ML032820550
| ML032820550 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/2003 |
| From: | Ogle C Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Keenan J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-03-008 | |
| Download: ML032820550 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000324/2003008
Text
October 9, 2003
Carolina Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. J. S. Keenan
Vice President
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461
SUBJECT: BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN
AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION - REPORT NOS.
05000325/2003008 and 05000324/2003008
Dear Mr. Keenan:
This refers to the safety system design and performance capability team inspection conducted
on August 11-15 and August 25-29, 2003, at the Brunswick facility. The enclosed inspection
report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 29, 2003, with
Mr. C. J. Gannon and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one finding of very low safety significance (Green) was
identified. This issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. This finding
has very low safety significance and has been entered into your corrective action program.
However, the NRC is withholding the treatment of this issue as a non-cited violation as provided
by Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy, pending our review of your corrective
actions related to restoration of compliance. If you contest this finding, you should provide a
response with the basis for your concern, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC
Resident Inspector at the Brunswick facility.
In accordance with 10CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
CP&L 2
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324
Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
C. J. Gannon, Director
Site Operations
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Carolina Power & Light
Electronic Mail Distribution
W. C. Noll
Plant Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Terry C. Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs CPB 7
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Edward T. ONeil, Manager
Support Services
Carolina Power & Light Company
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Licensing Supervisor
Carolina Power and Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
(cc w/encl contd - See page 3)
CP&L 3
(cc w/encl contd)
William D. Johnson
Vice President & Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power and Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128
Beverly Hall, Acting Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environment
and Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Peggy Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
c/o Sam Watson, Staff Attorney
Electronic Mail Distribution
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
4326 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-4326
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. O. Box 11649
Columbia, SC 29211
Donald E. Warren
Brunswick County Board of
Commissioners
P. O. Box 249
Bolivia, NC 28422
(cc w/encl contd - See page 4)
CP&L 4
(cc w/encl contd)
Dan E. Summers
Emergency Management Coordinator
New Hanover County Department of
Emergency Management
P. O. Box 1525
Wilmington, NC 28402
Distribution w/encl:
B. Mozafari, NRR
L. Slack, RII EICS
RIDSRIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP
SIGNATURE RA RA RA RA RA RA RA
NAME JMOORMAN NSTAPLES MMAYMI NMERRIWEATHE MTHOMAS RSCHIN PFREDRICKSON
DATE 10/7/2003 10/9/2003 10/9/2003 10/9/2003 10/8/2003 10/8/2003 10/9/2003
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML032820550.wpd
OFFICE RII:Enf
SIGNATURE RA
NAME S.SPARKS
DATE 10/9/2003
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO
PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML032820550.wpd
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324
Report Nos.: 05000325/2003008 and 05000324/2003008
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light
Facility: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location: 8470 River Road SE
Southport, NC 28461
Dates: August 11-15, 2003
August 25-29, 2003
Inspectors: J. Moorman, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)
N. Merriweather, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Schin, Senior Reactor Inspector (Week 1 only)
M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Maymí, Reactor Inspector (Week 2 only)
N. Staples, Reactor Inspector
Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000325/2003-008, 05000324/2003-008; 08/11-15/2003 and 08/25-29/2003; Brunswick
Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2; safety system design and performance capability.
This inspection was conducted by a team of inspectors from the Region II office. The team
identified 1 Green unresolved item. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color
(Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP).
Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after
NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3,
dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The team identified a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design
Control requirements. The Technical Specification (TS) allowable value for the
Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Level - Low function, for automatic high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI) pump suction transfer to the suppression pool, was not
adequately supported by design calculations. The calculations did not adequately
address the potential for air entrainment in the HPCI process flow due to vortexing. This
finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Action Request 102456.
This finding is unresolved pending further NRC review of the requirements for the CST
Level - Low function and of the corrective actions related to restoration of compliance
with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The finding is
greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating
systems cornerstone objective. It is of very low safety significance (Green) because the
finding is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of the HPCI function per GL 91-
18 (Rev. 1) and the likelihood of having a low level in the CST that would challenge the
CST level - low automatic HPCI suction transfer function is very low. In addition,
alternate core cooling methods would normally be available, including reactor core
isolation cooling (RCIC) as well as automatic depressurization system and low pressure
coolant injection. (Section 1R21.11. b)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)
This team inspection reviewed selected components and operator actions that would be
used to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a loss of direct current power event.
Components in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling
(RCIC), and 125/250 volt (v) direct current (dc) electrical systems were included. This
inspection also covered supporting equipment, equipment which provides power to
these components, and the associated instrumentation and controls. The loss of dc
power event is a risk-significant event as determined by the licensees probabilistic risk
assessment.
.1 System Needs
.11 Process Medium
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees installed configuration and calculations for water
volume in the condensate storage tank (CST) and for net positive suction head for the
HPCI pump. This included reviews of system drawings and walkdown inspection of
installed equipment to compare arrangements and dimensions to those used in the
calculations. The team also reviewed the licensees calculations supporting the
Technical Specification (TS) setpoint for the CST level instrumentation which initiates an
automatic transfer of the HPCI pump suction from the CST to the suppression pool.
This included checking the adequacy of the calculations and comparing calculated
values to values in the TS and in the instrument calibration procedures.
b. Findings
Introduction: An unresolved item of very low safety significance (Green) was identified
for inadequate design control of the HPCI suction source from the CST. The
calculations which determined the CST low level setpoint for automatic HPCI system
suction transfer from the CST to the suppression pool did not adequately account for air
entrainment in the process flow due to vortexing. This finding involved a violation of
NRC requirements. However, it is unresolved pending further NRC review of the
requirements for the CST Level - Low function and corrective actions related to
restoration of compliance.
