scenario #4 23
EVENT 6 SULCV Falls Closed The crew responds to SULCV failure and reactor water level lowering.
Malfunctions required:
SULCV fail closed Objectives:
sco Direct actions for failed SULCV and lowering reactor water level BOP Take action to respond to a failed SULCV and lowering reactor water level RO Monitors reactor plant parameters Success Path:
Level restored to normal band by establishing flow through an alternate path Simulator Operator Actions:
D When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 4 to initiate closure of the SULCV.
LI Before a reactor scram occurs, Initiate TRIGGER 6.
LI If contacted as TBAO to investigate SULCV, acknowledge request.
LI If contacted as l&C to investigate failure, acknowledge request.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 24
dImII -
EVENT 6 contd SULCV Fails Closed Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct actions in response to lowering reactor water level.
A-07 2-2, REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW A-05 3-3, SRM PERIOD Direct AOP-23 entry Direct injection to the vessel be established by manually opening one of the following valves:
. FW-V120
. FW-V118
. FW-V119 Direct manual scram if level control not established and level continues to lower.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Recognize and respond to lowering reactor water level (may notice before alarm) APP-A-07 2-2 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW Diagnose SULCV has failed closed and attempt to OPEN If direct by SRO, insert manual scram 2012 NRC Scenario #4 25
EVENT 6 contd SULCV Fails Closed BOP Time Required Actions Notes Attempt to establish flow to the Reference 20P-32, &tep-&9-2-1-9---
vessel bymanuallyopening one of the following valves:
. FW-V120 3. i4-
. FW-V118 v
. FW-V119 Monitor plant parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #4 26
EVENT 717a Multiple control rods driftinglManual ScramIATWSIARI reset failurelRod Select failurelSLC failure When level control has been established, multiple control rods will drift. The RO will insert a manual reactor scram lAW the requirements of AOPO2. When the manual scram is initiated, not all control rods will insert requiring entry into LPC. The SRO will direct performance of LEP-02. SLC pumps will fail to run. When performing LEP-02, ARI will fail to reset and the Rod Select will fail preventing the insertion of control rods Malfunctions required:
Rod Drifts, ARI reset failure, Rod Select failure, SLC failure Objectives:
Sco Direct manual reactor scram Direct actions for LPC RO Insert manual scram in response to multiple rod drifts Perform actions to Terminate and Prevent injection Perform LPC actions Success Path:
Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 5 AND Trigger 6 to initiate multiple control rod drifts LI Ensure Trigger 10 (SLC Pump failure) initiates when SLC switch is not in Stop.
LI If directed as RBAO to perform field actions for LEP-03, acknowledge request.
Li If contacted as I&C for Rod Select switch repairs, acknowledge request.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 27
EVENT 717a contd Multiple control rods drifting/Manual Scram/ATWSIARI reset failure/Rod Select failure/SLC failure Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct actions of OAOP-02 for multiple control rod drifts (Scram)
Direct actions of LPC:
o After steam flow is less than 3 X 106 lb/hr Place Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN o Initiate ARI o If Reactor Power is NOT less than 2 %, Trip both Reactor Recirc Pumps o May Initiate SLC o May direct performance of LEP 03, Alternate Boron Injection o Inhibit ADS o Direct performance of LEP- Critical Task 02, Alternate Control Rod Insertion o Bypass Group I Low Level Will contact the WCC SRO to perform this task.
Isolation lAW SEP-10 o Establish reactor water level band LL-4 to +200 inches 2012 NRC Scenario #4 28 IITII5IZIdIIIIE1L I
EVENT 717a contd Multiple control rods driftinglManual ScramIATWSIARI reset failurelRod Select failure/SLC failure RO Time Required Actions Notes Recognize multiple control rods are Immediate Operator Action of AOP-02 drifting and insert manual scram Performs LPC actions:
o After steam flow is less than 3 X 106 lb/hr Place Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN o When directed, manually initiate ARI o Report failure of ARI to initiate o If directed, trip both Reactor Recirc Pumps o If directed, Initiate SLC o Report failure of SLC pumps o If directed, perform LEP-03, Alternate Boron Injection:
o Dispatch AO to perform field actions.
o WHEN SLC tank level reaches 0%, OR All control rods are inserted to or beyond position 00, OR It has been determined that the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions without boron THEN Direct AO to perform field actions to secure from alternate boron injection.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 29
EVENT 717a contd Multiple control rods drifting/Manual ScramIATWS/ARI reset failure/Rod Select failurelSLC failure RO contd Time Required Actions Notes o When directed, perform LEP- Critical Task Perform LEP-02, Alternate Control Rod Insertion 02 At this time the procedure cannot be completed Report failure of Rod Select due to the rod select power failure. The RO will attempt Sections 5 and 3 of the procedure.
Power See Enclosure I for procedure steps.
a If directed, Terminate and Prevent injection from HPCI:
a If NOT operating, Place HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Control Switch in PULL-TO-LOCK a If Operating:
a Depress and Hold Trip Pushbutton a When turbine speed is zero RPM AND E41-V9 is Closed, PLACE Control Switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.
a When A-O1 4-2, HPCI TURB ERG OIL PRESS LO is sealed in, RELEASE TRIP Pushbutton a Ensure E41-V8 and E41-V9 remain closed and HPCI does not restart 2012 NRC Scenario #4 30
EVENT 717a contd Multiple control rods driftinglManual ScramIATWSIARI reset failurelRod Select failurelSLC failure BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor plant parameters If directed, Terminate and Prevent condensate and feedwater:
o Trip all operating RFP5 OR o Idle one RFP o Close FW-V6 and FWV8 o Close SULCV:
o Place in M (Manual) o Select DEM and Decrease signal until VALVE DEM indicates 0%
o Ensure FW-V120 is closed Place the following switches to Reset Group 10 Isolation actions Override Reset:
o DIV I NON-INTRPT RNA-SV..
5262 o DIV II NON-INTRPT RNA-SV 5261 2012 NRC Scenario #4 31
EVENT 8!8a SRF F fails openISRV tailpipe rupturelRHR Spray Logic FaiIureIED on PSP SRV F will fail open. AOP-30 will be entered. The SRV will not reset using the control switch.
Pulling fuses lAW AOP-30 results in loss of indication but the SRV remains open. When reactor pressure decreases to 500 psig, the SRV F tailpipe will rupture pressurizing containment. RHR spray logic will fail to operate.
Malfunctions required:
SRV F fails open, SRV F tailpipe rupture Objectives:
SRO Directs actions of AOP-30 Directs Emergency Depressurization RO/BOP Perform AOP-30 actions Open 7 ADS valves Insert Control Rods Success Path:
Control Rods are inserted, Reactor is depressurized and level restored to normal band Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 7, SRV F failure.
El If contacted as Ops Center SRO to pull fuses for SRV F, acknowledge request, wait one minute, then activate Trigger 8 and report fuses pulled.
LI When reactor pressure decreases to 500 psig, ensure Trigger 9, SRV F downcomer rupture initiates.
LI If contacted as l&C to investigate SRV F opening, acknowledge request.
LI When directed by lead examiner, delete Override K2614A, CS-5562 ARI, then inform SRO as l&C that ARI switch has been repaired. Delete Malfunction RPOI I F, ATWS-4.
Delete Malfunction RDOO5M for control rods 22-47, 14-39, and 30-23.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, the scenario may be terminated.
LI CAUTION: DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR UNTIL DIRECTED BY THE LEAD EXAMINER.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 32
EVENT 818a SRF F fails openISRV tailpipe rupturelRHR Spray Logic Failure/ED on PSP Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct AOP-30 actions Direct pulling fuses for SRV F lAW AOP-.30.0 Monitor containment parameters Enters and Directs actions of PCCP:
o Before Suppression Chamber pressure reaches 1 1 .5 psig directs SP Spray lAW SEP-03 o When Suppression Chamber exceeds 11.5 psig directs DW Spray lAW SEP-02 o Directs Emergency Critical Task Emergency Depressurize when PSP is exceeded Depressurization when PSP exceeded 2012 NRC Scenario #4 33
EVENT 818a SRF F fails openISRV tailpipe rupturelRHR Spray Logic FailurelED on PSP RO Time Required Actions Notes Report SRV F is failed open:
A-03 1-10, SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE OPEN 1-1, SAFETY OR DEPRESS VLV LEAKING Perform OAOP-30.0 actions:
NOTE: A full open SRV will not reseat until reactor pressure reduces to the reseat pressure for that SRV (approximately 900 to 1100 psig).
o CYCLE the control switch of the Immediate Operator Actions affected safety/relief valve to OPEN and CLOSE OR OPEN and AUTO several times.
o ENSURE the affected safety/relief valve control switch is left in CLOSE OR AUTO.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 34
EVENT 818a SRF F fails openISRV tailpipe rupturelRHR Spray Logic FailurelED on PSP RD contd Time Required Actions Notes o IF a safety/relief valve is stuck open, THEN PERFORM the following:
NOTE: Pulling safety/relief valve fuses will de-energize the red and green indicating lights on Panel P601.
o PULL the fuses in the order listed in Attachment 1 for the affected safety/relief valve.
o MONITOR the following to determine safety/relief valve position:
o Tailpipe Temperatures (ERFIS Screen 241 o Other indications as available (feed/steam flow mismatch, generator MWE, etc.)
Report failure of RHR Spray Logic.
When directed by SRO, Open 7 Critical Task Emergency Depressurize when PSP is exceeded ADS valves When informed ARI has been Critical Task Perform LEP-02, Alternate Control Rod Insertion repaired, inserts manual scram lAW LEP-02: See Enclosure I for procedure steps. Will perform Section 3 of the procedure.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Restore reactor water level 170 -
200 inches using condensate system (SULCV) 2012 NRC Scenario #4 35
Simulator Operator Activities:
WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2012 NRC Scenario #4 36
ENCLOSURE 1 Section 5 The purpose of this section is to insert control rods with the Reactor Manual Control System.
NOTE: Manpower: I Reactor Operator Special equipment Main Control Room 1<evlocker V1..Onl: 1 5450 key for RWM
,ZOnl: 1 5451 key for RWM
- 1. IF a CRD pump is NOT operating, THEN PERFORM the fol lowing:
RO: a. ENSURE CRD FLOWCONTROL, Cl 1(C12FC.Rf3OO, is in MAN.
RO: b. CLOSE the in-service FLOW CONTROL VL Cl 1C I 2FOO2A(FOO28,).
RO: c. START a CR0 pump.
RO: 2. IF available, THEN START the second CRD pump.
RO: 3. IF no CR0 pump can be sta1ed, THEN RETURN to Step 2.6 an page 3.
- 4. INSERT control rods with RMCS as follows:
RO: a. ENSURE CRD FLOW CONTROL, CIi(C12FCR6OO, is In MAN.
RO: Ii THROTTLE OPEN FLOW CONTROL VL CII (Ci2F0O2AFOO28,l until drive water differential pressure is greater than or equal to 260 psid..
RO: c. IF drive water differential pressure is less than 260 psid, THEN THROTTLE CLOSED DRIVE PRESSURE VLV, Ci I(Ci2,PCV#OO3. until drive water differential pressure is greater than or equal to 260 psid..
RO: d. BYPASS RWM.
RO: e. INSERT control rods with EMERGENCY ROD IN NOTCH OVERRIDE switch.
{ OEOP-Oi-LEP-02 Rev. 27 Page 21 0130 2012 NRC Scenario #4 37
ENCLOSURE I Section 3 The purpose of this section is to insert control rods by repeated manual scram. overriding RPS if required.
NOTE: Manpower: I Reactor Operator Special equipment 4 jumpers (15, 16, 17, and 18)
RO: 1. Unit I Only: ENSURE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, 071-Si, is in SHUTDOWN.
RO: 2. Unit 2 Only: IF steam flow is less than 3 X 10 IbThr, THEN ENSURE REACTOR MODE SWITCH, C72-Si is in SHUTDOWN.
NOTE: Steps 3 and 4 may be performed concurrently.
- 3. IF an automatic scram signal is present AND power is available to the RPS bus, THEN INSTALL the following jumpers to bypass the reactor scram:
RO: - Jumper *15 in Panel H12-P609, Terminal Board DD, from the right side of Fuse 071A(C72A)-F14A to Terminal 4 of Relay C71A(C72A)-K12E RO: - Jumper 3 in Panel H12-P609, Terminal Board 58, from the left side of Fuse C71A(C72A)-FI4C to Terminal 4 of Relay C71A(C72.A)-K12G RO: - Jumper *i7 in Panel H12-P61i, Terminal Board DD, from the right side of Fuse C71A(C72A)-F146 to Terminal 4 of Relay C71A(C72A)-Ki 2F RO: - Jumper 18 in Panel H12-P611, Temtinal Board SB, from the left side of Fuse C7IA(C72A)-Fi$D to Terminal 4 of Relay C71A(C72A)-K1 2H OEOP-01-LEP-02 Rev. 27 Page 14 of 30 2012 NRC Scenario #4 38
La ,L ENCLOSURE 1 Section 3 (Continued)
- 4. INHIBIT ARI by pertorming the following steps:
RO: a. PLACE AR! AUTO/MANUAL INITIA TION switch, C1i(CI2J-CS-5560. to INOP.
RO: b. PLACE AR! RESET switch (spring return, C1i(C12,)-CS-5562, to RESET AND MAINTAIN for a minirnuni of five (51 seconds, THEN RELEASE.
RO: C. CONFIRM red TRIP light located above AR!
iNITIATION, Ci (Ci2-CS-5561. is off.
RO: 5.. ENSURE D!SCH VOL VENT & DRAiN TEST switch is in ISOLATE.
