ML080350426
| ML080350426 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2008 |
| From: | Randy Musser Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Waldrep B Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-005 | |
| Download: ML080350426 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000324/2007005
Text
January 29, 2008
Carolina Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. Benjamin Waldrep
Vice President
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461
SUBJECT: BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT NOS. 05000324/2007005 AND 05000325/2007005
Dear Mr. Waldrep:
On December 31, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Brunswick Units 1 and 2 facilities. The enclosed integrated inspection report
documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 22, 2008, with you and
other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Randall A. Musser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000325, 324/2007005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: (See page 2)
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA By e-mail/ /RA by e-mail/ /RA/
NAME R Musser J Austin S Rutledge G Wilson
DATE 1/29/08 1/30/08 1/30/08 1/29/08
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
CP&L 2
cc w/encl:
Director, Site Operations John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
Carolina Power & Light Company 2300 N. Street, NW
Electronic Mail Distribution Washington, DC 20037-1128
J. Paul Fulford, Manager Beverly Hall, Chief, Radiation
Performance Evaluation and Protection Section
Regulatory Affairs PEB 5 N. C. Department of Environment
Carolina Power & Light Company and Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
Terry D. Hobbs, Plant General Manager Peggy Force
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Assistant Attorney General
Carolina Power & Light Company State of North Carolina
P. O. Box 10429 Electronic Mail Distribution
Southport, NC 28461
Chairman of the North Carolina
Donald L. Griffith Utilities Commission
Manager - Training c/o Sam Watson, Staff Attorney
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Randy C. Ivey Public Staff NCUC
Manager - Support Services 4326 Mail Service Center
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Raleigh, NC 27699-4326
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Electric Mail Distribution Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
Garry D. Miller, Manager P. O. Box 11649
License Renewal Columbia, SC 29211
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution David R. Sandifer
Brunswick County Board of
Annette H. Pope, Supervisor Commissioners
Licensing/Regulatory Programs P. O. Box 249
Carolina Power and Light Company Bolivia, NC 28422
Electronic Mail Distribution
Warren Lee
David T. Conley Emergency Management Director
Associate General Counsel - Legal Dept. New Hanover County Department of
Progress Energy Service Company, LLC Emergency Management
Electronic Mail Distribution 230 Government Center Drive
Suite 115
James Ross Wilmington, NC 28403
Nuclear Energy Institute
Electronic Mail Distribution
CP&L 3
Report to Ben Waldrep from Randall A. Musser dated January 29, 2008
SUBJECT: BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT NOS. 05000324/2007005 AND 05000325/2007005
Distribution w/encl:
S. Bailey, NRR
R. Pascarelli, NRR
C. Evans, RII
L. Slack, RII
RIDSNRRDIRS
OE Mail
PUBLIC
NRC Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
8470 River Road, SE
Southport, NC 28461
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-325, 50-324
Report Nos: 05000325/2007005 and 05000324/2007005
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light (CP&L)
Facility: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location: 8470 River Road SE
Southport, NC 28461
Dates: October 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007
Inspectors: J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Rutledge, Resident Inspector
Approved by: Randall A. Musser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000325/2007005, 05000324/2007005; 10/01/07- 12/31/07; Brunswick Steam
Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and one senior
reactor inspector. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance
of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection
Manual Chapter (IAC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRC's
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December
2006.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
NONE
B. Licensee-Identified Findings
NONE
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1
Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at full power. On October 6, power was
reduced to 93 percent to perform a control rod improvement. The unit was restored to
full power the same day. On October 13, power was reduced to 93 percent to perform a
control rod improvement. The unit was returned to full power the same day. On
October 20, power was reduced to 93 percent to perform a control rod improvement.
Full power was restored the same day. On October 27, power was reduced to 93
percent to perform a control rod improvement. Full power was achieved later that day.
On November 3, power was reduced to 67 percent to facilitate valve testing. The unit
was returned to full power later that day. On November 4, power was reduced to 95
percent to perform a control rod improvement. Full power was restored on November 5.