Description: Vortexing in pump suction sources is a well known phenomenon. It is
discussed in typical textbooks on centrifugal pumps. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.82,
Sumps for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Spray Systems, dated June
1974, discussed the need to preventing vortexing. Regulatory Guide 1.82, Rev. 1,
dated November 1985, and Rev. 2, dated May 1996, included specific guidance on how
to prevent air ingestion due to vortexing in containment heat removal systems. That
2
guidance included limiting the Froude number (Fr) to less than 0.8 for BWR suppression
pool suctions [where Fr is equal to the inlet pipe velocity (U) in feet per second divided
by the square root of {the suction pipe centerline submergence below the water level (S)
in feet times gravity (g) in feet per second squared}]. NRC NUREG / CR-2772,
Hydraulic Performance of Pump Suction Inlet for Emergency Core Cooling Systems in
Boiling Water Reactors, dated June 1982, included experiments on suctions from tanks
and showed almost no air entrainment with a Fr of 0.8. The experiments also showed
that air entrainment increased dramatically when Fr reached 1.0. The BWR Owners
Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines included guidance on preventing vortexing in
emergency core cooling system pump suctions from the suppression pool. This
guidance included a vortex limit curve based on maintaining Fr less than 0.8.
All of the above references addressed suction pipes that extended into a tank/sump. A
more recent research paper published in 2001 by ASME titled Air Entrainment in a
Partially Filled Horizontal Pump Suction Line described tests on air entrainment. The
tests were conducted at various flowrates, in a horizontal suction pipe that did not
extend into the a tank; a configuration similar to the HPCI suction from the CST at
Brunswick. The papers conclusions about vortexing and air entrainment at high flow
rates were similar to those of the previous references where a suction pipe extended
into a tank.
Brunswick Units 1 and 2 TS Table 3.3.5.1-1 stated that the allowable value for the HPCI
system automatic suction transfer from the CST to the suppression pool was a low CST
level of $ 23 feet 4 inches above mean sea level. (NOTE: That value represented 3 feet
4 inches above the bottom of the CST.) Once initiated, the HPCI suction transfer
involved first opening the suppression pool suction valves (E41-F041 and F042) and then
closing the CST suction valve (E41-F004). The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) stated that for each units CST:
...the HPCI and RCIC pumps take suction through a 16-inch line
connected to the tank with a nozzle centerline 2 feet above the tank
bottom. Level instruments will initiate an automatic transfer of the pumps
suction path to the suppression pool suction if level approaches this
connection. For HPCI the setpoint is above the 3.3-foot TS limit and
below the 3.5-foot calibration maximum allowed value. To allow time for
the suction transfer to take place, this setpoint provides a margin of
approximately 10,000 gallons in the tank after the setpoint is reached and
before air will be entrained in the process flow.
The calculation of record that supported the TS allowable value was Calculation 0E41-
1001, High Pressure Coolant Injection System - Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low
Uncertainty and Scaling Calculation [E41-LSL-N002(3) Loops], Rev. 1, dated March
29, 1999. The team noted that Calculation 0E41-1001 stated that its objective was to
determine the allowable value and setpoint for the CST low water level trip function for
the HPCI system. However, the calculation did not include a hydraulic analysis to
determine the allowable value. Instead, it relied on a design basis input from
Engineering Service Request (ESR) 97-00026, Action Item 2, for the allowable value.
3
ESR 97-00026, Action Item 2, stated its objective: ... the analytical limit for the HPCI
and RCIC CST low level transfer function is 23 feet 4 inches. Provide a basis for this
analytical limit. The basis should address air voids ... It also stated: This ESR action
item will show that using the TS limit as the analytical limit is acceptable. The ESR
included Condition Report (CR) 97-02379 Task 2 (approved August, 27, 1997) as an
attachment. The team noted that the ESR relied entirely on CR 97-02379 Task 2 for
concluding that using the TS limit as the analytical limit was acceptable. However, the
ESR also stated: This CR review was not conducted as a design basis input with
formal testing and design verification.
CR 97-02379 Task 2 stated that its objective was to determine if a vortexing problem
existed in the CST when running the HPCI pump. Task 2 further stated that it was
responding to an operating experience event where a nuclear plant had identified that
they had failed to account for unusable volume in their CST due to vortexing concerns.
It described a scale model test that had been performed by another nuclear plant to
conclude that no vortexing would occur in their CST. However, the CR noted reasons
why this test could not be relied upon as a design input. The CR also contained results
from an informal test performed by the licensee. The CR concluded that, based on the
results of the informal testing and engineering judgement, air ingestion may briefly occur
during the transfer process; however, the air ingestion would be of such limited duration
and such a small percentage that there was no concern for damage to the HPCI pumps.
The team noted that the informal test used a small scale model without determination
that the results would be applicable to the installed CST and HPCI suction, the test was
performed without calibrated instruments, and the test was not independently verified.
The team considered that the informal test was not suitable for use as an input to a
design basis calculation.
Subsequently, action request (AR) 00005402 documented an engineering audit concern
with relying on ESR 97-00026 as a design basis input to a calculation. ESR 01-00322
was then written to respond to AR 00005402. ESR 01-00322 stated that its purpose
was to document the technical resolution of the CST intake vortex formation issue and
to insert appropriate references into design documents. ESR 01-00322 included an
extensive review of reference documents on vortexing. It included references to LERs
and INPO Event Reports on vortexing issues at other nuclear plants; NUREG/CR-2772;
and several research papers on vortexing. The team noted that ESR 01-00322 did not
reference NRC Regulatory Guide 1.82.
ESR 01-00322 agreed with the conclusions of CR 97-02379 and ESR 97-00026 that the
TS allowable value of 23 feet 4 inches was adequate. It concluded that the potential for
a significant air ingestion event was of sufficiently low probability to be considered non-
credible. The team noted that this conclusion was based primarily on the CR 97-02379
informal test and on a research paper by A. Daemi of the Water Research Center in
Tehran, Iran, that had been presented to the American Society of Civil Engineers in
1998. The research paper tested the effect of an intake pipe protruding various
distances into a reservoir and found that a pipe that did not protrude into the reservoir
showed some vortexing but no air entrainment while a pipe that did protrude into the
reservoir would have significant vortexing and air entrainment into the pipe. ESR 01-
00322 considered that, since the NUREG/CR-2272 tests used a configuration where the
4
suction pipe protruded into the tank and the licensees HPCI suction pipe did not
protrude into the CST, the NUREG/CR-2272 conclusions were not applicable to the
Brunswick design. The NRC team noted that the research paper by A. Daemi was
significantly flawed for applicability to Brunswick in that it did not state what flowrates
were used in its tests and apparently used gravity flow. Regulatory Guide 1.82 and
NUREG/CR-2272 indicate that flow velocity is one of the most important factors in
vortex formation. A suction pipe that would have little or no vortexing at low flow
velocities (e.g., gravity flow) could have significant vortexing at higher flow velocities
(e.g., a HPCI pump at 4300 gpm). The team considered that both sources of
information on which the conclusions of ESR 01-00322 were based were not suitable for
use as inputs to safety-related design calculation 0E41-1001.
