Potentially Inadequate Performance of ECCS in PWRs During Recirculation Operation Following a LOCAML031150118 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
09/14/1988 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-88-074, NUDOCS 8809080339 |
Download: ML031150118 (8) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 14, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-74: POTENTIALLY INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE OF
ECCS IN PWRs DURING RECIRCULATION
OPERATION FOLLOWING A LOCA
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for Westinghouse
(W) and Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)-designed nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential
problems that could result in inadequate performance of the emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) during the recirculation phase of operation following
a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). It is expected that recipients will review
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
The NRC has received two licensee event reports on potential deficiencies in
performance of the ECCS during the recirculation phase of operation following.
a small-break LOCA. These events were reported by the licensees of the Oconee
and Turkey Point facilities after engineering analysis for each facility had
identified the potential problems.
Oconee Nuclear Station
During a technical review of nuclear safety-related mechanical calculations, the licensee discovered that the design analysis had not been adequately per- formed for the recirculation phase of operation following a small-break LOCA.
Subsequent engineering analysis indicated the following design deficiencies:
(1) Under certain small-break LOCA scenarios, when the borated water storage
tank (BWST) is depleted and the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure
remains high (greater than the low-pressure injection (LPI) pump shut- off head), a piggyback-type operation is required to ensure core cooling.
This operation entails taking suction from the reactor building sump, through the LPI pumps, through the high-pressure injection (HPI) pumps,
880900339c
IN 88-74 September 14, 1988 and then to the RCS. However, because of (1) the high flow resistance
in the cross-connect piping between the HPI and LPI pumps, (2) the
potential for partially closed LPI discharge throttle valves, and (3)
the high flow rate downstream of the LPI pumps, there may not have been
adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) at the suction inlets of the
HPI pumps. Inadequate NPSH would render the HPI system inoperable. The
high flow rate would have occurred when the reactor building spray pumps
and HPI pumps take suction simultaneously from the LPI pump discharge.
The licensee has corrected the problem by revising the operating pro- cedures to provide guidance for maintaining adequate NPSH to the HPI
pumps operating in the piggyback mode. The revised procedures provide
for (1) HPI flow limitations when the HPI and reactor building spray
pumps are piggybacked off the LPI pumps, (2) precautions on the use of
reactor building spray, and (3) precautions on the throttling of the
LPI discharge valves LP-12 and LP-14. (A simplified Oconee ECCS and
reactor building spray system are shown in Attachment 1.)
(2) A single failure of the "TD" ECCS switchgear during loss of offsite power
would have prevented the remote alignment of the LPI system to the HPI
system in the piggyback mode because (1) valves LP-9, LP-15, and LPI
pump B are powered by ECCS switchgear bus "TDV but their backup power
supplies are classified as load shed power supplies,'and (2) valves
LP-9.and LP-15 were in the normally closed position.
The licensee has corrected the problem by (1) changing valve LP-9 to a
normally open position so that it will not be required to operate when
the LPI system is being aligned with the HPI system in the piggyback mode
of operation, and (2) revising the emergency operating procedure to ensure
time is available for operators to locally, manually open valves LP-15 and
LP-16 (if the valves cannot be opened remotely) before LPI suction must be
swapped from the BWST to the reactor building sump.
Turkey Point Nuclear Station
As part of its ongoing design-basis reconstitution program, the licensee dis- covered a condition of potentially inadequate NPSH for the containment spray
and safety injection (SI) pumps during the recirculation mode of operation
following a LOCA. Under these conditions, the low head residual heat removal
(RHR) pumps are providing flow to the containment spray pumps and the SI pumps.
A throttle valve in each RHR discharge line is normally throttled to 30 percent.
However, an analysis to support this valve throttling position had not been
performed. To resolve this discrepancy, the subject valves were locked in the
fully open, position until an engineering evaluation showed that the original
configuration (30 percent open) was acceptable.
