IR 05000498/2006009
| ML063200197 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/2006 |
| From: | Laura Smith Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Sheppard J South Texas |
| References | |
| IR-06-009 | |
| Download: ML063200197 (19) | |
Text
ber 16, 2006
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000498,499/2006009
Dear Mr. Sheppard:
On October 5, 2006, the U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed during the exit meeting on July 27, 2006, with Mr. Edward D. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight, and other members of your staff (held onsite), and a telephonic exit on October 5, 2006, with Mr. Scott Head, Manager, Licensing.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs. However, NRCs final assessment of the safety conscious work environment at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station is still under NRC review, pending final resolution of a petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.
STP Nuclear Operating Company -2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Linda J. Smith, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-498, 499 License: NPF-76, NPF-80
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000498; 499/2006009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION IV==
Docket.: 50-498, 499 License: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report No.: 05000498,499/2006009 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: July 10 through October 5, 2006 Team Leader: R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors: S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector, D. Livermore, Reactor Inspector, J. Taylor, Resident Inspector, Project Branch A Approved By: Linda Smith, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF ISSUES IR 05000498,499/2006009; STP Nuclear Operating Company; on 7/10-10/05/2006; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.
The inspection was conducted by one senior reactor inspector, two reactor inspectors, and a resident inspector.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors reviewed approximately 253 condition reports, 23 work orders, associated root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to assess problem identification and resolution activities. Overall, the team identified that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and putting them into the corrective action program. The licensee's effectiveness at problem identification was evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be effective and highlighted a similar concern in the root cause area.
Operating experience usage was also found to be effective. Self assessment results adequately identified problems and proposed corrective actions to address these problems. On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, the team found that in general workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the corrective action program, raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervision, bring concerns to the employee concerns program, and bring concerns to the NRC. During interviews, licensee personnel generally expressed confidence that nuclear safety issues that were entered into the corrective action program would be appropriately addressed. However, NRCs final assessment of the safety conscious work environment at is still under NRC review, pending final resolution of 10 CFR 2.206 petition.
During interviews, licensee personnel expressed confidence that nuclear safety issues that were entered into the corrective action program would be appropriately addressed. The inspectors found that the licensee's employee concerns program appropriately identified and adequately addressed nuclear safety concerns. The team concluded that overall a positive safety-conscious work environment existed at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.
-2- Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS 4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors based the following conclusions, in part, on all issues that were identified in the assessment period, which ranged from January 4, 2005, (the last biennial problem identification and resolution inspection) to July 28, 2006. The issues are divided into two groups. The first group (current issues) included problems identified during the assessment period where at least one performance deficiency occurred during the assessment period. The second group (historical issues) included issues that were identified during the assessment period but all the performance deficiencies occurred outside the assessment period.
a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the inspectors selected and reviewed condition reports that had been issued between January 2005 to July 2006.
The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of selected systems and equipment, such as the essential cooling water system and essential chillers, to inspect for deficiencies that should have been entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors also observed control room operations and reviewed operator logs, plant tracking logs, and station work orders to ensure conditions adverse to quality were being entered into the corrective action program. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of self assessments, trending reports, system health reports, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.
The inspectors interviewed station personnel, attended condition review committee and corrective action review board meetings, and evaluated corrective action documentation to determine the licensees threshold for entering problems into their corrective action program.
The inspectors reviewed condition reports, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the licensees ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues identified.
-3- Enclosure
The inspectors performed a historical review of condition reports and notifications written over the last 5 years that addressed the essential cooling water system, essential chillers, steam generator and pressurizer power-operated relief valves, control room envelope integrity (tracer gas testing) and the residual heat removal system.
The inspectors reviewed plant records, primarily, condition reports and work orders to verify that corrective actions related to identified problems were developed and implemented, including corrective actions to address common cause or generic concerns. The inspectors sampled specific technical issues to evaluate the adequacy of the licensees operability determinations.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports that addressed past NRC-identified violations, for each affected cornerstone, to ensure that the corrective actions adequately addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other condition reports, work orders, or tracking programs to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.