The HPCI pump was designed to automatically start and establish a flowrate of
4300 gpm. Licensee procedures did not contain guidance to reduce that flowrate when
the CST level approached the low level switchover setpoint. Using the NUREG/CR-
2272 methodology, the team calculated that, at a HPCI pump flowrate of 4300 gpm, an
Fr of 0.8 would be reached at a CST level of 5.0 feet and an Fr of 1.0 would be reached
at a CST level of 3.9 feet. Considering the automatic suction transfer actuation setpoint
and the valve stroke times, the HPCI pump suction pipe could be exposed to a suction
Fr in excess of 0.8 (some air entrainment) for about 8.9 minutes and over 1.0 (over 2%
air entrainment) for about 5.0 minutes. Calculations that used the 2001 ASME research
paper equations provided different results: air entrainment in the process flow would
start at a tank level of 3.2 feet and would exceed 2% at tank levels below 3.0 feet. This
would represent a HPCI pump suction pipe exposure to some air entrainment in the
process flow for about 1.8 minutes and to over 2% air entrainment for about
1.1 minutes. The team concluded that the plant design was not consistent with the
UFSAR in that the TS allowable value for the HPCI automatic suction transfer would not
prevent air from becoming entrained in the HPCI process flow.
During this inspection, team and licensee measurements of the installed CST
configuration revealed non-conservative errors of about 1.5 inches in the actual heights
of the Units 1 and 2 CST level switches above the HPCI suction pipes. These would
result in additional non-conservative errors in the HPCI automatic suction transfer
setpoints.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as AR 102456102456 This
AR included an operability determination and planned corrective actions that were
reviewed by the team. The operability determination concluded that the CST Level -
Low instrument was operable with the existing TS allowable value and related setpoint
and no compensatory measures were needed. This conclusion was based on the
following: 1) HPCI operation during design or licensing basis events would not
challenge the CST Level - Low instrument; and 2) Operator actions consistent with
plant procedures would not result in 4300 gpm HPCI flow for the full duration of the
suction transfer. The operability determination did not include an analysis which
assured that the instruments allowable value was adequate to prevent significant air
entrainment during the full duration of a CST Level - Low setpoint initiated suction
transfer while the HPCI pump was operating at its maximum flowrate of 4300 gpm.
However, the teams interpretation of licensing basis documents indicated that the CST
5
Level - Low function was required to be able to protect the HPCI pump from damage
from any suction hazard that could occur. This included air entrainment in the process
flow due to vortexing that would result if the CST level became low while the HPCI pump
was operating at about 4300 gpm, even if this could only occur outside of a design basis
event.
The licensees corrective actions for this issue were in AR 102456102456 This AR included
only two planned corrective actions. The first corrective action was: Issue a UFSAR
change package to correct the description of HPCI air entrainment potential during
suction swap. This was described in more detail in the AR under Section 3,
Inappropriate Acts, item 4: Error 4 was a simple text error by BNP engineering where
the concept was understood (no significant air at the pump) but was not translated into
specific detailed words. The second corrective action was: Issue an evaluation to
update the HPCI CST level switch design basis information to reflect the evaluation
provided in the operability review portion of this AR. The operability determination
portion of the AR concluded that the CST Level - Low automatic HPCI suction transfer
function would not be challenged during design basis events and consequently the TS
allowable value was adequate.
The documented corrective actions in AR 102456102456did not appear to be sufficiently
comprehensive to restore compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design
Control. The licensees planned corrective actions did not specifically include revising
the design calculation, 0E41-1001. In addition, they did not include assuring that the
CST Level - Low suction transfer function will protect the HPCI pump if it is operating at
its maximum flowrate during the transfer. The planned corrective actions identified in
the AR did not include obtaining a certification from the pump vendor that the pump can
withstand a certain amount of air in the process flow for a certain amount of time without
pump damage. [This was subsequently done by the licensee.] The planned corrective
actions identified in the AR also did not include submitting a license amendment request
to the NRC to revise the TS allowable value, remove the CST Level - Low function from
TS, or add an operator action to throttle HPCI pump flow at low CST levels so that the
existing setpoint will be able to protect the pump. This issue will remain unresolved
pending further NRC review of the design basis and operability requirements for the
CST Level - Low suction transfer function. Specifically, the NRC will review whether the
CST Level - Low function is required to be able to protect the HPCI pump from damage
only during design basis events; or if it is required to be able to protect the HPCI pump
from damage due to air entrainment if the level is the CST becomes low with the HPCI
pump operating at a flowrate of about 4300 gpm, even if this could only occur outside of
a design basis event.
Analysis: Design Calculation 0E41-1001, for the CST Level - Low setpoint and TS
allowable value was inadequate. The finding is greater than minor because it affects the
design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective. It is of very low
safety significance (Green) because the finding is a design deficiency that will not result
in loss of the HPCI function per GL 91-18 (Rev. 1) and the likelihood of having a low
level in the CST that would challenge the CST Level - Low automatic HPCI suction
transfer function is very low. In addition, alternate core cooling methods would normally
6
be available, including RCIC as well as automatic depressurization system and low
pressure coolant injection.