On November 11, power was reduced to 90 percent to perform a control rod
improvement. Full power was achieved later that day. On November 16, power was
reduced to 91 percent to perform a control rod improvement. The unit was returned to
full power November 17. On November 24, power was reduced to 90 percent for control
rod testing. Full power was restored later that day. The unit remained at full power for
the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at full power. On October 1, a power
ascension occurred from main turbine valve testing. Full power was restored later that
day. On October 1, power was reduced to 95 percent to perform a control rod
improvement. Full power was restored later that day. On October 1, power was
reduced to 96 percent to perform a control rod improvement. The unit was returned to
full power later that day. On October 2, power was reduced to 98 percent to perform a
control rod improvement. Full power was restored later that day. On November 8,
power was reduced to 71 percent for a Whiteville line outage. Power was returned to
full later that day. On November 9, power was reduced to 98 percent for a control rod
improvement. Full power was restored later that day. On November 17, power was
reduced to 68 percent for main turbine valve, reactor feed pump and scram time testing.
The unit was returned to full power on November 18. On November 18, power was
reduced to 94 percent for xenon build-up following main turbine valve testing and control
rod sequence exchange. Full power was returned on November 19. On November 19,
power was reduced to 85 percent to perform a control rod improvement. Full power was
restored November 20. On November 20, power was reduced to 95 percent to perform
a control rod improvement. Full power was achieved November 21, 2007. The unit
remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Enclosure
3
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees cold weather protection
program as it related to ensuring that the facilitys service water pumps, emergency
diesel generators, and condensate storage tank low level switches would remain
functional and available in cold weather conditions. In addition to reviewing the
licensees program-related documents and procedures, walkdowns were conducted of
the freeze protection equipment (e.g., heat tracing, area space heaters, etc.) associated
with the above systems/components. Licensee problem identification and resolution
associated with cold weather protections was also assessed.
- AR 246713, Unit 2 condensate storage tank heat trace inoperable
- AR 253047, Emergency diesel generator #1 jacket water heater temperature
switch
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed three partial walkdowns of the below-listed systems to verify
that the systems were correctly aligned while the redundant train or system was
inoperable or out-of-service (OOS) or, for single train risk significant systems, while the
system was available in a standby condition. The inspectors assessed conditions such
as equipment alignment (i.e., valve positions, damper positions, and breaker alignment)
and system operational readiness (i.e., control power and permissive status) that could
affect operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified and resolved
equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact mitigating
system availability. The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure
ADM-NGGC-0106, Configuration Management Program Implementation, to verify that
available structures, systems or components (SSCs) met the requirements of the
configuration control program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 2A Nuclear service water pump when the 2B nuclear service water pump was
OOS for scheduled maintenance on October 3, 2007
Enclosure
4
November 19, 2007
To assess the licensees ability to identify and correct problems, the inspectors reviewed
the following Action Requests (ARs):
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 2
high pressure coolant injection system. The inspector reviewed the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report, associated attachments of Operating Procedure 2OP-19, High
Pressure Coolant Injection System Operating Procedure, 0PT-09.2, HPCI System
Operability Test and the systems diagrams (drawing numbers D-02523 and LL-09272)
in determining correct system lineup. The inspectors also reviewed maintenance history
of the system.
To assess the licensees identification and resolutions of problems, the inspectors
reviewed the following:
- AR 250203, HPCI inoperable due to pump seal leakage
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
5
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Fire Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed ARs and work orders (WOs) associated with the fire
suppression system to confirm that their disposition was in accordance with Procedure
0AP-033, Fire Protection Program Manual. The inspectors reviewed the status of
ongoing surveillance activities to verify that they were current to support the operability
of the fire protection system. In addition, the inspectors observed the fire suppression
and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed
which would impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors toured the
following six areas important to reactor safety and reviewed the associated prefire plans
to verify that the requirements for fire protection design features, fire area boundaries,
and combustible loading were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Units 1 and 2 Control Building, - 49' elevation (2 areas)
- Units 1 and 2 Control Building, - 23' elevation (2 areas)
- Units 1 and 2 Reactor Building - 17' elevation (2 areas)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On October 6, 2007, the inspectors observed a plant fire drill at the auxiliary boiler unit
located outside near the Emergency Diesel Generator Building, to assess the fire
brigade performance and to verify that proper firefighting techniques for the type of fire
encountered were utilized. The inspectors monitored the fire brigades use of protective
equipment and firefighting equipment to verify that preplanned firefighting procedures
and appropriate firefighting techniques were used, and to verify that the directions of the