(2) Assessments (a) Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification The inspectors determined that the licensee's problem identification aspect of the corrective action program appeared to be working appropriately. Although two examples (Examples 2 and 3) were noted, during the evaluation period, whereby, the licensee failed to identify conditions to be entered into the corrective action program, the inspectors determined that these were independent and isolated instances. The inspectors found that overall, problems were adequately identified and entered into the corrective action program as evidenced by the relatively few findings identified during the assessment period. The licensees threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program was appropriately low. The licensee's condition report tracking system's automatic process for identifying and flagging condition reports that appear to indicate a trend, was notable. Routine licensee review of condition reports also were effective in identifying trends. Closed condition reports that were sampled were closed after all corrective actions had been completed. Few examples were found where condition reports were closed to other condition reports.
Current Issues Example 1: The licensee missed several opportunities to identify component cooling water heat exchanger throttle valve degradation. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005005)
Example 2: The licensee missed several opportunities to identify the excess power condition. Check Valve CV-0739 was not seated correctly permitting reactor coolant to leak-by past the check valve. This leak-by represented approximately 0.4 megawatts thermal that was not being considered in the calculation of thermal power using the reactor thermal output instruments. Although the initial indications of the possibility of-4- Enclosure
an overpower condition were available on the control room panel for 31 days (indications of elevated excess letdown heat exchanger temperature while the excess letdown system was not in service). (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005003)
Example 3: The licensee identified an adverse trend in personnel contamination events in clean areas. This adverse trend was reversed through implementation of improved engineering controls, enhanced training and additional housekeeping hours. The number of clean area personnel contamination events has declined at the site during each of the last five refueling outages. The team determined that this was an improvement in the identification and control of contamination events.
Example 4: The licensee identified an adverse trend in the writing/posting of equipment clearance orders. Enhanced operator training, control of clearance models, creation of permanent clearance writer positions and the creation of procedures for some system restoration steps, are a number of corrective actions currently being implemented to reverse the negative trend. Equipment clearance order program effectiveness is tracked daily, but the effectiveness of corrective actions will not be known until after the next refueling outage because of the amount of data obtained from the numerous system tag outs involved during a refueling.
Historical Issues Example 1: The licensee failed to identify, evaluate, and promptly correct a degraded bearing condition and lubricating water flow problems on Essential Cooling Water Pump 1B. The degrading condition of Essential Cooling Water Pump 1B was not recognized, although there were several condition reports written for anomalous lube water flow alarms and indications; also, a decreasing trend of lube water flow had existed for over a month before action was taken to evaluate pump operability. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498; 499/2005002)
Example 2: The licensee failed to vent air from Essential Chiller 22C causing the chiller to be inoperable. The air was introduced during routine maintenance performed 10 days earlier. The system was idle during the period and required frequent draining of the expansion tank to clear high level alarms. The frequent alarms and draining of the system were not recognized as abnormal conditions for the state of the system. This resulted in voids in the system. When nitrogen was restored to the expansion tank, tank level went below available indication and makeup water was added to restore level to normal but voids were not removed. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005002)
(b) Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause analyses reviewed, that the licensee was generally self critical and exhaustive in its research into the history of significant conditions adverse to quality.
-5- Enclosure
Current Issue Example: Relief Valve PSV-3100 lifted during the performance of Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-RH-0009, on March 16, 2004, and again during performance of preventive maintenance Procedure PM IC-2-89001568 on May 2, 2005. Failure to evaluate extent of condition of inadequate letdown system procedures was a cause of the second lifted relief valve incident. (NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2005003-01)
(c) Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The effectiveness of identified corrective actions to address adverse conditions was generally adequate. The inspectors reviewed one example, identified by other NRC inspections, where the licensee failed to take prompt corrective actions to resolve long-standing issues and did not evaluate the potential impact of such a delay. Because of the lack of any other examples having been identified during the assessment period, the inspectors determined this to be an isolated instance and, thus, did not indicate an adverse trend.
Current Issue Example: Condition Report 03-18389 identified that the grade around Manhole B0XYABKEM52 had been raised. This allowed rainwater to enter the manhole as a catch basin for the area. At the time of the 2005 routine NRC maintenance rule inspection, no corrective actions had been taken. When questioned by the inspectors, licensee personnel lowered an instrument through a small opening in the manhole and discovered approximately 4 feet of water. (NRC Inspection Reports 05000498;499/2005004 and 05000498;499/2005005)
b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience. A number of operating experience notification documents (NRC bulletins, information notices, generic letters, Part 21s, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, etc.), that had been issued during the assessment period, were selected to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for relevance to the facility. The inspectors then examined whether the licensee had entered those items, that had been deemed relevant, into their corrective action program. Finally, the inspectors reviewed a number of significant conditions adverse to quality and conditions adverse to quality to verify if the licensee had appropriately evaluated for industry operating experience.
