IR 05000546/1980004
| ML20037B749 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Marble Hill |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1980 |
| From: | Foster J, Hawkins F, Hayes D, Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037B747 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-546-80-04, 50-546-80-4, 50-547-80-04, 50-547-80-4, NUDOCS 8011200553 | |
| Download: ML20037B749 (40) | |
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U.S. Nt' CLEAR REGl'LATORY COM'!ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEstEST RECION III Report No. 50-546/80-04; 50-547/80-04 License No. CPPR-170; CPPR-171
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Docket No. 50-546; 50-547 Licensee: Public Service of Indiana P. O. Box 190 New k'ashington, IN 47162 Facility Nane: Marble Hill, l' nits 1 and 2 Investigation At: Marble "ill Site and vicinity Investigation Conducted: J a n t.r.r y 23-25, 30-31, F(.bruary 1, 6-8, June 17-20, 30, July 1-3, and 8-11, 1950 G.f V 4 4 h6 Investigator-F.
Foster
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Investination Summarv Investication Conducted on January 23-25, 30-31, February 1. 6-8, June 17-20, 30, July 1-3, and 8-11, 1980 (Report No. 50-536/80-04: 50-547/S0-04)
Areas Investicated:_ Special, unannounced investigation into allegations concerning improper practices and falsification of records by the site concrete testing laboratory; review of pertinent records, interviews of past and present personnel, inspections of equipment and materials.
The intestigation involved 300 inspection hours by two NRC personnel.
Results: Several of the allegations were found to relate to acceptable
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itens or nonconfornances properly identified and dispositioned within the licensee's quality assurance system.
Other allegations reviewed resulted in the identification of three itens of noncorpliance with NRC requirements relative to; identification on testing personnel on inspection / test records, docunentation of activities affecting quality, identification of conditions adverse to cuality, and failure to follow procedures.
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REASON FOR INVESTIGATION On June 20, 1979, Mr. J. E. Henry, Jr., provided Mr. T. Dattilo, Attorney for Save-the-Valley, (an intervenor group) with a sworn statement concern-ing improprieties at the U. S. Testing Laboratory on the Marble Hill site.
Subsequently, Mr. Henry was interviewed by Mr. Dattilo and Representative Joel Deckard, and a transcript was made of portions of the interview.
Mr.
Henry also provided Representative Deckard with copies of documents to support some of his allegations.
Representative Deckard advised NRC Headquarters personnel, on June 28,
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1979, of general allegations concerning U. S. Testing, but did not provide specifics or the source of his information.
SUMMARY OF FACTS In response to Representative Deckard's concerns, the U.S. Army Engineer Wate:vays Experiment Station was contracted by the NRC to perform a detailed independent inspection of the UST Laboratory on July 25-27. 1979. This inspec-tion included a review of UST laboratory and field testing procedures, and the general areas of concern provided by Representative Deckard. The results of this inspection are documented in IE Report 50-546/79-16.
Representative Deckard then provided the statements and documents that he had received frem Mr. Henry to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Fraud Section, on August 28, 1979. A partially legible copy of this package was recei ed by NRC Region III (RIII) from the FBI thro 9gh NRC Headquarters on September 20, 1979.
It was not until January 24, 1980, that a completely legible copy of the statements and associated documents were received by RIII.
As the information passed to the FBI suggested possible criminal actions, RIII coordinated its investigation with the FBI. On December 20, 1979, Mr. Dattilo contacted the FBI and indicated he was representing Mr. Henry in any actions concerned with the investigation.
Mr. Henry was interviewed by FBI agents on December 31, 1979, but declined to be interviewed concurrently by NRC personnel. When subsequently contacted on January 13, 1980, Mr. Henry again declined to be interviewed.
RIII personnel reviewed the information sontained in Mr. Henry's statements and documents supplied, and were advised of the subjects discussed during his interview by FBI agents.
From this information, a list of allegations was infecred.
However, many of these lacked the specific information necessary to perform an adequate investigation.
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i In the interest of performing a timely investigation, RIII personnel visited the '!arble Hill site during January and February 1960.
During those visits, the investigative team reviewed documents, interviewed present and former l
Lir personnel, and inspected present and former UST facilities.
Sone of the information developed during these visits appeared to relate to the inferred allegations, but because of the lack of specific'information it could not be ascertained if all of Mr. Henry's concerns had been reviewed by the investigation team.
It was concluded that an intervicw of Mr.
Henry by NRC personnel was imperative to assure that the specific concerns were addressed.
Continued efforts to interview Mr. Henry were not successful, and the NRC issued a subpoena for hin to appear at the Region III offices on March 31, 19S0.
Mr. Henry did not respond to this subpoena.
During May and June, 1950, enforcement of the subpoena was pursued, through the U. S. Departrent or J stice.
It was then found that Mr. Henry had moved and enlisted in the U. S. Armed Forces.
Following additional contacts with C. S. Military personnel anc Mr.
Dattilo, arrangements were nade for an interview of Mr. Henry on June 17, 1930. This interview was perfor ed under oath, with a court reporter present, and a transcript of the interview was prcduced.
The interview ccnsisted of over seven hours of discussion, and therefore the interview transcript is lengthy, consisting of 242 pages and several exhibits.
(The transcript is not attached to this report, but a copy will be placed in the NRC Public Docunent Roots in Madison, Indiana and Washington, D.C.)
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Frcm a revicu of all interview transcripts, including that of the NRC l
interview, a list of specific allegations was developed.
These allega-tions (paraphrased) are as follows:
1.
Mr. Henry's name was misspelled on a conpressive stre: gth test report, indicating it was not his signature.
2.
The compressive strength test report for grout cube sample No. 521 (AU-346-7) was falsified.
3.
The grout placed in concrete placement AW-346-7 (Sample No. 521) did not meet design compressive strength requirements.
4.
UST personnel were told to increase low grout cube compressive strength results to bring then within 107 of the result of their companion grout cube.
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The compressive strength test results for cylinder No. 783 were a
" test failure", but no corrective action was taken. No concrete was ever removed as a result of a " test failure."
6.
The initial curing temperatures for compressive strength cylinders were not within the limits specified.
7.
The laboratory curing temperatures for compressive strength cylinders were not within the limit specified.
8.
Unqualified UST personnel performed testing.
9.
All required in process tests for grout were not performed.
10.
The moist cure room temperature log for the old laboratory was falsified for the dates July 12 and 13,197c.
11.
The moist cure room temperature log for the new laboratory was falsified for September 4, 1978.
12.
Newberg QC personnel disregarded notification of in process test failures by UST personnel and continued to place out of specifica-tion concrete.
Newberg QC personnel switched the order of concrete trucks during 13.
tightened sampling to circumvent specification requirements.
14.
UST personnel were advised to look for a truck containing concrete of acceptable quality during in-process testing.
15.
Concrete was placed in the rain.
16.
Concrete in a fuel handling slab placement had unacceptably high temperatures when placed.
17.
Workers used discarded in-process concrete samples for patching areas of concrete imperfection.
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Methods used to place concrete caused segregation.
19.
Foreign matter entered some concrete pours during placement.
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A UST technician never returned the concrete and fly ash logs to the lab manager after removing them from the site.
Some logged informa-tion was falsified.
21.
A relative density soil sample was lost and improperly re-sampled.
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22.
Soil and concrete material samples sat unprotected and were contaminated.
23.
Pour notificati vis contained inadequate inf ormation to establish in-process acceptant? criteria. An example of this was the Aycock unloading fa-ility placetuent.
24.
lioneycombed surf aces on the Fuel llandling slab vere covered to hide tnem from inspectors.
25.
Concrete cylinders were improperly stored after casting, causing unparallel ends and therefore unacceptable compressive streng'h test results.
26.
Reinf orcing steel testing was performed improperly on a " worn" machine.
27.
No reinforcing steel ever failed a retest, thereby implying the retests are in question.
28.
UST was notified prior to NRC inspections.
29.
" Improper" equipnent (slump cones), being used in the field, were thrown away during an NRC inspection.
30.
The concrete corpression testing machine utilized in the old laboratory was hand-operated.
31.
No aggregate correction factor was utilized by UST when performing the test for air content of fresh cencrete.
32.
Communications were poor, and some in-process concrete tests were missed as a result.
33.
Aggregate storage was improper, causing segregation of coarse aggregates and noisture control difficulties for fine aggregates.
34.
The concrete cylinder " break log" for UST starts at No. 100.
35.
Cylinder capping compound nixed with bash cylinders during capping, making the compression tests unrepresentative.
36.
An NRC inspector took no action on information provided by Mr. llenry.
37.
PSI had been made aware of concreting problems in writing and had ignored the notification.
During the invescigation two allegations were developed separate fron those made by Mr. llenry.
These allegations are as follows:
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A UST technician was told to decrease an abnormally high grout cube.coepressive strength test result.
39.
The test report for tests to determine the optinum rheostat setting on the relative density vibratory table was altered, and the technician's signature falsified.