fire brigade leader were thorough, clear, and effective. The inspectors attended the
critique to confirm that appropriate feedback on performance was provided to brigade
members and to ensure that areas for improvement were properly identified for licensee
follow-up. In preparing for the drill, the inspectors reviewed the preplanned drill
scenario, Brunswick Nuclear Plant Drill Scenario Guide, 99-F-0S, Revision 1.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
6
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees internal flooding analysis as described in
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 3.4.2, Protection From Internal
Flooding. Due to the risk significance of equipment in the Service Water and
Emergency Diesel Generator Buildings, the inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 3.4.2
analysis of the effects of postulated piping failures for these two areas to determine if
the analysis assumptions and conclusions were based on the current plant
configuration. The internal flooding design features and equipment for coping with
internal flooding was inspected for the equipment located in these buildings. The
walkdown included sources of flooding and drainage, sump pumps, level switches,
watertight doors, curbs, pedestals and equipment mounting. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees external flooding analysis as described in
UFSAR Section 3.4.1, Protection from External Flooding, to determine the external flood
control design features. Walkdowns were conducted to inspect the external flood
protection barriers including watertight doors, curbs, sealing of external building
penetrations below flood line, and the sump pumps and level alarm circuits. Areas
reviewed included the Emergency Diesel Generator Building, and the Service Water
Building. The inspector reviewed the procedures for coping with external flooding
contained in Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 0AOP-13.0, Operation During
Hurricane, Flood Conditions, Tornado, or Earthquake. Other documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
7
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
.1 Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance and reviewed the associated
training documents during annual dynamic simulator examination sessions for training
cycle 2007-05. The simulator observations and review included evaluations of
emergency operating procedure and abnormal operating procedure utilization. The
inspectors reviewed Procedure 0TPP-200, Licensed Operator Continuing Training
Program, to verify that the program ensures safe power plant operation. Simulator
sessions were observed on November 20, 2007. The scenarios tested the operators
ability to respond to secondary plant failures, loss of emergency power, and an
automatic trip without a scram followed by a rupture of the scram discharge volume.
The inspectors reviewed operator activities to verify consistent clarity and formality of
communication, conservative decision-making by the crew, appropriate use of
procedures, and proper alarm response. Group dynamics and supervisory oversight,
including the ability to properly identify and implement appropriate Technical
Specification (TS) actions, regulatory reports, and notifications, were observed. The
inspectors observed instructor critiques and preliminary grading of the operating crews
and assessed whether appropriate feedback was planned to be provided to the licensed
operators.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
For the two equipment issues described in the ARs listed below, the inspectors reviewed
the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to
the characterization of failures, the appropriateness of the associated Maintenance Rule
a(1) or a(2) classification, and the appropriateness of the associated a(1) goals and
corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the work controls and work practices
associated with the degraded performance or condition to verify that they were
appropriate and did not contribute to the issue. The inspectors also reviewed operations
logs and licensee event reports to verify unavailability times of components and
systems, if applicable. Licensee performance was evaluated against the requirements
of Procedure ADM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance Rule Program.
- AR 242066, BNP response to operating experience 2007-08 degradation of
buried piping
- AR 256103, Loss of full out indications on the full core display
Enclosure
8
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)
requirements during scheduled and emergent maintenance activities, using Procedure
0AP-025, BNP Integrated Scheduling and Technical Requirements Manual 5.5.13,
Configuration Risk Management Program. The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of
risk assessments performed due to changes in plant configuration for maintenance
activities (planned and emergent). The review was conducted to verify that, upon
unforseen situations, the licensee had taken the necessary steps to plan and control the
resultant emergent work activities. The inspectors reviewed the applicable plant risk
profiles, work week schedules, and maintenance WOs for the following five conditions:
- AR 250203, HPCI inoperable due to pump seal leakage
- AR 255545, Unexpected annunciators during performance test (PT-12.2a) for
EDG #1
- AR 257721, Unit 1 condensate storage tank instrumental vent line excessive
sloping
- AR 256079, 1-E11-F017B inoperable due to high energy line break issues at the
motor control cubicle compartment
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations associated with the six issues
documented in the ARs listed below, which affected risk significant systems or
components, to assess, as appropriate: 1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; 2)
the justification of continued system operability; 3) any existing degraded conditions
used as compensatory measures; 4) the adequacy of any compensatory measures in
place, including their intended use and control; and 5) where continued operability was
considered unjustified, the impact on any TS limiting condition for operation and the risk
significance. In addition to the reviews, discussions were conducted with the applicable
system engineer regarding the ability of the system to perform its intended safety
function.