- 6. CONFIRM tile following valves are closed:
RO: DISCH VOL VENT VLV Cl 1C12V139 RO: - DISCH VOL VENT VLV C? 1C12,1-CV-EOiO RO: - DISCh VOL DRAIN VLVCII( 12)-V140 [J RO: DISH VOL DRAM! VLV Ci I(C2)CV-FOi1 RO: 7 RESET RPS.
RO: 8. IF RPS can NOT be reset, THEN RETURN to Step 2.6 on Li page 3.
- 9. PLACE D1SCH VOL VENT & DRAIN TEST switch to NORMAL.
- 10. CONFIRM the following valves are open:
RO: DISH VOL VENT VLV Cl 1(C12,1-V139 RO: - DISOH VOL VENT VLV Ci flC123-CV-FOld RO: - DISOH VOL DRAIN VLV Cl i(C12,,l-V140 RO: OISCH VOL DRAIN VLVCII(C12 1-CV-FO11 1 Li OEOP-01-LEP-02 Rev, 27 Page 150130 2012 NRC Scenario #4 39
ENCLOSURE 1 Section (Continued)
RO: 11. WHEN the scram discharge volume has drained for approximately 2 minutes OR SDV Hi-HI LEVEL RPS TRIP annunciator (405 1-6) clears, THEN CONTINUE in trns procedure RO: 12. IF venting contrnl rod over piston area n accordance with Section 6, THEN NOTIFY the AO to secure venting prior to inserting a manual scram.
RO: 13, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor, 1$. IF control rods moved inward, ThEN PERFORM the following:
RO: a. iF all control rods are Inserted to or beyond Position 00, THEN RETURN to Step 2.6 on page 3.
RO: h. IF all control rods are NOT inserted to or beyond Position 00, THEN RETURN to StepS on page 15.
RO: 1& iF control rods did NOT move inward. THEN RETURN to fJ Step 26 on page 3.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 40
SHIFT BRIEFING Plant Status Unit startup is in progress per OGP-02 following a refueling outage.
Reactor power is approximately 5%.
Reactor pressure is 800 psig with one bypass valve open to approximately 40%.
OGP-10, sequence A2X, is being used and is complete up to Step 12 Item 179.
Equipment Out of Service 2A NSW Pump is under clearance for maintenance.
2A CSW Pump is in standby aligned to the nuclear header.
IRM A was declared inoperable early last shift due to spiking and is bypassed.
I&C Troubleshooting has determined that the instrument loop is functioning satisfactorily and that the spiking was due to welding near the pre-amp at that time. Stable operation has been observed for the last 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The Ops Center SRO is evaluating IRM Operability.
Protected Equipment 1A, lB and 2B NSW Pumps.
Plan of the Day Place Reactor Feed Pump A in Automatic operation.
Continue with OGP-02 actions to raise reactor power to 10% in preparation for placing the Mode switch to RUN.
2012 NRC Scenario #4 41
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Brunswick Scenario No.: NRC 2012-5 Op-Test No.: FINAL Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit Two is operating at 20% power. The Main Turbine is at 1 800 rpm and preparations for synchronizing the generator to the grid are in progress lAW OGP-03. GP-10 sequence A2X is complete up to Step 32, Item 299. APRM 2 INOP and bypassed Turnover: Continue with actions to synchronize the main generator to the grid then raise generator load to 200 MWe.
Event MaIf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*
1 N/A N-BOP Synchronizing Main Generator N-SRO 2 N/A R-RO Raise power using control rods lAW OGP-03 R-SRO 3 RD183F C-RO CRD Pump Trip (AOP-02)
C-SRO 4 CNO17F C-BOP AOG Guard Bed Fire C-SRO 5 ESO15F C-RO CST Level switch failure on HPCI (TS)
C-SRO 6 ZUA2865 C-BOP Flooding in Turbine Building Condenser Pit (AOP-31)
C-SRO 7 EEOO9F M-ALL Loss of Offsite Power (AOP-36. 1)
C-RO 7a DGOO6F C-BOP DG3 Trip and DG4 Output Breaker Fail to Auto Close C-SRO 8 NBOO9F M-AII Small Break LOCA HPCI - Uncoupled shaft Emergency Depressurize (Level) 8a RHOO2F C-RO LPCI FO15B Fail to Auto Open C-SRO
- (N)ormal (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Event I The crew will perform actions to synchronize the generator to the grid lAW OP-27.
Event 2 The RO will continue to raise power lAW OGP-03.
Event 3 CRD pump 2A will trip on motor overload. AOP-02 will be entered and the RO will start CRD pump 2B.
Event 4 An AOG off gas fire will occur in the guard bed. High temperatures will quickly spread into the charcoal adsorber beds. The APPs require bypassing and isolating the AOG system, and initiating a nitrogen purge.
Event 5 A failure of the CST low level pressure switch will occur. The E41-F004 (HPCI CST Suction Valve) will fail to automatically close. The SRO will evaluate TS 3.5.1 Action D.
Event 6 A water box leak will occur. Turbine Building flood status and debris filter alarms will be received. An AO will report condenser pit level at 10 inches slowly rising. The crew will determine A-S water box is leaking based on debris filter high d/p. The crew will respond per OAOP-31 .0 and take actions to isolate the leak.
Event 7 A Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The crew will respond per OAOP-36.1.
Event 7a All Diesel Generators will start on the LOOP signal. DG3 will trip on Duff oic. DG 4 output breaker will fail to auto close. The BOP operator will close DG 4 output breaker to energize bus E4.
Event 8 After scram actions have been completed and level is stabilized, a LOCA will occur in the drywell. The crew will maximize RCIC flow and implement LEP-Ol for alternate cooling systems. HPCI Pump will be uncoupled and unavailable for level control, level will lower until Emergency Depressurization is required.
Event 8a RHR Loop B injection valve El l-F0l 5B will fail to automatically open due to mechanical binding. Annunciator A-03 5-8, RHR B Valves Overload, will be received. The thermal overload may be reset and the valve opened using the control switch. When the vessel is depressurized and level is being restored, the scenario may be terminated.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 2 I!MIII1WIIb F
DUKE ENERGY BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION SIMULATOR SCENARIO r
2012 NRC Exam Scenario #5 Prepared By:
Nuclear Operations Instructor Date Concurred By Iz_
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SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC-7 RxPwr 20%
Events:
Event Trigger Trigger Description Number 1 Synchronize main generator 2 Raise reactor power by pulling control rods 3 4 Manual CRD A Pump Trip 4 1 Manual AOG Guard Bed Fire 5 2 Manual HPCI Power Supply Failure 6 3 Manual Flooding in Condenser Pit 7 5 Manual Loss of Offsite Power 7a Automatic DG4 Output Breaker Fail to Auto Close 8 6 Manual LOCA 8a Manual LPCI FOl 5B Failure to Open Malfunctions Summary MaIf ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig ID Value Value CNO17F AOG GUARD BED FIRE FALSE TRUE DGO26F DG3 DIFF FAULT FALSE TRUE 5 Sec 5 RD183F A CRD PUMP MOTOR WINDING FAULT FALSE TRUE 4 EEQO9F LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FALSE TRUE 5 RDOO1M DG4 DGOUTPUTBREAKERFAILTO TRUE TRUE CLOSE NBOO9F A SMALL RECIRC PMP SUCT LINE 0.00 5.0000 00:10:00 6 RUPTURE RHOO2F RHR INJECTION VALVE FOI5B STUCK TRUE TRUE CLOSED 2012 NRC Scenario #5 4
Remotes Summary Remf ID Mult ID Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig Value Value RDRDSUCTF B V307/309 SUCTION FILTER ISOL VALVES CLOSE OPEN 7 RD_RDVF034 CHARGING WATER ISOLATION VALVE .2500 .2500 F034 SL_IASLCTST SLC SUCT. LINEUP NORMAL ALT 8 (NORM=SLCTNK/ALT=JUMPER HOSE)
EP_IACS993P DW CLR A&D OVERIDE - NORMAL STOP 9 NORMAL/STOP EP_IACS994P DW CLR B&C OVERIDE NORMAL STOP 9 NORMAL/STOP EG_PSSBYP PSS ALARM BYPASS SWITCH BYPASS BYPASS RP_K9JMP TURB 1 ST STAGE PRESS RPS SCRAM NORMAL NORMAL BYP SW (C72-S10)
XA_VHNPV8OL PURGE NITROGEN TO AOG NP-V80 SHUT SHUT XAIALPB141 AOG-XCV-141 LOCAL OPEN CLOSE 10 XA_IALPB142 AOG-XCV-142 LOCAL OPEN CLOSE 10 XAIALPB143 AOG-XCV-143 LOCAL OPEN CLOSE 10 XA_IALPB147 AOG-XCV-147 LOCAL OPEN CLOSE 10 XA_IALPB148 AOG-XCV-148 LOCAL OPEN CLOSE 10 XA_IALPB1O2 AOG-XCV-102 LOCAL AUTO OPEN 11 HP_IAHPUNCP Uncouple HPCI Turbine From Pump YES YES HP_ZVHPO41M SUPP SUCTION VLV E41-F041 ON OFF 2 HPZVHPO42M SUPP SUCTION VLV E41-F042 ON OFF 2 HP_VALVES E41-F004 CONDTKSUCTVLVE41-F004 ON OFF 15 Override Summary Tag ID Description Position/ Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Target Value Value Q6A12SR9 TB PIT E R ON/OFF OFF ON 3 Q1123RRL TORUS SUCTVLVE41-F041 RED ON/OFF OFF ON 2 Qi 124RRL TORUS SUCT VLV E41-F042 RED ON/OFF OFF ON 2 Qi 1 O8LGL CST SUCT VLV E41 -F004 GREEN ON/OFF OFF ON 15 G4K37G15 CIRCH2ODEBRISFILTPRESSA-S 85 20 85 3 Q4B021G5 COND A-S VLVS FILTR HI DP ON/OFF OFF ON 3 KIHOIA ADS TIMER RESET OFF ON Ki HO2A ADS TIMER RESET OFF ON Annunciator Summary Window Description Tagname Override Type Oval AVaI Actime Dactime Trig 6-5 TB E Cond Pit Flood Hi ZUA2865 ON ON OFF 3 6-4 HPCI CND STORAGE TNK WTR ZA164 ON ON OFF 2 LVL LO 3-9 CW DEBRIS FILTER HI D/P ZUA139 ON ON OFF 3 2012 NRC Scenario #5 5
SIMULATOR SETUP Special Instructions
- 1. Ensure simulator security is established lAW TAP-41 1.
- 2. Ensure appropriate keys have blanks in switches.
- 4. Ensure no rods are bypassed in the RWM.
- 5. Ensure hard cards and flow charts are cleaned up.
- 6. Ensure all key have blanks installed.
- 7. Ensure affected procedures are free of any marks.
- 8. Place all SPDS displays to the Critical Plant Variable Display #100.
- 9. Ensure no ENP-24.5 is located at the P603 panel.
- 10. Reset to IC-7 and place in run.
- 11. Ensure GP-1 0 is completed up to Step 31 Item 299 of A2X sequence with Attachment 3.
- 12. Ensure OP-27 is completed up to Step 5.1.2.10
- 13. Ensure OGP-03 is completed up to Step 5.3.3.
- 14. Ensure Reactor pressure is 930 psig with two bypass valves open.
- 15. Load scenario file if required.
16.Advance all chart recorders to indicate steady state conditions.
- 17. Provide Shift Briefing sheet to the CRS.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 6
Scenario Information Critical Tasks (Critical Tasks are bolded & italicized in required operator statements)
- 1. Close DG4 output breaker
- 2. Emergency Depressurize on level REFERENCES A. OP-07 B. OP-08 C. OP-27 D. OP-29 E. GP-03 F. GP-1O G. AOP-02.O H. AOP-31.O I. EOP-01-RSP J. EOP-O1-RVCP K. EOP-02-PCCP L. EOP-LEP-O1 M. EOP-O1-SEP-02 N. EOP-O1-SEP-03
- 0. EOP-O1-SEP-09 P. Conduct Of Operations Manual Q. Technical Specifications R. Annunciator Panel Procedures 2012 NRC Scenario #5 7
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator The crew will synchronize the main generator to the grid lAW OP-27, Section 5.1.
Malfunctions required:
None Objectives:
Sco Directs synchronizing the main generator.
BOP Synchronize the main generator lAW OP-27, Section 5.1 Success Path:
Main generator synchronized with the grid.
Simulator Operator Actions:
El If directed as OSAO to perform field actions for transformer fan control, acknowledge request. Wait two minutes and report field actions complete.
El If directed as TBAO to perform field actions for isophase bus duct and generator gas, acknowledge request. Wait two minutes and report field actions complete.
El If directed as TBAO to perform field actions to bypass Power System Stabilizer, report actions complete.
El If contacted as Ops Center SRO to ensure trip relay flags on Panel XU-8 are clear, report no flags.
El If contacted as l&C to troubleshoot the Transformer Bus Synchronizing Switch, acknowledge request.
El If contacted as Unit 1 report generator gassing is not in progress on Unit 1.
El If contacted as Load Dispatcher, direct generator VARs be maintained positive.
El When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 8
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator Required Operator Actions Normal operation. Synchronize main generator.
SRO Time Required Actions Notes Directs BOP operator to synchronize the main generator lAW OP-27.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitors plant parameters.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 9 7
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP Time Required Actions Notes Synchronizes the main generator:
ENSURE GEN MANUAL VOLT ADJ RHEO, 7OCS, LOWER LIMIT light is on.
ENSURE GEN AUTO VOLTADJ RHEQ, 9OCS,LOWER LIMIT light is on.