In general, the allegations were found to represent actual incidents.
Esny of the allegations reflected previously identified situations or items.
The investigatien did identify that lab personnel had in sore cases initialed and signed for technicians without indicating that this had been dene.
No attenpts to forge documents (copy writing or initialing styles) were detected.
Ne evidence could be developed to substantiate that concrete and grout corpressive strength test results or terperature logs had been falsified.
It was found that the lab canager had supplied to Public Service of Indiana (PSI) a lab test report pertaining to a relative density vibratory table con-taining adjusted figures, and he had signed for the testing technician.
No evidence was developed to shew that the figures were adjusted vich the purpose of altering the final results of the test report.
Investigation of the allegations resulted in the identification of three itens of noncompliance with NRC requirements relative to identificatice of testing personnel, decomentation of octivities affecting quality, identification of conditiens adverse to cuality, and fa*1ure to follow procedures.
The effect of the substantiated allegatiens on concrete quality and the ability of the plant to reet design requirerents was not considered significant.
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contactgd Public Service of Indiana
- G. Brown, Project Director
- C. Chmielewski, Superintendent-Civil Quality Systems
- B. Morrison, Quality Engineering Superintendent-Civil
- R. Kime, Construction Manager j
- J. Norris, Quality Assurance Manager
- D. Ingmire, Construction Verification Coordinator
- C. Beckham, Manager-Quality Engineering
- G. Warner, Civil Quality Engineering, Superintendent
- L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Manager
- D. Shuter, Lead Quality Controi-Civil R. Turner, Quality Assurance Manager U. S. Testing D. Hargrave-Thomas, Technician
- D. Lanham, Site Project Manager D. Morris, Technician R. Brunner, Technician
- A. Simonti, Project Manager
- R. Rademacher, Assistant Site Project Manager A. Sperber, Project Manager Newberg-Marble Hill
- J. Ball, Cost and Scheduling
- D. Stegemoller, Vice President Federal Bureau of Investigation Lamont Hagen, Agent in Charge, New Albany Field Office U. S. Congress
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Representative Joel Deckard Save-the-Valley T. Dattilo,
.t.t tc rn ey Individuals
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Individuals "A" ti rough "II'
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- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on July 11, 1980.
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2.
Introduction The Marble Hill Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, licensed to Public Service of Indiana, is under construction at a site approxi-mately ten (10) niles south of Madison, Indiana. Sargent and Lundy Engineers (SSL) is the architect / engineering corpany for the plant.
The facility is designed to utilize pressurized water reactors supplied by b'estinghouse, and to generate 1,120 megawatts of elec-tricity per unit.
Unit 1 is approximately 20% complete and Unit 2 is approximately 62 complete at this time.
Newberg-Marble Hill (N-Erl) a joint venture of Gust K. Newberg Construc-tion Company, and Gust K. Newberg, Inc., is the prime concrete con-tractor for the facility, providing concrete for both safety-related (centainnent, auxiliary, steam tunnel, ultimate heat sink, and fuel handling buildings) and nonsafety-related (turbine, radwaste, admini-strative buildings, and cooling towers) structures.
Only those structures considered as safety-related (Category I) are required to neet the quality requi.erents of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulr. ions (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B (Quality Assurance criteria for nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing plants).
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Safety-related work at the oite was halted by PSI on august 7, 1979, and confirred by the NRC Order on August 15, 1979. The NRC concluded during an inspection concocted and documented in IE Report No. 50-546/
79-11 that effective inplerentation of the doeurented Marble Hill Ouality Assur ance Progran fer all safety-related constructicn had not occurred and that consequently, safety-related construction should cease.
E. S. Testing Company (UST), headquartered in Hoboken, New Jersey, is an independent testing laboratory contracted to PSI.
T. e site labor-atory functions as a service organization. UST performs tests of concrete, concrete naterials, soils, reinforcing steel, and performs inspection of structural steel erection, rechat.ical splice (cadweld)
operations, and blasting activities.
3.
Scope This investigation focuses on allegations received fron Mr. James E.
Henry, Jr., regarding inproper testing and falsification of records
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the Marble Hill UST laboratory.
Also included are two allegations at
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received by NRC personnel during the investigation.
4.
Technical Backgroun<1
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The majority of sampling and testing performed by UST is in
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accordance with the standard methods of the American Society for Testinc and Materials (ASTM). Other standards in use at the Marble Hill site include the American Concrete Institute (ACI), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station Concrete Research Division (CRD) methods, and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 2.
The definitions of certain terms which are used frequently through the body of this report are included in this section.
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a.
Grout - A mixture of cementious material, water, and aggregate, proportioned to produce a pourable consistency without segrega-
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tion of the constituents. Several dif ferent strengths of grout are used at Marble Hill. The two most common are designed to develop 90-day compressive strengths of 3,500 psi and 5,500 psi, respectively.
b.
S1rnp A measure of the consistency of freshly mixed concrete
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equal to the subsidence measured to the nearest 1/4 inch of the molded specimen immediately af ter removal of the slump cone.
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The slump test is an uncomplicated test to perform and is one of the in process quality control tests for fresh concrete which is required by the Marble Hill job specifications.
c.
Bash - A mixture of cement, fly ash, water, and aggregate used as structural backfill at Marble Hill. The " Bash" mix is designed to develop a minimum compressive strength of 50 psi at 90-days.
5.
Receipt of Allegations On May 8, 1979, Mr. Charles Cutshall provided Mr. Thomas Dattilo, Attorney for Save-the-Valley, with a sworn statement concerning the repair ci concrete imperfections at the Marble Hill plant. This sworn statement was not released by Mr. Dattilo, at the request of Mr.
Cutshall, until June 12, 1979. Subsequently on June 14, 1979, RIII received a copy of the statement.
This statement was the basis for IE Investigation Report No. 50-546/79-03 which is presently unissued due to a FBI request.
Portions of this statement (pages 16 through 18) ter.d to indicate that Save-the-Valley had received allegations concerning UST at that time.
During contacts with Mr. Dattilo on June 21 and 25, 1979, Mr. Dattilo
advised NRC representatives to "look at" grout cube compressive
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strength tests for concrete placement AW-346-7 (auxiliary buildinJ wall, 346 ft. elevation). He declined to identify his source of information. NRC personnel reviewed documentation for AW-346-7, located the grout cube " break" discussed later in this report, and on June 28, 1979, advised Mr. Dattilo that compressive strength documentation for this placement was considered acceptable. The alleged low compressive strength result for one grout cube in Sample No. 521 was also discussed.
On June 28, 1979, Representative Joel Deckard requested that NRC headquarters personnel meet and brief him on the status of Marble Hill. During this meeting, Mr. Deckard advisac NRC personnel of generalized allegations concerning UST.
Mr. Deckard declined to provide specifics or identify the alleger (See Exhibit I).
These generalized allegations were provided to the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station for review during an NRC contracted inspection of UST at Marble Hill during July 25-27, 1979, (IE Inspection Report No. 50-546/79-16).
Due to lack of specific information, some items could not be reviewed by the Waterways Experiment Station inspectors during this inspection.
On August 28, 1979, Mr. Deckard provided a package of the sworn statement, an undated interview transcript of Mr. Henry (See Exhibit II ), plus a large number of documents, to Mr. Walter Barnes, Fraud Department, TBI. The package was not sent to the NRC.
On September 20, 1979, RIII received a partially legible copy of the allegation package which the FBI had subsequently provided to NRC headquarters personnel. On January 24, 1980, a completely legible copy of the statement and associated documents were received by RIII from Representative Deckard. Discussions with the FBI indicated that they wished to coordinate their criminal investigation with the NRC.
Initiation of the NRC investigation was delayed at their request.
Contcets with the investigating FBI office indicated that they desired NRC's assistance in interviewing Mr. Henry and evaluat-ing the technical basis of his allegations.
On December 20, 1979, Mr. Dattilo called the investigating FBI office (New Albany, Indiana) and advised that he was acting as counsel for Mr. Henry.
FBI agents met with Mr. Dattilo on December 28, 1979, to discuss interviewing Mr. Henry, and were advised that Mr. Henry did not wish to be interviewed by NRC personnel.
Mr. Henry was interviewed by FBI personnel at Mr. Dattilo's office on December 31, 1979.
No NRC person:wl were present during this interview.
On January 10, 1980, FBI personnel provided an address and phone
number at which Mr. Henry could be reached.
Mr. Henry was contacted by telephone on January 13, 1980. He declined to be interviewed, and referred NRC personnel to Mr. Dattilo.
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Several letters and telephone contacts by RIII and NRC headquarters personnel were made with Mr. Dattilo in an effort to arrange an interview with Mr. Henry. These contacts were not successful.
On January 23, 1980, RIII began an onsite investigation, utilizing information derived from the documents and statements received from the FBI.
