ML030790384

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Operations Notebook Package Regarding AFW Pump Operation
ML030790384
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/2002
From: Sokol K
Nuclear Management Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0094
Download: ML030790384 (14)
v • d • e


Text

Page _ of Point Beach Nuclear Plant OPERATIONS NOTEBOOK FILE:__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SUBJECT:

AFW Pump operation Due to the potential for plugging of the AFW Recirc Orifice with resultant insufficient recirc flow, We have made changes to 102 procedures. The majority are EOP's, ECA's, CSP's, and some SEP's and AOP's. In these procedures we take no credit for recirc flow.

When any AFW pump is running it must have flow to the SIG. A minimum 50 GPM for the motor driven pump and 75 GPM for the turbine driven MUST always be maintained or the pump stopped. In EOP space that means we would have to stop/start the pump as required to maintain the required SIG level. For the motor driven pump we must also consider starting duty. Starting Duty limitations can be maintained by using the control band (i.e. 29% - 65%) that the EOP etc. calls for. Once we start the pump, it is desirable to run it for a minimum of 15 minutes. This can be accomplished by feeding at a rate that is sufficient to satisfy minimum flow requirements but less than max flow. (i.e. filling the SIG at 100 GPM will allow for longer run time than at 200 GPM). In all cases the requirements set forth in the EOP's etc. must be met.

We also changed 01 62A &B. In these procedures we recognize that there may be a need to feed at less than minimum flow. If this is the case, then a dedicated operator must be stationed to continuously monitor recirc flow and immediately notify the control room if recirc flow is less than 50 for motor driven pumps and 75 for turbine driven pumps. The control room is expected to evaluate whether the associated pump needs to be stopped by checking flow to SIG. The low flow could be the result of recirc valve shutting due to increased flow to the S/G's Please review the changes to 01 62A &B.

Please also review the attached OD for the AFW System Approved By: K Sokol Place in Section:

Placed in Notebook: 10/3112002 Remove By:

Date Date Schedule for Removal: DSS Acknowledgement Night Orders: 4 days or less Crew A:

Operational Information: 31 days or less Crew B:

Significant Events: 31 days or less Crew C:

Industrial Safety: 31 days or less Crew D:

Administrative: 31 days or less Crew E:

Operational Experience: 31 days or less Crew F:

Modifications: 31 days or less Miscellaneous: 31 days or less Request for Data: Until data is gathered PBF-2015 Revision 9 04/09/01 Reference OM 3 13

Point Beach Nuclear Plant OPERABILITY DETERMINATION PART I OPR CAP REV 000031 029952 0

C I )

ENGINEERING TO COMPLETE THIS BOX WHEN OD ACCEPTED BY DSS SYNOPSIS FOR NIM INFORMATION ONLY CHAMPS Unit(s) 0, 1, 2 System AF Equipment ID Various

[] Inoperable - does not meet the minimum level of performance.

Q Operable - fully meets performance requirements. No further action required.

Operable But Degraded - or Operable But Nonconforming - meets the minimum required level of performances, compensatory measures ARE required.

Operable But Degraded - or Operable But Nonconforming - meets the minimum required level of performances, compensatory measures are NOT required.

Potential for simultaneous failure of al AFW pumps due to insufficient minimum pump flow TITL. (*_QUMENT NUMBER AND DESCRIPION OF ISSUE)

1. Describe the conditiop, Duringa plant transient,a combination of the existingplant design and operating proceduresmay result in afailure mode of one or more AFWpumps.

When steam generator(SG) levels have been restoredto desiredlevelsfollowing a transient,manual action is requiredto maintainthose levels. This manual action could be accomplishedby securingthe associatedpump(s), or by reducingflow to match the

. steaming rate.-It could also be accomplishedby completely closing-offflow to one or both SGs if desired; this is likely to be the case if the desiredlevel has been exceeded due to overfill, swell, etc. Isolatingdischargeflow to the SGs, could result in no flow through a runningAFWpump since the recirculationline orificepassagesare susceptible to blockage particularly.whenthe safety related SWis aligned as the suction source. This would cause very rapidfailureof these multi-stagehighpressurepumps.