CLOSE EXCITER FIELD BREAKER, 4ICS.
ENSURE field voltage increases.
CAUTION Generator output voltage should be raised slowly when approaching rated terminal voltage; otherwise, a generator lockout and trip may occur. The continuous raising of output voltage should NOT be used when close to rated terminal voltage.
SLOWLY ADJUST GEN MANUAL VOLT ADJ RHEO, 7OCS, to raise generator output voltage to 23.5 Ky.
ADJUST GEN AUTO VOLTADJ RHEO, 9OCS, to null the GEN VOLTREG DIFF VOLT indicator.
WHEN GEN VOLT REQ DIFF VOLT indicator is nulled, THEN PLACE REGULATOR MODESELECTOR, 43CS, in AUTO.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 10
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes OPEN either the TRANSFORMER BUS 230K V PCB 26A OR TRANSFORMER BUS 230KV PCB 26B.
NOTE: The generator should be paralleled to the 230 KV bus that is NOT feeding the units startup auxiliary transformer.
PLACE the switch key for the generator output breaker NOT supplying the SAT, in either GENERATOR 2 TO BUS 2A 230 KVBREAKER 29A SYNCHROSCOPE OR GENERATOR 2 TO BUS 2B 230 KV BREAKER 29B SYNCHROSCOPE switch.
ENSURE all SYNCHROSCOPE key switches on Panels XU-1 and XU-2 are in OFF.
PLACE the selected generator output breaker SYNCHROSCOPE key switch in ON.
NOTE: Step 5.1.2.10.1 ensures generator speed (frequency) is closely matched to system frequency prior to adjusting voltage to minimize the possibility of over excitation of the generator.
NOTE: IF the synchroscope indicator fully stops rotating, THEN generator and system frequencies are matched.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 11 V
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes DEPRESS LOAD SELECTOR INCREASE OR LOAD SELECTOR DECREASE push until the SYNCHROSCOPE indicator is stopped OR rotating slowly (less than 1 rpm) in the fast direction.
ADJUST GEN AUTO VOLTADJ RHEO, 9OCS, to ensure INCOMING VOLTMETER equals RUNNING VOL TMETER.
DEPRESS LOAD SELECTOR INCREASE OR LOAD SELECTOR DECREASE push button until SYNCHROSCOPE indicator rotates slowly in the fast (clockwise approx. 3 to 6 rpm) direction.
NOTIFY System Load Dispatcher of pending generator synchronization.
ENSURE stability of generator speed by allowing SYNCHROSCOPE indicator to make several revolutions.
NOTE: Steps 5.1.2.1O.q through 5.1.2.1O.t should be performed in a quick and continuous manner.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 12 ILc WI
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes CAUTION The selected generator output breaker should NOT be closed with the synchroscope indicator standing still.
CAUTION IF the generator breaker fails to close, as indicated by control switch lights or failure of the synchroscope to stop at the 12 oclock position, THEN the control switch should NOT be held in CLOSE.
WHEN the SYNCHROSCOPE is at the 12 oclock position, THEN CLOSE the selected generator output breaker.
ENSURE the CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED indicator light is on.
IF the selected generator output breaker did NOT close, THEN RETURN breaker control switch to TRIP AND INVESTIGATE.
CAUTION Operation at less than 33% turbine load AND less than 25 Hg vacuum (greater than 5 HGA backpressure) can cause damage to the last stage buckets and should be avoided.
DEPRESS the LOAD SELECTOR INCREASE push button to increase generator load to a minimum of 100 MWe.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 13
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes If Annunciator 2APP-UA-04 2-10, Normal Heater Drain Deaerator level is 48 inches.
HD DEAERATOR LEVEL HIGH LOW, is received:
Slowly open HD-V57 to bring level to normal.
PLACE the selected generator breaker SYNCHROSCOPE key switch in OFF.
COORDINATE with the System Load Dispatcher to maintain the minimum generator MVAR load AND a voltage of 232 to 237.5 KV ((A Bus + B Bus) ÷ 2).
IF unable to maintain minimum MVAR, THEN CONTACT the System Load Dispatcher for additional guidance.
NOTE: IF only one main generator output breaker is available, startup and load increase may continue with approval from Operations Management.
WHEN the generator has stabilized, THEN CLOSE the remaining generator output breaker as follows:
PLACE the switch key in GENERATOR 2 TO BUS 2A 230 KV BREAKER 29A SYNCHROSCOPE OR GENERATOR 2 TO BUS 2B 230 KV BREAKER 29B SYNCHROSCOPE switch.
PLACE the selected generator output breaker SYNCH ROSCOPE key switch in ON.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 14 J
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes ENSURE the SYNCHROSCOPE indicator is NOT rotating.
CLOSE the selected generator output breaker.
PLACE the selected generator output breaker SYNCHROSCOPE key switch in OFF.
ANNOUNCE on the plant public address system the generator is synchronized to the grid.
PERFORM the following to re close the alternate supply breaker to the SAT:
PLACE TRANSFORMER BUS Note: The Bus Voltage selector switch is located directly beside the PCB control switch.
230 KV PCB 26A/26B SYNCHRONIZING SWITCH to A common error is operating this switch instead of ON. the Synchronizing Switch.
RE-CLOSE either 230 KV PCB 26A OR PCB 26B.
PLACE TRANSFORMER BUS 230 KV PCB 26A/26B SYNCHRONIZING SWITCH to OFF.
ENSURE generator is operating in accordance with Section 6.0.
RESTORE main transformer fan controls to automatic (AO field actions) 2012 NRC Scenario #5 15
EVENT I Synchronize Main Generator BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes NOTE: To provide for a smooth transfer of generator voltage regulation in case of failure of the auto voltage regulator, the GEN MANUAL VOLTADJ RHEO, 7OCS, should be adjusted as necessary to null GEN VOLT REG DIFF VOLT indicator.
DEPRESS LOAD SELECTOR INCREASE push button to increase generator load in accordance with OGP-03.
WHEN all main turbine bypass valves are closed, THEN RAISE EHC load set to 100% by depressing load set INCREASE pushbutton.
RESET any applicable trip relay flags on Panel XU-8 (Ops Ctr SRO)
PLACE isophase bus HEATER SWITCH in OFF (AC field actions)
ENSURE Unit us NOT adding hydrogen to their generator.
WHEN generator cold gas temperature (U2HC_G022) temperature is greater than 104°F, THEN RAISE generator hydrogen gas pressure in accordance with2OP-27.3 to obtain the desired pressure (usually 60 psig).
INITIATE WO to request a thermography scan of the main generator output breaker manual disconnects.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 16 Iiitiiiiiiiiii.iiz i
EVENT 2 Raise Reactor Power The crew will continue to raise reactor power using control rods.
Malfunctions required:
None Objectives:
SCO Directs RO to continue raising power.
RO Raise reactor power using control rods Success Path:
Controls Rods are withdrawn to raise reactor power.
Simulator Operator Actions:
fl If asked as RE, state that there are no high worth control rods located in steps 32 through 36 of GP-1O, A2X.
L If asked as RE, continuous withdrawal of control rods is approved.
D When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Raise reactor power.
SRO Time Required Actions L Notes Directs RO to raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods lAW OGP-1O, A2X Sequence.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitors plant parameters.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 17 X/ZIII1IiI1. IJ
EVENT 2 Raise Reactor Power RO Time Required Actions Notes Commence rod withdrawal at Step 32, Item 299, GP-10, A2X sequence. (Control Rod 30-15) 20P-07,Section 5.1, Notch Control Used for GP-10 Step 32, Items 299 through 306.
Moving the rods from position 08 to 12.
Rod Withdrawal (30-15, 22-15, 38-23, 14-23, 38-31, 14-31, 30-39, and 22-39) o Ensures ROD SELECT POWER control switch is in ON.
20P-07, Attachment 14, Notch Control Rod Withdrawal o Selects control rod by depressing its CONTROL ROD SELECT push button.
. Ensures the backlighted CONTROL ROD SELECT push button is brightly illuminated
. Ensures the white indicating light on the full core display is illuminated
. Ensures ROD WITHDRAWAL PERMISSIVE indication is ill urn in ated o NOTCH WITHDRAW control rod to position designated on GP pull sheets by momentarily placing ROD MOVEMENT in NOTCH OUT.
o Monitors control rod position and nuclear instrumentation while withdrawing the control rod.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 18 I
EVENT 2 Raise Reactor Power RD contd Time Required Actions Notes o Performs the following for control rods withdrawn to an intermediate position:
o WHEN control rod reaches designated position, confirms the following:
. Control Rod settles into desired position
. Rod settle light extinguishes o Repeats steps for remainder of control rods.
20P-07,Section 5.1, Continuous Used for GP-10 Step 33, Item 307 forward.
Moving the control rods from position 12 to 24.
Control Rod Withdrawal (30-07, 22-07, 46-2 3, 06-23, 06-31, 46-31, 22-47, and 30-47) o Ensures ROD SELECT POWER control switch is in ON.
20P-07, Attachment 13, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal o Selects control rod by depressing its CONTROL ROD SELECT push button.
. Ensures the backlighted CONTROL ROD SELECT push button is brightly ill urn i nated
. Ensures the white indicating light on the full core display is illuminated
. Ensures ROD WITHDRAWAL PERMISSIVE indication is illuminated 2012 NRC Scenario #5 19 iLiLT]
- jIt i;jvz 4
EVENT 2 Raise Reactor Power RD contd Time Required Actions Notes o CONTINUOUSLY WITHDRAW control rod to position designated on GP or OENP-24.5 pull sheets by HOLDING EMERGENCY ROD IN NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE, while SIMULTANEOUSLY HOLDING ROD MOVEMENT switch to NOTCH OUT.
o Monitors control rod position and nuclear instrumentation while withdrawing the control rod.
o Performs the following for control rods withdrawn to an intermediate position:
. BEFORE control rod reaches the position designated on GP or ENP-24.5 pull sheets, RELEASE ROD MOVEMENT AND EMERGENCY ROD IN NOTCH OVERRIDE control switches:
. ENSURE control rod settles into desired position.
. CONFIRM rod settle light extinguishes.
a Repeats steps for remainder of control rods.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 20
EVENT 3 CRD Pump Trip The crew will respond to a trip of CRD pump A.
Malfunctions required:
CRD A Pump Motor Overload Oblectives:
SCO Direct starting CRD Pump 2B RO Start CRD Pump 2B Success Path:
CRD Pump B running.
Simulator Operator Actions:
Li When directed by the lead evaluator, initiate Trigger 4 to activate CRD Pump A motor overload.
LI If asked as RBAO, report CRD pump motor is hot to the touch.
Li If asked as OSAO, report 51 devices picked up on E3 for CRD pump 2A.
LI If asked as RBAO, report pre-start checks completed for 2B CRD Pump.
LI When directed as RBAO to perform OP-02, steps 8.7.2.1, 8.7.2.2, 8.7.2.5, 8.7.2.6, or 8.7.2.7, wait two minutes and report actions complete.
Li When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct AOP-02 entry.
Direct monitoring for HCU alarms Direct stopping power changes in progress.
Contact maintenance to investigate CRD Pump failure.
Direct starting standby CRD pump lAW OP-08, Section 8.17.
- Time Required Actions Notes Monitor plant parameters.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 21 II!IIIit1LZ .
EVENT 3 CRD Pump Trip RO Time Required Actions Notes Announce and Enter AOP-02.
Restart CRD lAW 20P-08, Section 8.17:
o CLOSE SEAL INJECTION VALVE, B32-V22, for Recirc Pump A.
o CLOSE SEAL INJECTION VALVE, B32-V30, for Recirc Pump B.
o PLACE CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, in MAN AND REDUCE potentiometer to minimum setting.
o ENSURE DRIVE PRESS VLV, C12-PCV-F003, is fully open.
o ENSURE RBCCW is in operation to supply cooling water to CRD pumps.
o Direct an AC to perform prestart checks for the 2B CRD Pump.
o START CRD Pump B.
o RAISE CRD flow rate to between 30 and 60 gpm, by adjusting manual potentiometer on CRD FLOWCONTROL, Cl 2-FC-R600.
o RESTORE recirc pump seal purge lAW 20P-02, Section 8.7, Restoring Seal Purge Flow With Pump Running Seal Leakage Normal.
(Concurrently with this section) 2012 NRC Scenario #5 22
EVENT 3 CRD Pump Trip RO contd Time Required Actions Notes o NULL CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, by adjusting the setpoint tape.
o SHIFT CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to AUTO.
o ADJUST setpoint tape on CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to maintain cooling water differential pressure between 10 and 26 psid on C12-PDI-R603 on Panel P603.
o ENSURE CRD flow rate is between 30 and 60 gpm.
o ESTABLISH drive water header differential pressure between 260 and 275 psid on C12-PDI-R602 on Panel P603, by throttling closed DRIVE PRESS VLV, C12-PCV-F003.
o MONITOR operation of CRD System in accordance with Section 6.0.
Restore seal purge flow lAW OP-02:
o Direct AO to perform Steps 8.7.2.1 and 8.7.2.2 o ENSURE SEAL INJECTION VLV, B32-V22(V30) is open.
o ENSURE the CRD System is in operation.
o Direct AO to perform Steps 8.7.2.5, 8.7.2.6, and 8.7.2.7.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 23
EVENT4 AOG Fire An AOG off gas fire will occur in the guard bed. High temperatures will quickly spread into the charcoal adsorber beds. The APPs require bypassing and isolating the AOG system, and initiating a nitrogen purge.