This effort was hampered by the lack of information in the statements themselves, as no technically knowledgeable individual had participated in the interviews, nor any individuals conversant with NRC requirements. Due to the failure to arrange an interview of Mr.
Henry, and the need to contact him to clarify his allegations, the NRC issued a subpoena for him to appear at the RIII offices on March 31, 1980.
Mr. Henry did not respond to the subpoena.
During May-June, 1950, NRC pursued enforcement of this subpoena
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through the Department of Justice and began action in Federal District Court in Mobile, Alabana (Mr. Henry's address when contacted by the FBI).
It was then found that Mr. Henry had left Mobile and enlisted in the U. 3. Air Force. A chronology of the efforts to interview Mr.
Henry is attached as Exhibit III.
Discussions with Mr. Dattilo and Air Force pezsonnel led to arrange-cents for an interview with Mr. Henry. Court actions to enforce the subpoena were then terminated.
Mr. Henry, accompanied by Mr. Dattilo, was interviewed on June 17, 1980, by Mr. J. E. Foster and Mr. F. C. Hawkins of the RIII office, accerpanied by Mr. R. Bachman, Office of the Executive Legal Director.
This interview was conducted under oath, with a court reporter present.
The interview comprised approximately 'i 1/2 hours of discussion. RIII personnel also provided Mr. Henry with the opportunity to review con-crete compressive strength test reports generated during his empicy-cent with UST.
Mr. Henry did not review these documents.
A transcript of the interview was produced from recordings cade by the court reporter. This transcript is comprised of two hundred forty-two pages of testimony and eleven pages of exhibits. Due to its length, copies are not attached to this report.
A copy of the transcript will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room in Madison, Indiana and Washington, D.C.
From the reviews of all transcribed interviews of Mr. Henry, a list
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of specific allegations was produced.
6.
Background Mr. Henry worked for the firm of UST at the Marble Hill Site fror March 23, 1978, until December 13, 1978. During his employment, he performed field and laboratory tests on concrete and reinforcing steel. His early duties principally required that he perform in-
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process concrete tests for slump, temperature, unit weight, and
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cast compressive strength cylinders.
During,the last days of
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Fepteeber, 1978, Mr. Henry was assigned to laboratory testing duties.
According to UST records, Mr. Henry was terminated on Dec er.be r 13, 1979, for excessive absenteeism.
The UST site laboratory was initally housed in a small frame building
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a shert distance from the site entrance. A trailer parked near this building was also utilized.
Curing roons were established in both the trailer and in the baserent of the frare building (91-dav cylind6rs were kept in the baser.ent roon).
These facilities were utilired until the permanent onsite lab building was constructed.
During the, last weeks of July 1978, the lab nade the transition from the-frore building to the new laberatory structure.
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Investigation Site Visits January 23-25, 19E0 4.
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Januarv 30-February 1, 1980 c.
Tebruary 6-S, 1950 d.
June 17-20, 1960 e.
Junc 30-July 3, 1980 f.
July S-11, 1950 S.
Allegations and Findings Fror discussions with Mr. Henry, and review of the docunents he supplied, the following allegations were understood.
Allegatien 1:
Mr. Henry's name was misspelled on a ccepressive strength report, indicating that it was not his signature.
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Mr.1:enry could not identify any particular compressive strength report as having been falsified, or recall the specific tire frame of such falsification.
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A review of the compressive strength test forns indicated that full signatures were used to show the individual who molded the concrete cylinders and for the site project superviser's approval.
The forms contained long-hand full signatures, initials, printed full nar.es, and typed names in the block entitled " Molded Ey".
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All compressive strength reports produced during Mr. Henry's ceploy-
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eent were reviewed for eisspellings of his name.
No misspellings
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were noted. A second review, following the NRC interview with Mr.
Henry, focused on tests performed during his first conth's employren:.
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Onbpt;ntedmisspe1}ing(Henery)wasactedinthe"MoldedBy"bleci
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on the c'omiressive strength test repor: for concrete placenent 2 cs-361/1CW-345-1 (Sampic No. 389).
As alleged, this indicated
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that Mr. Henry did not personally place his nane on the fore.
e.SSI N45.2-1971,.Section IS, requires that inspection and tes: records
'shall,fden:ify the inspector er data recorder.
NRC Headquarters per-sennel were contacted and sta:ed that the NRC position concerning :his requirer.ent is that:
(1) the full legal signature of the designated ins)ector performing verk is acceptable; (2) initials are accep:able
.if they are traceable (signature / initial log) to the inspector making the initials; (1) o:her persennel may sign or initial for the inspector;who perforned the work, if they so designate; and (a) rubber stants arc acceptable if their use is controlled and they are tractable to the individual they represent.
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PCI has idsntified on Corrective Action Request (CAR) Nc. PC0760
- tar the practice of signing or initialing for other personnel, w cheu: so designa:ing, did. occur at UST before August 7, 1979.
FSI bas verified that.a valid signature of the Level II or Level III
. responsible for the evaluation of inspection or test results is
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presen: on UST inspectien/ test reports.
PSI personnel stated tha:
this signature cons:itutes review for legibility, completeness, and final acceptance of the inspec icn/ test ne: hod and its results.
Te prevent recurrence, the laberatory testing procedures and report ferns are being revised under the revised PSI Quality Assurance Prograr to require the signatures / initials of individuals or grcup leaders perferring inspecticns or :ests.
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This failure to assure that inspection and test records identifs the
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inspector or data recorder, as discussed abeve, is considered an iter of noncenpliance with the requirements of 10 CTR 50, Appendix L,
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Criterion XVII as-described in Appendix A of the repor: transmittal letter. No response to this iter is required since the licensee initiated corrective action to assure proper disposition and to prevent re:urrence.
(546/80-04-01; 547/50-04-01)
Allegation 2: The conpressive strength test report for grout cube sample number 521 (AW-346-7) was falsified.
Findines:
During the June 17, 1980 interview with RIII, Mr. Henry stated tha:
his initials in the " Tested By" block of the test form for this sample were not his own. (See Exhibi: IV)
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Records in'the documentation package for placement AW-346-7 were reviewed by RllI personnel.
In addition, the wall was visually inspected.
Discussion with Individual
"A",
the former Level II inspector for concrete, indicated that Mr. Henry had refused to sign this compres-sive strength report as it had been marked as acceptable.
Individual
"A" readily admitted that he had placed the initials "JH" in the acceptance block on the test report to indicate that Mr. Henry was the technician who had performed the testing.
He stated that Mr.
Henry had observed him place the initials on this form. Review of Mr. Henry's initials on other documents indicates that the referenced
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initials clearly are not his, being of an entirely different hand-writing style. This is a further example of noncompliance as cited previously in Allegation 1 of this report (546/80-04-01; 5t7/80-04-01).
No response to this item is required since the licensee initiated corrective action (CAR No. PC0760) to assure proper dispos-ition and to prevent recurrence.
During the interview on June 17, 1980, Mr. Henry further stated that the Level II inspector who made reference to one 91-day cube for sample No. 521 as being " damaged" acted out of the bounds of his responsibility and that that act constituted falsification.
ACI 214 states that, "It is recommended that a specimen..be discarded if its deviation from a test mean is greater than 3 standard divations.. ".
The cube in question broke greater than 3 standard deviations below the test mean.
Therefore, it was not beyond the responsible Level II's authority to conclude that the reason for the low compressive strength result was due to damage of the specimen.
Allegation 3: The grout placed in concrete placement AW-346-7 (Sample No. 521) did not meet design compressive strength requirements.
Findings:
Grout was used in placement AW-346-7 to lubricate the pump lines and as bedding material on the horizontal construction joint.
The design strength for this grout mixture is 5,500 psi.
One of the 91-day companion grout cubes for sample No. 521 broke at 4,325 psi.
The permanent record for grout cube No. 521 indicated the 4,325 psi result had been rounded to 4,320 psi, as specified by ASTM C39.
S&L Specification Y-2722, Section 414.2 requires that grout be as strong as the concrete with which it is placed. The specified strength of concrete for use in placement AW-346-7 was 3,500 psi.
All compres-sive strength results (Sample No. 521) for grout placed in AW-346-7
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exceeded this 3,500 psi requirement.
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No itens of noncompliance were identified.
A11ccatie1_i: UST personnel were toid to increase low grout cube corpressive strength results to bring them within 107 of the result of their conpanion gratit cube.
Mr. Henry did nm. indicate which tests were irproperly increased, or which UST personnel were advised to falsify test results.
Findings: This allegation appears closely related to Allegation 38, which was not provided by *
Henry.
The inspector could not identify any centrally nixed grout t.t and a rd which referenced the 107 mentioned by Mr. Henry.
ASTM C109, section 10.1 does refer to compressive strengths differing by more than lot, and provides guidance on cube molding, but this standard applies onl:.
to the testing of hydraulic cement nortars.