2. Identify the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) functions and performance requirements including:

Tech Spec Reference 3.7.5 FSAR Reference 10.2, 7.3.3.4 NRC Commitment Reference Other 50.59 EVAL 2002-005, FCR 02-027, FCR 02 019 If no CLB function, requirement or commitment is affected, no further action is required. N/A Steps 3, 4 and 5 and proceed with Step 6.

PBF-1553 Revision 9 10116/02 Page I of 8

Reference:

NP 5.3.7

TS3.7.5 The AFW System shall be OPERABLE with one turbine driven AFWpump system <per Unit> and two motor driven AFWpump systems when in modes 1, 2, and 3. The bases for this Technical Specificationstates that "The AFW System automaticallysupplies feedwater to the steam generatorsto remove decay heatfrom the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normalfeedwatersupply".

FSAR Chapter10.2.1 The AFWsystem shall automaticallystart and deliver adequateAF system flow to maintain adequategeneratorlevels duringaccidents which may result in main steam safety valve opening including:Loss of NormalFeedwater(LONF)andLoss ofAll AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries (ZOAC). These accidents are evaluated in detail in sections 14.1.10 and 14.1.11 respectively.

The AF system is credited with automaticallystartingand deliveringsufficientAF flow to maintain adequatesteam generatorlevels during accidents which requirerapidreactor coolant system cooldown to achieve cold shutdown condition within the limits of the analysis,including Steam GeneratorTube Rupture (SGTR; FSAR Chapter14.2.4), and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB; FSAR Chapter14.2.5).

The AF system shall be capableof isolatingthe AF steam andfeedwatersupply lines from the rupturedgeneratorfollowing a SGTR event.

The AF system also is capable of automaticallysupplying sufficientfeedwater to remove decay heatfrom both units without any relianceon ACpowerfor one hour (station blackout).

In the event ofplhntfires, includingthose that requireevacuation of the control room, the AF system shall be capableof manual initiationtoprovidefeedwaterto a minimum of one steam generatorper unit at sufficientflow andpressureto remove decay and sensible heatfrom the reactorcoolant system over the rangefrom hot shutdown to cold shutdown conditions.

FSAR 10.2.2 This section states thateachpu.mp has an AOV controlledrecirculationline back to the condensatestoragetanks to eiisure minimumflow to preient-hydraiilicinstabilitiesand dissipatepump heat.

FSAR 10.2.3 Based on the operatingcharacteristicsofthe minimum recirculationflow control scheme, a portion a AFpumps dischargewill be automaticallyrecirculatedback to the CSTs for approximately 45 seconds afterthe pump starts.The 45 second time delay in closing the recirculationline control valves is incorporatedin the design toprovidefor pump stability and cooling during coastdown.

FSAR 7.3.3.4 If a loss of instrument airoccurs or an Auxiliary FeedwaterPump minimumflow recirculationvalvefails closed, manual operatoraction is requiredto prevent the potentialfailureof thepump(s). By procedure,the operatorwill eithersecure the running pump(s) or maintainforwardflow through the still runningpump(s) to preventpump damage that could be causedby overheating.

Backuppneumatic supplies are provided to all AFIpump minimum recirculationvalves.

These backup supplies are sized to provide adequatetimefor operatorsto either maintainminimum flow through the runningpump(s) to secure the unneededpump(s) if necessaryto restore instrument air,or to use the manual gag on each valve to provide minimum recirculationflow.

PBF-1553 Revision 9 10/16/02 Pame 2 of 8

Reference:

NP 5 3 7 81A *b*OQ

3. Aggregate Review: Identify related issues by review of active ODs for the same system including as applicable their compensatory measures. Historical ODs can also be included in this review at the discretion of the Engineer. The review of the active ODs and their compensatory measures is to ensure there is no conflict between the related conditions, i.e., conflicting assumptions or compensatory measures.

El No related issues exist.