Malfunctions required:
None Objectives:
SCO Direct actions of APP for Guard Bed Hi Temp Direct Guard Bed locally isolated and nitrogen purge per OP-33 Refer to ODCM 7.3.10 for AOG being bypassed BOP Perform APP actions to isolate and purge AOG Guard Bed.
Success Path:
AOG fire extinguished and AOG bypassed.
ODCM 7.3.10, CONDITION A.
Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger I to start AOG fire LI If asked, as OSAO initially report Guard Bed temperatures have significantly increased.
LI When directed to locally isolate the Guard Bed, acknowledge the request. Wait two minutes then report actions complete.
LI When directed as OSAO to perform step 7.1.2.3 to place AOG SYSTEM BYPASS VALVE, AOG-HCV-102 valve switch position at local control panel H2E is in OPEN, Initiate Trigger 11 then report action complete.
LI When directed as OSAO to perform step 7.1.2.5 to place local control switches to close, Initiate Trigger 10 then report actions complete.
LI When directed as OSAO to perform steps 8.4.2.4, 8.4.2.5, 8.4.2.6, 8.4.2.7 and 8.4.2.9, wait two minutes and report actions are complete.
LI When directed to initiate purge, initiate remote function XA_VHNPV8OL to open AOP NP-80 then immediately delete MF_CNO17F, and report local temperature indication shows temperatures are dropping.
LI When directed to close NITROGEN PURGE SUPPLY VAL VETO CHARCOAL GUARD BED Dl, AOG-NP-V080, delete Remote function XA_VHNPV8OL.
LI When directed as OSAO to perform steps 8.4.2.17, 8.4.2.18, and 8.4.2.19, acknowledge request, wait two minutes and report field actions complete.
LI When directed as OSAO to perform step 8.4.2.22, report action complete.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 24
EVENT 4 AOG Fire Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes o Direct actions of APP-UA-48 3-3, for Guard Bed Dl Temperature High
. BYPASS AND ISOLATE the AOG System by performing the applicable steps of 20P-33, Section 7.0
. Enter OPFP-PBAA, Prefire Plans Power Block Auxiliary Areas, Attachment 9.
o Determines ODCM 7.3.10, CONDITION A GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM not in operation applies:
. A.1 Place GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM in operation 7 days.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 25
EVENT4 AOG Fire BOP Time Required Actions Notes o BYPASS AND ISOLATE the AOG System by performing the applicable steps of 20P-33, Section 7.0.
. CONFIRM AOG SYS VLV CONT SEL SW,AOG-CS 3161, is in CENT at Panel XU-80.
. OPEN AOG SYSTEM BYPASS VALVE,AOG-HCV 102 at Panel XU-80.
. Direct OSAO to perform step 7.1.2.3.
. CONFIRM AOG SYSTEM BYPASS VALVE,AOG-HCV 102 stayed open
- Direct OSAO to perform step 7.1.2.5.
o CLOSE the following valves at Panel XU-80:
. AOG SYS INLET SEC ISOL VALVE,AOG-XCV-147
. AOG SYS INLET PR! ISOL VALVE,AOG-XCV-148
. AOG SYS OUTLET PRI ISOL VALVE,AOG-XCV-143
. AOG SYS OUTLET SEC ISOL VALVE,AOG-XCV-141
. GUARD BED ISOLATION VALVE, AOG-XCV-142 2012 NRC Scenario #5 26
EVENT4 AOG Fire BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes
. Direct OSAO to perform steps 7.1.2.7 and 7.1.2.8.
a PURGE the AOG System by performing the following steps from OP-33, Section 8.4
. Direct OSAO to perform step 8.4.2.1.
. CONFIRM AOG SYS VLV CONTSEL SW, AOG-CS 3161, is in CENT at Panel XU 80.
. OPEN the following at Panel XU-80:
. AOG SYS OUTLET PR!
ISOL VALVE, AOG-XCV 143
. AOG SYS OUTLET SEC ISOL VALVE, AOG-XCV 141
. Direct OSAO to perform steps 8.4.2.4, 8.4.2.5, 8.4.2.6, 8.4.2.7 and 8.4.2.9 (8.4.2.8 is N/A).
. Direct OSAO to THROTTLE OPEN NITROGEN PURGE SUPPLYVALVE TO CHARCOAL GUARD BED Dl, AOG-NP-V080, to maximize nitrogen flow, NOT to exceed 50 scfm, indicated by OFFGAS SYS OUTLET FLOW, AOG-F!-035 or AOG SYSTEM OUTLET FLOW, AOG-UR-157.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 27 IwfrirIIw Wj
EVENT4 AOG Fire BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes
. WHEN nitrogen purging is complete, THEN direct OSAO to CLOSE NITROGEN PURGE SUPPLY VALVE TO CHARCOAL GUARD BED DI, A OG-NP- V080.
. Direct OSAO to perform steps 8.4.2.17, 8.4.2.18, and 8.4.2.19.
. CLOSE the following at Panel XU-80:
. AOG SYS OUTLET PR!
ISOL VALVE, AOG-XCV 143
. AOGSYSOUTLETSEC ISOL VALVE, AOG-XCV 141
. ENSUREAOG SYSTEM BYPASS VALVE, AOG-HCV 102, is open at Panel XU-80.
. Direct OSAO to perform step 8.4.2.22.
. Notify SRQ that fire has been extinguished and purge is secured.
. Inform SRO to reference ODCM 7.3.10.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitors plant parameters.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 28
EVENT 5 HPCI CST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW! E41-F004 FAILURE HPCI Condensate Storage Tank Level Switch E41-LSL-N002 will fail low causing HPCI suction to shift to the Suppression Pool.
Malfunctions required:
HPCI Power Supply Failure Objectives:
SCO - Address Technical Specifications for I-IPCI CST level transmitter inoperability RO Diagnose HPCI CST low level and failure of E41-F004.
Success Path:
HPCI suction aligned to the Suppression Pool only and TS addressed Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead evaluator, initiate Trigger 2 to initiate HPCI CST level transmitter failure.
LI If contacted as I&C to investigate, wait 2 minutes and report E41-LSL-N002 has failed downscale and need replaced.
LI If contacted as I&C to investigate E41-F004 auto closure failure, acknowledge request.
LI If contacted as Ops Center SRO to initiate an impairment lAW OPLP-O1 .5 and establish compensatory measures for ASSD and Station Blackout procedures with HPCI aligned to the Suppression Pool, acknowledge the request.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions Tech Specs 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation Determine Function 3d.
REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 (D) for the channel Immediately.
CONDITION D REQUIRED ACTION D.1 Declare HPCI System inoperable (Only applicable if HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability.
AND REQUIRED ACTION D.2.1 Place channel in trip.
OR D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump suction to the suppression pool Either within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 29 1IIt!rci
EVENT 5 HPCI CST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW! E41-F004 FAILURE SRO Time Required Actions Notes Contact l&C to investigate HPCI CST level transmitter failure and E41-F004 auto closure failure.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Instrumentation and Determine Function 3.d requires 2 Channels.
CONDITION A. One or more channels inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION A. I Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 (D) for the channel Immediately.
CONDITION D REQUIRED ACTION D.1 Declare HPCI System inoperable (Only applicable if HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability.
AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip.
OR D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump suction to the suppression pool Either within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
May reference 001-18 to place channel in trip requires aligning suction to Suppression Pool.
SOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the plant.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 30
EVENT 5 HPCI CST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW! E41-F004 FAILURE RO Time Required Actions Notes Acknowledge and report annunciator A-Ui, 6-4 HPCI COND STORAGE TNK WTRLVLLO Verifies Auto Actions Torus Suction Valve, E41-F041, open.
Torus Suction Valve, E41-F042, open.
CST suction Valve, E41-F004, closed.
Recognize and report E4i-F004 auto closure failure.
Manually closes E41-F004 Notifies SRO HPCI suction is aligned to the Suppression Pool Notifies SRO of APP requirement to initiate an impairment lAW OPLP 01.5 and establish compensatory measures for ASSD and Station Blackout procedures with HPCI aligned to the Suppression Pool.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 31
EVENT 6 Condenser Pit Flooding The crew will respond to flooding in the condenser pit.
Malfunctions required:
Condenser flooding Objectives:
SCO Directs isolation of waterbox.
BOP Isolates waterbox.
Success Path:
A-S water box isolated.
Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead evaluator, initiate Trigger 3 to activate A-S water box leak LI If asked as TBAO, report level is 10 inches slowly rising in condenser circ water inlet pit. Report cannot tell where the leak is located due to the water spray.
LI When the A-S water box is has been selected to close change Circ Debris Filter dip gauge to zero and activate with a 40 sec ramp, initiate Trigger 14 when d/p is -50, initiate Trigger 16 and when the A-S water box is fully isolated report as AO the leak appears to have been isolated.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 32
EVENT 6 Condenser Pit Flooding Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct entry into OAOP-31 .0, Flooding in Turbine Building Condenser Pit or Pipe Tunnel.
Direct isolation of A-S waterbox.
Contact maintenance to investigate.
BOP Time Required Actions Notes Announce and enter OAOP-31 .0, Flooding in Turbine Building Condenser Pit or Pipe Tunnel Dispatch personnel to determine magnitude of leak.
Acknowledge and address alarms:
UA-01, 3-9 CW DEBRIS FILTER HIGH tiP UA-28, 6-5 TURB BLDG E CNDSR PIT FLOOD LVL HI Diagnose failure in A-S Waterbox and Isolate A-S Water box lAW OAOP-31 .0:
o Place A-S water box isolation valve control switch in MAN.
a Close CONDENSER A-S INLET VALVE, CWV12 and CONDENSER A-S OUTLET VALVE,_CWV16.
a When unit stabilizes, perform applicable remaining actions for removal of water box from service_lAW_OP-29.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitors Plant Parameters 2012 NRC Scenario #5 33 1MIIcwJA w i
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close The crew will respond to a Loss of Offsite Power.
Malfunctions required:
SAT lockout DG4 output breaker fail to tie Objectives:
SCO Direct actions of AOP-36.1 BOP Close DG4 output breaker Success Path:
Actions of AOP-36.1 completed and DG4 output breaker closed.
Simulator Operator Actions:
L When directed by the lead evaluator, initiate Trigger 5 to activate LOOP.
D Acknowledge and silence Fireworks alarms.
u If requested to monitor DG5, acknowledge alarms on DG local Alarm Panel (Instructor Aids/Panels) and report alarms if requested.
If directed to align RBCCW to CSW cooling, wait 4 minutes and initiate Trigger 13 then report valve open.
D If directed to restart RPS MG sets, wait 3 minutes and insert the following as requested: Remote Functions, RP_IARPSA, RESET; RP_IARPSB, RESET; RP_IAEPAMGA, SET; RP_IAEPAMGB, SET; RP_IAEPAALT, SET, or use Batch Files RPS.MGA. RESTART and RPS.MGB.RESTART.
D If directed as RBAO to ensure BFIV latching mechanisms are disengaged, wait two minutes, then report latches are disengaged.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
LI CAUTION: DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR UNTIL DIRECTED BY THE LEAD EXAMINER.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 34
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close Required Orerator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct AOP-36.1 actions.
Direct DG4 output breaker closed. Critical Task Contacts Maintenance for failure of DG3 and DG4 output breaker.
Enters and directs actions of RSP:
o Directs RO to perform scram immediate actions o Direct control of reactor pressure using SRVs (establishes pressure band 800 1000 psig) o Direct water level band of 170 200 inches Enters and directs actions of PCCP:
o Monitor and control Suppression Pool temperature below 95 deg F.
o Start available RHR Loops in Suppression pool Cooling as necessary to maintain temp below 95 F.
o Monitor HCTL o Operate available drywell coolers o Verify RCC operation and alignment to the drywell 2012 NRC Scenario #5 35 IIiiI1III!LLLJT
EVENT 717a LOOP!DG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close RO Time Required Actions Notes Perform Scram Immediate Actions:
o Ensure Scram Valves Open o Control reactor pressure 800 1000 psig o Control reactor water level 170 200 inches o Place SULCV in operation:
. ENSURE the following:
- FW-FV-177 closed
- FW-Vi 20 closed
- FW control MODE SELECT in 1 ELEM
- SULCV in M (MANUAL) closed
- B21-F032A AND/OR 821-F032B open
. PLACE RFP A(B) RECIRC VLV, control switch to open
. PLACE RFPT A(B) SP CTL in M (MANUAL)
- ENSURE MAN/DFCS control switch in DFCS 2012 NRC Scenario #5 36
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close RO contd Time Required Actions Notes
. RAISE RFPT A(B) SP CTL speed until discharge pressure is greater than or equal to 100 psig above reactor pressure
- ADJUST SULCV to establish desired injection
- lF desired, THEN PLACE SULCV in A (AUTO) o Insert nuclear instrumentation o Ensure turbine oil system operating o Ensure reactor recirc pump speed lower to 34%
o Ensure heater drain pumps tripped Perform actions of RSP:
o After steam flow is less than 3 mlb/hr, Place mode switch to Shutdown o Trip Main Turbine o Ensure Master Reactor Level Controller setpoint is +170 inches o If two reactor feed pumps are running and level is above
+160 inches and rising, then trip one o If SRVs are cycling, Open SRVs until reactor pressure decreases to 950 psig 2012 NRC Scenario #5 37
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close RO Contd Time Required Actions Notes o Maintain reactor water level between 170 200 inches o Start available RHR Loops in Suppression pool Cooling as necessary o Perform LEP-02 o Downrange IRM5 o Ensure one CRD pump running BOP Time Required Actions Notes Diagnose failure of DG4 output breaker Manually close DG4 Output Critical Task Breaker Diagnose and report to the SRO DG3 tripped and Locked out.