As indicated in Allegation 3E, later in this report, an individual stated he had been told to decrease a high greur cube break result se as to be within 10: ef the lower grout cube break result, and indicated that Mr. Henry was present and would be knowlec eable of this incident.
e A review of greur cube test reports fer the period of Mr. Henry's enploymen: did not indicate any instances where a low grout cube or concrete cylinder break result had been increased (alteration of nunbers et whiting-out).
Interviews with past and present UST persennel did not identify any specific test reports which had been falsified.
Se itens of noncorpliance were identified.
A11egatien 5: The compressive strength test results fer cylinder Nc.
783 were a " test failure", but no ccrrective action was taken.
No concrete was ever renoved as a result of a " test failure".
Findincs:
Permanent record files contained the test report for Sarple No. 763 (Exhibit V) with results identical to that furnished by 'tr. Henry.
The file fore differs only in that the test age of the cylinder has been corrected fron 91 to 90 days.
Exhibit V reflects the test results of two concrete cylinders, cost as recuired by S&L specificatien Y-2850 when concrete exceeding the extrere limit for slu=p is identified
.
F
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during in process testing. The document indicates that one cubic yard of concrete was placed.
The compressive strength test results for both cylinders failed to
-
meet the 5,500 psi specified strength for that concr(te mix.
The test failure was documented on N-NDI Nonconformance Report (NCR) No.
233, dated July 14, 1978 (See Exhibit V).
An evaluation of the test results by Sargent & Lundy Engineers indicated the concrete was acceptable.
The allegation apparently reflects the incorrect belief that any
" test failure" requires removal of the in place concrete from which the sample was taken. The strength of the structure in place is considered potentially deficient if it sails to comply with any requirements which control the strength.
Compressive strenth is an example of one of these requirements. ACI 301, Chapter 18 states that, " Concrete work judged inadequate by structural analysis or by results of a load test shall be reinforced with additional construc-tion.. or shall be replaced...". The failure of Sarple No. 7S3 to meet its specified compressive strength does not in itself require removal of the in place concrete from which the sample was taken.
PSI personnel stated that to date, no concrete at Marble Hill has failed to meet design requirements, thereby requiring its removal.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 6: The initial curing temperatures for compressive strength cylinders were not within the limits specified.
Findings:
ASTM C31, Standard Method of Making and Curing Concrete Test Specimens in the Field requires that initial curing temperature for compres-sive strength specimens be in the range of 60 -80 F for 20 + 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Site records indicate centrol of field cure box temperatures was a recognized problem, and various attempts at corrective action were made, including:
(1) placing ice in field boxes for cooling, (2)
providing lamps for heating, (3) boxes were built with air condition-ing units, and (4) hard wiring of boxes with air conditioning was done to prevent disconnection of air conditioning units.
PSI required temperature readings on cure box temperatures to be measured via high-low thermometers, and the results are recorded on concrete cylinder compressive strength test reports.
A review of these reports indicated that field cure box temperatures were not within the specified range for a large number of cylinder specimens.
,
The majority of these had not been identified within the PS1 Quality Assurance Program.
,
i j
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t l
l
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_.
.
._
.
_
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d
'
s This failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.is considered'an item of noncompliance with
the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI as described
in Appendix A of the report transmittal letter.
No response to this
'
,
item is required since the licensee initiated corrective action to l
assure proper disposition and to prevent recurrence.
(546/80-04-02;
547/S0-04-02).
.
!
PSI fra initiated CAR No. PC0699.to asrure. proper disposition of all compressive strength specimens which were'not initially cured for the proper length ~of time or which were not cured within the specified temperature range of 60 -80 F.
The results of that disposition will be reviewed at the time of its completion.
Ir. addition, efforts are underway by PSI to develop new facilities for the field curing of conpressive strength cylinders. The acceptability of these facilities
!
will be verified by NRC during the PSI Concrete Demonstration.
Allegation 7: The laboratory curing temperatures for compressive i
strength cylinders were not within the limit specified.
Mr. Henry. stated that on one occasion the in-line pump for the old lab lost its prime, the cylinders dried out, and temperatures were
"very high" Findincs:
I ASTM C511, Moist Cabinets and Rooms Used in the Testing of Hydraulic Cemtnts and Concretes, requires that such rooms should maintain a temperature of 73.4" + 3 F and a relative humidity of not less than 95!..
The incident to which Mr. Henry specifically referred, apparently occurred in the old UST laboratory on July 31, 1978.
It was correctly
'
documented on Field Nonconformance Report.(FNR) No. 13, dated August 11, 1978, to assure prcper disposition.
No. data could be developed to j
indicate that temperatures were unusually high.
j UST Internal Corrective Action Requests (ICARs) and their subject
{
matter reviewed during this phase of the investigation included:
l ICAR 1036-21; indicates that on September 1, 1978, water was turned off to the curing room.
i l
ICAR 1036-29; indicates that the curing room temperature control malfunctioned during November 11 - December 7, 1978.
ICAR_1036-37; indicates that curing room temperatures were below
70.4" on February 16, 24, and 25, 1979, due to water pressure and water heater failures.
- 17 -
_ _,
A review of the new UST laboratory moist cure room temperature log indicated that the curing room temperatures had not been within the 73.4 + 3 F limits as spacified by ASTM C511 on several occasions during the period Sept e aber 1,1978 - November 13, 1978 (See Exhibit VI).
These instances had not been identified within the PSI Quality Assurance Program.
This is a further example of noncompliance as cited previously in Allegation 6 of this report.
(546/80-04-02; 547/80-04-02). No response to this item is required since the licensee initiated correc-tive action (CAR No. PC0501) to assure proper disposition and to prevent recurrence.
Allegation 8:
Unqualified UST personnel performed tesiang.
Mr Henry stated that he performed tests prior to being given his T-vci I certification.
Findings:
Regulatory Guide 1.58 which endorses ANSI N45.2.6-1973, contains the necessary certification requirements for inspection, examination, and testing personnel for the construction phase of nuclear power plants.
Inspectors are certified Level I, Level II, and Level III, with Level III representing the highest level of experience and authority.
Pro-visions are also established in ANSI N45.2.6-1973, Section 2.2.1 to provide for training programs.
Further, it indicates that these train-ing programs shall include on-the-job participation with emphasis on firsthand experience gained through actual performance of processes, tests, examinations, and inspecticas when under the supervision of a qualified person.
No evidence could be developed to indicate that trainees had performed safety-related testing without the super-vision of a qualified person.
A review of training and qualification records indicated that *:r.
)
Henry was certified to Level I for those tests which he performed and that for a time prior to his Level I certification, he was in a training status. Records reviewed indicated that a number of former and present UST personnel did not have prior concrete testing experience, and had been hired at the trainee level. This is not considered as an unusual or unacceptable practice.
NRC personnel identified inadequacies in the qualification / training
'
and certification program of UST. These deficiencies are addressed in IE Report No. 50-546/79-18.
In addition, a meeting was held on December 14, 1979 a: NRC headquarters
.
with NRC, PSI, and UST representatives in attendance. The purpose of l
,
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.
this meeting was to clearly establish the NRC position concerning the qualification / training and certification of personnel at UST job sites throughout the United States.
It was held as a result of the identified deficiencies in the UST program at Marble Hill and other sites within RIII.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allecation 4: All required in-process tests for grout were not performed.
Findings:
The instance to which Mr. Henry referred in his allegation, was established as placement 2CW-351-1 where grout was utilized in lieu of concrete, made on September 7, 1978.
Placement 2CW-351-1 was inspec:ed by RIII personnel. As a result of a RITI pre-place:ent inspection, it was identified that the job specifications contained no requiremen:s for the air content and unit weight in-process testing of centrally mixed grout used in lieu of concrete.
In respense, PSI instructed UST to perform in-process tests for terpera-ture, air content, unit weight and cast compressive strength cubes.
Addi:icnally PSI initiated Field Change Request (FCR) No. 289 and No.
290 to assure the necessary changes to SLE Specifica: ions Y-2722 and Y-2550.
The RIII inspector verified during his September, 197S inspection that all in-process tests for the grout were perforced.
The results of this inspection are documented im IE Report No. 50-546/78-06.
A subsequent review of the UST in-process reports for placeren: 2 CM-351-1 revealed that the test results for air content hac been omit:ed frer the pernanent record copy.
This failure to maintain suff.icient records to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality is a further exanple iter of noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CTR 50, Appendix Y, Criterion XVII, as cited previously in A11ecation 1 of this report. (546/80-04-01; 547/80-04-01) No response to this iter is required si.ne the licensee initiated corrective action (NCR No. PC0201) to assure proper disposition and to prevent recurrence.
Allegation 10: The noist cure room terperature log for the old laboratory was falsified for the dates July 12 and 13, lo76.
l Findines:
Mr. Henry stated that he had obtained a page of the log (See Exhibit
.
VII) and felt that missing temperatures for these dates had been i
I l
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filled in on the permanent record copy.
He stated he was asked at one time to initial this record by Individual
"B", and at another
,
time that he had been asked to initial a falsified temperature reading i
by the site project. manager.
