Information Notice 1989-57, Unqualified Electrical Splices in Vendor-Supplied Environmentally Qualified Equipment

Unqualified Electrical Splices in Vendor-Supplied Environmentally Qualified Equipment
	ML031180713
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	07/26/1989
From:	Rossi C; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
References
	IN-89-057, NUDOCS 8907200019
	Download: ML031180713 (6)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

July 26, 1989

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-57:

UNQUALIFIED ELECTRICAL SPLICES IN

VENDOR-SUPPLIED ENVIRONMENTALLY

QUALIFIED EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice Is being provided to alert addressees to a potential

problem involving unqualified electrical splices in vendor-supplied environ- mentally qualified (EQ) equipment.

It is expected that recipients will review

the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this

information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action-or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On June 5, 1989, the licensee for the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) reported to

the NRC the finding of unqualified splices within conduits on vendor-supplied

instrument racks. The racks contain wire junction boxes and Barton differen- tial pressure indicating switches (DPISS). A piece of flexible conduit runs

between the junction box and a condulet mounted on the DPIS (See Attachment 1).

The flexible conduits vary in length from 2 to 10 feet. The unqualified

splices consisted of wirenuts, insulated butt crimps, or Scotch tape splices.

This problem was discovered during an unrelated walkdown inspection that was

being performed as part of an instrument upgrading process for Regulatory Guide

1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess

Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident."

The racks

were manufactured by HUICO Incorporated of Pasco, Washington, and supplied as a

unit by the General Electric Company during initial plant construction.

Discussion:

The only wiring performed by the licensee during initial plant construction was

that from the field to the rack-mounted junction boxes.

During previous EQ

walkdown inspections of plant equipment, the licensee inspected the junction

boxes only to verify the existence of qualified wiring. The licensee did not

inspect the cable terminations in the DPISs because such an inspection would

Aft

}lJ

90720001

IN 89-57 July 26, 1989 have affected the EQ integrity of the DPISs and because only a short run of

wire was involved. It was assumed that the qualified wire in the junction

boxes continued to the DPIS terminal strips, but unqualified splices were found

instead. These splices were not indicated on any plant drawings.

The licensee performed a 100-percent walkdown inspection of all instrument

racks and believes that the problem is confined to approximately seven racks.

A review of maintenance records indicated that about four of the DPIS instru- ments were replaced.

As this replacement only involved disconnection of leads

at the terminal strip located inside the instrument, the unqualified splices

remained undetected. The results of the licensee's investigation indicate that

the unqualified splices are restricted to the specific instrument racks

manufactured by HUICO. The investigation also indicates that the unqualified

splices existed in the conduits when the racks were delivered to CNS.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

-- --

-

- ---Dtston-of-nperational Events-Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Thomas F. Stetka, Region IV

(817) 860-8247 Attachments:

1. Figure 1, "Typical Junction Box and Barton Switch Arrangement"

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

r

%

Attachment I

IN 89-57

July 26, 1989

---

1 LOCAL RACK-MOUNTED JUNCTION BOX

Boundary of

o

Vendor-Supplied

d

EquIpmentsB

zz

~Flexible

Condults

l

/

~BARTON SWITCH

LLI

ti

\\

ndulet

Splices/0'

iL_____________---------------------

Figure 1 Typical Junction Box and Barton Switch Arrangement

Attacluient 2

July 26. 1989 Page I f I

LIST OF RECEILT ISSUED

IRC INFORMATION

XOTICu

uaoflation

llttite

Sssu.ns

e

Issued to

9-16 Questioneabl

Certification

7/20/89

All holden of .Ls

of Material Supelied to the

or CPs for nuclear

Defens DePrt" wt by Meleer

power reactors.

Suppliers

-45.

Itetalclad. Low-voltage

7/6/88

All holders of Os

Supp. I

Power Circuit Breakers

or Cs for nuclear

Refurbished With Substandard

power reactors.

Parts

89-55 Dogredation of Contelamont

6/30/89

All holder, of Os

Isolatie Capability by a

or Cs for nuclear

High-Energy Line Break

power reactors.

9-54 Potential Onrspressuriztioen 8/23/89

All holder, of OLs

of the Ctmaoneat Cooling

or CPs for nucleer

water System

power reactors.

89-53 Rupture of Extrection

6/13/89

All holders of OLs

Staea Line on High

or CPs for nuclear

Pressure Turbine

power reactors.

3s-46.

Licensee Report of

6/8/89

All holders of OLs

Supp. 3 Defective Refurbished

or CPs for nucler

Circuit Breakers

power reactors.

89-52 Potentiel Fire Duaer

6/8/89

All holders of OLs

Operational Problm

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

89-51 Potential Loss of Required

5/31/89

All holders of OLs

Shutdown Margie During

or CPs for nuclear

Refueling Operetions

power reactors.

8s-U.

Dmeredatioa of Westinghouse

5/31/89

All holder, of OLs

Supp. 1 Relays

or Cft for nuclear

pO~r reactor,.

89-50

Inadequate Enrgency

5/30/89

All holders of 0s

Distal Generator Fuel

or CPs for nuclear

Supply

power rectors.

L : Opereting License

CP

Construction Permit

,,

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300

FtRST CLASS MAIL

POSTAGE & FEES PAID

USSBINoC

l, .

1T

IN 89-57 July 26, 1989 have affected the EQ integrity of the DPISs and because only a short run of

wire was Involved.

It was assumed that the qualified wire in the Junction

boxes continued to the DPIS terminal strips, but unqualified splices were found

instead. These splices were not indicated on any plant drawings.

The licensee performed a 100-percent walkdown inspection of all instrument

racks and believes that the problem is confined to approximately seven racks.

A review of maintenance records indicated that about four of the DPIS instru- ments were replaced. As this replacement only involved disconnection of leads