Dispatch OSAO to monitor DGs Observe systems operating as required for plant conditions MOMENTARILY PLACE DIV I NON INTRPT RNA, SV-5262 control switch to OVERRIDE/RESET, THEN to OPEN, AND ENSURE DIV I NON-INTRPT RNA, SV-5262 opens.
MOMENTARILY PLACE DIV/I NON INTRPT RNA, SV-5261 control switch to OVERRIDE/RESET, THEN to OPEN, AND ENSURE DIV II NON-INTRPT RNA, SV-5261 opens.
START the CRD system in accordance with OP-08, Section 8.17.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 38
EVENT 717a LOOP!DG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes ENSURE the associated NSW and CSW pumps are operating.
ENSURE 125V and 24V DC battery chargers return to service for each energized 480V E Bus.
PERFORM the following to transfer RBCCW HXs from the NSW header to the CSW header:
o CONFIRM CSW system available.
o ENSURE at least one of the following is closed:
0 o RBCCWHX SERVICE WATER INLET VALVE,SW V103 o RBCCWHX SERVICE WATER INLET VALVE, SW V106 o NUCLEAR HEADER TO RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER SUPPLY VALVE, SW-V193 o OPEN CONVENTIONAL HEADER TO RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGERS SUPPLY VALVE, SW-V146.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 39
EVENT 717a LOOP!DG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes IF the opposite unit has power to its Service Air compressors AND it is desired to cross-tie air systems, THEN PERFORM the following:
o OBTAIN permission from the opposite Unit CRS to cross-tie unit air systems.
o ENSURE CROSS-TIE VALVE, 2-SA-PV-5071 is open (Unit 2, XU-2).
o ENSURE CROSS-TIE VALVE, 1-SA-PV-5071 is open (Unit 1, XU-2).
PERFORM the following to start Control Building Ventilation on the affected unit:
o CONFIRM the Control Building Instrument Air Compressors are functioning properly.
o ENSURE at least one of the following units is operating:
o CTL ROOM A/C & SUPPLY FAN,ID-CU-CB and iD-SF CB o CTL ROOM A/C & SUPPLY FAN,2D-CU-CB and 2D-SF-CB o CTL ROOM A/C SPARE FAN, 2E-SF-CB 2012 NRC Scenario #5 40
EVENT 717a LOOP!DG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes IF available, THEN START the following battery room fans, as required:
o BATTERY ROOM IA VENT FANS, IC-SF-CB and IC-EF CB o BATTERY ROOM lB VENT FANS, IB-SF-CB and IB-EF CB o BATTERYROOM2A VENT FANS,2C-SF-CB and 2C-EF-CB o BATTERY ROOM 2B VENT FANS,2B-SF-CB and 2B-EF-CB PERFORM the following to restore drywell cooling:
o IF three RBCCW pumps are running, THEN STOP one RBCCW pump, AND PLACE its control switch in AUTO.
o IF only one RBCCW pump is running, THEN START a second pump, if available.
o IF no RBCCW pump is running, THEN PLACE all RBCCW pump control switches in OFF, AND PERFORM one of the following:
2012 NRC Scenario #5 41
, 5)/
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes NOTE: Drywell temperature limit for starting the RBCCW System:
- Greater than or equal to 260°F below the 75 elevation, as indicated on Control Room recorder CAC-TR 4426
- Greater than or equal to 258°F as indicated on Points 1, 3 & 4 of RSDP recorder CAC-TR-778.
o IF any local drywell temperature is currently greater than the starting temperature limit OR has exceed the starting temperature limit since the initiation of the event, THEN PERFORM 20P-21, Section 8.6.
o IF all local drywell temperatures have remained less than the starting temperature limit since the initiation of the event, THEN PERFORM 20R-21, Section 5.2.
o ENSURE all available drywell coolers on the affected unit are operating.
IF HPCI or RCIC is running with suction from the CST AND CST level indication is NOT available in the Control Room or Radwaste, THEN MONITOR CST level locally AND REPORT level every hour.
START RPS MG Sets A(B) in accordance with OP-03, Section 5.2 2012 NRC Scenario #5 42 JIiiFI! c
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes PERFORM the following to start the Reactor Building HVAC:
o IF PROCESS OG VENT PIPE RAD HI-HI (UA-03, 5-4) is in alarm, AND is NOT the result of a valid high radiation signal, THEN PLACE CAC PURGE VENT ISOL OVRD, CA C-CS-5519, in OVERRIDE o RESET the following Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitors on Panel H12-P606:
o -PROCESS REACTOR BLDG VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR A, D12-RM-K609A o -PROCESS REACTOR BLDG VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR B, D12-RM-K609B.
o DEPRESS the following Isolation Reset Groups push buttons:
o -ISOLA TION RESET GROUPS 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, A71-S32 o -ISOLATION RESET GROUPS 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, A71-S33.
o ENSURE Instrument Air header pressure is greater than 95 psig.
o Ensure BFIV latching mechanisms are disengaged.
(Local) 2012 NRC Scenario #5 43
EVENT 717a LOOPIDG4 Output Breaker Failure to Close BOP Contd Time Required Actions Notes o OPEN RB VENT INBD ISOL VALVES, A-BF1 V-RB and C BFI V-RB.
o OPEN RB VENT OTBD ISOL VALVES, B-BFI V-RB and 0-BFI V-RB.
o START three sets of Reactor Building Ventilation Fans in accordance with OP-37. 1, Section 8.8 to maintain Reactor Building static pressure negative.
START RWCU START Fuel Pool Cooling MONITOR sump levels locally 2012 NRC Scenario #5 44
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure The crew will respond to a small break LOCA.
Malfunctions required:
Recirc piping break El l-FO15B Overload Objectives:
SCO Direct Emergency Depressurization RO Emergency Depressurize Success Path:
RPV Emergency depressurized and reactor water level restored.
Simulator Operator Actions:
When directed by the lead evaluator, initiate TRIGGER 6 to activate Small Line Break malfunction.
D If asked to perform AO actions to maximize CRD flow, initiate TRIGGER 7. When complete, contact the control room and report the AC actions to maximize CRD flow lAW SEP-09 are complete.
D If requested to line up SLC for demin water injection, initiate TRIGGER 8, wait 3 minutes and report demin water lined up.
D If directed to place drywell coolers to STOP, initiate TRIGGER 9, wait 2 minutes and report coolers are stopped.
L If directed to reset thermal overloads for Ell-FOI5B, wait two minutes and delete malfunction RHOO2F. Report thermal overload reset.
D If requested to defeat RCIC low pressure isolation (SEP-i 0), initiate Trigger 12.
H If directed by the lead evaluator, increase LOCA by modifying Malfunction NBOO9F.
H When directed by the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 45
EVENT 818a contd LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct E7 to E8 crosstie lAW AOP 36.1.
Direct activities for EOP-02-PCCP:
o Before Suppression Chamber press reaches 11.5 psig, Direct torus sprays per SEP-03.
o When suppression chamber exceeds 11.5 psig, direct drywell spray per SEP-02 o Confirm Drywell Spray Initiation Limit in Safe Region o Monitor PSP o Monitor HCTL o Place H2/O2 analyzers in service Direct activities for RVCP:
o Perform LEP-Ol, Alternate Coolant Injection o Lineup and start Table 1 injection systems o When below TAF, verify low pressure pumps on o Determine level cannot be See Enclosure 1 for LL4 Determination maintained above LL-4 o Emergency depressurization Critical Task by opening 7 ADS valves o Perform Alternate Source Term actions (Table 5) 2012 NRC Scenario #5 46
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure SRO Contd Time Required Actions Notes o Direct use of all available Table 1 systems and Alternate Coolant Injection Systems for injection o Direct level be restored and maintained +170-200.
o Contact maintenance for HPCI failure RO/BOP Time Required Actions Notes Recognize and report rising drywell pressure.
Ensure RCIC injection @ 500 gpm.
Report failure of HPCI to SRO Maximize CRD flow per SEP-09:
IF a CRD pump is NOT operating:
o ENSURE CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, is in MAN.
o CLOSE the in-service FLOW CONTROL VLV,C12-FOO2A (FOO2B).
o STARTaCRDpump.
o IF a reactor scram is NOT sealed in, THEN ADJUST CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to greater than or equal to 30 gpm.
o Direct an AO to perform field actions for two pump operation.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 47
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure RO/BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes When field actions are complete:
o START the second CRD Due to loss of power no second pump is available.
pump.
o ENSURECRDFLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, is in MAN.
o THROTTLE the following valves, as necessary, to maintain charging water pressure greater than or equal to 950 psig, but as low as possible:
- In-service FLOW CONTROL VLV,C1 1(C12)-
FOO2A (FOO2B)
- DRIVE PRESSURE VLV, Cl l(C12)-PCV-F003
-CHARGING WATER HEADER THROTTLE VALVE, Cl l(C12)-F034 (Field Action)
Direct AO to rack in the E7 and E8 crosstie breakers lAW AOP-36.1.
After the breakers are racked in closes the crosstie breakers to energize E7.
Inject demin water using SLC per LEP-Ol:
o Dispatch RBAO to align SLC for demin water injection o When AO reports SLC alignment is complete, Start SLC pumps A & B 2012 NRC Scenario #5 48
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure RO/BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes When directed, Start drywell spray per SEP-02:
o ENSURE WELL WATER TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW V141, is closed.
NOTE: With a LOCA signal present, OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, Ell-FO17A(FO17B) can NOT be closed for five minutes.
o IF INBOARD INJECTION VLV, Ell-FO15A(FOI5B) is open, THEN CLOSE OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, Eli FOl 7A(FO1 7B).
o ENSURE one of the following valves is open:
- CONy SW TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW-Vlll
- NUC SW TO VITAL HEADER VLV, SW-V1l7 o ENSURE both reactor recirculation pumps are tripped o PLACE all drywell cooler control switches to OFF (L/O).
o IF necessary, THEN PLACE Loop A(B) 2/3 CORE HEIGHT LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch, El l-CS-S18A(S18B),
to MANUAL OVERRD.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 49
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure RO/BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes o IF the CTMT SPR OVRD light for Loop A(B) CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, El 1-CS-SI 7A(SI 7B),
is NOT on, THEN MOMENTARILY PLACE Loop A(B) CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, EII-CS-SI7A(SI7B), to MANUAL o ENSURE TORUS COOLING ISOL VLV, ElI F024A(F024B), is closed.
o CONFIRM the following:
- Drywell pressure and drywell temperature are in the SAFE region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit graph
- Suppression pool water level is below +21 inches.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 50
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure ROIBOP contd Time Required Actions Notes o ENSURE one RHR Pump is running.
o OPEN Loop A(S) DRYWELL SPRAY INBD ISOL VL V, Eli FO2IA(FO2IB).
o THROTTLE OPEN Loop A(S)
DRYWELL SPRAY OTBD ISOL VLV, Eli FOI6A(FOI6B), to obtain between 8,000 gpm and 10,000 gpm flow.
o IF additional cooling is required, THEN START the second Loop A(S) RHR pump AND limit flow to less than or equal to 11,500 gpm.
o IF necessary, THEN PLACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS A&C(B&D)LOCA OVERRIDE switch, Eli 519A(SI9B), in MANUAL 0 VERRD.
o ALIGN the RHR Service Water System to supply cooling water to RHR Heat Exchanger A(S) (OP-43).
o ENSURE HXA(B) INLET VLV, Eii-F047A(F047B) is open.
o ENSURE HXA(B) OUTLET VLV,E1 i-FOO3A(FOO3B) is open.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 51
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure RO/BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes NOTE: HXA(B) BYPASS VLV, Eli F048A (F048B), is normally open, but with a LPCI initiation signal present can NOT be closed or throttled for three minutes.
o CLOSE HXA(B) BYPASS VLV, El l-F048A(F048B).
When directed, Start torus spray per SEP-03:
o IF necessary, THEN PLACE Loop A(B) 2/3 CORE HEIGHT LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch, El l-CS-SI8A(SI8B),
in MANUAL OVERRD.
o IF the CTMT SPR OVRD light for the Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, Eii-CS-S17A(S17B) is NOT on, THEN MOMENTARILY PLACE Loop A(B)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CONTROL switch, Ell-CS-517A(517B), to MANUAL.
o IF INBOARD INJECTION VLV, Ell-FOI5A(FO15B) is open, AND injection to the reactor is NOT required, THEN CLOSE OUTBOARD INJECTION VLV, El 1-FOl 7A(FOl 7B).
o ENSURE RHR Loop A(B) is placed in the LPCI, Suppression Pool Cooling, or Drywell Spray mode.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 52
EVENT 818a LOCAIEDILPCI Injection valve failure RO/BOP contd Time Required Actions Notes o ENSURE TORUS DISCHARGE ISOL VLV, Eli F028A(F028B), is open.
o OPEN TORUS SPRAY ISOL VLV, Ell-F027A(F027B).
When directed, Open 7 ADS Critical Task valves Recognize failure of El l-FOI5B to Critical Task open, diagnose as thermal overload, and dispatch AO to reset thermal overload Control injection flow to maintain RPV level +170-200 as directed by the SRO.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 53
ENCLOSURE 1 ATTACHMENT 6 Page 15 of 19 FIGURE iSA Unit 2 Reactor Water Level at LL-4 (Minimum Steam Cooflng Level) 0
-10 20 UI
-30 C.,
z
-40
-J UI LII -50
-J UI -60 U -70 z -80
- so
- 100 60 200 400 600 800 100G REACTOR PRESSURE (PSIG)
WHEN REACTOR PRESSURE IS LESS THAN 60 PSIG, USE INDICATED LEVEL.