.
A review of site documentation indicated that the use of the. temperature log (old lab) was initiated as-corrective action-in response to a nonconformance report on curing room temperature. This nonconformance
,
report had been generated following a PSI surveillance of the temporary
!
curing room. The copy of the log maintained in UST files (this log was not part of the formal documentation package and had been recopied)
had the dates in question filled in (See Exhibit VIII).
However,
'
no initials are present in this log, nor the copy supplied by Mr.
Henry.
I Individual "B" provided the RIII investigator with a signed statement indicating that he had not requested Mr. Henry to falsify the log.
A typed transcript of this statement is included as Exhibit IX.
The UST site project manager stated that he did not recall asking people j
to falsify the log, and that the temperature readings coula have been i
recorded on other documentation and later added to the log.
The site project manager additionally stated that some of the recorded temper-
atures could have been based on the reading of a high-low thermometer.
No evidence could be developed that the log was falsified.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 1l-The moist cure room temperature log for the new laboratory was falsified for September 4,1978.
Findings:
l l
Mr. Henry stated he was in the lab on this date, but took no curing room tempera;ure readings, and was later asked to initial as having i
.
taken the required readings.
No malfunction of the curing room temperature control was alleged.
'
UST personnel stated that curing room temperature readings at this
time had been taken from a high-low thermometer, because the recording thermometer was not in service.
,
a
,
The lab records indicated Mr. Her.ry had been in the lab, at least briefly, on September 4, 1978.
The original temperature log was not
,
available.
It was reportedly recopied due to water damage and wear.
(See Exhibit VI).
The log does contain a temperature reading for
l September 4, 1978 ascribed to Mr. Henry. This was the only temperature
,
reading in the entire log ascribed to him.
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-, - -.. - -. -
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The inarvidual who recopied the log was interviewed by Rlll personnel, and stated his belief that portions of the log had been falsified by the UST site project manager. The site project manager denied falsify-ing any log information but stated that some temperature entries could have been estimated. He indicated that this could be done by noting the high and low readings from the high-1cw thermometer, and using this for entry in the log (actual temperature being estimated between these
.
readings). The site project manager stated he was of the opinion that this was an acceptible practice.
No evidence could be developed to show that the record was falsified as alleged.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
, Allegation 12.
Newberg QC per onnel disregarded notification of in-process test failures by UST personnel and continued to place out-of-
'
specification concrete.
Findings:
Mr. Henry indicated th it while on a placement for the Unit 2 incore instr :centation shaf t (the " keyway"), Individual "D" allowed the centinued placement of concrete which he knew was beyond the extreme limits for slump.
Mr. Henry stated that the high slump was due to a heavy rainstorm which occurred during the placement.
Mr. Menry could not specifically identify the placement numoer, its date, or location.
S&L Specifications Y-2722 and Y-2850 provide working limits for concrete slump, as placed, at Marble Hill.
It was learned through interviews with Mr. Hanry that he defined out-of-specification conciete as concrete which exceeded the extreme limit.
The above referenced specifications require that concrete be rejected wh.ch exceeds the extreme limit for the test being conducted.
All UST in process concrete data sheets for Unit 2 reactor building placements were reviewed by RIII personnel to identify concrete which exceeded the extreme limit and was placed.
Special emphasis was placed on incore instrumentation shaft placements and others within the Uni 2 reactor building where Mr. Henry was a part of the UST crew.
It was found that the UST 'n process report for placement 2CW-348-1, on June 12, 1978, met the particulars supplied by Mr. Henry.
Site records were found that indicated rainfall occurred on this date.
Review of th? in process UST dat, for placement 2CW-348-1 indicated
,
that 9 cubic yards of concrete with a 7" slump (exceeding the extreme
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limit) had been placed. Conversely, the batch plant delivery tickets indicated that this particular truckload of concrete was rejected and used as lean concrete backfill.
The responsibility for the rejection of out-of-extreme concrete is that of the N-MH QC inspector.
Notation of any rejection would therefore be made on the delivery ticket and it is considered the accurate record.
In addition, Individual "D" was interviewed by RIII personnel. He stated that he did not recall any incident in which he intentionally placed concrete which exceeded the extreme rejection limit.
No evidence could be developed to support the allegation.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 13-Newberg QC personnel switched the order of concrete trucks during tightened sampling to circumvent specification requirements.
Fi n dir. gs :
S&L Specification, Y-2850, Section 411.8A.g, requires that when the result of an in process test (slump, temperature, or air centent) is beycnd allowable limits, but not beyond extreme limits, ti2htened sampling is instituted. Tightened sampling requires that concrete samples be taken from the next available concrete truck. This may continue until five consecutive loads outside the allowable limits have been tested; at which time concrete placement is discontinued until corrections are made.
If two consecutive samples are tested within the allowable limits, normal sampling is resumed.
Interviews with UST personnel indicated that several testing personnel believed that N-MH QC and production personnel would remove trucks of questionable acceptability from the line, substitute trucks not batched in sequence which they knew to contain concrete of acceptable quality, and then subsequently dump the trucks which were originally removed. This in effect avoids the requirement to discontinue concrete placement and allows concrete outside the allowable limits to be placed.
This practice, as alleged, would not violate the specification require-ments as written, but would be contrary to quality and is not the intent of the specification (Reference IE Report No. 50-546/79-09).
Neither Mr. Henry nor other individuals interviewed could provide specifics which would substantiate the a' legation in safety-related areas.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 14: UST personnel were advised to look for a truck contain-ing concrete of acceptable quality during in process testing.
Findings:
During the June 17, 1980 interview with NRC representatives, thc.
Henry clarified the actual meaning of his original allegation. He former supervisor had instructed that if, during routine stated that a scheduled sampling, he encountered a concrete sample which exceeded f
the specified extreme property limits, he should not cast the scheduled compressive strength cylinders for that test.
He was further instructed that this was to be done only if the scheduled record tests for temperature, slump, air content, and cylinders could still be taken within the specified frequency. He was not instructed to sample only concrete of acceptable quality, nor was he instructed to disregard the specification requirements for concrete which exceeded the extreme property limits and was inadvertantly placed.
As a result of the interview, it was concluded that Mr. Henry misinter-peted his supervisor's instructions and did not fully understand the Marble Hill system to assure concrete product control. The supervisors instructions, as related by Mr. Henry, d'i not violate specification requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 15:
Concrete was placed in the rain.
Relating to this allegation, Mr. Henry expressed his belief that the in-process tests he performed on samples of fresh concrete were not
" representative" of the concrete being placed during inclement weather.
He stated that this was based on the fact that his testing was performed in a.
area shelteret from rain and the concrete from which his sample was procurred was exposed to rain during conveyance.
(It is believed that this allegation is related to Allegation No. 12).
Mr. Henry could provide no placement number, or general time f rame to identify the alleged concrete placement made during inclement weather.
He specifically recalled only that the placement was made with the use of belt conveyors.
Findings:
Placing of concrete with belt converyors during rain is not unaccept-able providing adequate weather protection is available at the place-
ment area and the belt conveyor system is not of sufficient length to-23-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ - _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _. _. - _ _ - _ __
_,
expose the concrete so as to cause significant changes in its properities.
ACI 304 (Title 72-33) states that, "there is rarely a need to enclose or protect the concrete on portable conveyors or on other types of conveyors up to 200 to 300 ft long. The concrete is conveyed at high speed and is exposed to ambient conditions for only a short time."
The inspector could identifiy no instance in which conveyors.over 200 feet were used to place concrete at Marble Hill, nor could he identify any instance in which climatic conditions were so severe as to cause significant changes in the concrete's properties during conveyance.
Based on these facts, Mr. Henry's concern of testing unrepresentative in process concrete samples could not be substantiated.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 16:
Concrete in a fuel handling building slab placement had unacceptably high temperatures when placed.
Findings:
Placement FHS-401-1 and 2, on May 19, 1978, was identified by the inves-tigative team to be the placement referred to by Mr. Henry.
A review of in-process concrete test reports for the placement showed that two additional cylinders were cast in five instances where PSI persennel incorrectly believed that concrete temperatures had exceeded the extreme values for concrete temperature, as placed. The casting of additional cylinders for concrete which exceeds extreme rejection limits and is inadvertantly placed, is as required by S&L Specification Y-2850, Section 411.8A.g.
All reported concrete temperatures were reviewed and found to be within the limits specified in S&L Specifica-tion Y-2722, Table 4-1-4.
No items of nonccmpliance were identified.
Allegation 17: k'orkers used discarded in process concrete samples for patchine areas of co-crete imperfection.
Findings:
RIII personnel reviewed all documentation for Unit 2 reactor building placements. This review disclosed that the in process test report for placement 2CS-353-1, July 25, 1978, contained a note describing the referenced incident.
This was confirmed as the note Mr. Henry referred to in his statement to KRC representatives on June 17, 1980.