Related AR Number CR 01-3648 Impact:

Review ofthe condition described in section I of this OD indicatesapotentialfor the loss of aflowpathfor the MDAFWPs mirroringthat describedin OD CR 01-3648. OD CR 01-3648 describes a condition where an Appendix R fire in FireAreasAO1-B, A02, A23N andA23S, could result in the loss ofMDAFPflowpath due to afire initiatedauto-startof an MDAFP with a coincidentloss of off-site power and instrument air. In each of thefire areas listed above, a MDAFP is reliedupon as the means of deliveringAux Feedwaterto at least one Steam Generatorfor at least one or both Units to support decay heat removal from the RCS. This condition occurs due to afire initiatedtrip of the Main Feedwater Pumps or startsignal to the creditedMDAFP. This auto-startsignalgeneratedby this condition opens the associatedrecirculationvalve and motor operateddischargevalve(s) for the steam generatorto be suppliedAF Due to fire damage, the motor driven dischargevalve may fail to open and the mini-recircvalve may fail closed due to a loss of instrument airsupply.

The difference in the conditions describedin OD CR 01-3648 and this OD is thefailure mechanism of the MDAFPrecirculationline, however thefailure mechanism for the MDAFPs is the sad e. The condition describedin this OD, as it pertainsto Appendix R, is bounded by that describedin OD CR 01-3648 because the initiatingevent is essentially the samefor both conditions,i.e., auto-startof the MDAFP and loss of control of the motor operateddischargevalve(s) for the steam generatordue to fire damage. The loss ofinstrument air describedin OD CR 01-3648 is equivalent to the recirculationline failure mechanism describedin this OD because loss of instrument airis assumedfor all Appendix R fires and thefailuremechanism described in this OD could appy to allfire initiatedstarts of the MDAFPs. Theref.ore,failure oqfthe kfDAFPs as described in OD CR 01-3648 is the samefor this condition andAppendix R operabilityconclusion of OperableBut Nonconforming also remains the same.

Related AR Number CR 01-3595 Impact Closed. Concernspostulatedfailure of the recirculationline A 0V. This is a related issue but it does not impact this OPR.

Related AR Number Impact Review additionally, as applicable, these items to help clarify current plant conditions.

These items may have impact on the SSC performance.

PBF-1553 Revision 9 10/16/02 Page 3 of 8

Reference:

NP 5.3.7

Active Temporary Operating Procedure Changes None Applicable Active Temporary Modifications None Applicable Modifications currently being installed None Applicable Recent Work Orders None Applicable Approved DCNs None Applicable Recently Performed Inservice Testing IT-10

4. Evaluate the CLB functions and performance requirements identified in Step 2 against the as-found condition and the related issues identified in Step 3. The evaluation must identify the extent to which the SSC is capable of performing its identified CLB function. Document the evaluation:

After the automaticinitiationofAF in response to an analyzed event, operatorsare requiredto manually controlAFflow basedon SG levels (FSAR 7.3.3.4). Manual control may include shuttingpump discharge valves resulting in pump operationstrictly on recirculationflow. Due to the potentialdebris blockage of the recirculationline restrictionorifices (1/2R0-4003, RO-4008, RO-4015), sufficientflow to preventpump damage may not be achieved.

Measures taken include heightened Operatorawareness of thepotentialforpump damage (briefingsjwithon-coming shift personnel), temporary information tagsposted on the AFWpumpflow controls.Revisions to operatingproceduresthat will alertthe Operatorto the limitationsofthe AFWsystem with respect to minimum AFWpump flow are in progress.The revisions will ensure thatAFWMinimum Flow Requirements are maintainedor the affected AFWpump is secured.

NEMA guidelines states that motor driven pumps may be startedtwicefrom an initial standby condition with no restrictions.After the initialstarts,NEMA MG-i recommends

. .b-x-*-rst'a-drier"alltcdhdition- bifJleaing operation ha-vb-ei-thdfo'zighlj" - - -

investigatedand the apparatushas been examinedfor evidence of excessive heating."