LL-4 IS -27.5 INCHES.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 54
Simulator Operator Activities:
WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2012 NRC Scenario #5 55
SHIFT BRIEFING Plant Status Unit startup is in progress.
Reactor power is approximately 20%.
OGP-1 0, sequence A2X, is complete up to Step 31, Item 299.
GP-03 is complete up to step 5.3.3 OP-27 is complete up to step 5.1.2.10.
Equipment Out of Service APRM 2 INOP and bypassed Protected Equipment None Plan of the Day Synchronize main generator.
Continue with OGP-03 actions to raise reactor power.
Reactor Engineer approval has been obtained to continuously withdraw control rods.
2012 NRC Scenario #5 56
Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.:2012-1 Op Test No.: FINAL Examiners: Operators:
(SRO)
,, (RO) 4)ç
/
I (BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Cycle.
1A NSW Pump U/C.
APRM 2 INOP and bypassed.
Turnover: Transfer 2A SJAE Train to FULL LOAD and secure 2B SJAE Train lAW 20P-30.
Event MaIf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*
1 N/A N-BOP Transfer 2A SJAE Train to FULL LOAD, secure 26 SJAE Train N-SRO 2 RDO1 7F C-RD CRD flow controller failure C-SRO 3 R-RO Small condenser leak causes lowering vacuum. (AOP-37)
CNOO1 F R-SRO RD reduces reactor power with recirc flow to stabilize vacuum >24.5.
4 CFO39F C-BOP Heater Drain Controller Failure (AOP-23)
C-SRO 5 C-BOP NSW Pump 2BTrip, failure of NSW Pump 2A to auto start, manual start CWO23F reqd; C- SRO (TS) (ADP-18) 6 I-RD Nl031 F Recirc Loop B Flow transmitter Failure (TS) l-SRD 7 RWO13F/15F/ M-ALL 16F Un-isolable RWCU leak, SCRAM, Loss of Vacuum, RFPs Trip 8 E5028F C-RD . .
HPCI Injection valve fails to auto open C.SRD 9 N/A M-ALL Emergency Depressurization 10 K1507A C-BDP Failure of two ADS valves to open, manually open two additional SRVs; K1 51 2A Scenario ends when reactor pressure reaches 50#
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Description Event I BOP operator will transfer SJAE 2A to FULL load using 20P-30 Section 8.1. Task requires some component manipulations and parameter monitoring.
Event 2 The CRD flow control valve 2A will fail closed. The crew will place the standby CRD flow control valve 2B in service per OP-08.
Event 3 A small condenser leak which will cause condenser vacuum to slowly lower. Crew should enter AOP-37. SRO should direct RO to lower reactor power to stabilize vacuum. Once power has been reduced at least 10%, vacuum will stabilize.
Event 4 The Heater Drain Deaerator level control system will fail causing the HD pumps discharge valves to fail full open. The crew will respond per AOP-23.0 stop 1 HD pump before HDD level goes <24 and then use the HD-V57 to control HDD level.
Event 5 The running NSW pump will TRIP on motor overload. The STBY NSW pump will fail to AUTO start. The BOP operator should recognize the failure and manually start the STBY NSW pump. With a Ui NSW pump under clearance will require entry into TS.
System parameters will return to normal. SRO should address T.S. implications.
AOP-18 entry.
Event 6 The Recirc Loop B flow transmitter to APRM Channel 4 will fail downscale resulting in a rod block and a trip input to each voter. The crew will respond per APPs and bypass APRM 4. The APRM will be declared Inoperable per TS 3.3.1.1, Condition A and placed in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. APRM TS Actions to be taken requires the APRM mode selector switch to be place in INOP lAW 001-18.
Event 7 A large un-isolable RWCU leak will occur. Crew will enter AOP-5.0 and SCCP. SRO should direct a SCRAM. Original vacuum leak will worsen causing a complete loss of vacuum. Group 1 isolation will occur due to loss of vacuum.
Event 8 HPCI injection valve will fail to open if HPCI AUTO initiation is received. Manual operation will open injection valve.
Event 9 Secondary containment conditions will worsen, forcing the SRO to direct an Emergency Depressurization due to high water levels. Two ADS SRVs will fail to manually open. SRO should direct opening two additional SRVs. Scenario will end when reactor pressure reaches 1 00#.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 2
DUKE ENERGY BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION I
2012 NRC EXAM SCENARIO #1 PREPARED BY; 9/04/2012 Operations Instructor/Dev&oper DATE CONCURRED BY: f)n 9 04/12 Operations nstruct DATE VALIDATED BY:
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Opfations Department Rep. DATE
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VALIDATED BY:
OpeatioDeprtmnt Re_,_.:: DATE
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VALIDATED BY: AC ent Rep. LATE APPROVED BY;
SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC ENP-24.5 forlCl3 RxPwr 100%
Core Age MOC EVENTS Event Trigger Trigger Description Number 1 N/A Transfer 2A SJAE to Full Load, Secure 2B SJAE 2 1 Manual CRD Flow Control Valve 2A Failure 3 2 Manual Small condenser leak, lowering vacuum, power reduction 4 3 Manual Heater Drain Controller Failure 5 4 Manual NSW pump 2B trip, failure of NSW Pump 2A to start 6 5 Manual Recirc Loop B Flow transmitter failure 7 6 Manual Unisolable RWCU leak, SCRAM, Loss of vacuum, Grp 1 isolation 8 N/A Auto HPCI lnj Valve Failure 9 N/A Emergency Depress 10 N/A Auto Failure of 2 ADS valves to open 11 Auto Trips RFP A on Scram Channel A (2 mm delay) 11 Auto Trips RFP B on Scram Channel B (2 mm delay) 2012 NRC Scenario #1 4
SL -
SIMULATOR SETUP Interventions Summary (Shaded entries = Active)
Malfunctions Summary Maif ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig ID Value Value RD017F FCVA CRDFCVAFaiIsCIosed FALSE TRUE 1 CFO39F HTR DRN DEAER LVL CNTRLR FALSE TRUE 3 FAILURE CNO01 F LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM 0.00 825.00 00:03:00 2 CW019F B NUC SERVICE WATER PUMP MOTOR False True 4 WINDING FAULT N1063F 4 Recirc Loop B Xmitter Fail 0 0 00:00:10 5 RWO13F RWCU BRK IN TRIANGLE ROOM 77 0.00 100.0000 00:10:00 6 RWO15F G31 -FOOl FAILURE TO AUTO CLOSE TRUE RWO16F G31-F004 FAILURE TO AUTO CLOSE TRUE ES028F HPCI INJECT VLV FAILS TO OPEN TRUE Remotes Summary Remf ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig ID Value Value RW_ZVRWOO4M G31-F004 OUTBOARD ISOL VALVE ON OFF 8 RW_ZVRWOO1M G31-F001 INBOARD ISOL VALVE ON OFF 9 CF1AFWATRP LOCAL RFP A TRIP NORMAL TRIPPED 00:02:00 11 CF_i AFWBTRP LOCAL REP B TRIP NORMAL TRIPPED 00:02:00 11 RD_VHRD47BL CRD FCV B ISOL CLOSED OPEN RD_IACRDFVA CRD FCV A CONTROL AUTO MAN RD_IACRDFVB CRD FCV B CONTROL MAN AUTO RD_VHRD47AL CRD FCVA ISOL OPEN CLOSED 2012 NRC Scenario #1 5 77
IIt!I SIMULATOR SETUP Override Summary Tag ID Description Position/ Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Target Value Value K4B2OA NUC HDR SW PMP A DISCH VLV AUTO ON OFF K1507A AUTO DEPRESS VLV B21-F013C OPEN OFF OFF K1512A AUTO DEPRESS VLV B21-F013K OPEN OFF OFF Q1401RRK RWCUVLVG31-FOO4RED ON/OFF ON ON 8 Q14O1LGK RWCUVLVG31-FO04GREEN ON/OFF OFF ON 8 GK3O7PLZ INTERCONDSR 2B COND DRN LVL 90 64 64 00:00:20 13 Annunciator Summary Window Description Tagname Override Oval AVaI Actime Dactime ]_
SOUTH RHR RM FLOOD LEVEL HI-HI ZUA1214 On On Off 12 I 5-5 OTBD NSS VALVES MTR OVLD ZA255 ON ON OFF 8 Special Instructions
- 1. Ensure simulator security is established lAW TAP-41 1.
- 2. Ensure appropriate keys have blanks in switches.
- 4. Ensure no rods are bypassed in the RWM.
- 5. Ensure hard cards and flow charts are cleaned up.
- 6. Ensure all key have blanks installed.
- 7. Ensure affected procedures are free of any marks.
- 8. Place all SPDS displays to the Critical Plant Variable display (#100).
- 9. Reset to IC-i 3 and place in run.
- 10. Ensure ENP-24.5 form for IC-13 is located at the P603 panel.
- 11. Ensure 2A SPE in service.
- 12. Bypass APRM 2 and place blue card on joystick.
- 13. Load scenario file, if required.
- 14. Place protected equipment placards on 2A and 2B NSW Pumps.
- 15. Update orange protected equipment board with 1 B, 2A, and 2B NSW.
- 16. Advance all chart recorders to indicate steady state conditions.
- 17. Provide Shift Briefing sheet to the CRS.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 6
L SCENARIO INFORMATION Critical Tasks (bolded and italicized in the required operator actions)
- Insert a reactor scram prior to any area reaching its Max Safe Operating Value.
- Perform Emergency Depressurization when two plant areas exceed max safe water level.
References:
AOP-05 AOP-18 AOP-23 AOP-37 ENP-24.5 01-18 OP-08 OP-30 0P-35 RSP, RVCP, SCCP Tech Specs APP-A-05 (2-2) (4-8)
APP-A-06 (2-8) (3-8) (5-7)
APP-UA-01 (1-10) (4-10)
APP-UA-03 (1-5) (2-7)
APP-UA-04 (2-10)
APP-UA-05 (1-9) (2-9) (5-3) (5-4)
APP-UA-12 (1-3) (1-4) (2-3) (2-4)
APP-UA-18 (6-1)
APP-UA-23 (1-1) (2-1) (3-1)
APP-UA-45 (3-2) (4-3) (6-3)
APP-UA-48 (5-3) (5-4) 2012 NRC Scenario #1 7
EVENT I SHIFT TURNOVER I SJAE TRAIN MANIPULATIONS The crew places 2A SJAE in full load per SCO direction Malfunctions required: None Ob/ectives:
ROIBOP
- Monitors reactor plant during evolution Success Path:
2A SJAE in full load, 2B SJAE secured, vacuum steady Simulator Operator Actions:
LI If contacted as the Auxiliary Operator, respond that you are standing by and ready to assist during the evolution.
LI When contacted to open MVD-V5023, change INTERCONDSR 2B COND DRN LVL value to match current reading and activate with a 20 sec ramp rate, then delete the override after it ramps out.
LI If contacted as chemistry to take samples due to spiking of the SJAE Rad Monitor, acknowledge the request.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct BOP operator to place 2A SJAE in full load and secure 2B SJAE 2012 NRC Scenario #1 8
EVENT I SHIFT TURNOVER I SJAE TRAIN MANIPULATIONS BOP Time Required Actions Notes Place 2A SJAE in full load and removes 2B SJAE from service per 20P-30, section 8.1 as follows Verify Auxiliary Operator available to respond to valve or breaker problems that could be encountered during the transfer Depress OFFGAS TRAIN A MASTER SWITCH, FULL LOAD pushbutton.
Verify the following valves auto open:
SJE-V1 1 HTOG-V1 SJE-V4 OG-V1O Alarms expected for this evolution.
2APP-UA-45 (6-3) ICNDSR COND OUTLET VLV CO-Vi 7 OPEN 2APP-UA-45 (4-3) AFTER CNDSR COND LVL HIGH/LO 2APP-UA-45 (3-2) RECOMBINER INLET TEMP LOW Check SJAE Off Gas Rad The rad monitors will increase requiring Chemistry to be notified.
Monitors A&B Contact Chemistry for sampling due to SJAE Rad monitor spiking.
Depress OFFGAS TRAIN B MASTER SWITCH, OFF/RESET pushbutton.
Verify the following valves close:
SJE-V1 2 OG-V13 MVD-V56 2012 NRC Scenario #1 9
iLi1Lh EVENT I SHIFT TURNOVER I SJAE TRAIN MANIPULATIONS BOP Continued Time Required Actions Notes After three minutes, verify the following valves have closed:
SJE-V1 SJE-V1 7 HTOG-V4 Confirms intercondenser condensate drain level MVD-Ll-4332 on the 2B SJAE train is RISING.
Directs AO to open bypass valve to lower level.
Directs AO to close valve when level is less than 80 inches.
Verifies that 2A SPE is in service and N/As step 8.
Close the following condensate system valves:
CO-V16, SPECONDINL VALVE CO-Vi 82, AFTERCONDSR COND OUTLET VALVE CO-Vi 7, SJAE INTERCONDSR COND OUTLET VALVE Ensures condenser vacuum is stable.
Informs SCO to initiate a 24 Tracking for Function 6 until E&RC can verify hour tracking LCO on ODCM setpoints are within ODCM limits.
table 7.3.2-1.
Place recombiner electric strip heaters_to_OFF.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitor reactor plant parameters during evolution.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 10
EVENT 2 2A CRD FCV FAILURE The crew will receive CRD charging header pressure high alarm and lose drive header pressure. The crew will place the standby CRD flow control valve in service per OP-08.
Malfunctions required: CRD FCV A Fails Closed Objectives:
- Direct action to swap CRD Flow Control Valves.
RO/BOP
- Performs actions to swap CRD Flow Control Valves.