The noce stated "on July 15, 1978, at 2CS-353-1 concrete obtained
.
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________________
_
._l
from discarded test samples, up to two hours old, and soil were introduced into the Unit 2 containment area".
Discussion with Individual
"E" indicated that he had been present and recalled the incident.
He was unable during a field trip, to identify the area in which the incident took place. He stated that two laborers, each carrying an 11 quart bucket, had collected portions of discarded concrete samples. When confronted, the laborers stated that batch plant production tad been discontinued and the concrete was necessary in bring the slab to proper grade.
He further stated that some soil may have been mixed with the concrete which was gathered-by the laborers, as a result of a concrete truck running over the discarded sample.
Individual "E" also indicated that the laborers took the freshest concrete of the discarded samples (also with the least soil contamin-ation).
The last concrete truck for the placement was one of those sampled for in process testing.
This quantity of concrete allegedly used to bring the slab to' grade, would have no adverse effect on the serviceability or load carrying capability of the slab.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation IS: Methods used to place concrete caused segregation.
Findings:
Mr.' Henry was not able to specify his concern in this area or describe
where improper concrete placement or consolidation had occurred.
The UST laboratory at Marble Hill functions only as a service organi-
,
zation.
In this role, they are contracted to provide a civil material i
inspection and testing service. The placement and consolidation of I
concrete are not the responsibility of the UST technicians at Marble l
Hill.
Mr. Henry's personnel certification records revealed that he
!
was neither trained nor qualified to inspect the placement and consolid-ation of concrete.
,
The specific allegations were not received by the NRC until after the
halt of safety-related construction.
Therefore, the investigative team was not above to witness present concrete placement techniques.
This will be observed when safety-related construction is resumed.
l IE Report No. 50-546/79-09 identified improper vibration techniques as
'
they relate to concrete placement.
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- _____
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 19:
Foreign matter entered some concrete. pours during placement.
Findings;
" Foreign matter" was defined by Mr. Henry on June 17, 1980, as being pieces of soil and hardened concrete. None of the site documentation reviewed during the investigation reflected either of these alleged conditions.
!
Discussion with UST personnel indicated that there had been rare occasions when clay was picked up by the front end loader when charging the aggregate bins. They stated that the batch plant was promptly advised when this occurred, and the loader operator was cautioned to avoid aggregate at the bottommost levels of the storage piles.
Mr.
Henry stated during the June 17, 1980 interview that the occurrence of soil contamination was relatively infrequent and that his major concern was relative to hardened concrete pieces.
Inspection of the batch plant aggregate storage bins on several occasions by RIII per-sonnel during concrete production did not identify any unacceptable practices. The alleged occurrence of soil contamination could not be substantiated.
UST personnel also indicated that hardened concrete, from either the central mixer or truck mixer blades, had been observed.
Mr. Henry stated on June 17, 1980 that, "They (production personnel) would stop the belts as they (hardened concrete pieces) would plug up the holes and cause the concrete to spill off the sides of the belt and fall on people below."
The presence of small pieces of hardened concrete of the type from mixer blades, is only concern from a production rate standpoint because of delays due to
- nveying equipment Palfunctions.
Hardened concrete pieces such as those mentioned do not affect the capability to produce a quality concrete product. To minimize the occurrence of this problem, UST does condact routine scheduled inspections of the central mixer and truck mixers to assure their cleanliness.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 20:
A UST technician never returned the concrete and fly ash logs to the lab manager after removing them from the site.
Some logged information was falsified.
Findings:
From discussions with PSI and UST personnel, an anonymous note concern-
ing the cement and fly ash logs was sent to PSI during November, 1978.
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___________A
_
This note.could not be located.
Mr. Henry indicated to RIII personnel that he had been a party to the note.
In response to the note, PSI personnel reviewed both logs to verify their completeness. Surveillance Report No. 644, dated November 20, 1978, indicates that it was-identified that some sampling frequencies for cement and fly ash had been missed.
UST Internal Corrective Action
' Request (ICAR) No. 1036-25 was initiated to assure proper identifica -
tion and disposition of the occurrence.
On July 25, 1979, S&L con-curred in the proposed disposition and provided engineering basis'for acceptance of the material.
UST personnel stated that the subject technician (who was terminated November 17, 1978) had taken the. cement and fly ash sample logs with him when he left the construction site, and that he surrendered them when given his last paycheck. They indicated that.a review of the logs, at the time of their return, indicated that several cement.
and fly ash samples had been missed.
Delivery tickets were then reviewed to reconstruct missing portions of the logs, and identify missed in process grab camples.
As part of this investigation, RIII personnel reviewed copies of the two logs in an attempt to verify the accuracy with which missed samples had been identified. The review indicated several missed samples for cement and fly ash that had not been identified by-ICAR No. 1036-25.
PSI then initiated a full review of the logs to verify that all material delivered had been recorded and that the specified sample frequencies had been met or identified where the frequency was deficient.
UST personnel stated that,.as CARS PC0660 and PC0661 indicate, this ftl1 review revealed that the original re-construction of the logs was in This error was indicated as being acceptance of log figures error.
predating the reconstructed portions of the logs. The review indicated a total of nine (9) missed fly ash samples, and six (6) missed cement samples.
No evidence was developed to indicate falsification of the logs.
No items of noncomp'iance were identified.
Allegation 21: A relative density soil sample was lost and improperly re-sampled.
Mr. Henry stated that Individual
"F", while performing a test to determine the relative density for No. 53 stone, found that the sample he was working with was unacceptable for test.
He stated that
,
,
Individual "F" was then instructed to obtain another sample of the-27-
.
same material.
Mr. Henry stated that he was concerned as to how the technician could obtain a representative sample of the material when he was not aware of the precise location the first sample was taken.
Findings:
When advised of the allegation,_ Individual "F" stated-that he recalled the incident to which Mr. Henry was referring.
He stated that the test being performed was a gradation test for No. 53 stone, not a relative density test as_Mr. Henry had stated.
He stated that the sample was originally taken by another technician and that:during preparation to perform the sieve analysis, it was noticed that the sample was unacceptable for testing purposes.
Individual "F" was'
'
then requested to cbtain another sample of the same material. He stated that the stockpile from which the original sample was taken had been depleted in the interim and therefore he secured a sample from another stockpile of identical material.
A review of the relative density log indicated that the No._53 stone sample in question was sample No. 21, tested on August 23, 1978.
This was verified by Individual
"F".
The fact that the resample was taken from another stockpile is of no significance. Records show that there was no substantial variation in grading for No. 53 stone and therefore the specific stockpile from which the sample was taken is immaterial.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 22:
Soil and concrete material samples sat unprotected and were contaminated.
Findings:
Mr. Henry stated that on occasion, soil samples in the old laboratory building were contaminated due to improper storage.
The frame house fc.rcerly utilized as a laboratory was inspected by RIII personnel. No. testing has apparently been done in this structure since approximately August, 1478. Nothing unusual was noted.
NFC inspections during February 15-17, 1978, May 10-12, 1978, and June 20-22, 1978, did not indicate problems with sample retention or testing in the old UST lab building.
Mr. Henry's sper2fic concerns apceared to be predicated on second-hand infor...t:on gathered by him from other technicians.
Mr. Henry referred *n inese sessions as a " venting of frustrations". Discussions
with lab personnel and with former UST employees during this investi-gation indicated that sample contamination was not a problem at the old or r.aw lab f acilities.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
A_llegation 23:
Pour notifications contained inadequate information to establish in process acceptance criteria. An example of this was the Aycock unloading facility placement.
Findings:
Under site procedures in effect in 1978, pour notifications were made via a Scheduled Concrete Placement Noti fi cat ion. This document would contain the location, estimated amount of concrete, concrete mix number, the date, and estimated time of placement. Many UST personnel interviewed expressed the opinion that communication between UST and N-MH personnel, concerning placement notification was not adequate at all times.
PS1 Project Quality Assurance Manual (PQAM) 1036, Revision 1, Page 1.1, Paragraph 1.1 states that:
" United States Testing is contracted to provide civil material inspection and testing service. The results of inspection and tests are submitted to those who are responsible for accepting or rejecting the materials inspected or test."
N-MH QC inspectors retain the responsibility and authority for the acceptance or rejection of materials which have been inspected or tested by UST.
This acceptance / rejection authority applies only to construction which is nuclear safety-related. The Aycock unloading facility is not safety-related.
A review of the UST compressive strength test reports for the Aycock placements showed that they were incorrectly designated by UST as safety-related.
On June 17, 1980, Mr. Henry expressed an additional concern to the RIII investigative team.
It specifically dealt with the alleged failure of N-HH and PSI to supply QC inspectors for concrete placements on which Mr. Henry was working. The instance to which he referred was at a Aycock unloading facility concrete placement.
Because the Aycock unloading facility is not nuclear safety-related, there is no requirement for either N-tm or PSI QC inspectors to be present during concrete placement.