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires in part, that
design control measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality
standards are specified and included in design documents. Contrary to the above
requirements, the NRC identified during this inspection that, from 1999 to August 2003,
licensee Calculation 0E41-1001 and associated design documents did not adequately
consider air entrainment in the HPCI pump process flow due to vortexing in the CST for
the current TS value for the CST Level - Low setpoint for automatic transfer of the HPCI
pump suction from the CST to the suppression pool. This finding was entered into the
licensees corrective action program as Action Request 102456 and is unresolved
pending further NRC review of the requirements for the CST Level - Low function and of
the licensees corrective actions related to restoration of compliance with Criterion III of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This finding is identified as URI 05000325, 324/2003008-01,
Failure to Adequately Consider Vortexing in the Calculation for CST Level for Automatic
Transfer of the HPCI Pump Suction.
.12 Energy Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed appropriate test and design documents to verify that the
125/250 vdc power source for HPCI system valves and controls would be available and
adequate in accordance with design basis documents. Specifically, the team reviewed
the 125/250 vdc battery load study, 125 vdc battery charger sizing calculation, and
125/250 vdc system voltage drop study, and battery surveillance test results, to verify
that the dc batteries and chargers had adequate capacity for the loading conditions
which would be encountered during various operating scenarios. The team reviewed a
sample of HPCI motor operated valves (MOVs) to verify the adequacy of available motor
output torque, stroke times, thermal overload heater sizing, and valve performance at
reduced voltages. The team also reviewed portions of a voltage study to verify adequacy
of voltage for HPCI solenoid valves 1-E41-F025 and -F026 under worst case voltage
conditions. A list of related documents reviewed are included in the attachment.
The team reviewed design basis descriptions and drawings and walked down the HPCI
and RCIC systems to verify that a steam supply would be available for pump operation
during a loss of station dc power event. This included review of the steam supply drain
systems and review of a recent modification to the HPCI steam supply drain system.
The team reviewed the HPCI steam supply drain pot flow orifice inspections; the drain
pot level switch logic and calibration records, and the drain pot drain line isolation valves
modification to verify that the HPCI steam supply would be available if needed. The
team reviewed functional valve testing for the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum
breaker check valves to verify adequacy of acceptance criteria and to verify that vacuum
breaker functionality was being maintained.
7
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.13 Instrumentation and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed electrical elementary and logic diagrams depicting the HPCI pump
start and stop logic, permissives, and interlocks to ensure that they were consistent with
the system operational requirements described in the UFSAR. The team reviewed the
HPCI auto-actuation and isolation functional surveillance procedures and completed test
records to verify that the control system would be functional and provide desired control
during accident and event conditions in accordance with design. The team reviewed the
calibration test records for the CST low water level instrument channels to verify that the
instruments were calibrated in accordance with setpoint documents. The team also
reviewed the records demonstrating the calibration and functional testing of the HPCI
suppression pool high level instrument channels to determine the operability of the high
level interlock functions of HPCI.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.14 Operator Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The team assessed the plant and the operators response to a Unit 1 initiating event
involving a loss of station battery 1B-2. The team focused on the installed equipment
and operator actions that could initiate the event or would be used to mitigate the event.
The team reviewed portions of emergency operating procedures (EOPs), abnormal
operating procedures (AOPs), annunciator panel procedures (APPs), and operating
procedures (OPs) to verify that the operators could perform the necessary actions to
respond to a loss of dc power event. The team also observed simulation of a loss of dc
power event on the plant simulator and walked down portions of Procedure 0AOP-39,
Loss of DC Power. The simulator observations and procedure reviews focused on
plant response and on verifying that operators had adequate instrumentation and
procedures to respond to the event. The team reviewed operator training records
(lesson plans, completed job performance measures, etc.) to verify that operators had
received training related to a loss of dc power event.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
8
.15 Heat Removal
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed historical temperature data for the Unit 2 battery rooms to verify that
the minimum and maximum room temperatures were within the allowable temperature
limits specified for the batteries.
The team reviewed heat load and heat removal calculations for the HPCI and RCIC
rooms. The team also reviewed the calculated peak temperature and pressure
responses during high energy line break and loss of coolant accidents for these rooms.
The team reviewed service water temperature and flow requirement calculations for the
HPCI and RCIC rooms and fan coolers. These reviews were conducted to verify the
adequacy of design for the room coolers, and to verify that heat will be adequately
removed during a loss of dc power event.
The team also reviewed HPCI and RCIC room cooler thermostat calibrations, inspection
and cleaning records, and corrective maintenance history to verify room coolers were
properly maintained and would be available if called upon.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 System Condition and Capability
.21 Installed Configuration
a. Inspection Scope
The team visually inspected the 125/250 vdc batteries and battery chargers, dc
distribution panels, dc switchgear, and dc ground detection systems in both units to
verify that the dc system was in good material condition with no alarms or abnormal
conditions present and to verify that alignments were consistent with the actions needed
to mitigate a loss of dc power event. The batteries were inspected for signs of
degradation such as corrosion, cell discoloration, plate buckling, grid cracks, and
excessive plate growth.
The team walked down the HPCI and RCIC systems and the CST to verify that the
installed configuration was consistent with design basis information and would support
system function during a loss of dc power event.
The team walked down portions of the HPCI system to verify that it was aligned so that
it would be available for operators to mitigate a loss of dc power event. During this
walkdown, the team compared valve positions with those specified in the HPCI system
operating procedure lineup, and observed the material condition of the plant to verify
that it would be adequate to support operator actions to mitigate a loss of dc power
9
event. This also included reviewing completed surveillance tests which verified selected
breaker positions and alignments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.22 Design Calculations
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the thermal overload sizing calculations for a sample of Unit 1 HPCI
MOVs to verify adequacy of the installed overload relay heaters. The team also
reviewed calculations that assessed the stroke times and motor torque produced at
reduced voltage to verify that they would exceed or meet minimum specified
requirements. The valves and calculations reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The team reviewed design basis documents, probabilistic risk assessment system
notebooks, UFSAR, selected piping and instrumentation diagrams, selected TSs,
system reviews, ARs, and the corrective maintenance history for HPCI and RCIC
systems to assess the implementation and maintenance of the HPCI and RCIC design
basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.23 Testing and Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the 125/250 vdc battery surveillance test records, including
performance and service test results, to verify that the batteries were capable of
meeting design basis load requirements.