IN 88-74 September 14, 1988 Discussion:
Following a small-break LOCA, the piggyback mode of operation may be required
(depending on the size and location of the break) to sustain injection flow
when the BWST (B&W plant) or refueling water storage tank (Westinghouse plant)
has been depleted and RCS pressure remains above the shutoff head of the low
head pumps. As previously described, two mechanisms could prevent this in- tendeo piggyback mode from operating: (1) insufficient MPSH at HPI (or SI)
pump suction inlets, or (2) inadequate operating procedures combined with
system design deficiencies for a loss-of-offsite-power condition. Although
the low head pumps provide relatively high discharge pressure, the intervening
cross-connect piping between the high head and low head systems and/or partially
closed low head pump discharge valves could result in excessive hydraulic
resistance and cause insufficient NPSH at the HPI (or SI) pump suction inlets.
Insufficient NPSH could also be caused by running multiple pumps off the dis- charge of a single pump that may increase the flow above the design flow rate
and consequently reduce the available pressure at the low head pump discharge.
These are safety concerns because of the reliance on HPI (or SI) for mitigating
small-break LOCAs, and in some cases, the piggyback-type operation is used for
hot leg recirculation even for large-break LOCAs.
There are no redundant systems to perform the function of the HPI (or SI) system
in the piggyback mode. Although the reactor vessel high-point vents and the
power-operated relief valve(s) could be used to depressurize the RCS to low
head pump operating pressures, the related safety analysis had never been
performed -- thus, their effectiveness was not ensured.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
ar esIE. ossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: S. Israel, AEOD
(301) 492-4437 J. Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1175 P. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Simplified Oconee Emergency Core Cooling
and Reactor Building Spray Systems
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Figure 1 Simplified Oconee Emergency Core Cooling
and Reactor Building Spray Systems
.a > i a a al zr
LI LI LI LI LI.
RIDSPRAY "UPS
EI 4 ec-7o- _
DECAY HEAT lANY
MPS CODEtRS
CF I CF 2
_ CtDEG
1,r 2AI .2R.iC
At IE _^,L
M_; v fW GNfCl :
4--t liD
Hp41 lIGAJF
Eip 100X~ HP al?
Frin r (.D
_T. _ r__ $fill L c-1
2 lp 'S
I, I .-
Attachment 2 IN 88-74 September 14, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
88-73 Direction-Dependent Leak 9/8/88 All holders of OLs
Characteristics of or CPs for nuclear
Containment Purge Valves power reactors.
88-72 Inadequacies in the Design 9/2/88 All holders of OLs
of dc Motor-Operated Valves or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-71 Possible Environmental 9/1/88 All holders of OLs
Effect of the Reentry or CPs for nuclear
of COSMOS 1900 and power reactors, fuel
Request for Collection cycle licensees, of Licensee Radioactivity and Priority 1 Measurements Attributed material licensees.
to That Event
88-70 Check Vdlve Inservice 8/29/88 All holders of OLs
Testing Program or CPs for nuclear
Deficiencies power reactors.
88-69 Movable Contact Finger 8/19/88 All holders of OLs
Binding in HFA Relays or CPs for nuclear
Manufactured by General power reactors.
Electric (GE)
88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/24/88 All holders of OLs
Supplement 1 Refurbished Valves or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- 8/22/88 All holders of OLs
surizer Safety Valves with or CPs for nuclear
Filled Loop Seals Using power reactors.
Hydraulic Assist Devices
88-67 PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 8/22/88 All holders of OLs
Turbine Overspeed Trip or CPs for nuclear
Failure power reactors.
88-66 Industrial Radiography 8/22/88 All NRC industrial
Inspection and Enforcement radiography licensees.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 88-74 September 14, 1988 Discussion:
Following a small-break LOCA, the piggyback mode of operation may be required
(depending on the size and location of the break) to sustain injection flow
when the BWST (B&W plant) or refueling water storage tank (Westinghouse plant)
has been depleted and RCS pressure remains above the shutoff head of the low
head pumps. As previously described, two mechanisms could prevent this in- tended piggyback mode from operating: (1) insufficient NPSH at HPI (or SI)
pump suction inlets, or (2) inadequate operating procedures combined with
system design deficiencies for a loss-of-offsite-power condition. Although
the low head pumps provide relatively high discharge pressure, the intervening
cross-connect piping between the high head and low head systems and/or partially
closed low head pump discharge valves could result in excessive hydraulic
resistance and cause insufficient NPSH at the HPI (or SI) pump suction inlets.
