IR 05000528/1984033
| ML17298B512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1984 |
| From: | Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Kirsch D, Kirsch D, Miller L, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298B510 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-84-33, 50-529-84-26, NUDOCS 8411160415 | |
| Download: ML17298B512 (16) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-528/84-33, 50-529/84-26 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529 License No. CPPR-141, 142 and 143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Com an P. 0. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85836 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Units 1 and
Inspected at:
Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersbur
, Arizona Inspectors:
, L. Miller, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
Date Signed R.
immerman enior Resident Inspector
/o-4-Date Signed G. Fi relli, Resident Inspector C.
osted, esident Inspector
/0-Zo -g Date Signe lo-zs Date Signed Approved by:
D. K. Kir
, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects D te igned
~Summar:
2ns eot1on on Au ust 13 Se tembet 8, 1984 (Re ott No. 50-528/
84-33 and 50-529/84-26)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine resident inspection by resident inspectors at preoperational test activities, reviewed preoperational test results, reactor vessel overfill event, system acceptances, and follow-up of previously identified items.
The inspection involved 215 hours0.00249 days <br />0.0597 hours <br />3.554894e-4 weeks <br />8.18075e-5 months <br /> onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
One violation was identified (activity not in accordance with applicable instructions).
8421180428 S42028 PDR ADOCK 05000528
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
a
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Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
J. Allen, Operations Manager J.
Basak, Integrated Safeguards Test Director R. Beecken, Startup Test Group Supervisor J.
R.
Bynum, Director Nuclear Operations C. Churchman, Startup Test Group Supervisor W. Fernow, Plant Services Manager R.
Gouge, Unit 1 Operations Supervisor J. Houchen, Transition Manager W. Ide, Corporate QA Manager J. Kirby, Unit 1 Startup Manager D. Karner, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production R. Nelson, Maintenance Manager C. Russo, (}uality Audits Manager D. Sanchez, Electrical Test Group Supervisor E. E. Van Brunt Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Production R. Younger, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Follow-u of Previousl Identified Items a
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(Closed) 528/84-28-02 (Unresolved Item):
Incorrect equipment lineups and statusing prior to component operation.
The inspector reviewed the operations experience report associated with the boric acid makeup pump misalignment.
Although the report was detailed, it lacked clarity in several areas.
Discussion with the Operations Superintendent was necessary to fully understand the sequence of events.
The licensee's review of the event was considered adequate and corrective action implemented was appropriate to the circumstance.
A review of the operations experience report regarding the failure to follow procedures involving the inadvertent transfer of reactor coolant to the Refueling Water Tank was also performed.
The report documented the contributing factors associated with the misalignment and included the proposed corrective actions which were also appropriate for this specific even Shortly after the above equipment lineup problems a similar failure to establish a proper lineup resulted in overfilling the Reactor Vessel.
The details associated with this latest event are documented in paragraph 5.
This unresolved item is considered administratively closed, with inspector review of the licensee's boarder corrective actions to preclude further incorrect equipment lineup and statusing errors to be tracked under item 528/84-33-01.
b.
(Closed) 528/83-38-01 (Inspection Follow-up Item):
One set of containment water level monitor sensors and transmitters may not have been environmentally qualified.
The inspector discussed the environmental qualification of containment sump level instrumentation with APS engineering staff members and reviewed environmental testing documentation.
The inspector confirmed that testing of the containment sump level sensors and transmitters included Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) temperature, pressure and humidity parameters as well as seismic and radiation effects on the sensor and transmitter operability.
The licensee has determined the test results to be acceptable.
3.
Review of Prep erational Test, Activities a
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The major peroperational test activities in progress in Unit 1 during the reporting period were the integrated testing of the emergency safeguards system (IST) and the post hot pump test inspection of the NSSS components which had failed during the initial hot functional test.
The IST was being conducted in two phases.
The first phase involved the restoration of circuits and equipment following the hot pump test so as to align the systems in a configuration that would allow testing in accordance with procedure 93SU-1SAOl "Preparation for Integrated Test of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)".
This procedure identified the preliminary checkouts of equipment and systems to be formally tested in 93PE-1SOl "Integrated Test of Engineered Safety Features".
The first phase testing identified several problems which required correction'.
Some of the more significant test exceptions included:
1.
Failure of essential chillers to restart following ESF actuation.
2.
Failure of various valves to indicate proper position following ESF actuation.
3.