(2) Assessment Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee had appropriately evaluated existing industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, and had entered identified-6- Enclosure
items in the corrective action program. The inspectors found that the licensee had appropriately evaluated for industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations of significant conditions adverse to quality and conditions adverse to quality. No problems were noted.
c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a number of licensee self and independent assessments and audits. These included the licensee's quality independent oversight reports; quality audit reports; executive oversight board exit meeting minutes; corrective action program self assessment; quality department self-assessment; work control self-assessment:
work package quality; work control self-assessment: operational challenges; reactor coolant system leakage and primary system integrity self-assessment; and technical training corrective action effectiveness self-assessment.
(2) Assessment In general, the licensee's self-assessments and audits were consistent with the data collected. Identified issues were appropriately addressed through the licensee's corrective action program. Licensee's proposed corrective actions appeared to be appropriate to resolve identified issues.
d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors interviewed 67 individuals from different departments representing a cross section of functional organizations and supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel.
This group included 40 security personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscious work environment.
While onsite, the inspectors reviewed the results of the "Site Wide Culture Assessment,"
performed by Management Insight Technologies in May 2005 to determine if any potential on-going concerns with the safety conscious work environment had been identified at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.
(2) Assessment Based on interviews, the inspectors concluded that a safety conscious work environment existed at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. In general, interviewed employees felt free to enter issues into the corrective action program, as well as raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns program, and the NRC. During interviews, licensee personnel generally expressed confidence that nuclear safety issues that were entered into the corrective action program would be appropriately addressed. However, NRCs final assessment of the safety conscious work environment at the South Texas Project is still under NRC review,
-7- Enclosure
pending final resolution of a 10 CFR 2.206 petition that was received on May 16, 2006.
That petitioned requested the NRC to seek enforcement action in the form of a Demand for Information that would require STP Nuclear Operating Company to provide the NRC with information associated with the safety conscious work environment at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.:
The 10 CFR 2.206 petition review request was granted because it met the NRC criteria outlined in NRCs Management Directive 8.11. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Division of Operating Reactor Licensing is reviewing the petition. The results of this review are not final.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 0500498/2003003-01: Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Indications On April 12, 2003, boric acid residue was discovered on two bottom mounted instrumentation nozzles of the Unit 1 reactor vessel. The details of this event and the NRC's subsequent dispositioning of the findings were documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000498;499/2003008. The inspectors reviewed the supplement to this licensee event report (0500498/2003003-01) and did not identify any new findings. This supplemental licensee event report is closed.
4OA6 Exit Meeting On July 27, 2006, the inspectors conducted an exit meeting with Mr. Edward D. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight, and other members of his staff.
On October 5, 2006, the inspectors conducted a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. Scott Head, Manager, Licensing, to discuss the inspection results following interviews with security personnel regarding safety conscious work environment in the security department.