Insufficient NPSH could also be caused by running multiple pumps off the dis- charge of a single pump that may increase the flow above the design flow rate
and consequently reduce the available pressure at the low head pump discharge.
These are safety concerns because of the reliance on HPI (or SI) for mitigating
small-break LOCAs, and in some cases, the piggyback-type operation is used for
hot leg recirculation even for large-break LOCAs.
There are no redundant systems to perform the function of the HPI (or SI) system
in the piggyback mode. Although the reactor vessel high-point vents and the
power-operated relief valve(s) could be used to depressurize the RCS to low
head pump operating pressures, the related safety analysis had never been
performed -- thus, their effectiveness was not ensured.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: S. Israel, AEOD
(301) 492-4437 J. Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1175 P. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Simplified Oconee Emergency Core Cooling
and Reactor Building Spray Systems
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
- AEOD *OEAB:DOEA *OGCB:DOEA *TECH ED *SRXB:DEST *D:DEST
SIsrael JThompson PWen WHodges LShao
8/30/88 8/30/88 8/30/88 8/30/88 8/30/88 8/31/88
,:OGCB:DOEA
HBerlinger 4
8/31/88 9/ V/88
IN 88-xx
August xx, 1988 been depleted and RCS pressure remains above the shutoff head of the low head
pumps. As previously described, two mechanisms could prevent this intended
piggyback mode from operating: (1) insufficient NPSH at HPI (or SI) pump
suction inlets, or (2) inadequate operating procedures combined with inadequate
system design during a loss-of-offsite-power condition. Although the low head
pump provides relatively high discharge pressure, the intervening cross-connect
piping between the high head and low head systems and/or partially closed low
head pump discharge valves could result in excessive hydraulic resistance and
cause insufficient NPSH at the HPI (or SI) pump suction inlets. Insufficient
NPSH could also be caused by running multiple pumps off the discharge of a single
pump that may increase the flow above the design flow rate and consequently
reduce the available pressure at the low head pump discharge. These are safety
concerns because of the reliance on HPI (or SI) for mitigating small-break LOCAs, and in some cases, the piggyback-type operation is used for hot leg recirculation
even for large-break LOCAs.
There are no redundant systems to perform the function of the HPI (or SI)
system in the piggyback mode. Although the reactor vessel high-point vents
and the power-operated relief valve (PORV) could be used to depressurize the
RCS to low head pump operating pressures, the related safety analysis had
never been performed -- thus, their effectiveness was not ensured.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the
appropriate regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: S. Israel, AEOD
(301) 492-4437 J. Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1175 P. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Simplified Oconee Emergency Core Cooling
and Reactor Building Spray Systems
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
- AEOD *OEAB:DOEA *OGCB:DOEA *TECH ED *SRXB:DEST *D: DEST
SIsrael JThompson PWen WHodges LShao
8/3 /88 8/30/88 8/30/88 8/30/88 8/30/88 8/31/88 C: CB:DOEA D:DOEA
CHBerlinger CERossi
f/31/88 9/ /88
IN 88-xx
August xx, 1988 been depleted and RCS pressure remains above the shutoff head of the low head
pumps. As previously described, two mechanisms could prevent this intended
piggyback mode from oeprating: (1) insufficient NPSH at HPI (or SI) pump
suction inlets, or (2) inadequate operating procedures combined with inadequate
system design during a loss-of-offsite-power condition. Although the low head
pump provides relatively high discharge pressure, the intervening cross-connect
piping between the high head and low head systems and/or partially closed low
head pump discharge valves could result in excessive hydraulic resistance and
cause insufficient NPSH at the HPI (or SI) pump suction inlets. Insufficient
NPSH could also be caused by running multiple pumps off the discharge of a single
pump that may increase the flow above the design flow rate and consequently
reduce the available pressure at the low head pump discharge. These are safety
concerns because of the reliance on HPI (or SI) for mitigating small-break LOCAs, and in some cases, the piggyback-type operation is used for hot leg recirculation
even for large-break LOCAs.
