Information Notice 1988-65, Inadvertent Drainages of Spent Fuel Pools

Inadvertent Drainages of Spent Fuel Pools

ML031150190
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	08/18/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-065, NUDOCS 8808120327
Download: ML031150190 (10)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 18, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-65: INADVERTENT DRAINAGES OF SPENT FUEL POOLS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors and fuel storage facilities.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems resulting from unintentional draining of spent fuel pools (SFPs).

It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

Description of Circumstances

Wolf Creek - On December 22, 1987 the licensee, Kansas Gas and Electric, un- intentionally lowered the level of water in the SFP to an estimated minimum

height of 22 feet above the stored fuel. The licensee determined that a valve

in the return line to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) had been inadver- tently left open two days earlier after operations to clean up the RWST inven- tory through the SFP clean up system. The licensee stopped the drainage by

closing this valve.

The safety-related area radiation monitors near the SFP did not alarm. In

the control room, the SFP level indicator and the low level alarm on the SFP

cooling system pump suction were both inoperable. The control room operators

were alerted to this event by the successive tripping of SFP cooling system

pump A while they were operating the SFP clean up system.

River Bend - On September 20, 1987 the licensee, Gulf States Utilities, while

preparing for refueling, intentionally lowered the level in the upper SFP to

2 feet below the normal level of 185 feet to allow for the expected water dis- placement when the steam dryer assembly would be transferred there. This

caused the level indicator in the control room to go off scale as expected

and the related low level alarm to activate as expected. Pool level indi- cation is provided for a narrow range: 185 feet +/- 12 1/2 inches. The alarm

is set at 184 feet 7 1/2 inches when the level decreases.

8808120327 \ _ D

( X '(g

-' IN 88-65 August 18, 1988 After placing the steam dryer in the pool, the

valves from the condensate storage tank (CST) plant operators opened two

with the intent of then closing

two valves in the SFP purification suction line

minutes, while the four valves were opened, the (see Figure 1). Within 20

5 feet, partially uncovering the dryer assembly. level decreased an additional

monitors at both ends of the pool alarmed and Safety-related area radiation

indicated fields of about

80 mr/hr.

The drainage had been made possible by a procedural

free flow path in conjunction with a nonredundant sequence establishing a

vent pipe under water) in the suction line of antisiphon device (a vertical

antisiphon device had been plugged. the SFP purification system. The

The operator in the control room was not aware

level indicator was off scale. At the time of of the pool draining because the

the SFP area radiation monitor

alarms, however, an operator at an auxiliary equipment

a water level increase in the CST. Realizina control panel noticed

that this combination of signals

meant the SFP was draining, operators closed the

two

purification system suction line to stop the draining. manual valves in the SPF

in about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> using one SFP purification pump They restored the level

drawing suction from the CST.

Discussion:

In addition to the two events discussed above, spent fuel pool occurred at San Onofre 3 on Juneanother partial drainage of the

can cause potentially high radiation doses and 22, 1988. Drainage of SFPs

damage to fuel elements result- ing from the uncovery of spent fuel in storage

Although the consequences of the events describedor, in particular, in transit.

were not significant, they indicate deficiencies in this information notice

refueling operations and SFP safety. in control and management of

At San Onofre, the SFP cooling system design

was apparently properly siphon- protected, but the SFP purification system design

Bend, antisiphon devices in the SFP purification apparently was not. At River

preoperational testing but were not unplugged system were plugged to permit

at the beginning of refueling

operations.

Operating procedures for the interconnected systems

were not sufficiently detailed or were incorrect associated with SFPs either

ments causing unintentional drainage. At River and failed to prevent align- Bend, indication was limited. Detailed operating procedures the range of SFP level

not correct. At Wolf Creek, detailed operating were available but were

procedures did not exist.

Surveillance procedures were not implemented to

instrumentation and control equipment. At Wolf ensure the operability of all

lance procedures for water level instrumentation Creek, there were no surveil- a year. Also, the SFP cooling pump suction alarmthat had been inoperable for

was inoperable.

IN 88-65 August 18, 1988 notice.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

contact one of the techni-

If you have any questions about this matter, please

cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

h/aA

HEo osk r

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 J. Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Simplified Flow Path Diagram of Upper Pool

Purification System at River Bend

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

,Normal Water Level 185' O"

72'1"t*oL a_ A.

CC

o -en(7 D

0~0

-ua

Figure 1. Simpified Flow Path Diagram of Upper Pool so

Purification System at River Bend.

Attachment 2 IN 88-65 August 18, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-64 Reporting Fires in Nuclear 8/18/88 All holders of OLs

Process Systems at Nuclear or CPs for nuclear

Power Plants power reactors.

88-63 High Radiation Hazards 8/15/88 All holders of OLs

from Irradiated Incore or CPs for nuclear

Detectors and Cables power reactors, research reactors

and test reactors.