Enclosure
9
- AR 249130, 1A Residual heat removal heat exchanger degradation during
testing (OPF08.1.4A)
- AR 245864, E-4 Loss of coolant accident logic relay 27E2 de-energized
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five maintenance activities listed below, the inspectors reviewed the post-
maintenance test procedure and witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to
confirm that the scope of testing adequately verified that the work performed was
correctly completed. The inspectors verified that the test demonstrated that the affected
equipment was capable of performing its intended function and was operable in
accordance with TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions
against the requirements in Procedure 0PLP-20, Post Maintenance Testing Program.
- WO 1137349 Inspection of HPCI sump after drain down
- AR 250499, Basis for changing piping test plan not understood
- AR 247456, Balance of plant under-voltage relays not tested as required
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
.1 Routine Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed surveillance tests or reviewed test data for the three risk
significant SSC surveillances, listed below, to verify the tests met TS surveillance
requirements, UFSAR commitments, in-service testing (IST) requirements, and licensee
procedural requirements. The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the tests in
demonstrating that the SSCs were operationally capable of performing their intended
safety functions.
Enclosure
10
- 0PT-09.2mst-HPCI 23Q, High Pressure Coolant Injection System operability test,
performed on Unit 2 on October 22, 2007
- 2O1-03.2, Control Operator Daily Surveillance Report (including drywell leakage
rate determination), performed the week of November 12, 2007.
C 0PT-9.3a, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Component Test, performed
on Unit 1 on December 7, 2007.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 In-service Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the performance of Periodic Test 0PT-9.7, High Pressure
Coolant Injection System Valve Operability Test, performed on Unit 1 on December 7,
2007. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI testing program to determine equipment
availability and reliability. The inspectors evaluated selected portions of the following
areas: 1) testing procedures; 2) acceptance criteria; 3) testing methods; 4) compliance
with the licensees IST program, TS, selected licensee commitments, and code
requirements; 5) range and accuracy of test instruments; and 6) required corrective
actions. The inspectors also assessed any applicable corrective actions taken.
To assess the licensees ability to identify and correct problems, the inspector reviewed
AR 214876 which documented that the Unit 1 A conventional service water pump was
discovered to be in the Alert range following testing on November 30, 2006.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed site emergency preparedness training drill/simulator scenarios
conducted on October 30, 2007 and November 8, 2007. The inspectors reviewed the
drill scenario narrative to identify the timing and location of classifications, notifications,
and protective action recommendations development activities. The inspectors
evaluated the drill conduct from the control room simulator, technical support center,
and the emergency operations facility. During the drill, the inspectors assessed the
adequacy of event classification and notification activities. The inspectors observed
portions of the licensees post-drill critiques at the technical support center and
emergency operating facility.
Enclosure
11
The inspectors verified that the licensee properly evaluated the drills performance with
respect to performance indicators and assessed drill performance with respect to drill
objectives. To assess the ability of the licensee to identify and correct problems, the
inspectors reviewed the following corrective action documents that were generated as a
result of the drill:
- AR 252936, knowledge gap in the required actions associated with the Reactor
Building positive pressure as defined in AST documentation
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Operating Manual 0PLP-22, Temporary Changes, to assess
the implementation of Engineering Change (EC) 67830, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
System Low Suction Pressure Trip Delay which was implemented on October 21, 2007.
The inspectors reviewed the EC to verify that the modification did not affect the
functional capability of the EDG, that the modification was properly installed, and
appropriate post-installation testing was performed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee data for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below.
To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during the period reviewed, PI definitions
and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev.
5 were used to verify the basis for each data element.
Reactor Safety Cornerstone
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Units 1 and 2 PIs listed below for the
period January 2007 through November 2007.