The team reviewed functional and valve operability testing (stroke times), and corrective
maintenance records for HPCI and RCIC selected valves, including the minimum flow
bypass valves, and steam admission valve. This review was conducted to verify the
availability of the selected valves, adequacy of surveillance testing acceptance criteria,
and monitoring of selected valves for degradation.
The team reviewed HPCI and RCIC system operability tests to verify the adequacy of
acceptance criteria, pump performance under accident conditions, and monitoring of
system components for degradation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
10
.3 Selected Components
.31 Component Degradation
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed in-service trending data for selected components, including the
HPCI and RCIC pumps, to verify that the components were continuing to perform within
the limits specified by the test.
The team reviewed the maintenance history of the 125/250 vdc batteries, 125 vdc
battery chargers, and selected 4160 v alternating current (ac) and 480 vac breakers to
assess the licensees actions to verify and maintain the safety function, reliability, and
availability of the components in the system. The team also reviewed the preventive
maintenance performed on selected 4160 vac and 480 vac breakers to verify that
preventive maintenance was being performed in accordance with maintenance
procedures and vendor recommendations. The specific work orders and other related
documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.32 Equipment/Environmental Qualification
a. Inspection Scope
The team conducted in-plant walkdowns to verify that the observable portion of selected
mechanical components and electrical connections to those components were suitable
for the environment expected under all conditions, including high energy line breaks.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.33 Equipment Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team conducted in-plant walkdowns to verify that there was no observable damage
to installations designed to protect selected components from potential effects of high
winds, flooding, and high or low outdoor temperatures.
The team walked down the HPCI and RCIC systems and the CST to verify that they
were adequately protected against external events and a high energy line break.
11
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.34 Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees dispositions of operating experience reports
applicable to the loss of dc power event to verify that applicable insights from those
reports had been applied to the appropriate components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed corrective maintenance work orders on batteries, battery chargers,
and ac breakers to evaluate failure trends. The team also reviewed Action Requests
involving battery problems, battery charger problems, and charger output breaker
problems to verify that appropriate corrective action had been taken to resolve the
problem. The specific Action Requests reviewed are listed in the attachment. The team
reviewed selected system health reports, maintenance records, surveillance test
records, calibration test records, and action requests to verify that design problems were
identified and entered into the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. Other Activities
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The lead inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. C. J. Gannon, and other
members of the licensee staff, at an exit meeting on August 29, 2003. The inspectors
confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during this
inspection.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
L. Beller, Supervisor, Licensing
E. Browne, Engineer, Probabilistic Safety Assessment
B. Cowan, Engineer
C. Elberfeld, Lead Engineer
P. Flados, HPCI System Engineer
N. Gannon, Director, Site Operations
M. Grantham, Design
C. Hester, Operations Support
D. Hinds, Manager, Engineering
G. Johnson, NAS Supervisor
W. Leonard, Engineer
T. Mascareno, Operations Support
J. Parchman, Shift Technical Advisor, Operations
C. Schacher, Engineer
B. Stackhouse, Systems
H. Wall, Manager, Maintenance
K. Ward, Technical Services
NRC (attended exit meeting)
E. DiPaolo, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Austin, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000325,324/2003008-01 URI Failure to Adequately Consider Vortexing in the
Calculation for CST Level for Automatic Transfer of
the HPCI Pump Suction (Section 1R21.11. b)
Attachment
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
0AI-115, 125/250 VDC System Ground Correction Guidelines, Rev. 6
0AOP-36.1, Loss of Any 4160V Buses or 480V E-Buses, Rev. 25
0AOP-39.0, Loss of DC Power, Rev. 16
0OI-01.02, Shift Routines and Operating Practices, Rev. 31
0OI-50, 125/250 VDC Electrical Load List, Rev. 25
0OP-50.1, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System Operating Procedure, Rev. 55
0PM-ACU500, Inspection and Cleaning of the RHR/Core Spray Room Aerofin Cooler Air Filters
and Coolers, Rev. 7
1APP-A-05, Annunciator Procedure for Panel A-05, Rev. 46
1APP-UA-23, Annunciator Procedure for Panel UA-23, Rev. 45
1EOP-01-RSP, Reactor Scram Procedure, Rev. 8
1OP-19, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operating Procedure, Rev. 58
1OP-50, Plant Electrical System Operating Procedure, Rev. 64
1OP-51, DC Electrical System Operating Procedure, Rev. 40
2APP-A-01, Annunciator Procedure for Panel A-01, Rev. 44