There are no redundant systems to perform the function of the HPI (or SI)
system in the piggyback mode. Although the reactor vessel high-point vents
and the power-operated relief valve (PORV) could be used to depressurize the
RCS to low head pump operating pressures, the related safety analysis had
never been performed -- thus, their effectiveness was not ensured.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the
technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the
appropriate regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: S. Israel, AEOD
(301) 492-4437 J. Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1175 P. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172 Attachments:
1. Figure 1
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
AEOEa
1 1A OEAB: OGCB:DOEA T CH ED SRX :DEST C:OGCB:DOEA
P Israel JTh idon PWen ( WHodges
f5 CHBerlinger
V8/3c88 8/ - jr 8/30 /88 /3i /88 8/3 0 /88 8/ /88 D:DOEA D4_0
CERossi LShao
8/ /88 8/)//88
|
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list | - Information Notice 1988-01, Safety Injection Pipe Failure (27 January 1988, Topic: Unidentified leak, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-03, Cracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover Welds (2 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals (5 February 1988, Topic: Fire Barrier, Fire Watch, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-05, Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets (12 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-06, Foreign Objects in Steam Generators (29 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-07, Inadvertent Transfer of Licensed Material to Uncontrolled Locations (7 March 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-08, Chemical Reactions with Radioactive Waste Solification Agents (14 March 1988, Topic: Process Control Program, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-09, Reduced Reliability of Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Caused by Instability of Woodward PG-PL Type Governors (18 March 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 FR 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988, Topic: Fatality, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and Osha Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988. (23 December 1988, Topic: Fatality, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center And/Or Switchboard Function Due to Faulty Tie Bolts (7 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-12, Overgreasing of Electric Motor Bearings (12 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-13, Water Hammer & Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-14, Potential Problems with Electrical Relays (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (Fda) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-16, Identify Waste Generators in Shipments of Low-Level Waste to Land Disposal Facilities (22 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-17, Summary of Responses to NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants. (22 April 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Weld Overlay, Feedwater Heater, Through-Wall Leak, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-18, Malfunction of Lockbox on Radiography Device (25 April 1988, Topic: Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class Ie Components (26 April 1988, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class IE Components (26 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-20, Unauthorized Individuals Manipulating Controls and Performing Control Room Activities (5 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-21, Inadvertent Criticality Events at Oskarshamn and at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (9 May 1988, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1988-22, Disposal of Sludge from Onsite Sewage Treatment Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-23, Potential for Gas Binding of High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps During a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-24, Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems (13 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-25, Minimum Edge Distance for Expansion Anchor Bolts (16 May 1988, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1988-26, Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records (16 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-27, Deficient Electrical Terminations Identified in Safety-Related Components (18 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-28, Potential for Loss of Post-Loca Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage (19 May 1988, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1988-29, Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical Penetration Assemblies (24 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-30, Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-31, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of Significant Incidents Involving Radioactive Material (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-33, Recent Problems Involving the Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (27 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-34, Nuclear Material Control & Accountability of Non-Fuel Special Nuclear Material at Power Reactors (31 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-36, Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation (8 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-37, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components (14 June 1988, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1988-38, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment of General Electric Circuit Breakers (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-39, Loss of Recirculation Pumps with Power Oscillation Event (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-40, Examiners' Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Examinations (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-42, Circuit Breaker Failures Due to Loose Charging Spring Motor Mounting Bolts (23 June 1988, Topic: Loctite)
- Information Notice 1988-43, Solenoid Valve Problems (23 June 1988, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1988-44, Mechanical Binding of Spring Release Device in Westinghouse Type DS-416 Circuit Breakers (24 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-45, Problems in Protective Relay & Circuit Breaker Coordination (7 July 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1988-46, Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers (8 July 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-47, Slower-than-Expected Rod-drop Times (14 July 1988)
... further results |
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