Failure of several air handling unit dampers to operate on ESF actuations.
4.
Emergency power shed/sequence signal overlap causing safeguards equipment loads to shed but not reloa kl kk
, 3'
iR 5.
Trip of the A Diesel Generator on'overspeed due to a bent governor linkage.
These problems have been corrected and the appropriate retesting completed satisfactorily.
Phase two involves the formal integrated testing of the Engineered Safety Features.
This test which is still ongoing involves the testing for independence of electrical power systems, response of load centers to ESF actuations, proper load shedding and sequencing on loss of power, proper system operation with combinations of ESF actuations and loss of power, and proper operation of the 125 DC volt battery systems.
The inspector observed that the testing was being done in accordance with test conduct procedures.
Personnel were qualified and testing coordination and communications were effective in carrying out planned test activities.
b.
Following the hot pump test, the reactor coolant pump, upper guide structure, hot leg and cold leg thermowells were inspected for confirmation that the corrective actions to repair previous problems with these components had been adequate.
'1.
Reactor Coolant Pum s
An inspection of the 2B Reactor Coolant Pump by APS and its contractors was conducted following an extended pump run of greater than 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> at various operating temperature and pressure conditions.
Based on detailed visual inspection and penetrant testing, as well as review of data obtained from numerous instrumented locations to detect abnormal motion, the bolting, cavitation and impeller problems encountered during initial test are considered by APS to be resolved.
Additionally on August ll, following completion of the demonstration test, the inspector visually examined the disassembled 28 Reactor Coolant Pump impeller and diffuser.
No component structural problems were observed.
2.
Thermowells During the drain down of the primary coolant system following the hot pump demonstration test, visual inspection of the modified thermowells in the hot and cold legs was conducted by APS and its contractors.
APS has concluded that based on no damage or wear being observed during the visual inspection and review of data from various thermowells which were equipped with accelerometers, the redesigned thermowells are structurally adequat V
3.
U er Guide Structure (UGS)
Following completion of the hot pump demonstration test the upper guide structure was removed from the vessel and a
detailed visual inspection performed.
Based on no damage or wear being observed during the visual inspection and review of data from strain gages attached to the UGS, APS has concluded that the potential for cracking has been eliminated as a result of the modifications made to the UGS.
4.
Thermal Sleeves Based on an engineering analysis, the four cold leg injection thermal sleeves and the pressurizer surge thermal sleeves were removed from the primary coolant system.
The remaining thermal sleeve on the charging system injection point into the primary coolant system was left intact.
A visual inspection of the thermal sleeve following the hot pump demonstration test did not disclose a problem.
APS considers the matter to be resolved.
c.
During the course of the inspection, tours of the following plant areas were conducted:
-Control Room, Units 1 and
-Auxiliary Building, Units 1 and
-Turbine Building, Units 1 and
-Main Steam Support Structure, Units 1 and
-Containment, Units 1 and
d.
The following areas were observed during the tours:
1.
Control Room lo s and records.
Records were reviewed for completeness and accuracy to verify conformance with administrative procedure requirements.
2.
E ui ment ta in
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Several equipment tags were confirmed to have been processed in accordance with procedures.
3.
Plant Housekee in
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Plant conditions were observed for conformance with administrative procedures.
No violations were identified.
4.
Prep erational Test Results Evaluation The results of seventeen properational tests were reviewed and evaluated to assure the following:
b.
An adequate evaluation was performed
'on the test results.
All test data was within established acceptance criteria or properly dispostione ),
c.
The method of correcting deficiencies and retesting was adequate.
d.
The administrative controls governing test conduct were adequate.
e.
The tests were reviewed, evaluated, and accepted in accordance with established procedures.
The test results reviewed were:
91CM-1SG04 91HF-1CHOl 91PE-1EMOl 91PE-1FH07 91PE-1AF01 91PE-1CH01 91PE-1CH02 91PE"1CH04 91PE-1CG01 91PE-1SI04 91PE-1SI05 91PE-1SI06 92PE-1SI08 92PE-1SB10 92PE-1SB11 92PE-1SB12 92PE-1SB13 Steam Generator Met I,ayup Pump Integrated Precore Chemical and Volume Control System Essential Cooling Mater System 150/15 Ton Cask Handling Crane Auxiliary Feedwater System Chemical Volume and Control Purification Subsystem Test Refueling Mater System Chemical Volume and Control Charging System Diesel Generator System Iow Pressure Safety Injection System High Pressure Safety Injection System Containment Spray System Full Flow Test Safety Injection Plant Protective System Channel A
Plant Protective System Channel B
Plant Protective System Channel C
Plant Protective System Channel D
All test results had been reviewed by the Test Morking Group (TWG) in accordance with procedure 70AC-OZZ17 "Test Results Review Group".