Success Path:
Places CRD Flow Control Valve B in service lAW 20P-02 Section 8.3 Simulator Operator Actions:
LI When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger I to initiate CRD FCV Failure.
Li If asked to investigate the CRD flow controller failure, as the RBAO report that the A FCV is in service but no flow indicated and no apparent cause for the failure is seen.
Li If asked to check the R018 temperature recorder, report as the RBAO that none of the CRDs indicate an alarm present.
Li If asked as RBAO to transfer CRD FCV per CR08 (steps 8.3.2.6a-6g, when contro l
room has placed CRD Flow Control to Manual @ zero output, then enter Remote Functions, RD_VHRD47BL, OPEN, (CRD FCV B Isol), RD_IACRDFVA, MANUAL (CRD FCV A Control), RD_IACRDFVB, AUTO, (CRD FCV B Control) and report CR08 completed up to step 8.3.2.6h. After control room has completed step 8.3.2.6h. report step 8.3.2.6i is complete.
Li When requested, isolate CRD FCV using RD_VHRD47AL CLOSE, (CRD FCV A Isol) and report steps 8.3.2.12 and 13 are complete.
Li If asked as I&C to investigate, acknowledge the request.
Li When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 11
JLY EVENT 2 2A CRD FCV FAILURE Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes May direct entry into OAOP-02.O, Control Rod Misposition/Malfunction, for inability to move control rods Direct standby CRD FCV placed in service lAW OP-08.
Contact I&C to investigate 2A CRD FCV Failure BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the plant 2012 NRC Scenario #1 12
EVENT 2 2A CRD FCV FAILURE RO Time Required Actions Notes Diagnose and report failure of CRD FCV Enter and announce OAOP-02.O, if directed by the SRO.
Addresses Annunciator:
A-5 2-2, CRD Charging Wtr Press Hi Determine steps of 20P-08 (section 8.3) required to shift FCVs Station an operator in direct communication with the Control Room at CRD Master Flow Control Station Shift CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to BAL.
Null CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, by adjusting manual potentiometer.
Shift CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to MAN.
Maintain CRD flow rate between With the failure of the FCV this step should be 30 and 60 gpm, by adjusting noted and approved by SRO as not being able manual potentiometer. tobe done. (lAW PRO-NGGC-0200, Section Direct RBAO to perform 20P-08 Section 8.3 Step 6a 6g-2012 NRC Scenario #1 13
EVENT 2 2A CRD FCV FAILURE RO Time Required Actions Notes Null CRDFLOWCONTROL VALVE CONTROLLER, C12-FK-DOO9B, by adjusting manual potentiometer on CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600 Direct RBAO to perform 20P-08 Section 8.3 Step 61.
Determines 20P-08 Section 8.3 step 7 is N/A.
Null CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, by adjusting setpoint tape.
Shift CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to AUTO.
Adjust setpoint tape on CRD FLOW CONTROL, C12-FC-R600, to maintain cooling water differential pressure between 10 and 26 psid.
Ensure CRD flow rate is between 30 and 60 gpm.
Direct RBAO to perform 20P-08 Section 8.3 Steps 12 & 13.
Monitor operation of CRD System in CR0 Drive Water Pressure operating band is 260 to accordance with Section 6.0. 275 psid.
Complete 20P-08 Attachment 6.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 14
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EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUM/POWER REDUCTION The crew responds to lowering condenser vacuum.
NOTE: Vacuum will stabilize as crew lowers power.
Malfunctions required:
- Condenser leak Objectives:
- Direct actions in response to lowering condenser vacuum RO/BOP
- Respond to lowering condenser vacuum
- Reduce reactor power, as directed by SRO, to stabilize vacuum above 24.5 Hg Success Path:
Reduce reactor power approx. 10% to stabilize condenser vacuum above 24.5 Hg Simulator Operator Actions:
LI WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 2 (Condenser Leak)
LI IF asked as the Rad Waste Operator to maintain hotwell level using manual hotwell level control, respond in the affirmative.
LI IF contacted as Ops Center to assist with vacuum leak search, acknowledge request.
LI IF contacted as chemistry to perform actions for 15% power reduction, acknowledge.
LI IF contacted as HP to assist in SJAE room entry, acknowledge request.
LI IF contacted as AO to check closed MVD-5023, acknowledge request.
LI When crew lowers power 10%, stabilize condenser vacuum by changing severity of condenser leak to 500.
LI When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 15
EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUMIPOWER REDUCTION Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct crew to enter and execute AOP37, Low Condenser Vacuum.
Direct RO to reduce reactor power May direct the use of Manual Runback pushbutton, per ENP-24.5 to maintain vacuum OENP-24.5 flow limit greater than 24.5 Hg.
Contact Nuclear Engineering of the reduction in power due to condenser leak.
Contact System Load Dispatcher of the reduction in power.
Contact AOs and Maintenance to help with Condenser Air Leak hunting.
Contact Chemistry to take samples if power was reduce >15%.
Direct inserting control rods to maintain operation below the MELLL.
May direct entry into GP-12 after the power reduction.
Refer to ODCM LCO 7.3.10 if AOG Bypass occurs (2APP-UA-48 (5-4)
AOG SYSTEM BYPASS).
Condition Al applies to place AOG in service in 7 days.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 16 z
EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUMIPOWER REDUCTION BOP Time Required Actions Notes Announce and Enter AOP-37, Low Condenser Vacuum.
Direct Radwaste to maintain hotwell level between -7 and ÷7 inches in manual hotwell level control Dispatch AOs to perform Condenser Leak hunting in the field.
Verify proper SJAE operation.
Respond to Alarms.
2APP-UA-48 (5-4) AOG SYSTEM BYPASS 2APP-UA-48 (5-3) AOG SYSTEM OUTLET FLOWITEMP HIGH 2APP-UA-23 (2-1) EXH HOOD A VACCUM LOW 2APP-UA-23 (3-1) EXH HOOD B VACUUM LOW 2012 NRC Scenario #1 17
EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUMIPOWER REDUCTION RO Time Required Actions Notes Enter and execute OAOP-37.0, Low Condenser Vacuum.
Reduce reactor power as required to maintain condenser vacuum greater than 24.5 Hg per OENP-24.5. (This is an Immediate Operator Action from OAOP-37.0.)
Reduce recirc flow on both May be directed to use Manual Runback pumps using the Recirc Master pushbutton, which reduces recirc flow to the OENP 24.5 flow limit of 47 MIbm/hr or 75% power. If Control, Lower Fast used expect A-5, 4-8 OPRM Trip Enabled pushbutton. Annunciator.
Continues with Recirc pump reductions until vacuum is steady and greater than 24.5 inches HG.
Verifies operation on the Power to Flow map.
Recognizes operation above the MELLL line and informs SCO.
Inserts control rods using ENP 24.5 to get below the MELLL line. (Should only need to insert one control rod 22-19)
Turns control rod power on.
Selects control rod (22-19) in accordance with ENP-24.5 sheet. May also insert 30-35, 30-19, or 22-35. (in this order to establish margin to MELLL line).
Continuously drives selected rod in using RMCS.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 18
EVENT 4 Heater Drain Deaerator Controller Failure HDD level will slowly lower. If level reaches 36, HD DEAERATOR LEVEL HIGH-LOWwill alarm. If level reaches 54, HD DEAERATOR LEVEL HIGH-LOWwill alarm on high level.
If level gets too high, a HDD Extraction Trip will occur and require additional operator actions.
Malfunctions required: Htr Drn Deaer Lvl Cntrlr Failure Oblectives:
SCO Direct Actions for a Condensate/Feedwater System Failure per OAOP-23.O RO/BOP Respond to a Condensate/Feedwater System Failure per OAOP-23.O Success Path:
The crew should trip one HD pump before HDD level is <24 and then control HDD level with HD-V57.
Simulator Operator Actions:
When directed by the lead examiner, initiate Trigger 3, HDD Controller failure.
D If directed as l&C to investigate the HDD level controller acknowledge only.
D If contacted as AC to investigate, report LC-91 is in master and is sending a full open signal.
D When HDD level is stabilized and if directed to place controller in Manual or to swap master controllers, Delete CFO39F and report controller in manual maintaining level.
ü When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 19
Li1IIILiJ1Z EVENT 4 Heater Drain Deaerator Controller Failure Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct entry into AOP-23.O May direct lowering power Direct I&C to investigate HDD level control problem Direct trip of 1 HD pump and HDD level control with HD-V57 May direct HDD level control to be placed in Manual or swapped.
RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitors the plant May reduce reactor power with control rods lAW OENP-24.5 as directed by the CRS 2012 NRC Scenario #1 20
EVENT 4 Heater Drain Deaerator Controller Failure BOP Time Required Actions Notes Acknowledge and report UA-4 2-10 HD DEAERATOR LEVEL HIGH-LOW alarm.
Diagnose HD Pump discharge valves full open Enter and announce OAOP-23.0 Trips one of the operating Heater Drain pump Maintains heater drain deaerator If level reaches 60 inches UA-4, 3-10 may alarm and level less than 60 inches indicated the HDD Moture removal valves MVD-LV-266 and on HEATER DRAIN DEAERATOR LEVEL, HD-Ll-97 Move to the next event when level is being controlled with the HD-V57.
May dispatch TBAO to check HD Pump Air-Operated Discharge Level Control Valves, HD-LV-91-1, 2, & 3.
May direct TBAO to place HDD level control in Manual lAW 20P-35 Section 8.2. or swap controller lAW 2OP-35, Section 8.8 Monitors main condenser vacuum and condensate parameters May have to secure a CBP if one auto started during the evolution.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 21 r
,- v F
EVENT 5 2B NSW PUMP TRIP I FAILURE OF 2A NSW PUMP TO START The crew responds to the trip of a NSW pump and the failure of the auto pump to start.
Malfunctions required: NSW Pump trip, NSW pump auto select switch off
- B NSW Pump motor overload
- Failure of STBY NSW pump to start Objectives:
SCO
- Direct actions for loss of NSW
- Evaluates Tech Specs 3.7.2 Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink RO/BOP
- Respond to the trip of B NSW pump
- Respond to the failure of an automatic start of the A NSW pump Success Path:
STBY NSW pump started and NSW system pressure returned to normal band Simulator Operator Activities:
El WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 4. (NSW pump trip)
El IF contacted as OAO to investigate NSW pump and breaker, report 51 devices are tripped for at the breaker.
El IF contacted as maintenance or l&C to investigate trip, acknowledge request.
El When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 22 zzzzz
EVENT 5 2B NSW PUMP TRIP I FAILURE OF 2A NSW PUMP TO START Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct entry into AOP-18 NSW System Failure.
Contact maintenance to investigate trip of 2B NSW Pump.
May also report to I/C that 2A NSW Pump did not auto start.
Evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.2 Service Failure to auto start due to failed pressure Water System and Ultimate Heat switch does not make the pump INOP.
Sink.
Determine 2B NSW pump in operable Determine 1A NSW Pump inoperable due to clearance.
Per the Bases, 3 NSW pumps required site wide.
3.7.2 Condition B. One required NSW pump inoperable for reasons other than condition A. Required Action B.1 Restore required NSW pump to Operable status in 7 days RO Time Required Actions Notes Monitor reactor plant parameters during evolution.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 23
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EVENT 5 2B NSW PUMP TRIP I FAILURE OF 2A NSW PUMP TO START BOP Time Required Actions Notes Monitor NSW system parameters.
Recognize lowering NSW system pressure.
Announce and execute OAOP-18.0, NSW System Failure.
Recognize trip of 2B NSW pump.
Recognize the failure of the STBY NSW pump to start and starts standby pump.
Places 2A NSW pump in Manual.
Starts 2A NSW Pump.
Refer to alarms.
UA-01 (4-10) NUCLEAR HDR SW PUMP B TRIP UA-01 (1-10) NUCLEAR HEADER SERVWTR PRESS-LOW UA-03 (1-5) RBCCW HEAD TANK LEVEL HI/LO UA-05 (1-9) FAN CLG UNIT CS PUMP RM A INL PRESS LO UA-05 (2-9) FAN CLG UNIT CS PUMP RM B INL PRESS LO UA-18 (6-1) BUS E4 4KV MOTOR OVLD 2012 NRC Scenario #1 24
_)_1_
EVENT 6 RECIRC LOOP B FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE Flow reference off normal alarm, rod block and scram signal to all 4 voters Flow transmitter signals are displayed on PC display 845, and on individual NUMACs by selecting Input Status.
Malfunctions required: APRM Flow Unit Failure Objectives:
SCO - Determine LCO for APRM 4 inoperability and direct placing channel in trip.
RO - Respond To A Flow Unit/Transmitter Failure Per APP A-06 5-7.
Success Path:
ARPM 4 TS 3.3.1.1 declaration and placed in trip condition lAW 001-1 8.
Simulator Operator Actions:
When directed by lead evaluator, INITIATE TRIGGER 5 to activate APRM 4 failure.
D If asked as I&C to investigate, acknowledge the request.
If asked to pull fuses (for TRM 3.3 actions) acknowledge the request.
After LCO entries have been determined and SRO is waiting for l&C, call as WCCSRO and request APRM 4 be placed in tripped condition to support l&C trouble shooting. The WCC will hang the status control tag paperwork.
Required Operator Actions SRO Time Action Notes Direct actions of APPs Direct I&C to investigate Evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation TS 3.3.1.1, Function 2b, Required Action Al. With one or more required channels inoperable, place in trip condition in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Evaluate TRM 3.3 Control Rod Block Instrumentation TRM 3.3, Function la, Required Condition Al. With one of the required channels not operable 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore to operable.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 25
EVENT 6 RECIRC LOOP B FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE SRO contd Time Action Notes Refers to 001-18 for actions to place APRM 4 in a tripped condition.