This guidance encompassessituationswhere the load orprime mover may have experiencedafault which causes afailure to startor run; excessive temperaturesare not expected with the equipmentfunctioningnormally.Additionalstarts therefore are allowed andnot expected to cause machinefailure.It shouldbe recognized minimum of 3 startsof a motor driven AFpump are allowed in thefirst 15 minutes of operation.An additionalone or two starts is allowedprovidedthe run time is at least 15 minutes between these laterstarts.Motor startingnameplate information directs that after initial starts the motor may be restartedif run time has exceeded 15 minutes or it has been securedfor 60 minutes. Excessive consecutive startingwill decreaseoverall motor life.

Startingduty limitationsareprovidedby the manufacturerto provide the longest possible motor life.

The AOP SG control band is 29% to 65%. This representsan approximatevolume of 5000 gallons.At a steamingrate of 50 gpm, a motor driven pump start would be requiredevery 50 minutes to controllevel within halfof the control band.At maximum pumpflow rate of 200 gpm, the pump would be operatedfor 16 minutes to recover the level lost while the pump was secured.Since the operationof the pumps will meet the NEMA criteriaestablished,thepump motor will not fail as a result of repetitive starts.

The pump motors are suppliedfrom Westinghouse DB-50 Air CircuitBreakers. Vendor PBF-1553 Revision 9 10/16/02 Page 4 of 8

Reference:

NP 37 v

information indicates an in-rush, non-fault duty cycle of 750 breakeroperations. The recommended operatingconditions are afrequency of operationnot to exceed 20per 10 minutes or 30per hour. Since the MDAFPs are only used duringstartup,shutdown (includingSG chemical additions)and requiredsystem testing, the number of breaker operationsare well below these operatinglimits. If an operatoris requiredto secure and restartpumps during a transient,the actionswould be performed at afrequency of operationmuch less than the recommended valuefor the entire transient.

There are no startingcycle limitations on the turbine driven AFWpumps. The turbine vendor was contacted and verified that no duty cycle concerns existfor this pump assembly. The steam supply MOVs areratedfor 5 minutes ofoperation every hour which correspondsto five open/shut cycles. With a maximum steaming rate of 75 gpm, it would take approximately 33 minutes to steam off half of the control band (2500 gallons). The nameplateguidancefor motors and valves is based on manufacturers'recommendations for long life and are consideredconservative. Therefore, operation of the valve will not be degraded.

The recommendations ofthis OperabilityDeterminationis to considerthe AFsystem OPERABLE but NON-CONFORMING. The potential Non-Conformancepertainsto the FSAR statement of the minimum recirculationflow path ensuring minimumflow is available Note: If the SSC is determined to be inoperable based on this evaluation, mark Step 5 N/A and continue with Step 6.

5. Evaluate the need foreormpensatory measures. Complete with input from DSS.

[] Degraded or nonconforming, however, no compensatory measures are required.

Degraded or nonconforming. The following compensatory measures are REQUIRED in order to maintain operability.

If Compensatory Measures are not required go to Step 6.

I Compensatory measures must be in place prior to OD fimal approval by the DSS Affected Unit (I OR 2 OR 0) 0 Describe the Compensatory Measure (what needs to be performed):

As an immediate compensatory measure, a briefing of allresponsible on-shifi Reactor Operationsstaffshould be conducted describingthe concern and appropriateresponses:

1. If dischargeflow cannotbe maintainedper the applicableoperatingprocedure(s) without exceeding desired SG level, secure the associatedpuinp(s) andre-start again later when (if)needed.
2. Install tags, placards,or otherwisepost the pertinent information at the controls (in the ControlRoom and locally)for the associatedAFWpumps.

PBF-1553 Revision 9 10/16/02 Page 5 of 8

Reference:

NP 53. .7 v

7

3. Emphasize verifying a minimum of50 (75) gpm flow through a motor (turbine)driven pump when reducingflow as stated in operatingprocedures.

Basis which indicates the Compensatory Measure maintains operability.

By verifying minimum pumpflow requirements,the continued availabilityof the AFW pumps is ensured.Minimum pump flow maintainshydraulic stability, removes pump heat and increasethe life of thepump. If the minimum flow requirement cannot be maintained,then the pump will be securedto prevent damage.Repetitive operation of a motor driven or turbine driven AFpump for SG level controlhas been determinedto be acceptable.

As an additionalaction, revise operatingprocedures as appropriateto prevent reducing flow of operatingAFWpumps below the minimumflow requirements.