OPIC-TMR002, Calibration of Agastat 7020 Series Time Delay Off Relays, Rev. 18
OPM-BKR001, ITE 4KV-line Breaker and compartment checkout, Rev 27
OPM-BKR002A, ITE K-line Circuit Breakers, Rev 31
OPM-TRB518, HPCI & RCIC Steam Inlet Drain Pot Flow Orifices Inspection, Rev. 3
Drawings
1-FP-60085, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Unit 1, Rev. J
Contract No. 71-2162, Dwg. No. 1, General Plan for Condensate Storage Tanks by Brown &
Root, Inc; Rev. C
D-02523, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Unit 2, Sh. 1 & 2, Rev. 52 & 45
D-02529, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Unit 2, Sh. 1 & 2, Rev. 52 & 36
D-25023, Sheet 2, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Piping Diagram, Rev. 45
D-25023, Sheet 1, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Piping Diagram, Rev. 54
F-03044, Units 1 & 2 480 Volt System Key One Line Diagram, Rev. 18
LL-7044, Instrument Installation Details Units 1 & 2, Sh. 15, Rev. 10
Calculations
0E41-1001; High Pressure Coolant Injection System - Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low
Uncertainty and Scaling Calculation (E41-LSL-N002(3) Loops), Rev. 1, dated March 29, 1999
9527-8-E41-06-F; NPSH Requirements - HPCI and RCIC; dated March 26, 1987
BNP-E-6.033, AC/DC MOV Thermal Overload Sizing Calculations, Rev. 3
BNP-E-6.062, 125/250 Volt DC System Voltage Drop Study, Rev. 3
BNP-E-6.074, 125/250 Volt DC Battery Load Study, Rev. 2
BNP-E-6.079, 125 Volt DC Battery Charger Sizing Calculation, Revision
BNP-E-6.109, Unit 1 Stroke and Motor Torque Calculations for 250VDC Safety-Related MOVs,
Rev. 5
BNP-E-8.013, Motor Torque Analysis for AC MOVs, Rev. 4
3
BNP-EQ-4.001, Temperature Response in RHR and HPCI Rooms Following LOCA with
Reduced
BNP-MECH-E41-F002, Mechanical Analysis Report to Verify Minimum Torque Availability,
Rev. 3
BNP-MECH-RBER-001, Reactor Building Environmental Report, Rev. 0A
HVAC Flow Rates, Rev. 0
M-89-0021; HPCI/RCIC NPSH with Suction from the CST; Rev. 0, dated November 27, 1989
PCN-G0050A, RHR Room Cooler Allowable Service Water Inlet Temperature, Rev. 2
Design Basis Documents
DBD-19, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 11
DBD-51, DC Electrical System, Rev. 5
Engineering Service Requests
ESR 97-0026; Provide a Basis for the Analytical Limit for the HPCI and RCIC CST Low Level
Transfer Function; dated November 24, 1997
ESR 98-00067; HPCI/RCIC Reserve Capacity in CST; Rev. 1, dated February 17, 1998
ESR 99-00404; HPCI/RCIC Drain Pot Piping Boundary Changes; dated February 25, 2000
ESR 01-00322; Document the Technical Resolution of the CST Intake Vortex Formation Issue;
dated September 25, 2001
ESR 99-00405, HPCI Design Conversion To Fail Open for E-41-F028/29, Rev. 0
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UFSAR Section 5.4.6, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
UFSAR Section 6.3, Identification of Safety Related Systems - Emergency Core Cooling
Systems
UFSAR Section 7.1.1.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems
UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems
UFSAR Section 9.2.6, Condensate Storage Facilities
Improved Technical Specifications Section 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating
Section 3.5.3, RCIC System
Section 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating
Section 3.8.6, Battery Cell Parameters
Section 3.8.7, Electrical Distribution Systems - Operating
TS Bases Section 3.5; Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
System
List of Valves Inspected
1-E41-F001, HPCI Steam Supply Valve
1-E41-F006, HPCI Main Pump Discharge Valve
1-E41-F007, HPCI Main Pump Discharge Valve
1-E41-F008, HPCI Test Bypass to CST Valve
4
1-E41-F011, HPCI Redundant Shutoff to CST Valve
1-E41-F012, HPCI Test Line Miniflow Valve
1-E41-F041, HPCI Suppression Pool Suction Valve
1-E41-F042, HPCI Pump Suction Valve
Completed Maintenance and Tests
0PT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test, completed 06/27/03, 04/03/03, 01/10/03, 08/20/03,
05/29/03, 04/04/03
0PT-20.10, Testing of Valves E41-F076, E41-F077, E51-F063, E51-F064, completed 04/24/02,
03/08/02, 03/10/03, 04/22/02
0PT-10.11, RCIC System Operability Test, completed 06/06/03, 03/14/03, 12/20/02, 07/31/03,
05/08/03, 04/03/03
0PT-09.3, HPCI System - 165 Psig Flow Test, completed 04/20/03, 03/26/01, 03/29/02,
03/23/00
0PT-09.7, HPCI System Valve Operability Test, completed 07/25/03, 05/02/03, 02/07/03,
05/01/03, 04/01/03
0PT-10.1.8, RCIC System Valve Operability Test, completed 07/04/03, 04/10/03, 07/03/03,
04/09/030PT-10.1.3, RCIC System Operability Test - Flow Rates at 150 Psig, completed
03/18/00, 03/29/02, 03/23/01, 04/02/03
Completed Work Orders (WOs) and Work Requests (WRs)
WO 49443-01, HPCI Turbine Restricting Orifices Inspection, completed 03/13/01
WO 49442-01, RCIC Turbine Restricting Orifices Inspection, completed 03/15/01
WO 45798-01, HPCI Turbine Supply Steam Drain Pot Hi Level Switch Calibration (Unit 2),
completed 02/06/01
WO 192543-01, HPCI Steam Supply Valve 2-E41-F001 Repairs due to Leakage Past the Seat,
completed 03/31/03
WO 45817-01, HPCI Turbine Supply Steam Drain Pot Hi Level Switch Calibration (Unit 1),
completed 11/25/01
WO 46107-01, Calibration of RHR Room Cooler Thermostats, completed 11/09/00
WO 50172-01, Inspection & Cleaning of the RHR Room Cooler, completed 03/05/02
WO 50171-01, Inspection & Cleaning of the RHR Room Cooler, completed 03/05/02
WR AFQO 001, HPCI Turbine Supply Steam Drain Pot Hi Level Switch Calibration (Unit 2),
completed 06/07/96
WR AITI 001, HPCI Turbine Supply Steam Drain Pot Hi Level Switch Calibration (Unit 1),