Direct APRM 4 mode selector switch placed in INOP to allow I&C troubleshooting.
BOP Time Action Notes Monitors the plant.
May check back panel APRM indications.
RO Time Action Notes Acknowledges, refers to & reports annunciators A-6 2-8 APRM UPSCALE 3-8 APRM UPSCALE TRIP/INOP 5-7 FLOW REF OFF NORMAL A-5 2-2 ROD OUT BLOCK 4-8 OPRM TRIP ENABLED Diagnose and report failure of APRM 4 Flow Transmitter Obtains key number 114 from the SRO key locker to place APRM 4 in trip.
Places APRM mode selector switch in INOP lAW 001-18.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 26
EVENT 7 & 8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK! SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM The crew will respond to an un-isolable RWCU leak in secondary containment.
Malfunctions required:
- RWCU leak Triangle Room 77ft
- RWCU isolation valve failures
- Vacuum Loss
- HPCI Injection valve failure to open Ob/ectives:
SCO
- Direct response to un-isolable primary system breach in secondary containment
- Respond to un-isolable primary system breach in secondary containment
- Perform SCRAM actions Success Path:
Crew enters and executes AOP-5.O and SCCP, attempts to isolate RWCU, inserts reactor scram, recognizes Group.l isolation, Both RFPs trip after five minutes from scram, recognizes failure of HPCI injection valve, maintains reactor water level above LL3, controls reactor pressure with SRVs.
Simulator Operator Actions:
WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 6 E WHEN crew inserts a SCRAM, increase Condenser Air In-Leakage malfunction setting (vacuum leak) to maximum.
D If contacted as engineering, acknowledge request for EQ envelopes for the U2 Reactor Building D When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Critical Tasks Insert a reactor scram prior to any area reaching its Max Safe Operating Value.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 27 7
EVENTS 7&8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK I SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM RO Time Required Actions Notes Enter and execute AOP-5.O High Radiation.
Diagnose source of radiation as RWCU leak.
Trip RWCU Pumps May close G31-F042 valve.
Recognize RWCU isolation valve failures and report to SRO.
(FOOl Breaker trip)
(F004 Overload trip)
Insert Reactor scram as directed Critical Task Insert a reactor scram prior by SRO. to any area reaching its Max Safe Operating Value. These can be monitored on SPDS
. screen 410.
Complete scram actions Recognize Grp.l Isolation (vacuum loss) and report to crew.
Maintain reactor pressure with SRVs as directed by SRO.
Maintain reactor water level as directed by SRO.
Perform reactor cooldown as directed by SRO.
Recognize failure of E41-F006, HPCI injection valve to open and open manually.
Recognize and report to SRO alarm A-2 RB 50/20 ft Temp Hi.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 29
EVENTS 7 & 8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK I SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM Required Operator Actions SRO Time Required Actions Notes Direct entry into AOP-5.0 High Radiation Direct RO to trip and isolate RWCU.
Enter and execute SCCP. Critical Task Insert a reactor scram prior Direct a reactor scram. to any area reaching its Max Safe OperatIng Value. These can be monitored on SPDS screen 410. (It will take 10 minutes to Direct cool down at normal cool reach max safe operating values) down rates (<100°FIhr).
Request EQ envelopes for the U2_Rx_Bldg Enter RSP and exit to RVCP due to the scram required.
Enter and execute RVCP.
Direct RO/BOP to stabilize reactor pressure below 1050 psig.
Verify Instrument operability per Caution 1.
Direct crew to not use NO26AIB due to 50 temperatures after 50 alarm reported.
Direct verification of group isolations, ECCS initiations and DG starts as appropriate.
Direct RO/BOP to restore and maintain reactor water level 170-200 using systems available in Table 1.
Direct E41-F006, HPCI injection valve to be opened.
Contact I/C for assistance with RWCU isolation valve failures.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 28
EVENTS 7 & 8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK! SCRAM! LOSS OF VACUUM BOP Time Required Actions Notes Respond to alarm UA-03, 2-7 Area Rad Rx Bldg Hi.
Enter and execute AOP-5.O.
Evacuate Unit 2 Reactor Bldg.
Direct AD to close PIV-33 RB Sprinkler Shutoff Valve.
Direct E&RC to take applicable AOP-5.O actions.
Check area radiation readings at back panels.
Diagnose source of radiation as RWCU leak.
Recognize Grp.l Isolation (vacuum loss) and report to crew.
2APP-UA-23 (2-1, 3-1) EXH HOOD A/B LOW VACCUUM 2APP-UA-23 (1-1) TURB VACCUUM TRIP 2APP-A-5 (5-4, 5-3) GP.I ISOL LOGIC TRIPPED Maintain reactor pressure with SRVs as directed by SRO.
Maintain reactor water level as Aligns SULCV per hard card (OP-32, Attachment 6) directed by SRO. See Enclosure 1.
Perform reactor cooldown as directed by SRO.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 30
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EVENTS 7&8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK I SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM BOP Continued Time Required Actions Notes Recognize failure of HPCI injection valve to open and open manually.
Recognize and report to SRO alarm A-2 RB 50/20 ft Temp Hi.
Recognize and report to SRO alarm UA-12 South Core Spray Flood Level Hi.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 31
EVENT 9 & 10 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION I ADS VALVE FAILURES The crew will perform and respond to a manual emergency depressurization with ADS valve failures.
Malfunctions required:
- C and K ADS valves fail to open manually Objectives:
- Evaluate plant conditions and direct an Emergency Depressurization BOPIRO
- Perform Emergency Depressurization
- Recognize and respond to component malfunctions Success Path:
Emergency depressurization performed as required by SCCP Simulator Operator Actions:
El 2 minutes after receiving annunciator UA-12 (2-4) SOUTH RHR RM FLOO D HI, initiate TRIGGER 12 (South RHR RM Flood HI-HI)
El When directed by the lead examiner, proceed to the next event.
Critical Tasks Perform Emergency Depressurization when two plant areas exceed max safe water level.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 32
EVENT 9 & 10 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION I ADS VALVE FAILURES Required Operator Actions:
SRO Time Required Actions Notes Continue reactor cooldown per SCCP direction.
Direct Emergency Critical Task Perform Emergency Depressurization when RHR RM Depressurization when two plant areas FLOOD LEVEL HI-HI alarm exceed max safe water level.
(Two plant areas with radiation levels above Max Safe South CS and RHR)
Direct RO/BOP to open 7 ADS valves.
If informed by RO/BOP that 2 SRVs SRVs C and K fail to open failed to open, direct opening additional SRVs until 7 SRVs are open.
Enter PCCP when torus temperature exceeds 95°F.
Directs all available loops to be placed in suppression pool cooling.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 33
EVENT 9 & 10 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION I ADS VALVE FAILURES RO/BOP Time Required Actions Notes Continue reactor cool down as directed by SRO.
Recognize and report South CS and South RHR Room Flood Hi-Hi alarms.
Open seven ADS valves as Critical Task Perform Emergency directed by SRO. Depressurization when two plant areas exceed max safe water level.
Recognize failure of 2 ADS valves to SRVs C and K fail to open OPEN and report to SRO.
Open 2 additional SRVs as directed by SRO.
Maintain reactor water level as Should use condensate system via SULCV.
directed by SRO.
Place available loops in suppression See Enclosure 2 for SPC Hard Card actions.
Pool Cooling lAW hard card.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 34
Simulator Operator Activities:
WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RE CEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEA D
EXAMINER 2012 NRC Scenario#1 35 zzzz__z
ENCLOSURE I ATTACHMENT 6 Page 1 oT2 Feedwater Level Control Following a Reac tor Scram
[ NOTE This attachment is NOT to be used for routine system operation.
ENSURE the following:
- FW-V6 AND FW-V8 OR FW-V 1 18 AND FW-Vi 19 dosed a FW-FV-177 closed a FW-V120 closed
- EW control MODE SELECT in I ELEM
- SULCV in M (MANUAL) closed
2.. PLACE the MSTR RFPT SPIRX LVL CTL in M (MANUAL), THEN: E
- ADJUST to 187
- 3. IF any RFP is running, THEN:
- 4. IF no REP is running, THEN:
- b. ENSURE the following:
- REPT A(B) SP CIL in M (MANUAL) at lower limit
- RFPT A(E MAN/DECS control switch in MAN
- Reactor water level is less than ÷206 inches AND REPT A&B HIGH LEVEL TRIP reset
- c. DEPRESS RFPTA(B) RESET 20P-32 Rev. 184 Page 347 of 357 2012 NRC Scenarb#1 36 4
ENCLOSURE 1 ATTACHMENT 3 Page 2 of 2 Feeciwater Level COfltQI FOIIOW:iflg a Rea ctor Scram ci. ENSURE RFPT A(S) LP AND HP STOP VLV S open e, ROLL RFPT A(S) to 1000 rpm by depressin g RFP A(S)
START
- 5. ENSURE MANJDFCS control switch in OFCS
- 6. RAISE RFPT A(S) SP CTL speed until disch arge pressure is greater than or equal to 100 psig above reactor press ure
- 7. ADJUST SULCV to establish desired injection
- 8. IF desired, ThEN PLACE SULCV in A (AU TO) LI 9 IF needed, THEN THROTTLE FW-V120 LI 10, IF needed, THEN GOTO 20P-32 Section 817 for level contro LI 3
2 2/1204 5/1205 f 2OP32 Rev. 184 Page 348 or 357 2012 NRC Scenario #1 37
AA1TItIILjiALIJ ..
ENCLOSURE 2 ATTACHMENT 8A Page 1 aT I Emergency Suppression Pool Cooling Using Loop A(20P-17)
H NOTE: This attachment is NOT to be used for normal system operati ons.
OPEN SW-VIOl OPEN SW-V105 CLOSE SW-V143 LI OPEN SW-V102 START CSW PUMPS AS NEEDED LI CLOSE SW-V143 LI IF LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT THEN LI START PUMPS ON NSW HDR AS NEEDED LI PLACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS IF LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT THEN A & C LOCA OVERRIDE SWITCH LI PLACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS A & C LOCA TO MANUAL OVERRIDE OVERRIDE SWITCH TO MANUAL OVERRIDE START RHR SW PMP START RHR SW PMP LI ADJUST El 1-PD V-F068A ADJUST Eli-PD V-.F068A ESTABLISH CLG WTR TO VITAL HDR LI ESTABLISH CLG WTR TO VITAL HDR LI START ADDITIONAL RHR SW PUMP AND ADJUST FLOW AS NEEDED START ADDITIONAL RI-IR SW PUMP AND ADJUST FLOW AS NEEDED LI START RHR LOOP A iF LOCA SIGNAL iS PRESENT, THEN VERIFY SPRAY LOGIC IS MADE UP IF El1-FOI5A, IS OPEN. THEN CLOSE Ell-FOI7A LI START LOOP A RHR PMP OPEN El1-F028A THROTTLE El1-F024A LI THROTTLE El 1-F048A LI START ADDITIONAL LOOP A RHR PMP AND ADJUST FLOW AS NEEDED LI I
2/1061 S/i 062 20P-17 Rev. 162 Page 290 oT298 2012 NRC Scenario #1 38
z ENCLOSURE 2 ATTACHMENT 88 Page 1 of 1 Emergency Suppression Pool Cooling Using Loop B (20-i?)
[NOTE This attachment is NOT to be used for norm al system STARTRHRSWB!P9nNUC START RlIR SVL?. LOOP (CONV OPEN SW-Vl05 OPEN Sk4WIOI CLOSE SWWI4J C C OPEN SW-V102 START PMPS ON NSW HDR AS NEEDED C C CLOSE SW-V 143 IF LOGA SIGNAL IS PRESENT THEN C fl START CSW PUMPS AS NEEDED PL4CE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS C IF LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT THEN B & 0 LOGA OVERRIDE SWITCH C PLACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS B & D LOG A
TO MANUAL OVERRIDE OVERRIDE SWITCH TO MANUAL OVERRIDE START RHR SW PMP C START RI-fR SW PMP ADJUST Eli-RD V.10688 C C ADJUST El i-PD V-10688 ESTABLISH CLG WTR TO VITAL HDR C C ESTABLISH CLG WTR TO VITAL HDR START ADDITIONAL RHR SW PUMP C AND ADJUST FLOW AS NEEDED fl START ADDITIONAL RHR SW PUMP AND ADJUST FLOW AS NEEDED Li START RHR LOOP B IF LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT, THEN VERIFY SPRAY LOGIC IS MADE UP IF Eil-10158 IS OPEN, THEN CLOSE El 1-101 78 C START LOOP B RHR PMP C
OPEN Eli-10288 C
THROTTLE El 1-10248 C
THROTTLE Ei1-F0486 C
START ADDITIONAL LOOP B RHR PMP AND ADJUST FLOW AS NEEDED 1
I 21 1 063 Sf1064 2OP*.17 Rev. 162 Page 291 012981 2012 NRC Scenario #1 39 df
SHIFT BRIEFING Plant Status The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Cycle.
Equipment Out of Service IA NSW Pump APRM 2 INOP and bypassed Protected Equipment 1 B, 2A, and 2B NSW Pumps Plan of the Day Maintain current power.
Following shift turnover, place 2A SJAE in full load and remove 2B SJAE from service per the direction of 20P-30 Section 8.1. (An AO has been briefed and is standing by in the field with a copy of the procedure)
The 2B SJAE is being removed from service for periodic main tenance and will be unavailable for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
2012 NRC Scenario #1 40