Implementation Mechanism (Procedure number, Temp Mod number, etc):

As determined appropriateby Operations.

Plant condition(s) or mode(s) of operation which require the Compensatory Measure:

Modes 1, 2, and 3 (modes in which decay heat removalfrom the SGs is necessaryand requiredcapabilityperITS.

jrA Under what conditions may the Compensatory Measure be terminated?

Engineeringevaluation or modification to restorethefunction of the recirculationlines.

6. Prepared Br.

ý . A ,, / 4ý.Date/Time:

Name (Print) / Signature Engineering Manager Approval of Evaluation and Proposed Compensatory Measure (if applicable)

~7 Yu-&~r~ 'DateTIixe: gýL aIZ Name (Print) / Signature

7. SRO Review of Operability Documentation:

fl Inoperable - does not meet the minimum level of performance.

[J Operable - fully meets performance requirements. No further action required.

Operable But Degraded - or Operable But Nonconformiing - meets the minimum required level of performances, compensatory measures ARE required.

Operable But Degraded - or Operable But Nonconforming - meets the minimum required level of performances, compensatory measures are NOT required.

PBF-1553 Revision 9 10/16/02 Paie 6 of 8 Reference. NP 5.7

P Evaluation Accepted C4 Evaluation and Compensatory Measures Accepted.

SCompensatory Measures Verified in Place.

I] NNP 10.1.1, LCO Tracking Log updated to include new items.

DSS: f - ,&ko / Date/Time: Os N (Print) /Signature Route OD packageto in-box in WCCforprocessing. Packageincludes originalPart1, all attachments, and relatedcondition report.

if-PBF-1553 Revision 9 10116102 Page 7 of 8 Reference. NP 5.3.7

OPERABILITY DETERMINATION OPR Unit(s)

CAP System REV CHAMPS ID 8ODD condition which requires compensatory measures.

OBD condition which does NOT require compensatory measures.

Title (Equpment ID and Description of Issue PART II CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN, SCHEDULE AND JUSTIFICATION (30 days to complete)

I. For those Operable But Degraded or Nonconforming items, what action(s) need to be done to restore the condition to its "fully operable" or 'Tully qualified" status?

> Also consider any compensatory measures in place and what needs to be done for their removal.

2. Provide a schedule for completion of the action(s) listed in question 1. This schedule represents the earliest available opportunity to perform the corrective actions, allowing reasonable time for planning, scheduling, design, procurement, etc.

3.- List the date of the next refueling outage for the affected Unit(s). PB1: PB2:

4. E] All actions requAd to bring this degraded or non-conforming issue back to fully operable will be completed prior or concurrent with the next refueling outage as indicated in Step 3. N/A Step 5 and obtain approval 0 All actions required to bring this degraded or non-conforming issue back to fully operable will NOT be completed prior or concurrent with the next refueling outage as indicated in Step 3. COMPLETE Step 5 and obtain approval.
5. Please provide justification for this schedule based on:

> the amount of time zequired for desfkn, review, and approval of the corrective action,

> procurement for replacement or repair,

)> availability of specialized equipment to perform the repair,

)> the need to be in hot or cold shutdown to implement the corrective action,

> - or other factors that constrain the corrective action schedule.

.Prepared by:. Date/Time:

Name (Print) / Signature Engineering Manager Approval: Date/Time:

Name (Print) / Signature PBF-1553 Revision 9 10/16/02 Page 8 of 8

Reference:

NP53 7

Schroeder, John-P crom: Lauzze, J Mike (WLS) [J-MikeLauzze@ DRESSER-RAND.com]

Sent: Tuesday, December 04, 2001 2:02 PM To: , Schroeder, John-P

Subject:

Terry Turbine John You should not have any major problem starting or stopping your turbine ever 15 minutes or so in an Emergency situation. You could end of with some condensation or control problems but this should not prevent the turbine from running.