88-62 Recent Findings Concerning 8/12/88 All holders of NRC

Implementation of Quality quality assurance

Assurance Programs by program approval

Suppliers of Transport for radioactive

Packages material packages.

88-61 Control Room Habitability - 8/11/88 All holders of OLs

Recent Reviews of Operating or CPs for nuclear

Experience power reactors.

88-60 Inadequate Design and 8/11/88 All holders of OLs

Installation of Watertight or CPs for nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-04, Inadequate Qualification 8/9/88 All holders of OLs

Supplement 1 and Documentation of Fire or CPs for nuclear

Barrier Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-59 Main Steam Isolation Valve 8/9/88 All holders of OLs

Guide Rail Failure at or CPs for nuclear

Waterford Unit 3 power reactors.

88-58 Potential Problems with 8/8/88 All holders of OLs

ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L or CPs for nuclear

Time-Overcurrent Relays power reactors.

88-57 Potential Loss of Safe 8/8/88 All holders of OLs

Shutdown Equipment Due to or CPs for nuclear

Premature Silicon Controlled power reactors.

Rectifier Failure

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-65 August 18, 1988 by this information notice.

No specific action or written response is required contact one of the techni- If you have any questions about this matter, please of the appropriate

cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 J. Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments: Pool

1. Figure 1. Simplified Flow Path Diagram of Upper

Purification System at River Bend

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCES *PDSNP:DRST:NRR

• C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ARM *D/IMNS:NMSS

CHBerlinger TechEd RCunningham CMiller

-

08/10/88 04/27/88 08/08/88 08/09/88 R *SPLB:DEST:NRR *C/SPLB:DEST:NRR*SAD/DEST:NRR *D/DEST:NRR

JKudrick JCraig AThadani LCShao

VHodge 07/28/88

07/15/88 07/18/88 07/20/88 07/26/88

IN 88-xx

August xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 J. Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Simplified Flow Path Diagram of Upper Fuel Pool

Purification System at River Bend

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

, LUt, F'?

LA

L,.} bc 000

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENC rev

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DO A: NRR*RPB:ARM D/IMNS:NMSS PDSNP:DRST:NRR

CERossi CHBerllnger TechEd RCunningham CMiller

08/ /88 08//0/88 04/27/88 08/O/88 08/01/88

• OGCB:DOEA:NRPt *SPLB:DEST:NRR *C/SPLB:DEST:NRR*SAD/DEST:NRR *D/DEST:NRR

VHodge JKudrick JCraig AThadani LCShao

07/15/88 07/18/88 07/20/88 07/26/88 07/28/88

IN 88-xx

July xx, 1988 notice.

No specific action or written response is required by this information techni- of the

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one

cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 J. Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Simplified Flow Path Diagram of Upper Fuel Pool

Purification System at River Bend

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RPB:ARM

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd

07/ /88 07/ /88 04/27/8

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR *C/SPLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DESTzNR D/DESTfRR/

VHodge JKudrick JCraig AThadani-K LCSh

07/15/88 07/18/88 07/20/88 07f4/88 07/ / 8 8

IN 88-xx

July xx, 1988 Surveillance procedures were not implemented to ensure the operability of all

instrumentation and control equipment. At Wolf Creek, there were no surveil- lance procedures for water level instrumentation that had been inoperable for a

year. Also, the SFP cooling pump suction alarm was inoperable.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge

(301) 492-1169 J. Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Simplified Flow Path Diagram of Upper Fuel Pool

Purification System at River Bend

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR *RPB:ARM C: DST C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR

VHodge JKudrick TechEd J raig CHBerlinger CERossi

07/15/88 07/18/88 04/27/88 072,,/88 07/ /88 07/ /88

IN 88-xx

July xx, 1988 Antisiphon devices were either not included in the system design, not in- stalled, or were initially placed in service but were not operable when re- quired. At San Onofre, the SFP cooling system design was apparently properly

siphon-protected, but the SFP purification system design apparently was not.

At River Bend, anitsiphon devices in the SFP purification system were plugged

to permit preoperational testing but were not unplugged at the beginning of

refueling operations.

Operating procedures for the interconnected systems associated with SFPs either

were not sufficiently detailed or were incorrect and failed to prevent align- ments causing unintentional drainage. At River Bend, the range of SFP level

indication was limited. Detailed operating procedures were available but were

not correct. At Wolf Creek, detailed operating procedures did not exist.

Surveillance procedures were not implemented to ensure the operability of all

instrumentation and control equipment. At Wolf Creek, there were no surveil- lance procedures for water level instrumentation that had been inoperable for a

year. Also, the SFP cooling pump suction alarm was inoperable.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charl es E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge

(301) 492-1169 J. Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Simplified Flow Path Diagram of Uppe r Fuel Pool

Purification System at River Bend

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPL :NRR RPB:ARM OhM' C/OGCB :DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR

VHodge JKu k TechEd CHBerli i nger CERossi

07/1?/88 07/\ 8 Otf 2-9/88 b\ 07/ /I38 07/ /88