Inspections for areas which are not safety-related are conducted by the site engineering group.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 24: Honeycombed surfaces on the fuel handling building slab were cosered to hide them from inspectors.
Mr. Henry stated that these concrete imperfections were identified, tagged, temporarily backfilled against, then untevered and repaired.
- Findings:
N-MH QC personnel stated that they did recall one area on the southwest corner of the fuel handling slab where concrete imperfections had
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been identified and documented on N-MN NCR's.
It was indicated that before the areas were repaired, temporary backfill was'placed over
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them to facilitate the flow of construction traffic.
N-MH'QC personnel confirmed, that at a later date, the temporary backfill was removed and the imperfections _ properly repaired.
No items of noncompliance.were identified.
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Allegation 25:
Concrete cylinders were improperly stored after.
casting, causing unparallel ends and therefore unacceptable compressive strength test results.
Findings:
ASTM C39, Standard Test Method for Compressive Strength of Cylindrical Concrete Specimens, requires that, "neither end of compressive. test (
specimens when tested shall depart from perpendicularity to the axis by more than.5. The ends of compression test specimens that are not plane within 0.002 inches shall be capped."
ASTM C617, Capping Cylindrical Concrete Specimens, requires that,
" caps should be about 1/S" thick, and in no instance shall any part'
of the cap be more than 5/16" thick."
RIII personnel inspected capped and uncapped compressive strength cylinders at the UST site laboratory. Cap thicknesses for nonsafety-related cylinders were found to exceed the maximum allowable thick-ness specified in ASTM C617.
Safety-related construction was halted by PSI on August 7, 1979. Due to the delay in obtaining Mr. Henry's specific allegations, no safety-related compressive strength cylinders were available for inspection during this investigation. The last day that safety-related cylinders would have been available for inspection would have been November 6, 1979.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 26:
Reinforcing steel testing was performed improperly on a " worn" machine.
Findings:
Mr. Henry's specific concerns dealt with the spacing of the jig holes and that the mandrel used for bend tests was badly worn.
A testing error was identified by PSI concerning bend tests for
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reinforcing material during 1978. They identified that test specimens
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were too long and consequently, double bending was being induced into the steel.
This was not in accordance with ASTM A370 and led to bend test failures for reinforcing material which was of acceptable quality.
Further discussion of the occurrence can be found in IE Report No.
50-546/78-06.
The placement of the jig holes was apparently perceived by Mr. Henry as the cause of the high percentare of failing bend tests for rein-forcing material.
The actual cau: e, as discussed in the previous paragraph, was the testing of spetimens of improper length.
The mandrel Mr. Henry referred to was still in-service at the UST lab.
It was inspected by RllI personnel and found to be acceptable.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 27: No reinforcing steel ever failed a retest, thereby ir.7 ying the retests are in question.
Findings:
Discussion with PSI and UST personnel and a review of site files did not substantiate this allegation. Rill personnel reviewed files indicating failure and rejection of a number of reinforcing steel heats.
Letters transmitted f rom PSI to N-M}i indicated the heat numbers of failing heats and specified that their use be prohibited from site construction. As a sample of such letters, the following heats were rejected:
Heat Rejected by Letter Dated 2F7679 February 1, 1979 VF6686 September 27, 1976 1F1722 October 11, 1978 V2F6719 September 27, 197S V2F6682 September 19, 1978 VlF1554 September 5,1978 V2F6721 September 5, 1978 V1F1312 August 18, 1978 V2F6154 June 20, 1978 V2F6016 June 20, 1978 IF1436 August 30, '978 (rejected without retest)
Several additional heats were rejected when the supplier chose not to have them retested.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Allegation 28: UST was notified prior to NRC inspections.
Findings:
By policy, the majority of NRC construction inspections are made on an unannounced basis.
Unannounced mear.: that the inspector (s) arrive at the plant gate unannounced.
It is expected that site personnel will become aware that NRC personnel are onsite relatively shortly after their arrival at the construction site.
NRC construction inspections are generally two to four days in duration.
During any particular inspection, the inspector may inspect various areas, organized at the inspector's discretion.
As such, some site personnel could become aware of an inspector's presence onsite two or more days before he began to inspect their particular area.
Most often, an inspector's arrival time would not be predictable, as it is affected by the type of inspection, the items to be inspected during the inspection, and the particular inspector's organization of his inspection time.
Some inspections of critical construction points are announced, and coordinatcJ with licensee personnel well in advance.
Inspections of certain concrete placements, vessel lifts, and preoperational testing, are typical examples of announced inspections.
In such cases, an NEC inspector is expected well in advance.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegatico 29:
" Improper" equipment (slump cones), being used in the field, were thrown away during an NRC inspection.
Findings:
A review of the UST equipment logs indicated that UST had utilized a total of 13 slump cones at the Marble Hill site since the start of construction. The majority of this equipment is still in service.
Slump cones No. 234 and No. 251 were both noted as being taken out-of-service on September 7, 1978.
This date coincides with an NRC inspection, documented in IE Report No. 50-546/78-06. This Rlll inspection was conducted on September 6-7 and 19-21, 1978.
The UST calibration log indicated both slump cones were taken out-of-service on September 7, 1978, due to damage.
No evidence was developed to indicate that anything was improper concerning the above actions.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 30: The concrete compression testing machine utilized in the old laboratory was hand-operated.
Findings:
Site documents indicate that the concrete compression testing machine
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used in the old laboratory facility was a Forney Model FT400R.
Records indicated 0.st it was initially calibrated on September 19, 1977, and war taken out-of-service on September 6, 1978.
Safety-related 90-J_
design age compressive strength cylinders were first tested on approximately May 19, 1978.
ASTM C39 states that, "The testing machine may be any type of sufficient capacity, and shall be capable of applying the rate of loading prescribed in 4.2 (20-50 psi /sec.).
It must be power operated and must apply this load continuously rather than intermittently, and without shock" Discussion with past and present UST technicians indicated that the Forney F1400R compression machine had mechanical problems and cequired hand pumping some of the time.
From statements received, 91-day specimens, with their higher compressive strengths, were those most often requiring hand pumping. Hand pumping provides an intermittent loading rate.
Interviews further indic ated that the loading rate, due to hand-pumping, would probably oe somewhat variable from technician to technician. All those interviewed stated they felt that hand pumping produced a slower loading rate than power operated loading.
Discussion with UST and PSI personnel indicated that surveillances had been performed by PSI personnel to insure that the 20-50 psi loading rate specified by ASTM C39 was being met.
No records specifically referencing surveillance of loading rate could be located, although surveillances of concrete testing in the old lab were documented.
This failure to assure that activities affecting quality are accomp-lished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings is considered an item of noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V as described in Appendix A of the report transmittal letter.
No response to this item is required since actions have been initiated to correct the matter and to prevent recurrence.
(546/80-04-03; 547/80-04-03).
Compressive strength is one of many product control tests which are performed to establish the acceptability of the finished concrete
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product. The application of intermittent loading within the specified-33-
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rate of 20-50 psi /see produces lower (more conservative) compressive strength test results than if an identical specimen were tested by application of a continuous power operated load at the same 20-50 psi /sec loading rate.
Allegation 31: No aggregate correction factor was utilized by UST when performing the test for air content of fresh concrete.
Findings:
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This allegation was reviewed in detail by the U. S. Army Engineer Vaterways Experiment Station on July 25-27, 1979.
Its resolution is
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documented in IE Report No. 50-546/79-16.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegatic, 32:
Comnunications were poor, and some in process concrete tests were mis,cd as a result.
Mr. Henry was not able to provide specifics for this allegation.
Findings:
Site records indicated that nine UST ICAR*s had been initiated concern-ing missed test f requencies of various kinds.
Among these records was an ICAR fer a missed in process concrete test by Mr. Henry.
It matches the documentation he supplied to representative Deckard.
Interviews with past and present UST employees indicated that communi-cation problems were sometines experienced on large concrete pours with multiple points of concrete placement.
Missed frequency tests were described as infrequent.
In response to the August 15, 1979, NRC Order Confirming Suspension of Construction, PSI has established, as part of the Construction Verifica-tion Program, Procedure SPP-13.
SPP-13 is the procedure by which concrete material test results and inspection records / test results contained in Category I pour packages will be reviewed to verify compliance with S&L Specifications Y-2722 and Y-2350.
Sample frequencies for in process con-crete testing are a part of this program.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 33:
Aggregate storage was improper, causing segregation of coarse aggregates and moisture control difficulties for fine aggregates.
Findings:
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This allegation was reviewed in detail by the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station on July 25-27, 1979.
Its resolution is documented in IE Report No. 50-546/79-16.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 34: The concrete cylinder " break log" for UST starts at number one hundred.
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l Findings:
l RIII personnel reviewed the UST concrete compressive stren~gth log.
Early results were recorded under a system which assigned unique numbers and letters to concrete strength samples. The log then begins, on October 19, 1977 to give numbers to samples, beginning with sample 100.