Mike 1

Nuclear Management Company Page 1 of 4 STATE CHANGE HISTORY Initiate AR Pro-Screen 10/29/2002 12:41:27 PM Owner (None) by WILLIAM ZIPP SECTION I Activity Request Id: CAP029952 Activity Type: CAP Submit Date: 10/29/2002 12:41:27 PM 0 One Line

Description:

Possible Common Mode Failure of Aux Feed Recirculation Lines

  • Detailed

Description:

1012912002 12:41:27 PM - WILLIAM ZIPP:

Partial plugging of the minl-reciro orifice (RO-4008) In the recirc line from aux feed pump P-38A occurred during documented in CAP 029908. Flow through the recirc line remained above operational limits during the event, and testing on 10124. This Is pumps were run to check for extent of condition with no reduction In recirc flows found. Review of this event has the remaining aux feed led to the conclusion that it Is possible the mini-recirc orifices for all the aux feed pumps (3 per unit) could plug during an emergency when Plugging of the recic orifice could then render Its associated pump Inoperable, as this flowpath provides a safetyaux feed Is needed.

a required amount of flow for pump protection. This considers use of our credited water supply (service water), related function to maintain using the normal CST water supply. This Is because of the small orifice opening sizes compared to the size of but may also be an Issue material be Introduced Into the system from service water, such as rust nodules from the carbon steel supply piping, sand/silt, that might credibly and lake grass.

Material could also be Introduced from the CST water supply, though this Is thought to be a very pure supply of water.

Intl~ator: ZIPP, WILLIAM 9 1 Initiator Department: ESBR nnnineerinn Fnlnmant ,CZefameQrlD Mechanical PB Datemme of Discovery: 10/2912002 11:21:55 AM Date/Time of Occurrence: 10/29/2002 11:21:55 AM IdentIfied By: Site-identifled System: (None)

Equipment # (1st): (None) Equipment Type (1st): (None)

Equipment # (2nd): (None) Eq%4pment Type (2nd): (None)

Equipment # (3rd): (None) Equipment Type (3rd): (None)

SitetUnit: Point Beach - Common Why did this occur?: 10/2912002 12:41:27 PM - WILLIAM ZIPP:

My opinion: It Is explained via considering the history for the aux feed reclrc lines:

2-3 years ago, due to recirc line vibration, cavitation, and ensuing weld failures, the recirc orifices were redesigned and a modification was Initiated to replace the existing orifices with anti-cavitation models. All four have been replaced, the last one being UI R27. The new orifices have smaller passages than the original model. At the time the mod was conceptualized, done last month during was to LIMIT flow, ensuring adequate forward flow to the steam generators. Potential for blockage of the orifices the recirc line's function considered possible, but Justified based on the short length of time the recirc line Is needed at the beginning of was explored, and an accident. The recirc line's function to limit flow bounds any postulated orifice blockage.

https://nmc.ttrackonline.comltmtrack/tmtrack.dll?issuePage&TableId_1 000&Recordld=-278389&Template--viewbodv 10/30/2002

Nuclear Management Company Page 2 of 4 Nov/Dec 2001: Issue of reclrc line AOV failing closed on loss of instrument air; subsequent "red" finding. PBNP design philosophy evolves to needing recirc ine flow to maintain aux feed pump operability. EOPs and AOPs revised to ensure protect the pumps from overheating is maintained, and absent that, that recirc flow Is present. The minimum forward flow required to means of verifying recirc flow is that the recir AOV Indicates open, as them Is no control room Indication of recirc flow. Apparently, the impact of the new orifice mod was not considered. Unclear to me at this point.

Summer 2002: Recira line AOV function to open becomes a safety, related function. The internals line to the CSTs was removed to eliminate a potential common mcde failure. Again, the orifice of the check valve in the common return appears to have not been considered.

Immediate Action Taken: 10/29/2002 12:41:27 PM - WILLIAM ZIPP:

Discussed with engineering management, Ops management Including the on-shift DSS, Ucensing.

The shift manager declared all four aux feed pumps Inoperable at approx. 1025 on 10/29/2002. Came to concensus on Immediate actions needed.