completed 08/03/95
WR ABPD 003, Calibration of RHR Room Cooler Thermostats, completed 09/13/00
WR ABPD 002, Calibration of RHR Room Cooler Thermostats, completed 06/25/97
WR AGEB 002, Calibration of RHR Room Cooler Thermostats, completed 08/21/97
WR AIWK 004, Inspection & Cleaning of the RHR Room Cooler, completed 03/09/02
WR/JO ANRR001, 1A-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WR/JO ANTK001, 1A-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WR/JO ANSN001, 1B-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WR/JO ANST001, 1B-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WO 0004546501, 2B-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WO 0004546401, 2B-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
5
WO 0004546301, 2A-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WO 0004546601, 2A-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, Performance Capacity Test
WO 0004635001, 1A-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, Service Capacity Test
WO 0004635101, 1A-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, Service Capacity Test
WO 0004634901, 1B-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, Service Capacity Test
WO 0004634801, 1B-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, Service Capacity Test
WO 0017812801, 2B-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, 2B-2 Service Capacity Test
WO 0017569601, 2B-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, 2B-1 Service Capacity Test
WO 0017400501, 2A-1 Batteries, 125 VDC, 2A-1 Service Capacity Test
WO 0017414101, 2A-2 Batteries, 125 VDC, 2A-2 Service Capacity Test
WO 0040723401, OMST-BATT11W, 125 VDC, Weekly Test
WO 0040495901, OMST-BATT11W, 125 VDC, Weekly Test
WO 0040496001, OMST-BATT11W, 125 VDC, Weekly Test
WO 0040777701, OMST-BATT11W, 125 VDC, Weekly Test
WO 0037714901, 1B-1 & 1B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031256501, 1B-1 & 1B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0030900101, 1B-1 & 1B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0028260501, 1B-1 & 1B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0038119301, 1A-1 & 1A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031639601, 1A-1 & 1A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031256401, 1A-1 & 1A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0028260601, 1A-1 & 1A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0030391401, 2A-1 & 2A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0030391501, 2B-1 & 2B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031256201, 2A-1 & 2A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031256301, 2A-1 & 2A-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031256601, 2B-1 & 2B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0031256701, 2B-1 & 2B-2 OMST-BATT11Q Quarterly
WO 0004680801, HPCI Auto-Actuation and Isolation Logic System Functional Test
WO 0017956801, HPCI Auto-Actuation and Isolation Logic System Functional Test
WO 0039711701, 1MST-HPCI27Q and RCIC CST Low Water Level Instrument Calibration
WO 0031316101, 1MST-HPCI27Q and RCIC CST Low Water Level Instrument Calibration
WO 0039317801, 2MST-HPCI27Q and RCIC CST Low Water Level Instrument Calibration
WO 0031323101, 2MST-HPCI27Q and RCIC CST Low Water Level Instrument Calibration
WO 0038677201, HPCI Suppression Pool High Level Instrument Channel Calibration
WO 0031264601, HPCI Suppression Pool High Level Instrument Channel Calibration
WO 0038677301, HPCI Suppression Pool High Level Instrument Channel Calibration
WO 0004589001, Calibrate 1-E41-FSHL-N006 in accordance with OPIC-DP-S001
WO 0007165101, Replace HPCI pump discharge line flow switch
WO 0043163601, Perform single cell charging on 1-1A-2 Cell #43 IAW OSPP-BAT010
WO 0043161301, Perform single cell charging on 1-1B-1 Cell #13 IAW OSPP-BAT010
WO 0042888401, 1-1B-1 125 VDC Battery Cell # 13 has a low voltage reading
WO 0041657401, Perform single cell charging on 1A-2 Battery Cell # 1
WO 0037821401, 1B-2 Battery Cell # 53 has a cell voltage of 2.124, minimum voltage is 2.13
WO 0033286001, 1-1B-2 Battery corrosion found on positive terminal of battery cell # 52
WO 0033285401, 1-1A-1 Battery corrosion found
WO 0033285301, 1-1A-2-125VDC-BAT, Replace Cell # 7 on Battery 1A-2
WO 0016351401, Equalize 1-1B-2-125VDC-BAT IAW OPM-BAT004
6
WO 0014092401, 1-1B-2 Cell # 1 needs to be replaced due to low specific gravity reading
WO 0006930901, Using ESR 00-00345 and WO Task Instructions, Replace Cell # 54 in 1-1B-
125VDC-BAT while batteries remain on line
WO WR/JO 99-ADIK1, Troubleshoot and assist operations in ground hunting for 1B Battery
WO 0043131301, 1-1A-2-125VDC-CHRGR investigate breaker trip/charger voltage card
replacement
WO WR/JO 99-AFEC1, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 1-1A-1-125VDC-CHRGR
WO WR/JO 99-AFED1, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 1-1A-2-125VDC-CHRGR
WO WR/JO 99-AFEE1, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 1-1B-1-125VDC-CHRGR
WO WR/JO 99-AFEE2, Place 1-1B-1-125VDC-BAT on equalize
WO WR/JO 99-AGKA1, Investigate problem with 1-1B-2-125VDC-CHRGR
WO WR/JO 99-AGKA2, Troubleshoot ground on 1-1B-2 Battery Charger during Unit 1 outage
WO WR/JO 99-AFEF1, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 1-1B-2-125VDC-CHRGR
WO WR/JO 98-ACNW1, Troubleshoot and Repair 1-1B-2-125VDC-CHRGR
WO 0033286301, Perform OMST-BATT11Q to remove corrosion from battery terminals
WO 0033286201, Perform OMST-BATT11Q to remove corrosion
WO 0027849301, 2-2A-1-125VDC-BAT, Perform DLRO measurements