Attachment: Supplemental Information-8- Enclosure
Supplemental Information Partial List of Persons Contacted Licensee E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight D. Cobb, Manager, Employee Concerns Program J. Winters, Manager, System Engineering S. Head, Manager, Licensing T. Frawley, Manager, Performance Improvement R. Aguilera, Supervisor, Radiation Protection D. Swett, Supervisor, Radiation Protection M. Ruvalcaba, Supervisor, Engineering G. Gaytko, Performance Improvement R. Savage, Engineer Licensing Staff Specialist, Quality & Licensing S. Brown, Concerns Coordinator, Employee Concerns Program R. Harris, System Engineer Condition Report HVAC M. Chandler, System Engineer RHR R. McAnnally, System Engineer RHR M. Prinz, System Engineer 480 Vac L. Sterling, ECO Coordinator, Operations R. Barr, Operations J. Milliff, Operations B. Sotos, Design Engineering K. Taplett, Licensing Engineer, Licensing B. Mookhoek, Licensing Engineer, Licensing J.Heil, System Engineer - Reactor Coolant System D. Klockentage, System Engineer - Main Steam, Extraction Steam Systems LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 05000498/2003-03-01 LER Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Indications (Section 4OA3)
-1- Attachment
Documents Reviewed In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:
Procedures Administrative Procedures STP Reporting Manual, Revision 2, 05/2002 STI 31751003, RCA-0001, Root Cause Investigators Manual, Revision 8 STI 31883386, STP-411, Reporting of Safety Related or Quality Concerns, Revision 3 STI 31883453, STP-707, Corrective Action Program, Revision 1 STI 31905869, 0PGP04-ZA-0002, Condition Report Engineering Evaluation, Revision 6 STI 31917489, 0PGP03-ZX-002, Condition Reporting Process, Revision 30 STI 31968537, CAP-0001, Condition Report Classification Guideline, Revision 1 STI 31970309, 0PGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program, Revision 31 STI 31987403, ACE-0001, Apparent Cause Evaluators Manual, Revision 1 STI 31997614, Radiation Protection Condition Reporting Guideline, Revision 7 STI 32002338, 0PGP03-ZA-0504, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 11 Maintenance Procedures PM 03000250, Replace NTD Cards, Revision 1, 08/09/2002 WCG-0001, Work Screening and Processing WCG-0002, Work Management Scheduling WCG-0008, Preventing Recurring Equipment Problems Surveillance Procedures 0PSP11-ZH-0010, EAB and FHB Adsorbent Test, Revision 16, 01/31/2005 0PEP05-ZH-0013, HVAC Test and Balance Procedure, Revision 4, 08/16/2004 Operations Procedures 0PGP03-ZO-ECO1, Equipment Clearance Order Program, Revision 16 0PGP03-ZO-ECO1A, Equipment Clearance Order Instructions, Revision 4 Engineering Documents System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Essential Chillers, 04/07/2006 System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Essential Cooling Water, 04/06/2006 System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Reactor Coolant, 03/31/2006 System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Residual Heat Removal, 03/31/2006 System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, EAB HVAC, 04/06/2006 System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Reactor Coolant System System Health Report - First Quarter 2006, Main Steam/Extraction Steam Systems-2- Attachment
Work Orders 101429 236293 278154 298381 427265 206399 262961 286429 307438 433789 228252 263754 292700 307275 445840 230326 267135 293162 310464 458200 230327 277281 293581 Condition Reports 01-11436 03-15587 04-3451 04-12764 05-5740 05-14758 01-14371 03-15720 04-3682 04-13075 05-6547 05-15107 01-14382 03-15972 04-3773 04-13218 05-6891 05-15134 01-16170 03-16392 04-5246 04-13393 05-6936 05-15596 01-19641 03-16610 04-5249 04-13454 05-7139 05-15598 01-19661 03-16892 04-5264 04-13522 05-7162 05-15950 02-1525 03-17283 04-5286 04-13802 05-7187 05-15959 02-2175 03-18103 04-5304 04-13862 05-7198 05-16152 02-2541 03-18545 04-5371 04-13875 05-7718 05-16333 02-2834 03-18867 04-5454 04-14075 05-7882 05-16528 02-4336 03-423 04-5557 04-14455 05-8124 05-16627 02-4562 03-2389 04-5645 04-14465 05-8247 06-122 02-6004 03-5239 04-5962 04-14652 05-8289 06-319 02-6062 03-5872 04-6236 04-14935 05-8716 06-1408 02-7267 03-12081 04-6255 04-15311 05-8941 06-1954 02-7850 03-12230 04-6742 04-15397 05-9131 06-2326 02-9291 03-12561 04-7098 04-15819 05-9491 06-2475 02-10160 03-13102 04-7202 04-16343 05-9575 06-2479 02-12302 03-14440 04-7669 04-16344 05-9635 06-3248 02-12550 03-14810 04-7685 05-229 05-9665 06-3408 02-17481 03-15058 04-8155 05-252 05-9961 06-3595 02-17546 03-15720 04-8283 05-467 05-9978 06-4091 02-17550 03-15972 04-9215 05-940 05-10555 06-4207 02-17825 03-16057 04-9599 05-1197 05-10567 06-4403 02-18840 03-16392 04-10012 05-1823 05-10665 06-4317 02-19092 03-16610 04-10188 05-1927 05-10747 06-4495 02-252 03-16892 04-10403 05-1929 05-11100 06-4528 02-3862 03-17283 04-10419 05-2079 05-11458 06-4695 03-963 03-18103 04-10584 05-2084 05-12000 06-4865 03-3694 03-18867 04-10883 05-2215 05-12089 06-5417 03-3749 04-945 04-11120 05-2442 05-12590 06-5543 03-3929 04-976 04-11127 05-3071 05-12875 06-5741 03-4704 04-1547 04-11136 05-3310 05-12944 06-6351 03-5783 04-1637 04-11274 05-3379 05-13010 06-8293 03-8990 04-1680 04-11323 05-3570 05-13449 06-8431 03-9745 04-2765 04-11428 05-4186 05-13584 06-8910 03-9749 04-3019 04-11518 05-4244 05-13732 06-8940 03-12143 04-3110 04-11654 05-4251 05-14310 06-8945 03-12392 04-3148 04-11733 05-5037 05-14373 06-8970 03-15021 04-3218 04-12381 05-5557 05-14506 06-9147 03-15431 04-3365 04-12719-3- Attachment