The test results had either been accepted or were in the process of being accepted.
The comments of the reviewers were also reviewed by the inspector.
The TMG met all requirements for the review of the test results.
All data reviewed met the established criteria or was dispostioned in accordance with procedures.
The test exceptions, test change notices and procedure changes were in accordance with the procedures in effect at the time.
The test results indicated that the systems performed in the manner that they were designed.
No violations were identified.
Reactor Vessel Overfill Event - Unit 1 On August 27, 1984 after having filled the Reactor Vessel to approximately two feet above the hot legs, the shutdown cooling system was being placed in service to mix and circulate hydrazine which had been added to the Primary Coolant System. 'he valve alignment needed to accomplish this task was provided to the Assistant Shift Supervisor by the Startup Engineer as an informally written note.
Coolant circulation was to be accomplished with the "B" Containment Spray Pump in the shutdown cooling mod )I
'After the lineup was completed, the Control Room received a report that water was overflowing the Reactor Vessel.
Upon checking the control board, control room operators realized that valve CH-HV-530, the Refueling Mater Tank (RWT) discharge valve, was open.
HV-530 had not been included on the lineup, and when the Containment Spray Pump Suction Valve was opened, a path from the RWT to the reactor coolant system was created causing the RWT to gravity feed into, and overfill, the reactor vessel.
No equipment damage or personnel injuries occurred.
In reviewing the event, the operating staff realized that in its review prior to initiating the valve lineup, the omission of HV-530 was not discovered.
Prior to executing the lineup, actions had been taken by the Shift Supervisor ab'ove those requested by the Startup Engineer.
The Shift Supervisor directed that the Pool Seal be inflated and verification be performed that the transfer tube flange was in place, in the event that an overfill condition were to occur.
The lack of an approved procedure to control the valve alignment portion of this activity resulted in an improper valve alignment and the unplanned overfilling of the Reactor Vessel.
This was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and APS Operations Quality Assurance Criteria Manual, Criterion 5 and is considered a Severity Level IV violation.
(84-33-01)
This event represents another instance where controls were inadequate to execute prior valve lineups.
Equipment lineup problems were also discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-528/84-28.
Following the review of the event by the licensee, the inspector determined that the following significant corrective actions had been taken:
a.
A review of operating problems was conducted by APS Operations.
This review led to the development of an instruction which governs the request, review and approval of equipment lineups not covered by existing test or oper'ating procedures that are request by Startup.
Highlighted PAID's will also be required except for very simple changes.
b.
C.
Use of the recently developed instruction will be factored into the training programs of operators and startup,.test personnel.
I J
A Transition Department representative having interface responsibility with Operations will review the control room log each morning and will interface with the operations manager, to identify and conduct formal reviews of problems reported in the log.
6.
S stem Acce tance b
0 erations To date 277 subsystems out of a total of 562 have been accepted by Operations.
Essentially all of the accepted subsystems are nonsafety related.
The inspector determined that the acceptance of the subsystems was conducted in accordance with established procedures.
Procedural content was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-528/84-1 II l lI I
'The following subsystem packages accepted by Operations were reviewed by the inspector:
QF-70 - In Plant Communication XA-01 - Service Air DG-70 - Technical Support Center Diesel Generator NN-01 - Sonclass Instrument AC Power The packages were noted to contain the information required.
Formal acceptance sign-off by Operations was confirmed.
Outstanding items were identified, prioritized and required closeout actions identified.
Following acceptance by Operations, the responsibility for each subsystem is assigned to a responsible operations engineer.
This responsibility includes the follow-up of closeout action and the incorporation of any follow-up testing items into subsequent pre/post core testing, as appropriate.
The inspector noted that temporary modifications associated with the acceptance of a subsystem would require safety evaluations by Operations if the temporary modifications were not closed prior to receipt of the license.
The matter was brought to the attention of the licensee so that effective communication and coordination of temporary modification status could be implemented among Startup, Operations Engineering and Operations.
With exception of minor documentation oversights the program appeared to be well executed.
No violations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection, scope and finding l
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