WO 0027849201, 2-2B-1-125VDC-BAT, Perform DLRO measurements
WO 0016331601, 2-2B-1-125VDC-CHRGR has no output voltage please investigate and repair
WO 0013345101, The corrected specific gravity was less than the required 1.205 tolerance
WO WR/JO 99-ADML1, Place 125 VDC Battery Banks 2A-1, 2A-2, 2B-1, 2B-2 on equalize
WO WR/JO 00-ADJS1, Replace Cell # 27 in 2-2A-2-125VDC-BAT
WO WR/JO 00-ADEE1, Clean off electrolyte on cell #27 of 2-2A-2 Battery
WO WR/JO 99-AAGJ1, 2-2A-2-125VDC-BAT individual cell voltage out of tolerance
WO WR/JO 00-AARJ1, Troubleshoot 2-2B battery bus ground
WO WR/JO 99-ACRS1, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 2-2A-2-125VDC-CHRGR
WO WR/JO 99-ACSW1, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 2-2A-1-125VDC-CHRGR
WO 0011166201, Replace float/equalize toggle switch on 2-2B-1-125VDC-CHRGR
WO 0017170101, Specific gravity on Cell #56 of battery 1B-2 out of tolerance
WO WR/JO 99-AAGE1, 1-1B-2-125VDC-BAT Cell #37 voltage low
WR/JO ASLE001,1-E6-AV4-52, 5175 480 VAC Distribution System, Substation Breaker PM
WR/JO ADUE001,1-E5-AU9-52, 5175 480 VAC Distribution System, Substation Breaker PM
WR/JO ADKC001,1-E6-AX1-52, 5175 480 VAC Distribution System, Substation Breaker PM
WR/JO 99-ACPT1,2-2CB-C56, 5175 480 VAC Distribution System, Substation Breaker
Maintenance
WR/JO 00-ABHD2,1-1CA-C05, 5175 480 VAC Distribution System, Substation Breaker
Maintenance
WR/JO 00-ABDH1,1-1CA-C05, 5175 480 VAC Distribution System, Substation Breaker
Maintenance
WR/JO ACDU001, 2-2A-GKO-72, 5240 125 VDC Battery Charger System, Circuit Breaker
Functional Test
WR/JO ACDX001, 2-2A-GK3-72, 5240 125 VDC Battery Charger System, Circuit Breaker
Functional Test
WR/JO AAKO001, 2-2CB-C56-52, 5240 125 VDC Battery Charger System, Circuit Breaker
Maintenance
WO 0005034401, PM on 1-E2-AH1
WO 0017871402, In-situ Test of Mag Latch for 1-E6-AV4-52
7
WO 0030223001, Overload Relay Setting Change
WO 0017871002, In-situ Test on 1-E6-AV4-52
WO 0029973501, Circuit Breaker Tie Between Unit Substation E5&E6
WO 0017868201, In-situ Test of Mag Latch of E5-E6 Tie Breaker
WO 0005033201, PM on 1-E2-AH1
WO 0012789501, Breaker Operator Replacement
WO 0005030701, PM on Breaker 1-1B-GM1-72
WO 0005009301, PM on Breaker 1-1B-GM4-72
WO 0029610701, PM on Breaker 2-2B-GM1-72
WO 0029609301, PM on Breaker 2-2B-GM4-72
WO 0013432712, Test/Replace Breaker 2B-1-125VDC-Charger AC CKT
Completed Surveillance Procedures, Preventive Maintenance (PM), and Test Records
0PT-12.6, Breaker Alignment Surveillance, Rev. 42, Completed 8/2/03, 8/9/03, 8/16/03, 8/23/03
Action Requests (ARs)
087358, Deficiencies related with valve 2-E41-F001
CR 97-02379; Determine if Vortexing Problem Exists in the CST When Running the HPCI
Pump; dated August 27, 1997.
AR 00005402; Vortexing in CST Needs More Formal Analysis than CR 97-02379; dated
December 30, 1998.
AR 00098654, 125 VDC 1A-2 Battery Charger Main Supply Breaker Trip
AR 00047078, 1B-2 Cell # 56 Failed Specific Gravity
AR 00071076, Positive Plate Discoloration and Expansion
AR 00071079, 1B-2 Battery cells have positive plate discoloration and expansion
AR 00058078, Battery 1A-2 has low voltage cells
AR 00053109, Visual signs of degradation on 2B-1 battery
AR 00083997, 2A-1 Battery Cell #31 cracked cell top
AR 00085750, 1B-2 Battery Cell #53 has a low voltage
AR 00044684, 1B-2 Batteries are A(1) under new Maintenance Rule criteria
AR 00052618, DC MOV Thermal Overload Heater Sizing
AR 00076440, BESS Calculations Self Assessment 50952
Action Requests Written Due to this Inspection
101924, Update periodic maintenance program to add periodic replacement of diaphram in
valve E41-PCV-152, dated 08/14/03
102321, Valve E41-F042, reduced voltage strike time calculation basis, dated 08/19/03
102456, CST Vortexing Documentation Discrepancies; dated 08/20/03
103005, Note in 0PT-09.2 Referring to Auto Closure of HPCI Steam Line Drains (F029 and
F028) should have been removed by ESR 99-00405, dated 08/26/03
8
103106, Correct procedure inconsistencies in preventative maintenance Procedure
0PM-BKR001, ITE 4KV Breaker and Compartment Checkout, dated 08/27/03
103252, Procedure Enhancement to 0PT-09.3, Rev. 50, HPCI System - 165 Psig Flow Test.
Add Procedural Guidance to Ensure that HPCI Minimum Flow Isolation Valve E41-F012 Goes
Closed After Proper Flow Setpoint is Reached, dated 08/28/03
103256, Procedure Enhancement to 0PT-09.2, Rev. 111, HPCI System Operability Test. Add
Procedural Guidance to Ensure that HPCI Minimum Flow Isolation Valve E41-F012 Goes
Closed After Proper Flow Setpoint is Reached, dated 08/28/03
103299, Provide procedural guidance as to when a Shift Technical Advisor should activate their
post, dated 08/28/03
Lesson Plans/Job Performance Measures (JPM)
Lesson Plan CLS-LP-51, DC Distribution, Rev. 0
Lesson Plan CLS-LP-302-G, Electrical Failure Related AOPs (AOP-12.0, AOP-22.0, AOP-36.1,
and AOP-39.0), Rev. 0
AOT-OJT-JP-051-A01, DC Ground Isolation for P, N, and P/N, Rev. 1
AOT-OJT-JP-302-G01, Loss of DC Power - Transfer of DC Control Power, Rev. 2
Miscellaneous Documents:
Brunswick Nuclear Plant Probabilistic Safety Assessment
RSC 98-24, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Notebook, Rev. 0
RSC 98-23, HPCI System Notebook, Rev. 0
HPCI System Periodic Review, dated 02/20/03
RCIC System Periodic Review, dated 02/20/03
Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria, System 1001, ECCS Suction Strainer
Vendor Manual FP-3808, Battery Charger, Rev. G
Specification 137-002, 125 Volt Battery Chargers, Rev. 7
Engineering Evaluation BNP-DC-03, Overload Heater Resizing for Valves 1-E41-F001, F006,
F007, and F008, Rev. 0