Licensee Event Reports (LER)
LER 2003-03-01 Vendor Manuals Crosby Instruction Manual, Operation & Maintenance Instructions For Solenoid Power Operated Relief Valve, Revision 4 Assessments and Audits STPNOC, Site Wide Culture Assessment - May 2005, by Management Insight Technologies STPNOC, Quality Program Implementation Self-Assessment Report (Conditon Report 03-15961)
STPNOC, Corrective Action Program Self-Assessment Report (Conditon Report 04-10188)
STPNOC, Work Control Self-Assessment Report (Conditon Report 04-10403)
STPNOC, Technical Training Program Focused Self-Assessment (Conditon Report 04-106)
STPNOC, Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Primary System Integrity Self-Assessment STP Quality Independent Oversight Report 05-01: August 2004 - February 2005 and 1RE12 STP Quality Independent Oversight Report 05-02: April 2005 - September 2005 and 2RE11 STP Quality Independent Oversight Report 06-01: November 2005 - March 2006 STP Executive Oversight Board Exit Meeting Minutes Root Cause and Apparent Cause Evaluations Conditon Report 03-1845 Root Cause Investigation Conditon Report 03-4704 Root Cause Investigation, Revision 1 Conditon Report 04-6255 Apparent Cause Evaluation Conditon Report 04-7202 Apparent Cause Evaluation Conditon Report 04-14935 Root Cause Investigation, Revision 3 Conditon Report 05-4244 Apparent Cause Evaluation Conditon Report 05-9635 Apparent Cause Evaluation, Revision 1 Conditon Report 05-10665 Apparent Cause Evaluation Conditon Report 05-15959 Root Cause Investigation Conditon Report 05-1819 Root Cause Investigation-4- Attachment
Information Request 1 - May 2006 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station PIR Inspection (IP 71152; Inspection Report 50-498/06-09; 50-499/06-09)
The inspection will cover the period of April 1, 2004 to April 30, 2006. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. To the extent possible, please provide the information in electronic media in the form of CDs. The agencys document software is Corel Wordperfect 10, Presentations, and Quattro Pro. However, we can also accept Microsoft suite files and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files.
Please provide the following information to the following address by May 26, 2006.
NRC / Region IV ATTN: Ray Azua 611 Ryan Plaza Dr., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4005 Note: On summary lists, please include a description of the problem, status, and initiating date.
1. Summary list of all condition reports related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period 2. Summary list of all condition reports related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period 3. Summary lists of all condition reports which were up-graded or down-graded during the period 4. A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or roll up one or more smaller issues for the period 5. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened or closed during the period.
6. List of all root cause analyses completed during the period 7. List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at the end of the period 8. List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program 9. List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during the period 10. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective actions completed during the period 11. All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments)
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12. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization 13. Governing procedures/policies/guidelines for:
a. Corrective action program/condition reports b. Apparent and root cause evaluation/determinations c. Employee concerns program 14. A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station during the period 15. Condition reports or other actions generated during the period for each of the items below:
a. Part 21 reports b. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters c. LERs issued by the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station d. NCVs and Violations issued to the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station 16. Security event logs and security incidents during the period 17. Radiation protection event logs during the period 18. Condition reports generated as a result of emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises during the period 19. Current system health reports or similar information during the period 20. Condition reports associated with maintenance preventable functional failures during the period 21. Condition reports associated with adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs during the period 22. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period 23. List of emergency plan exercise and drill deficiencies during the period 24. List of training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period-6- Attachment