Because safety-related cylinders were not tested until approximately May 19, 1978, this numbering system was in effect for some time prior to safety-related testing.
UST personnel stated that the initial system proved awkward and the numbering system was revised to start at 100 on an arbitrary basis.
No items of nonecmpliance were identified.
Allegation 35:
Cylinder capping compound mixed with bash cylinders during capping, making the compression tests unrepresentative.
Findings:
RIII personnel inspected bash cylinders (nonsafety-related) presently at the UST lab.
While the end surfaces of the cylinders were rough, they were not porous, and it was apparent that capping compound could not intrude into the cylinders.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 36: An NRC inspector took ao actica on information provided by Mr. Henry.
Mr. Henry had provided Mr. Dattilo with an affidavit concerning his contact with the inspector (See Exhibit X).
Findings:
This allegation was covered in detail during the interview with Mr.
Henry by NRC personnel, as reflected in pages 125 through 129, 152-161, 179-181, 236-241 of the sworn interview transcript (attached as Exhibit XI).
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A review cf Mr. Henry's statements does not indicate he provided significant information to the NRC inspector mentioned, or that the inspector acted improperly.
It is believed that the NRC inspection referred to is one which took place during September, 197S documented in IE Report No 50-456/78-06.
Although no improprieties were evidenced, all of the information con-cerning Mr. Henry's statements regarding contacts with NRC inspectors referred to the Executive Officer for Operations Support (NkC)
was for his review. No basis for an investigation of the inspector's conduct was found.
No items of noncompliance were identified. No improper actions on the part of NRC personnel were indicated.
Allegation 37:
PS) had been made aware of concreting problems in writing and had ignored the notification.
Findings:
On June 17, 1980, Mr. Henry made specific reference to a document entitled, Proposed Actions To Be Taken Bv PSI in Response To UST Personnel Concerns (See Exhibit XII).
The document was generated as a result of a meeting which had been arranged by the UST Site Project Manager.
It was held as a forum for the UST employees to air their problems.
PSI pers nnel indicated that the document did not represent firm commitments, only rhat they would evaluate eac-concern according to its merit and take action as appropriate, hence the word " Proposed."
RIII inspections did verify that action to evaluate each item identified had been ta':?n by PSI.
Actions were taken by PSI on those items where it was deei; appropriate.
PSI personnel indicated that weekly meetings with UST personnel were instituted following this meeting, so that potential problems could be identified before they became major items of concern.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Special Notation: During the investigation of allegations provided by Mr. Henry, two allegations were developed from interviews with past and present UST personnel.
These allegations are as follows:
Allegation 38:
A UST technician was told to decrease an abnormall:,
high grout cube compressive strength test result.
Findings:
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It was alleged during the interview with Individual "G",
that the two 91-day compressive strength test results for a grout specimen were
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widely disparate. Consequently, he was allegedly instructed to reduce the highest test result to within 10% of the companion cube.
He indicated that he had done this as requested.
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"G" stated that Mr. Henry was present when he was told to reduce the compressive strength result. This allegation. appears to be related to Allegation 4, although the circumstances are' reversed.
Individual
"G" stated that he had never been asked t-increase a com-pressive strength result. He stated further, that this was the only test result he had ever altered.
Rill personnel reviewed grout cube compressive strength tests for placements made durins April-May, 1978 with the individual.
Individual
"G", could not ident2fy the report in question.
In-office revies of grout compressive strength tests by Indiv2 dual "C" for placements during April-May, 1978 was performed, and strength dif-ferences of 91-day compa. tan cubes were analyzed.
Five reports of the tot 31 of 15 tests reports indicated differences within 10%. One report showed a difference of exactly 10%.
No evidence was developed to show that these results were incorrect.
Lowering a compressive strength result is conservative in nature and therefore this act would not be considered adverse tc quality.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Allegation 39: The test report for tests to determine optimum rheostat setting on the relative density vibratory table was altered, and the techr.iciar.'s signature falsified.
Findings:
Site records indicate that an audit of UST by PSI in May 1975, indicated that the relative density vibratory table was not calibrated.
PSI Field Nonconformance Report (FNR) 045, dated May 3, 1978, documented the results of this audit and the need for corrective action.
On July 18, 1978, UST responded to the FNR, by preparing six ident'.;al samples of No. 53 stone and running them through the relative densst.,
process at various rheostat control settings. The results of these tests indicated that the most compactive effort was achieved with a l
rheostat setting of 85.
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In a subsequent request for more information, PSI asked that a second sample of a different material be run through the same testing process.
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No other material was available and the tests were run on No. 53
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stone again to provide additional data. The test deta reported again indicated that the rheostat setting of 85 was correct for No.
53 stone. This data was provided to S&L as.part of the total evaluation to determine the proper rheostat setting.
The testing technician who performed the tests for the second sample was interviewed by Rll! personnel. He provided a sworn statement to the effect that the figures recorded on the second test form were not those he had obtained, and the signature on the form was not his own.
A transcript of this sworn statement is attached as Exhibit XIII. The technician also stated his belief that test results which he originally reported, indicated that the most compactive effort was achieved at a rheostat setting of approximately 77.
RIII personnel then interviewed the UST Site Project Manager.
He indicated during his review of the test results for the second sample, several mathematical errors were identified. He further stated that he had adjusted the Maximum Relative Density vs Rheostat Setting curve which was obtained from the second sample.
He stated this was to aid in its comparison with the curve which was plotted from the-test results of the first samples.
He indicated that this' procedure had not changed the rheostat setting indicated by the graph.
He also stated that he altered the test data for the second sample, so that the calculations would correspond to the curve he had just a dj us ted. The site project manager stated the he had done this work for his own information, and that it had been transmitted to PSI as a valid test in error. No copy of the original test data could be located in the UST or lab manager's personal files. The site project manager provided a sworn statement to RIII personnel, a transcript of which is attached as Exhibit XIV.
The site project manager stated that he had signed.the test report for the technician, who was not available. The signature is in the site project manager's handwriting, and no attempt has been made to reproduce the handwriting of the testing technician.
This is a further example of noncompliance as cited previously in Allegation _1 of this report.
(546/80-04-01; 547/80-04-01) No respense i
to this item is required since the licensee initiated corrective action to assure proper disposition and to prevent recurrence.
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l Attachments:
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Exhibits I.
Listing of general allegations provided by Representative Joel
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Deckard.
II.*
Sworn statement of James E. Henry, Jr., transcript of interview.
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III. Chronology of NRC Efforts.
IV.
Compressive strength test sheet for group sample No. 521.
V.
Compressive strength test report for concrete sample No. 783, and l
related nonconformance report.
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VI.
Temperature log for new laboratory curing room (file copy).
VII.
Temperature log for old laboratory curing room (copy provided by Mr. Henry).
VIII. Terperature Icg f or old laboratory curing room (file copy).
IX.
Written statement of Mr. Arthur Sperber.
X.
Affidavit by Janes E. Henry, Jr.
XI.
Jar.cs E. Henry, Jr. interview transcript pages 125-129, 236-241, 152-161, 179-181.
XII.
List of " proposed actions to be taken in respense to UST per'sonnel cencerns".
XIII. Swern state =ent of technician.
XIV.
Swern statement of Darryl Lanhar.
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Marble Hill Allegations 1.
There may have been an irregularity in the approved water sup;1y fcr concreting.
Che:L into water supply used for concreting.
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2.
Apparently U.S. Testing used temporary facilities at some time for concrete testing. A trailer may have been used and humidity and
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temperature control may not have been properly controlled.
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3.
U.S. Testing's limit cf authority for stopping the job in the event -
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at some point and been thwarted.
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4.
The qualifications of U.S.' Testing personnel was questioned.
5.
A point was made that U.S. Testing was never made aware of where concrete cylinders had been taken from. Traceability of con: rete sarples should be checked and it should be ascertained if all samples were tested according to the proper procedures.
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6.
Reportedly PS! had been made aware of concreting problems in writin; and had ignored the notification.
7.
Appatently PSI inspectors were supposed to witness all pours com;l' tely and they have not.
e S.
PSI and/or U.S. Testing inspectors may not have been familiar with the PSI Q/A manual.
9.
Apparently 355 cu yards of concrete were improperly tested; i.e.,
an insufficient number of test cylinders were taken. This may be the subject of a Deviation Report.
1C. Apparer.tly there is some irregularity with the Fly Ash Log.
11. Apparently aggregate has been improperly stored; sand was not kept dam; :o d shape of aggregate piles indichted segregation of aggregate.
12. The- : may have been a oroblem with the correction factor for aggregate size in arriving at tr_ proper air entrainment value.
13. There may have been a problem with rebar tensile strength.
14. Apparentiy there have been a large number of nonconformances reported in connection with Category 1 columns.
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15. Apparently there has been some problem with rement/ water ratio in Class I concrete.
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Exhibit I Page 1 of 1
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