Enclosure
12
A sample of plant records and data was reviewed and compared to the reported data to
verify the accuracy of the PIs. The licensees corrective action program records were
also reviewed to determine if any problems with the collection of PI data had occurred.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of ARs
To aid in the identification of repetitive equipment failures or specific human
performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed frequent screenings of items
entered into the licensees CAP. The review was accomplished by reviewing daily ARs.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth annual sample review of plant operator
workarounds as documented in licensees operator workaround program and corrective
action documents. This review was performed to verify that the licensee identified
operator workarounds at an appropriate threshold, entered the issues into the CAP, and
planned or implemented appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the
actions taken to verify that the licensee had adequately addressed the following
attributes:
- Complete, accurate, and timely identification of the problem
- Evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- Consideration of previous failures, extent of condition, generic or common cause
implications
- Prioritization and resolution of the issue commensurate with the safety
significance
- Identification of the root cause and contributing causes of the problem
- Identification and implementation of corrective actions commensurate with the
safety significance of the issue
The inspectors reviewed the associated corrective action for AR 250203, Unit 2 high
pressure coolant injection pump seal failure that occurred on October 10, 2007.
Enclosure
13
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to
identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The
review was focused on repetitive equipment issues but also considered the results of
frequent inspector CAP item screening (discussed above), licensee trending efforts, and
licensee human performance results. The review considered the period of July through
December 2007. The review further included issues documented outside the normal
CAP in major equipment lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, operational
focus list, control room deficiency list, outstanding work order list, quality assurance
audit/surveillance reports, key performance indicators, and self-assessment reports.
The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in
multiple root cause evaluations the licensee has performed over the last 2 quarters.
Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees
trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the reports
against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in Nuclear Generation
Group Standard Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR
50, Appendix B.
b. Assessment and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors noted a trend in the control
and retrieval of foreign material in systems and the adverse effects this has had on
system performance; this was exemplified by the following identified issues:
1) Foreign material found in the 1B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Room cooler
(AR243465); 2) Metallic foreign material found in the 1B RHR Heat Exchanger
(AR246790); 3) 1D RHRSW Booster pump failed to start was bound by valve pin (AR
243867); 4) Unit 2 HPCI main pump inboard seal failure due to blockage of seal cooling
line (AR250203). The inspectors have determined that the licensee has addressed all
immediate operability concerns, and is currently developing long-term improvements.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On January 24, 2008, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to
Mr. Waldrep and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary
information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
G. Atkinson, Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness
L. Beller, Superintendent Operations Training
A. Brittain, Manager - Security
D. Griffith, Manager - Training Manager
L. Grzeck, Lead Engineer - Technical Support
S. Howard, Manager - Operations
R. Ivey, Manager - Site Support Services
T. Pearson, Supervisor - Operations Training
A. Pope, Supervisor - Licensing/Regulatory Programs
S. Rogers, Manager - Maintenance
B. Waldrep, Site Vice President
T. Sherrill, Engineer - Technical Support
T. Trask, Manager - Engineering
J. Titrington, Manger - Nuclear Assessment Services
M. Turkal, Lead Engineer - Technical Support
M. Williams, Manager - Operations Support
E. Wills, Plant General Manager
NRC Personnel
Randall Musser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Division of Reactor Projects Region II
Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None
Discussed
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Plant Operating Manual (POM), Volume VII, Operating Instruction 0OI-01.03, Non-Routine
Activities
POM, Volume XII, Preventive Maintenance 0PM-HT001, Preventive Maintenance on Plant
Freeze Protection and Heat Tracing System
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
POM, Volume III, Operating Procedure 2OP-39, High Pressure Coolant Injection System
Operating Procedure
POM, Volume III, 0OP-39, Diesel Generator Operating Procedure
System Description SD-39, Emergency Diesel Generators
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
POM, Volume XIX, Prefire Plan 0PFP-DG, Diesel Generator Building Prefire Plans
POM, Volume XIX, Prefire Plan 0PFP-PBAA, Power Block Auxiliary Areas Prefire Plans
POM, Volume XIX, Prefire Plan 1PFP-RB, Unit 1 Reactor Building Prefire Plans
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
POM, Volume XXI, Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 0AOP-13.0, Operation During
Hurricane, Flood Conditions, Tornado, or Earthquake
POM, Volume X, Periodic Test (PT) 0PT-34.2.2.1, Fire Door, ASSD Access/Egress Door,
Severe Weather Door Inspections
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapters 2 and 3
Attachment