Recommendations: 10/29/2002 12:41:27 PM - WILLIAM ZIPP:

1) Write and hang temp Info tags on the pump handswitches, requlring that a minimum forward aux feed flow of greater than 50 gpm (P-38 A/B) or 75 gpm (1/2 - P29) be maintained, if not, stop affected pump.; brief the Ops crews on the
2) Make changes to affected AOPs, EOPs, and other critical procedures to ensure that minimum issue. (Ops) forward flow Is malntainedLor the affected pump Is stopped. (Ops, Engr support 50.59)
3) Review for reportability; report the Issue (Licensing)
4) Review from PSA significance determination process perspective. Evalute the present way the orifices are modeled (PSA).
5) Review for Impact on aux feed pump unavailabilty for NEI cornerstone performance Indicator
6) Redesign the recirc line orifices to make use of an orifice design that has aperture size of >1/8"(EESN).

(basis: service water zum strainer size Is 1/8"). Consider providing Control Room with Indication of recirc line flow. (design engr) 10 Notify Me During Eval?: N 10 SRO Review Required?: Y SECTION 2 Operability Status: (None)

  • Compensatory Actions: N Basis for Operability:
  • Unplanned TSAC Entry- N
  • External Notification: N SECTION33 Screened?: N
  • Significance Level: (None)

INPO OE Reqd?: N Potential MRFF?: N

  • QA/Nuclear Oversight?: N

Nuclear Management Company Page 3,of 4 Inappropriate Action:

Process: (None) Activity (None)

Human Error Type: (None) Human Perf Fall Mode: (None)

Equip Failure Mode: (None) Process Fall Mode: (None)

OrglMgt Failure Mode: (None) 0 Group Causing Prob: (None)

Hot Buttons: (None)

SECTION 5 CAP Admin: PBNP CAP Admin Prescreener: (None) 0 Project: Corrective Action Program (CAP)

  • State: AR Pre-Screen
  • Active/inactive: Active
  • Submitter: WILLIAM ZIPP
  • Owner: (None)

AR Type: Parent

  • Last Modified Date: "10/30/20029:56:58 AM
  • Last Modifier: MARYBETH ARNOLD
  • Last State Change Date: 10/29/2002 12:41:27 PM
  • Last State Changer: WILLIAM ZIPP
  • Close Date:

NUTRK ID:

  1. of Children: 0

References:

Update: The Managers' Screen Team initially reviewed this CAP on 10/30/02 and determined a Root Cause Evaluation of this Level A CAP occur, as well as Issuing actions as those made in the Recommendations section. This CAP still remains In the screening should queue awaiting OD completion.

Prescreen Comments:

Import Memo Field:

OPR Completed?: N OLDACTIONNUM:

sub tsld: 0 original_projectlId: 0 orIgInal-Issue.ld:

Site: Point Beach Cartridge and Frame:

https://mnc.ttrackonline.com/tmtrack/tmtrack.dll?IssuePage&Tableid=1000&Recordld=278389&Template=viewbodv 10/l0!200?

Nuclear Management Company Page 4 of 4 ATTACHMENTS AND PARENTICHILD LINKS SPrincloal to OPROO031: Possible Common Mode Failure of Aux Feed Recirculation Lhes CHANGE HISTORY 1012912002 6:23:38 PM by DAN WEBER Last Modified Date Changed From 10/29/2002 12:41:27 PM To 10/29/2002 6:23:38 PM Last Modifier Changed From WILLIAM ZIPP To DAN WEBER 1012912002 6:32:25 PM by DAN WEBER Last Modified Date Changed From 10/29/2002 6:23:38 PM To 10/2912002 6:32:25 PM Attachment Added: Principal to OPR000031: Possible Common Mode Failure of Aux Feed Redrculatlon Unes 1013012002 9:56:58 AM by MARYBETH ARNOLD Last Modified Date Changed From 10129/2002 6:32:25 PM To 10/30/2002 9:56:58 AM Last Modifier Changed From DAN WEBER To MARYBETH ARNOLD Update Changed From "To lAppended:JThe Managers' Screen Team Initially reviewed this CAP on 10/3X102 and determined a Root Cause Evaluation of this Level A CAP should occur, as well as Issuing actions as those made Inthe Recommendations section. This CAP still remains In[,..]'

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